
Peter M. Swartz

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Abstract
This briefing, drafted in 2009, summarizes the influence of the Marine Corps on Navy capstone documents from 1970 to 2010. It discusses the writing, publication, and key ideas of 27 Navy capstone documents, emphasizing how the Navy’s relationship with the Marine Corps affected the drafting or substance of these documents.

The content of this paper is current through November 19, 2009.

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Overview (I)

- Significant USMC influence on USN capstone documents dates from Sea Plan 2000 (1978)
- CMC co-signature dates from The Amphibious Warfare Strategy (1985) and The Way Ahead (1991)
- Heavy USMC influence on USN capstone documents in early 1990s
- Less USMC influence on USN capstone documents in mid-late 1990s
- Since 2002, USMC influence on USN capstone documents has been routine (except for Navy Strategic Plans)
## Overview (II): Who signed USN documents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>SECNAV</th>
<th>CNO</th>
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### US Navy capstone documents of the 1970s

- **1970** *Project SIXTY*
- **1974** *Missions of the US Navy*
- **1975** *Strategic Concept for the US Navy*
- **1977** *NWP 1: Strategic Concepts of the US Navy*
- **1978** *NWP 1: Strategic Concepts of the US Navy (Rev. A)*
- **1978** *Sea Plan 2000*
- **1979** *CNO Strategic Concepts and The Future of US Sea Power*
1970s: USMC in USN capstone documents

- No co-signed USN-USMC capstone documents
- Little mention of USMC in most USN capstone documents
- Little emphasis on its own capstone documents within USMC

Project SIXTY (1970)

- Signed by CNO ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr.
- Little on USMC
  - Bid for USMC TACAIR in CVWs
  - USMC on distribution list
Missions of the US Navy (1974)

- Signed by NAVWARCOL President VADM Stansfield Turner
- Some mention of USMC
  - Four “missions” of the Navy, each subdivided into “tactics”
  - USMC implements a few of the tactics

Strategic Concepts of the US Navy (1975–78)

- Signed by CNO ADM J. L. Holloway, III
- USMC mentioned
Strategic Concepts of the US Navy (1975–78)

- Six fundamental warfare tasks
  - AAW
  - ASW
  - ASUW
  - Strike
  - Amphibious
  - Mine

- Six supporting warfare tasks
  - Special warfare
  - Ocean surveillance
  - Intelligence
  - C³
  - EW
  - Logistics

Note: USMC seen as a significant player in 1/2 of 1/6 of USN’s fundamental warfare tasks

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Documents signed by SECNAV Graham Claytor
- Article signed by Under SECNAV James Woolsey
- **Significant USMC influence**
- USN-USMC study group drafted
  - Director: F. J. (Bing) West, Jr. (NWC civilian professor; former USMC)
  - 12 military team members (10 USN; 2 USMC)
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Key ideas included:
- Navy-Marine Corps team
- Strong USMC amphibious assault role
- Amphibious ships important in USN force structure options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustrative Alternative Force Levels</th>
<th>Option 1</th>
<th>Option 2</th>
<th>Option 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total active ships</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack submarines</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface combatants</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious ships</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Future of US Sea Power (1979)

- Signed by CNO ADM Thomas Hayward
- US Marine Corps and amphibious assault not addressed
The 1980s

- 1982 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET brief)
- 1984 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET publication)
- 1985 *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy* (SECRET publication)
- 1985 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET publication revision)
- 1986 *The Maritime Strategy* (UNCLAS booklet)
- 1987 “Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy” (UNCLAS article)
- 1989 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET publication revision)
- 1990 “Maritime Strategy for the 1990s” (UNCLAS article)

1980s: Related USMC developments

- USMC began to emphasize its own capstone documents at the end of the decade
  - USMC DCOS for PP&O reprinted, distributed widely 1940 USMC *Small Wars Manual* (April 1987)
    - Maneuver warfare as USMC philosophy of waging war
    - Culminated a decade of major USMC internal debate

- Development of USMC intellectual institutions
  - Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) reorganized and renamed (1987)
    - Had been Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC)
  - Marine Corps University organized (1989)
  - Marine Corps War College established (1990)
The Maritime Strategy (1982–90)

- Signed by:
  - CNO ADM James D. Watkins
  - CNO Carlisle A. H. Trost
- Amphibious Warfare Strategy signed by:
  - CNO ADM James D. Watkins
  - CMC Gen Paul X. Kelley
- “600-ship Navy” companion piece signed by:
  - SECNAV John F. Lehman, Jr.

1980s: USN-USMC relations

- Easy collaboration on first several versions of The Maritime Strategy (1982–86)
- Creation of separate Amphibious Warfare Strategy (1985)
The Maritime Strategy (1982–90)

How it was written: USN-USMC coordination (I)

- SSG included USMC members from the start
- HQMC staff officers LtCol Tom Wilkerson and Maj Tony Wood actively participated in drafting early SECRET versions
- Col Phil Harrington wrote *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy* (SECRET) with CAPT Seaquist

How it was written: USN-USMC coordination (II)

- CMC Al Gray, PP&O LtGen Carl Mundy inputted, chopped on 1989 SECRET version, signed by CNO ADM Carl Trost
- OP-603 including USMC (and USA and USAF) AOs in mid-late 1980s
- **But CMC almost never a co-equal signatory**
The Maritime Strategy (1982–90)

Key ideas included:

- Very inclusive; showed how all the players might play
  - USMC and USCG
  - USAF and USA
  - Allied and friendly navies and other armed forces
- Showed how new kinds of force packages might play
  - BBSAGs, MARDEZs, MPSRONs
- Some discussion of "littoral" operations
  - Only in The Amphibious Warfare Strategy (1985)
  - Cited as a US Army responsibility (1984–5)
- New USMC OTH and pre-positioning concepts

The 1990s

1991 The Way Ahead
1992 The Navy Policy Book
1992 . . . From the Sea
1994 Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare
1994 Forward . . . From the Sea
1997 Navy Operational Concept (NOC)
1997 Anytime, Anywhere
1999 & 2000 Navy Strategic Planning Guidance
1990s: USN-USMC relations

- CMC cited . . . *From the Sea* and *Forward . . . From the Sea* in the seminal USMC *Operational Maneuver From the Sea* (OMFTS) concept
- But there were no further co-signed CMC-CNO capstone documents (1995–2001)

