Drawing Lines in the Sea: The U.S. Navy Confronts the Unified Command Plan (UCP), 1946–1999 (A Sourcebook for Navy Planners, with Recommendations)

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with Chester L. Eiland, Jr., Michael C. Markowitz, and Maureen A. Wigge

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Abstract

This report, written in 1999, is an analytical history of the relationship between the Navy and the commands designated in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). It was part of a larger project sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations (N3/5). It was intended to serve as a reference document for Navy planners and decision-makers as they developed policies regarding the UCP. Before this document, no publication had systematically analyzed the development of the UCP and the history of the joint, unified, specified, and combatant commands it mandated, changed, or abolished over time. This study aimed to fill that gap and to inform future Navy positions regarding changes to the UCP. Beyond Navy decision-makers, this study was also intended to reach a wider audience of students and analysts of naval and national security affairs.

The content of this paper is current through January 1999.

Distribution

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Summary

Overview

This study is an analytical or “applied” history of the relationship between the U.S. Navy and the commands designated in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). It is intended for use as a reference document by Navy planners developing policies regarding the UCP. For those planners, it answers two main questions:

- Just how did the Navy get here, anyway?
- How can knowing any of this help Navy and other planners now and in the future?

Bottom line

Our analyses show that history has a message for the contemporary U.S. Navy. In this regard, Navy planners should:

- Strive to create and maintain UCP command structures within which naval operational commanders of the future can optimally participate in and/or lead Joint Task Force operations.

- Focus less on creating or maintaining UCP structures that serve primarily to protect the institutional health of the Navy. The Navy’s institutional health is sound and the UCP is not an important variable in its determination.

- Accordingly, listen more to the views of the numbered fleet commanders on their command relationship requirements for future joint littoral operations, since they will be the Navy commanders actually participating in future joint littoral operations.
• Listen less to the views of the Navy component commanders and OPNAV, since they are principally concerned with resourcing, not operations.

• Let Navy commander operational requirements drive Navy positions on the UCP, not Navy resource sponsor and claimant requirements. In confronting the UCP from here on in, the CNO and the OPSDEP should fight for the perceived future needs of the Navy’s operational commanders.

What we discuss

In this sourcebook, we:

• Describe the commands delineated in the UCP of 1998, as well as the U.S. Navy’s organization, to provide a baseline and common vocabulary for what follows.

• Present background on the “pre-history” of the UCP (i.e., before the start of the Cold War) to show some of the origins of both the UCP and Navy views.

• Outline the history of the UCP chronologically since 1946. Specifically, we describe the origins and history of each of the nine U.S. combatant commands—and their naval components—existing as of 1999. (This is the heart of the paper.)

• Provide additional summary observations on particular important topics.

• Identify and interpret patterns in the data, present insights leading from those patterns, and derive conclusions.

• Make recommendations for future treatment of the UCP, and identify possible future trends based on the record of the past.

The findings

Continuity and change

The Navy’s problem throughout the Cold War was essentially one of trying to wrap each successive joint structure—mandated by the
President, the SECDEF, the Congress and/or the JCS—around the Navy's stable operational and administrative organization that had essentially been in place since the start of World War II.

The Navy's essential stability of vision—in sharp contrast to continuous changes in direction in the joint arena—was one of the main sources of friction among the services as the Navy confronted UCP issues throughout the Cold War.

The commands

As noted above, the most important—and lengthiest—sections of this paper describe the origins and history of each of the nine U.S. combatant commands—and their naval components. (Figure 1 captures the subject matter of this history in one page.) These sections can be summarized briefly as follows:

**USPACOM and PACFLT**

The organizational history of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)—and of its Navy component, the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)—is long and complex. The central trend, however, has generally been one of enormous growth and increased power and responsibility at the expense of other commands. The Navy has sought to maintain a coherent oceanic theater under Navy command.

**USEUCOM and NAVEUR**

The highlight of the organizational history of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and its Navy component is the early—and ultimately successful—struggle by USEUCOM to bring U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic (NELM, later NAVEUR) under its authority. This was the first major instance of a true land-sea theater, with significant forces from all services, being created under the UCP.
Figure 1. Evolution of combatant commands and Navy components

Geographical Commands

Far East Command
- NAVFE
- Alaskan Command
- ALSEAFRON
- US Pacific Command
- PACFLT

Northeast Command
- US Atlantic Command
- LANTFLT

European Command
- NAVGER
- US European Command
- NELM/NAVEUR
- US Air Forces Europe

Caribbean Command
- CARIBSEAFRON
- 15th ND/USNAVCARIB
- US Southern Command
- NAVSO
- LANTFLT

NELM
- US Strike Command/MEAFSA
- MIDEASTFOR
- LANTFLT

US Central Command
- NAVCENT

Functional Commands

Strategic Air Command
- US Strategic Command
- LANTFLT
- PACFLT

Continental Air Defense Cmd
- NAVFORCONAD

Aerospace Defense Command
- US Space Command
- NAVSPACECOM

Readiness Command
- Forces Command

Military Airlift Command
- US Transportation Command
- MSC

US Special Operations Cmd
- NAVSPECWARCOM

Existing Command
Former Command
Double-hat
Existed in early 1999 (Bold)
Former Unified or Navy Command (Plain)
Former Specified Command (Italic)
Combatant Command (underline)
USSOUTHCOM and LANTFLT
The organizational history of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)—and of its predecessor, the Caribbean Command (CARIBCOM)—is largely the history of a struggle with the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) for dominance in the Caribbean and Latin American littoral waters. Navy components came and went. In the end, USSOUTHCOM won and LANTCOM became USACOM—something else entirely.

USACOM and LANTFLT
The organizational history of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM, formerly USLANTCOM) has been complex. It has involved struggles to achieve and maintain unified command status and to create and maintain Army and Air Force components; expansion beyond U.S. Navy World War II AORs into the eastern Atlantic and Arctic; an early international confrontation with the British over the NATO Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) structure; continual struggles over responsibilities in and around Latin America with USSOUTHCOM; occasional arguments over responsibilities in Africa; and recent jousting among the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the services, and those unified commands designated as joint force integrators.

USCENTCOM and NAVCENT
The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was the late-comer among the five geographic CINCs existing in 1999. Created in only 1983, it inherited an area—the Middle East and the Persian Gulf—that had been batted around and/or divided and redivided among various unified and specified commanders since 1946, with little long-term continuity of command. Long an area of largely maritime access and Navy preeminence, the region has now become a focus for all the services, with the Navy often in a secondary role. Meanwhile, the Navy component has grown in stature.
**USSPACECOM and NAVSPACECOM**
The U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) was established as a functional unified command in 1985. It evolved out of earlier Air Force and Army–Air Force commands with North American air defense responsibilities and swallowed up a small Navy space component, the Naval Space Command (NAVSPACECOM). Although the Navy resisted participation in all these endeavors, it joined Air Force–dominated joint commands rather than ceding missions completely to the Air Force as DOD single manager.

**USSOCOM and NAVSPECWARCOM**
The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was created in 1987. Over Navy protestations, it included the fleet commanders' Sea-Air-Land commandos (SEALs) in its Navy component, the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM). The Navy had wanted combatant command of its special operations forces—especially the SEALs—to remain with the geographical CINCs, especially USPACOM and USLANTCOM, to better support the fleet.

**USTRANSCOM and MSC**
Transportation remained a common-user, single-service responsibility rather than a CINC responsibility throughout most of the Cold War. A U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was finally created in 1987, incorporating the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) over strong Navy protestations. The Navy feared degradation of vital logistic support to the fleet.

**USSTRATCOM; LANTFLT and PACFLT**
The Navy long fought the creation of a unified U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), fearing Air Force misuse and lack of appreciation of Navy assets. The Navy stopped resisting its creation in the early 1990s. The command was born in 1992, with the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Navy components.
Conclusions

From our survey of the history of the Navy and its relationship to the UCP and the commands it authorizes, we draw six principal conclusions:

• The Navy held strong positions on the UCP and the combatant commands throughout the Cold War, and it fought for them.

• These positions derived from a set of Navy patterns of thinking, or paradigms, regarding the proper deployment, employment, and administration of the nation’s naval forces.

• The Navy lost most of its major UCP battles down through the years. By the post-Cold War era, the Navy’s traditional paradigms that underpinned its UCP positions had become pretty much bankrupt. Of the nine combatant commands in existence in 1999, only one—USPACOM—represents the triumph of traditional Navy views. In their current forms, the eight others reflect the triumph of other agendas. Figure 2 summarizes the Navy’s “win-loss” record.

• That said, it is not clear that these losses had any appreciable effect on the Navy’s institutional health, which was one of the Navy’s chief concerns. For example, Navy UCP position “wins” and “losses” do not correlate with Navy operational or budgetary successes or failures.

• Maintaining the Navy’s traditional positions on the UCP, however, can have adverse effects on the ability of Navy operational commanders to contribute to and lead joint operations.

