In recent years, persons, vessels, and corporations based in or tied to the People's Republic of China (PRC) have reportedly engaged in illicit maritime activities around the globe. These alleged illicit activities are at odds with Beijing's official rhetoric expressing support for international maritime laws, rules, and norms. To develop a better understanding of the contradictions between Beijing's official rhetoric and the illicit international maritime activities of PRC state and nonstate actors, CNA examined 15 cases in which PRC actors were accused of carrying out illicit activities in the maritime domain between 2018 and 2021. The incidents occurred in the maritime areas surrounding Southeast Asia, the Atlantic coast of Africa, and the Pacific Island countries. Our key findings are discussed below. This document includes translated versions of our key findings in Arabic, Bahasa Indonesian, French, Khmer, Malay, and Tagalog Filipino.

This report examines the apparent gaps between the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) policy and rhetoric regarding its role in the transnational maritime environment and the illicit activities that PRC actors reportedly conduct. The illicit maritime activities allegedly carried out by PRC actors inflict economic and environmental damage on coastal nations, violate their sovereignty, and harm their citizens. These alleged illicit activities are at odds with Beijing's official rhetoric expressing support for international maritime laws, rules, and norms. To develop a better understanding of this apparent contradiction, CNA examined 15 instances in which PRC actors were accused of carrying out illicit activities between 2018 and 2021 in the maritime areas surrounding Southeast Asia, the Atlantic coast of Africa, and the Pacific Island countries. In all but one case, Beijing sought to minimize any negative impact on China's image by denying or downplaying the accusations that PRC actors had engaged in illicit behavior. This PRC strategy of denying and downplaying bad behavior is problematic and could create the appearance that, rather than acknowledging and addressing the illicit behavior of some PRC actors, Beijing is publicly subverting international laws, rules, and norms.

This document contains the original English-language version as well as Arabic, French, Bahasa Indonesian, Malay, Khmer, and Tagalog Filipino translations of CNA's case study examining reports of PRC vessels allegedly ramming fishing vessels from the Philippines, Mauritania, Vietnam, Senegal, and Brazil between 2018 and 2021.

This document contains the original English-language version as well as Arabic, French, Bahasa Indonesian, Malay, Khmer, and Tagalog Filipino translations of CNA's case study examining reports of PRC vessels allegedly shutting off or tampering with their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to obscure illicit activities in the waters of the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), Ecuador, Vanuatu, West Africa, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

This document contains the original English-language version and a Malay translation of CNA's case study examining a 2020 incident in which Malaysia's Maritime Enforcement Agency detained six PRC-flagged fishing vessels for entering and anchoring in its territorial waters without permission.

This document contains the original English-language version and a Bahasa Indonesian translation of CNA's case study examining a 2021 incident in which the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency intercepted a PRC research vessel for suspected unauthorized oceanographic research in the Sunda Strait in Indonesian waters with its AIS de-activated.

This document contains the original English-language version and a Tagalog Filipino translation of CNA's case study examining a 2021 report alleging that more than 200 PRC vessels at anchor in the Spratly Islands were dumping sewage into the water, potentially damaging marine organisms and ecosystems.

This document contains the original English-language version and a Khmer translation of CNA's case study examining a 2020 incident in which Cambodian maritime authorities arrested 36 PRC nationals and two Cambodians for illegal entry into the country aboard a Cambodian-flagged vessel named Tong Hai.

This document contains the original English-language version and a Bahasa Indonesian translation of CNA's case study examining a series of incidents since 2019 in which PRC-flagged fishing vessels reportedly exploited dozens of Indonesian crewmembers, many of whom have died from illness, beatings, unsafe working conditions, or lack of food and water.

This document contains the original English-language version and an Arabic translation of CNA's case study examining a 2020 incident in which a PRC-flagged trawler entered an area restricted to artisanal fishing where industrial trawlers are prohibited and rammed a Mauritanian fishing vessel at night, killing three of its crew.

This document contains the original English-language version and a Tagalog Filipino translation of CNA's case study examining a 2021 incident in which PRC fisherfolk illegally harvested protected giant clams in the vicinity of Philippines-administered Pag-asa Island (Thitu Island) in the Spratly Islands.

This document contains the original English-language version and a French translation of CNA's case study examining a 2021 incident in which Vanuatu Maritime Police intercepted two PRC-flagged fishing vessels for suspected IUU fishing activities within Vanuatu's territorial waters, where they did not have permission to fish.

The continuing crisis between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over Ukraine has remained the dominant topic of Russian media coverage for the fourth reporting period in a row, with at least 14 articles on the topic published in the Russian press. The articles can be grouped into three broad areas. The first highlights Western military activity in the region and assistance to Ukraine, and the extent to which these efforts are threatening to Russia; the second focuses on Western statements about how the West would respond to a Russian invasion of Ukraine; and the third addresses the Biden-Putin virtual summit and its potential implications for resolving the crisis.

This report examines the apparent gaps between the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) policy and rhetoric regarding its role in the transnational maritime environment and the illicit activities that PRC actors reportedly conduct. The illicit maritime activities allegedly carried out by PRC actors inflict economic and environmental damage on coastal nations, violate their sovereignty, and harm their citizens. These alleged illicit activities are at odds with Beijing's official rhetoric expressing support for international maritime laws, rules, and norms. To develop a better understanding of this apparent contradiction, CNA examined 15 instances in which PRC actors were accused of carrying out illicit activities between 2018 and 2021 in the maritime areas surrounding Southeast Asia, the Atlantic coast of Africa, and the Pacific Island countries. In all but one case, Beijing sought to minimize any negative impact on China's image by denying or downplaying the accusations that PRC actors had engaged in illicit behavior. This PRC strategy of denying and downplaying bad behavior is problematic and could create the appearance that, rather than acknowledging and addressing the illicit behavior of some PRC actors, Beijing is publicly subverting international laws, rules, and norms.

This report, the twenty-eighth in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

Welcome to the China AI and Autonomy Report, a biweekly newsletter published by CNA. Read in browser. In this issue, we cover the People's Republic of China's (PRC) first position paper on regulating the military application of AI. The PRC also signed on to a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) set of non-binding AI guidelines that ban social scoring and mass surveillance but the PRC is not expected to abolish its mass surveillance program as a result. AI giant SenseTime suspended its IPO after being sanctioned by the US government. More on cognitive warfare—a PLA Daily article outlines four different types of cognitive warfare. Please check out the US Army's "The Convergence" podcast, where CNA analysts Kevin Pollpeter and Amanda Kerrigan discuss intelligent warfare and People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization. The China AI and Autonomy Report will take a break for the holidays and will return in the new year. We wish everyone a healthy, safe, and happy holiday season and best wishes for 2022!