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1990s: USN-USMC relations

- NAVDOCCOM issues:
  - USMC never disestablished its own service doctrine organization and melded it into NAVDOCCOM
  - USMC never provided a general officer NAVDOCCOM deputy or an alternating NAVDOCCOM commander
  - USN resentment at the “two-way USMC veto of USN doctrine”
    - Need to continue to coordinate with MCCDC
    - O-6 USMC deputy within NAVDOCCOM
  - Continued simultaneous USMC development of single-service vision, concept, strategy, and doctrine publications
    - E.g., CMC signed MCDP 3 *Expeditionary Operations* (1998)
1990s: Related USMC developments

♦ USMC maneuver warfare focus
  ♦ FMFM 1 *Warfighting* (1989)
  ♦ MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (1997)

♦ 12 USMC warfighting concepts developed
  ♦ 1996–8
  ♦ Some Navy participation
  ♦ UNCLAS
  ♦ Widely disseminated

The 12 USMC warfighting concepts (1996–8)

♦ CG MCCDC *Advanced Expeditionary Fire Support* (1998)
The Way Ahead (1991)

Signed by:
- SECNAV H. Lawrence Garrett, III
- CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, II
  - Almost one year in office
- CMC Gen Alfred M. Gray, Jr.
The Way Ahead (1991)

Why it was written:

- To demonstrate that the Navy understood the world had changed and that the Navy was changing too
- To provide a vision with a detailed agenda for the changes the Navy foresaw would be necessary
- To provide a replacement for the suddenly obsolete Maritime Strategy, replacing SLOC defense with “enabling”
- To show links between the Navy and evolving Bush administration policies, refocusing on regional threats
- To provide a basis for new rationales for new, lower 451-ship “base force” USN force level goal
- **To demonstrate Navy-Marine Corps solidarity**
- To answer USAF “Global Reach—Global Power” (1990)
- **Primary targets: USN, USMC officer corps**

The Way Ahead (1991)

How it was written (I):

- Various aborted OPNAV staff efforts had begun, responding to changes in the world (1989–1990)
- Key players: CAPT Dick Diamond (OP-607, later OP-603), CAPT Jim Stark (OP-OOK), and HQMC PP&O
- Discussion venues:
  - Navy Long-Range Planners’ Conference at USNA (1989)
  - Unofficial “Ancient Mariners” officer study group
    - Kicked around emerging naval concepts
    - CAPT Jim Stark (OP-OOK) administered
    - Representation from across OPNAV
    - CDR Joe Sestak and “enabling” concept
The Way Ahead (1991)

How it was written (II):

- Personalities:
  - New CNO ADM Frank Kelso (June 1990)/new EA CAPT Dan Murphy
  - VADM Paul David Miller (OP-07)
    - Former close Lehman Secretariat Kelso, Murphy colleague
  - CAPT Bill Center, CDR Rick Wright (principal OP-07 drafters)
  - (VADM Barney Kelly) (New OP-06)
  - CAPT Dick Diamond (OP-607, then OP-603)
  - CDR Mike Dunaway (principal OP-603 drafter)
  - CMC Gen Gray
  - HQMC PP&O LtGen Carl Mundy and AO Maj Al Heim

The Way Ahead (1991)

How it was written (III):


- Three-way rivalry developed: OP-06, OP-07, and HQMC PP&O
  - Competing OP-06 and OP-07 briefings all through 1990
  - USMC insistence on full equality, heavy emphasis on amphibious expeditionary warfare
The Way Ahead (1991)

How it was written (IV):

- OP-603 “Won if by Sea” briefing circulated, briefed to CMC Gen Al Gray (Sept. 1990)
- OP-07 drafted final “Way Ahead” version
  - Adopted earlier OP-603-incubated “Won if by Sea” ideas
  - CNO ADM Kelso-CMC Gen Mundy-OP-07 VADM Miller endgame at CNO quarters
- Published as US Naval Institute Proceedings, Marine Corps Gazette articles (Apr. 1991)
- Major USMC influence; USN-USMC equality drafting, signing, publishing

Key ideas included:

- “Meeting our presence requirements with fewer assets calls for...new patterns in length and location of deployments, as well as in the composition of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups”
- “Presence; humanitarian assistance; nation-building; security assistance; and peacekeeping; counter-narcotic, counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, and crisis response operations will receive new emphasis as we focus our efforts on developing and maintaining regional stability”
The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ What was new?

♦ Focus on the special nature of naval operations in *littoral* regions

♦ Naval services to “pave the way” for other joint, combined forces

♦ “Enabling and participatory”

The Navy Policy Book (1992)
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

- Signed by CNO ADM Frank Kelso
- **Only passing mention of USMC**
  - Complementary amphibious warfare capability

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...From the Sea (1992)

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…From the Sea (1992)

Signed by:
- SECNAV Sean O’Keefe
- CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, II
  - Third year in office
- CMC Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr.

Why it was written (I):
- To provide a conceptual basis for the shift in US Navy focus to joint, forward littoral, enabling, and expeditionary operations in regional contingencies
- To guide Navy programmatic decisions away from sea control programs and toward power projection programs
- To highlight continuing regional naval peacetime presence, crisis response, and warfighting requirements, despite the ending of global anti-Soviet war requirements
- To demonstrate Navy-Marine Corps solidarity and USN embrace of USMC concepts
- To overcome Desert Storm’s negative legacy in USN
- To demonstrate USN recognition of the importance of doctrine
...From the Sea (1992)

How it was written (I):
- SECNAV Garrett tasked CNO and CMC Nov. 20, 1991
- Three-phase effort
  - Phase I: Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort (NFCPE)
    - Nov. 1991 to Mar. 1992 at CNA
    - Complex, multi-faceted, formal process
      - Large working groups, seminars
      - Three-star and four-star conferences
      - War games
    - Co-chairs: VADM Leighton Smith (OP-06) and LtGen Hank Stackpole USMC (PP&O) (OPSDEPs)
    - Working Group oversight: RADM Ted Baker and MGen M. Caulfield
    - CAPT (Ret) Bill Manthorpe and “Manthorpe curve” presentation
    - Several products
      - Included white paper: The Strategic Concept of the Naval Service
    - NFCPE products influential but not definitive

How it was written (II):
- Phase II: Wholesale rewriting
  - Personalities: VADM Leighton Smith, LtGen Stackpole, BGSEL Tom Wilkerson, CAPT Rusty Petrea, etc.
  - Flag officer inputs, especially ADM Miller, VADM Tuttle
- Phase III: Endgame (more rewriting):
  - VADM Smith, CAPT Petrea, Gen Krulak, new OPNAV N8 VADM Owens, new SECNAV O’Keefe, and CDR Stavridis
  - Endgame coincident with VADM Owens’s new OPNAV Assessment Process and OPNAV reorganization
  - Contractor drafting and polishing support (Dr. Scott Truver)
- USMC very much a co-equal player throughout
  - CMC Gen Mundy had been PP&O for The Maritime Strategy (IV)
  - BGSEL Tom Wilkerson active (had been the principal USMC POC for The Maritime Strategy (I) and (II))
...From the Sea (1992)