• In determining its positions regarding changes to the UCP, the Navy of today and tomorrow must derive those positions from paradigms that work (i.e., that continue to maintain the Navy’s institutional health but that also support the ability of Navy operational commanders to contribute to and lead joint operations).
Figure 2. Erosion of traditional USN Cold War-era positions re: the UCP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Navy “wins” (selected)</th>
<th>Major Navy “losses” (selected)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAC &amp; LANT made unified commands</td>
<td>1946 CARIBC, ALC, large FECOM created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NELM designated specified command</td>
<td>1947 NELM made a EUCOM component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy nuclear role confirmed</td>
<td>1948 NATS abolished; MATS created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains Caribbean missions</td>
<td>1950 NECOM created as unified command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM gains Philippines, Taiwan</td>
<td>1951 6th Fleet under SACEUR in NATO role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952 LANTCOM gains sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1954 PACOM regains 7th Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1956 USSEC disestablished</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1957 PAC/LANT gains FECOM, Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANT, PAC, NELM keep SSBNs</td>
<td>1958 PAC/PACFLT split</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1959 CNO no longer CINC executive agent</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960 CNO unified space agency bid fails</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961 LANTCOM gains China, Greenland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962 PACOM gains IO, S. Asia, Aleutians</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCOM disestablished</td>
<td>1963 USSTRICOM created</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1965 ALCOM re-created under PACOM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971 USSTRICOM disestablished</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972 PACOM retains West Coast naval forces</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1975 ALCOM disestablished</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980 PACOM gains IO, S. Asia, Aleutians</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983 CENTCOM created</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1985 SPACECOM created</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1986 G’water-Nich’ls Act mandates COCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987 SOCCOM and TRANSCOM created</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988 SOCCOM gains SPECWARGRUs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1989 ALCOM re-created under PACOM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992 CENTCOM gains Gulfs of Aden, Oman</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993 CENTSTREM created</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994 CENTCOM gains West Arabian Sea</td>
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<td>1995 CENTCOM gains West Arabian Sea</td>
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Recommendations

We base our recommendations on the history presented and the historical trends analyzed. Navy planners should consider the following concepts when formulating positions on UCP changes:

- Design the staff and command structures of each joint command—geographic and functional—in such a way that naval professional knowledge, skill, and advice can be used in operations at least as extensively as the knowledge, skill, and advice of the practitioners of air, ground, and other types of warfare.

- Ensure that, in forward theaters with significant naval forces assigned, combatant commanders who are not naval officers have powerful on-scene Navy component commanders, who are relatively unencumbered by force-provider duties, to render advice regarding naval warfare.

- Design coherent land-sea-air regional geographic theaters, in which the power of naval forces "... from the sea" can best be brought to bear as part of joint task forces.

- Ensure that each major discrete naval forward operating area is neither too large nor too small; that is, that it be neither divided among CINCs nor diluted by combination with other areas.

- Resist creation of a homeland defense command limited only to North America.

- Ensure that the administrative efficiency of the base, ship, and aircraft support complexes on both coasts is enhanced—and not impaired—by any UCP changes.

- Ensure that any UCP changes enhance and not impair the ability of the complexes on both coasts to support the global forward-deployment operational posture of the fleet.

- Ensure force provider tails do not wag operational dogs. UCP divisions and assignments should be based primarily on joint operational requirements, and only secondarily on the requirements or desires of commands in the service branch of the chain of command.
• Ensure the functional commands mandated in the UCP are so structured that Navy task force commanders can lay their hands on all the assets they need to carry out all their missions.

• Allow the core assets that the naval task force commander needs to carry out his central missions to be placed under his immediate operational control.

• Ensure the naval task force commander is divested of extraneous support forces, the command and control of which would merely slow him down.

• Ensure, however, that UCP command structures allow timely and unconstrained access to those support forces when needed.

• Ensure that the operational task forces so constituted can be soundly backed up by the most efficient Navy administrative structure.

• Seek common joint solutions to common joint problems.

• Cooperate where possible.
1. Introduction

Much as close scrutiny of a skeleton tells a shrewd scientist about the physique and evolution of a gigantic beast, the history of formal military organization can tell much about a great power's armed forces, conception of national security, and, in the case of the United States, growth to global dominance.¹

Overview

This study is an analytical or “applied” history of the relationship between the U.S. Navy and the commands designated in the UCP. It is intended for use as a reference document by Navy planners developing policies regarding the UCP.

For those planners, it answers two main questions:

- Just how did we get here, anyway?
- How can knowing any of this help Navy and other planners now and in the future?

Background

Every few years since the end of World War II, the U.S. defense establishment has geared up to revise the existing UCP. Each time, the Navy staff (OPNAV) has defined its vision of the country’s maritime interests and the Navy’s institutional interests in some fashion, and then striven to ensure that each resultant UCP revision reflected those interests to the maximum extent possible.

The OPNAV office charged with drawing up the Navy's position for each UCP revision round has been the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division (N51) and its organizational predecessors (N–60, OP–60, OP–30, etc.). The key OPNAV decision-makers have been successive Navy Operations Deputies (OPSDEPS)—the Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations (N3/5, formerly N6, OP–06, OP–03, etc.)—and, of course, ultimately the Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs).

The arena within which the CNOs and their OPSDEPs have tried to achieve their goals regarding the UCP has been the joint planning system, capped by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and facilitated by the Joint Staff and its predecessors, the Joint Committees. In this arena, the other services, the combatant commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff all likewise seek to further their own interests—which they also view as in the best interest of the nation.

From time to time, officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Secretary of Defense, and even the President weigh in with their views. At the end of the day, it is the President who signs the revisions to the Unified Command Plan. The unified commands are, after all, his commands, as commander in chief of the U.S. armed forces. Occasionally, individual members of Congress and/or Congress as an institution make their desires known forcefully as well.

The joint and other executive branch processes that result in UCP revision recommendations are often acrimonious. Drawing lines on

the earth's surface, assigning missions to senior officers, and determining the number and size of joint commands are political issues that raise emotions as well as issues susceptible to objective analyses.

**Why this study?**

In formulating their positions for each round of joint UCP revision debates, the CNO, the OPSDEP, and N51 routinely survey the various offices within OPNAV. They also routinely survey Navy flag officers currently serving as combatant commanders or Navy component commanders. (Even if this last group were not surveyed, they would nevertheless make their views known.) During their deliberations, these Navy leaders sometimes refer to the Navy's history, as they understand it.

But these references have often been ill-informed. Why? Because a publication had never been written that systematically laid out and analyzed for them the history of the relationship between the U.S. Navy and the commands designated in the UCP.

This study aims to fill this gap, and to assist in informing current and future Navy positions regarding changes to the UCP. Publication of this paper has been timed to coincide with Navy staff planning for the 1999 revision the UCP.

This study is part of a larger project of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations (N3/5).

This report also has roots in research done earlier for an earlier study (1996–1997) sponsored by the Navy's four (at the time) geographic component commanders: the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of

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3. The principal product of that project, and the companion to this paper, is Maureen A. Wigge et al., *The Unified Command Plan: Charting a Course for the Navy*, CRM 98-165/November 1998 (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses).
the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and Naval Forces Europe, and the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command.4,5

The audience

The study is principally written to aid Navy planners on Navy staffs and, through them, Navy decision-makers. The study should benefit Navy and non-Navy planners on joint and other staffs as well.

In addition, we designed the study to reach a wider audience of students and analysts of naval and national security affairs. Thus, it should benefit war colleges and the Naval Postgraduate School. Finally, the study may be of interest to academic historians of naval and national security affairs. Because it was not written principally for their benefit, it does not conform completely to standard academic style and standards.

What can histories like this do?

A work of history can be many things:

- It can be “entertainment” (for the writer and/or for the reader).
- It can be “basic research,” adding generally to mankind’s store of knowledge about its past, with no more focused intent.


5. Abbreviated as CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR and COMUSNAVCENT. Collectively, as of 1999 these four commanders are the “Navy component commanders” assigned to the five geographic unified combatants commanders (or “unified CINCs”). CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT and CINCUSNAVEUR—each a full admiral wearing four stars—are also, in Navy parlance, “Fleet CINCs.” while CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT are also “Major Fleet Commanders.”
• It can be what we call "applied" history—written with a particular set of aims and a targeted audience beyond the general reading public or academia.6

We view this study as an example of the last category.7 It is designed to help naval planners solve certain problems, and also to educate a broader community of naval professionals and analysts about their professions.

History can educate professionals in at least three ways:

• It can inspire with stories of past accomplishments that illustrate important and often timeless qualities and values.

• It can inform with facts and events, to help explain an institution’s origins and the complexity of its development.

• It can empower, giving a sense of the record of past choices by individuals and groups, so that those in positions of current responsibility (and those advising them) can be better aware of the range of possible alternatives.8

6. See www.cna.org for other examples of CNA-produced applied history studies.

7. We are certain that this study does not qualify as entertainment, on either count. Its purpose is hardly to have its readers “captured by the lure and pleasures of historical reflection”—an activity recently decried—along with “steer[ing] by the wake” by a prominent contemporary Navy leader. See VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski USN, (President, Naval War College), “President’s Notes,” Naval War College Review LII (Winter 1999), 7.

While we are uncertain that this paper can inspire, it is certainly intended to inform. It is also intended to help empower staff officers and decision-makers seeking to develop cogent Navy positions on changing the UCP in 1999 and beyond.

We hope to do this in two ways:

- By presenting data that are new to them
- By presenting fresh analyses of data they already know but may have misinterpreted.

Historical analysis can help do this. As a prominent U.S. military officer has pointed out, the study and analysis of military history provides U.S. military and naval officers with a laboratory, intellectual training, and discipline, and can help in developing professional concepts and placing them into context.10

Scope

This is principally a study and analysis of the development of the UCP and of the joint, unified, specified, and combatant commands it mandated, changed, or abolished over time. It is also a study of the development of the U.S. Navy components to those commands, and of Navy attitudes toward the UCP, its commands, and the very institution of joint command in the field.

