Evolution of U.S. Navy Roles in NATO: Always an Important Part of a Larger Whole

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Abstract
This paper, written in 2004, was catalyzed by a series of conferences held in Europe in the early twenty-first century that analyzed international naval policies and history. Conference participants, including this paper’s author, discussed the need for up-to-date resources to explain NATO’s maritime development to current and future generations of naval officers and sailors, officers of other services, and civilians. In response to this need and under the sponsorship of the US Naval Historical Center, CNA produced this paper, which examines the relationship between the US Navy and NATO through six lenses: the historical context, the global American policy context, the NATO policy context, relations within NATO, relations with other NATO member navies outside NATO, and other NATO navies’ non-NATO activities. This study is intended to provide perspective and context for present and future decision-making as both NATO and the US Navy continue to evolve.

The content of this paper is current through 2004.

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Contents

Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 1
  Overview .......................................................................................................................... 1
  Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 1

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 5
  Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
  Background ...................................................................................................................... 5
  Approach .......................................................................................................................... 6

Preludes to NATO: The two strands ...................................................................................... 10
  Before 1949: The US Navy in European waters ............................................................ 10
  Before 1949: The US Navy as a coalition partner ......................................................... 20
  1949: Tying the two strands together: Joining and creating NATO ......................... 35

The NATO years: Decade by decade ................................................................................. 37
  The 1950s: Building NATO’s “Fraternity of the Blue Uniform” ............................... 37
  The 1960s: Fine-tuning NATO’s maritime nuclear and conventional postures .......... 57
  The 1970s: Facing a rising Soviet challenge at sea ..................................................... 68
  The 1980s: The Maritime Cold War peaks ................................................................. 76
  The 1990s: NATO navies go to war ............................................................................. 88
  Entering the twenty-first century ................................................................................. 104

Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 120
  On the US Navy and Europe ......................................................................................... 120
  On the US Navy, other NATO navies, and NATO .................................................... 121
Executive Summary

Overview

This study:
• Traces US Navy roles in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1949.
• Places US Navy-NATO relations in larger global and historical contexts.
• Draws conclusions regarding those roles and relations.
• Provides a guide to much of the literature on the Navy and NATO.

The study is designed to help:
• Provide perspective and context for present and future decision-making as both NATO and the US Navy continue to evolve.
• Foster further advanced research and analysis in the field.
• Inform European, Canadian, and other foreign readers, as well as Americans.

Conclusions

Among the study’s major conclusions are the following:

On the US Navy and Europe

• The US Navy has been deployed globally and forward, almost from birth, to further US diplomatic, military, and economic policies. Through much—but not all—of its history, the United States has kept permanent forward deployed naval forces in European waters.
• At the beginning of the Cold War and on a few occasions since, the Mediterranean was the most important forward theater of US naval planning and operations. During most of the Cold War, however, the Mediterranean shared pride of place with the western Pacific as the locus of significant permanent US Navy combat-credible forward presence. Especially toward the end of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean and Norwegian Sea also became particularly salient.
• Since the end of the Cold War, however, neither the Mediterranean nor the North Atlantic has kept its former priority. Nevertheless, many factors should continue to yield a mix of permanent and intermittent US naval presence in European waters.
• Throughout its history, the US Navy has periodically—and easily—surge deployed naval forces to European waters, either as independent force packages or reinforcements. Under the new Fleet
Response Plan (FRP), US Navy surges can be expected to increase.

- The US Navy has maintained a highly operational posture. Its high tempo of "real-world" operations has not often been matched by other NATO navies, for which scripted NATO exercises have often been the most demanding challenge. For US Navy ships and aircraft, however, the NATO exercise program has usually been only one among many of the at-sea jobs they have to do, and usually not the most important.
- When needed, the US Navy has usually been able to acquire and use adequate forward base facilities, but it has also depended heavily on the unique organic capabilities of its afloat forces to maintain themselves with full readiness at sea for long periods. Should the US Navy follow through on its current Sea Basing concept, these organic capabilities for self-sustainment should increase.
- The US Navy has never formally organized within its ranks a group of career specialists in NATO matters. Nevertheless, numerous US Navy officers have become prominent in the affairs of the Alliance and contributed to its success.

**On the US Navy, other NATO navies, and NATO**

- Since its founding, the US Navy has continually interacted with the major navies of Europe worldwide. For almost a century, the US Navy has undertaken no major campaigns without allies or coalition partners at sea.
- Throughout its history, the US Navy freely adopted many cultural, tactical, and technological innovations originally developed by European navies. Since the establishment of NATO, the US Navy has especially benefited from innovations from Europeans, Canadians, and others. This continues today.
- Likewise, starting in the nineteenth century, European navies adopted many naval innovations developed in America. As the United States achieved naval pre-eminence during World War II, this innovation flow back to Europe—and to Canada—intensified. It continues today.
- Since World War II, the US Navy has been the world’s (and NATO’s) pre-eminent naval force. Accordingly, the US Navy has supplied—and continues to supply—the NATO alliance with much of its senior naval leadership. The recent radical changes in the NATO military command structure have continued these policies.
- That said, given the increased practice in the US military and the NATO military command structure—and reduced US Navy force levels in the European waters—there appears to be no reason why the positions of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) or the Commander Joint Forces Command Naples should henceforth always be held by a US Navy officer.
The very real success of NATO cooperation notwithstanding, there have often been times when the Alliance has not been able to agree on the advisability of the use of military forces by one or more of its members, even within the NATO area. During such periods, navies of individual NATO members—especially the US Navy—have provided their nations with vital tools of national military policy. This continues today and will continue in the future.

The US Navy has participated in numerous unilateral and multilateral naval operations since the founding of NATO. In few of them have Alliance command structures been used. US Navy participation in multinational naval operations has been in ad hoc coalitions rather than as a member of NATO.

A chief NATO multinational naval success has been in the area of standardization of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures—many of which are used worldwide as well as within the Alliance. Yet even in this area, the US Navy has developed many unique standards, as well as special non-NATO relationships.

Naval technical, operational, and political/cultural interoperability has been a necessity for as long as there have been maritime alliances. Today's advances and changes, especially those by the US government and its navy, pose particular challenges to continued NATO naval coordination, cooperation, and interoperability at sea.

The high levels of combined Alliance naval coordination and cooperation have only recently been matched by similar levels of "jointness" within the militaries of individual NATO nations, especially the United States. As jointness increases throughout the NATO militaries, Alliance bonds among navies could weaken.

NATO—and the US military—during the Cold War recognized distinct maritime theaters of operations. Today these maritime theaters are gone, replaced by conflations of land, sea, and air environments into joint and combined theaters, commands, and force structures.

Since the early days of the Alliance, multinational NATO at-sea exercises have been a primary tool for deterrence as well as improving readiness for war. These exercises have demonstrated Alliance resolve and solidarity and have afforded NATO naval forces opportunities to operate together to hone peacetime presence, crisis response, and combat skills. A major challenge for the Alliance and for individual Alliance navies in the future—including the US Navy—will be to integrate this longstanding and robust naval exercise program into a larger web of joint combined exercises.

The contribution of NATO's navies to the success of the NATO alliance has been considerable. Yet, for most of the Cold War, maritime issues were of secondary concern to Alliance leaders. The post–Cold War years, however, have seen NATO's maritime forces achieve new salience within NATO, especially in the Mediterranean.
• Few other navies in the world—and no others within NATO—have the same high level of domestic influence as the US Navy. Consequently, the US Navy has occasionally been asked to use its own influence to increase that of sister navies. This can be expected to continue.

• At the same time, Allied naval officers sometimes see the existence of powerful forward US Navy forces as a rationale for their governments to stifle their own navies’ growth and development.

• Today, NATO navies continue to operate together extensively and successfully throughout the world, both within and outside Alliance structures, and often far from Atlantic and European waters. Much of the credit for this success is due to the long and rich history of NATO maritime cooperation and to US Navy leadership.
Introduction

Overview

This study:
• Traces the role of the US Navy in the Atlantic Alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (Treaty of Washington) in 1949
• Draws several conclusions regarding those roles
• Places US Navy-NATO relationships within the wider contexts of:
  ▪ The development of NATO policy and strategy over time
  ▪ The centuries-old record of forward US Navy European and coalition operations
  ▪ The US Navy’s global missions and responsibilities during and following the Cold War
  ▪ US Navy relationships outside the Alliance with the navies of other NATO members
• Provides an annotated guide to the most important published descriptions and analyses of the subjects it discusses to aid in further research and analysis

The history of US Navy leadership and participation in NATO is rich and complex. In particular, it cannot be understood properly outside larger contexts, which must therefore be explained. This study helps to enhance understanding of the Alliance and the US Navy’s role in it during the Cold War and the immediate post–Cold War decades. It provides necessary background, perspective, and context for staff officers, decision-makers, and analysts and policy advisors as the Alliance and the US Navy evolve and change. Knowledge of correct background and context is often essential in internal government policy debates, especially to counter bogus “history” wielded by skillful but ill-informed policy adversaries.

The study is designed for European, Canadian, and other foreign readers as well as Americans. It is also intended for readers in new NATO member nations as well as readers in nations that joined the Alliance during the Cold War.

Background

This study was catalyzed by a series of conferences, analyzing international naval policies and history, held in Europe during the early years of the twenty-first century.¹ Conference participants from both

¹ The catalyzing conferences were the 4th Pelagic Meeting (co-sponsored by the European Institute of Maritime Studies & Research (INMER) and the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping), on Kefalonia, Greece, May 9-13, 2001, and the Workshop on NATO Naval
sides of the Atlantic decried the lack of up-to-date resources with
which to explain NATO’s maritime development to current and future
generations of naval officers and sailors, officers of other services, and
civilians. Several participants resolved to fill this void with new article-
length and book-length historical studies focused on their own nations’
naval relationship to the Atlantic Alliance. A seminal compendium of
conference papers was published, with more in the offing.

CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) undertook to conduct the
study of the relationship of the United States and its navy to NATO.
CNA is an independent not-for-profit organization engaged in ad-
vanced research and analysis for a wide variety of governmental and
independent clients, especially the US Navy. The study was spon-
sored by the US Naval Historical Center and the general oversight of
the Directorate for Strategy and Policy on the staff of the US Navy
Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N51).

This document is the product of that undertaking.

Approach

Initial examination of the history of the US Navy’s experience with
NATO revealed that it could be treated either very strictly or more
broadly. That is, the history could focus exclusively on US Navy rela-
tions within the NATO alliance, or it could deal more broadly with those
relationships within a wider context. A virtue of the former approach

2 Key conference participants included Dr. William Rawling and Dr. Isabel Campbell
(Canada); Prof. Hervé Coutau-Bégarie (France); Dr. Jörgen Hillmann, Commander
(Germany); Dr. Ioannis Loucas (Greece); Dr. Massimo de Leonardis and Rear Admiral
Tiberio Moro, IN (Ret.) (Italy); Dr. Victor Enthoven (Netherlands); LCDR Krzysztof
Kubiak (Poland); Dr. Geoffrey Sloan (United Kingdom); Captain Peter M. Swartz
(Ret.) (USA); and others.

3 Dr. Jörgen Hillmann, Commander FGN, directed the initial effort to commission stud-
ies focused on the record of national naval relationships to NATO.

4 The seminal and catalytic volume on the origins and development of national naval
contributions to NATO was I. Loucas and G. Markoyannis, eds., NATO’s Maritime
Power, 1949-1990 (Piraeus, Greece: European Institute of Maritime Studies and Re-
search (INMER)), 2003.

5 CNA grew out of a merger during the 1960s of various naval research and analysis
groups, the most well known of which was the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG).
OEG’s roots stem from a 1942 US Navy decision to apply then-new techniques of op-
erations research to solving anti-submarine warfare problems during the Battle of the
Atlantic—techniques already pioneered in Great Britain. For the seminal British role in
OEG’s establishment, as well as the subsequent evolution of CNA and its components,
see Keith R. Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group: A History of Naval Opera-

6 The Senior Historian of the Navy, Dr. Edward Marolda, provided the initial impetus,
tasking, guidance, and oversight for the Naval Historical Center.
was that it was easily boundable. The downside, however, was that it did not appear that such an effort would prove to be all that relevant to policy students or practitioners, other than a very small group of specialists.

On the other hand, although examining wider contexts clearly seemed more likely to provide more interesting and even useful conclusions, the problem of how both to bind and parse the subject appeared daunting, since “everything seemed connected to everything else.”

Preliminary analysis of the data, however, yielded six important sets of insights relating to the following:

- Historical context
- Global American policy context
- NATO policy context
- Relations within NATO
- Relations with other NATO member navies outside NATO
- Other NATO navies’ non-NATO activities

**Historical context**

The US Navy experience with NATO comes at the end of a centuries-old record of US Navy operations in North Atlantic and European waters, and of ad hoc and formal coalition operations with the navies of other NATO nations throughout the world. These roots should be explored, if only briefly, to fully comprehend the nature of the US Navy’s involvement with NATO and its naval forces. The US Navy had been no stranger to European waters or military problems when NATO was founded, nor was it new to issues of coalition coordination and cooperation.

**Global American policy context**

During the Cold War and post–Cold War “NATO Era,” NATO and its member states have occupied only a portion of the attention of the United States—albeit always an important portion and occasionally a central one. NATO was also, therefore, only one of many US Navy concerns. The US Navy—as a principal policy tool of the United States government in peacetime, crises, and wars—was routinely given global responsibilities and tasks, many of which had little or no NATO connection.

In particular, the US Navy was a major policy instrument of the United States in the Far East, the Caribbean, and the Arabian Sea—areas that fell outside the NATO area of responsibility. Even within the NATO area, US Navy operations in the Mediterranean Sea, for example, were more likely than not to be in support of unilateral US government policies vis-à-vis situations in the Middle East than connected to the
affairs of the Alliance. And yet they were almost never unconnected to NATO considerations.

Also, the Cold War Soviet Union was a global superpower with increasingly global naval interests and capabilities. In peacetime, crises, and (potentially) in war, the Soviet Navy confronted the US Navy all over the world. The United States and its navy accordingly developed and tended a global network of maritime allies, not only those of the Atlantic Alliance. Consequently, the US Navy developed deep allied relationships with numerous non-NATO navies, especially those of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. These non-NATO allied relationships continued after the Cold War ended. To the extent that NATO naval doctrine and tactics were useful to these wider naval coalitions, the US Navy was often in the forefront of those within Alliance councils urging their wider dissemination beyond the confines of NATO.

**NATO policy context**

At the same time, especially during the Cold War, naval matters were only one set of issues that the Atlantic Alliance faced, and usually not the most salient. Most especially, naval considerations were usually secondary—or tertiary—regarding most issues concerning the status of Germany within the Alliance, the command and control of theater nuclear weapons, arms control, and the defense of central Europe against large Warsaw Pact ground force formations. This often led to a lack of awareness of (and interest in) naval matters on the part of much of the political leadership of Alliance institutions, and of the bureaucracies in NATO capitals—including Washington—that were the real centers of NATO policy.

Nevertheless, naval issues occasionally occupied center stage in Alliance deliberations, such as the creation and subsequent modification of the Atlantic and Mediterranean integrated military command structures, the initial debates on nuclear command and control, and the deployment of the Alliance’s strategic nuclear deterrent.

**Relations within NATO**

This is the heart of the matter. The US Navy’s formal involvement with NATO has encompassed contributions to six main types of Alliance activities:

- Strategy formulation
- Military operational and force planning
- Exercises and standing multinational force operations
- The NATO integrated military command structure (used largely for operational planning and during exercises)
- Enhancing operational interoperability through standardization of doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment
- Maintenance of base infrastructure

A seventh Alliance activity was added to the list in the 1990s:
- Conduct of Alliance military operations

**Relations with other NATO member navies outside NATO**

The US Navy maintained numerous relationships with the navies of other NATO allies that did not fall within the formal purview of the Alliance. Some of these relationships—such as at-sea operations responding to crises, navy-to-navy policy talks, or intelligence-sharing—existed well beyond the bounds of Alliance responsibilities. Others—such as foreign military sales and assistance, technology transfers, and non-NATO exercises—had obvious close Alliance linkages. All, however, affected the US Navy’s relationship to Alliance naval matters to some degree.

**Other NATO navies’ non-NATO activities**

As was true of the United States, each other sovereign state within the Alliance had a foreign and military policy of its own, sometimes transcending the concerns of the North Atlantic Treaty. Throughout the early Cold War, several European states had major colonial conflicts to resolve, some of which involved the use of naval force. Later, as European economic, political, and even military integration began to blossom, it was only natural for some steps to be taken to integrate European naval forces as well. Also, each NATO navy has been a political and bureaucratic actor within its own unique domestic scene, vying for internal influence, power, and resources. Occasionally, internal bureaucratic political rivalries have spilled over into Alliance or bilateral navy-to-navy arenas.

**Inter-relationships among these activities**

The bottom line is that all the above sets of relationships can intersect. It is only by exploring each of them that a comprehensive picture of the US Navy’s role in NATO can emerge. This study will therefore address each of them, paying particular attention to formal NATO activities.

Historical context will be laid out first, showing how the twin strands of the US Navy’s long string of European and coalition experiences formed a basis for US Navy involvement in NATO beginning in 1949. Each subsequent chapter will cover an unfolding decade. Analysis of each decade will address all the remaining topics, centering on the US Navy’s role within the Alliance.
Preludes to NATO: The two strands

In 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, the US Navy had been no stranger to European and North Atlantic waters, nor to the special demands of allied naval operations and planning. Global forward operations, especially in the Mediterranean, had been central to the US Navy's history since its founding. Likewise, the US Navy had had an equally long history of forward basing and global combined operations and planning, chiefly but not exclusively with the Royal Navy.

On these twin foundations—Euro-Atlantic and combined—were built the enormous contributions of the US Navy to the leadership and operations of NATO at sea, now in its sixth decade. To provide the necessary context, this paper will therefore first trace the development of these two strands of US naval history before showing how they came together at the founding of NATO in 1949.

Before 1949: The US Navy in European waters

Operations before World War II

During the American Revolution in the eighteenth century, and in America’s wars with Britain and the North African (Barbary) states in the early nineteenth century, American warships had surge deployed across the Atlantic to operate at sea or had landed sailors and marines (and diplomats) ashore from North Cape all the way around to the Eastern Mediterranean.


Throughout most of the nineteenth century, American presidents and their secretaries of the navy maintained a squadron of about five US Navy warships in the Mediterranean to protect American commerce and look out for other American interests. There were also some occasional deployments into the Baltic, although none into the Black Sea until 1879. Europe, however, was only one of the nation’s naval concerns. Active forward US Navy squadrons also cruised off Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

During the American Civil War, the US Navy was preoccupied with implementing President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles’s aggressive forward blockade of the Southern Confederacy in the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, as well as forward offensive amphibious and riverine operations along the Confederate coasts and the Mississippi river system. Nevertheless, Secretary Welles stationed occasional Union warships forward to search European waters for Confederate commerce raiders operating against Northern shipping there—most famously the USS Kearsarge, which sank the Confederate Navy raider CSS Alabama off the French Channel coast in 1864.

On their part, to outflank the Union blockade diplomatically and militarily, the Confederacy sent naval agents to Britain and France to build, purchase, outfit, and deploy commerce raiders and other warships, and to set up forward bases. Most of their efforts in that regard were unsuccessful, but they did manage to deploy some raiders and blockade runners from European ports.

10 Prior to the Civil War, the squadron was styled the Mediterranean Squadron. After the war, it was re-named the European squadron. These squadrons included frigates, sloops, and smaller vessels and occasionally—before the war—a ship-of-the-line. On US Navy operations in European waters during the nineteenth century (and beyond), see William N. Still, Jr., American Sea Power in the Old World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865-1917 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); Thomas A. Bryson, Tars, Turks and Tankers: The Role of the United States Navy in the Middle East, 1800-1979 (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, Inc.: 1980); and James A. Field, Jr., America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969).

11 On the Black Sea cruise of the screw sloop USS Wyoming, see Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 377-8.


13 Blockade runners were more likely to sail from colonial ports in the western hemisphere, especially Spanish Havana and British Nassau and Bermuda.
During the Spanish-American War of 1898, President William McKinley readied an American naval squadron to surge deploy to carry the war across the Atlantic to Spain. It was, however, never dispatched. In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt disbanded the old US European squadron and other forward squadrons around the world. In their place, he created a new, powerful American battle fleet, operating largely in the western Atlantic and the Caribbean. Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, however, directed that surge deployments to European waters be made (and in strength) in the Baltic, the Channel Ports, and the Mediterranean.

Toward the end of World War I, after America finally entered the war, the US Navy operated globally against the Central Powers—at sea and in the air—but especially forward in the North Atlantic, the North Sea, and the Mediterranean. President Wilson and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels set up the first-ever major forward American naval headquarters in London, under Vice Admiral William S. Sims, Commander, US Naval Forces Operating in European Waters. Small US Navy command centers were established in France and Italy. More than half the American fleet deployed in North Atlantic and European waters, including two squadrons of battleships, to reinforce the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet and a considerable number of destroyers and aircraft for anti-submarine warfare and commerce protection. A submarine flotilla deployed forward as well. American warships protected the allied Portuguese Azores from German seaborne attacks.

Between the World Wars, the US Navy by now was second in the world only to the Royal Navy. Its focus, however, was on preparing for war in the Pacific with Japan. Nevertheless, US Navy warships were directed periodically to conduct minor but intense operations in the Adriatic, Baltic, Black, and White Seas, as well as the eastern Mediterranean and the waters off Spain. Beginning in the late 1930s, as

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17 These little-known US Navy operations in European waters deserve more recognition. On the various forward deployed units of the US Navy during the early interwar period, see Bernard D. Cole, "The Interwar Forward Intervention Forces: The Asiatic Fleet, the Banana Fleet, and the European Squadrons: The Battle Fleet Trains while the Gunboats Fight," unpublished paper prepared for the *US Navy Forward Presence Bicentennial Symposium* (Alexandria, VA: CNA, June 21, 2001). On the Adriatic, see A.C. Davido-
fears of renewed war in Europe grew, President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to transfer warships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and to build up the total numbers of the fleet. By 1941, at presidential direction, American Atlantic Fleet units were engaged in combat operations against Axis warships, especially submarines, all across the North Atlantic, including the waters off Danish Iceland and Greenland. On the day that much of the US Pacific Fleet was attacked by the Japanese Navy at Pearl Harbor, the US Navy in fact had more aircraft carriers and destroyers—and almost as many battleships—deployed in the Atlantic than in the Pacific.18

Operations during and after World War II

After America entered World War II, President Roosevelt and his newly constituted Joint Chiefs of Staff primarily deployed the rapidly expanding US Navy fleet to the Pacific. Significant forces, however, were retained to serve in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean.19 A major US Navy headquarters was again set up in London. After the US Navy’s Western Task Force landed General George Patton’s US Army troops in North Africa in November 1942, a US Eighth Fleet was con-

18 On December 7, 1941, four of the US Navy’s seven aircraft carriers, eight of its seventeen battleships, and 91 of its 171 destroyers were deployed or at bases in the Atlantic. For a detailed compilation, see “Locations of Warships of the United States Navy December 7, 1941,” http://www.navsource.org/Naval/usf.htm.

19 Reflecting the global deployment of the American fleet during the war, more than a third of the 14 substantive volumes in Samuel Eliot Morison’s History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1948-60) deal with operations in the Atlantic and European waters.
stituted for subsequent amphibious operations in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{20} A US Twelfth Fleet was also organized under the London headquarters to run the build-up and training of US naval forces in the United Kingdom for the Allied landings in Normandy in 1944.\textsuperscript{21} There was even a special US Navy deployment into the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{22}

As the war in Europe ended, the US Navy, now unquestionably the world’s largest and most powerful naval force, was withdrawn almost completely from European waters. The wartime US Eighth Fleet in the Mediterranean was disestablished, and its few remaining forces were downgraded to a mere task force. The US Naval Forces Europe (NAVEU) headquarters in London was retained, however.\textsuperscript{23} The activities of the small number of ships assigned to it were seen as complementing those of the Royal Navy, which was still presumed to be both friendly and pre-eminent in European waters, the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. The position of Commander NAVEU remained an important one, requiring a full (four-star) admiral to fill it.\textsuperscript{24}

The postwar US Navy focused mostly on operations in the Western Atlantic, off Latin America and throughout the Pacific, but it now also be-

\textsuperscript{20} A good short history of the evolution of the US Navy’s command in Europe during and since World War II is at http://www.naveur.navy.mil/About_NAVEUR.asp?Cat=History.

\textsuperscript{21} After 1942, the US Navy headquarters in London was headed by Admiral Harold B. Stark, who had been Chief of Naval Operations at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack and was an advocate of close allied naval cooperation. See B. Mitchell Simpson III, Admiral Harold B. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939-1945 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

\textsuperscript{22} In February 1945, the command ship USS Catoctin (AGC -5) deployed into the Black Sea to Yalta, in the recently liberated Soviet Crimea, to provide a sea-based headquarters for President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the “Argonaut” Conference with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Catoctin was accompanied into the Black Sea by the Liberty ship SS William Blount and the minesweepers USS Implicit (AM-246) and USS Incredible (AM-249). See Tomblin, With Utmost Spirit, 460-1.

\textsuperscript{23} On the US Navy’s posture in and around Europe and in the Atlantic during the first year after World War II, see Peter M. Swartz, "The Navy's Search for a Strategy, 1945-1947," Naval War College Review 49 (Spring 1996), 103.

gan to deploy to Arctic waters. The size of the entire active force was drastically pared from its wartime peak. The global fleet balance was readjusted, however, so that the US Atlantic Fleet soon became about the same size as the US Pacific Fleet.

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and the Navy’s uniformed leadership reorganized these geographic fleets. They kept the bulk of their ready forces at home, but with the ability to surge deploy striking fleets of carrier and amphibious forces forward across the oceans if the President so directed. A new Eighth Fleet, homeported on the east coast of the United States, became the designated surge striking arm of the Atlantic Fleet in late 1945, but it would never deploy to Europe.

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27 By June 1948, less than three years after the war, there were 149 major active combatant vessels (including 6 carriers) in the Atlantic Fleet, but only 128 (including 5 carriers) in the Pacific. See Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, FY 1948 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949), 6.

To provide surge amphibious striking power, in 1946 the Navy’s Second Marine Division relocated from the western Pacific to the US Atlantic coast.  

Meanwhile, however, the world was changing. Fear of the Soviet Union and a desire to bolster the nations of Western Europe led America and its Navy to reverse course yet again within a couple of years and to build up once more forward in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. US Navy re-involvement in European affairs grew rapidly: President Harry S. Truman and Secretary Forrestal ordered highly visible battleship, carrier, and cruiser task force deployments to Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Scandinavia from 1946 on. Starting in 1947, there was always an American carrier on station in the Mediterranean, and the rank of the US Navy’s commander there had been upgraded from rear admiral to vice admiral.

