Vincent Manzo
Research Scientist


Vincent Manzo is an expert in nuclear weapons policy. His research portfolio includes deterrence, extended deterrence, escalation management, strategic stability, and arms control.

Prior to joining CNA, Manzo worked in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy from October 2013 to May 2017. Manzo received the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service for his work on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy and planning. Manzo also previously held research positions at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

Manzo's articles have been published in Joint Forces Quarterly, Arms Control Today, The National Interest, and Defense One. He has delivered presentations at the University of Virginia, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the James Timbie Forum on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

Manzo holds an M.A. in international relations from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and a B.A. in political science from Kenyon College.


August 8, 2019

Vince Manzo says, "Deterrence and arms control are two tools that should work in concert with each other, they should be self-reinforcing and part of a comprehensive strategy for reducing nuclear dangers and nuclear risks."

USSTRATCOM Deterrence Symposium 2019: During the Cold War US & Russia constrained nuclear capability via arms control. Are there areas today to consider similar mutual restraint in a multi-polar world?

July 28, 2019

Vincent Manzo and Madison Estes write, "Verifiable limits on strategic nuclear forces remain valuable, but the spectrum of weapons and actors that could trigger arms competitions and nuclear conflict has expanded beyond the narrow U.S.-Russian arms control framework."

Defense One: "If New START Dies, These Questions Will Need Answers"

July 17, 2019

According to the CNA report, Nuclear Arms Control Without A Treaty: Risks and Options after New START, "Without New START's cooperative transparency practices, the US intelligence community would likely devote more resources to monitoring Russian strategic nuclear forces but have less insight and less confidence in its analytical judgements."

Breaking Defense: "U.S. Missile Warning Sats Fair Game If No New START?"

June 21, 2019

Vincent Manzo writes, "Current U.S. limited nuclear response options are consolidated on platforms that face near-term challenges from Russian defenses and whose replacements programs are set to arrive on tight timelines."

Defense One: "A Closer Look at the Arguments Against the Low-Yield SLBM"

June 20, 2019

According to the CNA report, Nuclear Arms Control without a Treaty? Risks and Options After NEW START, "The collapse of New START could, in theory, push Beijing toward strategic nuclear dialogue with the United States, especially if the alternative would be unrestrained competition with a much more powerful nuclear contender."

Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission: "A 'World-Class' Military: Assessing China's Global Military Ambitions"

April 11, 2019

Vincent Manzo says, "These treaties help reduce suspicion and fear. They help both countries [The U.S. and Russia] have confidence that they have the forces they need today and out into the future."

WNPV: "Scientist: Tumultuous Time for Arms Control"