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9. For a good example of the use of history to inspire, see RADM Herbert E. Schonland USN, “A Perspective on Leadership,” Surface Warfare (November/December 1998), 34-37. The admiral had won the Medal of Honor for his cool heroism conducting damage control on board USS San Francisco (CA 38) off Guadalcanal in 1942.

It is not, however, a study of U.S. joint military organization and operations. That publication has yet to be written. Nor is it a survey of all Navy history. Nor is it even principally a study or analysis of all the


institutions of naval administration. It draws from these important areas, of course, but its treatment of them is by no means comprehensive. For such accounts, the reader is urged to look elsewhere.

This study introduces the reader of the late 1990s and early 2000s to some very strange and unfamiliar worlds in which:

- USACOM—actually its predecessor—runs the Indian Ocean.
- USPACOM is responsible for the waters off Chile—but not off East Asia.
- CINCUSNAVEUR is a combatant commander with a writ extending from the mid-Atlantic to India.

We will do well just to address these worlds adequately.

**Methodology**

The methodology we employ in this paper is fairly straightforward:

- We gathered, organized, and presented data.
- We found patterns in the data, and discovered insights from those patterns.
- We drew conclusions and made recommendations based on these insights.

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Data: sources and presentation

Few subjects have as little glitter as the history of organizational wiring diagrams.14

Primary and secondary sources

We gathered much of the data in this paper from secondary sources, and used government documents and other primary sources to fill a few gaps in the public record.15

That said, we were unable to identify no one previous work that treats specifically the origins and development of the unified CINC’s Navy service components. Thus, we have had to organize, analyze, and synthesize the data uncovered through our research to draw insights accessible, useful, and relevant to contemporary analysts and decision-makers and their advisors.

The virtue of using secondary sources is that we have, in effect, let others do much of our primary research for us. This has enabled us to cover a wider ground and focus our limited time and resources on compiling, organizing, presenting and analyzing data others have already discovered and published.16

Sources and dissemination

The use of unclassified secondary sources also has the virtue of ensuring a wider dissemination of this paper than would otherwise be the


15. For contemporary organization charts, correct official command terminology and quick thumbnail histories, command web-sites also proved quite useful. They must be used with great care however, and their data cross-checked when possible, as they often include historical inaccuracies.

16. We note here that much relevant U.S. Navy organizational history, especially of the operating forces in joint commands, can be found in published histories of U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force commands, especially the latter.
case. This paper will be most useful if it achieves the broadest possible distribution. Such distribution will enable defense specialists outside the Navy to debate its validity publicly, to the benefit of those inside the Navy who might use it. Unfettered distribution will also ensure its most effective use as a professional education tool.

The History of the Unified Command Plan

An especially helpful source was *The History of the Unified Command Plan*, the official unclassified history of the UCP, published by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1995. This study is based almost exclusively on primary source documents, especially records of the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their staffs. We used this document as a starting point, and recommend that it be reviewed alongside this document by anyone contemplating further serious research and analysis in this area.

That publication, however, while quite thorough as an overview, does not focus on any one service, and is organized chronologically rather than by command. Thus, while convenient for a historian interested in chronological eras and issues of broad joint concern, it is less user-friendly to a planner—especially a Navy planner—wishing to trace quickly the development of a particular command or set of issues relating to a command—especially a Navy command. It also is largely a running text, with few appendices and no maps or other graphic aids.

Presentation

Organizational histories are typically hard to read and hard to use. Mostly this is due to the nature of the material: The endless recitation of changing commands and their acronyms can be mind-numbing.

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We sought to alleviate—although not completely solve—this inherent problem through extensive use of five presentation devices:

- Subheadings
- Maps
- Wiring diagrams
- Timelines
- Graphs.

Hopefully, the use of these devices will render the data more intelligible, not more confusing.\(^\text{18}\)

## Caveats

As noted earlier, this study is a specialized organizational history, and analysis of same. It is not, and is not designed to be, a comprehensive account or analysis of all U.S. Navy policies, strategies, or operations.

Even as a specialized organizational history and analysis of the Navy and its relationship to the UCP, this represents only a first rough cut. Given constraints on time and resources, our research was hardly exhaustive. Relying principally on secondary sources, we did not rigorously scrub many primary source archival documents (not even many command histories), nor did we interview the CNO, the Navy OPSDEP, N51 staff officers, or their predecessors.

Some academic historians may rightly carp that a work dependent on secondary literature is only as good as whatever book it happens to be

This is, of course, true, although we believe we have chosen our secondary works well and that our data and analysis reflect contemporary professional and academic understanding and interpretation of post-World War II U.S. Navy history.

We are confident this paper will prove useful. But, as a study that is the first of its kind, it is only an initial step. There is still much useful work to be done.

II. How things are: the Navy and the UCP in 1999

Overview

This section sets the scene; in it we describe the nine commands delineated in the UCP as of 1999. We detail things as they are now, in 1999, and introduce the nine combatant commands and their Navy components whose history we will subsequently trace. We also outline the organization of the operating forces of the Navy and explain the nation’s military chain of command.

This section is designed to provide a baseline and common vocabulary for what follows. 20

Introduction

In 1999, the National Command Authorities (NCA)—the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)—exercise command and control of the Armed forces through a single chain of command with two distinct branches: The Combatant Command Branch and the Service Branch.

- The Combatant Command Branch runs from the President, through the SECDEF, directly to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands.

20. For evidence that many Navy readers could gain from such a baseline, see the imprecise descriptions of the organization and structure of the naval services published annually in the Navy's widely distributed official guide to its programs. The latest edition is Vision, Presence, Power (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Feb 1999). The offending pages in that edition are 113-114.
• The Service Branch is used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to combatant commands. It runs from the President, through the SECDEF, to the Secretaries of the three Military Departments. The Service Secretaries exercise authority, direction, and control, through the individual Chiefs of the Services, of their forces not specifically assigned to combatant commanders.

It is common to refer to these branches as "operational" and "administrative," or "OPCON" and "ADCON." While these usages may have been accurate in the past, however, they are misleading in 1999. For example, combatant commanders have administrative control over subordinate elements, and there are Navy warships in the Service chain conducting what naval personnel call "operations," preparatory to deployments. Thus, we have adopted the terms "Combatant Command Branch"—which is mandated in law—and "Service Branch" to describe the two branches of the chain of command in this paper.

Combatant commands and Navy component commands

In accordance with public law, combatant commands are established by the President through the SECDEF, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). As of 1999, the U.S. armed forces are organized operationally into nine combatant commands. All are unified commands (i.e., composed of elements of more than one service).  

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21. Combatant commands composed of only one service are termed Specified Commands. There have been no Specified Commands since 1993, when the all-Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) lost its combatant command status. The only all-Navy Specified Command has been U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM), which existed from 1947 to 1963. Its story is recounted below, in the chapters on European and Middle East commands.
on function. The boundaries of the geographic combatant commanders are set forth in the UCP, a document signed by the President. Figure 3 depicts those boundaries as of 1999.

The combatant command Navy service components

Administrative and logistic support for joint forces, including combatant commands, are provided through service component commands, including Navy service component commands. Joint force commanders, including combatant commanders in chief, also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders.

Note that some commands serve as Navy service components for more than one combatant command:

- The U.S. Atlantic Fleet serves as Navy service component for the U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Southern Command, and the U.S. Strategic Command.

- The U.S. Pacific Fleet serves as Navy service component for both the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Strategic Command.

Note that one combatant command—the U.S. Strategic Command—has two Navy service component commands: the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

22. For an analysis concluding that only USTRANSCOM of the “functional” commands is in fact organized by function, see Senator Charles S. Robb, “Examining UCP Structures,” Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 1996-7), 85-93. Robb regarded USSPACECOM as organized by “operational medium” and USSTRATCOM and USSOCOM by “conflict level/type.”

23. The first UCP was styled the Outline Command Plan (OCP) and was approved by President Truman in 1946. See below for more detail on development of the UCP.

24. The figure will be analyzed in greater detail later in the paper.

25. USSTRATCOM likewise has two Air Force service components: the Air Combat Command and the Air Force Space Command.
Figure 3. The UCP as of 1999, showing Navy and Marine Corps components
Thus, seven commands serve as Navy service component commands for the nine combatant commands.

In accordance with joint doctrine, when a service command is designated as the “Service component” to multiple combatant commanders, the component commander and only that portion of the component commander's assets assigned to a particular combatant commander are under the command authority of that particular combatant commander.26

Component executive agent

USSOUTHCOM

In February 1996, CINCLANTFLT designated the Commander, Western Hemisphere Group (COMWESTHEMGRU) as his Executive Agent to SOUTHCOM for Navy component issues. In December 1996 CINCLANTFLT designated COMWESTHEMGRU as COMNAV-SOUTH (FORWARD).27

Affiliations of combatant command commanders in chief

Service affiliations

As of 1999, all combatant commander positions are nominative (i.e., they can be held by an officer from any Service). All, however, have in fact been typically affiliated with the Navy or the Air Force.

Regarding the Navy:

- The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command has always been a U.S. Navy officer.

- The same has been true of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command except for the period 1994–1997, when a Marine Corps general was appointed commander in chief.