Also in 1947, US Naval Forces Europe (NAVEU) was redesignated US Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NAVEASTLANTMED, later shortened to NELM), and placed under the direction of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The US Navy’s At-

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32 The CNO was the JCS Executive Agent for NELM, which was co-equal in status with the US Army-dominated US European Command (EuCom). US naval forces participating in the occupation of Germany were part of EuCom, however. For the history of the US military joint combatant command structure and the role played by the US Navy in shaping it, see Ronald H. Cole et al., *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
Atlantic Fleet commander also acquired similar status under the JCS, for which he was given the additional title of Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT).  

submarines also began to probe the waters of the Norwegian and Barents Seas.\textsuperscript{38}

By 1949, the Eighth Fleet had been disbanded. There now existed instead a powerful, balanced, and permanent forward deployed fleet cruising the Mediterranean itself, ready for a wide spectrum of operations on short notice—the US Sixth Fleet.\textsuperscript{39} The next year, a similar powerful and ready fleet was organized forward in the Far East—the US Seventh Fleet. These forward fleets were now the most important elements of the American naval force structure. They were backed up at home by powerful surge fleets (one on each coast) with similar if less readily available capabilities—fleets whose responsibilities also included the training of units for the forward fleets.\textsuperscript{40} These fleets were complemented by independent fleet submarine forces whose post–World War II mission had now become one of forward surveillance and anti-submarine operations.\textsuperscript{41}

The US Navy’s new forward “numbered fleets” and forward submarine forces represented a major historic transformation in American naval

\textsuperscript{38} Forward submarine deployments in both the Atlantic and Pacific were conducted in the late 1940s. In the Atlantic, Submarine Development Group Two (SUBDEVGRU TWO) was formed in 1949 to develop innovative tactics to be used by US Navy attack submarines to detect and destroy enemy submarines. From the start, the submariners believed that far forward operations hard by the Soviet coasts would be necessary. In 1949, four SUBDEVGRU TWO submarines deployed to the Norwegian and Barents Seas for the first submarine-on-submarine exercises. A fire destroyed USS Cochino (SS-345) during this operation off Norway's North Cape. Similar operations were conducted in the Pacific off the Soviet Siberian coast. On the origins and subsequent history of SUBDEVGRU TWO, see Captain Frank Andrews (Retired), "The Evolution of Sub-DevGroup Two," Submarine Review (Apr. 1983), 4-17. On the Cochino disaster, see Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, "A Deadly Beginning," chap. in Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 1-24; and William J. Lederer, The Last Cruise (New York: William Sloane, 1950).


\textsuperscript{40} These were the US First Fleet in the Pacific and the US Second Fleet in the Atlantic

\textsuperscript{41} During World War II, American submarines had independent surveillance missions and operated in support of battle fleet and special operations. Their principal mission, however, was to sink the Japanese merchant fleet in the Pacific and sever Japan’s links with her empire. Following World War II, American submarine officers turned from anti-shipping warfare to anti-submarine warfare as their principal mission. On the changing missions of the US Navy submarine force, see Owen R. Cote, Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the US Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003).
deployment strategy, which occurred just as the Atlantic Alliance was being created. This transformation was occasioned by the recent and ongoing changes in the world situation, US foreign policy, and US naval capabilities, particularly in strike and amphibious warfare and the large-scale replenishment of warships at sea while underway. The US Navy's peacetime employment strategy became one of global combat-credible forward presence (to re-assure friends and allies and to deter or intimidate adversaries) and crisis response. The US Navy's complementary planned wartime employment strategy became one of global forward combat operations against the Soviet Union and its friends and allies, featuring carrier air strikes, Navy-Marine Corps amphibious assaults, submarine warfare against enemy submarines and surface vessels of any type, and control and protection of shipping.

The post-war US Navy also was beginning to develop its capabilities to deter (and, if necessary, to wage) nuclear war. During the late 1940s the US Navy committed resources and conducted experiments to enable the deployment of nuclear-capable aircraft from its forward carrier forces.

Thus, by 1949, an important strand of US naval history—the US Navy's long experience in forward operations in European waters—was firmly in place. The new American forward and surge naval striking fleets and submarine forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and North

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43 On the transformational changes in US Navy underway replenishment capabilities during and after World War II, see Marvin O. Miller et al., Underway Replenishment of Naval Ships (Port Hueneme, CA: Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, Underway Replenishment Department, 1992).

44 The term combat-credible forward presence was not coined by US Navy officers until the 1990s. Nevertheless, it aptly describes the US Navy’s deployment strategy from the late 1940s on. For the conceptual underpinnings of combat-credible forward naval presence, see Linton Brooks, Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence (Alexandria, VA: CNA, Oct. 1993).


Atlantic had now become the centerpieces of US Navy global strategy, plans, policy, and procurement.47

Before 1949: The US Navy as a coalition partner

Overview

This historical strand of European operations was paralleled by—and often intertwined with—a second important strand: the US Navy’s long history of multinational operations all over the world.

For much of its history prior to 1949, the United States as a country remained aloof from many of the concerns, disputes, and interactions that entangled most of the states of Europe. Nevertheless, as one of the principal tools of American foreign policy, the US Navy prior to the Cold War had a history replete with examples of multinational interactions and operational cooperation.48

Bilateral & multinational relationships before World War II

During the American Revolution, the Continental Navy owed its logistic support while in European waters to the seaports of France, Spain, and the Netherlands. Although the Americans were allied after 1778–1779 with those naval powers, combined operations between the navies of America and its European friends and allies were insignificant and undistinguished.49 Meanwhile, the French Navy ensured the 1781 American victory at Yorktown, Virginia, clinching American independence and bringing the war to an end.50


48 For the global operational context within which US Navy participation in most of these multinational operations took place, see Peter M. Swartz and E.D. McGrady, A Deep Legacy: Smaller-Scale Contingencies and the Forces that Shaped the Navy, CRM 98-95.10 (Alexandria, VA: CNA, Dec. 1998), especially 92-6.

49 For example, as a combined Franco-American squadron operation, Continental Navy Captain John Paul Jones’s effort against the British Baltic Convoy in 1779 makes for dismal reading. Yet embedded within that grim story was one of the greatest individual sea fights of all time: Jones’s magnificent single-ship victory on Bonhomme Richard over HMS Serapis. For the latest retelling of the story, see Evan Thomas, John Paul Jones: Sailor, Hero, Father of the American Navy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003) 160-97. Bonhomme Richard’s officers and crew included Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Norwegians, Portuguese, and an Italian. See Samuel Eliot Morison, John Paul Jones: A Sailor’s Biography (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959), 205.

50 On the skillful joint and combined land, sea, and amphibious operations that resulted in the victory at Yorktown, see Barbara Tuchman, The First Salute (New York: Alfred
During its Quasi-War with Revolutionary France in the Caribbean, the re-born US Navy relied to some extent on Royal Navy cooperation and support. 51 And during the Barbary Wars, American warships used Neapolitan ports and British Gibraltar and Malta for supplies.

Later, the US Navy established a series of small forward depots in friendly Mediterranean countries to support its nineteenth century squadron in that sea. 52 At Constantinople, American naval advice helped get the Ottoman Navy back on its feet after the battle of Navarino. 53 During the 1840s, in the Baltic, a new American warship helped the fledgling German Federation try to establish a Navy. 54 Beyond Europe, American naval operations were often conducted in cooperation with European navies, such as landings in Argentina and Uruguay and several operations on the China coast. 55 US Navy and

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53 On American naval assistance to the Ottoman Navy during the 1830s and the role of Commodore David Porter USN (Retired), see John M. Belohlavek, “Let the Eagle Soar,” *The Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 130-4.

54 In 1848 the newly commissioned frigate USS *St. Lawrence* deployed to Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden. The German States, then striving to establish a German Federation, had recently become aware of the need for a national navy and had asked the United States for help in establishing and training one. *St. Lawrence* took four German midshipmen on board for several months' training, and her captain, Hiram Paulding, consulted with leaders in several German cities on what setting up a Navy involved. See John Gerow Gazley, *American Opinion of German Unification, 1848-1871* (New York: Columbia University, 1926) 23-6; and Rebecca Paulding Meade, *Life of Hiram Paulding, Rear Admiral, USN.* (New York: The Baker & Taylor Company, 1910) 88-112.

55 For an example of one such combined operation, see Pegram Harrison, “Fighting Pirates on the Zhu Jiang,” *Naval History* 9 (Mar./Apr. 1995), 35-40.
Royal Navy warships made three combined attempts during the 1850s to lay the first transatlantic cable together.56

In the decade prior to the American Civil War, the US Navy’s Africa Squadron worked with Royal Navy units to suppress the trade in slaves from Africa.57 Even during the American Civil War, the US Navy participated in multinational forward operations (in Japan).58 At the turn of the century, the US Navy was in the forefront of those western navies that participated in the Boxer War in China.59 In 1914, the US Navy’s intervention in Mexico benefited from the on-scene cooperation of European warships.60

All during the nineteenth century, US naval leaders had assimilated the practices and innovations of the Royal Navy and other European navies into their own squadrons, a practice often reciprocated by the European navies.61 Thus European naval strategy and tactics influenced American naval thinkers, and American naval inventions in the fields of steam propulsion, screw propellers, oceanography, ironclad

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56 On the first three (combined) naval efforts to lay the first submarine telegraph cable between Europe and America, see John Steele Gordon, A Thread across the Ocean: The Heroic Story of the Transatlantic Cable (New York: Walker & Company, 2002), 83-123. The fourth attempt—solely British and using a civilian vessel—was successful.
58 In 1864, an ad hoc coalition of British, French, Dutch, and American warships bombarded forts and landed forces against the warlord controlling Shimonoseki Strait. The American contribution was a chartered armed merchant steamer. See Theodore P. Savas, "Gauntlet of Fire!" Naval History 13 (Jan./Feb. 1999), 27-30; and Robert J. Cressman, "To Show the American Flag," Naval History 2 (Spring 1988), 20-25.
60 On relationships off Mexico between the US Navy squadron and warships from Britain, France, Germany, and Spain, see Jack Sweetman, The Landing at Veracruz: 1914 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968).
warships, gun turrets, and underwater warfare influenced European designs.\textsuperscript{62}

The creation of a new American steel battle fleet at the end of the nineteenth century saw an acceleration of this transatlantic cross-fertilization.\textsuperscript{63} The new American battle fleet of that era owed much to its borrowing of European technology and procedures, including advances made by the British in gunnery, by the Germans in diesel engines, and by the French in undersea mines.\textsuperscript{64} American thinking on the utility of navies—especially the work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan—had wide influence in Europe.\textsuperscript{65} American naval technology likewise benefited European navies, as in the 1914 sale of two American battleships to Greece.\textsuperscript{66}


\textsuperscript{66} On the sale of the two US Navy battleships to Greece, see John Thomas Malakasses, \textit{The Greek Naval Building Program in 1910-1914 and the United States: America’s Stand in the Greco-Turkish Rivalry for Supremacy in the Aegean: A Study in American Diplomacy with Greece} (Ioannina, Greece: University of Ioannina, 1978).

Independent US Navy commands included naval air stations in Nova Scotia, Canada; a battleship squadron based at Bantry Bay in Ireland; destroyers and anti-submarine patrol bombers working out of Brest, France; US naval aviation based in Italy and the Portuguese Azores; submarines in Ireland and the Azores; and subchasers on the Greek island of Corfu. See Coletta and Bauer, United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas, 361-74; and Ivor D. Spencer, "US Naval Air Bases from 1914 to 1939," US Naval Institute, Proceedings 75 (Nov.1949), 1242-55.

The US Navy's Cruiser and Transport Force carried 46 percent of the more than two million American troops who deployed to Europe during the war. 48 percent were carried in and escorted by British vessels. See Vice Admiral Albert Gleaves, A History of the Transport Service: Adventures and Experiences of United States Transports and Cruisers in the World War (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1921). On the transatlantic convoys, see Stackhouse, “The Anglo-American Atlantic Convoy System in World War I, 1917-18.”

On the deployment of US Navy guns to the Western front, see The United States Naval Railway Batteries in France, reprint ed. (Washington DC: Naval Historical Center, 1988).

much of their rudimentary technical and operational experience regarding carrier aviation.\textsuperscript{72}

At war’s end, US Navy leaders participated in various ad hoc inter-Allied institutions, such as the Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers, which drafted naval terms for the various peace treaties with the Central Powers.\textsuperscript{73} US Navy technical cooperation with the British and French trailed off, but the US Navy now sought to exploit newly captured Imperial German Navy technology, especially regarding submarines.\textsuperscript{74} The US Navy also acquired European dirigible technology.\textsuperscript{75} Although the United States declined to join the new League of Nations, the US Navy had done some preliminary staff work on a possible League Navy.\textsuperscript{76} The United States did participate, however, in a new International Hydrographic Bureau, initially through the Navy.\textsuperscript{77}

Later, during the interwar period, the various US Navy interventions in Europe were often in the context of coordination and cooperation with European navies, especially the British, French, Italians, and


\textsuperscript{73} US Navy pressure during this “Naval Battle of Paris” to maintain some kind of German fleet after the war as a balance to the Royal Navy, while not entirely successful, prevented the total ban on a German Navy that the British wanted, and provided the basis for Germany’s small post-war Weimar Republic Navy. See Mary Klachko with David Trask, \textit{Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations} (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 127-53; and Stephen W. Roskill, \textit{Naval Policy between the Wars}, Vol 1, (New York: Walker, 1968), 77-78, 85-86. The author is indebted to Dr. John Hattendorf for this point.

\textsuperscript{74} On the US Navy’s exploitation of Imperial Germany’s submarine advances, see Weir, \textit{Building American Submarines}.


Greeks. In China, American naval forces routinely worked in ad hoc coalitions with warships from several western European naval powers. Later, US naval forces operating off Spain used French and Portuguese ports as advanced bases. The interwar years were also the years of the great international naval arms control treaties. US Navy officers throughout this period periodically collaborated with (and/or conspired against) their British, French, Italian (and Japanese) opposite numbers at conference tables in Washington, London, and Geneva.

During the late 1930s, American foreign policy shifted to support European democracies, with US Navy policy and operations in the vanguard. US Navy leaders held ever-more intensive talks on combined planning, military assistance, and technology and intelligence exchanges with their British and Canadian counterparts, and later with French and Dutch naval officers. European (especially British) naval innovations began to flow freely again to the US Navy, including electronics advances, amphibious ship designs, and sea mines. The US Navy was particularly cooperative in providing increased assistance to the French Navy.

78 For references, see above. See also Peter M. Buzanski, “The Interallied Investigation of the Greek Invasion of Smyrna, 1919,” The Historian, 25 (May 1963), 325-43.


82 On the American adaptation of British amphibious ship designs, see Colonel Don P. Wycoff, USMC (Retired), "Let There Be Built Great Ships . . . ," US Naval Institute, Proceedings 108 (Nov. 1982), 51-57. In 1940, the British provided the US Navy with technology to jump-start American development of a new generation of sea mines for offensive mining operations. See Duncan, America's Use of Sea Mines, 118-27. Actual offensive naval operations with these new mines would not occur until 1942.

83 On pre-war US Navy assistance to and cooperation with the French Navy, especially regarding the transfer of US Navy dive bombers, see John McVickar Haight, Jr., American Aid to France, 1938-1940 (New York: Atheneum, 1970). On the deliberate use of an American warship with a French name to transfer French bullion out of the country dur-
Following the Anglo-American "Destroyers-Bases Agreement" of 1940, the US Navy transferred 50 old American destroyers to the Royal Navy and in return acquired an extensive new advanced base system in British colonies in the eastern Atlantic.\(^{84}\) In May of 1941, it was an American naval aviator, co-piloting a new US-built Royal Air Force PBY Catalina patrol plane, who first spotted the German battleship *Bismarck* after its disappearance following its sinking of HMS *Hood*.\(^{85}\) In July 1941, a US Navy Marine Defense Battalion replaced British troops in the occupation of Danish Iceland, and US Navy maritime patrol aircraft began to operate from the island the following month.\(^{86}\)

By late 1941, President Roosevelt had made the US Navy an operational ally of the British and Canadians in everything but formal designation. US Navy anti-submarine forces were operating and coordinating with their Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy counterparts in the North Atlantic, routinely and in strength, and taking losses at sea.\(^{87}\) A committee to coordinate multinational military communications had been set up.\(^{88}\) A US Navy transport and escort force was at sea in the South Atlantic delivering 20,000 British troops from Canada to Iraq.\(^{89}\) By the time America entered the war, following the Japanese attacks on American, British, and Dutch forces in the Pacific, the US government and its Navy were already deeply committed to global combined naval planning and operations.

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\(^{89}\) This distinctly un-neutral late-1941 US Navy operation is recounted in “Convoy William Sail 12X (Task Force 14),” at http://www.cofepow.org.uk/pages/ships_convoy_william_sail.htm.
The watershed: Bilateral & multinational relationships during & after World War II

The scale of Allied naval cooperation during World War II was unprecedented, and it served as a template for further cooperation once the war ended.\(^{90}\) Beginning in January 1942, US Navy and Royal Navy leaders and staff officers sat as members of the new Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff organization.\(^{91}\) By early 1942, an American-British-Dutch-Australian Supreme Command (ABDACOM) had been cobbled together in Southeast Asia, but it was unable to stem the Japanese onslaught. At the Battle of the Java Sea, American warships were among those lost in Royal Netherlands Navy Admiral Karel Doorman’s vain attempt to hold the line at sea.\(^{92}\) Meanwhile, the US Navy sent forces to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean in 1942 to reinforce the British, and a British carrier reinforced the US Pacific Fleet in 1943.\(^{93}\)

In the Atlantic, the British, Canadian, and American navies and air forces battled the Nazi German U-boat fleet under a variety of coordinated command arrangements, but never under a unified and integrated combined theater-wide Atlantic command.\(^{94}\) At the tactical level, however, integrated ad hoc multinational Allied task units were often created, including the celebrated US Navy-led Anglo-American-


\(^{91}\) On the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see Vernon E. Davis, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: Volume I: Origin of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972).


Canadian-Polish escort unit “Heineman’s Harriers.” From late 1942 through 1944, large American naval forces served under senior Royal Navy commanders successively off North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Normandy. The naval portion of the last big Allied landing—the landing of Allied armies in the south of France in 1944—was, however, under US Navy command.

Throughout the war, the smaller Allied navies normally worked under British, not American command. Toward the end of the war, a British Pacific Fleet—including some Canadian units—served under US Navy commanders in their final campaigns against Japan.

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Also throughout the war, the US Navy and its Canadian, British, and other counterparts achieved unprecedented levels of operational and technical interoperability and cooperative data exchanges. A Washington-headquartered Combined Communications Board (CCB) superseded the London-based inter-allied communications committee set up just before America’s entry into the war. American Lend-Lease programs put almost 2,000 US-built warships and numerous small craft into Allied hands. As the war progressed, Allied naval aviators—especially in the Royal Navy—flew predominantly American naval aircraft. Significant assistance was rendered to the Free French Navy. Numerous foreign warships, including British and French carriers, battleships, and cruisers were repaired and modernized in American shipyards. Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation was particularly close and productive.

Numerous innovations and improvements in naval technology and procedures were borrowed back and forth across the Atlantic. By

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101 The London-based Associated Communications Committee set up in London in November 1941 became the London Communications Committee after US entry into the war. In July 1942 it was merged into the Combined Communications Board (CCB) in Washington. CCB membership consisted of representatives of the three British services, the US Army and Navy, and one representative each from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. See Admiral Furer, *Administration of the Navy Department in World War II*, 655; and Commander Robert Howell RN, “Aus-Can-What?” *Signal* 37 (Sept. 1982), 35.


103 Allied use of American aircraft during the war, due to their superiority over British and other models, is a central theme of Norman Polmar and Dana Bell, *One Hundred Years of World Military Aircraft* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004).


106 Among the myriad examples of transatlantic tactical and technological transfers during the war was the celebrated “Thach Weave” fighter tactic, which was used by US Navy carrier aviators in the Pacific War and had British roots. The US Navy’s long-range,
war’s end, large numbers of US Navy bases had been established throughout the British Isles and in several other European countries and their colonial territories, including British Bermuda, Danish Greenland, and the Portuguese Azores.\textsuperscript{107}

During the early post-war period, most of these naval bases were closed down, including the bases on Iceland and in the Azores. Some small facilities remained in Britain, Germany, French Morocco, and (for a time) Italy. Significantly, the US Navy did not close its European headquarters in London, nor its communication station in Londonderry. Rather, it continued to support a major US Navy peacetime headquarters and communications nodes forward on foreign soil despite the end of the war.\textsuperscript{108} The bases in French Morocco—with their airfield and communications facilities—were particularly useful, especially for intelligence gathering.\textsuperscript{109} Specially configured US Navy land-based patrol bombers flew from Morocco to the Baltic and Adriatic on electronic intelligence-gathering missions during the last half of the 1940s.\textsuperscript{110}

Although Lend-Lease and most wartime command arrangements were terminated, US Navy relations with the British and Canadians stayed close in many areas, including data exchanges, discreet staff visits, and (later) war planning and exercises.\textsuperscript{111} Both the Combined Chiefs


\textsuperscript{108} On the continuity of US Navy operations in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, from 1941 through the 1970s, see Coletta and Bauer, \textit{United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas}, 342-4.

\textsuperscript{109} A “Port Lyautey Base Technical Agreement” between the US Navy and the French Navy was signed in Paris in 1947, allowing the US Navy to continue to maintain facilities in Morocco, despite the end of World War II and the lack of any formal alliance yet between the United States and France. See Leon Borden Blair, \textit{Western Window in the Arab World} (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1970), 126-9.


of Staff wartime organization and the Combined Communications Board (CCB) were finally dissolved in 1949, but new Washington-based institutions were created to carry on the work of the CCB.112 US Navy warships and aircraft continued to have unfettered use of the British global base system.

Despite the end of World War II hostilities and the roll-up of bases, the early post-war US Navy found itself called upon to respond to a steady stream of crises around the world, some in cooperation with its former allies.113 In a residual post-war action reminiscent of those in the eastern Mediterranean and Adriatic a quarter century before, US Navy warships coordinated their operations with the Royal Navy in support of the Allied position in Trieste against communist Yugoslav pressures. US Navy warships also cooperated closely with their Royal Navy counterparts along the China coast.114 Relations with the navy of Canada—the only formal American ally in the years just after the war—remained close as the Canadians began to turn more towards the US Navy and away from the Royal Navy for their equipment and doctrine.115 In 1947, the US Navy used its wartime base at Argentia, British Newfoundland, for cold weather operational exercises.116

At the same time, relationships were established with former officers of the defeated German Navy, both to help man maritime patrol and har-

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112 On the Combined Communications Board (CCB) in the late 1940s, see Captain Kent, Signal! 169-70. On the CCB’s termination and its succession by new Anglo-American institutions, with Commonwealth participation, see Howell, 35.


114 For example, in November 1948 and April 1949, both US Navy Forces Western Pacific and Royal Navy cruisers deployed to Shanghai to protect American and British nationals. The Royal Navy force included a Canadian destroyer for a few months in 1949. See Lieutenant Commander Richard Gimblett CN, “Prism to the Past: The Post WW II Royal Canadian Navy Seen through the Cruise of HMCS Crescent to China, 1949,” in Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, eds., Canada’s Pacific Naval Presence: Purposeful orPeripheral (Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1999), 98-109.

115 The literature on the post-war Royal Canadian Navy is large, and it necessarily covers US-Canadian naval relations, including the turn toward US Navy materiel and procedures. See, for example, Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), especially 168-71 and 178-81.

116 On the cold weather exercise in Newfoundland (not yet a part of Canada), see James S. Santelli, A Brief History of the 8th Marines (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1976), 54.

Also under the terms of the Peace Treaty, US forces in Italy had to give up base facilities they had acquired during and since the war. Although this made the positions of the US Army and Air Force in Italy untenable, the US Navy could still operate in the Mediterranean, since it depended far less on shore bases.

To keep the post-war peace, a new world organization—the United Nations (UN)—had been set up at war’s end. Its original vision included international military forces, including international naval forces. Accordingly, the United States assigned notable US Navy officers to UN headquarters in New York to participate in a new UN Security Council (UNSC) Military Staff Committee (MSC).\footnote{The first senior US Navy officer appointed as representative of the CNO on the UNSC MSC was the brilliant and irascible Pacific War veteran Admiral Richmond Kelly.} The MSC became...
deadlocked early on, however, and never achieved much.121 A few US Navy units were placed under UN command and (with a French mine-sweeper) flew the UN flag in support of peacemaking efforts in the Middle East, in the aftermath of the declaration of independence by the new Jewish state of Israel.122

At the same time, as civil war raged in Greece and Soviet pressures intensified on Turkey, the US Navy began programs of military assistance to the navies of those beleaguered nations, supplementing and eventually taking over programs begun during and just after World War II by the Royal Navy.123 Little new American aid was forthcoming, however, to the Netherlands Navy in its ongoing war with Indonesian nationalists, or to the French Navy in its war against Communist revolutionaries in Indochina.124

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122 Three US Navy destroyers and a French warship were placed under United Nations command in 1948 in support of a United Nations mediator enforcing an Arab-Israeli truce. A US Navy carrier (without an air group) and an amphibious attack cargo ship (AKA) also supported the UN effort. This was the first instance of US Navy warships flying the UN flag. See Frank Uhlig, Jr., “The First United Nations Force,” US Naval Institute, Proceedings 77 (Feb. 1951), 201; and Amitzur Ilan, Bernadotte in Palestine, 1948: A Study in Contemporary Humanitarian Knight-Errantry (New York: St. Martin’s press, 1989).


Thus, by the time the NATO alliance was established, the US Navy had a long and rich history of cooperation with foreign navies, culminating in the enormous Allied planning, operational, and technical efforts of World War II—efforts that were still continuing (albeit at a reduced level) in the immediate postwar years.

1949: Tying the two strands together: Joining and creating NATO

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 resulted in a joining of both strands of the US Navy’s experience: operations in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, plus combined operations and other multinational relationships worldwide. American naval war plans, the reborn American naval presence in the northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean, and continuing cooperative efforts with the British, Canadians and others had to be integrated into new, evolving, and robust Alliance plans, structures, and operations.

New NATO institutions and plans

The North Atlantic Treaty authorized creation of a council of its members (the North Atlantic Council, or NAC) and subordinate multinational Alliance institutions. To facilitate military planning, the NAC created allied regional planning groups for North America, Western Europe, Northern Europe, the North Atlantic, and Southern Europe and the Western Mediterranean. The US Navy’s Atlantic Fleet commander chaired the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group (NAORPG).

Much British, Canadian, and American trilateral war planning became subsumed within new Atlantic Alliance plans. Efforts to achieve in-

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125 There is a large literature on the founding and early development of NATO. See especially Lord Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954* (NATO: 1955).
127 NATO’s 12 founding members included naval powers Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States (as well as Iceland and Luxembourg).
creased standardization among the American, British, and Canadian navies also quickened, and a NATO board was created to promote standardization throughout the Alliance.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{130} On early NATO standardization efforts, see Trevor Taylor, \textit{Defence Technology and International Integration} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 17.
The NATO years: Decade by decade

The 1950s: Building NATO’s “Fraternity of the Blue Uniform”\textsuperscript{131}

Global American policy context

The 1950s saw the expansion of the nation’s alliance system throughout the world, as the United States became the leader of a global coalition aimed at containing the Soviet Union, the newly established Peoples Republic of China, and other communist states.\textsuperscript{132} Thus the US Navy found itself formally partnering in some way not only with the other NATO navies but also with dozens of other navies in the Middle East, Northeast and Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Latin America. To provide visible and potent forces to stiffen America’s coalitions and carry out other American missions, the US Navy was directed to maintain a powerful permanent forward striking fleet (the US Seventh fleet) afloat in the western Pacific, as well as the similar US Sixth fleet in the Mediterranean.