Key ideas included:

- "Fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea to joint operations conducted from the sea"
- **Regional, joint, forward, littoral, enabling, expeditionary**
- Shift from global threat to regional challenges
  - Enormous uncertainty in critical regions
- Extensive development of sea-shore littoral warfare concepts
  - *Littoral* reaches as far as 650 n.mi. inland
- Emphasis on Navy-Marine Corps integration
- Need to “structure a fundamentally different naval force”
  - Call for "New Expeditionary Force Packages"
  - Integrated Naval Expeditionary Forces and Naval Expeditionary Task Forces (NETFs)

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...From the Sea (1992)

Key ideas included:

- "Peacekeeping, coalition building, humanitarian ops"
- **Naval “maneuver from the sea”** a potent tool for the JTF commander
  - First discussion of “maneuver from the sea”
- **Mandated actions, including:**
  - Create NAVDOCCOM (alternating RADM/MajGen command)
  - Create “new naval force packages for expeditionary ops”
  - Expand integration of USN and USMC TACAIR
  - Fully integrate SSNs, MPA, and MWF into expeditionary task forces
**Cited references:**
- *Navy Policy Book*
- *Marine Corps Master Plan*
- President Bush Aspen Institute speech (Aug. 1990)
- “Base force” concept (1991)

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Reprinted from:
**Navy criticisms:**
- Many in USN saw USMC influence as too heavy
- Integrated Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEFs) and Naval Expeditionary Task Forces gained little traction in USN
  - Saw change from CATF/CLF command relations as harmful
  - CVBGs, ARGs, and SSNs continued to train and deploy separately
  - Many in USN saw “integration” as “subordination.” Resisted both.
  - Hostility to Marines as afloat NEF commanders

**USMC Criticisms (II):**
- Subsequent Navy programs and budgets not aligned enough with the rhetoric
  - Not enough emphasis in programs and budgets on the littorals
  - Programs and budgets still too “blue water” and “high end”
  - Document developed separately from and subsequent to USN 451-ship “base force” battle force goal; prior to VADM Owens (as OPNAV N-8) force structure changes
  - Amphibious force levels decreased at only a somewhat lower rate than the rates of other ship types. Made up only a somewhat higher percent of total battle force.
…From the Sea (1992)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - Significant
  - Focus on littoral and strike continued
  - Cited in CMC *Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS)* concept (Jan. 2006)

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Signed by:

- CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, Jr.
  - Third year in office
- CMC Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr.

Why it was written:

- Because USN had an unhappy Desert Storm experience with USAF-dominated joint air command and control doctrine
- To fill externally and internally felt need for Navy strategy and operations to become more doctrinally based
- To tie Navy doctrine more closely to joint and USMC doctrine—especially maneuver style of warfare
- To provide a basis for a future family of USN doctrinal publications
  - Part of a wholesale overhaul of USN warfare publication system (NWP 1-01)
  - First of a planned series of six NDPs
- To reinforce concepts in . . . From the Sea
- Primary target: All US military and defense civilians
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

How it was written (I):

- Drafted at new Naval Doctrine Command (est. 1993)
  - CDR Rob Zalaskus (AO) with Col Marv Floom USMC (DEPCOMNAVDODCOM)
  - Mostly fleet sailors. Few had a background in strategy, concepts, or doctrine
  - But also: Dr. Jim Tritten, CAPT (Ret) Sam Leeds (ex-SSG 1), and Floyd Kennedy (CNA Field Rep)
- Strong COMNAVDODCOM command support (RADM Fred Lewis)
- Used USAF and USA doctrine publications as models, but more condensed

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

How it was written (II):

- Adopted the same paperback format as the new Joint Doctrinal publications
  - Advocated by CAPT Peter Bulkeley, Head of NAVDOCCOM Doctrine Branch
- Little AO-level outreach for inputs or to obtain buy-in
- Little early or continuous engagement with outside experts or academia
- Numerous active and retired flag review boards
- US Naval Institute edit and photos; commercially printed
- Oral history of project recorded (Tritten-Zalaskus)
- NDPs 2, _, 4, 5, 6 published
- USN and USMC could never agree on NDP 3 content
  - Dozens of drafts attempted
Key ideas included:

- “While naval forces are built to fight and win wars, perhaps as important is their contribution to deterring conflict”
- “Naval forces prepare to fight and win wars. We also play an important role in preventing them”
- Shift from blue-ocean maritime strategy to joint, littoral, enabling operations . . . from the sea
- Littoral warfare
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Key ideas included:
- Naval services as an enabling force
- Naval operations—other than war
- Humanitarian assistance operations
- Combat terrorism
- Counter-drug operations
- All naval (not just amphibious) forces prefer maneuver style of warfare over attrition style
  - USMC influence

Suggested follow-on reading included:
- Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (1993)
- FMFM 1, Warfighting (1989)
- Army FM 100-5, Operations (1993)
  - “AirLand Battle Future”
- AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (1992)
- Clausewitz, Corbett, Liddell Hart, Wylie, Mahan, Sun Tzu
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

♦ Criticisms:
✧ Deterrence requires more than shows of force
✧ More than one “center of gravity” is possible
✧ Overstated Navy ability to operate autonomously
✧ Not enough on naval operational art; too tactical
✧ Imperfect fit with joint doctrine
✧ Too dominated by USMC concepts
✧ Endorsement of maneuver warfare and NEF concepts downgraded other important Navy equities
✧ Little of substance
   ✧ Substance deferred to NDP 3, which was never signed

Forward…From the Sea (1994)
**Forward…From the Sea (1994)**

- **Signed by:**
  - SECNAV John H. Dalton
  - CNO ADM Jeremy M. Boorda
  - During first year in office
  - CMC Gen Carl E. Mundy

- **How it was written:**
  - **Personalities:**
    - SECNAV Dalton, RADM Phil Dur (N51); CAPT Joe Sestak (N513); LCDR Ed O’Callahan (N513 AO); CDR Ed Smith; **MajGen Tom Wilkerson (HQMC Plans)**; CAPT Robby Harris (OLA)
  - **Development methodology:**
    - SECNAV Dalton tasker for a new framework for a new maritime strategy (June 1994)
    - Drafted in OPNAV N51, with OLA impetus and HQMC participation
    - Heavy involvement of RADM DUR and **MajGen Wilkerson**
    - Workshop series
    - Several related flag officer and contractor writings commissioned
    - Contractor drafting support (Dr. Scott Truver)
Forward...From the Sea (1994)