• Since its inception in 1992, command of the U.S. Strategic Command has rotated between Air Force generals and Navy admirals.

All other combatant command Commander in Chief positions have been held only by Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps generals.28

Dual-hatting

Four of the nine combatant commanders occupy more than one official position. Of these, only CINCUSACOM was a Navy-held position in 1999.

• USCINCEUR is dual-hatted as NATO SACEUR, a combined forces position.
• CINCUSACOM is dual-hatted as NATO SACLANT, a combined forces position.29
• USCINCSPACE is dual-hatted as the Commander, Air Force Space Command, his Air Force Service Component.30 He is triple-hatted as CINCNORAD, a combined forces position.
• USCINCTRANS is dual-hatted as the Commander, U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC), his Air Force Service component.

Bottom line

No two unified commands are organized quite the same. Each unified commander’s responsibilities are unique.

28. When NELM was a Specified Command, it was always headed by a Navy admiral.
29. CINCUSACOM, as USCINCLANT, had also been triple-hatted as CINCLANTFLT, his Navy component commander, until 1985. USCINCPAC had been dual-hatted as CINCPACFLT from 1947 through 1958, but is no longer. For details, see subsequent sections.
30. As such he is both an Air Force Major Commander and one of two Air Force component commanders to USCINCSTRAT.
Combatant commands, subordinate commands, and other components

Command structure of combatant commands

The combatant commands have four principal types of standing direct subordinates:31

- The service component commands, including Navy component commands (all)
- Subordinate unified commands (U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Pacific Commands only)
- Standing joint task forces (U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Southern Command only)
- Theater (functional) special operations commands.

Combatant commands also can constitute ad hoc joint task forces, functional component commands, and other subordinate command structures as they see fit.32

In keeping with joint doctrine, unified commands, subordinate unified commands; and joint task forces are joint forces and as such “include Service component commands, because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service component commands.”33 Service forces, however, may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a service component of that joint force.34

33. Joint Pub 0-2, IV-3. For a graphic depiction of the various possible levels of service componenty, see Joint Pub 02, III-2, 24 Feb 1995.
Subordinate unified commands

Two combatant commands—the Atlantic and Pacific Commands—have a total of five Subordinate Unified Commands under them. All but one have Navy service components, as depicted in table 1.

Table 1. The Subordinate Unified Commands and their Navy components: 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant command</th>
<th>Subordinate Unified Command (with date of establishment)</th>
<th>Naval component of Subordinate Unified Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Command</td>
<td>Iceland Defense Forces (1951)</td>
<td>Fleet Air Keflavik (No Navy component)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Forces Azores (1953)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
<td>U.S. Forces Japan (1957)</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Forces Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Forces Korea (1957)</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Forces Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alaskan Command (1989)</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Forces Alaska</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AFSC Pub 1, 2-31; individual command web sites, June 1997.

a. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Alaska is a U.S. Coast Guard admiral, the sole U.S. Coast Guard officer to have achieved this status. For details, see section on history of USPACOM.

Two of these Subordinate Unified Commands—U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea—had constituted the core of what was once a separate combatant command, the Far East Command (FECOM).35

Only one of these Subordinate Unified Commands—the Iceland Defense Forces—has been commanded by a naval officer (since 1961).36 The others have always been commanded by Army or Air Force officers. The Commander of the Iceland Defense Force is

35. FECOM existed from 1947 to 1957 before having its functions assumed by USPACOM. For details, see chapter on USPACOM.

36. From its inception in 1951 until 1961 the Iceland Defense Force had been commanded first by Army and then by Air Force officers. It is the sole unified or subordinate unified command to have evolved its commander's service affiliation through all three services in this fashion.
dual-hatted as his own naval component commander, Commander Fleet Air Keflavik.37

Joint Task Forces

Geographical combatant commanders have organized standing Joint Task Forces, as listed in table 2.38

Table 2. The Combatant Commands and their long-standing Joint Task Forces: 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant command</th>
<th>Standing JTF (with start date)</th>
<th>Navy JTF component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>JTF Bravo (1984)</td>
<td>None in peacetime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JIATF East (1989)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JIATF South (1989)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTF Safeborder (1995)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACOM</td>
<td>JTF 6 (1989)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>JIATF West (1989)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTF Full Accounting (1992)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>JTF-SWA (1992)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Functional component commands for theater special operations

Each of the five geographic combatant commanders has special operations components as well as service components assigned. They are as depicted in table 3.


Table 3. Combatant commands and Navy special operations commands: 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant command</th>
<th>Special operations component</th>
<th>Navy component of special operations component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>NSWU–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>SOCPAC</td>
<td>NSWU–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
<td>SOCEUR</td>
<td>NSWU–2, NSWU–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>SOCCENT</td>
<td>NSWU–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>SOCSOUTH</td>
<td>NSWU–8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Typically, while in the United States, all special operations force units fall under the combatant command of the Special Operations Command; when deployed overseas, they report to the regional combatant commander in chief. Naval Special Warfare Command detachments report to either a regional Naval Special Warfare Unit (NSWU), under the regional special operations component commander, or to a numbered fleet commander, under the Navy component commander.39

**NATO relationships**

As mentioned earlier, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command is also the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). The Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR) is also the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). As such, he has three NATO subordinate commanders reporting to him. USCINCEUR’s Navy component commander, CINCUSNAVEUR, is also the NATO Commander in Chief,

39. RADM George Worthington USN (Ret), “Whither Naval Special Warfare?”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 1996), 63. For details on the origins of these commands, see section below on special operations commands.
Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), one of SACEUR’s three subordinates.\textsuperscript{40}

Elements of the NATO command structure will be introduced in this paper where necessary. The paper does not purport, however, to treat the NATO command structure in any detail. Note, however, that the NATO command structure was itself evolving as of 1999.\textsuperscript{41}

**Korean relationships**

The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea is in peacetime a subordinate unified commander reporting to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC). He is also, however, the wartime Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC), and of the Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC). Both are combined commands: The first is a United Nations command and the second a U.S.–Republic of Korea command. Neither combined command reports to USCINCPAC in wartime.\textsuperscript{42}

The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea is, accordingly, in peacetime:

- U.S. Forces Korea Navy service component commander
- UN Command Naval Component Commander
- Combined Forces Command Deputy Naval Component Commander.\textsuperscript{43}


\textsuperscript{42} See also section on USPACOM later in this paper.

\textsuperscript{43} U.S. Naval Forces Korea Website: “Command History,” May 1997.
Commander, Seventh Fleet becomes the wartime naval component commander for all three commands.

**NORAD**

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a combined U.S. Air Force–Canadian Air Force command. The commander in chief (CINCNORAD) is a dual-hat of USCINGSPACE.

**Navy components as CNO subordinates**

Having surveyed the combatant commander chain of command as it exists in 1999, including its Navy components, we now turn to the Navy service chain of command, which figures prominently in our story.

**Organization of the Navy**

The U.S. Navy is one of the two naval services reporting to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV). SECNAV is a civilian appointed to the office by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The service chief of the Navy is the CNO, with responsibilities similar to those of the other service chiefs. The CNO, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President on employment of the combatant commands. He also oversees the Navy, which is divided administratively into two types of forces: the Operating Forces and the Shore Establishment.

The most important administrative elements of these two types of forces are as depicted in table 4.

44. The other is the U.S. Marine Corps, headed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). The U.S. Marine Corps is therefore part of the Department of the Navy, and has a close relationship with the U.S. Navy. During the early 1990s, U.S. Marine Corps service components were established in each geographic combatant command. Before that time, Marine forces were considered part of the Navy service components. Marine Corps componency is briefly described and analyzed in a later section of this study.
Table 4. The U.S. Navy’s operating forces and shore establishment: 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The operating forces</th>
<th>The shore establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Fleet</td>
<td>Bureau of Naval Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>Bureau of Medicine and Surgery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Naval Forces Europe</td>
<td>Naval Sea Systems Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Naval Forces Central Command</td>
<td>Naval Air Systems Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Sealift Command</td>
<td>Naval Supply Systems Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Special Warfare Command</td>
<td>Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Test and Evaluation Forces</td>
<td>Strategic Systems Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve Forces</td>
<td>Naval Computer and Telecommunications Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office of Naval Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief of Naval Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Security Group Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Legal Service Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Naval Space Command</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A dozen or so other shore commands)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Adapted from Navy On-Line web-site “Navy Organization.” Shading identifies commands that are also Navy service components of the combatant commands.

Each of the seven commands serving as Navy service components of combatant commands is also one of the Navy’s 35 or so second-echelon commands, reporting directly to the CNO (indicated by shading in table 4). Six of the seven Navy component commands are commands in the Operating Forces; one—the Naval Space Command—is a part of the Shore Establishment.
Two component commanders—the Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets—command “major fleets.” Three component commanders—the Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and the Commander, Naval Forces Europe—are styled, in common Navy parlance, “Fleet Commanders in Chief,” or “Fleet CINCs.”

The Navy components of the USACOM and USPACOM subordinate unified commanders also report as echelon 3 or 4 commanders to the appropriate major fleet commander—CINCLANTFLT or CINCPACFLT. One USAGOM subordinate unified commander—Commander, Iceland Defense Forces—is always a Navy Rear Admiral and is himself dual-hatted as Commander, Fleet Air Keflavik, an echelon 4 commander under the Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (who is in turn an Atlantic Fleet echelon 3 type commander).