The United States went to war in Korea in 1950 to help South Korea block aggression from the north, using significant US ground, naval, and air forces. It also reacted repeatedly to crises around the world over the decade with shows of force, often using naval forces. The most significant of these crises occurred in the Taiwan Straits, the Caribbean, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Berlin. America’s military commitments during the Cold War were always global.\textsuperscript{133} American naval requirements in the North Atlantic Treaty area, therefore, always had to be balanced against those in the Far East and elsewhere, especially after the start of the Korean War in June 1950.

\textsuperscript{131} The phrase “Fraternity of the Blue Uniform” is borrowed from the title of Joel Sokolsky’s analysis of the contributions of Admiral Richard Colbert to naval multilateralism from the 1940s through the 1970s. See Joel J. Sokolsky, \textit{The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform: Admiral Richard G. Colbert, US Navy and Allied Naval Cooperation} (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991)

\textsuperscript{132} During the 1950s, the United States entered into numerous mutual security and defense treaties, including agreements with Spain, Japan, South Korea, the Republic of China on Formosa, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand. It affiliated itself with a new Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and a new Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and it developed further defense relationships with Latin American republics under the 1947 Rio Pact.

\textsuperscript{133} For comparisons among US and other naval forces deployed across various regions of the world from 1946 through 1986, see Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr. et al., \textit{Trends in Force Levels and Disposition of Major Navies Since World War II} CNR 145 (Revised), (Alexandria, VA: CNA, June 1989).
Forward presence and crisis response in Europe

Throughout the 1950s, the US government maintained a potent combat-credible permanent naval force forward in the Mediterranean, comprising some 30 to 60 warships, including two or three aircraft carriers and a squadron of amphibious ships loaded with US marines.134

This US Sixth Fleet force was used for national and bilateral as well as Alliance purposes, most importantly during the various crises over Trieste in the early 1950s (in coordination with Royal Navy warships); humanitarian operations following earthquakes in Greece in 1953; the Suez Crisis of 1956, when United States policy split sharply with that of NATO allies Britain and France; and the Lebanon Crisis of 1958, when a Royal Navy carrier task force was also on scene to lend support.135 At Suez and off Lebanon, the Sixth Fleet was reinforced by powerful naval forces surge deployed from the United States.

Nevertheless, by the end of the 1950s, the Mediterranean and the Sixth Fleet had ceased to be the sole or even central focus of global American naval policy, strategy, and operations. Even within NATO—and especially within the US Navy—there were now growing concerns for the security of the Northern flank and the Norwegian Sea.136

Meanwhile, the US Navy had become an important domestic bureaucratic actor in the emerging US national security structure. NATO’s founding year had been a particularly traumatic one for the US Navy leadership in Washington, then engaged in intense, high-level domestic inter-service arguments to ensure the Navy’s continued important

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134 On Sixth Fleet force levels during the 1950s, see Dur, “The Sixth Fleet,” 160. See also Kennedy et al., Trends in Force Levels and Disposition of Major Navies Since World War II; and Commander Gravatt, US Navy Ship-Days in the Mediterranean.
role in America’s defense establishment. By the 1950s, the Navy’s role in councils of government was secure. Nevertheless, the most influential American military arm during the decade was the US Air Force and its strategic Air Command, given its centrality to emerging American concepts of the importance of strategic nuclear deterrence.

Globally, the mid-1950s saw the Western Pacific increase in salience in US Navy eyes for a variety of international, foreign policy, and bureaucratic political reasons. The US Navy was deployed in response to numerous crises along the Korean, Chinese, and Vietnamese littorals. Accordingly, the US Navy bristled under US and NATO war planning constraints that would “swing” Pacific Fleet forces—especially carriers—to NATO theaters in time of crisis or war. Getting out from under the strictures of a “swing strategy” would become a central US Navy policy goal throughout the duration of the Cold War.

The US Navy maintained a stronger position within American society and government than did most of its NATO sister navies in theirs—even the Royal Navy. Allied naval leaders began to routinely press the US Navy to use its influence in Washington and in high Alliance councils to argue for the importance of their own roles within both NATO and their own countries’ defense establishments.

The NATO policy context
The North Atlantic Alliance itself responded to the attack in Korea by organizing a new multinational allied command structure, on land and

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137 On the disagreements within the US defense establishment during the late 1940s, see Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950, (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994).
139 On the US Navy’s engagement in the Western Pacific during the 1950s, see Hooper et al., The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, Volume I. See also Edward J. Marolda, “Hostilities Along the China Coast during the Korean War,” in Robert W. Love Jr. et al., eds., New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Eleventh Naval History Symposium (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 351-63.
141 The Royal Netherlands Navy and the Spanish and Portuguese navies during the Franco and Salazar eras probably had domestic prestige and influence comparable to the US Navy.
at sea, throughout the Treaty area. It also abolished most of the regional planning groups. The Treaty area itself was expanded in 1952 to include Greece, Turkey, and allied forces in the Mediterranean (including the Black Sea).

The US Navy and NATO

Organizing NATO command structures at sea

At first there was an enormous amount of discussion and debate within the Alliance regarding the strategy, organization, and force structure of NATO at sea—one of the few times in the history of the Alliance when naval issues became of central concern to national and NATO policy-makers. The dialogue was mostly between the US Navy and the Royal Navy, but the US Army, the French Navy, the Canadians, and other entities were important players as well. Sometimes even the American president and the British prime minister became involved. What emerged was a NATO naval organization commanded at the top mostly by Americans, but with considerable British influence at most secondary levels.

In Europe, a new Allied Command Europe (ACE) was created as a Major NATO Command (MNC), answerable to the NAC. It was initially commanded by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower and later by a succession of other American generals—mostly from the US Army—designated as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This command subsumed the Mediterranean and Black

142 For an argument that the new NATO command arrangements were simply the logical outgrowth of the World War II Allied command structure, see Maloney, *Securing Command of the Sea*, 5, 25.
143 Only the Canada-US Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG) was retained.
144 For the 1951 *Greece-Turkey Protocol* to the North Atlantic Treaty, see Lord Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years*, 20-1.
146 On the dominant role of US Navy and Royal Navy commanders in the NATO command structure and their relationships with each other, see ibid., 158-71.
147 Following Eisenhower’s term, SACEUR became a double-hat of the officer appointed to the position of CINCEUR within the American national military command structure. That officer normally spent most of his time on Alliance matters and delegated the actual management of the US European Command to his deputy. Thus the Deputy CINCEUR had a more powerful position in the US chain-of-command than the title implies (or was true of other American deputy combatant commander). As time went on, the European Command evolved from being a largely US Army command to a true joint command,
Seas and all allied naval forces deployed there. Its southern region, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), was always commanded by a US Navy admiral—the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH)—and included allied ground and air forces. It also included, in time of war, the US Sixth Fleet combined with some other allied contributions to form NATO’s Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFOR SOUTH). CINCSOUTH’s headquarters were established in Naples.

ACE also included an Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) command, encompassing Norway and Denmark and the Baltic Straits. Initially, the Norwegians desired a US Air Force officer as commander-in-chief. Eisenhower’s deputy, British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, desired an Army general. The Royal Navy was reluctant to assume responsibility. Yet, General Eisenhower’s strong preference for a Royal Navy admiral commanding on his northern flank won out, at least initially. Eisenhower’s strategic concept was to have powerful American and British naval striking forces under his
command on both NATO European flanks, with NATO’s ground and air forces concentrated in the center.

Likewise, an Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) was also created as an MNC, equal in status to ACE. Its commander was designated the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), and the position was filled by the US Navy’s Atlantic Fleet commander (who was already the American joint Atlantic theater commander). ACLANT included both functional and geographical subordinate commands. For the US Navy, the most important of these were the American-led Striking Fleet Atlantic (STRIKFLTLANT)—at the core of which were the carrier-based nuclear-capable attack aircraft of the US Second Fleet—and the various submarine commands. ACLANT, like the joint US Atlantic Command, encompassed a large, coherent maritime theater: the entire North Atlantic (less the English Channel and southern North Sea, which were under CINCCHAN).

**NATO naval roles and missions**

In the view of Eisenhower and others, SACLANT’s principal wartime mission would be to ensure the reinforcement and re-supply of ACE from North America, doubtless through escorting convoys across the Atlantic. SACLANT, however, would evolve into a command focused not only on protecting the sea lines of communication, but also on supporting AFNORTH’s under-strength forces in Norway and Denmark, and on preventing the growing Soviet Navy from emerging from

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155 Unfortunately, there is no history of ACLANT available, nor have many ACLANT records survived into the twenty-first century.

156 The joint and combined positions of Commander-in-Chief, US Atlantic Command and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic were subsequently separated from the US Navy administrative position of Commander-in-Chief, US Atlantic Fleet, in 1985.

157 The ACLANT command structure was largely put in place during 1952. Allied agreement on command of ACLANT’s subordinate Iberian-Atlantic (IBERLANT) Command, however, would not be agreed to until 1967. See Maloney, Securing the Sea, 164-9.

158 As with the Striking and Support Forces in the Mediterranean, keeping NATO’s Atlantic strike fleet under American command satisfied American legal requirements regarding US operational control over nuclear weapons. From the start, however, STRIKFLTLANT always had a significant Royal Navy component, as well as contributions from other NATO navies. British nuclear-capable carrier-based aircraft entered the Royal Navy—and the Striking Fleet Atlantic—in 1959. For an example of planned STRIKFLTLANT US Navy and Royal Navy force levels in the 1950s, see Eric Grove with Graham Thompson, Battle for the Fiords: NATO’s Forward Maritime Strategy in Action (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 10.

159 The concept of the North Atlantic as one unified theater of operations—and always commanded by a naval officer—was thus an artifact of the Cold War. It had not been treated as a coherent maritime military theater during World Wars I or II, nor would it continue to be so treated once the Cold War ended.

160 SACEUR also worried that NATO continental European members (especially France and the Netherlands) were putting too many resources into their navies that could be better spent—in his view—on ground and air forces.
its ports into the North Atlantic at all. The US Navy generally supported this SACLANT position, privately and in public, although its public voice would be somewhat muted during the 1960s and 1970s.

Likewise, US and allied army and air force officers with NATO leadership and planning responsibilities tended to view the US Pacific Fleet and most of the US Marine Corps as reinforcements or strategic reserves for US forces in Europe. On the other hand, the US Navy—and US Pacific allies—thought that the Pacific Fleet would have its hands full right where it was, participating in what would inevitably be a global war with the Soviet Union, a Eurasian superpower with Pacific territory, interests, and vulnerabilities. The marines accepted a role as SACEUR’s strategic reserve as an option, but they saw that role as being best played out on one or both of ACE’s flanks, rather than in the center as part of the great mass of NATO ground forces deployed there.161

Although many of the top military jobs in NATO were staffed by Americans, they (like other NATO commanders) were served in their planning, exercising, and other functions by international staffs manned by officers from many NATO nations. This was even true of those commanders—such as SACLANT, the striking fleet commanders, and (later) CINCSOUTH—who also had a set of American national responsibilities (and separate American staffs). At NATO headquarters, US Navy representatives from Washington sat on numerous planning committees with allied colleagues from Ottawa and European capitals. Thus from NATO’s earliest days, US Navy officers became well experienced in leading, working with, and working for officers of allied navies, and vice-versa.

The US Navy as the Alliance’s naval leader

American naval leadership in the Alliance was based, in American eyes, on America’s vast and global naval experience in World War II and on the huge size, power, and modern characteristics of the US Navy’s postwar fleets when compared to the fleets of the Canadians, Continental Europeans, and even the Royal Navy. This was a bitter pill to swallow for many officers in the Royal Navy—which had been somewhat superior to the US Navy during the interwar period, and which had provided Allied naval leadership in much of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean for most of World War II.

About the post-war US Navy, one Second Fleet and NATO Strike Fleet commander made an apt sandlot baseball metaphor: “The little boy who owns the baseball usually gets to pitch.” He went on to ex-

plain that the US Navy “knew very well what the game was; it had joined the team, and it would play to win. But to the extent that it could, the US Navy meant to pitch: After all, it was they who almost always ‘brought the baseball.’”

NATO exercises at sea

1952 saw the first massive NATO maritime exercises. In the spring, 200 warships from the US Sixth Fleet and the British, French, and Italian navies participated in Exercise "Grand Slam" in the Mediterranean. A similarly sized NATO strike fleet, including four US Second Fleet carriers, conducted Exercise “Mainbrace” in the Norwegian Sea later that year. The following year, another massive NATO exercise was held in the northeast Atlantic, and another in 1957.

These evolutions inaugurated one of the principle features of NATO's use of sea power—a robust and multifaceted exercise program, involving all of NATO’s navies in both major and minor exercises, general and specialized, nuclear and conventional.

Backing the Germans to defend in the Baltic

The Baltic, meanwhile, remained all but a Soviet lake, guarded at its mouth by only the small naval forces that Norway and Denmark could muster, and by whatever the Royal Navy could spare as reinforcements. In 1955, however, the situation of the Alliance in Baltic waters began to improve, when a new allied navy joined the Alliance—the Federal German Navy. It would take several years, however, before a satisfactory NATO command structure that integrated the new German Navy would be created.

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164 The 1953 exercise was “Mariner” and involved 300 ships from nine nations. For a Canadian view, see “Exercise Mariner,” Crowsnest 6 (Dec. 1953), 14-17. In 1957, SAC-LANT practiced nuclear warfare in the Norwegian Sea in Exercise “Strike Back.” See Grove, Battle for the Fiords, 10-12.
165 There had been some antecedents to “Grand Slam” and “Mainbrace.” The US Navy had been exercising with the Royal Navy and Canadians in the Caribbean since 1948. The British, French, and Netherlands Navies had likewise participated in Western Union exercises at sea, commencing with “Verity” in 1949. See “Western Union Naval Exercises, 1949,” RUSI Journal 94 (Aug. 1949), 430-3.
166 Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) was finally put into place in 1962 under CINCNORTH. See Pedlow, “The Evolution of Allied Command Europe,” 111.
The North Atlantic islands

US Navy commanders during this period also had to face problems of homeland defense, especially the maintenance of air, sea, and undersea barriers across the North Atlantic (and North Pacific) to warn against possible Soviet air and submarine raids.\textsuperscript{167} The Atlantic Islands increased in importance to the United States as nodes for early warning of air attacks on North America, as well as bases for long-range land-based maritime patrol aircraft for ocean surveillance and anti-submarine warfare. 1951 agreements brought the US military back to Iceland and the Portuguese Azores.\textsuperscript{168} US Navy aircraft immediately began flying out of Keflavik, Iceland, again and continued to do so despite a crisis in 1956 when a new left-wing Icelandic government threatened to expel the US military.\textsuperscript{169}

In 1957, the US Navy re-established a naval base in the Azores, and in 1959 a new base was commissioned at Sigonella in Sicily.\textsuperscript{170} The US Navy base in Argentia, Newfoundland, (now part of Canada) was also expanded in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{171} During the early years of the 1950s, US Navy bases in French Morocco grew as well, but they be-


\textsuperscript{168} Although initially dominated and commanded by the US Army and US Air Force, the American bases in Iceland and the Azores reported operationally to the commander-in-chief of the joint US Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia, a US Navy admiral. Likewise, as Island Commands (ISCOMs) of NATO, they reported to the same admiral in his role as SACLANT.

\textsuperscript{169} There is an extensive literature on US military basing in Iceland during the Cold War and its relationship to Icelandic domestic politics. For recent scholarship, see Valur Ingimundarson, “The Role of NATO and the US Military Base in Icelandic Domestic Politics, 1949-99,” in Gustav Schmidt, ed., A History of NATO—The First Fifty Years: Volume 2 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 285-302; and

\textsuperscript{170} NATO units in the Azores came under SACLANT, including those in Sigonella, Sicily, under SACEUR and CINCSOUTH. On the US naval air facilities in the Azores and at Sigonella, see Coletta and Bauer, United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas, 188-9 and 308-9.

\textsuperscript{171} The base at Argentia, Newfoundland, while active since before US entry into World War II, had declined in importance after the war. Its utility increased, however, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, when it took on responsibilities for early warning of air attacks on North America. It began to “phase down” again in the late 1960s. See Coletta and Bauer, United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas, 13-17.
gan to contract as the decade ended, after Morocco had re-asserted its independence from France and Spain.\textsuperscript{172}

Strategy and operations: Agreements and disagreements

NATO’s naval apparatus became more than just paper military organizations with gaggles of planning staffs and international commanders. NATO also became a forum where allied naval policy, strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures were endlessly debated and decided upon.\textsuperscript{173} There was considerable allied naval cooperation and agreement. Nevertheless, professional disputes among the allies were frequent—especially between the US Navy and the Royal Navy—regarding anti-submarine warfare, carrier aviation, nuclear weapons employment and other critical naval issues.\textsuperscript{174}

As the Cold War continued, forward defense at sea and “attack at source”—the need to strike at Soviet bases and fleet units in their Kola and Crimean ports—became articles of faith among American and most other NATO naval war planners. So too did the need to support NATO ground and air forces should they come under Soviet attack in Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. After 1957, this support became a largely US Navy task, since the British government began to re-direct the Royal Navy’s carriers toward non-European missions “East of Suez.”

There were disagreements in several mission areas, however, especially anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The American, British, Canadian and Netherlands navies all developed hunter-killer carrier ASW task forces during the 1950s. On the other hand, Naval Control and Protection of Shipping (NCAPS)—including convoy escort for reinforcement shipping—was also a primary mission and capability for many allied naval officers from Britain, Canada, and other allied nations. NCAPS, however, was a secondary concern for most American naval planners, despite their own large and modern escort fleet. Rather, the US Navy’s anti-submarine warfare focus all through the Cold War was on far forward nuclear attack submarine operations and on protection of its own carrier and other task forces.\textsuperscript{175} In this they were joined by many in the

\textsuperscript{172} During the early 1950s, the base at Port Lyautey was vital to US naval aviation’s fledgling nuclear strike posture. With Moroccan independence from France and the commissioning of the base at Rota, Spain, however, its utility and desirability waned. On basing in Morocco, see ibid., 238-40; and Blair, \textit{Western Window in the Arab World}.


\textsuperscript{174} On doctrinal clashes between the US Navy and the Royal Navy in the 1950s, see Swartz, “The US Navy’s Relations with West European Navies,” 7-8.

\textsuperscript{175} For an excellent short analysis of US Navy thinking on submarine and anti-submarine warfare during the Cold War, including contrasts with NATO allies, see Owen R. Cote,
Royal Navy’s submarine service, if not by many of Britain’s destroyer sailors.\textsuperscript{176}

US Navy officers became strong proponents of increased allied naval strength for anti-submarine and mine warfare. They also could be counted on as advocates for existing or would-be land-based and sea-based naval aviation components of allied navies, especially in the face of allied and US Air Force hostility. They were often less enthusiastic, however, for increased allied investments in major combatants such as cruisers. This stance—akin to Eisenhower’s when he was SACEUR—sometimes put them at loggerheads with allied naval partners such as the Dutch and the French.\textsuperscript{177}

Standardizing naval equipment and procedures

In addition to the military command structure, committees and agencies were created to help achieve standardization of equipment and procedures among the NATO allies at sea. A formal Naval Tripartite Standardization Program in several areas of naval warfare was instituted by the United States, Britain, and Canada in 1950.\textsuperscript{178} These and other tripartite efforts provided a basis for the establishment of a NATO Military Standardization Agency (MSA)—later the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS)—in London in 1951, including a Navy Service Board, to standardize administrative and operational naval procedures among all the NATO members, based initially on the tripartite agreements.\textsuperscript{179} MAS instituted a process to conclude what became known as STANAGs (NATO standardization agreements), including several on naval material and procedures.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{176} Royal Navy submarines began their own forward operations in the Barents Sea in 1952. On British forward submarine operations and their coordination and cooperation with the US Navy submarine force, see Jim Ring, \textit{We Come Unseen: The Untold Story of Britain’s Cold War Submariners} (London: John Murray, 2001). A scathing critique of the Royal Navy’s focus on protection of sea lines of communication and its alleged failure to develop and maintain forward power projection capabilities—especially amphibious capabilities—is in Ian Speller, \textit{The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defense Policy, 1945-1956} (London: Palgrave, 2001).

\textsuperscript{177} On the cool Alliance reception given to Dutch desires to deploy major combatants, even by the US Navy, see Sokolsky, \textit{Seapower in the Nuclear Age}, 20-1; and Honig, \textit{Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance}, 20-3.

\textsuperscript{178} On the tripartite standardization agreement, see “Staff Talks on Standardization,” \textit{Journal of the RUSI} 95 (Nov. 1950), 629-30.

\textsuperscript{179} On NATO efforts at standardization in the 1950s, see James R. Carlton, “NATO Standardization: An Organizational Analysis,” in Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson, eds., \textit{NATO After Thirty Years} (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), 199-204.

\textsuperscript{180} On the evolving relationship between NATO “STANAGs” and tripartite (and later ABCA) Naval Standardization Agreements (NAVSTAGs), see Thomas-Durrell Young.
Jointness and combinedness

During the 1950s, the NATO navies achieved levels of combined organizational, technical, doctrinal, and operational integration that often surpassed similar levels of joint integration within individual NATO nations—including the United States.\(^\text{181}\) Strong US Navy leadership within NATO and the easy camaraderie of fellow sailors contrasted sharply with the strong inter-service rivalries that characterized American and other allied defense establishments—or so US Navy officers often have strongly believed.\(^\text{182}\)

Likewise, the US Navy continued to assign some of its very best officers to NATO positions.\(^\text{183}\)

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\(^{181}\) For example, see the statement by a former senior US Navy officer at ACLANT: “During my 14 years in joint and combined assignments, I frequently found I had more in common with foreign naval officers than I did with American officers of the other services.” Rear Admiral Sayre A. Swarztrauber, USN (Ret), “On Reorganizing the Pentagon,” *Naval War College Review*, 37 (May-June 1984), 92.


Relations with other NATO member navies outside NATO

Aiding Alliance navies

The reborn German Navy—like that of Japan—was initially heavily assisted by the US Navy.\textsuperscript{184} The American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, pushed hard for the German Navy to own its own naval aviation arm and transferred to them the famous ships of his wartime destroyer squadron—the "Little Beavers."\textsuperscript{185}

Naval assistance to Germany was but a small part of a gigantic effort on the part of the US government and its navy during the 1950s to get the European navies “back on their feet” to counter any potential Soviet aggression. Large numbers of amphibious vessels, surface combatants, mine warfare ships, submarines, support ships, and naval aircraft were transferred.\textsuperscript{186} In particular a massive assistance program to expand vastly allied naval capabilities in minesweeping began, along with programs to improve land-based maritime patrol aviation.\textsuperscript{187}


\textsuperscript{185} The “Little Beavers” transferred to the Germans were six Fletcher-class destroyers. On the US Navy’s role in ensuring the nascent Federal German Navy had a powerful air arm, see Captain Peter M. Swartz USN (Ret), “The US Navy’s Relations with the West European Navies in the First Cold War Decade: The Italian and German Cases,” paper presented at the 11th Naval History Symposium (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Academy, Oct. 22, 1993), 38-41.

\textsuperscript{186} A basic reference on Cold War naval arms transfers from and to all nations is Anthony, \textit{The Naval Arms Trade}. See especially Appendix I, “Second-hand ships transferred 1947-88: USA,” 184-95.

\textsuperscript{187} Ninety-six ocean minesweepers (MSOs) were built by the United States in the 1950s, of which 34 went to other NATO navies. Likewise, 108 of 128 US-built coastal minesweepers (MSCs) went to foreign navies, with many more constructed in European yards. 14 inshore minesweepers (MSIs)—12 for other NATO navies—were also built. See David Miller, \textit{The Cold War: A Military History} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 219-222. In the 1950s and 1960s, over 150 American land-based maritime patrol aircraft were transferred to the French and Royal Netherlands Navies and to the Royal (UK) and Royal Canadian Air Forces. See Wayne Mutza, \textit{Lockheed P2V Neptune: An Illustrated History} (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1996); and R.F. Mackness, “The P2V Neptune Saga” \textit{Maritime Patrol Aviation} 1 (Oct. 1988), 17-20.
US Navy aid to French Navy carrier aviation and amphibious forces—then heavily committed in Indochina—was particularly significant. Also, although the British, Dutch, and Canadian navies of the period deployed British-built carriers, their air wings flew American antisubmarine warfare aircraft. US assistance to the reborn Italian and Royal Netherlands navies was extensive. The US Navy weighed in heavily, although ultimately unsuccessfully, to have the Italian Navy acquire a strong naval air arm, in the face of determined opposition by the Italian Air force backed by the US Air Force.

Technology transfer

The close transatlantic sharing of naval innovations continued apace during the 1950s, especially between the British and Americans. Most notable was the adoption by the US Navy of a host of significant British improvements to aircraft carrier operations, including angled flight decks, steam catapults, mirror landing systems, nylon crash barriers, pilot ejection seats, and the “probe and drogue” air refueling system. At the same time, the US Navy began to share its nuclear

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189 Both the Canadians and the Dutch deployed American ASW aircraft on their carriers, first TBM Avengers and later S-2F Trackers. The Canadians built their own Trackers to US designs. The Royal Navy deployed Avengers until British-built Fairey Gannets were available for service. The Canadians also operated American F2H Banshee fighters from their carrier for a time. The US transferred numerous Trackers to Latin American and Pacific allies as well. On US Navy aircraft flown by the Royal Navy during the Cold War, see Ray Williams, Royal Navy Aircraft Since 1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989).


191 The US Navy facilitated the provision to the Italian Navy of S-2F Tracker ASW aircraft, but they were ultimately seized and operated by the Italian Air Force. For a case study of this example of transnational inter-service rivalry, see Swartz, “The US Navy’s Relations with the West European Navies in the First Cold War Decade,” 14-20. See also Michele Cosentino and Ruggero Stanglini, The Italian Navy (Firenze, Italy: EDAI, 1994), 18 and 189-190.

technology with the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{193} American naval theater nuclear weapons (and/or the capabilities to deliver them) began to be introduced into the plans and force structures of other NATO navies.\textsuperscript{194} Also, during this period, the US Navy belatedly began to exploit a key German innovation of World War II: the multipurpose forward replenishment ship.\textsuperscript{195}

**US naval bases in Europe and aid to Spain**

During the 1950s, the United States cultivated close relations with Spain, despite the authoritarian regime there.\textsuperscript{196} Although not yet a NATO ally, the Spain of caudillo Francisco Franco was anti-communist and anti-Soviet, and it afforded valuable naval and air basing sites for American forces. The US Navy developed a large base just outside the Mediterranean at Rota, near Cadiz, as well as other Spanish logistics facilities.\textsuperscript{197} The Rota base would eventually grow to become the largest and most important forward US naval shore facility in Europe.