Welcome to the China AI and Autonomy Report, a biweekly newsletter published by CNA. Read in browser. We hope our US readers had a relaxing and safe Thanksgiving holiday. In this issue, we report that People's Liberation Army (PLA) researchers have coauthored a paper on defeating image classifiers. Italian authorities have accused an Italian drone manufacturer of hiding its acquisition by a PRC company. PLA media carried another article on cognitive warfare, and a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) website published an article on the need for PRC citizens to improve their "intelligent media" literacy to combat disinformation on the internet. We also include reports on Turkey replacing the PRC as a key supplier of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the PRC government fining several AI champions for anti-trust violations. Finally, despite increasing tensions between the PRC and Taiwan, associations from both sides of the strait conducted a conference on the use of UAVs in maritime rescue.

The continuing crisis between Russia and NATO over Ukraine has remained the dominant topic of Russian media coverage during the reporting period, with 17 articles on the topic published in the Russian press. The articles can be grouped into two broad areas. The first highlights Western military assistance to Ukraine and the extent to which this assistance is threatening to Russia. The second focuses on Western claims that Russia is preparing an invasion of Ukraine, with most articles suggesting that these claims are overblown.

This report, the twenty-seventh in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

This compilation of 15 case studies examines the apparent gaps between the People's Republic of China's (PRC) policy and rhetoric regarding its role in the transnational maritime environment and the illicit activities that PRC actors reportedly conduct. The illicit maritime activities allegedly carried out by PRC actors inflict economic and environmental damage on coastal nations, violate their sovereignty, and harm their citizens. These alleged illicit activities are at odds with Beijing's official rhetoric expressing support for international maritime laws, rules, and norms. To develop a better understanding of this apparent contradiction, CNA examined 15 instances in which PRC actors were accused of carrying out illicit activities between 2018 and 2021 in the maritime areas surrounding Southeast Asia, the Atlantic coast of Africa, and Pacific Island Countries. In all but one case, Beijing sought to minimize any negative impact on China's image by denying or downplaying the accusations that PRC actors had engaged in illicit behavior. This PRC strategy of denying and downplaying bad behavior is problematic and could create the appearance that, rather than acknowledging and addressing the illicit behavior of some PRC actors, Beijing is publicly subverting international rules, laws, and norms.

In recent years, persons, vessels, and corporations based in or tied to the People's Republic of China (PRC) have reportedly engaged in illicit maritime activities around the globe. These alleged illicit activities are at odds with Beijing's official rhetoric expressing support for international maritime laws, rules, and norms. To develop a better understanding of the contradictions between Beijing's official rhetoric and the illicit international maritime activities of PRC state and nonstate actors, CNA examined 15 cases in which PRC actors were accused of carrying out illicit activities in the maritime domain between 2018 and 2021. The incidents occurred in the maritime areas surrounding Southeast Asia, the Atlantic coast of Africa, and the Pacific Island countries. Our key findings are discussed below.

This report examines the apparent gaps between the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) policy and rhetoric regarding its role in the transnational maritime environment and the illicit activities that PRC actors reportedly conduct. The illicit maritime activities allegedly carried out by PRC actors inflict economic and environmental damage on coastal nations, violate their sovereignty, and harm their citizens. These alleged illicit activities are at odds with Beijing's official rhetoric expressing support for international maritime laws, rules, and norms. To develop a better understanding of this apparent contradiction, CNA examined 15 instances in which PRC actors were accused of carrying out illicit activities between 2018 and 2021 in the maritime areas surrounding Southeast Asia, the Atlantic coast of Africa, and the Pacific Island countries. In all but one case, Beijing sought to minimize any negative impact on China's image by denying or downplaying the accusations that PRC actors had engaged in illicit behavior. This PRC strategy of denying and downplaying bad behavior is problematic and could create the appearance that, rather than acknowledging and addressing the illicit behavior of some PRC actors, Beijing is publicly subverting international laws, rules, and norms.

In late 2020, the City of North Charleston hired CNA to conduct a racial bias assessment of the North Charleston Police Department (NCPD). Beginning in March 2021, CNA undertook a comprehensive assessment of NCPD's policies and practices, focusing on assessing racially biased practices and procedures. Assessments such as these, which touch on more than racial and social justice matters, help police departments gauge the status of their community relationships, especially amongst minority and disenfranchised communities. In addition, the assessment can help identify policies and practices that may unintentionally negatively affect the community, especially those who feel they have been marginalized. Through this assessment, the CNA team developed a strong objective understanding of NCPD's operations in various areas including law enforcement operations, community-oriented policing practices, complaints, training, oversight and accountability, and recruitment, hiring, and promotions. We developed this report by reviewing community engagement programming documents, strategic plans, training lesson plans, training curriculum, general orders, department data, and sentiments from interviews with community members and NCPD personnel and community listening sessions. This report includes findings and associated actionable recommendations for the department. In developing our recommendations, we assessed the NCPD's policy manual against emerging best practices. CNA's comprehensive assessment of NCPD included an examination of the following:

• Law enforcement operations
• Community-oriented policing practices
• Complaints
• Recruitment, hiring, and promotions
• Training
• Oversight and accountability

• Racial disparities are present in many of NCPD's interactions with the community, indicative of potential systemic, organizational, or individual bias, and these disparities are deeply felt by the community.
• Community members have substantial concerns regarding NCPD's police presence and perceived over-enforcement of certain individuals, community groups, and neighborhoods.
• NCPD's School Resource Officer Program has room to improve to better serve the youth of the North Charleston community.

This memo is part of a larger effort by CNA's China & Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division that is examining how allies, partners, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are assessing US policy in the Indo-Pacific. It focuses on how select allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific were viewing US policy toward the region during the initial months of the new US administration. The views herein are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the views of CNA or any of its sponsors.

This report, the twenty-sixth in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

Russian Perspectives on Western Military Activities

Welcome to the China AI and Autonomy Report, a biweekly newsletter published by CNA. In this issue, we cover several topics of note. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force (PLAAF) celebrated its 72nd birthday on November 11. Images of a new two-seat version of the J-20 have been released with media speculating that the second crew member could control drones. Meanwhile, PRC media outlets report that the WZ-7 UAV has been fully integrated into PLAAF training. A substantial article appearing on the PRC Ministry of National Defense website written by a researcher from the PLA's Central Theater argues that future warfare enabled by AI will be global. In non-defense news, the PRC's Personal Information Protection Law went into effect on November 1, and the PRC and Pakistan have signed a MOU to create an AI research center in Pakistan. Finally, Facebook's name change to Meta seems to have sparked PRC media reporting on PRC companies' plans for the metaverse.