CINCUSNAVEUR, a fleet CINC reporting to the CNO and at the same echelon as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), is also the wartime U.S. Commander, Eastern Atlantic (USCOMEASTLANT), with logistics responsibilities. As such, he is an echelon 3 commander, reporting to CINCLANTFLT.

45. Joint Pub 1-02 defines a “major fleet” as “A principal, permanent subdivision of the operating forces of the Navy with certain supporting shore activities. Presently there are two such fleets: the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet.” Joint Pub 1-02 is more formally the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, published by the Joint Staff in Washington DC. The latest printed edition, from which the above definition is taken, is dated 23 March 1994, as amended through 10 June 1998, although it is updated periodically on-line.

46. Standard Navy Distribution List (SNDL), 1997. In 1997, the JCS directed changing the designation of each service component CINC (including fleet CINCs) to “commander” vice “commander in chief.” CINCUSNAVEUR became CINCUSNAVEUR in 1998.

47. SNDL 1 Feb 97 Section 3 “Shore Activities by Command: Shore Activities and Detachments under the Command of the Chief of Naval Operations.”
Command and control: one chain two branches

As discussed above, there are two branches in the U.S. national military chain of command as of 1997: a combatant command branch and a service branch. Operational matters are almost exclusively the domain of the combatant command branch of the chain of command; budgetary matters are largely—but no longer almost exclusively—the domain of the service branch.

The combatant command branch of the chain of command

As mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Navy and other forces are assigned to combatant commanders by an annual Secretary of Defense “Forces for Unified Commands” Memorandum.

Combatant Commanders exercise combatant command (COCOM) authority over Navy and other service forces assigned to them, normally through their service component commanders, joint task force commanders, and subordinate unified commanders. These subordinates can themselves only exercise operational control (OPCON) over forces assigned to them.48

The combatant command branch of the chain and the defense budget

In accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the operational combatant commanders now have certain responsibilities relative to the formulation of the defense budget, as part of their COCOM. They actively participate in the DOD Planning, Program, and Budgeting System (PPBS).49

The Service branch of the chain of command

The Service secretaries exercise administrative authority and administrative control (ADCON) over forces assigned to them, to fulfil their statutory responsibilities. ADCON includes direction or exercise of

48. For full definitions of COCOM, OPCON, and other command terms, see Joint Pub 0-2, Chapter III.
49. As charged in Joint Pub 0-2, III-6.
authority over organization, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training and other matters not included in operational missions.\footnote{ADCON is more exhaustively defined in \textit{Joint Pub 0-2}, Chapter III. For the functions of the military departments, see DOD Directive 5100.1 \textit{"Functions of the Department of Defense and its major Components"} and \textit{Joint Pub 0-2}, II-3.}

As delegated by their Service secretaries, the CNO and other service chiefs exercise administrative authority and ADCON over forces assigned to them.

The service branch and the budget

Organizations in the Department of the Navy's executive structure, operating forces, and shore establishment receive specific budget allocations, and they are directly responsible for DON budget execution. Accordingly, these organizations, known as claimants, are called upon to submit information for, and to review the results of, Department of the Navy (DON) planning, programming, and budgeting activities.

The major Navy claimants for Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) funds—i.e., those which receive most of the Navy's budget dollars for operating the fleet—are CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, and the Commanders of the Naval Sea and Air Systems Commands (COMNAVSEA and COMNAVAIR).\footnote{Eric V. Larson and Adele R. Palmer, \textit{The Decisionmaking Context in the U.S. Department of the Navy: A Primer for Cost Analysts} (Santa Monica CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, MR-255-PA&E, 1994), 63. NAVSEA and NAVAIR, commands in the Navy's Shore Establishment, will not be discussed further below, as they have no direct relationship to the UCP or the combatant commands.}


**Relationship between the chains**

The secretaries of the military departments—including the Secretary of the Navy—are responsible for the administration and support of their services' forces assigned or attached to combatant commands.\(^{52}\)

Service component commanders normally communicate through the combatant commander on those matters over which the combatant commander holds COCOM or directive authority. On Service-specific matters (e.g., administration), service components normally communicate directly with their service chief, informing the combatant commander as the combatant commander directs.\(^{53}\)

**Summary**

Thus, the seven Navy second-echelon commands with responsibilities as Navy service components of combatant commands take their direction from two distinct branches of the chain of command:

- A combatant command branch from the President through the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders
- A service branch from the President through the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations.\(^ {54}\)

Now that we have outlined these concepts and explained the UCP as it existed in 1999, we now turn to discovering how this all came about.

\(^{52}\) In joint doctrine the relationship is, however, heavily nuanced. For details, see *Joint Pub 0-2.*

\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) For more detail on command relationships, see ibid.
III. Before the UCP: Pre-history and history to 1945

The pre-1941 record: starting from almost nothing

We begin our history of the UCP with a brief discussion of its scant origins and “pre-history” before World War II.

The old Navy

Since its formal beginning as a military department in 1798, the Navy had been organized internally into the three principal parts still in existence today: the Navy Department, including the bureaus, boards, and offices located in the headquarters; the Operating Forces, primarily the ships and squadrons, and later the fleets; and the Shore Establishment, which encompasses the Navy field activities that provided the logistical, material, and other support needed by the Operating Forces. 55

The Operating Forces of the U.S. Navy of the nineteenth century had consisted of a half-dozen cruising squadrons deployed globally and forward. In the early twentieth century, the squadrons had consolidated into one U.S. Fleet, concentrated at first in the Atlantic and then—in the 1920s and 1930s—in the Pacific.

**Type commands and task organizations**

With the creation of unified battle fleets at the turn of the century, new internal Navy administrative and operational organizational concepts were needed. A system of dual administrative and operational chains of commands was formalized in the 1920s. It would mature during World War II. More or less permanent *type commands* were developed as the principal organizations for administering and equipping the fleet. *Task organizations* were used to conduct actual operations. The task organizations were composed of ships and aircraft drawn from the type commands on an ad hoc basis, although the numbered fleet staffs achieved a degree of permanency similar to that of the type commands.

During the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, the *operational* commander of all Navy fleets and squadrons in the Operating Forces was the *civilian* Secretary of the Navy. During the World War I and interwar periods, his operational authority, however, was eroded due to the establishment of the position of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 1915. This position was held by a uniformed officer.


During World War II, the Secretary would become entirely divorced from operational matters. In the immediate postwar period, however, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal would be able to briefly reassert some secretarial operational command and control prerogatives.

**Early jointness**

Jointness is not a modern phenomenon. Many joint operations and joint institutions have been created since the birth of the American Republic. Although discussing them is well beyond the scope of this paper, we provide the outline in figure 4 to reinforce the point.

Almost *absent* from the chart in figure 4, however, are joint *field* commands. Joint operations and institutions before World War II were constituted in accordance with the principles of *coordination* and *cooperation*, not *command* and *control*. The only joint force commander for much of American history was the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, i.e., the President.

There were exceptions, to be sure: In the early days of the American Revolution, Generals George Washington and Benedict Arnold each built their own naval forces, which came under their direct command. During the Civil War, the first Union Navy contingents on Western Rivers likewise came under Army command for a short while. But these exceptions are not significant. In general, *joint command in the field has been a recent invention in American military history.*

A Joint Army and Navy Board had been constituted early in the twentieth century. It had a coordinating and advisory function only, and was without any directive power. The Board conducted joint war planning with a vengeance. The plethora of joint war plans it sponsored,

59. The best analysis of the U.S. Navy and jointness before World War II—and of Navy views on the same in the immediate post-war period—is in Albion, 347-376.

60. There were more exceptions if one counts—as we do not—instances when sailors operating *off their ships ashore* (as infantry, artillery, or security forces) came under Army command. Examples are the Navy contingent at Baltimore’s Fort McHenry during the War of 1812, and naval station personnel during the Seattle General Strike of 1919.
Figure 4. U.S. joint operations and institutions, 1775–50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary War</td>
<td>* 1775 &quot;Washington's Navy&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* 1775 &quot;Arnold's Navy&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1787 Constitution names President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army &amp; Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1789 First Cabinet formed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1798 Navy part of War Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Embargo Enforcement</td>
<td>1807 Navy moves to new Navy Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1807 Secretary of the Navy joins Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War of 1812</td>
<td>1812 Board of Engineers for Fortifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Canada Boundary Surveys</td>
<td>(&quot;Bernard Board&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Florida Intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nullification Crisis</td>
<td>1821 Coast Survey Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Seminole War</td>
<td>1842 Lighthouse Board created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican War</td>
<td>1843 Blockade Board convened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camel Transport</td>
<td>1852 Navy Mississippi Flotilla created under US Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco Vigilante Crisis</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>1861 Harbor Defense Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York City Draft Riots</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Newport Joint Maneuvers</td>
<td>1883 Gun Foundry Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spanish American War</td>
<td>1885 Joint Army-Navy Board on Fortifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Insurrection</td>
<td>(&quot;Endicott Board&quot;)</td>
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<tr>
<td>China Relief Expedition</td>
<td>1887</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plans &amp; Exercises</td>
<td>1903 Joint Army and Navy Board created</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1906 National Coast Defense Board (&quot;Taft Board&quot;)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexican Intervention</td>
<td>1910 Lighthouse Board abolished</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1910 Panama Fortifications Board</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1913 Joint Army and Navy Board suspended</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1915 Philippine Defense Board (&quot;Liggett Board&quot;)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1916 Joint Army and Navy Aeronautical Board created</td>
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<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>1919 Joint Army and Navy Board revived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Interventions</td>
<td>1922 Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee created</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1922 Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board created</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interwar Plans &amp; Exercises</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1933 Joint Economy Board created</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1939 Joint Boards now directly under President</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1941 Joint Intelligence Committee created</td>
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<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>1942 Outline Command Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupations</td>
<td>1946 Joint Institutions legislated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berlin Airlift</td>
<td>1947 (Joint Army and Navy Board abolished)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>1948 MATS created</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949 MSTS created</td>
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<td>1950</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* shading = length of operation

** no shading = institutions of limited duration

*** shading = continuing institutions

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however, were characterized by standoffish cooperative or sequenced command and control concepts: “Direct Communications,” “Passage of Command from Navy to Army,” “coordination,” and “paramount interest.”61 True joint theater command structures were nowhere to be found in these plans.