- Criticisms:
  - The Marine rap on *Forward ... From the Sea*
    - A step backward in Navy-Marine Corps integration
    - CMC signed, but many Marines unenthusiastic
    - Saw *Forward ... From the Sea* as having eroded their gains made in ... *From the Sea*
      - No assertion of unquestioned current USN ability to *command the seas*, as in *Forward ... From the Sea*
      - *Forward presence* emphasis touted a predominantly Navy at-sea capability not necessarily integrated with USMC ops ashore
      - Ditto *ballistic missile defense*
      - *Far inland* ops would pull Navy strike aviation away from the littoral
      - Focus on *jointness and sealift* diluted Navy-Marine Corps team
      - Support in the document for *Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEF)* tepid and non-specific
  - USMC often (but not always) ignored it

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- Signed by CNO ADM Jay Johnson
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Why it was written:
- To stimulate internal USN doctrine and concept innovation and USN contributions to joint doctrine
- To answer some internal Navy concerns that USN forward presence and enabling focus had become stale and even counter-productive in joint, OSD arenas
- **To set forth new concepts of naval operational maneuver and speed of command**
- To present a Navy concept of equal stature to USMC’s *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*
- Not to supplant or compete with ...FTS and F...FTS as capstone Navy documents (and program drivers)
- To highlight that USN not only enabled but also complemented and amplified and was useful post-conflict
- To tie Navy to CJCS Joint Vision 2010
- **Principal target: USN (and USMC) officer corps**

How it was written: Two phases
- I. USN-USMC draft *Naval Operational Concept* (1995-96) (aborted)
  - II. USN-only *Navy Operational Concept* (1996–7)
- **USN mistrust of USMC influence led to a USN-only document**
- SECNAV Dalton insistence that *Forward... From the Sea* remain as a Navy strategic concept and not be superseded during his tenure
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

How it was written: Origins

- USMC developing *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* (OMFTS) concept; wary of F...FTS and N00K “2020 Vision” precision strike emphasis as USN return to “blue water”
- USN wary of NDC, NDP 1; lack of an NDP 3
- OPNAV N513 skeptical of future utility of F...FTS
- Strong CMC Gen Krulak entreaties to CNO ADM Boorda
- So...IR3B tasked OPNAV N513 (CDR Bouchard) and HQMC Plans Division (LtCol Jay Paxton) to plan to develop a *Naval Operations Concept* to guide future planning

How it was written: Naval Operational Concept phase (1995–6) (I)

- NOC intended as a bridge between F...FTS and F...FTS (naval strategic concepts) and present and future USN and USMC doctrine, TTP, across spectrum of ops
- Initially used Business Process Reengineering (BPR) techniques from US industry and USMC OMFTS experience
- Project team created BPR “activity model” (Oct.–Dec. 1995)
  - OPNAV N513, N812; HQMC Plans, PP&O; MCCDC; NDC; SRA
  - Personalities: CDR Bouchard (N513), CDR Pat Tracey (N812), LtCol Jay Paxton (PP&O)
- Documented in SRA Corporation report *Naval Operational Concept Project* (Jan. 1996)
**Navy Operational Concept (1997)**

- **How it was written: Naval Operational Concept phase (1995–6) (II)**
  - USMC drove not only OMFTS but other nascent USMC concepts into the paper
    - Included USMC concepts for non-naval ops
  - OPNAV suspicion of USMC influence on NOC manifesting itself in increased USMC budget share vis-a-vis Navy
  - OPNAV N8 preference for capstone documents to justify current and programmed forces vice innovative changes in direction not reflected in POM
  - Tepid support by NAVDOCCOM for what they viewed as rival effort to ill-fated NDP 3
  - Joint USN-USMC effort terminated after CNO ADM Boorda died

- **How it was written: Navy Operational Concept phase (1996–7) (I)**
  - CNO, OPNAV N3/N5 saw need for USN-only future concept
  - Personalities: CDR Bouchard (N513); VADM Cebrowski (N6); CNO; ADMs Boorda and Johnson
  - Drafted in OPNAV N513 (CDR Joe Bouchard)
    - Emphasized N513 “concepts” vice “strategy” role
  - Heavy OPNAV N6 input (VADM Art Cebrowski)
  - N513 saw as counter to (aborted) OPNAV N00K “2020 Vision”
    - Decried what it saw as “2020 Vision” over-emphasis on decisive precision strike deterrent and warfighting concepts
  - Widely vetted in Navy before signature
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

How it was written: *Navy Operational Concept* phase (1996–7) (II)

- New CNO ADM Johnson a “customer,” not an author
  - Viewed *NOC* as an internal USN document to guide further concept and doctrine development and as a counterpart to USMC OMFTS concept
- CHINFO did not want NOC to compete with OPNAV N8’s contractor-developed *Force 2001: A Program Guide to the US Navy*. Recommended NOC be published only on the web.
- Principal target: USN (and USMC) officer corps

Key ideas included:

- Rapid innovation to “transform the Navy into a twenty-first century force”
- Two key “closely related concepts”:
  - Naval operational maneuver
    - CAPT Bouchard championed
  - Speed of command
    - VADM Cebrowski championed
- USN can serve as afloat JFACC and afloat CJTF
- Forward deployment “hubs” and dispersal from the same
- Effects-based deep precision naval fires
  - Incorporated from aborted N00K 2020 Vision draft
  - Seen as a part of the USN’s concept, but not the centerpiece
- Protection for joint and coalition forces ashore
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Key ideas included:

- **Navy-Marine Corps team**
  - Emphasis on Expeditionary Ops as in *From the Sea*
- Future USN modernization and innovation concepts IAW CJCS *Joint Vision 2010*
  - Most of NOC dealt with the present; last part dealt with the future
  - Fleet Battle Lab experiments
  - Cooperative Engagement Concept (CEC)
  - *Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS)*
  - Integrated joint fires
- Priorities implicit, not explicit

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

*Reprinted from Proceedings with permission. Copyright © Nov. 1997 US Naval Institute, www.navalinstitute.org*
**Anytime, Anywhere (1997)**

- Signed by CNO ADM Jay Johnson
- Key ideas included:
  - Emphasis (priority) on warfighting missions
    - Naval presence was discussed but not highlighted
  - **Navy-Marine Corps “Operational Primacy”**
    - “The US Navy will influence, directly and decisively, events ashore from the sea—anytime, anywhere”
    - “We can and will fight our way through any opposition”
  - Very little on USMC roles


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CNA Historical Paper Series (2009)

- Signed by CNO ADM Jay Johnson
- Key ideas included:
  - Included “Maritime Concept” built on . . . From the Sea and Forward . . . From the Sea
  - Navy focus on “the littorals and the land beyond”
  - Heavily influenced by USMC OMFTS