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\textsuperscript{193} On the US Navy sharing of nuclear propulsion technology with the Royal Navy, including the role of Admirals Arleigh Burke, Hyman Rickover, and Lord Louis Mountbatten, see Eric J. Grove, \textit{Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II} (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 230-3.


\textsuperscript{195} The German diesel multiproduct replenishment ship \textit{Dithmarschen}, taken over by the US Navy at the end of World War II, was re-commissioned as USS \textit{Conecuh} (AOR-110). \textit{Conecuh} became the prototype for the fast multiproduct underway replenishment ships that the US Navy has built and deployed since. See Thomas Wildenberg, \textit{Gray Steel and Black Oil} (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 207-16; 228-9.


\textsuperscript{197} On the development of the base at Rota, see Coletta and Bauer, \textit{United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas}, 275-82.
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including helicopters to revive Spanish naval aviation after a decade and a half of non-existence.\footnote{198}

During the early part of the decade, the US Navy repeatedly asserted that its forces—and the Sixth Fleet in particular—were truly sea based, with no inherent need for vulnerable forward shore bases—in sharp contrast to US Army and Air Force forces.\footnote{199} The Mediterranean was touted as being especially base-free (Port Lyautey and Rota being just outside the strait of Gibraltar). US Navy ships deployed in European waters were routinely replenished while underway, at sea as well as in port.\footnote{200} Most of these ships deployed there on rotation from bases in North America. A few, however, had always been based forward. The Northern European Force worked out of Plymouth, England from 1946 through 1956.

As the decade wore on, however, the Navy began to slowly rely more and more on forward shore infrastructure in Europe and elsewhere, although nowhere near to the extent of its sister services.\footnote{201} It reestablished itself ashore in Italy in the early 1950s, when the Italian Peace Treaty restrictions on foreign bases were lifted.\footnote{202} The Navy returned to Naples, Italy, in 1951, first to support the new NATO AFSOUTH headquarters and later to set up a support base for American fleet units and aircraft.

Three Sixth Fleet logistics ships were forward-based in Barcelona, Spain, starting in 1955, and the Sixth Fleet flagship began to use Villefranche, France, as its homeport in 1956. Small US Navy shore facilities were set up to facilitate this forward basing scheme, although they would be dwarfed by the immense infrastructure developed at the

\footnote{198 On the essential contribution made by American helicopters to the rebirth of Spanish naval aviation, see Captain Leopoldo Lopez Eady SN, “The Revival of the Spanish Naval Aviation,” in Loucas and Marcoyannis, NATO’s Maritime Power, 189-92; and John M. Andrade, Spanish and Portuguese Military Aviation (Leicester, UK: Midland Counties Publications, 1977), 22-4.}
\footnote{199 On the claimed freedom of the Sixth Fleet from forward shore support, see William H. Hessler’s two US Naval Institute, Proceedings articles: “The Versatile Sixth Fleet” 78, (May 1952), 469-77; and “Sixth Fleet: Beefed Up for a Bigger Job” 84 (Aug. 1958), 23-30.}
\footnote{200 For an analysis of the role of underway replenishment in the initial conceptualization and deployments of the Sixth Fleet, see Dur, “The Sixth Fleet,” 144-59.}
\footnote{202 On the lifting of the treaty restrictions, see E. Timothy Smith, “From Disarmament to Rearmament: The United States and the Revision of the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947,” Diplomatic History 13 (Summer 1989), 359-82.}
same time in Germany, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere to support US Army and US Air Force units in Europe.\textsuperscript{203}

One little-mentioned basing requirement in Europe during the 1950s and later was the continued need for airfields in-theater for land-based intelligence-gathering by specially configured US Navy patrol aircraft. Until satellites took over many of their missions in the 1960s and 1970s, US Navy and Air Force long-range aircraft were often the only source of electronic and other intelligence on the otherwise difficult-to-penetrate Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states.\textsuperscript{204} As they flew along the borders of these states, these aircraft were vulnerable to Soviet attack. Several were shot down, beginning in 1950 with a Navy PB4-Y-2 Privateer patrol bomber over the Baltic between Danish Bornholm Island and Soviet Latvia.\textsuperscript{205} Port Lyautey in French Morocco and (later) Rota in Spain and Naples and Sigonella in Italy were their principal bases.\textsuperscript{206}

Side by side with the establishment of NATO, plans had been drafted for significant US Navy assistance to rebuild Continental European navies—a process begun by the British right after the war. Assistance to the Greek and Turkish navies—not yet in NATO—also continued. Most importantly, plans were put in train in May 1950 to provide significant aid to the French in their war against the communists in Indochina, including naval aircraft and amphibious shipping.\textsuperscript{207}

Korea

The initial allied response to the North Korean attack on the South was spearheaded by American Seventh Fleet and Royal Navy carrier task forces fortuitously already operating—and cooperating—in the Far


\textsuperscript{206} On US Navy electronic intelligence gathering in Europe by carrier-based as well as long-range land-based patrol aircraft, see Captain Don East, “The History of US Naval Airborne Electronic Reconnaissance,” 32-47.

East at the time.208 Soon, smaller Canadian, French, Dutch, Danish, and other western maritime forces would also deploy to Korean waters as part of a multinational United Nations effort to supplement American, British, and South Korean units.209 This initial multinational out-of-area deployment in the Far East would prove to be the most significant cooperative naval undertaking by the NATO allies during the Cold War, despite the lack of official NATO institutional involvement.

Despite the war in Korea and related naval operations off China, the perceived threat to the North Atlantic Treaty area remained a higher priority for the United States and its navy throughout the first Cold War decade.210 The three large US carriers, for example, with their nascent nuclear weapons delivery capabilities, remained in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean throughout the Korean War.211 So too did the newest American submarines and other ship types.

NATO had a definite Area of Responsibility (AOR) that extended only as far south as the Tropic of Cancer. Beyond that line, the US Navy had enormous national responsibilities, but NATO command structures did not apply, NATO policies had no formal writ, and Alliance forces did not conduct NATO exercises.212 (Neither was NATO re-

208 On British operations with the US Navy off Korea, see Stephen Prince, “The Contributions of the Royal Navy to the United Nations Forces During the Korean War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 17 (June 1994), 94-120.
211 On the deployment of the first American nuclear-equipped naval aviation forces to the Mediterranean, see Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers.
212 For example, the major (but ultimately unconsummated) 1954 preparations by US Navy carrier strike forces in the South China Sea to support the French at Dien Bien Phu.
sponsible for contingencies arising from the division and occupation of the former German capital of Berlin, for which supporting allied naval operations were planned by separate tripartite arrangements.\textsuperscript{213}

**Anglo-Saxon connections**

NATO was thus not the “only game in town” for America and her Navy.\textsuperscript{214} In particular, the “ABCA” or “AUSCANUKUS” network of military relationships among America, Britain, Canada, and now Australia continued to develop outside the framework of the NATO alliance.\textsuperscript{215} Numerous other new Cold War alliances and defense relationships had to be tended as well, and the US Navy—more than its sister services—was in the forefront of many of these activities and operations around the world.\textsuperscript{216}

Another committee was organized under the auspices of the CAN-UK-US communications committee in Washington to develop a series of NATO communications publications.\textsuperscript{217} A European Naval Commu-
The Communications Agency (ENCA) was set up in 1951, with American participation. In all of these committees, the US Navy played a powerful role in shaping Alliance views.\textsuperscript{218} Intelligence cooperation among the NATO allies also intensified, although mostly outside NATO channels (since intelligence remained, like logistics, a largely national responsibility under NATO policy).\textsuperscript{219}

Naval data links were developed internationally from the start. A CAN-US-UK Naval Data Transmission Working Group was formed in 1954. Its main product was Link 11, a high-frequency/ ultra-high-frequency (HF/UHF) system that would become widely—although not universally—used by the US and allied navies.\textsuperscript{220}

In 1956, the US Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, instituted an annual course for senior foreign officers, which rapidly became well attended by the most outstanding officers from the other NATO navies.\textsuperscript{221}

Other NATO navies’ non-NATO activities

The French Navy was deployed in Indochina (until 1955), the Royal Navy at Hong Kong and off Malaya, and the Royal Netherlands Navy off Netherlands New Guinea.


\textsuperscript{219} On the cooperation between American and European military and naval intelligence services throughout the Cold War, see Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes, eds., \textit{Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond} (London: Frank Cass, 2001).

\textsuperscript{220} The high cost of Link 11 led the United Kingdom to develop a simpler, lower-capacity system (Link “X” or “10”), which was also sold to the Belgian, Dutch, Greek, and Turkish Navies. See Eric Grove and Michael Pugh, “Operational and Technical Requirements,” in Pugh, \textit{Maritime Security and Peacekeeping}, 181.

The 1960s: Fine-tuning NATO’s maritime nuclear and conventional postures

Global American policy context

The 1960s saw an increase in the capabilities of the Alliance at sea, especially nuclear, building on developments of the mid- and late-1950s. The US government and the US Navy experimented with several approaches and options, including nuclear-capable carrier aircraft, submarine-launched Regulus cruise missiles, and a variety of theater nuclear weapons systems launched from ships, submarines, and land-based maritime patrol aircraft. Another option considered was equipping Long Beach-class cruisers with Polaris sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

These options were all eventually downgraded in importance or discarded as American sea-based strategic nuclear systems of choice in favor of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) carrying Polaris submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The initial short range of these missiles, however, necessitated forward deployment and advanced basing of the submarines. Consequently, sea-based US Navy tenders and floating dry docks for these vessels were deployed to Holy Loch, Scotland, in 1961 and to Rota, Spain, in 1964.

All of these navy-to-navy relationships in the 1960s, like those in the 1950s, existed in the context of a focus by NATO’s most important committees on ground forces and land-based airpower, and a US national focus on strategic airpower—despite the successes of the SSBN program. Throughout the 1960s, the US Air Force received a much larger slice of the US national defense budget than the US Navy—a situation replicated in other NATO countries.

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223 By 1960, the first US Navy SSBN was at sea on patrol in the Atlantic; by 1963, in the Mediterranean; and by 1964, in the Pacific. On the Navy’s strategy regarding procurement and deployment of strategic missile submarines, see David A. Rosenberg, "Process: The Realities of Formulating Modern Naval Strategy," in Mahan is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, eds. James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), 141-175. On the strategic submarine support facilities at Holy Loch and Rota, see Coletta and Bauer, United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas, 164-6 and 279-80.
New forward presence and crisis response initiatives

American and NATO conventional postures at sea also evolved during the 1960s. The forces that the US Navy allocated to the Mediterranean were no longer significantly more powerful than those it deployed in the Pacific, as had been the case during the Korean War. They also included fewer ships. The Navy nevertheless continued to commit two carriers routinely to the Mediterranean, in part to counter a slow Soviet naval build-up in that sea that had begun in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{224}

The United States and NATO took several major initiatives in and around Europe during the decade, although the Vietnam War began to focus American policy attention elsewhere. In 1960, US Sixth Fleet surface combatants began deploying routinely into the Black Sea, to show the flag, assert American freedom of navigation rights, and gather intelligence.\textsuperscript{225} The Sixth Fleet also responded to crises all through the 1960s, especially the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, during which the Soviet Navy reinforced its Mediterranean squadron and increased its surveillance of US Sixth Fleet and British Mediterranean Fleet carrier task forces.\textsuperscript{226} Also during this crisis, a US Navy warship was attacked—by Israelis—without US or NATO retaliation.\textsuperscript{227}

As the Soviets increased their forces on ACE’s northern flank, the US Navy and NATO responded as well. NATO exercises in and off Norway began to take on new importance during the first half of the

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\textsuperscript{224} The decline in US naval force levels in the Mediterranean by the end of the 1960s was a result of both the demands of the Vietnam War and an overall drop in the size of the US fleet, as large numbers of obsolescent World War II-era ships began to be retired without replacement. For US Sixth Fleet force levels during the 1960s, see Commander Gravatt, \textit{US Navy Ship-Days in the Mediterranean}.


\textsuperscript{227} On the Sixth Fleet’s operations in the 1960s, see Bryson, \textit{Tars, Turks and Tankers}, 121-62. Whether the Israeli attack on \textit{USS Liberty} (AGTR-5) was deliberate or not continued to stir debates well into the twenty-first century. For a thorough and persuasive analysis demonstrating that the attack was accidental, see Captain A. Jay Cristol, \textit{The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on the US Navy Spy Ship} (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002). For an unconvincing contrary view, see David C. Walsh, “Friendless Fire?” \textit{US Naval Institute, Proceedings}, 129 (June 2003), 58-64. In any event, despite a military attack inside the North Atlantic Treaty area on a warship belonging to a NATO ally, the Alliance did not invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in this instance.
1960s. Thereafter, despite the growing commitment to the war in Vietnam and periodic crisis requirements in the Mediterranean, US Navy carrier and other forces continued to regularly surge deploy forward into the Northeast Atlantic to participate in NATO exercises.\(^{228}\) Also, in 1962, the United States for the first time sent an anti-submarine carrier task force into the Baltic for exercises.\(^{229}\)

The Navy’s amphibious forces and the US Marine Corps turned to the north during this period as well. A Marine rifle company went to Norway for training in 1964.\(^{230}\) In that same year, US Navy and Marine Corps amphibious and support forces surge deployed across the Atlantic for a gigantic division-strength amphibious landing exercise, in cooperation with the Spanish armed forces.\(^{231}\) Commitments in Vietnam, however, would interrupt this new US Marine Corps concern for major European contingencies for another decade.

**Command and control: Changes in the US structure**

Meanwhile, important changes were taking place in the US national command structure regarding Europe. During this period, NELM lost its status as an independent specified command reporting directly to the US Secretary of Defense, as jointness slowly but inexorably continued to expand within the United States military establishment. By 1964, NELM had become the US Navy component of the joint unified US European Command and had taken on a new name—Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR). The new Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) became a component commander under the Commander-in-Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR)—who also served as NATO SACEUR.\(^{232}\)

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\(^{228}\) SACLANT initiated the “Teamwork” series of exercises in 1964 to practice the maritime reinforcement of Norway. 160 ships from seven nations deployed to the Norwegian Sea. On NATO operations in the North Atlantic during the 1960s, see Grove, *Battle for the Fiords*, 12-25.

\(^{229}\) The 1962 US Navy anti-submarine warfare carrier task force in the Baltic consisted of USS *Wasp* (CVS-18) and seven destroyers. On that exercise, *Wasp* became the first aircraft carrier to ever visit the West German port of Kiel.


\(^{231}\) The exercise was “Steel Pike” and involved 22,000 US marines on 60 ships. See Lieutenant Colonel James B. Soper USMC, “Observations: STEEL PIKE and SILVER LANCE,” US Naval Institute, *Proceedings* 91 (Nov. 1965), 46-58. This was the largest amphibious assault ever conducted by the US Marine Corps in peacetime. STEEL PIKE was reminiscent of Operation ‘Torch’ a generation earlier—the transatlantic American wartime deployment and landing in North Africa that began American participation in the liberation of Europe from the Nazis.

\(^{232}\) On the changes in the US Unified Command Plan during this period, see Cole et al., *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 29-34.
During the 1960s, anti-submarine warfare replaced air defense and airborne early warning as the primary American and NATO military activity in the North Atlantic. In 1961, to counter the growing Soviet submarine threat, a US Navy admiral took command in Keflavik of the joint US Iceland Defense Force (IDF) from a US Air Force general. As Island Command (ISCOM) Iceland, this was also a NATO command subordinate to SACLANT. In 1970, a similar change occurred in ISCOM Bermuda, when a US Navy officer took over command from the US Air Force of the American military airfield on that British Atlantic island.

**Bases and basing**

The intense preoccupation of the US Navy with forward sea basing during the 1950s gave way in the 1960s to a more balanced approach. This was due to a number of factors: the advent of nuclear weapons at sea had greatly increased the vulnerability of fleet trains, the vast numbers of available World War II era ships began to decline, the growing Soviet submarine threat required forward deployment of land-based ASW aircraft, and the Navy’s base infrastructure had slowly built up in Europe.

For example, during most of the 1950s and 1960s, the Sixth Fleet included an advanced aviation base ship homeported in Naples, capable of supporting in wartime (and during exercises) a temporary advanced naval air base “. . . from the sea.” This sea basing practice gave way in 1969, however, to a shore-based US Navy detachment at Souda Bay, on the Greek island of Crete.

**The global context**

The US Navy’s NATO responsibilities remained important, but as the decade wore on they often became secondary in US Navy planning and deployments to the salience of the Vietnam War and the geo-military pre-eminence of the US Navy in the Pacific theater. Close US Navy coordination and cooperation with foreign navies extended well beyond the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The US Navy continued to take a global approach to American national security, ex-
emplified by its convening in 1969 of the first Free World Seapower Symposium.236 In the Pacific, strong bilateral relationships were created with several regional navies.237 In 1960, ongoing “ABCA” relationships involving the sharing of technology and intelligence spawned a board—later styled the AUS-CAN-NZ-UK-US Naval Communications Board—to reduce communications incompatibilities among the American, British, Canadian, and later Australian and New Zealand navies.238

NATO policy context

NATO in the 1960s went through a series of crises, but it emerged from the decade still vibrant. The Alliance spent the early part of the decade solidifying its approach to the command, control, and deployment of strategic and theater nuclear weapons. As the decade wore on, however, the United States was increasingly distracted by the war in Vietnam, France left the Alliance’s integrated military command structure, and Britain redeployed its forces from the Mediterranean.

France’s move triggered several moves and reorganizations within the Alliance. A defense planning committee was created alongside the NAC to ensure consensus could still be reached on Alliance military matters. Likewise, a Defense Planning Group was created as the mechanism to deal with nuclear command and control issues. NATO headquarters moved from Paris to Brussels, and SHAPE moved from Fontainebleau to Mons. American and other allied forces vacated their facilities in France.

USN relations within NATO

NATO and nuclear weapons at sea

Meanwhile, Italy also experimented with strategic missile-firing surface combatants, successfully test-firing American Polaris missiles fired 236 The Seapower Symposium convened at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, included naval leaders from US allies and friendly neutral nations from all over the world. Subsequent symposia were convened in Newport biennially. See Sokolsky, The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform, 48-51; and Hattendorf, “International Naval Cooperation and Admiral Richard G. Colbert,” 176-7. 237 These bilateral partners included the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Republic of Korea Navy, the Republic of China Navy (until 1973), and other regional navies. There were even stronger tripartite links with the navies of Australia and New Zealand. 238 On the AUS-CAN-NZ-UK-US NAVCOMMS Board, see Commander Howell, “AUS-CAN-WHAT?” Signal, 36-7; and Young, “Cooperative Diffusion through Cultural Similarity,” 103-4.
from an Italian light cruiser.\textsuperscript{239} (Italy also planned to build a nuclear-powered attack submarine, but Washington refused to cooperate, and the project was abandoned.)\textsuperscript{240}

From 1960 through 1965, the Alliance considered the creation and deployment of a Multilateral Force (MLF), another of the few times when naval issues preoccupied national and NATO policy-makers.\textsuperscript{241} This was to be a fleet of 25 multinationally manned converted merchant ships equipped with nuclear-armed Polaris missiles, under NATO command.\textsuperscript{242} An experimental mixed-manned warship was deployed in 1964-65, skippered by a US Navy officer but with a wardroom and crew representing seven NATO nationalities.\textsuperscript{243}

In the end, however, the United States and its NATO allies opted for the commitment to SACEUR, for planning and targeting, of three Polaris-firing US SSBNs based in Holy Loch or Rota and deployed in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{244} To underscore this commitment, in 1963 a US Navy SSBN made a widely publicized port visit in Turkey.\textsuperscript{245} SACLANT too was given nuclear responsibilities.\textsuperscript{246} Later, as longer range multiwar-


\textsuperscript{240} On the abortive Italian attempt to build the nuclear submarine Guglielmo Marconi, see Cosentino and Stanglini, The Italian Navy, 27-8.


\textsuperscript{242} The MLF had been proposed as a means of sharing responsibility within the Alliance for the command and control of—largely American—nuclear weapons. In 1966, NATO opted instead for the creation of a NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) as the primary mechanism to resolve this contentious issue.

\textsuperscript{243} The mixed-manned MLF test ship was the recently commissioned US Navy guided missile destroyer USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5). The ship’s original name—Biddle—was changed in 1964 to honor the just deceased US Navy Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) who had been an ardent proponent of the MLF plan. See Toby Marquez, “The Mixed-Manning Demonstration,” US Naval Institute, Proceedings 91 (Jul. 1965), 87-103. Note a precedent in Captain John Paul Jones’s polyglot Bonhomme Richard during the Revolutionary War, discussed above.


\textsuperscript{245} On April 14, 1963, USS Sam Houston (SSBN-609) visited Izmir, Turkey.

\textsuperscript{246} On SACLANT’s nuclear authority, see Carnovale, Control of NATO Nuclear Forces in Europe, 42-5.
head Poseidon missiles replaced Polaris, the US Navy’s commitment was changed to targeting and alerting authority for a specific number of warheads, rather than numbers of ships or missiles.

The United States also decided to share Polaris with the Royal Navy, which committed to put its missiles under NATO operational control in wartime and to have SACEUR plan their targets. The US Navy and Royal Navy warships with tactical nuclear weapons on board continued to deploy in NATO waters throughout this period.

STANAVFORLANT

In 1968, an important and enduring Alliance innovation occurred in the Atlantic: SACLANT’s creation of a Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT)—the first permanent peacetime international naval force in modern history. The US Navy participated in this permanent multinational NATO formation of destroyers and frigates from its inception, always contributing a warship and periodically providing the force commander and his staff. In 1969, CINCSOUTH and COMNAVSOUTH set up a NATO On-Call Force for the Mediterranean (NAVOÖCFORMED)—similarly comprised of destroyers and frigates,


248 On the deployment of US Navy tactical nuclear weapons, see Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, 65-6.

249 STANAVFORLANT grew out of a 1964 Royal Navy-initiated extended multinational exercise. See Captain D.V.M. Macleod RN, “Exercise Match Maker,” US Naval Institute, Proceedings 92 (Jan. 1966), 139-43. There were several ad hoc wartime precedents, including Ocean Escort Unit A-3, “Heineman’s Harriers,” during World War II (see above), but none that lasted for a significant length of time.

250 The initial STANAVFORLANT comprised American, British, Dutch, and Norwegian destroyers and frigates, soon joined by ships from Canada and Germany, and later Portugal, Denmark, and Belgium. STANAVFORLANT was in part the brainchild of Rear Admiral Richard Colbert, then on the SACLANT staff. See John B. Hattendorf, "International Naval Cooperation and Admiral Richard G. Colbert" and "NATO's Policeman on the Beat: The First Twenty Years of the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, 1968-1988," chaps. in idem, ed., Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays, 161-85 and 187-200.
but without permanent status. These NATO multinational naval forces rapidly acquired practical as well as symbolic value.

RSI

The effort to improve standardization and interoperability among Alliance navies, especially in communications, continued in the 1960s. In 1965, NATO’s European Naval Communications Agency (ENCA) became the Allied Naval Communications Agency (ANCA), to emphasize its NATO-wide responsibility, and was joined by the Canadians. In 1966, the NAC established a Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) as a major NATO committee aimed at achieving consensus on defense equipment issues and related problems. The CNAD set up a subordinate NATO Naval Armaments Group (NNAG) to improve standardization of naval armaments.

The NATO Sea Sparrow short-range surface-to-air missile system—arguably NATO’s most successful collaborative development enterprise—began to evolve during the decade, based on an American design.

Changing naval relationships within the Alliance

Although the US Navy’s preoccupation with the Far East grew through the 1960s, great changes were taking place in the naval balance of power and NATO command arrangements in European and North Atlantic waters regarding the British and French navies. In 1967, the Royal Navy was drastically cut by its government and withdrawn for the most part from the Mediterranean, forcing major changes in the NATO naval command structures there. Consequently, the respon-
sibilities of CINCSOUTH grew to encompass all NATO naval missions in the Mediterranean, not just the US Navy-dominated Striking and Support Forces.\textsuperscript{258}

After the French withdrawal from Indochina in 1954, French naval forces had built up in the Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic, but in 1959 the new French Fifth Republic government had taken them out of the integrated Alliance military structure in the Mediterranean, and in 1966 it withdrew them from NATO’s Atlantic command structure as well. At the same time, French President Charles de Gaulle demanded that the United States close all its military facilities in that country, forcing the US Sixth Fleet flagship to shift its forward homeport from Villefranche, France, to Gaeta, Italy, in 1967. Despite these changes, operational relations between French Navy commanders and their US Navy and other NATO counterparts remained close, but discreet.\textsuperscript{259}

1967 also finally saw the creation of ACLANT’s Iberian Atlantic (IBERLANT) Command, commanded by a US Navy admiral.\textsuperscript{260} Creation of IBERLANT had lagged that of the other subordinate ACLANT commands due to incessant American, British, French, and Portuguese disagreements. With the new drastic alterations in the British and French naval roles within the Alliance, these disagreements were now able to be resolved.

Navies throughout the Alliance felt under-appreciated and un-influential. Other NATO navies—including the French—continued to look to the US Navy for leadership, and for support in their own national capitals.

\textsuperscript{258} On the career of one of the most effective CINCSOUTHs during this period—and one of the US Navy’s most ardent internationalists—see Hattendorf, “International Naval Cooperation and Admiral Richard G. Colbert,” and Sokolsky, \textit{The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform}; and Sokolsky, \textit{Seapower in the Nuclear Age}, 109-11.

\textsuperscript{259} On the continued close cooperation between French, US and other NATO naval commanders, see Sokolsky, \textit{The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform}, 40-1 and 55; and \textit{Seapower in the Nuclear Age}, 52-3.

\textsuperscript{260} IBERLANT was charged with guarding the Atlantic approaches to the Mediterranean. It was headquartered in Lisbon and had a Portuguese Navy Deputy Commander. The nationalities of the commander and deputy were reversed in 1982. Instrumental in finally establishing IBERLANT was Rear Admiral Richard Colbert USN, then on the SAC-LANT staff. See Hattendorf, “International Naval Cooperation and Admiral Richard G. Colbert,” 174; and Sokolsky, \textit{Fraternity of the Blue Uniform}, 34.
Relations with other NATO member navies outside NATO

The most important combined relationship for the US Navy during this period—as in most periods—was with the Royal Navy. Doctrinal debates on the effective use of naval power by the Alliance continued, with the US Navy continuing to argue for the primacy of forward strike, amphibious, and submarine operations. The US Navy focused its increasingly nuclear-powered submarine fleet on the Soviet nuclear submarine threat, while allied ASW focused more on finding and killing Soviet and other Warsaw Pact diesel submarines. Also, many Royal Navy and other allied officers continued to focus their attention on area anti-submarine warfare and NCAPS—especially through convoy escort—instead of forward strike operations.

At the same time, Canadian, Dutch—and many American—carrier-centered ASW hunter-killer task groups began to disappear towards the end of the decade, as their aging carrier centerpieces retired and new technologies yielded new ASW tools and tactics. In the US Navy, the underwater Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS)-MPA team along the US Atlantic Coast began to mature as an important ASW arm. SOSUS and similar allied installations began to proliferate forward, in and near the waters of several NATO nations, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Danish Greenland, and Norway.