During the interwar period, the Joint Board also published documents outlining joint command procedures, should they be needed. Up until 1941, however, the services—and certainly the Navy—could not agree that they were needed.62

World War II: the big change

World War II changed things, however. Apparently forever.

For considerations of time and resources, we cannot dwell extensively on the Navy’s participation in World War II joint command structures. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore them. Navy attitudes toward joint command before and during the war influenced the Navy views on the shape and composition of Cold War unified and specified commands. They still influence U.S. Navy thinking to some degree in 1999.


Navy theory: the "'Two-Ocean Navy' plus something else" idea

The old Navy vision

The driving vision of the U.S. Navy from World War I on had been captured in the catch-phrase “A Navy Second to None.” Note that the emphasis was—implicitly—on size and/or capability, not on geography. The fleet was considered a unity, capable of deploying to whichever ocean a unified enemy fleet—German, British, Japanese, etc.—might deploy.

The new Navy vision

By 1940, however, a new driving vision had taken hold—a vision that has had a powerful hold on U.S. Navy thinking ever since. That new vision was captured in a new catch-phrase—the “Two-Ocean Navy.” Note now the explicit emphasis on geography. In the summer of 1940, shaken by the fall of France, the Navy drafted—and the Congress and President approved—a formidable shipbuilding program aimed at creating two separate, balanced fleets. Assuming that one Navy command would be conducting major operations in Europe, while another was executing some variant of the Orange Plan in the Pacific, the CNO called for two fleets comprising 18 fast aircraft carriers, over 200 small carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, and a huge fleet train.

Then, in mid-1941, in Navy General Order No. 143, the U.S. Navy reorganized its operating forces to reflect the “Two-Ocean Navy” vision—and to prepare for war. The Navy basically thought in terms of fighting the war at sea exclusively through Navy operational command structures. These were principally the CNO; a (prospective) Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; and the Pacific and Atlantic Fleet

63. Our analysis of the difference between the two visions owes much to a formulation by Thomas Hone.


commanders. The Pacific Fleet was clearly the larger, more powerful, and more important of the two, but the buildup of the Atlantic Fleet had been steady since the late 1930s.66 From 1940 on, that fleet was the only one involved at sea in a shooting war.

There were other outlying elements—especially the small presence-and-tripwire Asiatic Fleet, and a new Special Naval Observer in London (and an all-but-non-existent Naval Transportation Service). Of these, the Asiatic Fleet clearly had pride of place. So the vision was really of a "Two-Ocean Navy" plus something else (e.g., the Asiatic Fleet). This vision has had a powerful influence on Navy thinking ever since.

Figure 5 shows the geography.

**The U.S. Navy operating with allies**

Since 1938, the U.S. Navy had been holding increasingly more specific talks with the Royal Navy concerning a global division of naval operational labor. By March 1941, this division had been formalized in an agreed document, the so-called ABC–1 Agreement.67 The U.S. Navy was to run operations in the North and Central Pacific and the Western Atlantic. The Royal Navy was to command them everywhere else. The U.S. Navy had even agreed to possible combined (i.e., British) operational command of certain small and second-string U.S.

66. The buildup had commenced in 1937 with establishment in the Atlantic of a U.S. Fleet Training Detachment. The detachment was reinforced and renamed in stages, becoming the Pacific-oriented U.S. Fleet's Atlantic Squadron in 1938, the U.S. Fleet's Patrol Force in 1940, and finally a fleet in its own right—the Atlantic Fleet—in 1941. The story is in Patrick Abbazia, *Mr. Roosevelt's Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975).

Navy forces. These plans had become enshrined in Rainbow 5—the principal U.S. operational war plan—by November 1941.

Figure 5 shows these divisions, superimposing the operational map of ABC-1 on the U.S. Navy fleet map of Navy General Order No. 143. Note that the map reflects a U.S. Navy vision of a principal Atlantic Fleet focus on the western Atlantic, a principal Pacific Fleet focus on the central Pacific, and a recognition of Royal Navy interests in the northeast Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. (We will meet this breakdown again in 1946; indeed, it will linger through the mid 1950s).

The Navy and jointness

As we have just seen, the U.S. Navy foresaw the possibility of operating under Royal Navy command in some instances. After all, it had done so in World War I. The Navy could not conceive, however, of operating under the command of U.S. (or British) Army generals—especially U.S. Army Air Forces generals (or British air marshals). Royal Navy leaders were, after all, fellow professionals in the proper application of seapower. Generals and air marshals were not.

68. ABC-1 and the later Rainbow No. 5, if implemented, would have put the small and mostly obsolescent Asiatic Fleet under RN command. They also called for U.S. Navy “old” submarine forces under RN control in the Mediterranean and British Isles, a large force of destroyers and seaplanes under RN control in the British Isles, and—possibly—a U.S. Navy carrier-battleship task force under RN control at Gibraltar.

69. This was, more completely, “Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, Revision No. 1” of November 1941. The full text is in Ross, American War Plans, 1919-1941, Volume 5, 97-141. For a good, brief analysis, see Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 50-60.

70. The map should be considered illustrative, not definitive. While the concept of a division certainly remained valid for over a decade, too much should not be made of the specific lines drawn on maps of the seas. These kept shifting. No sooner was the ink dry on ABC-1, for example, than the U.S. services began planning for an invasion of the Azores—superseded by an actual occupation of Iceland. Both these island territories lay in the UKAOR under ABC-1.
The Navy assumed its operational relations with the U.S. Army and its Army Air Forces would be important, but mediated through the devices of the Joint Board and its various subsidiaries. The Navy placed no priority on implementing the joint command schemes discussed in the Joint Board publications. In places where the Navy and the Army co-existed—like the Philippines, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal Zone—Navy commanders coordinated and cooperated with their Army counterparts. Labor was divided, tasks were apportioned, exercises were held, and promises were made. Joint command, however, was not implemented.

The Navy considered the world ocean to be basically indivisible. Few lines were drawn in the sea. Deployment and redeployment of warships between theaters were seen as the prerogative of the President and his Navy.

**Navy professionalism**

*The Navy saw the exercise of the nation's seapower as a specialized professional mission, capable of being understood and executed only by the nation's professional experts in such matters: the Navy.* The Navy believed the proper maintenance and use of seapower, in peace and war, involved a discrete and coherent set of operations and activities, capable of being encompassed by one organization: the Navy. The Navy also believed that Army—including Army Air Forces—officers were incapable of achieving the level of understanding in such operations that Navy officers had; and that—indeed—if placed in command of warships, Marines and naval aircraft—they would misuse them, perhaps disastrously for the country.71

71. After World War II, former Secretary of War Henry Stimson caricatured this view in his memoirs in an oft-quoted passage: “But some of the Army-Navy troubles... grew mainly from the peculiar psychology of the Navy Department, which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church.” Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 506. Endless repetition of this passage in the Cold War national security literature only confirmed Navy suspicions of the ignorance by others of how to effectively wield the nation’s sea power.
This idea of seapower as being a thing apart, understandable only by experts, had a powerful hold on the Navy officer corps before and during World War II. It continued to inform Navy thinking all through the Cold War, and will figure prominently in our story as it continues to unfold.

Navy practice: Joint and combined command organizations

Joint theaters and areas

When war came, things didn’t turn out the way the Navy had planned—or wanted. Instead of commanding almost all its own forces in two oceans almost exclusively, the Navy found itself enmeshed in a complex array of joint and combined commands all over the world. Figures 5 and 6 show the contrast.72

The pattern was set within days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the President mandated joint command in Panama under the Army and joint command in Hawaii under the Navy.73 A couple of months later, Navy commanders found themselves entangled in two combined commands in the Southwest Pacific—ABDA and ANZAC. These soon went away—ABDA in particular—due to defeat on land and sea at the hands of the Japanese.

Operational direction of the war—south of the President and the British prime minister—was entrusted to a plethora of new allied and U.S. committees. The most important of these by far were the

72. Figure 6, while quite complex, is itself a simplification. The boundaries shown are a composite, chosen to focus on the issue of U.S. Navy operational command and control. For example, several different US-UK and USN-RN boundaries existed simultaneously in the Atlantic, delineating zones of national strategic responsibility, convoy escort responsibilities, the “CHOP” line, etc. Some national forces, however, like U.S. Atlantic Fleet escort carrier hunter-killer groups, ranged throughout the entire ocean.