Cited references included:
- USMC Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) concept (1996)
- USMC Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) concept (1997)
The twenty-first century

- 2002: Sea Power 21 and Global CONOPs
- 2002: Naval Power 21… A Naval Vision
- 2003: Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO)
- 2003: Fleet Response Plan (FRP)
- 2006: Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (SECRET and UNCLAS)
- 2006: Naval Operations Concept (NOC)
- 2007: Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (SECRET)
- 2007: Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1)
- 2009: Navy Strategic Guidance (NSG) ISO PR 11
- 2009: Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12
- 2010: NDP 1 Naval Warfare
- 2010: Naval Operations Concept (NOC)

2000s: USN-USMC relations

- USN-USMC document collaboration
  - Routine USN-USMC capstone document collaboration
    - USMC POC Col King had previously served in OPNAV N513
  - Also:
    - CNO and CMC, FORCEnet Concept (Feb. 2005)
      - Operational-level doctrine
2000s: USN-USMC relations

- But . . . continued simultaneous USMC development of single-service vision, concept, strategy, and doctrine publications, alongside USMC-influenced USN-USMC-USCG “naval” publications

2000s: Related USMC developments

- Continued internal USMC strategy, concept, and doctrine development (I)
  - CMC Gen Jones, *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare* Marine Corps capstone concept (Nov. 2001)
  - USMC *Expeditionary Maneuver from the Sea* capstone operational concept (June 2008)
  - *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025* (June 2008)
2000s: Related USMC developments

♥ Continued internal USMC strategy, concept, and doctrine development (II)
  ♥ MCCDC concepts and related documents
    ♥ *Concept for Interagency Campaign Design* (May 2007)
    ♥ *Evolving the MAGTF for the 21st Century* (Mar. 2009)
    ♥ *Seabasing for the Range of Military Operations* (Mar. 2009)
    ♥ *Concept for Unified Action through Civil-Military Integration* (May 2009)

♥ USMC continued to acquire intellectual attributes of an autonomous and co-equal military service
  ♥ Marine Corps University Press (2008)
  ♥ *Marine Corps University Journal* (2009)

♥ USMC and Potomac Institute set up the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) (2001)
  ♥ At Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico, Virginia
  ♥ To identify potential operational challenges and solutions
Sea Power 21 with Global CONOPs (2002)

- Navy—not sea services—initiative
- Signed by CNO ADM Clark, several other admirals, one USMC general (NOT CMC)
- Why it was written:
  - To push OPNAV cross-functional analyses for USN POM development and fleet creation of new force packages
  - To re-energize sea and area control
  - To advertise the Navy as a joint player and as more than just an enabling force
  - To bring USN and USMC together by elevating Sea Basing status and visibility, expanding ARG to include organic fire support ships (and thus capable of CLF command)
Sea Power 21 with Global CONOPs (2002)

- How it was written:
  - Series of nine US Naval Institute *Proceedings* articles
  - Lead article signed by CNO ADM Vern Clark

Global CONOPs (2002)

- Key ideas included:
  - Implement second QDR (2001) “1-4-2-1” planning construct
  - Downgrade importance of forward “hubs”
  - Increase global presence
  - Widely disperse combat striking power
  - Simultaneous responses to crises around the world
  - New force packages, including ESGs
    - Possibility of USMC command of ESGs
  - Integrate new SSGNs and BMD ships into force
  - USN accepted USMC-backed MPF(F) as important new capability
  - 375 ships; 37 tailored independent strike groups
Global CONOPs (2002)

The Global CONOPs (with 375)  
*Maximum Power Forward*


Sea Power 21 (2002)

- **Criticisms included:**
  - Litany of programs and programmatic packages overshadowed the vision
  - **Making “Sea Basing” a pillar was an unwarranted concession to USMC**
  - Relationship to *Marine Corps Strategy 21 not addressed*
  - No priorities among concepts, force packages not presented

Signed by:

- SECNAV Gordon R. England
- CNO ADM Vern Clark  
  - During third year in office
- CMC Gen James L. Jones

Why it was written:

- To assert visibility of new SECNAV England and his agenda of bringing USN and USMC closer together
- To bring USN Sea Power 21 and USMC Strategy 21 visions and concepts together in one overarching document, endorsed by SECNAV
- To provide a conceptual basis for USN-USMC TACAIR integration—essentially a cost-saving measure
- To tie DON to the “transformation” agenda of the Bush Administration and SECDEF Rumsfeld
- To call for increasing fleet size by 25 percent
- In the wake of 9/11 attacks, to assert that USN’s role in homeland security is primarily far forward, but also at home
- Principle target: USN and USMC leadership

Cited references:

- Second (first Bush administration) DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (2001)
- CMC Gen Jones, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare USMC capstone concept (Nov. 2001)
- CMC Gen Jones, Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Nov. 2000)
- Sea Power 21 (2002)

♦ First joint USN-USMC capstone document in 8 years

♦ Key ideas included:
  ♦ Focus on Navy-Marine team
  ♦ Call for Navy-Marine strike fighter integration
  ♦ Described Marine Corps Strategy 21

  “Homeland Security: We will engage potential adversaries and address threats to our security as far from the United States and our interests as possible . . . Additionally, in partnership with the US Coast Guard and other federal agencies the Navy-Marine Corps team will continue defense at home”

- Signed by:
  - CNO ADM Vern Clark
    - Third year in office
  - CMC Gen Michael W. Hagee

- Why it was written:
  - To lay out a vision for near-term and far-term naval capabilities and operations
  - To lay out USN-USMC contributions to the joint force (including SOF), implementing “1-4-2-1” defense strategy and Joint Vision 2020
  - As USN-USMC input to proposed Joint Operations Concept
  - To achieve USN-USMC consensus on Sea Basing and other naval concepts
  - To expand upon and implement vision of Seapower 21
  - Principal target: USN, USMC officer corps
Cited references included:
- Family of USMC concepts
  - CMC Gen Jones, *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare* Marine Corps capstone concept (Nov. 2001)
  - *Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS)* (1996)
  - *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM)* (1997)
- USN-USMC *Enhanced Networked Sea Basing* concept draft

How it was written (I):
- SECNAV England tasked in *Naval Power 21* (Oct. 2001)
- Initial draft by OPNAV N513 and MCCDC (2002)
  - CAPT Will Dossel, CAPT Tommy Klepper, CDR Tim Groelinger, CDR Paul Nagy (OPNAV N513)
  - Col Art Corbett and staff (MCCDC)
    - Col Corbett had previously served on OPNAV staff in OP-603 (later N513)
  - N5/N51 oversight: VADM Green/ RDML Wachendorf
  - Contentious USN-USMC issues, esp. seabasing specificity
  - Never got beyond three-star level