Canadian and British naval and maritime aviation forces coordinated closely with their American counterparts during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

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263 The Royal Navy, however, retained the Hunter-Killer Group concept and built a new generation of ASW carriers. On ASW developments in the 1960s, see Cote, The Third Battle, 41-57, 76.


265 On Canadian-American naval relationships during the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Commander Peter Haydon CN, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993); and Bill
Naval interoperability and technology transfers

Also, in the Pacific, the US Navy purchased and used Norwegian-built Nasty-class fast patrol boats for raids into North Vietnam from the South in the early 1960s.266

On the other hand, by the 1960s rebuilt European shipyards and other industrial and technical facilities were replacing American military assistance as major sources of European naval modernization.267 Nevertheless, the decade saw significant transfers of former US Navy ships to Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Spain—especially submarines.268 The Spanish Navy received a World War II-vintage former US Navy light aircraft carrier and more advanced anti-submarine warfare helicopters. More significantly, the French Navy began to purchase the US Navy’s F-8 Crusader as its sole carrier-based fighter aircraft, enabling the close bonds established earlier between French and American naval aviation to continue for decades more.269

Multinational technological exchanges and transatlantic naval purchases also continued into the 1960s. In 1960, a coordinated program for the production of several hundred American Mark 44 ASW torpedoes in Europe was undertaken by France and Italy, with American participation. Production was also undertaken in the United Kingdom and Canada.270


267 For a good example of the progression in many European naval inventories—but especially submarines—from surplus British World War II equipment through American military assistance to modern Continental-built systems, see Vice Admiral Timotheos Massouras, Hellenic Navy, “The Hellenic Fleet of Submarines and NATO,” in NATO’s Maritime Power, 123-5

268 On ship transfers in the 1960s, see Anthony, Naval Arms Trade, especially 184-95.


270 On the coordinated Mark 44 torpedo program, see NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels, BE: NATO Information Service, 1978), 137-8.
Other NATO navies’ non-NATO activities

The Royal Netherlands Navy led a Dutch fight in Netherlands New Guinea against the Indonesians, but the territory eventually went to Indonesia, and the Dutch redeployed to European waters.

The 1970s: Facing a rising Soviet challenge at sea

Global American policy context

The world changes

By the mid-1970s, the Vietnam War had ended, and the US government was making new positive overtures to the People’s Republic of China. The US Pacific Fleet accordingly turned most of its attention from the China Seas to the North Pacific to aggressively counter a Soviet Navy build-up emanating from Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk.271 Events in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean—and the absence of significant allied forces in those waters—drove an increased US Navy presence there as well.272

The US Navy continued its permanent presence in the Mediterranean and its surge deployments into the northeast Atlantic. NATO, however, continued to be only one of several US Navy foci.

The Soviet challenge

The Soviet Navy, having been built up under Stalin and cut back under Khrushchev, emerged by the early 1970s as a formidable submarine, surface, and naval air force, especially from new bases on the Kola Peninsula and in the North Pacific.273 It reached farther out into the Atlantic and elsewhere, but at the same time set up well-defended and ever-expanding ocean bastions adjacent to its main littoral areas and ports to protect its own strategic submarines, defend its homeland at

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271 On the turn north in the Pacific, see ibid., 17-20.
272 The British withdrawal from the Mediterranean that began in 1967 (discussed above) was accompanied by a British pull-out from the Persian Gulf as well. The French still maintained a presence in the region, but it was minor. On the increased relative importance of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf theaters to US Navy operations during the 1970s and 1980s, see Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, 1992).
increasing distances, support operations against the NATO flanks, and
counter NATO’s strategy of forward defense at sea.274

In the Mediterranean, the Soviets deployed an increasingly robust for-
dward naval squadron that preoccupied US Navy and NATO com-
mmanders and their staffs.275 The increased Soviet naval presence also
led to dangerous incidents at sea between Soviet and NATO forces,
and to an agreement to reduce those incidents signed by the Ameri-
can and Soviet navies in 1972.276

More Mediterranean crises

The US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean continued to act as a power-
ful and ready forward arm of American national security policy, still
normally including two carrier task forces and dozens of other war-
ships for most of the decade.277 The fleet engaged in numerous NATO
exercises and US national operations in the Mediterranean—often re-
inforced by surge forces from across the Atlantic—especially during
the Jordanian crisis of 1970 and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.278

The 1973 war also saw a major bilateral naval confrontation between
the US Navy and the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean—the most se-

274 There is a large literature on the evolution of Soviet naval strategy. See especially the
declassified US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report “Soviet Naval Strategy and
Programs through the 1990s,” in John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the US Navy’s
275 The increased Soviet naval threat at sea in the early 1970s led to calls, especially by
US Navy Admiral Stansfield Turner, NATO CINCSOUTH, for an initial pull-back of
US Navy forces in the run-up to any war with the Soviets, especially in the Mediterrane-
an. See Admiral Stansfield Turner (Retired), “The Future of the US Navy in the Mediter-
276 On the US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, see David Winkler, Cold War at Sea:
High Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000); Rear Admiral Robert P. Hilton, Sr., USN (Ret), “A
Confidence-building Measure at Work: The 1972 United States USSR Incidents-at-Sea
Agreement,” in Naval Confidence-building Measures, Disarmament Topical Papers 4
(New York: United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, 1990), 151-63; and
Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Applying and Extending the USA-USSR Incidents at Sea Agree-
ment,” in Richard Fieldhouse, ed., Security at Sea: Naval Forces and Arms Control
(Ox-
is in ibid., 256-8.
277 For a compendium and analyses of US Sixth Fleet and other US military responses to
situations during the 1970s, see W. Eugene Cobble, H.H. Gaffney, and Dmitry Goren-
burg, For the Record: All US Forces’ Responses to Situations, 1970-2000, CIM
D0008414.A1/Final (Alexandria, VA: CNA, June 2003); and Siegel, The Use of Naval
Forces in the Post-War Era.
278 On the Sixth Fleet’s operations in the 1970s, see Bryson, Tars, Turks and Tankers,
163-212. On the maneuverings of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron and the US Sixth
Fleet in 1970, see Abram N. Shulsky, “The Jordanian Crisis of September 1970,” in
Dismukes and McConnell, Soviet Naval Diplomacy, 168-77.
rious since the Cuban Missile Crisis of a decade earlier. During that war, most NATO allies split with the United States regarding support for Israel, necessitating a major sea-based US Navy-US Air Force joint re-supply operation through the Mediterranean, aided only by Spain and Portugal. Following the war, US Navy units co-operated with French, British and other ships and aircraft in re-opening the Suez Canal to international shipping.

The Sixth Fleet’s forward presence posture became steadily more difficult to sustain as the 1970s wore on, as the total US Navy fleet underwent significant cuts in force structure. By 1980, US Navy warship numbers had declined considerably. Unfortunately for NATO’s maritime posture, the decrease in available US Navy forces was matched in many cases by decreases in allied capabilities as well. In 1978, for example, American strike warfare responsibilities within NATO increased, especially in the North Atlantic, with the paying off of the last Royal Navy fleet carrier. Ironically, it was the continued forward strength of the US Navy that sometimes justified allied governments in cutting the budgets of their own navies, especially in the Mediterranean.

Forward basing innovations

Given cuts in fleet strength and the continued perceived necessity for forward US Navy operations, the US government took another initiative in the early 1970s to increase the number of US Navy warships


281 On the various operations to re-open the Suez Canal, some of which were multinational, see Captain J. Huntly Boyd, Jr., USN “Nimrod Spar: Clearing the Suez Canal,” US Naval Institute, *Proceedings* 102 (Feb. 1976), 18-26; and Commander J.M. Lang USN, “Return to Egypt,” ibid., 98-100.

282 For changes in US Sixth Fleet force levels during the 1970s, see Commander Gravatt, *US Navy Ship-Days in the Mediterranean*.

283 On the demise of British carrier strike aviation, and its implications for NATO and the US Navy, see Grove, *Vanguard to Trident*, 268-297, especially 297.

284 For an analysis of this issue, and of the Italian government’s attitude “that the Sixth Fleet will always be available to back up the Italian Navy,” see Sokolsky, *The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform*, 55-6.
homeported forward overseas. Italy briefly hosted a US carrier task force staff and a patrol gunboat squadron with its tender. In 1972, eight American destroyers began forward basing in Phaleron Bay, near Athens, Greece. In 1973, a submarine tender began forward basing at La Maddalena, Sardinia, in Italy. US Navy forward overseas homeporting of warships in Greece precipitously ended in 1975 due to numerous difficulties in implementation.

A little later, in 1978, the last US Navy facilities in Morocco closed. In 1979, the increasing range of US submarine launched ballistic missiles allowed the departure for home of the US Navy submarine tender that had been forward deployed at Rota, Spain. Remaining in place, however, were the US military forces on Iceland, including US Navy maritime patrol aircraft, despite another attempt by a left-wing government in Iceland in 1971–1974 to oust US forces from the base at Keflavik.

Policies and strategies

All this US Navy activity notwithstanding, there was a tendency during these years within the Alliance to downplay the maritime elements of NATO strategy, both conventional and nuclear. There had always been an emphasis within the higher committees of the Alliance—and in Washington—on the defense of NATO’s Central Region (i.e., West Germany) over that of the two European flanks or the surrounding seas.

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286 On the basing of the submarine tender at La Maddalena, see Coletta and Bauer, United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas, 189-90.


288 As of 2004, both the submarine tender at La Maddalena and the Sixth Fleet command ship at Gaeta remain homeported forward in theater.

289 For a discussion of the seas as NATO’s “forgotten front,” see Sokolsky, The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform, 24-34. See also John Hattendorf, “Forward,” in Jordan, Alliance Strategy and Navies, x.
An argument often heard was that enhancing deterrence and readiness at the center would also deter attacks on the flanks or at sea. US Navy officers and others were not so sure of the validity of this proposition, having seen attacks on US naval warships and merchant shipping precipitate American participation in several previous wars. Likewise, Britons recalled the Battles of the Atlantic in both World Wars; Turks remembered the Allied assaults on Gallipoli and from Salonika during World War I; Norwegians and Danes noted that Hitler had launched his attacks on them before he attacked France; Greeks noted that he had attacked them prior to attacking the Soviet Union; and Italians noted that the Allies had invaded them—by sea—in 1943, a year before taking on Germany.

Moreover, by the mid-1970s some influential American defense specialists believed that America’s navy was over-supplied with strike and amphibious elements of little use in deterrence or a future NATO war, ill-prepared to protect Army convoys to Europe, parochially focused on East Asian and Pacific contingencies, draining resources away from US Army and Air Force units garrisoning part of ACE’s Central Region, and unconcerned with the defense of NATO. This despite all the operations and activities noted above and the continued assignment of thoughtful and highly capable US Navy officers to NATO assignments.291

In 1977, many of the views of these specialists became the views of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Department under newly

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291 Examples of the caliber of the Navy’s officers detailed to NATO posts during the 1970s include Admiral Richard Colbert (the US Navy’s “Mr. International Navy”) and Admiral Stansfield Turner (later Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency) as CINCSOUTH. Rear Admiral Robert P. Hilton, Sr. can be said to have inherited Admiral Colbert’s mantle as “Mr. International Navy” during the late 1970s and early 1980s. As Director of the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV OP-60), he greatly intensified OPNAV’s NATO focus. He was also instrumental in setting up the Incidents at Sea regime between the US and Soviet navies, and subsequently went on to serve at SHAPE and on the US Joint Staff. While in OPNAV, Admiral Hilton mentored a generation of rising NATO-oriented US Navy officers, including Commander John Bitoff, Lieutenant Commander Philip Dur, and Commander Henry Mauz—all future flag officers—and the author. Commander Mauz went on to become a US Navy flag officer assigned to SHAPE, commander of the US Seventh Fleet (during Operation “Desert Shield”) and Commander-in-Chief of the US Atlantic Fleet (as a four-star admiral). He had also served on the staff of the US Defense Advisor to the US Mission to NATO in Brussels, a staff that attracted numerous US Navy officers with expertise in political-military affairs over the years. On Moorer, see J. Kenneth McDonald, “Thomas Hinman Moorer,” in Love, The Chiefs of Naval Operations, 351-63. On Colbert, see Sokolsky, The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform; and Hattendorf, “International Naval Cooperation and Admiral Richard G. Colbert.” For Turner’s views of his tour as CINCSOUTH, see Admiral Stansfield Turner USN (Ret), Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), 9. On Hilton’s extensive dealings with the Soviets, afloat and ashore, see Winkler, Cold War at Sea.
elected President Jimmy Carter in 1977. For the next four years, a
globally deployed Navy saw its commitment to NATO and Europe and
its global worldview challenged by its civilian masters. Navy strat-
egists, however, found it difficult to understand why American strategy
should be focused so heavily on two länder in South Germany, when
the United States had allies in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean
to defend and when its opponent was a superpower with worldwide
capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities.292

From 1977 onward, the importance of the Pacific theater—and the
bankruptcy of a “swing strategy” moving Pacific carriers to Europe and
the Atlantic in time of war—were central to the arguments made by the
Navy’s dominant strategic thinker of the period, Admiral Thomas B.
Hayward USN.293 In 1978, the US Naval War College initiated its
Global War Game series to explore how best to leverage NATO mari-
time capabilities in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in which central front
operations had national primacy but in which the US Navy would fight
globally.294 By the end of the decade, thoughtful leading senior retired
naval officers were speaking out on the necessity of global forward
carrier operations in the North Atlantic and Pacific and the deficiencies
of a “swing” strategy.295

Debates over strategy and doctrine aside, the 1970s saw the begin-
nings of a recapitalization of the US Navy, as hundreds of old ships
were retired, and highly capable (if fewer) warships replaced them.
With the Vietnam War over, the Navy’s share of the US defense budg-
et became higher than that of the other services for the first time since
the end of World War II, and it would stay high for the remainder of the
century. Allied navies could only envy the US Navy’s domestic posi-
tion.

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292 For US Navy strategic thinking in the late 1970s regarding NATO, see Sea Plan
2000: Naval Force Planning Study (unclassified executive summary), Washington, DC:
Mar. 28, 1978); and Hattendorf, The Evolution of the US Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 13-
17.
293 Hayward served as Commander, US Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific from 1975
to 1976 and as Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet from 1976 to 1978; from
1979 on, he served as CNO. On Hayward’s thinking, especially regarding “swing,” see
294 On the initial 1979–1983 Global War Game series and the primary attention paid to
the Central European front, see Bud Hay and Bob Gile, Global War Game: The First
Five Years (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College Press,
June 1993),
295 For the views of senior retired US Navy officers see, for example, Admiral Thomas
H. Moorer, USN (Ret.) and Alvin J. Cottrell, “Sea Power and NATO Strategy,” and
Admiral Isaac Kidd, USN (Ret.), “For want of a Nail: The Logistics of the Alliance,” in
Kenneth A. Myers, ed., NATO: The Next Thirty Years (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980),
223-36 and 189-205). Admiral Moorer was a former SACLANT, former CNO, and for-
mer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Kidd was a former SACLANT and
former COMSTRIKFORSOUTH.
USN relations within NATO

NATO navies respond

The US and other NATO navies continued to try to counter these Soviet naval developments, especially in the north. In 1972, for example, US Navy units participated in another immense NATO exercise in the Norwegian Sea. In 1973 a third NATO multinational naval force—Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN)—comprised of mine countermeasures vessels, was stood up under CINCCHAN—with routine US Navy participation.

The US Navy also looked favorably on Federal German Navy attempts to operate beyond the Baltic and its approaches, despite Royal Navy opposition. This German Navy initiative became the catalyst for a 1979 NATO Tri-MNC North Sea Agreement, breaking down some of the rigidities imposed by NATO’s MNC command boundaries at sea.

Also, by the middle of the decade—with the Vietnam War behind them—the marines (and US Navy amphibious forces) resumed their earlier aborted training and exercising in Norway, and in greater strength. They also planned to pre-position equipment ashore there for ACE Northern Region contingencies.

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297 SACLANT Exercise “Strong Express,” conducted in September 1972, was the largest-ever combined exercise, involving some 300 ships, 700 aircraft, and 64,000 personnel from 12 nations. A good description is in John Marriott, “Exercise Strong Express,” NATO’s Fifteen Nations 18 (Feb.–Mar. 1973), 74-80. See also Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, 121; and Grove, Battle for the Fiords, 15, and 26-9. On NATO operations in the North Atlantic during the 1970s, see Grove, Battle for the Fiords, 15-30.
298 On the US Navy’s endorsement of an expanded Federal German Navy area of operations, see Admiral Zumwalt, On Watch, 469.
300 On the marines’ refocus on Scandinavia in the mid-1970s, see Crist, “A New Cold War: US Marines in Norway and the Search for a New Mission in NATO.”
Relations with other NATO member navies outside NATO

Also, in 1973, a new coalition exercise was instituted: Baltic Operations (BALTOPS). Although not connected formally to NATO, this CINCUSNAVEUR-led exercise in the western Baltic eventually included warships from most Northern European navies and became an important annual evolution.302

Navy-to-navy sharing

Several transatlantic naval dialogues were initiated during the 1970s to enhance cooperation among individual Alliance navies, both within and outside NATO. A series of navy-to-navy staff policy talks between the Office of the US Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and the naval staffs of key NATO allies was begun.303 Transatlantic sharing of innovative new naval procedures and technologies—such as hydrofoils—continued, fostered in part by NATO institutions created for that purpose.304

Naval aircraft designs, in particular, continued to migrate both ways across the ocean. Early in the decade, the US Navy purchased for the US Marine Corps an Americanized version of yet another British naval aviation innovation—the vertical and short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft (the AV-8A Harrier). Later, some of these Marine aircraft were transferred to the Spanish Navy’s Fleet Air Arm for operations on its carriers. The Lockheed P-3 Orion, a very successful land-based maritime patrol aircraft introduced into the US Navy in the 1960s, also found buyers in the Spanish and Norwegian air forces during the 1970s.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, the US Navy and US Coast Guard began arming their new guided missile frigates, hydrofoils, and high endur-

302 BALTOPs was launched to assert American rights of freedom of navigation in the Baltic and demonstrate US Navy concern for the region, despite minimal formal American responsibility for Baltic Sea defense under NATO plans and command structures. Participants normally included surface combatants, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft from Belgium, Denmark, the German Federal Republic, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For an outline history of BALTOPs, see Grzegorz Lyko, “From Confrontation to Co-Operation: The History of Baltops Exercise,” in Krzysztof Kubiak and Piotr Mickiewicz, eds., Between Rivalry and Co-Operation: The Baltic Region, 1000-2000 (Gdynia, Poland: Polish Naval University, 2004), 88-93.

303 During the 1970s, OPNAV participated in programs of navy-to-navy staff policy talks that were held with the navies of France, the German Federal Republic, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, as well as a few non-NATO allies.

304 What began in 1972 as an American-German-Italian consortium, however, soon became a US-only development and building program. See Al Ross, “Pegasus Class Hydrofoils,” Warship 1989, 166-74.
ance cutters with Italian-designed 76mm Oto Melara guns. On the other hand, toward the end of the decade, new US Navy weapons systems—especially the Harpoon anti-ship missile—became weapons of choice for many other NATO navies. Transfers of older naval equipment also continued, such as the Turkish Navy acquisition of US-built Dutch S2F Tracker ASW aircraft starting in 1971.

**Other NATO navies’ non-NATO activities**

An additional naval development of the 1970s was the deployment by the French Navy of its own strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines. These new French strategic submarines—not linked to NATO command and control institutions—both added to and complicated the seaborne strategic nuclear deterrence posture of the Alliance already embodied in the American SSBNs assigned to NATO commanders and the British strategic submarine force.

**The 1980s: The Maritime Cold War peaks**

**Global American policy context**

Adjusting the US Navy’s worldview

Emphases within the US Navy’s global worldview were evolving, driven as always by a confluence of changing world conditions, changing US government policy, and changes in naval technology. Under the Reagan administrations of 1981–89, the Navy took a more balanced view of its roles in the world’s oceans. The primacy of the Pacific theater faded in Navy eyes, at the direction of the Navy’s political and military masters as well as a reflection of the trend of world events. At the same time, the new administration enunciated a global national military strategy within which US Navy strategic thought fit comfortably.

Without neglecting the Pacific, the US Navy re-focused on its forward NATO responsibilities, especially on NATO’s northern and southern European flanks. US naval commanders, in their NATO command

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roles, led a series of large and complex NATO exercises in the eastern Mediterranean and the Norwegian Sea, to revitalize NATO’s naval forward maritime defenses. Prepositioned US Marine Corps stocks began to build up in Norway. NATO and US Navy global forward submarine operations likewise intensified, including forays under the Arctic ice. So too did US Navy sorties into the Black Sea.

NATO forward submarine exercises engendered a need for submarine rescue exercises as well. The US Naval War College’s Global War Games (now with British and Canadian participation) continued to investigate campaigns on the NATO European flanks and in the Pacific and their optimal relationship to the Central European front. The “swing” strategy continued to receive scrutiny by US Navy eyes, and it continued to be found wanting, despite the newfound importance of the Atlantic and Mediterranean in those same eyes.

New systems and new capabilities

Major—even transformational—changes occurred in the US fleet during the 1980s. With the introduction of the Tomahawk land-attack missile on its surface combatants and submarines, in European waters

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307 Similar non-NATO exercises were held in the northwest Pacific as well. On US Navy participation in NATO forward exercises at sea during the 1980s, see especially Grove, Battle for the Fiords; and Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, USN, “The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea,” Naval War College Review 39 (Mar.–Apr. 1986), 2-6.


310 The Soviets occasionally responded to this intensified US Navy and NATO forward activity. For example, in 1988, Soviet warships rammed American warships in the Black Sea, causing a major international diplomatic incident. See Aceves, “Diplomacy at Sea,” 59-79.

311 In 1986, in the Norwegian Sea off Stavanger, NATO held its first “Sorbet Royal” submarine rescue exercise. From this modest beginning would blossom a major NATO effort leading to the establishment of the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office (ISMERLO) two decades later. See below.


313 Ibid., 89 and 101.
and elsewhere, the US Navy began to distribute significant striking power throughout the fleet, beyond just its aircraft carriers.

The concomitant US Navy deployment of the Aegis fleet anti-air warfare system significantly increased the ability of US and NATO fleets to protect themselves in forward areas in the face of massed Soviet naval land-based aviation attacks. The installation of Vertical Launching Systems (VLS) in US Navy warships gave them the capability to launch significant numbers of missiles of several types. Taken together, the introduction of Tomahawk, Aegis, and VLS revolutionized the forward combat capability of the US Navy’s surface and attack submarine fleets.

Also during the decade, the US Navy deployed a squadron of Maritime Pre-positioning Ships (MPS) to forward stations in the Atlantic, with enough sea-based equipment for a Marine Amphibious Brigade. Along with the airlift and fast sealift of personnel and equipment, pre-positioning was designed to enable marines and other service members to deploy more rapidly and in greater strength than had heretofore been possible.

The US Maritime Strategy

The Reagan Administration of the 1980s called for an increased naval force structure, and from 1981 to 1987 the size of the US Navy grew until it almost reached its “600 Ship Navy” goal. This allowed the Navy to deploy a fleet of almost two dozen warships with one or two—and sometimes more—carrier battle groups forward in the Mediterranean all through the decade.

US, allied, and NATO naval strategy and doctrine were also updated. A highly influential US Navy-US Marine Corps “Maritime Strategy” was developed, widely promulgated, and extensively exercised. It em-

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314 In 1980, the United States began to pre-position equipment for the marines and other services on ships deployed forward in the Indian Ocean. In 1984, the first MPS ships in the Atlantic deployed with sea-based equipment for the 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade. A third squadron was subsequently deployed to the western Pacific. Ships and equipment were upgraded and modernized over the next two decades. MPS Squadron One deploys today in European waters as part of the US Sixth Fleet. On the initial deployments in the Atlantic, see “Updating MPSs 1, 2, and 3,” Marine Corps Gazette 69 (June 1985), 61; Lieutenant Colonel David B. Brown, “MPS: An Evolving Entity,” Marine Corps Gazette 69 (Jan. 1985), 34-9; and “MPS-1T Loadout Now Underway,” Marine Corps Gazette 68 (Nov. 1984), 6.

315 For US Sixth Fleet forces during most of the 1980s, see Commander Gravatt, US Navy Ship-Days in the Mediterranean; and Kennedy et al., Trends in Force Levels and Disposition of Major Navies Since World War II.

phasized early, global forward operations and the importance of the seas and the NATO European flanks to peacetime deterrence and wartime operational roles

Transforming jointness: The Goldwater-Nichols Act

Many other changes occurred within the US military command structure during this period. They represented a drastic quickening of the previously slow pace of increased jointness that had characterized the American services throughout the Cold War. These changes culminated in the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.

Goldwater-Nichols and various related American legislative and executive actions of the late 1980s would have far-reaching effects over the next two decades. For example:

- The US Navy would grow far closer to its US Army and Air Force sister services in its organization, doctrine, operations, and equipment.
- The internal influence within the US defense establishment of the unified commanders (including USCINCEUR and USCINCLANT, who were also NATO supreme allied commanders) was now enhanced vis-à-vis that of the CNO and other American service chiefs.
- The US Navy and Marine Corps would now provide officers to top US European command jobs formerly closed to them.


317 During the 1980s, the United States stood up new joint Space, Special Operations, Transportation, and Central Commands. The establishment of each had been opposed by the US Navy.

318 The Goldwater-Nichols Act passed despite intense US Navy opposition, due to fears of having its influence diluted in determining the nature of maritime campaigns. For a detailed, if highly opinionated, study, see James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002).
- The US Navy would cease to have a lock on the SA Claus position

**USN relations within NATO**

A complementary forward NATO “Concept of Maritime Operations” (CONMAROPS) was developed and endorsed by the Alliance’s naval commanders and others.319

By the mid-1980s, key US Navy flag officers who had been deeply involved in the formulation of the Maritime Strategy had assumed important senior Alliance naval posts.320 Some more junior contributors to the Maritime Strategy made similar moves.321 This increased even more the congruence between the Maritime Strategy and CONMAROPS and was reflected in the innovative and aggressive forward NATO naval exercises of the mid- and late-1980s.

Innovative new tactics for these forward operations were developed, including the use of the Norwegian and Greek islands to mask the presence of NATO aircraft carriers.322 Debate continued, however, inside and outside the US Navy, on the advisability of a continued strong US Sixth Fleet presence in the Mediterranean.323 Renewed consideration was also given to the uses of tactical nuclear weapons at sea.324

319 On the background and development of NATO’s CONMAROPS, see Swartz, “Preventing the Bear’s Last Swim.”

320 Examples include Admirals Lee Baggett, Jr. and Frank Kelso II (SA Claus between 1985 and 1990); William Small, Lee Baggett, Jr., and Arthur S. Moreau (CINCSOUTHs between 1983 and 1987); and Vice Admiral Jerome Johnson (COMSTRIKFORLANT from 1988 to 1990).