73. Details are in Grace Person Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 29-30.
combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Also, from 1942 through the end of the war, a series of great allied U.S.-U.K. operational theater and area commands were also created that together spanned the globe. U.S. Navy commanders found themselves under U.S. Army and Royal Navy operational command off North Africa, in the Mediterranean, and at Normandy. And in the southwest Pacific, Navy commanders reported operationally to a U.S. Army general.

In fact, only in the central Pacific and the western Atlantic did the U.S. Navy wind up being master of its own houses—and the latter was a side-show after 1943.

Each theater of the war had its own unique set of organizational arrangements, and each of these arrangements evolved as the war progressed. (Figure 7 shows the evolution.) The world ocean was divided and redivided into many pieces. Lots of lines were drawn and redrawn on the sea.

74. Details on the origins of the CCS and JCS are beyond the scope of this paper, but are well treated elsewhere. See, for example, Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1989 (Washington DC: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1989).

Figure 5. Pre-World War II: commands the Navy planned to fight with

Note: Derived from Navy GO No. 143, reprinted in RADM Julius A. Furer USN (Ret), Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1959), 178-180. Supplemented by several other sources.
Figure 6. World War II: commands the Navy actually used to fight

Figure 7. World War II: evolution of joint and Navy organizations

Joint Institutional Milestones

1938
- Joint Army and Navy Board placed under President vice Service Secretaries
- ABC discussions with UK
- LANTFLT Joint Amphibious Force created
- Army Caribbean Defense Command given joint role
- ABDA & ANZAC created & dissolved
- CCS & JCS created
- POA & SWPA created
- War Department moves into Pentagon
- Joint Army and Navy Board abolished

1939
- US Fleet Atlantic Squadron (later Patrol Force) created

1940
- US Fleet deploys forward to Hawaii
- Special Service Squadron & Squadron 40-T disestablished
- Atlantic & Pacific Fleets created
- US Fleet Divided
- Coastal Frontiers (later Sea Frontiers) created
- Asiatic Fleet dissolved
- ADM King becomes CNO and COMINCH
- Naval Forces Europe created
- Type Commands standardized
- SOLANT designated
- First numbered Fleets designated

1941
- Allied European and Med Theaters divided
- JCS reorganize Pacific commands
- Last meeting of CCS

1942
- Outline Command Plan designates Unified Commands
- US-UK Allied Med Command ends
- Navy Department moves into Pentagon

1943
- Position of COMINCH abolished

1944
- 5th & 8th Fleets redesignated as PACFLT, LANTFLT Striking Fleets
- SOLANT disestablished

1945
- Most numbered Fleets redesignated
- 5th & 8th Fleets abolished

1946
- National Security Act of 1947 JCS created in law

1947
- Naval Forces Europe created
- Type Commands standardized
- SOLANT designated
- First numbered Fleets designated

1948
- 5th & 8th Fleets redesignated as PACFLT, LANTFLT Striking Fleets
- SOLANT disestablished
- Most numbered Fleets redesignated
- 5th & 8th Fleets abolished

Note: The most significant events are shaded.

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Service components

Service component commands were set up wherever there were joint or combined unified commands. Although they were operationally part of the unified commands, components were still tied directly to their parent services for everything other than operational control. This service chain was maintained with great vigilance by the respective service staffs throughout the war.

The Navy furnished components to many allied and joint commanders. The most important—indicated on figure 6—were the Southwest Pacific Area's Seventh Fleet and the naval forces that supported the European invasions under General Eisenhower. Less important at the time, but important later as a precedent, was the Caribbean Sea Frontier's role as a component under the Army Caribbean Defense Command.

Admiral Chester Nimitz was the only U.S. naval officer to command a major theater or area during World War II. The largest naval force in World War II, his U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) acted for the most part as the main striking force of his joint command, the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA). Of the major joint and combined theater and area commanders, only Nimitz acted as his own service component commander (a practice the Navy would continue well into the postwar era).

Theater and area joint staffs

General MacArthur's General Headquarters area staff was not particularly joint (or combined), being composed almost exclusively of U.S. Army officers and run along U.S. Army staff lines. American and Australian naval officers and Australian Army officers were assigned as technical assistants at various levels. MacArthur claimed that because his component commanders were collocated in the same building with him or nearby, and because they acted "in effect, as a planning staff to the Commander in Chief," his virtually all-U.S.

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Army-manned General Headquarters “successfully developed an attitude that is without service bias.”77 Not all observers agreed.

After 1943 (and with Army prodding), the POA staff became the most joint of all the theater and area staffs of World War II.78 As CINCPOA, ADM Nimitz constituted a true joint staff under him, his assistant chiefs of staff for intelligence and logistics both being Army officers. It was in ADM Nimitz’s command that World War II joint logistics reached its highest development.79 This same joint CINCPOA staff, however, also served as the Pacific Fleet component staff, and thus had a clear naval character. In theory, the staffs were separate. In practice, however, the U.S. naval officers of CINCPAC/CINCPOA, augmented by officers from other allied nations and U.S. armed services, largely functioned as one organization.80

In the Mediterranean and European Theaters, with their heavy Royal Navy presence, U.S. Navy forces formed “components of components,” with minimal participation on joint and combined staffs. General Eisenhower’s theater staffs, like the area staff of General MacArthur in the Pacific, were not particularly joint, to naval eyes. His staffs were dominated by Army and Army Air Forces officers, except for a few naval liaison officers or personal aides.81


78. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, 256-7.


Realities of component coordination and cooperation

The above litany of theaters, commands, and components implies a rigidity in organization, concern for turf, and attention to artificial lines drawn on maps that was often belied, however, by the actual operational record of the forces. In addition to the subordination of U.S. Navy units to allied joint and combined command in the Mediterranean and Europe (and to U.S. Army command in the South West Pacific), the war was characterized by numerous major instances of excellent naval coordination, cooperation, and support of non-U.S. Navy commanders (and vice versa).

Examples included Navy amphibious support to Army units in the European theater; the institution of a joint and combined air command on Guadalcanal; Army participation in every amphibious assault campaign in the Pacific; GEN MacArthur’s strategic direction of ADM Halsey during the Solomons Campaign; MacArthur’s command of the First Marine Division assault on New Britain Island; the Pacific Fleet’s Fifth Fleet carrier attacks in New Guinea to support MacArthur’s campaign against Hollandia; the transfer of Pacific Fleet ships to GEN MacArthur for the assault on the Philippines; and the operations of the Pacific Fleet’s Third Fleet in support of that assault.

Navy practice: Operating Forces service organization

Navy Department internal operational organization stayed basically as planned throughout the war.82 There was, above all, a CNO—dual-hatted during the war as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH).83 Then came the Pacific Fleet commander in chief and the Atlantic Fleet commander in chief.84 The Asiatic Fleet had

82. For the Navy’s organization during World War II, see Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, especially Chapter IV, “Fleet Organization,” 171-194.

83. The wartime CNO/COMINCH, FADM Ernest King USN, achieved a measure of command and control over the Navy’s operating forces that had not occurred before and has not been duplicated since.

84. The internal operational organization also included a number of Sea Frontier and Naval District Commanders, not subordinate to the major fleet commanders, who were therefore freed up to conduct forward operations.
disappeared, but the “observer” in London had been transformed into a four-star admiral with a large staff and administration and training responsibilities throughout the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

*A basic Pacific-Atlantic-Europe operational structure of the fleet had solidified.*

**Airlift and sealift**

During the war, the unprepared Naval Transportation Service (NTS)—for sealift—had grown, and a new Naval Air Transportation Service (NATS)—for airlift—had blossomed. These two developments would influence postwar defense organizational changes and, eventually, the UCP. The Navy came out of the war with new stakes in ensuring proper sea and air transport support for its fleets.

NTS and NATS missions during the war were to meet Navy needs only. Army sealift and airlift were run by the Army and Army Air Forces.85

**Type commands**

As noted above, type commands originated at least by the 1920s. During World War II, the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet type command organizations took the shape they generally continue to reflect in 1999.86 Before World War II, type commanders had also been

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85. Although the Army and Navy ran separate services, each service did not necessarily operate its own vessels. Most troop transports and cargo ships were controlled and operated by a wartime agency, the War Shipping Administration. On the Navy, see LT Duncan S. Ballentine USNR, “Naval Transportation,” *Public Administration Review*, V (Autumn 1945), 342-9; RADM Furer, *Administration of the Navy Department in World War II*, 717-8; and Huston, *The Sinews of War*, 512. By the end of 1944 NATS would have 700 transport aircraft (to the Army Air Forces Air Transport Command’s 1700). On the Navy’s approach to sealift, as contrasted to the Army’s, see Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy*, 656.

86. This was a particularly American construct. The Royal Navy fought World War II in Europe using type commands for both administration and operations. After the war, however, the Royal Navy and many other navies adopted the American system.
dual-hatted as operational task force commanders, and served afloat, but the pressures of war militated against continuation of this practice. The submarine force was an exception.

Submarines

On January 1, 1942, Submarines, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet became Submarines, Pacific Fleet (later, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet). As such, it now reported directly to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet instead of through an intervening echelon. That same month, Admiral Nimitz moved all the Pacific Fleet type commanders ashore, splitting their responsibilities—except for the submariners—from those of the operational task force commanders.

In April 1942, the type organizations of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets were standardized, with the type commands established in each fleet for battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, service force, amphibious force, submarine force, patrol wings and other forces.