How it was written (II):

- **Effort resurrected by NWDC, MCCDC (2003)**
  - NWDC: CAPT Brian Barrington
  - MCCDC: LtCol Mike Raimondo
  - OPNAV N513 and HQMC PP&O contributed to end-game
  - OPNAV oversight: VADM Kevin Green (N3/N5) and RDML Eric Olson (N51) (SEAL officer)
  - SOF role highlighted

Key ideas included:

- **Navy-Marine team seeks to do it all**
  - Elevated *ready-force surge* alongside *forward presence*
  - Near-term, mid-term, and long-term (to 2020) visions
  - Meet conventional and unconventional threats
  - Meet nation-state and non-state adversaries

- **Integrated USMC concepts of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM)** throughout

- **Tentative USN-USMC Sea Basing consensus**

- **Call for new, revised version of NDP 1, naval warfare (1994)**

- **Call for more integrated USN-USMC education, training, doctrine, experimentation, and R&D**

♦ What was new?
  ♦ **USN-USMC operating concept**
    ♦ Rigorous look at near-term, mid-term, and long-term
    ♦ Effort to specifically and comprehensively link to joint and sister service concepts, especially SOF
  ♦ **Sea Basing elevated**
    ♦ Surge elevated for first time since *The Way Ahead* (1991)


- Signed by CFFC ADM Robert Natter
- Why it was written:
  - SECDEF and OSD demand for more, faster surge capability from all DOD components, post–9/11
  - USD (P&R) Dr. David Chu remark
    
    “There is in the Navy and Marine Corps a substantial portion of the structure that is unavailable to the President on short notice, short of heroic measures”

- Initially, related largely to Carrier Strike Group availability to COCOMs

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

- Overview:
  - Signed by CNO ADM Mullen
  - A “strategic plan”
  - Principle target: USN planners and programmers
  - SECRET and UNCLAS stand-alone publications; on web
  - Effects-based and capabilities-based planning
  - Used modified Sea Power 21 “pillars”
  - Non-traditional missions not solely sub-sets of MRCs
  - Emphasis throughout on programming for GWOT
  - Risk is inherent
  - Influence: Too late to affect POM 08 directly, but set the stage for A Cooperative Strategy and NSP ISO POM 10

Naval Operations Concept (2006)
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Signed by:
- CNO ADM Michael Mullen
  - During second year in office
- CMC Gen Michael W. Hagee

Why it was written:
- To continue socialization within USN and USMC of new, emerging national security and naval strategic concepts
- To provide internal USN and USMC intellectual stimulus for evolving a new maritime strategy
- To strengthen USN-USMC operational relations
- To replace NOCJO (2003)
- To elevate visibility of naval missions for the Long War/GWOT and homeland defense
  - E.g., maritime security operations, security cooperation, counterninsurgency, ballistic missile defense, information ops
- To promote new Global Fleet Stations deployment concept
- “Written for a wide audience”
  - Principally “to guide . . . Sailors & Marines”
  - Also to promote public, joint, interagency, and multinational understanding of Navy and Marine Corps ops and capabilities
Cited references:
- ...From the Sea (1992)
- Forward...From the Sea (1994)
- Sea Power 21 (2002)
- The 21st Century Marine Corps
- NOCJO (2002)
  - Focus on need for capabilities vs. Traditional but also Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive challenges
- Navy Operating Concept (anticipated, but not done)

How it was written (I):
- USN-USMC Warfighter Talks identified the need for “first principles” (VADM Morgan; LtGen Huly) (2005)
  - VADM Morgan had been stimulating “Principles of War” debate
- New CNO ADM Mullen tasked the drafting of the “Naval Operating Concept” (Jan. 6, 2006)
- USN starting point: Chart of naval principles, missions, etc.
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

How it was written (II):
- VADM Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) and LtGen Mattis (CG, MCCDC) oversaw
- OPNAV Deep Blue—MCCDC/SIG core team formed
- USFF participation
  - Initial USFF concerns that NOC properly its purview
- Personalities: RDML-SEL Phil Cullom, CDR Tom Disy, LtCol (Ret) John Berry (MCCDC)
  - Original OPNAV N3/N5 Deep Blue cog
  - People and cog later moved to OPNAV N5SP
- Endorsement by new incoming CMC Gen Conway in his initial planning guidance

Key ideas included:
- 13 naval missions
  - Forward Naval Presence*
  - Crisis Response
  - Expeditionary Power Projection*
  - Maritime Security Operations
  - Sea Control*
  - Deterrence*
  - Security Cooperation
  - Civil-Military Operations
  - Counterinsurgency
  - Counterterrorism
  - Counterproliferation
  - Air and Missile Defense
  - Information Operations
- VADM Turner’s four missions
- Added nine to Turner list
  - But not “sealift”
### Naval Operations Concept (2006)

**What was new?**
- “Maritime Security Operations” called out and described as a separate Navy mission area
- Mention of “globalization” as a driving force in the world
- “Global Fleet Stations” elaborated on as an important aspect of Sea Basing
- Illustrative historical and notional vignettes
- **Public acknowledgement that internal Navy-Marine Corps discourse “may become passionate,” citing past “volcanic arguments”**

### Naval Operations Concept (2006)

**Criticisms:**
- Relationship to the new maritime strategy unclear
- Process seemed backwards
- Relationship to *NDP 1* (1994) unclear
- **Based on an existing USMC operations concept, but USN concept not yet drafted**
- Too many lists: hard to remember, assimilate, and use
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents:
    - Influenced NWC contributions
  - Precedent seen as useful by OPNAV, HQMC, MCCDC
  - Generated June 2007 USMC revision of its Marine Corps Operating Concept
  - Cited in CMC operational employment concept The Long War (Jan. 2008) and in USMC Vision and Strategy 2025 (June 2008)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

- Overview:
  - Signed by outgoing CNO ADM Mullen
  - A “Navy strategic plan”
  - SECRET stand-alone publication (no UNCLAS version)
  - Developed in tandem with *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
  - Designed to translate strategy into programmatic guidance
  - Extensive strategic context analysis and risk guidance
  - Revised by incoming CNO ADM Roughead within two months
  - Principal target: DON programmers and budgeters

The 2006–7 sequence

- “We knew we were doing the process in a backwards way.”
- “Now . . . we want the strategy to lead”

VADM John Morgan, Nov. 15, 2007
The 2007–9 correction: The “Trifecta”

“The following three documents provide the basis of my overarching guidance to guarantee our continued dominance as the preeminent maritime power”