This paper examines the role of space domain awareness (SDA) as a strategic counterweight to potential adversary and competitor actions in space. It argues that awareness of the space environment is fundamental to maintaining and protecting U.S. interests in outer space. The U.S., however, has been slow in developing a SDA capability and must now hasten the transition from a more passive peacetime capability to a system that can provide commanders with timely knowledge to predict adversary actions in potentially hostile environments.

The ability of a police department to act in a fair and just manner is vitally important to creating internal and external trust, which in turn increases the perception of legitimacy by those who work for the department and those the department serves. Law enforcement agencies across the U.S. have faced increased scrutiny from the public in the last several years, with the events of 2020 exacerbating already simmering community relationships. The City of Little Rock has experienced recent issues of internal and external legitimacy stemming from the officer-involved shooting of Bradley Blackshire, a Black man, who was killed by a Little Rock Police Department (LRPD) officer in February 2019. The incident, in which Mr. Blackshire was fired upon at least 15 times, led not only to backlash from the public, but also internal strife within the LRPD. Since the February 2019 incident, the City of Little Rock, LRPD, the Chief of Police, and other members of LRPD have been the subjects of various lawsuits.

This report, the twenty-fifth in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

Welcome to the China AI and Autonomy Report, a biweekly newsletter published by CNA. In this issue, we cover, among other topics, reports that Alibaba has developed a new chip for AI applications; a report by a PRC think tank that estimates the PRC's AI workforce has a 1.7 million shortfall; and increased PRC government action on digital governance. We welcome your questions, comments, or subscription requests at chinaai@cna.org. Read in browser.

During the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, US jails have faced challenges in providing safety, security, programming, and care while limiting virus transmission. Data-driven insights can help inform correctional leaders as they seek to transition to more normalized operations. We customized an agent-based model, Simulation Applications for Forecasting Effective Responses in Corrections (SAFER-C), to simulate the operations, environment, and virus spread within a representative 100-bed housing unit, using de-identified data from District of Columbia Department of Corrections. Simulations indicated that most infections occur via staff-to-staff and inmate-to-inmate interactions, that benefits from higher facility vaccination rates are offset by the lower vaccination rates among intakes, and that resuming high-contact activities (e.g., basketball) may cause outbreaks. Simulation results aligned closely with practitioner experience. The detailed insights gained from this analysis suggest that SAFER-C is a valuable tool for correctional decision-makers.

Welcome to the inaugural edition of the China AI and Autonomy Report, a biweekly newsletter published by CNA. In this and future editions, we will keep you informed of important news, developments, and policies regarding artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy in the People's Republic of China (PRC). We welcome your questions, comments, or subscription requests at chinaai@cna.org.

The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting public health crisis continue to present public safety challenges, as well as challenges to the agencies tasked with protecting life and social order. Throughout the response to COVID-19, the federal government has deferred decisions about containing the virus to state and local leaders, resulting in an uneven response to contain the spread of this highly infectious disease. This unevenness has resulted in the continued spread of the coronavirus, with state leaders struggling to enforce state mandates on protective measures (e.g., travel restrictions, face coverings, self-quarantine, vaccinations) and lacking the authority to engage in any meaningful interstate enforcement of orders. Further exacerbating this situation is the issue of vaccination requirements, and documentation and enforcement where applicable. Given these realities, state and local agencies continue to risk to their own health and wellbeing to provide mandated services during the pandemic with very little guidance available for how to safely operate within this new environment.

Throughout its history of confronting sexual assault and racial extremism, the Department of Defense (DOD) has often described the perpetrators of such malignant behaviors as "a few bad apples." But in the view of some experts, the "bad apples" analogy is flawed. For example, the Century Foundation's Amanda Rogers noted that, whenever a white-supremacist incident occurs: It's treated as if it's an isolated phenomenon; it's never treated in comparative context with other military members in the movement looking at strategy or ties. Giving the appearance of "a few bad apples" helps further ideas of [white supremacists] being lone-wolf actors radicalized online, instead of coordinating via a strategy that's effective precisely because it's individual.1

In the approach to, and in the wake of, the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol, a series of reports called attention to the potential threat posed by extremists in the military. This issue is an exceptionally challenging one for a number of reasons including, but not limited to: little existing data on the problem, poorly defined key terms, and a high degree of politicization. In an effort to help inform the work of responding to this challenge, our research team set out to identify an analogous issue that DOD has addressed, which might serve as a model for addressing the challenge posed by racial extremism. We concluded that sexual harassment and sexual assault was the most fitting parallel. Specifically, we note that both sexual harassment/assault and racial extremism are best understood not as isolated illegal activities undertaken by "a few bad apples," but as existing on continuums of harm in which tolerance of less onerous behaviors leads to more egregious offenses, ultimately damaging military cohesion and readiness. Recognizing these parallels, we (1) identified the features of DOD's sexual harassment and sexual assault responses that were most relevant to the challenge posed by racial extremism and (2) articulated the precise lessons we thought could be learned from DOD's effort to deal with the problem of sexual harassment and sexual assault.

Artificial intelligence (AI) and unmanned/autonomous systems are poised to revolutionize modern-day warfighting, and Department of Navy (DON) leaders have stated that these systems will make the difference between victory and defeat in great power competition (GPC). Our review of DON strategy documents, however (see table), indicates that DON is paying insufficient attention to the full range of DOTMLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, facilities, and policy) implications that these technologies will have. In particular, more attention needs to be paid to the Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (MPT&E) to enable human-machine teaming (HMT). Ironically, humans are HMT's missing ingredient in DON's strategic planning for GPC.

This report, the twenty-fourth in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

Over the last decade, there has been great debate about the introduction of AI to warfare. However, that debate has been primarily about how to make sure that AI applications are not indiscriminate in warfare. There is another important question, in light of international law and the principle of humanity: how can we use AI to protect civilians from harm? And how can we lessen the infliction of suffering, injury, and destruction overall through the use of this emerging technology? This report represents a concrete first step toward meeting this goal. We find that AI can be used to help address patterns of harm and thus reduce the likelihood of harm. We then discuss some potential areas of focus militaries could prioritize in order to reduce risks to civilians overall.

The Center for Justice Research and Innovation led an internally funded initiative at CNA from October 2020 to September 2021 and conducted case studies of six agencies' Field Training Officer (FTO) programs. During this assessment, CNA examined common practices and policies that law enforcement agencies use within their field training, such as the qualifications an officer must have to become an FTO, and we assessed the quality and effectiveness of communication between trainers and trainees. In this resource, we identify several considerations and recommendations for agencies to develop, implement, and sustain their FTO programs with regards to recruiting FTOs and retaining those who demonstrate the ability to be successful and impactful trainers.