321 From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, key alumni of OPNAV’s Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603, later N513), an office that had been central to the development of the Maritime Strategy, were assigned to the staff of the Defense Advisor at the US Mission to NATO in Brussels. These alumni included Captains Raymond P. Conrad, Thomas Fedyszyn, Richard Kalb, James Moseman, and the author. Likewise, an important Naval War College strategist of the early 1980s, Captain Kenneth McGruther, was subsequently assigned to the staff of CINCSOUTH in the mid-1980s.


Later in the decade, debates on naval theater nuclear weapons shifted to their use from the sea, with the introduction into the US fleet of a nuclear-tipped version of the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).  

Paradoxically, the decade was characterized not only by a renewed vitality and singleness of purpose among the Alliance’s navies, but also by heightened private and public controversies on naval issues. Several commentators writing in the 1980s saw—and applauded—a return to forward US Navy maritime operations and strategic concepts of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Some American critics outside naval circles, however, asserted that this naval posture was globalist (true) and unilateralist (untrue), in juxtaposition to an alleged continentalist and coalition approach that they favored. They also argued for a shifting of scarce allied budget funds from naval to ground and air forces (specifically resurrecting the old arguments of the 1950s denigrating the position of the Royal Netherlands Navy within Dutch defense policy).

The US Maritime Strategy and the NATO CONMAROPS—not to mention the Soviet buildup on the Kola Peninsula—engendered a frenzy of conferences and meetings among national security affairs specialists from NATO nations, especially in Northern Europe. These in turn resulted in an avalanche of books disseminating the papers presented at


Return to the late 1940s was the theme of Michael A. Palmer’s influential Origins of the Maritime Strategy. See also Sokolsky, The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform, xiv.

For criticisms of strong and early forward naval wartime operations along these lines, see Robert W. Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense? (Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 1984). See also Keith A. Dunn and Colonel William O. Staudenmaier USA


those events. Some of Europe’s foremost defense experts participated vociferously in these debates.

Other critics—in light of the US Navy’s burgeoning force levels, operational experience, and self-confident assertiveness—questioned the need for allied navies at all—including the Royal Navy. European Atlantic navies—especially the Royal and Royal Netherlands Navy—had long argued that their continued robust existence was essential to “hold the ring” forward in time of war, until the US Second Fleet could surge deploy to the Norwegian Sea from the east coast of the United States. Increased US Navy attention to northern waters in the 1980s was seen by some as threatening that justification.

Canadian naval commanders embraced NATO’s new assertiveness at sea and were among the primary proponents of NATO’s CONMAROPS. They also, however, advocated an increased Ca-


333 There was much informed public and private discussion of the US Maritime Strategy and NATO CONMAROPS in Canada. See especially Joel J. Sokolsky, Defending Canada: US-Canadian Defense Policies (New York: Priority Press Publications, 1989); and
nadian national assertiveness of Canada's sovereignty at sea and Can-
adnadian deployment of its own nuclear-powered submarines in the Can-
adnadian Arctic, where US Navy and possibly Soviet submarines had presumably deployed.334

Meanwhile, critics inside NATO naval circles, especially within the Royal Navy but also some Americans as well, decried the Alliance's downgrading of close-in convoy escort tactics to protect transatlantic reinforcement shipping in favor of aggressive forward naval operations.335 Thorny issues regarding proper NATO maritime standing rules of engagement (ROE) likewise pitted American policy-makers and naval officers against their British and other European counterparts.336

Meanwhile, the US Navy continued its practice of assigning top offic-
ers to top NATO command positions.337

Joseph T. Jockel, “The US Navy, Maritime Command, and the Arctic,” Canadian De-

334 Low Canadian defense budgets, reinforced by American hostility to Canadian nuclear submarine plans, killed the proposal for a Canadian SSN fleet. For US Navy views of the Canadian SSN initiative, see Admiral Kinnard R. McKee USN (Ret.) Oral History (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Foundation, 2001), 104-5.
336 The debates over proper NATO maritime ROE centered around deciding what actions in which circumstances might constitute enemy “hostile intent.” For public manifesta-
tions of the internal NATO debates, see Admiral William N. Small USN (Ret.) Oral History (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Foundation, 1997), 68-9; Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North 286 & 356; Norman Friedman, “The Rules of Engagement Issue,” in E. F. Gueritz et al., NATO’s Maritime Strategy: Issues and De-

Relations with other NATO member navies outside NATO

At the same time, however, the US Navy continued to seek to limit actual tensions with Soviet forces at sea in accordance with the 1972 US-Soviet INCSEA Agreement. Several NATO naval powers followed suit in the 1980s and also signed their own similar bilateral agreements with the Soviets. Also, in 1988 a British think tank organized the first in an annual series of informal trilateral discussions among representatives from the Soviet Navy, the Royal Navy, and the US Navy (and British and American civilian naval experts)—the so-called “RUKUS” talks.

Multinational cooperation and crisis response in the 1980s

The US Navy of the 1980s responded to numerous crises throughout the world, but especially in the Mediterranean—often alongside allied and friendly navies. Multinational naval cooperation was a feature of operations responding to crises off Lebanon, in the Gulf of Suez, and in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. Also, American naval patrols began to

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338 Bilateral Incidents at Sea agreements were signed by the Soviet Navy and the navies of the United Kingdom (1986), the German Federal Republic (1988), France (1989), Canada (1989), and Italy (1989). The texts of the agreements with the navies of the United Kingdom and Germany are in Fieldhouse, ed., Security at Sea: Naval Forces and Arms Control, 258-64. As of 1990, agreements had been negotiated with Norway, the Netherlands, and Spain as well. See Hilton, “A Confidence-building Measure at Work,” 164-5.

339 The first RUKUS Talks were sponsored by the (British) Foundation of International Security, with Brown University and the US Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies providing American support. The initial talks in the late 1980s were limited to naval strategy, doctrine, and operational issues, and they were frank but cool. No US Navy flag officers participated. See Commander Barry Coombs USN and Commander Les Sim RN, “The Russians Are Here,” US Naval Institute, Proceedings 121 (Mar. 1995), 68-9; and Commander D. Leslie W. Sim RN, “The 1994 Russian-UK-US Naval War Game (RUKUS 94): Important Considerations for Multinational Naval Operations,” RUSI Journal 139 (Oct. 1994), 19-22, 56.

340 For the US Navy’s responses to crises around the world during the 1980s, see Cobble et al., For the Record; and Siegel, Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era.

help stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States from Latin America, often in cooperation with British, Dutch, and French warships stationed in Caribbean islands.

Support went in both directions across the Atlantic: US government aid to the United Kingdom during the Falklands War of 1982 included significant naval assistance. As then Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. explained, “One has to understand the relationship of the United States Navy and the Royal Navy—there’s no other relationship, I think, like it in the world between two military services.”

Joint US Navy and Air Force operations against Libya in 1986 validated yet again the importance of sea-based US Sixth Fleet strike forces, as NATO ally policies split once more (only the United Kingdom offered basing and over-flight rights to US Air Force warplanes). Likewise, in 1985, Sixth Fleet carrier-based aircraft had been used to force down a civilian airplane carrying hijackers over the Mediterranean.

**Transatlantic naval technology transfers**

The close Anglo-American relationship was also reflected in the acquisition by the Royal Navy of the US Navy’s Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile system, to upgrade the British strategic nuclear deterrent in step with American nuclear force modernization. Significant technology transfer to other NATO allies also continued during the
1980s. The Royal Netherlands Navy and the Canadian and Portuguese air forces joined the Norwegian and Spanish Air Forces and several other services around the world flying US P-3 Orion land-based maritime patrol aircraft. At the end of the decade, Spain put a new smaller carrier into service based on an unused US Navy sea control ship design of the 1970s. The Spanish Navy also took delivery of US-built Sikorsky SH-60B Seahawk helicopters.

On the other hand, some European technologies and systems were purchased for use by the US Navy. The US Navy used an Italian design for a new mine-hunter class and installed Italian engines in both these new mine-hunters as well as new American-designed mine countermeasures ships. The US Navy also purchased former British Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) combat stores ships to augment its underway replenishment force. Nevertheless, US Navy technological advances, especially in communications and intelligence, continued to complicate the abilities of other NATO navies—even the Royal Navy—to operate optimally with American warships at sea.

The 1980s saw one other naval technology transfer issue take center stage within the Alliance: the export of strategic materials from western nations to members of the Warsaw Pact. In 1987, the US Navy and the US government strongly protested the shipment to the Soviet shipbuilding industry by the Norwegian firm Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk (and the Japanese Toshiba Company) of equipment useful in reducing submarine propeller noise.

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346 For an argument that transatlantic technology transfers included assistance to the French nuclear deterrent, see Richard H. Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” *Foreign Policy* no. 75 (Summer 1989), 3-33.
347 On the origins of the US Navy sea control ship design that eventually was used for the Spanish Navy carrier *Príncipe de Asturias*, see Zumwalt, *On Watch*, 75-6, 106, 116-21.
349 In the early 1980s, the US Navy purchased three Sirius-class (ex-British Lyness-class) combat stores ships (AFS) to augment its own force, overstretched by Indian Ocean and other commitments.
351 On the Kongsberg-Toshiba case, see Tamnes, *The United States and the Cold War in the High North*, 293.
Non-US allied naval commanders re-emphasized the complementary forward roles of their own forces for deterrence and warfighting.\textsuperscript{352} The Federal German Navy was particularly assertive in this regard.\textsuperscript{353} So too was the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{354}

\subsection*{Command structure changes}

American and NATO command structures continued to evolve during the 1980s. With other NATO allies, in 1982 the United States welcomed Spain as the Alliance’s sixteenth member, an action that improved the already close relationships between the US Navy and the Spanish Navy. Throughout the decade, Spanish naval forces increased their integration into NATO forward maritime operations. By 1989, a Spanish carrier was operating with US Navy and other allied forces in a forward NATO exercise off Scotland and Norway.\textsuperscript{355}

At the same time, the US Navy relinquished command of SACLANT’s IBERLANT command to a Portuguese admiral.\textsuperscript{356} In 1983, the US national position of CINCUSNAVEUR and the NATO position of CINCSOUTH once again became held by the same US Navy admiral, although he was supported by separate staffs for each role.\textsuperscript{357} In 1985, however, the US Navy administrative command position of CINCLANTFLT was separated from the operational command positions of USCINCLANT/SACLANT.\textsuperscript{358}

\footnote{For example, the Royal Danish Navy planned to start defending the Danish Straits “east of Bornholm” (i.e., off Poland). See Rear Admiral Hans Garde RDN, “Defence of the Baltic Approaches: The Role of the Royal Danish Navy,” \textit{NATO’s Sixteen Nations} (Sept. 1989), 35.}


\footnote{For an example of the Royal Navy leadership’s advocacy of strong early NATO forward operations at sea, see Admiral Sir Julian Oswald, “Maritime Concepts of Operation: New Thinking,” \textit{RUSI Journal} 133 (Summer 1988), 10-14.}

\footnote{On Spanish Navy forward operations, see “Spain, UK Team Up for NATO’s ‘Sharp Spear 89’” \textit{Jane’s Defense Weekly} (Sept. 23, 1989), 563.}

\footnote{On the role of IBERLANT and the change in nationality of the IBERLANT commander in the 1980s, see Rear Admiral Louis A. Williams USN, “The Atlantic Connection—IBERLANT,” \textit{NATO’s Sixteen Nations} 28 (Special No. 2 1983), 31-8; and Jordan, \textit{Alliance Strategy and Navies}, 164.}

\footnote{The two positions had briefly been united under one US Navy flag officer decades earlier. See above.}

\footnote{On the separation of the US Navy’s Atlantic Fleet command from that of ACLANT and LANTCOM, see Hirrel, \textit{United States Atlantic Command}, 31.}
Innovative new lower level NATO institutions were also created or evolved during the 1980s. For example, in 1983 SACLANT stood up a Maritime Electronic Warfare Support Group (MEWSG), to help NATO navies conduct more realistic training and exercises in electronic warfare. Like the NATO AWACS force and SACLANT’s lone research ship, MEWSG assets were among the very few actually owned and operated by the Alliance itself. Within a few years, MEWSG was assisting NATO ground and air forces as well, and its name was changed from “Maritime” to “Multi-service.”

The 1990s: NATO navies go to war

Global American policy context

In 1989, a summit conference between the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union was scheduled to take place in the Mediterranean on board the US Sixth Fleet/STRIKFOR SOUTH command ship and a Soviet cruiser. This event was symbolic of a sea change then taking place in world politics and international security affairs. The Cold War was rapidly ending. The early 1990s saw the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as dangerous and threatening changes in the Middle East and elsewhere, which had several far-reaching results.

The total number of ships in the US Navy’s battle force declined sharply, for example, from almost 600 at the beginning of the decade to just over 300 at the turn of the century.

Changes in the size of the US Navy and other NATO navies were accompanied by changes in the comparative importance of their missions. US President George H.W. Bush announced in 1991 that all non-strategic theater nuclear weapons would be removed from US Navy surface ships and attack submarines. In 1992, changes in the

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360 For an overview of the US Navy and NATO at sea during most of the 1990s, see Joel J. Sokolsky, Projecting Stability: NATO and Multilateral Naval Cooperation in the Post Cold War Era (Halifax NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1998). For an argument that NATO had largely been a success at sea by the mid 1990s, see Captain Goode, “For Example, See NATO.”
US Navy’s strategic nuclear weapons posture caused the forward SSBN tender at Holy Loch, Scotland, to leave for home.

With much of the former Soviet submarine fleet rusting in Russian or Ukrainian ports, the US Navy’s complex open-ocean anti-submarine warfare forces were sharply reduced—a move that was echoed in other Alliance navies. The US Navy rolled up much of its North Atlantic SOSUS net and closed its anti-submarine warfare bases in the Portuguese Azores (1994) and British Bermuda (1995). Some US Navy forces and weapons systems that had been optimized to combat Soviet aircraft raids and surface ship salvos were likewise cut back.

At the same time, however, naval strike warfare against targets ashore, combat missions in littoral waters, and a variety of peace operations increased in saliency. All across the Alliance, naval strategy and policy began to shift, giving increased prominence to littoral sea supremacy, strike and amphibious operations, and military operations other than war (MOOTW), and far less to open-ocean sea control.

Although the Soviet threat quickly disappeared, the responsibilities of the US Navy for peacetime presence, crisis response, and combat operations endured and even increased, while the responsibilities of NATO at sea shifted drastically. In 1990 and 1991, the US Navy participated heavily in joint and combined coalition operations to protect Saudi Arabia, enforce the United Nations embargo, eject Iraqi invaders from Kuwait, and keep sea lines of communication open. US Navy warships attacked Iraq from the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean.366

Transforming policy and strategy

To acknowledge the vast changes that were taking place in the world and to give future direction to its planning, the US Navy promulgated new policy statements to replace The Maritime Strategy . . . From the

363 On the departure of US Navy anti-submarine warfare forces from the Azores, see J. King Cruger, “Navy Gears for Drawdown of Most Operations in Azores,” European Stars and Stripes (June 9, 1992), 3.


365 The 1990-1 operations in and around the Gulf were “Desert Shield” and “Desert Storm.”

Sea was published in 1992, and *Forward . . . From the Sea* in 1994.\(^{367}\) Both of these documents heavily touted US Navy efforts to increase jointness with its American sister services, but they also explicitly highlighted the importance of combined naval interoperability, exercises, and operations.\(^{368}\)

The rise of jointness

American and NATO operations off and in the western Balkans—and in much of the rest of the world—were increasingly as much joint as they were combined. The 1990s saw an increased integration of US Navy commands, forces and people into joint American force structures and operations, as well as a call by the Navy’s political and military masters for increased attention to experimentation, innovation, and transformation. It also saw an increased influence of US Navy and Marine Corps officers at USEUCOM headquarters, as running real-world operations supplanted formulating plans and policy as the headquarters’ centerpiece activity.\(^{369}\)

The Navy participated in these command changes and efforts to innovate. Starting in 1993, the formerly joint (but largely maritime) US Atlantic Command lost its Caribbean and South Atlantic areas of responsibility, but it gained new missions as a joint force integrator—and in 1999 it gained a new name: Joint Forces Command.\(^{370}\) At the same time, the water areas allocated to the joint US European command—and therefore to CINCUSNAVEUR—expanded westward into the Atlantic.\(^{371}\) US Second Fleet and Sixth Fleet units meanwhile


\(^{368}\) The thinking of other NATO navies changed as well during the 1990s. See, for example, CAPT Peter Hore RN ed., *The Genesis of Naval Thinking Since the End of the Cold War* (Royal Navy Maritime Strategic Studies Institute, Mar. 1999).


\(^{370}\) The US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) received a new abbreviation (USACOM) in 1993, to emphasize its changing missions. In 1999, it was re-designated US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Throughout the 1990s, however, despite these changes, NATO continued to appoint the evolving command’s commander-in-chief (CINC) as SACLANT.

\(^{371}\) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) change of 1995 transferred the Caribbean and the waters around South America from the US Atlantic Command to the US Southern
participated in a new global US Navy program of Fleet Battle Experiments to examine innovative warfighting concepts and technologies.372

US Navy presence in the European waters trails off

As the decade progressed, the focus of deployments by NATO navies shifted from the north and the Atlantic to the south and the Mediterranean.373 The US Navy was no exception. Yet despite its commitments in the Adriatic, the US Navy of the 1990s was hard pressed to maintain its traditional presence even in the Mediterranean in the face of a vanished Soviet threat, greatly reduced force size, other more pressing responsibilities in the Arabian Sea and the Western Pacific, and significant other remaining American and NATO military capabilities in the NATO AOR.374 For the first time in almost half a century, there were significant stretches of time during the 1990s when the US Sixth Fleet lacked even one carrier battle group and comprised less than a dozen ships in all.375 On the other hand, significant progress had been made in increasing the lethality of individual US Navy ships and air-


372 For example, in 2000, Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) Golf was held in the Mediterranean, assessing new technologies for ballistic missile defense and time-critical targeting. On the FBEs, see Vision, Presence, Power 2004, 12-16.

373 For a discussion of the shift in NATO naval deployments from north to south, see Hirschfeld, Multinational Naval Cooperation Options, 27-9.

374 To illustrate the pre-eminence of US Navy Arabian Sea operations over those in the Mediterranean: In 1991 six US Navy carrier battle groups were deployed in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf for Operation “Desert Storm” to liberate Kuwait. In 2001 three carrier strike groups were deployed in the Arabian Sea for Operation “Enduring Freedom” against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In 2003 five carrier strike groups (three in the Arabian Sea and the two in the eastern Mediterranean were deployed for Operation “Iraqi Freedom” to liberate Iraq. By contrast, in the mid-1990s, only one or two US Navy carrier battle groups were deployed in support of NATO and other operations in the Adriatic.

craft, so the reduced ship numbers did not necessarily mean a reduction in combat power.376

NATO policy context

The end of the Cold War and its effect on NATO navies

The NAC made transformational decisions to deploy NATO forces outside the Atlantic Treaty area for the first time, to expand NATO’s membership to the east, to engage with Russia and other non-NATO states in a “Partnership for Peace (PFP),” and to relate the Alliance to Europe’s emerging security identity. At the same time, individual NATO nations in both Europe and North America seized the opportunity to cut back on their armed forces, including their navies.

NATO and the European Security Identity

The 1990s saw an intensification of interest by many Europeans in more purely European defense organizations, while retaining NATO transatlantic ties.377 In 1994, in large part to accommodate this interest, NATO began to experiment with new operational force packages—Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). The NATO CJTF concept called for easily deployable, multinational joint forces flexibly tailored to a spectrum of military tasks.378

USN relations within NATO

Although NATO as an institution did not become involved in the Gulf War, it soon took the unprecedented step of becoming an active military participant in the wars spawned by the breakup of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO and other international organizations, as well as individual NATO member nations (including the United States) intervened repeatedly to help staunch turmoil in the western


Balkans. Thus a complex and overlapping series of Adriatic operations preoccupied the US Navy and most of NATO’s other navies during much of the 1990s, as they operated within national, NATO, United Nations, Western European Union, and ad hoc coalition command joint and combined structures in and around the Adriatic Sea.379 In each of the NATO operations with a maritime component, CINCSOUTH was a major NATO operational decision-maker, as was COMSTRIKFORSOUTH by 1999.380

Almost unnoticed during the mid-1990s was another NATO real-world at-sea “out-of-area” operation: the participation of STANAVFORLANT in counter-drug smuggling surveillance and hurricane disaster relief operations in the Caribbean.381

NATO exercises continue and transform

In the midst of these Middle Eastern, Balkan, and Caribbean operations, NATO continued its important and varied exercise program, especially at sea. For example:

- In 1992 and again in 1996, NATO conducted its second and third submarine rescue exercises, with participation in the latter by a submarine from Sweden, a PfP partner nation.
In 1993, 130 ships from 14 NATO countries deployed to the Norwegian Sea to test NATO’s complex new maritime command structures.382

In 1994, in another precedent-setting event, the first PfP naval exercise was held in the Norwegian Sea, with ships from 10 NATO nations, Russia, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden.383

Another PfP at-sea exercise was held in 1996 in the Black Sea.384

In 1998, the Alliance held its largest post–Cold War exercise to date, with participation by NATO and PfP navies in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.385

For the US Navy, NATO exercises in European waters continued to be an important activity. As the decade opened, for example, the US Navy participated in as many multilateral, bilateral, and unscheduled combined exercises in the Mediterranean and Baltic as in all the other seas and oceans of the world combined.386

Updating the NATO command structure and force structure

NATO maritime command structures changed alongside those of the United States. In 1994, in the first major post–Cold War reorganization of the NATO command structure, the number of MNCs was reduced to two: ACE and ACLANT. ACE and its commander SACEUR—normally an American army or air force officer—inherited the water space formerly assigned to the now disestablished Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN). Also in the mid-1990s, as part of a larger effort to alter US-European relationships within the Alliance, the French unsuccessfully attempted to wrest command of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) from the succession of US Navy admirals who had always occupied that position.387

382 This Norwegian Sea exercise was exercise “Strong Resolve,” during which the Striking Fleet commander chopped from SACLANT to SACEUR command. See Mike Wells, “Exercise ‘Strong Resolve,’” Jane’s Navy International 100 (May/June 1995), 39-42.
383 This initial PfP naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea was “Cooperative Venture 94,” held off Stavanger, Norway.
384 This Black Sea PfP exercise was “Cooperative Partner 96.”
385 This large NATO and PfP exercise was “Strong Resolve 98.” See Sokolsky, Projecting Stability, 19-21.
In 1999, there was another round of NATO military organizational changes, designed to reduce the number of ACE and ACLANT subordinate multinational military headquarters from 65 to 20. STRIKFORSOUTH was re-designated AFSOUTH’s Regional Reaction Force and moved from the NATO command structure to the NATO force structure. IBERLANT was re-designated Regional Headquarters, South Atlantic.

The 1990s also saw an expansion of the NATO force structure’s standing Maritime Immediate Reaction Forces, to which the US Navy routinely contributed. STANAVFORLANT remained largely as it had been since 1967, but in the Mediterranean, CINCSOUTH and COMNAVSOUTH created two new forces: A Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) in 1992, replacing the NAVOCFORMED created in 1969, and a Mine Countermeasures Force in the Mediterranean (MCMFORMED) in 1999 (renamed MCMFORSOUTH in 2001).

Also, a Mine Countermeasures Force North (MCMFONORTH), under CINCNORTH and COMNAVFORNORTH, superseded STANAVFORCHAN in 1998. Throughout the 1990s, the four Maritime Immediate Reaction Forces—with US Navy participation—contributed actively to the various NATO naval operations in the Adriatic.

Meanwhile, the US Navy continued to assign some of its very best leaders to maritime and other positions within the Alliance. Moreover, the US government and NATO now began to assign top American


388 On the status of the various ACLANT commands on the eve of the major 1999 reorganization, see NATO’s Sixteen Nations (Special Issue 1998). On the changes, see General Klaus Naumann FGA, “NATO’s New Military Command Structure,” NATO Review (Spring 1998), 10-14.

389 Headquarters COMSTRIKFORSOUTH would later be described as “a power projection and high readiness maritime headquarters available to the NATO force structure.” See “Press Releases on Exercise Co-operative Partner 2003,” IMS Press Advisory (Brussels: NATO International Military Staff, June 13, 2003).

390 On the evolution of NATO’s standing naval forces during the 1990s, see Toremans, “Standing Ready for NATO.”

391 Conspicuous among the US Navy officers assigned to key NATO positions during the 1990s were Admiral Paul David Miller as SACLANT and Admirals Jeremy Boorda (a future Chief of Naval Operations), Leighton Smith, and James Ellis (a future Commander, US Strategic Command) as CINCSOUTH. Former US Navy Vice Admiral Norman Ray, whose NATO military experience had been extensive, was appointed as a NATO civilian Assistant Secretary General for Defence Support. On Smith, see Colonel Mark A. Bucknam USAF, Responsibility of Command: How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower over Bosnia (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, Mar. 2003), passim. On Ellis, see General Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret), Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat (New York, Public Affairs, 2001), especially 143-4.
naval leaders to the very highest levels of joint and combined command in the American and NATO force structure in Europe. On the other hand, during the mid-1990s the United States and NATO began to appoint general officers from other US services as SACLANT—an unprecedented and controversial policy change.

**NATO and the US Navy’s doctrinal moment**

Below the level of naval policy and strategy lies naval doctrine. Throughout the Cold War, the highly operationally oriented US Navy had generally been suspicious of doctrine—both national and NATO—seeing it as potentially stultifying of initiative and irrelevant to the special situations the Navy was continuously called upon to face. This view was in sharp contrast to that of the US Army and many European militaries, including European navies—and of NATO’s doctrine-writing institutions. This was often a source of friction within the US military and the Alliance.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the US Navy was dissatisfied with playing what it saw as a secondary role, especially in strike warfare. It attributed at least part of this alleged shortcoming to a failure to have participated fully and to take seriously the great strides that had been made in the creation of joint US doctrine following the signing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Consequently, the new Navy white paper for the 1990s, . . . From the Sea, directed the establishment of a US Naval Doctrine Command (NAVDOCCOM), to develop new naval doctrine and to participate more fully in the creation of joint US and allied doctrine. This command stood up in Norfolk in 1993 and included a small cadre of allied officers (from Australia, Britain, etc.).

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392 In 1998, Admiral Charles S. Abbot, a former US Sixth Fleet commander, became the first US Navy officer to be appointed as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, US European Command, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. Admiral Abbot was followed in the position by a US Marine Corps general.


Canada, France, and Italy). Other NATO navies followed the US Navy lead and re-emphasized their own doctrinal efforts.

One of NAVDOCCOM’s most prominent products—Multinational Maritime Operations—collected and promulgated fundamental principles for the planning and conduct of multinational naval operations. Its coverage of alternative command structures for multinational operations was especially significant. This unclassified publication was widely disseminated on the worldwide web as well as issued in paper form. It was also designed to serve as a capstone publication for a series of NATO-created tactical and procedural documents known as “1000 Series EXTACs.” These unclassified EXTACs—derived from NATO tactical and procedural publications already in use—were intended by NATO to enable non-traditional partners to more easily join in training, exercises, and real-world operations alongside NATO member navies. NATO had long had a careful and lengthy procedure to allow other navies—such as the Australians and Japanese—access to classified NATO procedures and practices. The EXTACs broadened and speeded up that effort and were open to the world.

