In The News

Michael Kofman says that the rest [of the mobilized troops] have probably been used to fill out under-strength battalions and build a reserve to rotate front-line units out of Ukraine.

Michael Kofman says, "Over the past year, Russian forces in Ukraine leveraged their advantage in artillery to make up for a lack of manpower. But they were expending more than half a million shells per month."

Michael Kofman says, "Neither of these armies look today the way they did at the beginning of the war. Both have taken heavy losses. Both have lost a lot of their best people and best equipment."

Dmitry Gorenburg says, "The Russian navy has been left to, basically, just firing occasional precision guided missiles at energy infrastructure and that sort of thing in Ukraine."

Cornell Overfield says, “I would be surprised if Russia had not explored the re-base loophole, and that they didn’t use it/floated it unsuccessfully speaks volumes to me.”

Samuel Bendett says, “Prior to February 2022, Russian military academia was full of logical, interesting, and relevant analysis on the evolution of AI across the world’s military forces. Yet, there is a huge gap between what they say about AI and the war they have ended up fighting.”

Michael Kofman says, " The Russian military is still far too weak. It has restored a lot of the manpower deficit they had and replenished the military in terms of the losses they suffered, in terms of personnel, but the quality of the force is very low.”

Michael Kofman says, "A change in leadership will not necessarily lead Moscow to end the war."

Jeffrey Edmonds says, "I don't know that it means Russia is going to suddenly run off and start producing a tremendous number of ICBMs."

Michael Kofman says, "The field of Russian military studies had almost died or was on life support, so I found myself in many respects trying to ... work to help revive the field."

Michael Kofman says, "I think we were never seriously asked how the war could look if the U.S. truly backed Ukraine."

Samuel Bendett says, “Of the two loitering munitions, it is the Lancet that has practically dominated Russian headlines and is discussed in large numbers as a key Russian capability — not the KYB.”

Samuel Bendett says, "As to their effectiveness, it's hard to judge that based on limited open-source evidence we get. Both sides want it and decry the lack of this technology in large numbers."

Jeffrey Edmonds says, “They can certainly shell the peninsula if they got close enough, but it would be very hard militarily to take it.”

Michael Kofman says, “The war is highly dependent on defense industrial production, and these are critical investments that the United States and ultimately Ukraine will benefit from, but the question is whether they were made too late to affect what could be decisive phases of the conflict this year.”

Michael Kofman says, “Wars typically tend to go on longer than people expect or hope, but especially interstate conflicts of this length. History tells us that wars which go on this long … are likely to become protracted, lasting several years.”

Samuel Bendett says, "This modified type of warhead can leave a lot of damage in its wake in a strike on a civilian energy installation, making repairs difficult and lengthy, thereby increasing the impact of each drone that gets through Ukrainian defenses."