Data Scientists at the Center for Naval Analyses develop innovative predictive and prescriptive analytics to tackle the most important challenges in the Department of Defense. These efforts rely on a collaborative partnership between Department of the Navy personnel and data scientists here at the department's federally funded research and development center (FFRDC). Close collaboration ensures that insights can be developed iteratively and acted upon quickly. CNA's Data Science Division, led by Vice President of Data Science Tim Kao, consists of approximately 30 data scientists with graduate degrees in data science, operations research, computer science, statistics, economics, and other sciences. They develop solutions for Department of the Navy leadership at forums such as Performance to Plan (P2P), which is co-chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. CNA presents senior Navy leadership at the P2P forum with forward-looking performance forecasts, a foundation to progress toward readiness and capability goals.

This paper discusses U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally space capabilities. In November 2019, NATO recognized space as an operational domain, declaring it on par with the air, land, sea, and cyber domains. NATO's designation of outer space as an operational domain is a recognition of the growing role of space in NATO operations. The increased commitment to space by NATO as a whole, and by U.S. NATO allies individually, provides more opportunities for the United States to draw upon the space capabilities of its NATO allies. As the leading NATO space power, the United States is viewed by its NATO allies as an indispensable partner in conducting and expanding space capabilities. Current emphasis by U.S. NATO allies appears to be on improving SDA but as capabilities grow, cooperation involving launch sites and on-orbit capabilities will likely increase. As a result, the emphasis U.S. NATO allies place on space operations presents multiple avenues for the U.S. and its NATO allies to increase and expand capabilities across a range of military space capabilities.

CNA's Resources and Force Readiness Division provides insightful, data-driven analysis for critical resource allocation problems facing the Navy, Marine Corps, and other Department of Defense components and agencies. Our study teams use a wide range of state-of-the-art quantitative and qualitative methods and vast data repositories to help military and civilian leaders make critical decisions on human resources, population health, infrastructure, environment, energy, and budget-related challenges.

This paper explores the core tenets of Russian military strategy and associated operational concepts, situating its role within the Russian system of knowledge on military security. Russian military leaders describe the prevailing strategy as ‘active defense,' a strategic concept integrating preemptive measures to anticipate and prevent conflict, wartime concepts of operations that seek to deny an opponent decisive victory in the initial period of war, degrading and disorganizing their effort, while setting the conditions to attain war termination on acceptable terms. The strategy emphasizes integration of defensive and offensive operations, maneuver defense, sustained counterattack, disorganization of an opponent's command and control, engagement of their forces throughout the theater of military action, including infrastructure in their homeland. Its theory of victory is premised on degrading the military-economic potential of opponents, focusing on critically important objects, to affect the ability and will of an adversary to sustain a fight, as opposed to ground offensives to seize territory or key terrain. The study also explores the content of Russian strategic operations, associated missions and tasks, the echelonment of Russian military concepts, together with Russian outlooks on the theory and practice of modern warfare.

CNA's Center for Justice Research and Innovation led an internally funded initiative from October 2020 to September 2021 and conducted case studies of six agencies' field training officer (FTO) programs. During this assessment, CNA examined common practices and policies that law enforcement agencies use within their field training, such as the qualifications an officer must have to become an FTO, and we assessed the quality and effectiveness of communication between trainers and trainees. In this resource, an agency will learn why the pairing process is important and the different range of pairing methods an agency can implement.

Russian strategy is best characterized as offensive, seeking to revise the status quo, resulting in an activist foreign policy. The strategy does not eschew selective engagement in areas of mutual interest, but it is not premised on accommodation, concessions, or acceptance of the current balance of power. Instead, it emphasizes building the military means necessary for direct competition, and using them to enable indirect approaches for pursuing state objectives. Direct means range from conventional and nuclear force modernization, expansion of force structure in the European theater, exercises, brinksmanship, and use of force to attain vital interests. They deter US responses, threaten escalation, and create freedom of maneuver for Russian foreign policy. These are principally ways of compressing the opponent, and focusing on the main theater in the competition, which for Moscow is Europe. Indirect means in turn include military deployments abroad to peripheral theaters, covert action, use of proxies and mercenary groups, political warfare and information confrontation. These instruments are interrelated, with direct approaches, tied closely to military capability or classical forms of deterrence, enabling the indirect approach, which is the principal way by which Moscow pursues political aims. The logic of Russian strategy is that absent the ability to generate strong economic or technological means, Moscow is best served with approaches that reduce US performance by disorganizing its opponent's efforts, reducing cohesion, and employing asymmetric means in the competition.

CNA's Center for Justice Research and Innovation led an internally funded initiative from October 2020 to September 2021 and conducted case studies of six agencies' field training officer (FTO) programs. During this assessment, CNA examined common practices and policies that law enforcement agencies use within their field training, such as the qualifications an officer must have to become an FTO, and we assessed the quality and effectiveness of communication between trainers and trainees. In this resource, an agency will learn why incentives are important, how they can benefit the agency, and the range of incentives that the case study agencies implemented.

Preparing for future threats is a vital concern for US strategists. Innovation is one way to confront the threats we may face in the future, but achieving innovation presents organizational, cultural, decision-making, and technological challenges. To help strategists and policy-makers navigate these obstacles, CNA's National Security Seminar (NSS) convened three experts to share their perspectives from their service at different offices within the Pentagon: General James T. Conway (US Marine Corps, ret.), the 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps; Dr. Jamie M. Morin, former Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) at the Department of Defense; and Dr. Francis G. Hoffman, Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University, who was instrumental in authoring the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The discussion, moderated by CNA's Dr. Carter Malkasian, was divided into two parts: the first identified obstacles to innovation, and the second looked at how to overcome those obstacles.

This event continued a conversation begun at CNA's September 16, 2021, National Security Seminar, titled "Planning for Tomorrow's Threats: Overcoming Obstacles to Organize, Adapt, and Innovate." In this event, we heard insights on defense strategy from Christian Brose, Chief Strategy Officer of Anduril Industries, a defense technology company. Mr. Brose shared his perspective as a former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Chairman John McCain. He is also the author of The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare. Dr. Carter Malkasian, from CNA, moderated the discussion. Dr. Malkasian previously served as Special Assistant for Strategy to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This report, the twenty-third in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

Warring sides have undertaken sabotage operations throughout history to generate battlefield effects, with varying degrees of success. In many cases, the forces conducting these operations have been special operations forces, their predecessors, or intelligence agencies. CNA initiated a quick-look study to examine past instances of sabotage in order to derive lessons and best practices for the future conduct of such operations. To increase the utility of the study for US Navy and US Marine Corps organizations, and because of the dearth of prior research on the topic, we focused our efforts on examining sabotage in the maritime domain. We generated a dataset of maritime sabotage instances dating back to World War II and analyzed this dataset according to a set of coding variables. These coding variables allowed us to perform both descriptive analysis of the dataset, as well as exploratory analysis.