The “doctrinal moment” in modern US Navy history was a brief one. Before the decade was out, the US Navy had regained its lost confidence in itself—and its relative disinterest in doctrine. NAVDOCCOM was disestablished and its functions transferred to a subordinate element within a new Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC). Although NWDC continued to serve as the focal point for US Navy contributions to multinational naval doctrine, its main focus, however, was on at-sea experimentation—an activity far more congruent with US Navy culture. NATO EXTACs continued to be issued and updated,

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396 One of the chief products of those efforts was the superb The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine: BR 1806, 2nd. ed. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1995, updated in 1999).

397 Multinational Maritime Operations was signed out by the Commander, US Naval Doctrine Command and published in Norfolk in Sept. 1996.

398 EXTACs covered topics such as multinational maritime maneuvering and tactical procedures, helicopter operations from ships other than aircraft carriers (HOSTAC), replenishment at sea, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), and maritime interdiction operations (MIOs). A listing as of 1996 is in Multinational Maritime Operations, 4-2.

with US Navy input, but the allied officers went home, and their billets
were disestablished.\textsuperscript{400}

**The US Navy, NATO navies, and the CJTFs**

Central to NATO's experiments with CJTFs in the 1990s were multina-
tional staffs led by US Navy NATO strike force commanders on board
US Navy command ships. In May 1996, STRIKFORSOUTH participat-
ed in the first NATO combined/joint task force (CJTF) afloat exercise in
the Mediterranean, Exercise "Matador 96." STRIKFLTLANT likewise
tested some sea-based CJTF concepts in Exercise “Strong Resolve
98,” off Spain.

**Relations with other NATO member navies outside NATO**

**Operations at sea**

Although NATO as an institution did not participate, several individual
NATO nations deployed naval forces to the Arabian Sea and the eastern
Mediterranean to collaborate and cooperate in these operations.\textsuperscript{401}

These naval forces coordinated with US naval forces in a variety of
command arrangements, but almost all utilized NATO doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures to ensure coalition interoperability at sea.
Numerous follow-on actions against Iraq occurred all through the
1990s.\textsuperscript{402} In most of these, US Navy warships worked alongside coal-
ition forces, especially the British and French.\textsuperscript{403} Meanwhile, a multina-

\textsuperscript{400}The EXTAC series of documents, although unclassified, was not available for general
distribution as of 2005. Non-NATO nations seeking access to these documents were ex-
pected to do so through a NATO member nation.

\textsuperscript{401} On NATO's significant informal role during the Gulf War, see \textit{NATO Handbook}
sea against Iraq, see Edward J. Marolda, "A Host of Nations: Coalition Naval Operations
in the Persian Gulf," in \textit{Selected Papers from the 1992 (59th Annual) Meeting of the So-
ciety for Military History}, ed. Donald F. Bittner (Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps
Command and Staff College, May 1994), 265-84. See also Ballantyne, \textit{Strike from the Sea},
131-150; Eric Grove, \textit{Britain's Gulf War: Operation Granby} (London: Harrington Kil-
Canadian Naval Forces in the Persian Gulf} (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997); Commodore D. E. Miller, CF, and S. Hobson, \textit{The Persian Excursion: The Canadian Navy in
the Gulf War}, Clementsport, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995); and Cosentino
and Stanglini, \textit{The Italian Navy}, 48-9

\textsuperscript{402} Iraqi operations of the 1990s included "Northern Watch," "Southern Watch," "Vigil-

\textsuperscript{403} In late August 1992, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France agreed to po-
lice a “No-Fly Zone” over southern Iraq using land-based and sea-based combat aircraft.
The French withdrew from this operation (Operation “Southern Watch”) in the mid-
tional Maritime Interception Force (MIF) was established to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq. Several NATO nations—notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and Poland—contributed.

More non-NATO operations with NATO allies

Outside the Persian Gulf and the Adriatic, the US Navy was again called upon by the US government to respond to a variety of other situations all across the 1990s, and usually in tandem with naval forces from NATO member nations and other coalition partners:404

- In 1990, US Navy and US Marine Corps amphibious elements were ordered to wrap up ongoing maintenance and training activities in France and sail from Toulon to West Africa to evacuate noncombatants from Liberia.405 They were assisted by a Royal Navy frigate and tanker under US Navy tactical control and by a Nigerian task group.406 Another US Navy-Marine Corps operation off Liberia, again with Royal Navy assistance, occurred in 1996.407
- From 1991 through 1995, US Marines and soldiers and troops from other nations deployed to Somalia in a series of humanitarian assistance support operations. They were supported by US Navy warships operating in coordination with warships from Canada, France, Italy, Turkey, and several other nations.408

1990s. American and British air and naval forces continued combat patrols and—when necessary—combat strikes. Operation “Desert Fox” in 1998 was the most significant Anglo-American strike on Iraq during this period. On the Royal Navy’s contribution, see Ballantyne, “Keeping Saddam Caged,” in Strike from the Sea, 131-50.
404 For a compendium and analysis of US Navy and other US military responses to situations in the 1990s, see Cobble et al., For the Record.
407 The 1996 evacuation operation from Liberia was Operation “Assured Response.” As in 1990, it involved a US Navy ARG and its MEU (SOC), augmented by a surface combatant. This time a Royal Fleet Auxiliary was placed under the tactical command of the US Joint Task Force commander in Monrovia to prepare to assist in the evacuation of American and British nationals from Liberia. See Captain Hore, Royal Navy and Royal Marines Operations, 110.
• The US Second Fleet deployed off Haiti in 1993 and 1994 in joint operations to restore democracy to that troubled French-speaking nation. These operations also included Canadian, British, and other warships, coordinating and cooperating largely through NATO-developed procedures.\textsuperscript{409}

• In the Caribbean and elsewhere, multinational American, British, Dutch, and French naval patrols continued to help staunch the illegal smuggling of drugs by sea.\textsuperscript{410}

Other important non-NATO initiatives involving the US Navy and other NATO navies included the deployment of a US Navy amphibious ship into the Black Sea in the early 1990s; the expansion—from 1993 on—of the annual US-led BALTOPs exercises to include warships from PfP navies; and the routine integration from 1998 onward of Canadian Navy patrol frigates into forward-deploying US Navy carrier battle groups (CVBG).\textsuperscript{411}

One last operation during the decade must be noted: use of a US Navy warship to defuse a crisis between NATO allies. In 1994, a Sixth Fleet Aegis cruiser was interposed between Greek and Turkish forces to decrease rising tensions in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{412}
USN policy influences

Their promulgation had considerable influence on allied naval thinking, especially in the Royal Navy.\footnote{On the influence of the new American naval concepts on the British, see CAPT Peter Hore RN, *Seapower Ashore: 200 Years of Royal Navy Operations on Land* (London: Chatham Publishing, 2001), 21-3. A Canadian view is in Robert H. Thomas, *Multinational Naval Cooperation* (Halifax, NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1996), 40-3.} Their influence beyond the navies, however, was limited, given the continued lack of significant influence of NATO navies within their governments and societies.\footnote{For an argument that the relative lack of internal influence by navies may make navy-to-navy relationships easier to establish and maintain, see Henry H. Gaffney, Jr., *US Deterrence and Influence in the New Era (including the Contributions of Naval Forces)*, CIM 579 (Alexandria, VA: CNA, Aug. 1998), 109-12.}

Naval theory and combined operations

The numerous and intense combined operations in the Persian Gulf, the Adriatic, off Africa, and elsewhere spawned a renewed interest in the theory and modalities of naval combined operations among naval policy-makers and naval thinkers. Numerous studies were commissioned by governments and navies, and many others were drafted without any official sanction.

International conferences and workshops on combined operations abounded, and a whole new library of analyses and conference proceedings relating to alliances and coalitions at sea was created during the decade. The US Navy and the policy analysis community that supported it were no exceptions.\footnote{For example, as the 1990s opened, the US Navy’s Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations commissioned a major study by the Center for Naval Analyses examining the conditions under which multinational naval cooperation at sea could support US interests in the coming decade. For a summary of the study’s findings, see Hirschfeld, *Multinational Naval Cooperation Options*.} Thoughtful senior US Navy officers contributed significantly to this body of work.\footnote{On Alliance maintenance and coalition building, see former COMSTRIK-FORSOUTH/ COMSIXTHFLT Admiral William A. Owens USN, *High Seas* (1995), especially chapter 2, “The Use of Military Force and Overseas Presence,” 27-49. On the future of coalitions at sea, especially under United Nations auspices, see SACLANT/CINCUUSACOM Admiral Paul David Miller USN, *Leadership in a Transnational World: The Challenge of Keeping the Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993).}

One institution that flowered during the 1990s was the RUKUS Talks—the annual trilateral Russian-British-American naval discussions begun in 1988. With the end of the Cold War, the atmosphere at these talks became much less chilly, and operational simulations (and later...
games) were added to the program.\footnote{On the RUKUS games during the 1990s, see Commander Coombs and Commander Sim, “The Russians are Here”; and Commander Sim, “The 1994 Russian-UK-US Naval War Game.”} In 1991, US Navy flag officers began to attend. Later in the decade, the three participating navies were joined by a fourth—the French—and the talks became known as FRUKUS.

**Naval interoperability and technology transfer in the 1990s**

Efforts to achieve multinational material harmonization, co-development, and technical interoperability continued in the 1990s. Probably the most ambitious program was the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which continued into the twenty-first century.\footnote{The JSF program aims at fielding a multirole coalition strike fighter for not only the US Navy, US Marine Corps, and US Air Force, but also for NATO allies Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (as well as non-NATO Australia). The US Marine Corps and the Royal Navy intend to fly a VSTOL version of the aircraft. See Vision, Presence, Power 2004: A Program Guide to the US Navy (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2004), 48; and Christopher J. Castelli “Cutting STOVL JSF’s Internal Payload Would Reverse 2002 Decision,” Inside the Navy (Oct. 4, 2004), 1, 9-10. See also Ethan B. Kapstein, “Capturing Fortress Europe: International Collaboration and the Joint Strike Fighter,” Survival 46 (Autumn 2004), 137-59; and Paul T. Mitchell, “The Joint Strike Fighter: Solution or Wishful Thinking?” Canadian Military Journal, 3 (Summer 2002), 33-38.} An international program to upgrade the highly successful NATO Sea Sparrow anti-air warfare missile system also began in the 1990s (and continued into the twenty-first century).\footnote{NATO nations involved in the 12-nation Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) consortium include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. See Vision, Presence, Power 2004, 73-4.} Another successful product of international co-development, the German-American Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), also entered service in the 1990s, likewise with follow-on upgrades during the next decade.\footnote{On the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), designed to destroy incoming anti-ship missiles, see Vision, Presence, Power 2004, 75; and Anthony, The Naval Arms Trade, 78-79. As of 2004, the RAM had been installed on dozens of US Navy German Navy warships.}

Although efforts such as these had potential to improve NATO’s technical interoperability, other kinds of initiatives to improve operational and political/cultural interoperability among Alliance members also continued to be necessary.\footnote{For a superb in-depth analysis of issues relating to technical, operational, and political/cultural interoperability among NATO and other advanced navies, see Kenneth Gause, Catherine Lea, Eric Thompson, and Dan Whiteneck, “US Navy Interoperability with Its High-End Allies,” paper delivered at the Fifth C2 Research and Technology Symposium (Canberra, Australia: Australian War Memorial, Oct. 24-6, 2000). See especially the discussion of doctrinal incompatibilities among NATO navies during}
The United States continued during the 1990s to share advanced naval technologies with its closest naval allies. Most significant was the Royal Navy’s purchase—and immediate combat use—of the Tomahawk land attack cruise missile; the French Navy’s purchase of US-built E2-C airborne early warning aircraft for its new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, *Charles de Gaulle*; and the development and deployment of upgraded AV-8B Harrier II+ VSTOL aircraft for the Italian and Spanish navies.\(^{422}\) During the 1990s, Greece began to fly American P-3 Orion land-based maritime patrol aircraft (purchased from Australia), joining the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and numerous other countries allied or friendly to the United States.\(^{423}\) Greece also purchased American-made Sikorsky S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopters—derivatives of the SH-60 Seahawk—for service on its frigates.

Some naval technologies in the 1990s continued to flow across the Atlantic the other way as well. For example, the US Navy purchased British-designed T-45 Goshawks as its advanced jet trainer aircraft and Norwegian-designed Penguin anti-ship missiles for its own SH-60 Seahawk helicopters.

The NATO alliance expanded yet again in 1999 with the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Poland brought with it an aging Soviet-style naval force, which it immediately strove to modernize. To assist in this effort, in 2000, the United States transferred to the Polish Navy the first of two former US Navy missile frigates. During the 1990s the United States also transferred almost three dozen other former US Navy destroyers and frigates to Greece and Turkey, and other ships to Spain and Portugal.\(^{424}\)


\(^{423}\) On the status of the P-3C Orion aircraft in various allied and friendly navies during the 1990s, see Michael J. Gething et al., “Upgrade Update: The Omnipresent Orion,” *International Defense Review*, (Mar. 1, 1995).

Entering the twenty-first century

Global American policy context

On its part, in 2003, the US Navy replaced the concepts in its *Forward . . . from the Sea* document with a new conceptual framework, *Sea Power 21*. Even more than its immediate predecessors, this new concept document emphasized the US Navy’s contribution to joint American operations, although it did call for combined interoperability as well. Also, *Sea Power 21*’s “Sea Basing” concept highlighted the virtues of moving as much US military combat and logistic force to sea as possible and reducing requirements for American shore bases, especially advanced forward bases.

The US Navy, the Mediterranean, and nearby waters

One trend of the 1990s that continued into the twenty-first century was the demise of permanent combat-credible forward presence in the Mediterranean as a central organizing concept for US naval forces in the NATO AOR. Well before the FRP was devised, the post–Cold War US Navy had ceased to deploy significant naval forces forward on a permanent basis in the Mediterranean. Instead, that sea had become a venue for only intermittent presence, transits en route to and from the Arabian Sea via the Suez Canal, and surge deployments from the United States.

Said the US Navy CNO in 2003, “It’s been a long time since anybody in the Navy has talked about full time presence in the Mediterranean.” Meanwhile, the US Sixth Fleet’s AOR was expanded beyond the Mediterranean and Black Seas, and made coextensive with that of NAVEUR, to include the Baltic and the North and South Atlantic.

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Nevertheless, whatever, its actual composition on any given day, the prestige, reputation, and memory of the US Sixth Fleet remained a powerful element in any calculus of military power in and near the Mediterranean.\footnote{On the continuing reputation and memory of the Sixth Fleet, see, for example, its mention in Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s speech aired on October 29, 2004, excerpted in “Bin Laden Speaks to American People,” \textit{Washington Post} (Oct. 30, 2004), A16.} The proven ability of the United States to quickly surge forces from the United States to reinforce the Sixth Fleet continued to provide a basis in reality for the legend.

Whatever its on-scene naval force levels in Europe on any given day, the United States continued to view itself as a major naval power in European waters. The US Navy CNO routinely participated with other Navy leaders in the biennial Regional Seapower Symposia held in Venice.\footnote{On the Regional Seapower Symposia, see Admiral Angelo Mariani IN, “Review of the 1996 Black Sea-Mediterranean Regional Symposium” in John B. Hattendorf ed., \textit{Fourteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings, 2-5 November 1997} (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1998), 21-5; and Admiral Vern Clark USN: \textit{Remarks at the Fourth Regional Seapower Symposium, Venice, Italy, October 16, 2002}, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Information, 2002).} COMUSNAVEUR has likewise routinely participated in annual Chiefs of European Navies meetings.\footnote{Commander James Bergeron USNR, COMUSNAVEUR staff plans officer, provided this information in a communication to the author, Oct. 17, 2004.} In 2004, the United States also demonstrated its concern for maritime security in West African waters by convening in Naples, Italy, an international conference of naval leaders from European and African navies, as well as the US Navy.\footnote{In October 2004, the US European Command sponsored the three-day 2004 Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Conference, hosted by the Commander of US Naval Forces Europe (who in his NATO hat was also the Commander of ACO’s Joint Forces Command Naples). Participants included naval leaders from France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as 10 West African nations. See “Maritime Security Conference Brings Navies Together,” (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, American Forces Press Service (Oct. 5, 2004).}

**NATO policy context**

The first half-decade of the new century saw both significant changes as well as continuities in the relationship between the US Navy and NATO. Operational concepts, command structures, and operating areas all changed—sometimes radically—but the importance of combined naval power to the United States and to the Alliance remained high.\footnote{For a thoughtful study of the US Navy and its role at the start of the twenty-first century, see Henry H. Gaffney, \textit{Globalization and Naval Forces}, CRM D0005743.A1/Final (Alexandria, VA: CNA, Jul. 2002).} At the same time, NATO continued its traditional maritime exercise and interoperability improvement programs, now both compli-
cated and enhanced by an expanded Alliance membership and increased out-of-area activities.

Transforming the Alliance: NATO expansion

In 2004, NATO integrated seven more nations into its committees and councils and into its new integrated military command structures.\textsuperscript{434}

Accordingly, the US Navy—and US Navy commanders operating within the NATO command structure—stood ready to increase the range of their cooperative operations at sea, not only in the Black Sea and the Baltic, but also worldwide.

USN relations within NATO

Transforming policy and strategy

American and other NATO planners and policy-makers strove to keep abreast of a changing world and changing national and NATO security policies by developing more up to date conceptual frameworks and strategies. In 2001, \textit{CONMAROPS} was superseded by a new NATO conceptual document, \textit{Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept—The Maritime Dimension}, derived from a new Alliance strategic concept promulgated in 1999.\textsuperscript{435}

Transforming command structures

As the American military grew more joint in its concepts and operations, this was reflected in major changes in its operational command structure. In 2002, the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)—formerly the joint US Atlantic Command—lost all its geographic responsibilities. Henceforth, the command would focus its efforts entirely on joint force integration and military transformation.\textsuperscript{436}

\textsuperscript{434} New NATO members in 2004 included Bulgaria and Romania on the Black Sea; Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the Baltic; Slovenia on the Adriatic; and Slovakia on the Danube.

\textsuperscript{435} General J. W. Ralston, US Air Force and General W. F. Kernan, US Army, \textit{Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept—The Maritime Dimension} (North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Jul. 18, 2001). Reflecting the increasingly joint nature of warfare in the new century, it was signed by both SACEUR and SACLANT, at the time an American air force general and an American army general respectively. No sooner had the concept document been signed, however, then it was sidelined by yet another major NATO transformation of its overall military strategy and doctrine.

\textsuperscript{436} USJFCOM retained combatant command over the US Atlantic Fleet, US Marine Forces Atlantic, and most forces of the other US services located in the continental United States.
US military operations and activities in the eastern and central Atlantic—including those in Iceland and Danish Greenland—now became the responsibility of the joint US European Command (USEUCOM) and its Navy component, US Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR).437 (Thus USNAVEUR regained a responsibility that its predecessor NELM had lost half a century earlier). The western Atlantic and Canada were assigned to a new joint US Northern Command, tasked with North American homeland defense, in the wake of the 2001 Al Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington.438

By 2004, more changes in the US Navy’s command and basing structure in Europe appeared to be in the offing: press reports indicated that—as part of a larger Secretary of Defense-directed rationalization of US military forces worldwide—the London component commander headquarters would close in a year or two, and the staffs of COMUSNAVEUR, the commander of the Sixth Fleet and other US Navy commanders in Europe would all be consolidated in Naples, Italy.439 A US Navy submarine tender would remain homeported forward at La Maddelena (servicing a wide variety of warships besides submarines), as would a Sixth Fleet flagship at Gaeta, Italy.440

Meanwhile, in 2002 the North Atlantic Council directed yet another major post–Cold War overhaul of the NATO integrated military command structure.441 Accordingly, in 2003, ACLANT was replaced at Norfolk by

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437 Also, responsibility for US military activities in Russia was assigned to USEUCOM in 2002 as well. For the UCP changes of 2002, see “Unified Command Plan,” News Release #188-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Apr. 17, 2002).

438 Another change in 2002 was the downgrading of the titles of US combatant and component commanders from “commanders-in-chief” (“CINCs”) to “commanders” (“CDRs”) and “COMs”). Thus USCINCEUR became CDRUSEUCOM and CINCUSNAVEUR became COMUSNAVEUR.


440 Press reports indicate that both the submarine tender USS Emory S. Land (AS-39) and the command ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20) will be manned by mixed crews of uniformed US Navy officers and enlisted, as well as Military Sealift Command civilian merchant mariners. See Jack Dorsey, “Region to Lose Four Ships as Navy Shuffles its Vessels,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot (Aug. 26, 2004); and Jason Chudy, “USS Mount Whitney will Take Over as Flagship of 6th Fleet, Officer Says,” Stars and Stripes (European Edition) (Aug. 21, 2004).

441 For a general discussion of the 2002–2004 changes in the NATO military command system, see Air Vice-Marshall Andrew Vallance, “A Radically New Command Structure for NATO,” NATO Review (Autumn 2003). See also LTC Raymond A. Millen USA, Re-
a new Allied Command Transformation (ACT), under a Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). 442 Henceforth all NATO naval operations—in the Mediterranean, Baltic, North Atlantic, or elsewhere—would now be conducted by what had once been ACE, now Allied Command Operations (ACO)—still headed by SACEUR. ACLANT’s US Navy-commanded submarine command became Allied Submarine Command (ASC)—now a subordinate command of ACO, reporting to SACEUR. The old ACLANT regional commands were dis-established. 443 ISCOM Iceland and its US Navy commander became subordinate to a new command—Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum (in the Netherlands)—reporting to SACEUR. 444

In 2004, ACO’s AFSOUTH command was de-activated and replaced by a new Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples, still reporting to SACEUR and still commanded by a US Navy admiral (COMJFC Naples). 445 Also reporting to SACEUR was a new Joint Command (JC) Lisbon, commanded by the Commander of the US Sixth Fleet (but now spending the bulk of his time on NATO matters in Lisbon). 446 COMSTRIKFORSOUTH, headquartered in Naples, now became Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (COMSTRIKFORNATO), with a remit to operate NATO-wide under the operational command of SACEUR, but in an administrative relationship with COMJFC Naples. 447


442 SACLANT, since its establishment, had been a double-hat of USCINCLANT and later CINCUSACOM and CINCUSJFCOM. But in 2002 and 2003, the Deputy SACLANT—a Royal Navy admiral—became SACLANT for nine months until the establishment of ACT. This was the only time in NATO history that a SACLANT had been other than a US Navy officer. SACT became a double-hat of the commander of the US unified Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM). SACEUR remained a double-hat of the commander of the US unified European Command (CDRUSEUCOM)

443 Disestablished were ACLANT’s EASTLANT, WESTLANT, and SOUTHLANT (formerly IBERLANT) commands.

444 COMJFC Brunssum’s Maritime Component Commander was the Royal Navy’s Commander-in-Chief Fleet, headquartered in Northwood, UK.

445 COMJFC Naples became a double-hat of the US Navy’s COMUSNAVEUR, as NATO CINCOUTH had been. COMJFC Naples’s Maritime Component Commander—formerly COMNAVSOUTH—was still an Italian Navy admiral, likewise headquartered in Naples. The position of his subordinate NATO submarine commander, COMSUBSOUTH, was a double-hat of the US Sixth Fleet’s subordinate submarine commander, Commander Task Force 69 (CTF 69).

446 COMJC Lisbon and his JHQ Lisbon staff replaced the Portuguese Navy admiral and his staff at Regional Headquarters South Atlantic. See “From RHQ SOUTHLANT to JHQ Lisbon” and “18 Mar. 2004 Transition Ceremony,” (Lisbon: JHQ Lisbon Public Information Bureau, Mar. 18, 2004).

447 As a result of the many changes in both the NATO and US NATO command structure, COMSIXTHFLT now wore three additional hats: Deputy Commander, US Naval
It was envisioned in 2004 that the three subordinate headquarters of ACO—in Naples, Italy; Brunssum, the Netherlands; and Lisbon, Portugal—would also rotate responsibilities as lead headquarters for a new NATO Response Force (NRF). JC Lisbon was to assume the sea-based combined joint task force (CJTF) headquarters role for the Alliance, pioneered by COMSTRIKFLTLANT in the 1990s. COMSTRIKFORNATO was to be prepared to conduct military operations as a High Readiness Force Expanded Task Force (HRF (ETF)) Headquarters.

These changes marked the demise of the North Atlantic as a coherent and distinct military theater of operations. Indeed, they marked the demise of the very concept of separate maritime theaters of operation, in both the US command structure and that of the NATO alliance. Nevertheless, under these new arrangements, US naval leadership contributions to the Alliance within its new joint and combined command structures remained strong: As of 2004, SACT, COMJFC Naples, and COMJC Lisbon were all US Navy admirals, and numerous other US Navy officers served on NATO staffs in Brussels, Mons, Norfolk, Naples, Brunssum, Northwood, Keflavik, and elsewhere. In perhaps the most significant change of all, SACEUR was now a US Marine Corps general.

NATO’s standing Maritime Immediate Reaction Forces—STANAVFORLANT, STANAVFORMED, MCMFORNORTH and MCMFORSOUTH—continued to provide continuous NATO naval presence and emergency deployability when requested, routinely participating in NATO operations and exercises. The US Navy continued to provide warships—and occasionally commanders—for these permanently-constituted NATO forces. In 2004, a US Navy Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) exercised with STANAVFORLANT off the American East Coast to test new combined Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) operations.

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Forces Europe (DEPCOMUSNAVEUR); NATO COMJC Lisbon; and COMSFN. On STRIKFORNATO, see “Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO,” Factsheet (Naples IT: Joint Force Command Naples, Sept. 24, 2004).

Presumably, the new NATO sea-based headquarters, JC Lisbon, will use the capabilities of the US Sixth Fleet command ship, homeported in Gaeta, Italy—as will STRIKFORNATO headquarters as well.

The United States nominated STRIKFORNATO to NATO as a High Readiness Force (Expanded Task Force) Headquarters, with expanded manning and ready to operationally deploy within seven days. See “Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO,” Factsheet

In 2003, General James Jones, Commandant of the US Marine Corps, became the first officer from one of the naval services to be appointed Commander, US European Command and NATO SACEUR.

NATO and NATO navies at war again: Cooperation at sea

Coordination and cooperation by NATO navies both inside and outside the formal framework of the Alliance continued into the twenty-first century. Following the Al Qaeda attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the NAC for the first time invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and sent NATO AWACs aircraft—including a few US Navy aircrew members—from Europe to America to patrol the skies there and help protect American airspace. Individual NATO nations responded to 9/11 as well.

In October 2001, NATO authorized CINCSOUTH to begin Operation “Active Endeavor,” using a multinational NATO naval force to patrol and monitor shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean, to block Al Qaeda’s use of the sea for transport. US Navy ships and aircraft have participated in these operations since their inception, as well as to help NATO provide security for the Olympic Games in Athens. US and NATO logistic support facilities, especially the base at Souda Bay, Crete, supported these and other operations.

