Madison A. Estes
Associate Research Analyst


Madison A. Estes is an analyst with CNA's Strategy and Policy Analysis program. Her expertise is in nuclear weapons policy and arms control. Her research portfolio includes deterrence, extended deterrence, escalation, strategic stability, ballistic missile defense, and arms control.

Prior to joining CNA, Estes interned with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, where she worked on the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) with the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. She also interned with the U.S. Embassy in London in the Office of Network Engagement and with the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), where she was a contributing author to their quarterly publication, Trust & Verify.

Estes holds a master's degree in non-proliferation and international security from King's College London, where she completed her dissertation on the contribution of the New START Treaty to U.S.-Russia strategic stability. She received her bachelor's degree in international relations and global studies with a concentration in international security from the University of Texas at Austin. She is a member of the 2019 CSIS Project On Nuclear Issues Nuclear Scholar's Initiative.


August 30, 2019

Madison Estes says, "If U.S. allies, particularly within NATO that have really large anti-nuclear domestic constituencies, perceive that the United States is mismanaging this relationship with Russia and not really putting forward a serious nuclear risk-reduction strategy, it might become more difficult to really unite NATO allies around a common security strategy."

CIMSEC: "Forum for Authors and Readers" [1:35:25]

July 28, 2019

Vincent Manzo and Madison Estes write, "Verifiable limits on strategic nuclear forces remain valuable, but the spectrum of weapons and actors that could trigger arms competitions and nuclear conflict has expanded beyond the narrow U.S.-Russian arms control framework."

Defense One: "If New START Dies, These Questions Will Need Answers"

July 17, 2019

According to the CNA report, Nuclear Arms Control Without A Treaty: Risks and Options after New START, "Without New START's cooperative transparency practices, the US intelligence community would likely devote more resources to monitoring Russian strategic nuclear forces but have less insight and less confidence in its analytical judgements."

Breaking Defense: "U.S. Missile Warning Sats Fair Game If No New START?"