The absorption and spread of disinformation is a pervasive phenomenon across a wide variety of topics and media. Most disinformation research focuses on the source (who created it?) and the environment in which it exists (what platform/medium transmits the information?). Recognizing that disinformation primarily works in an individual person's mind, this report describes four normal, routine psychological mechanisms that are associated with the absorption and spread of disinformation. We then describe real-world case studies—focusing on activities linked to COVID-19, and to campaigns coordinated by US adversaries including Russia, China, and Iran—to illustrate the way these mechanisms can be manipulated to aid the spread disinformation. The report concludes with multi-pronged recommendations that DOD can use to address the vulnerabilities associated with these psychological mechanisms so as prevent the spread of disinformation and protect both US servicemembers and the country.

How to use the tool kit

China is a niche supplier of weapons systems, but has the capacity to expand its arms exports should it choose to do so.

Disinformation is a growing national security concern with a primary impact occurring in the mind. This study explores the underlying psychological principles facilitating the absorption and spread of disinformation and outlines options for countering disinformation grounded in in cognitive and social psychological literature. The report serves as an introduction to the topic for policy- and defense-decision makers with no prior background in psychology or disinformation. It first examines what disinformation is and why it is important before turning to the four key psychological principles relevant to this topic. A key finding is that the principles themselves are neutral and normal cognitive processes that malign actors can exploit to achieve their own objectives.

The widespread adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous weapon systems portends a new revolution in military affairs. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is now conceptualizing a future battlefield environment dominated by AI and autonomy, which it calls "intelligent warfare." This paper explores the PLA concept of intelligent warfare, according to articles by writers from the People's Republic of China (PRC). It concludes that PRC discussions of intelligent warfare reflect an ongoing debate over the nature and effects of the widespread use of AI and autonomy in warfare. Despite this ongoing debate, the PLA can be expected to adopt the use of AI and autonomy even as it explores the most appropriate concept of operations. PRC discussions of intelligent warfare suggest that the US military should begin preparing to face a PLA made more effective through the widespread adoption of AI and autonomy.

CNA's Center for Justice Research and Innovation seeks to further explore police field training programs around the country in an effort to highlight promising practices, identify areas for improvement, and promote information sharing.

The case explored in this paper was carefully scoped. CNA did not target or conduct a search of any specific individuals in completing this analysis. Instead, the analytic team looked at Twitter content related to the USMC, with a specific focus on tweets regarding the extremism stand-down.

This CNA study supports the Navy's Culture of Excellence by identifying key leadership and life skills in sailors' careers, important touchpoints in the behavior learning continuum ranging from recruitment to transition when these skills should be acquired and reinforced, and the appropriate sequence, frequency, and content for the identified skills at each touchpoint. We identified 18 life skills based on our literature review of skills that have been determined to be essential to provide people with the nontechnical skills they need to be productive, happy, healthy contributing members of society and the organizations they serve. We supplemented what we had learned from the literature review regarding touchpoints and frequency with discussions with 26 subject matter experts across the Navy. We conclude that initial training on all life skills should occur during the accession phase. Determining which skills should be refreshed or enhanced at each touchpoint depends on the assessed skill level of the sailor at that touchpoint and other characteristics of the sailors, such as family status.

To identify the key life and leadership skills, we reviewed literature on the essential nontechnical skills people need to be productive, resilient, healthy contributing members of society and the organizations they serve. The literature uses various terms for these skills, including soft skills, character skills, social and emotional skills, and 21st Century skills. In terms of the Navy's Primary Prevention Logic Model [5], these skills promote signature behaviors (SBs) and prevent destructive behaviors (DBs).

In the City of Antioch, hundreds of concerned community members voiced their opinions on race relations and policing reform during three City Council meetings in June 2020. The issues they raised were wide ranging, including systemic racism, body-worn cameras, and police recruitment, training, and accountability. In response, the Antioch City Council decided to hold a series of roundtable discussions called Bridging the Gap to hear the perspectives of additional community members and learn more about the kinds of changes in policing the community desired. The City wanted to better understand the community's perspectives on racial injustice and police-community relations and to identify ways to address them. CNA, an independent national research and analysis firm, was hired to organize and facilitate these roundtable discussions.

On September 10, 2021, CNA held its sixth Inclusive National Security event (@InclusiveNatSec on Twitter). This initiative provides a forum for discussions on inclusive national security. This month's event "Racism and National Security" explored the question, How can the United States overcome the legacy of racism in national security to actively further inclusivity and anti-racism? The keynote speaker was Dr. Keisha N. Blain, Associate Professor of History at the University of Pittsburgh, co-author of the New York Times best seller Four Hundred Souls: A Community History of African America, 1619-2019, and co-author of The Charleston Syllabus. Dr. Blain is an award-winning historian of the 20th-century United States with broad interests and specializations in African American history, the modern African Diaspora, and women's and gender studies. The event was moderated by Dr. Pauline Shanks Kaurin, Stockdale Cahir in Professional Military Ethics at the US Naval War College.

This paper addresses how China's rapidly expanding space program challenges U.S. access to space. In 2011, the U.S. National Security Space Strategy described outer space as "congested, contested, and competitive." As more countries operate in space, the United States has raised concerns over the sustainability of the space environment, the proliferation of space weapons, and its ability to remain commercially competitive in space. One of the most important countries contributing to the congested, contested, and competitive nature of space is China.

DOD's total force comprises active and reserve military personnel, government civilians, and contracted services. Each of these types of manpower brings unique and, in some areas, comparable capabilities to execute the work required to support DOD's mission. Fully understanding the scope and magnitude of the contributions of each manpower type to the readiness and lethality of the warfighter is a necessary prerequisite for optimizing the Total Force from an objective, data-driven perspective. This study assists that endeavor by providing visibility into the contributions and roles of DOD's government civilian workforce as enablers of warfighter readiness, lethality, and capability. It provides this visibility through two efforts. First, it develops and applies an analytical construct to identify and categorize, at a high level, how the civilian workforce contributes to DOD's mission. Second, it examines a specific sector of the civilian workforce (aviation depot maintainers) and develops quantitative relationships between the size of that workforce and aircraft readiness metrics.