Signed by:

♦ CNO ADM Gary Roughead
  ♦ During first month in office
♦ CMC Gen James T. Conway
♦ COMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen


What it was:

♦ Billed as a “strategy”
♦ UNCLAS
♦ “Sea Services” (vice USN) focus
♦ Multimedia promulgation
  ♦ Short booklet (16 pages)
  ♦ US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Nov. 2007)
  ♦ Marine Corps Gazette article (Nov. 2007)
  ♦ Naval War College Review article (Winter 2008)
  ♦ Navy Program Guide 2009 chapter (June 2009)
  ♦ DVD, CD-ROM, web
  ♦ Conferences, meetings, speeches, seminars, press releases
  ♦ “Conversations with the Country” and “Executive Seminars”
  ♦ Blogs
Why it was written:

- To change the Navy
- To tie the US Navy into a perceived new national security—and American public opinion—environment and policy era, reaching beyond conventional warfighting and current GWOT operations to encompass “soft power”
- To elevate visibility of—and resources devoted to—preventing wars, maintaining the global system, USN humanitarian assistance/disaster response and maritime security operations, and international cooperation
- To elevate the visibility of Global Fleet Stations and other new distributed fleet deployment options
- To demonstrate US Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard solidarity and highlight their participation in US government inter-agency processes and operations

How it was written (I):

- CNO Mullen formally tasked OPNAV N3/N5 Jul. 2006
  - Deliberate involvement of NAVWARCOL and publicizing of the same
    - RADM Jacob Shuford championed
    - CAPT “Barney” Rubel (Ret) managed and coordinated
  - Workshops, symposia, “Strategic Foundations game”
  - Five grand strategy options identified, developed, and debated
  - Initial “Conversations with the Country”
- October 2006 tri-service three-star TOR
  - Established three-star tri-service EXCOM: VADM Morgan, LtGen Amos, RDML Nimmich
- MSTF established (O5/O6-level)
How it was written (II):

- Phase II (Mar.–June 07):
  - Vetting and winnowing of grand strategy options by drafters, MSTF, EXCOM, and three or four stars
  - One strategy option chosen (in reaction to NWC-developed options)

- Phase III (June–Oct. 07)
  - Tri-service drafting
  - Vetting among four stars; re-drafting
  - “Conversations with the Country” continuing
  - Drafting team anticipated and prepared for counter-arguments

How it was written (III):

- End game (Oct. 2008)
  - Change in CNO leadership
    - ADM Roughhead for ADM Mullen as CNO
  - CNO Roughhead end-game initiatives
    - Strengthened “hard power,” major combat operations
    - Strengthened missile defense, MDA, sealift wording
  - CNA analyses; re-drafting
  - Four-star agreement on ordering of capabilities and imperatives
  - SECNAV Winter briefed
    - Thought “soft power” was over-emphasized
    - Simultaneous “Great White Fleet” anniversary focus
  - CNO-CMC-COMDT COGARD signatures (Oct. 2007)
How it was written (IV):

- The “Conversations with the Country”
  - Face-to-face, non-electronic public outreach meetings
  - Naval War College as OPNAV N3/N5’s executive agent
  - Two rounds
    - Seeking inputs (Nov. 2006–June 2007)
    - Sharing the published strategy (Nov. 2007–Sept. 2008)
- Small, focused groups: three formats
  - Larger-scale symposia
  - Smaller-scale executive seminars
  - Campus conversations
  - Plus aggressive local supporting public relations efforts
- Newport, Phoenix, Atlanta, Seattle, San Francisco, Chicago, New York, Omaha, College Station, Annapolis, Miami, Houston, Portland, Denver, Los Angeles, Raleigh, Durham, Philadelphia
- USMC participation (including CMC)

How it was written (V): Official testimony

- Statements by ADM Roughead, Gen Conway, and ADM Allen before the House Armed Services Committee (Dec. 13, 2007)
- Posture Statements by ADM Roughead, Gen Conway, and ADM Allen (Spring 2008)
Not addressed:

Many (but not all) naval warfare tasks
- Strike, amphibious, anti-air, anti-surface, electronic, mine warfare, underway replenishment not mentioned
- TBMD, ISR, MDA, TSC, sealift mentioned. ASW, IO implied.
- Cooperation with US Army and US Air Force by name
- US industrial base and shipbuilding industry
- Arctic Ocean; Atlantic Ocean; North, Mid-, and Eastern Pacific Ocean; Mediterranean Sea
- Riverine operations and capabilities
- China, Iraq, Afghanistan, “The Long War,” Europe
- “Transformation”
- Seapower 21 framework or vocabulary
  - Even though Seapower 21 remained central to OPNAV Independent Capability Analysis and Assessment (ICAA) program planning process and NWDC concept development

Scant mention:

- No mention of Fleet Response Plan or of importance of surge, except in passing
- Strategic sealift not included as a “core capability”
- Coast Guard constabulary and law enforcement roles received slight treatment
- No substantive discussion of seabasing
- Little on naval coastal warfare
- Only one very general reference to links to force level planning, programming, and budgeting
Influence:

- Immediate and strong within the US Navy
- Informed subordinate USN command concepts, strategies, plans, briefings, operations, and public affairs releases

Cited in:
- CJCS Risk Assessment to Congress (2008)
- CNO and other flag officer speeches and testimony
- CMC operational employment concept *The Long War* (2008)
- DON FY09 Budget Statement (Feb. 2008) (selected excerpts)
- SECDEF *Foreign Affairs* article (Jan.–Feb. 2009)
- Coast Guard Pub 1 (May 2009)
- Ideas and vocabulary informed USN preparations for 2008–9 QRM review and 4th QDR

Limitations on influence:

- USMC and USCG had their own sets of conceptual and doctrinal publications. The new maritime strategy did not fill the same need for them as for USN.
- External influence is limited by the omnipresence of ground campaign issues in OEF and OIF in contemporary US defense policy-making.
  - Navy issues remained unknown to many
  - Even when known, they did not appear salient to some
Influence on subsequent capstone documents:
- Informed revisions to:
  - Navy Strategic Plan (Sept. and Nov. 2007)
  - Naval Operations Concept (2009)
  - NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2009)

Influence on other Navy documents:
- Cited in VCNO POM-10 PLANORD (Jan. 2008) as providing context and priorities to guide POM 10 investment decisions
  - (But not mentioned in PLANORD for PR 11 (Jan. 2009))
- Cited often in USFF 2008 Annual Plan
- FY09 Navy Budget Book (2008) including four-page synopsis

Six strategic imperatives used in USMC Vision and Strategy 2025 (June 2008)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch. 1) (2007)