Exercises and naval presence

These NATO and non-NATO “real world” operations were demanding enough, but they existed alongside NATO’s normal intensive schedule of at sea exercises and naval presence demonstrations. The first half of 2004 provides an illustrative example:

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453 For Canada’s immediate naval response to assist the United States, see Richard Gimblett, Operation Apollo (Ottawa, Canada: Magic Light Publishing, 2004), 8-15.
454 STANAVFORMED and later STANAVFORLANT have formed the bulk of the NATO warships involved in Operation “Active Endeavor.” In March 2003, the operation was expanded to include escort of civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar. Compliant boardings began the next month. In March 2004, the operation was expanded further to encompass the entire Mediterranean. See the NATO AFSOUTH—later JFC Naples—website.
• In February, the US Navy contributed commanders, warships, and maritime patrol aircraft to an eleven-nation NATO anti-submarine warfare exercise in the Ionian Sea.\textsuperscript{457}

• In February and March, the US Navy frigate assigned to STANAVFORMED participated in a NATO exercise to validate and certify NATO’s new NRF High Readiness Maritime Forces.\textsuperscript{458}

• In May, a US Navy ship and dive team participated in a seven-nation NATO mine warfare exercise off Turkey.\textsuperscript{459}

• In June, the US Navy, through its participation in the NATO command structure and Maritime Immediate Reaction Forces, joined other NATO and Partner navies in a 40-ship JFC Naples crisis response exercise in the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{460}

• In July, the US Navy sent two carrier strike groups to participate in a 10-nation, 20-ship NATO exercise in the Atlantic off Morocco, commanded by COMSTRIKFORNATO.\textsuperscript{461} The American deployment was part of a wider global surge deployment of seven carrier strike groups styled “Summer Pulse 04” to implement and refine the US Navy’s new Fleet Response Plan (FRP) surge deployment initiative.\textsuperscript{462}

• In September and October, COMJFC Naples scheduled and COMSTRIKFORNATO directed 47 ships from 11 NATO na-

\textsuperscript{457} The NATO ASW exercise in the Ionian Sea was “Dogfish 04.” See JO1 Russ Tafuri, “Largest NATO Nation Exercise Kicks off at NAS Sigonella,” \textit{US Navy Newsstand Story #NNS040226-08} (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Information, Feb. 26, 2004).


\textsuperscript{459} The NATO exercise off Turkey was “Damsel Fair 2004.” See “NATO Mine Counter-Measure Exercise off the Coast of Turkey,” \textit{AFSOUTH Release #11-2004} (Naples, IT: Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe Public Information Office, May 17, 2004).


\textsuperscript{461} The NATO exercise off Morocco was “MEDSHARK/Majestic Eagle ’04.” The commander was COMSTRIKFORNATO (one of the NATO hats of the Commander, US Sixth Fleet), operating in a “coalition” mode, according to Commander James Bergeron USNR, COMUSNAVEUR plans officer in personal correspondence to the author, Oct. 17, 2004.

...ations—including France—in a major NRF-style amphibious exercise on Sardinia.463

• In October, a US Navy destroyer participated in at-sea exercises in the Adriatic with Albanian, Croatian, and Macedonian forces to enhance their nations’ bids for NATO membership464

Interoperability: Continuing to pursue the Holy Grail

None of these new initiatives at sea could have happened without the foundation provided by decades of NATO efforts to achieve interoperability at sea through multinational education, training, war games, exercises, plans, and tactical and material standardization. By 2004, NATO had published some 1500 NATO standardization agreements and publications and 700 allied publications, with another 200 or so standards under development. Many of these covered maritime procedures and equipment. The renamed NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) had nine working groups under its Maritime Standardization Board, headed by a Spanish Navy captain.465 The struggle to achieve and maintain Alliance interoperability at sea continued into the twenty-first century.466

Relations with other NATO member navies outside NATO

The US Navy continued to deploy its forces globally, especially in the Indian and Pacific Ocean theaters. Naval forces of other NATO nations routinely joined them there, especially in the Arabian Sea, using NATO-developed tactics, techniques, and procedures. The multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF) that had been enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq for a decade was given new missions.467 It was now complemented and supplemented by new multinational naval forces aimed at:

465 A brief overview of NATO standardization organizations and efforts, as of 2004, is in Brigadier General Julian Maj, Polish Army, “Standardization in NATO,” NATO’s Nations 49 (IV/2004), 172-4.
466 For example, seven NATO navies—including the US Navy—are co-developing the next generation NATO Tactical Data Link (also called NATO Improved Link Eleven, NILE, and Link 22) to facilitate future Alliance coordinated combat operations at sea. See Vision, Presence, Power 2004, 133-4.
• Supporting air and ground operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{468}
• Stopping terrorist activities at sea in and around the Horn of Africa\textsuperscript{469}
• Participating in coalition operations to topple the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq\textsuperscript{470}

\textsuperscript{468} The American name for the operation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan was Operation “Enduring Freedom” (OEF). Assisting in the effort were numerous allied ships and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), many from NATO nations. In mid-2002, for example, warships and MPA from Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States were all conducting operations in waters around the Arabian Peninsula, most as part of Task Force 50. See Ballantyne, “No Tougher Fight,” Strike from the Sea, 151-71; Captain Phil Wisecup USN and Lieutenant Tom Williams USN, “Enduring Freedom: Making Coalition Warfare Work,” US Naval Institute, Proceedings 128 (Sept. 2002), 52-55; and Carlos E. Cal and Juan A. Imperiale, “El Poder Naval Contra el Talibán y Al Qaeda: Afganistán—2001,” Boletín del Centro Naval (Argentina), 121 (Dec. 2003), 31-48.

France, Britain, and Italy deployed carrier battle groups, with French carriers conducting strikes on targets ashore. Royal Navy submarines launched Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against similar targets. Royal Air Force tanker aircraft refueled US Navy carrier fighters in flight. Canada’s at-sea contribution from 2001 through 2003 was particularly significant (see Gimblett, Operation Apollo). At the same time, NATO itself also took on increasingly formal and important roles in Afghanistan. Starting in 2002, individual NATO member nations (United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany, and the Netherlands) rotated command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) within Afghanistan, with NATO providing planning and other support.

\textsuperscript{469} The Commander, US Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM) set up Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) in 2002, using USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20) as initial command headquarters before transferring to a former French base in Djibouti. JTF-HOA was supported at sea by coalition maritime patrol aircraft and the multinational Task Force (TF) 150, composed of ships from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These nations have also rotated responsibility for providing TF 150’s commanders (the initial commander was German). See “UK Navy Turns Over Multinational Task Force Command to France,” US Navy Newsstand Story #NNS040602-04 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Information, June 2, 2004); “Horn of Africa Conflicts Threaten US Anti-Terrorism Efforts,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (June 2004), 46 ff; “US and Coalition Forces Bring Global War on Terrorism to the Enemy at Sea,” US Navy Newsstand Story #NNS030829-02 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Information, Aug. 29, 2003); and Michael Gordon, “German and Spanish Navies Take On Major Role Near Horn of Africa,” New York Times (Dec. 15, 2002).

\textsuperscript{470} The American name for the operations bringing down the Saddam regime in Iraq was Operation “Iraqi Freedom” (OIF). Multinational maritime intercept operations during the invasion phase of OIF were conducted by forces drawn from the MIF, including American, British, Danish, Italian, Polish, and Spanish warships. See Captain Peter D. Jones, Royal Australian Navy, letter, US Naval Institute, Proceedings 129 (Jul. 2003), 18 & 20. By far the largest coalition contributor of naval forces was the Royal Navy, which deployed dozens of warships, including carriers and nuclear-powered submarines (see Ballantyne, Strike from the Sea, 175-241; and Robert Fox, Iraq Campaign 2003: Royal Navy and Royal Marines (London: Agenda Publishing, 2003). Denmark contributed the force’s only diesel submarine for inshore surveillance. (See Gimblett, Operation Apollo, 135). Although only a small number of non-US coalition forces formally participated in the invasion phase of OIF at sea, multinational maritime cooperation across the USCENTCOM AOR at the time was extensive, given the number of other coalition op-
• Ensuring post-war security for Iraqi ports and sea lines of communication in the Gulf.\textsuperscript{471}
• Creating a new Iraqi Coastal Defense Force\textsuperscript{472}

Allied ground and air forces contributed to these and related operations as well.\textsuperscript{473} It should be noted that while most other NATO nations had been supportive of the 1991 war on Iraq and America’s 2001 Global War on Terror, the Alliance was sharply divided over the advisability of invading Iraq in 2003.

As the twenty-first century unfolded, NATO members and other countries also became increasingly concerned with the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Accordingly, in 2003 American president George W. Bush announced a new Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that included new multinational naval missions. PSI was a global effort to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems and related materials worldwide, especially at sea.\textsuperscript{474} Several NATO members (as well as other nations) signed up to the PSI and agreed to interdict WMD shipments.\textsuperscript{475} Numerous multinational exercises were held, often led by individual operations being conducted there simultaneously, especially OEF. On the complex and sometimes ambiguous relationships among coalition navies conducting the various operations in the Arabian Sea, see Gimblett, \textit{Operation Apollo}, 106-19). According to the Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT): “At the height of the war, we had 175 ships in our AOR, 65 of them Coalition ships.” Vice Admiral Timothy J. Keating USN, \textit{“This was a Different War,”} US Naval Institute, \textit{Proceedings} 129 (June 2003), 31.

\textsuperscript{471} Responsibility for maritime security in the Gulf during the transition phase of OIF rested with Task Force (TF) 55, consisting of warships from Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States under a US Navy commander. See “USS Princeton Protects Oil Moving from Iraq,” US \textit{Navy Newsstand} Story NNS030728-04 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Information, Jul. 28, 2003).


\textsuperscript{473} On the advantages of multinational maritime cooperation in these operations over cooperation in other combat environments, as seen by many Europeans and others, see Bergeron, \textit{“Beyond Integration,”} 252.

\textsuperscript{474} On PSI, see \textit{“The Proliferation Security Initiative,”} US Department of State Fact Sheet (Washington, DC: US Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Jul. 28, 2004); and \textit{“The Proliferation Security Initiative,”} International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Strategic Comments}, no. 4 (2003), 9.

\textsuperscript{475} Initial PSI signatories included NATO members France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as other countries. Subsequently, NATO members Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Turkey (and other countries) signed on.
NATO member navy commanders.\textsuperscript{476} In 2004, the US Naval War College hosted a PSI maritime interdiction game, with participants from several NATO member nations.\textsuperscript{477}

The NATO AOR also saw a number of other bilateral and multilateral exercises and operations among NATO navies that, while not formally commanded by Alliance commanders, relied on NATO doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

- In April, in the Arctic, US Navy and Royal Navy nuclear-powered attack submarines coordinated operations under the ice and surfaced together at the North Pole.\textsuperscript{478}
- In June, more than 35 ships representing 13 countries—including eight NATO member nations and Russia—conducted a series of maritime and joint exercises in the Baltic under a US Navy commander.\textsuperscript{479}

The US Navy-led Baltic Operations exercise series in particular saw a major transformation during the first years of the twenty-first century. In BALTOPS ’03, a ground force unit participated for the first time in what had now become a truly joint exercise. Also in the Baltic, COMSTRIKFLTLANT had deployed from the United States in 2002 for NATO Exercise "Strong Resolve 2002," to test the concept of a sea-based NATO CJTF, using the USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20) as command ship.\textsuperscript{480} As noted above, however, it was later envisaged that JC Lisbon would continue to develop NATO sea-based CJTF concepts.

\textsuperscript{476} An initial multinational PSI interdiction exercise was held in the Coral Sea in the Pacific in September 2003 and included warships from the United States, France, and other nations. Subsequent exercises—under Spanish, French, and Italian command and with US Navy participation—were held in the Mediterranean. The first US Navy-run PSI exercise was Operation “Sea Saber,” held in the Arabian Sea in January 2004 with forces from NATO members France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and from other countries. See JO2 Wes Eplen, USN, “Multi-national Forces Conclude Sea Saber,” US Navy Newsstand Story #NNS040122-03 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Information, Jan. 22, 2004).

\textsuperscript{477} Participants in the first PSI maritime interdiction game, held from September 27 through October 1, 2004, at the US Naval War College’s wargaming facility in Newport RI, included representatives from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries. See “DOD Hosts First Proliferation Security Initiative Maritime Interdiction Game,” News Release No. 980-04 (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, Oct. 1, 2004).

\textsuperscript{478} On the USN-RN Arctic submarine exercises, see JOC Mark O. Piggott USN, “USS Hampton Surfaces on ‘Top of the World’” US Navy Newsstand Story #NNS040420-02 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Information, Apr. 20, 2004). For more on the continuing US Navy submarine operations in the Arctic, see Commander Bob Clark, USN, “Top of the World,” Undersea Warfare (Fall 2003), 22-4.

\textsuperscript{479} The exercise was “Baltic Operations 2004 (BALTOPS ’04).” See Renata Stubinska, “BALTOPS 2004,” Naval Forces 25, no. 3 (2004), 141.

\textsuperscript{480} On the sea-based CJTF concept and the role of the US Navy command ship, see Vice Admiral Mike Mullen USN, “Commanding NATO Operations from the Sea,” US Naval
The US Navy, with its global responsibilities and numerous multinational relationships, continued to participate in non-NATO exercises outside the NATO area of responsibility. It was occasionally joined in these, however, by other NATO navies. In Exercise RIMPAC 2004 off Hawaii, for example, naval units from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada joined those of Australia, Chile, Japan, and the Republic of Korea for a month-long evolution.481

Not only was the US Navy still the world’s leading navy in size and power, but now it was increasingly the world’s naval technology leader as well. Some allied naval leaders even asked US Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark “are you going to slow down and let us catch up?” Admiral Clark’s repeated response was “No . . . But I promise you this, “I’ll reach halfway to you, if you reach halfway to me. We’ll make this work.”482

Making interoperability work would continue to challenge allied commanders. Navy-to-navy staff talks programs continued apace, albeit with increased participation by COMUSNAVEUR.483 Continued co-development of concepts, equipment, and software offered some possible solutions.484 Of particular note as the new century opened was the initial installation in NATO aircraft—including US Navy F/A-18s—of cooperatively developed lightweight interoperable multinational and joint tactical information distribution system terminals.485
Also, many allied navies continued to purchase American weapon systems or use US Navy technical assistance.\textsuperscript{486} Most notable were purchases by the Spanish and Norwegian navies of the Aegis anti-air warfare system for their new frigate classes, and by the Spanish Navy of more SH-60B Seahawk helicopters for its frigates.\textsuperscript{487} The Turkish Navy took delivery of its first American-built Sikorsky S-70B Seahawk helicopters, joining Spain, Greece, and several non-European nations in flying Seahawks or Seahawk derivatives. The Italian Navy was collaborating with the US Navy on Harrier aircraft for its new light carrier. A four-nation Joint Program Office was created for post-production support of Harriers serving in the American, British, Italian, and Spanish navies.\textsuperscript{488} Also, the Polish Navy received four former US Navy helicopters for its two former US Navy frigates.\textsuperscript{489}

At the same time, despite some problems, the US Navy opted to continue to use—but upgrade—the Italian engines in its mine warfare vessels, in service since the 1980s.\textsuperscript{490}

In 2001 and 2004, to further institutionalize joint and coalition training, US Navy carrier strike groups (CSGs) participated as part of their training in the Royal Navy’s Joint Maritime Course (JMC) in the east-
ern Atlantic, alongside other French Navy and other allied forces. Also in 2004, yet another Canadian frigate deployed for the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf as part of a US Navy Carrier Strike Group (CSG), as the US Navy’s program of integrating allied warships into its forward formations continued. Problems still remained to be solved, however, especially in exchanging digital data and connecting US and allied wide-area networks (WANs).

One area of multinational naval effort receiving special attention from the US Navy, NATO, and others was the rescue of distressed submarines at sea, in the wake of the 2000 sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk in which all hands on board perished. A fourth NATO submarine rescue exercise was held soon after the tragedy off the Turkish coast, followed by a fifth in 2002. An International Submarine Escape and Rescue Working Group (SMERG) was set up, and in 2004 an International Submarine Rescue Liaison Office (ISMERLO) was established at Norfolk under the sponsorship of SACEUR’s Allied Submarine Command (ASC) and US Naval Submarine Forces Atlantic (COMSUBLANT). In late 2004, a US Navy submarine support ship joined British vessels in the rescue of a Canadian submarine in the eastern Atlantic.


493 On the difficulties in connecting WANs, see Gause et al., “US Navy Interoperability with its High End Allies.”


495 ISMERLO—manned initially by submarine rescue experts from the United States, Norway and Spain—was set up in 2004 as a central clearing house for submarine rescue information, rather than as an operational or administrative command. See JOSN Andrew Zask USN, “New International Submarine Rescue Coordination Center Opens,” US Navy Newsstand Story #NNS040929-08 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Information, Sept. 29, 2004); and Kate Wiltrout, “NATO Answers Call for Sub SOS Service,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot (Sept. 28, 2004).

496 On the support rendered in 2004 by the US Navy Military Sealift Command submarine support ship MV Carolyn Chouest to the stricken Canadian submarine HMCS
Conclusions on the decade

Thus, as of the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, naval forces and personnel from NATO countries were deployed extensively and successfully around the world, afloat and ashore, working together to interdict illegal shipping, counter the scourges of international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction by sea, and mitigate maritime disasters.

These ongoing combined naval operations and activities were vitally important to the United States, its NATO allies, and the North Atlantic Alliance itself, and they represented a culmination of over half a century of US Navy leadership of and contributions to NATO’s naval capabilities.

At the same time, they were—as always—only a portion of the total global involvement of the US Navy in bilateral and multinational naval and joint relationships.

Conclusions

Drawing on the preceding historical analysis, the study draws the following conclusions:

On the US Navy and Europe

- The US Navy has been deployed globally and forward, almost from its inception, to further US diplomatic, military, and economic policies. Deployments have ranged from surge deployments from the United States, to permanently forward deployed forces optimized for military operations other than war (MOOTW), to permanently forward deployed combat credible forces ready for high-intensity warfare and armed with nuclear weapons. Among the other NATO navies, only those of Britain and France had similar recent records, and none have been capable of a permanent and sustained forward combat-credible posture.

- The US Navy's global forward deployments have been driven by a host of geopolitical, domestic, and technological factors. This dynamic can be expected to continue.

- Throughout much—but not all—of its history, the United States has maintained permanent forward deployed forces in European waters, either for MOOTW operations or—during the Cold War—as a fully combat-ready deterrent and ready fighting force against major enemies.

- At the beginning of the Cold War and on a few occasions since, the Mediterranean had been the most important forward theater for US naval planning and operations. During most of the Cold War, however, the Mediterranean shared pride of place with the western Pacific as the locus of significant permanent US Navy combat-credible forward naval presence. Toward the end of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean and the Norwegian Sea became particularly salient for US Navy war planners as well.

- Since the end of the Cold War, neither the Mediterranean nor the North Atlantic have maintained their former priority in the US Navy’s global concept of operations in the face of competing US national security requirements in the western Pacific and especially in the Arabian Sea. Nevertheless, historic geopolitical, domestic, and technological factors should continue to yield a mix of permanent and intermittent US naval presence in European waters.

- Throughout its history, the US Navy has periodically—and easily—surge deployed naval forces to European waters, either as independent force packages or to reinforce permanently forward deployed forces already in theater. This was especially true during the Cold War and as recently as the summer of
2004. Under the new US Navy Fleet Response Plan (FRP), US Navy surge capabilities—and intentions—have the potential to increase.

• Throughout the existence of NATO, the US Navy has maintained a highly operational posture globally. The American civilian leadership has routinely—and often simultaneously—tasked US naval forces with numerous “real-world” peacetime, crisis response, and combat missions. This high tempo of actual operations and the experience it has engendered has not often been matched by other NATO navies, for which scripted NATO exercises have often been the most demanding operational challenge. For US Navy ships and aircraft, however, the NATO exercise program has usually been only one among many of the at-sea jobs they have to do, and usually not the most important.

• When needed, the US Navy has usually been able to acquire and use adequate forward facilities ashore in and near European ports. It has also depended heavily, however, on the often unique organic capabilities of its fleets, squadrons, and individual ships to maintain themselves with full readiness forward at sea for long periods of time. Should the US Navy follow through on its current Sea Basing concept, these organic capabilities for self-sustainment can be expected to increase.

• The US Navy has never formally organized within its ranks a group of career specialists in NATO matters, preferring instead to develop an officer corps with a global operational outlook and experience. Nevertheless, numerous US Navy officers have become prominent in the affairs of the Alliance and contributed greatly to its success.

On the US Navy, other NATO navies, and NATO

• Since its founding, the US Navy has continually interacted with the major navies of Europe, worldwide, and especially with the Royal Navy. For almost a century—since World War I—the US Navy has undertaken no major naval campaigns without allies or coalition partners at sea, and few without Royal Navy participation.

• Throughout its history, the US Navy liberally adopted many cultural, tactical, and technological innovations originally developed by European navies. Since the establishment of NATO, the US Navy has especially benefited from innovations from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy. This continues today.

• Likewise, starting in the nineteenth century, European navies adopted many naval innovations developed across the Atlantic. As the United States achieved naval pre-eminence in the years during and following World War II, this flow of innovation back
across the Atlantic intensified. It continues today, far surpassing the technological flows in the other direction, and it appears that this trend will continue.

- Since World War II, the US Navy has been the world’s—and NATO’s—pre-eminent naval force, dwarfing even the Royal Navy. Accordingly, the US Navy has supplied and continues to supply the NATO alliance with much of its most senior naval leadership, including almost all its Supreme Allied Commanders, Atlantic; Commanders in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe; Atlantic, Mediterranean, and NATO striking force commanders; and its first Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation. The recent radical changes in the NATO military command structure have continued these policies.

- That said, the United States military and the NATO military organization have moved rapidly in recent years to increase jointness. This has included placing officers from all services in high positions which had previously been the preserves of particular services. There seems no reason as of this writing why the next Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) and/or the Commander, Joint Force Command Naples (COMJFC Naples) could not be a general officer drawn from the US Army or US Air Force.

- Given the much-reduced US Navy force levels in the Mediterranean and other European waters, there seems likewise no reason why COMJFC Naples should remain solely a US-held position.

- The US Navy’s central contribution to national, coalition, and NATO military power since World War II has been its carrier, surface combatant, amphibious, and submarine strike capabilities. It has focused its own strategies and doctrines on those capabilities, in which it has normally been peerless in the world and within the Alliance. This emphasis on strike warfare can be expected to continue, as exemplified by the “Sea Strike” pillar of the latest US Navy concept paper, Sea Power 21.

- The very real success of NATO cooperation over the past half century notwithstanding, there have often been times when the Alliance has not been able to agree on the advisability of the use of military forces by one or more of its members, even within the NATO AOR. During such periods, the navies of individual NATO members—especially the US Navy—have provided their nations with vital tools of national military policy, largely unfettered by a need for bases and overflight rights.

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497 Examples have included intra-Alliance crises over European colonial wars, the Suez intervention, Arab-Israeli wars, Vietnam, Cyprus, Libya, and Iraq.

498 For an analysis of difficulty that NATO members have had in supporting each other around the world, see James Cable, “NATO Naval Operations Out of Area,” Naval Forces 8, no. 1 (1987), 30-9.
This continues today—especially for the US Navy—and will continue in the future.

- The US Navy has participated in numerous unilateral and multilateral naval operations since the founding of NATO. In very few of them have Alliance command structures been used, despite the almost routine presence of one or more navies of other NATO members alongside the US Navy. Operationally, the US Navy’s participation in multinational naval operations has been as leader or participant in “coalitions of the willing” rather than formally as a member of the NATO alliance.

- US Navy technological cooperation and co-development with other navies, while extensive, has likewise usually been more ad hoc than Alliance-wide.

- It is often noted that the United States participates in a multilateral alliance in the Atlantic but a series of bilateral alliances in the Pacific. This is true in terms of international treaties and organization charts. In practice, however, allied naval relationships across the Atlantic during actual responses to crises and wars have been usually no less bilateral than those across the Pacific.

- The standardization of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures—many of which are used worldwide as well as within the Alliance—has been a major NATO multinational naval success. Yet even in this area, the US Navy has developed many unique standards, as well as special non-NATO relationships with individual navies or small groups of navies—especially the “ABCA” navies.

- Naval technical, operational, and political/cultural interoperability has been a necessity for as long as there have been maritime alliances. Today’s technical advances, especially those of the US Navy, pose particular challenges to continued NATO naval coordination, cooperation, and interoperability at sea, although they are not historically unique.

- The high levels of combined Alliance naval coordination and cooperation have only recently been matched by similar levels of jointness within the militaries of individual NATO nations, especially the United States. US military operations, inside and outside NATO, are now almost invariably joint. As jointness increases throughout the NATO militaries, bonds among national military establishments may strengthen, but those among the Alliance’s navies could weaken.

- The structure of NATO—and the US military—during the Cold War subsumed coherent and distinct major maritime theaters of military operations in the North Atlantic and the Channel, as well as less distinct but still identifiable maritime theaters in the Baltic Approaches and the Mediterranean. Today these maritime theaters have all disappeared, replaced by conflations of
land, sea, and air environments into joint and combined theaters, commands, and force structures.

- Since the early days of the Alliance, multinational NATO at-sea exercises have been a primary tool for deterrence as well as improving readiness for war. These exercises have demonstrated Alliance resolve and solidarity, as well as affording NATO naval forces opportunities to operate together to hone peacetime presence, crisis response, and warfighting skills. Their planning and execution has in fact been the primary activity of NATO naval staffs and forces. A major challenge for the Alliance and for individual Alliance navies in the future—including the US Navy—will be to integrate this longstanding and robust naval exercise program into a larger web of joint combined exercises.

- The contribution of NATO’s navies to the success of the NATO alliance has been considerable. Yet for most of the Cold War—with a few rare exceptions—maritime commanders, capabilities, and issues—nuclear and conventional—were of secondary concern to Alliance leaders and to civilian defense experts in Europe and America. The post–Cold War years, however, have seen NATO’s maritime forces achieve a new salience within NATO, especially in the Mediterranean.

- The US Navy occupies a position of power, prestige, and influence within the American defense establishment, government, and society—and indeed, in the world. Its position for at least a quarter of a century has been more or less co-equal with that of the US Army and US Air Force. Few other navies in the world—and very few within NATO—have this level of influence within their own governments and societies. Consequently, the US Navy has occasionally been asked to use its own influence to increase that of its sister navies and of the NATO alliance naval leadership. This can be expected to continue.

- At the same time, allied naval officers sometimes see the existence of powerful forward US Navy forces as rationales for their governments to stifle their own navies’ growth and development.

- Today, NATO navy ships, aircraft, and sailors continue to operate together extensively and successfully throughout the world, both within and outside the structures of the Alliance, and often far from Atlantic and European waters. Much of the credit for this success is due to the long and rich history of NATO maritime cooperation and to US Navy leadership, which have given national, NATO, and ad hoc coalition civilian policy-makers an extraordinary set of multicapable, highly professional, interoperable, and globally deployable diplomatic and military tools to use, both at sea and “... from the sea.”
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