More than five years into an unprecedented series of reorganizations and systemic reforms which began in 2016, the Chinese People's Liberation Army was issued new joint doctrine, the first update in 20 years. On November 13, 2020, the Xinhua News Agency announced that the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission had issued the Guidelines on Joint Operations of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (Trial). This paper presents what the PLA is saying about this new doctrinal guidance; places the joint operations Guidelines within the larger context of ongoing PLA reform and years of doctrinal evolution by drawing on previous work at the Center for Naval Analyses; engages in some informed speculation on various dimensions of the new joint doctrine; and identifies questions for further consideration.

This memo is part of a larger effort by CNA's China & Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division that is examining how allies, partners, and the PRC are assessing US policy in the Indo-Pacific. It focuses on how PRC subject matter experts were viewing US policy toward Beijing during the initial first few months of the new US administration.

This is the report for the CNA-Initiated study, The Future of US Alliances and Partnerships: A Data Science Approach. The project aims to explore the potential for how data science could help shed light on a complicated issue in international security relations, potentially generating new and actionable recommendations for US policy-makers. This file documents our data assembly and modeling methods, results of our data tabulations, and implications and caveats of our findings. We conclude by outlining future research tasks from this dataset for use by US policy-makers.

In May of 2020, the City of Methuen, through a competitive bid, selected the CNA Center for Justice Research and Innovation to conduct a performance audit of the Methuen Police Department (MPD). In conducting this audit, the CNA team developed an objective and in-depth understanding of MPD's operations in areas including budget, equipment, training, staffing levels, and processes (hiring, equipment acquisition, and development of policies and procedures). After the onset of the audit, the CNA audit team was made aware of concerns about department leadership, organizational culture, and department personnel morale. Although the City of Methuen did not originally contract with the CNA audit team to explore these issues, we expanded the scope of our inquiry and this report to reflect these emerging topics.

Though tens of thousands of pages have been written about terrorism and counterterrorism since 9/11, the history of counterterrorism in the United States has received relatively little analytical attention. The 1970s and early 1980s have become almost forgotten in the history of America's struggle with domestic terrorist violence. That period, though, was part of a long wave of terrorism that occurred across the developed world. In the United States, during that era, terrorist groups—including ethno-nationalists, separatists, and Marxist-Leninists—conducted a remarkable number of attacks, some of which resulted in significant injuries and deaths. In response to this threat, the US developed and deployed a robust repertoire of strategies appropriate for countering domestic terrorism. In 2014, CNA published a report that examined this forgotten history in order to identify what lessons learned from that era might be most appropriate to confronting the challenges posed by contemporary domestic terrorism. This short paper updates that report, and captures what is most important for responding to domestic terrorism today.

In this CNA Occasional Paper, Konrad Muzyka provides an in-depth assessment of Russia's Southern Military District, which consists of robust forces spanning the North Caucasus region, along with Rostov, Volgograd, Stravropol, Dagestan, and Crimea. Muzyka's analysis provides an up-to-date overview of the current force structure and posture of this military district, which has greatly expanded since 2013. These forces include the 8th, 49th, and 58th Combined Arms Armies, the 4th Air and Air Defense Army, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Caspian Flotilla. Muzyka also discusses the Russian threat perspectives which drive force posture changes in the Southern Military District, with contingencies that include Georgia, Ukraine, NATO in the Black Sea, and terrorism in the Caucasus.

On August 11, 2021, CNA held its fifth Inclusive National Security event. This initiative provides a forum for discussions on inclusive national security. This month's event (recording here) "Racism and Defense" explored the question, How can the Department of Defense build a diverse, inclusive, and resilient military? The keynote speaker was Bishop Garrison, Senior Advisor on Human Capital and Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion for the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Garrison has deep expertise regarding a range of race-related challenges and is a leader in work related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) for the Department of Defense. He also plays a critical role in the Department's efforts to counter extremism (including racially based extremism). The event moderator was Nilanthi Samaranayake, Director of the Strategy and Policy Analysis Program at CNA.

This paper, written in 2004, was catalyzed by a series of conferences held in Europe in the early twenty-first century that analyzed international naval policies and history. Conference participants, including this paper's author, discussed the need for up-to-date resources to explain NATO's maritime development to current and future generations of naval officers and sailors, officers of other services, and civilians. In response to this need and under the sponsorship of the US Naval Historical Center, CNA produced this paper, which examines the relationship between the US Navy and NATO through six lenses: the historical context, the global American policy context, the NATO policy context, relations within NATO, relations with other NATO member navies outside NATO, and other NATO navies' non-NATO activities. This study is intended to provide perspective and context for present and future decision-making as both NATO and the US Navy continue to evolve.

In the late 1990s, the US national security policy community was debating the role of the US Navy in coastal warfare and continental defense. The author of this paper sought to contribute to this emerging debate by examining the US Navy's contribution to these aspects of homeland defense over time. Written in 1998, this paper provides a chronological discussion of the US Navy's history regarding coastal warfare and continental defense. It intended to illuminate historical US Navy functions that generally received less attention than others. The author's goal was to provide decision-makers with necessary background knowledge as they made policy decisions that would affect the future of the US Navy.

This report was part of a study CNA performed for the Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, on future options for the numbered fleets. CNA conducted this study in response to frequent requests for insights regarding future force deployment, force employment, and staff sizing for the Navy's operating forces. To better respond to these requests, the researchers examined the operational history of the US Navy, described the origins of the numbered fleet system, and summarized relevant data regarding four critical issue areas: numbered fleet commanders and the levels of warfare, the fleets in joint operations, fleet headquarters, and fleet operations and technology change. This effort aimed to help decision-makers better understand the Navy's operational history and enable them to make informed decisions about the future.

This report, written in 1999, is an analytical history of the relationship between the Navy and the commands designated in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). It was part of a larger project sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations (N3/5). It was intended to serve as a reference document for Navy planners and decision-makers as they developed policies regarding the UCP. Before this document, no publication had systematically analyzed the development of the UCP and the history of the joint, unified, specified, and combatant commands it mandated, changed, or abolished over time. This study aimed to fill that gap and to inform future Navy positions regarding changes to the UCP. Beyond Navy decision-makers, this study was also intended to reach a wider audience of students and analysts of naval and national security affairs.

This paper, drafted in 2006, summarizes US Navy counterpiracy activities since the 18th century. It covers three general eras: the era of privateering (18th and 19th centuries), the era of Western imperialism (19th and 20th centuries), and the era of terrorism (20th and 21st centuries).

This annotated briefing, originally drafted in 2016, summarizes the history of the United States Marine Corps' deployment strategy, beginning with the 1775 establishment of the USMC as a guard for Navy ships and as a nascent expeditionary force. It also highlights the historical roles of the USMC as US Embassy guard detachments, as response units in US domestic crises, and as crisis response units for noncombatant evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions worldwide. The briefing concludes with a summary comparison of US Navy and USMC deployment strategies.