- Overview:
  - Signed by CNO ADM Roughead
  - A "Navy strategic plan"
  - Principal target: DON programmers and budgeters
  - SECRET stand-alone publication
  - Modest changes to CNO ADM Mullen *NSP ISO POM 10*, signed just weeks before
  - Emphasis on NSP as *the* strategic source document for USN POM development


♦ Overview:
  ♦ Full title: Navy Strategic Guidance in Support of Program Review 2011
  ♦ Signed by CNO ADM Roughead, May 8, 2009
  ♦ “Navy strategic guidance”
  ♦ Principle targets:
    ♦ DON officers and civilians charged with developing PR 11
    ♦ SECRET

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

- Overview:
  - Signed by CNO ADM Roughead
  - “Navy strategic plan”
  - Principle targets:
    - DON officers and civilians charged with developing POM-12
  - SECRET

Naval Operations Concept (2010)
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

◊ To be signed by:
   ◊ CNO ADM Gary Roughead
     ◊ During third year of his term
   ◊ CMC Gen James Conway
   ◊ CMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen

What it will be:
   ◊ Billed as a “Naval Operations Concept”
   ◊ Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard
   ◊ UNCLAS, pocket-sized booklet for portability
   ◊ To be signed Feb. 2010
   ◊ To supersede 2006 NOC
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Why it is being written (I):

- At least three major sets of disparate, contending, successive, and cumulative pressures on drafters:
  1. Define and articulate “how we fight” for sailors, marines, and coast guardsmen
  2. Address the void in USN future concept development, for joint and Navy concept and doctrine development community
  3. Explain linkages between A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and the Navy’s force goal for Congress and defense policy analysts

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Why it is being written (II):

- Also:
  - Replace NOC (2006)
  - Inform Navy positions for ongoing QRM review (2008–9); upcoming 4th QDR (2009–10); anticipated NPR (2009–10)
  - Align with new National Defense/upcoming Military Strategies
  - Set the scene for a revision of Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare
  - Continue close cooperation among the three sea services
    - First time USCG included in a NOC
  - Promote mutual understanding between sailors, marines, coast guardsmen, and joint, interagency, and international partners
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

♦ How it is being written (I):

♦ New CNO Roughead tasked in CNO Guidance (CNOG), Oct. 2007

♦ Drafting began Dec. 2007

♦ VADM Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) and LtGen Amos (DC, CD&I/CG, MCCDC) initially conceived and oversaw

♦ Complex development process

♦ Writing Team, Core Working Group, Extended Working Group; routine OPNAV SITREPs to GO/FOs, Flag VTCs, etc.

♦ Flag Maritime Security Conference (MSC) precept developed and adopted

♦ Discussion series; USMC War Game “Expeditionary Warrior 2008: Seabasing”; Flag venue discussions; CNO-CMC-COMDT CG discussions

♦ Wide circulation of at least five formal drafts for comment

Naval Operations Concept (2010)

♦ How it is being written (II):

♦ Personalities:

♦ Oversight:

♦ RADM Daly (OPNAV N3B/N5B) replaced VADM Morgan (Jan. 2008) overseeing NOC development

♦ VADM Crowder (OPNAV N3/N5) replaced RADM Daly (Aug. 2008)

♦ VADM Clingan to replace VADM Crowder (Dec. 2009)

♦ RDML Thomas replaced RDML Donegan as N5SP (later N51)

♦ RDML-SEL Woods to replace RDML Thomas as N51 (Jan. 2010)

♦ Drafters:

♦ USN: RDML-SEL Doug Venlet (N5SC) (later CAPT Randy Wood), LCDR Mike Mosbruger, Mr. Philip Ballard (later CDR John McLain)

♦ USMC: Maj Hollis, Col King, LtCol (Ret) Berry, Col (Ret) Dobson

♦ USCG rep
Naval Operations Concept (2010)

How it is being written (III):

♦ Successive and additive drafting guidance over time
  ♦ For sailors, marines, and coast guardsmen: “How to fight”
  ♦ For joint and Navy concept development community: How naval long-range concepts were generated and developed
  ♦ For Congress: Why USN needed ____ ships

♦ Long gestation period due to:
  ♦ Difficulties in coordinating agreed positions among three services at many levels
  ♦ Changing Navy target audiences, approaches, and agendas
  ♦ Backdrop of presidential primary elections, general election, administration transition, and QDR 2010 development

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2010)
NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2010)

To be signed by:
- CNO ADM Gary Roughead
  - During second year of his term
- CMC Gen James Conway
- CMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen

Why it is being written:
- Other services and allies requests for USN doctrine update
- Meet the need for “how we fight” document aimed at sailors, marines, and coast guardsmen
  - NOC 2009 draft had changed its own focus from this (mid-2008)
- Bring naval doctrine and TTP in line with A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) and agreed joint campaign phases doctrine
  - Parts of NDP 1 (1994) out of date
- Continue close cooperation among the three sea services
  - First time USCG included in an NDP
- Promote mutual understanding between sailors, marines, coast guardsmen, and joint, interagency, and international partners
- CNO and CFFC desire to enhance role of NWDC
NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2010)

How it is being written (I):

- 1994 edition seriously outdated
- **But revision delayed due to:**
  - USMC-USN differences
  - Low perceived priority by USN leadership
  - NWDC vice OPNAV responsibility
- Various aborted draft revisions (e.g., 2000, 2005)
- Revision tasked in *Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO)* (2003)
  - Little initial movement beyond NWDC efforts

How it is being written (II):

- USMC initially balked at revision; happy with 1994 edition
- USN pushed for agreed TOR (2008)
- **USN-USMC-USCG TOR finally signed (Oct. 2008)**
- Initial drafters’ conference convened at NWDC (Dec. 2008)
- Personality:
  - COMNWDC RADM Carpenter; CGMCCDC LtGen Flynn; Asst COMDT COGARD for Plans and Policy RADM Salerno
  - CAPT Edward Long III USN (Ret) lead NWDC AO
  - Northrop Grumman Defense Mission Systems contractor
- **Drafting of Naval Operations Concept ongoing simultaneously**
- Drafting of *Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11* and *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12* ongoing simultaneously
- OPNAV “Navy Strategic Planning Process” (NSPP) to inform *NSP ISO POM 12* ongoing simultaneously
The foreseeable future

- Tri-service signature and publication of NOC 2010 and NDP 1 Rev. (2010)
- **No other Navy or naval capstone documents currently on the horizon**
  - Navy-only NSG ISO PR 13 anticipated
  - Drafting not yet begun
- CNO ADM Roughead opposed to revision of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* during remainder of his term
This report was written by CNA’s Strategy, Policy, Plans, and Programs Division (SP3).

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