This paper, written in 2002, examines the many changes in U.S. Navy strategic and operational history over time, focusing on the Navy's deployment strategy. From this examination, it draws insights, options, and conclusions for today's Navy, providing useful context and perspective. Its goal is to help inform debate and discussion about the present and future Navy.

This briefing, drafted in 2009, summarizes the influence of the Marine Corps on Navy capstone documents from 1970 to 2010. It discusses the writing, publication, and key ideas of 27 Navy capstone documents, emphasizing how the Navy's relationship with the Marine Corps affected the drafting or substance of these documents.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense asked CNA to make recommendations to improve the A-76 process and to consider the repercussions of changing certain laws governing the conversion of DOD functions to the private sector. Specifically, CNA was tasked to examine the following issues; what best practices and lessons learned can be gleaned from the legacy A-76 program, what were the deficiencies and challenges of the legacy A-76 program and how can they be addressed in a future program, what actionable, practical, and concrete steps need to be taken to establish an effective A-76 program, and what policy improvements, process enhancements, additional resources, and organizational structures are necessary to ensure the viability and credibility of a reconstituted A-76 public-private competition capability in DOD?

This paper explores the core tenets of Russian military strategy and associated operational concepts, situating its role within the Russian system of knowledge on military security. Russian military leaders describe the prevailing strategy as 'active defense,' a strategic concept integrating preemptive measures to anticipate and prevent conflict, wartime concepts of operations that seek to deny an opponent decisive victory in the initial period of war, degrading and disorganizing their effort, while setting the conditions to attain war termination on acceptable terms. The strategy emphasizes integration of defensive and offensive operations, maneuver defense, sustained counterattack, disorganization of an opponent's command and control, engagement of their forces throughout the theater of military action, including infrastructure in their homeland. Its theory of victory is premised on degrading the military-economic potential of opponents, focusing on critically important objects, to affect the ability and will of an adversary to sustain a fight, as opposed to ground offensives to seize territory or key terrain. The study also explores the content of Russian strategic operations, associated missions and tasks, the echelonment of Russian military concepts, together with Russian outlooks on the theory and practice of modern warfare.

Officer safety is of critical importance in an era of increased risk for law enforcement officers. Law enforcement officers (hereafter, "officers") respond to some of the most unpredictable, traumatic, and violent encounters of any profession.1 Although much of an officer's workday entails repetitive interactions, some calls for service or self-initiated interactions by police officers may escalate into dangerous encounters. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) Program, between 2010 and 2018, an average of 51 officers died in a felonious killing per year. LEOKA defines a felonious killing as an "incident type in which the willful and intentional actions of an offender result in the fatal injury of an officer who is performing his or her official duties." Regardless of how officer line-of-duty deaths, assaults, or injuries occur, the consequences are tragic and complex, affecting officers' work and home life. Just as de-escalation, defusing, and crisis intervention tactics are paramount today, so is officer safety.

Navy senior leadership's recent effort to address innovation in the fleet continues a long tradition of naval innovation, and especially among dedicated innovation organizations. Some of these organizations still exist, such as the Naval Expeditions (NavalX) Agility Office, or Program Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems (PEO EIS) Innovation Cell, while others, having fulfilled their mission or were subject to external drivers, were eventually shuttered (e.g., the Strategic Studies Group and Deep Blue). One common thread among many of these innovation organizations is their attempt to address a wide range of innovative products but their lack of optimal organization to deliver. For instance, Deep Blue was given the broad mandate to innovate "new ways to fight wars" across various "cognitive" domains: intelligence, future operating concepts, manning, technology, operational art, and tactics [1]. Lacking a common framework or language to describe desired "innovation" can hinder how the Navy organizes to achieve innovation goals [2]. Having a more descriptive language would support design efforts in creating an organization optimally organized to achieve the type of desired innovation. All of this raises the question: What type of innovation does the Navy want? Below, we provide a rough framework to categorize innovation and provide other considerations that can affect how an organization should organize for innovation.

In this CNA Occasional Paper, Joe Cheravitch, Doctoral Student at King's College London, traces the evolution of Russian military thought on computer network operations such as cyberattacks and espionage. Examining Russia's cyber capabilities, as well as changes in doctrine and strategy, Cheravitch analyzes the ways and means of Russia's unique approach to "information confrontation," which has caught the West by surprise on a number of recent occasions. The report also explores possible future scenarios of Russian military cyber operations and notes the need for continuous study of Russia's military and its approach to modern conflict.

In this CNA Occasional Paper, Konrad Muzyka provides an in-depth assessment of Russia's Western Military District, which consists of robust forces spanning regions including St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kursk, and Kaliningrad. Muzyka's analysis provides an up-to-date overview of the current force structure and posture of this military district, which underwent deep structural reforms between 2013 and 2019 to better address Western threats. These forces include the 6th and 20th Combined Arms Armies, the 1st Guards Tank Army, three airborne divisions, the 6th Air and Air Defense Army, and a self-sufficient force in the Kaliningrad exclave. Muzyka also discusses the Zapad-17 military exercise, and provides assessments of ongoing modernization in the district.

In this CNA Occasional Paper, Konrad Muzyka provides an in-depth assessment of Russia's Western Military District, which consists of robust forces spanning regions including St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kursk, and Kaliningrad. Muzyka's analysis provides an up-to-date overview of the current force structure and posture of this military district, which underwent deep structural reforms between 2013 and 2019 to better address Western threats. These forces include the 6th and 20th Combined Arms Armies, the 1st Guards Tank Army, three airborne divisions, the 6th Air and Air Defense Army, and a self-sufficient force in the Kaliningrad exclave. Muzyka also discusses the Zapad-17 military exercise, and provides assessments of ongoing modernization in the district.

On June 17, 2021, CNA held its fourth Inclusive National Security event. This series explores the intersection of structural bias and national security, and this event explored the theme of "Deconstructing National Security: Can the discipline of national security overcome its structural biases?" The keynote speaker was Dr. Meera Sabaratnam, Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in International Relations at SOAS University of London. Dr. Asli Bâli, Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law and Faculty Director of the Promise Institute for Human Rights, moderated the event.

On May 19, 2021, CNA held its third Inclusive National Security event. This series explores the intersection of structural bias and national security, and this event focused on the relationship between racism and the work of diplomacy. The keynote speaker was Ambassador Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, the US State Department's inaugural Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer (CDIO). The event moderator was Ms. Tina Wong, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Office of Policy and Regional Affairs.

Artificial intelligence has seen groundbreaking developments in recent years that have yielded commercial and scientific applications affecting daily life around the world. In national defense, AI technology will advance — and even transform — warfighting.

This report provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of civilian and military artificial intelligence in Russia, examining all relevant sectors, key institutions, and trends. In particular, the report explores how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. This report is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of AI in Russia, and follows a series of more than twenty biweekly newsletters on the same topic. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

On April 9, 2021, CNA held its second Inclusive National Security event, this time focusing on the relationship between racism and cybersecurity. The keynote speakers were Camille Stewart, Head of Security Policy for Google Play and Android Google, and Royal Hansen, Google's Vice President of Security. The event moderator was Dr. Veronica Santos, UCLA Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering as well as Associate Dean of Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion and Faculty Affairs. This document summarizes key takeaways from the discussion.

The alleged participation of off-duty law enforcement personnel in the January 6, 2021, assault on the US Capitol has generated fresh interest in the broader issue of police participation in right-wing extremist groups and activities. Such extremism poses obvious but significant challenges for police agencies and their communities. It can undermine the rule of law, damage police morale, compromise investigations, hinder successful prosecutions, and disrupt relationships between the police and the communities they serve (particularly communities of color). In the words of one police captain, "whenever the police department shirks its unbiased responsibility…the community then is in for real trouble.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict – Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (OASD (SO/LIC-SHA)) asked CNA to study the role of women and gender in both violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and US counterterrorism (CT) and counter violent extremism (CVE) operations (hereafter CT/CVE). Our research demonstrates that the dominant stereotypes about women's roles in VEOs miss the vast majority of female activity in these groups and fundamentally fail to capture women's lived experiences. Despite the passage of Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) legislation in the US, we found that internal DOD activities that are truly gender considered are severely limited, lack nuance, and are not institutionalized. External US CT/CVE efforts do not consider the roles men or women play from a nuanced perspective, and they are disproportionately influenced by a set of gender stereotypes that shape expectations of men and women's roles. Much of the current DOD approach can be traced to misunderstanding gender as a concept. This report provides an analysis of the gaps, risks, and opportunities for the Department of Defense (DOD) on understanding women and gender in extremism, and integrating a gender-considered approach to CT/CVE.

This conference proceeding summarizes a virtual, on-the-record event organized by CNA's Strategy and Policy Analysis program on December 2, 2020. Exploring issues across Africa, Asia, and Europe, the event examined the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 that was passed 20 years ago. This document utilizes both qualitative and quantitative methods to identify the key points of discussion presented by Major General Suzanne Vares-Lum of US Indo-Pacific Command; Admiral (Ret.) James G. Foggo III, previously Commander of US Naval Forces Europe-Africa and NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples; CNA Principal Research Scientist Julia McQuaid, a counterterrorism and Africa expert; and CNA Research Program Director Nilanthi Samaranayake.

This report, the twenty-second in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

The unfolding COVID-19 pandemic has shed light on the wide-ranging disruption that nontraditional threats such as pandemics can have on the US economy, military, diplomatic corps, and national security apparatus. The US, its partners, and its competitors have tried to curb the spread of the virus by closing schools, workplaces, social gathering spots, and borders. Militaries have scaled back operations, postponed exercises, and curtailed engagements. Economic futures remain uncertain. Low-income workers in industrialized countries have been disproportionately affected by rolling shutdowns and stay-at-home orders, and wealth inequality is increasing.

On February 23, 2021, CNA held the first event for its Inclusive National Security initiative to explore the intersection of structural bias and national security. The event, held in partnership with Black Women in International Affairs (BWINTAF), focused on racism in terrorism and counterterrorism. The keynote speaker was Lieutenant General (Ret) Michael Nagata, a Strategic Advisor and Senior Vice President at CACI, and formerly the Director of Strategic Operational Planning for the US National Counterterrorism Center (2016 to 2019). The event moderator was Dr. Samer Shehata, Associate Professor in Middle East Studies in the Department of International and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma."

Domestic violent extremism (DVE) is a pressing concern for defense and national security policy-makers. In order to define the issue, place DVE in historical context, and suggest steps to address the problem, CNA's National Security Seminar convened three of its experts for a discussion titled "Countering DVE: Drivers, Challenges, and What Comes Next.""

Law enforcement agencies across the country continuously face challenges due to the ever-changing nature of policing, especially with recent events including the deaths of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor. These recent events have called into question the objectivity and fairness of policing practices. These developments signal a need for strengthened police-community relations, and the Town of Niskayuna, New York, and the Niskayuna Police Department (NPD) are working hard to ensure their community has positive relationships with their police department. This audit provides baseline information to inform the Town of Niskayuna's response to Governor Andrew M. Cuomo's Executive Order No. 203: New York State Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative. In December of 2020, the Town of Niskayuna developed a contract with CNA's Center for Justice Research and Innovation to conduct a racial bias audit of the NPD. This assessment focused on policies and practices, while also touching on more than racial matters. These types of assessments can help police departments gauge the status of community relationships and work towards improvement.

This report, the twenty first in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

This CNA occasional paper explores the defense and offense elements of Russian aerospace operations, addressing three widespread Western assumptions about Russia's approach and theory of victory. Russian air defense operations are a combination of offensive strike and defensive actions, instead of purely defensive as some in the West believe. The commonly used term "anti-access/area denial (A2AD)" is a misnomer in the context of Russian thinking on aerospace operations, and it conjures an inaccurate perception of Russian thinking on this subject. Furthermore, the popular Western belief that Russian operations are driven by a fait accompli strategy, has profound empirical problems. The operational concepts that would enable such a strategy cannot be supported by present-day available capabilities.

This report, the twentieth in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

This report, the nineteenth in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

Over the last decade, the Albany Police Department (APD) has pushed forward to engage the community in a positive manner, moving towards a mission that is focused on community policing practices. During this time, the Community Policing Review Board and the Common Council have recommended police reforms and legislation changes to further improve the police department, and they have called for change to address perceived disparate treatment of minority communities. Following recent high-profile events, including the First Street Incident and the shooting of Mr. Ellazar Williams, APD has striven to improve their transparency and implement initiatives to increase community trust. Both of these incidents, along with the eruptions of public protests across the country, led the City of Albany to initiate an evaluation of policy, procedures, and practices of the police department. In addition, this audit will provide baseline information to inform the City of Albany's response to Governor Andrew M. Cuomo's Executive Order No. 203: New York State Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative.1 In August of 2020, the City of Albany, through a competitive bid, selected the CNA Center for Justice Research and Innovation to conduct a racial bias audit of the APD.

This report, the eighteenth in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.