Throughout the war, Commander Submarine Force Pacific retained both operational and administrative responsibility for Pacific Fleet submarines, acting both as type commander and fleet commanderequivalent. This arrangement, unique to the submarine force, continued—with some breaks—through 1999, reflecting the unique characteristics of submarine command and control, operations, and coordination with other forces.

Task organizations and the numbered fleets

In 1942, Admirals King, Nimitz, and Halsey reorganized the Pacific Fleet’s Battle Force and Scouting Force into several task forces, each with a carrier at its core. As noted above, fleets and task forces had been U.S. Navy organizational concepts since at least the 1920s. Initially, the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets fought World War II at sea with naval task forces, drawn from naval theater and area forces created in
In March of 1943, however, COMINCH instituted the system of *numbering all operational fleets*, assigning the even numbers to the Atlantic and the odd to the Pacific.

This standardization of U.S. Navy operating fleet designations led to a standardized system of designating operational echelons subordinate to the numbered fleets: task forces, task groups, task units, and task elements, each with a progressively narrower operational mission.

After the war, the numbered fleets would be greatly reduced in number and standardized as three-star commands. The wartime numbering *system* devised for fleets, task forces, and subordinate elements, however, would endure through 1999.

**An alternative perspective**

We have adopted the view that the chief subordinate entities in the service chain of command for the Navy's operating forces were the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and the forces in Europe. This view is true in the formal sense and directly relevant to this study, in which we sought Cold War roots in the Navy's World War II experience.

We would be remiss, however—especially in 1999—if we did not present an alternative analysis of the Navy's late World War II structure. This view holds that the Pacific Fleet and the forces in Europe were principal forward striking arms of the fleet, engaged in forward operations on the far sides of the Pacific and Atlantic. The Battle of the Atlantic having already been won, the Western and Central Atlantic had become a strategic backwater.

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87. The vaunted flexibility of the Navy's operational organization can baffle outsiders, and even Navy leaders themselves. As the biographer of the Navy's initial combat commander in the Pacific notes regarding this period, "The assorted amorphous commands which arose, blossoming from task groups to task forces without specific timetables, made it impossible for anyone to thoroughly understand what was going on." Stephen D. Regan, *In Bitter Tempest: The Biography of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1994), 186. This description is similar to the Navy's 1990-1991 Gulf War experience as well.
The Atlantic Fleet—which in any event had never been solely responsible for prosecuting the war in the Atlantic or even in the Western and Central Atlantic—now focused on a very different function. The vast bulk of the new ships spewed out by American industry in 1944 and 1945 were commissioned in the Atlantic, initially crewed in the Atlantic, and worked up and trained in the Atlantic by the Atlantic Fleet—as its principal functions.

In short, the Atlantic Fleet, headquarted in Norfolk, had become the principal force provider to two forward-deployed operating fleets, one headquarted in Hawaii and one headquarted in Europe.

This operational concept existed only during the latter days of World War II, although vestiges of it continued through the early 1950s. We note—without having the mandate within this paper to explore the point more fully—that this bears a striking resemblance to—and indeed is a precedent for—the scheme of fleet organization offered by ADM J. Paul Reason USN more than half a century later in his book *Sailing New Seas.*

**End of the war**

The end of the war found the Navy deployed principally in the Pacific, but with operational and administrative organizational structures in place in the Atlantic and Europe to enable it to re-orient itself to those areas quickly if necessary.

In the Pacific, toward the end of the war the command structure changed radically, in preparation for the planned final assaults on the Japanese Home Islands. The theater divisions, which had endured for much of the war were changing. New theater-wide single service


89. Jeffrey G. Barlow disentangles the relationships to the extent they can be disentangled in “The Question of Command for Operation Olympic,” in William B. Cogar (ed.), *New Interpretations in Naval History* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 325-338.
commands were created—including an independent strategic bombing command directly under the head of the Army Air Forces.

The old area commands, however, still remained in place—or so the Navy, at least, maintained. The changes were just occurring when the war ended in August 1945.

*This organizational chaos would be the direct antecedent of the first UCP—the Outline Command Plan of 1946. Navy dissatisfaction was the driver.*

**The bottom line: Navy organizational continuity from World War II until today**

With all this turmoil in the joint arena, however, U.S. Navy organization maintained its basic stability. As figure 8 so vividly illustrates, there has been a basic continuity in Navy operational and administrative organization since before World War II. *The vision of “The Two-Ocean Navy’ plus something else” has had a remarkably long run.*

*Central to this continuity has been the maintenance of two four-star fleet commanders, plus a third four-star commander. Before the war, that third commander was the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet. During and after the war the third commander has been the Navy’s commander in Europe.*

*This essential stability of the vision on the Navy side—in sharp contrast to the continuous changes in direction on the joint side—will be one of the main sources of friction as the Navy confronts UCP issues throughout the Cold War. (This is one of the salient findings of this study.)*

The Navy’s problem throughout the Cold War thus became one of trying to wrap each successive joint structure—mandated by the President, the SECDEF, the Congress and/or the JCS—around the basic, stable operational and administrative organization the Navy essentially has had in place since the start of World War II.

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Figure 8. Continuity of the basic organizational structure of U.S. Navy operating forces, 1941–1998

Pre-World War II

CNO

Atlantic Fleet

Pacific Fleet

Asiatic Fleet

World War II

CNO / COMINCH

Atlantic Fleet

Pacific Fleet

Naval Forces Europe

Sea Frontiers

Naval Forces Southwest Pacific

Naval Forces NAW & ANXF

Cold War

CNO

Atlantic Fleet

Pacific Fleet

Naval Forces Europe

Post Cold War

CNO

Atlantic Fleet

Pacific Fleet

Naval Forces Europe

Naval Forces Central Command
IV. The Navy confronts the UCP, 1946–1999

Embedded in the dry details of bureaucratic wrangling are many vital stories, among them the rise of joint organizations, the expansion of American military interests over the entire globe, and the centralization of authority in the person of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.91

Summary

What follows is a brief summary of the development of the UCP from its roots during and after World War II, including Navy views of and participation in that development. It is intended only as an overview and summary. Much more detail can be found in the subsequent chapters on the origins of each individual combatant command in existence in 1999.

We provide maps, charts and timelines, to supplement the text and illustrate changes in geography and structure of the commands.

The History of the Unified Command Plan

For a fuller treatment (through 1993), see the unclassified baseline history of the UCP, The History of the Unified Command Plan, published by the Joint Staff.92 As noted earlier, we used this publication as the starting point for our research, and have relied on it heavily throughout this paper.

91. Eliot Cohen, review in Foreign Affairs.

92. The more recent changes can be traced in appropriate chapters of successive issues of The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide (Norfolk VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1997). The wiring diagrams of the combatant commands as they change over time are particularly useful and readable.
This section complements this publication, and is useful chiefly for its maps and charts.

Overview

From 1946 through 1999, 19 unified or specified commands have been designated by a succession of UCPs and revisions thereto. In any one year there could be anywhere between 7 to 10 such commands, although the norm has been 8 or 9.  

Most of the unified commands have had naval components. One of the specified commands—U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM)—was composed entirely of naval forces.

At the same time that these combatant commands evolved, the Navy internal organization of its operating forces also evolved. As we saw earlier, a basic outline of Navy operational structure that was set in 1941 continues through 1999. Some commands established at the beginning of World War II—such as the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets—have continued to the present. Other commands—like Naval Forces Europe—clearly grew out of wartime structures. Still others—like the Naval Space Command and U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, are post-war creations.

In the post-war period, the Navy as an institution was faced with two fundamental challenges regarding the UCP and combatant commands:

- Which combatant commands should the Navy create, change, or abolish?

- How should the Navy mesh its operational organization into joint organizations mandated by the UCP?

*The Navy saw its own operational organization as a going concern, and was reluctant to change it to satisfy the demands of new and ever-changing joint*

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93. Figure 67, later in the paper, traces the total number of combatant commands.
command structures. The Navy was not adverse, however, to trying to get the UCP organization to conform to the Navy's structure.

As a basic reference, figure 9 summarizes all the major changes in both the joint and Navy command structures since World War II. The most significant events, that is, changes in the UCP and the Navy, are shaded in the figure.

Organizing for defense

The history of the UCP—and of the Navy's relationship to it—is only one interwoven part of a much larger history of U.S. defense organization and re-organization. That said, however, a study of this size and scope cannot begin to do justice to that larger history, or even to the place of the UCP in it.

Suffice it to say here that a number of presidential, congressional, and departmental actions took place since World War II that heavily influenced the development of the UCP. These actions were in turn influenced by hearings, staff studies, government and non-government reports, and real-world actions.

Figure 10 provides an outline of the relationship.

Before World War II, the Congress had not normally involved itself with how the armed forces were organized in the field. This changed after the war. Since 1947, the Congress has enacted major legislation affecting command relationships in the field.

In addition, Presidents have occasionally used Executive Orders to promulgate command relationships among the elements of the armed forces, most notably in 1947. Secretaries of Defense have issued directives of their own in this regard far more frequently, from 1948 on.
Figure 9. The development of joint and Navy commands since 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Commands</th>
<th>Navy Commands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1941</strong></td>
<td>Atlantic &amp; Pacific Fleets created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coastal Frontiers (later Sea Frontiers) created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Forces Europe designated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fleet type commands standardized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbered Fleets designated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1942</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1944</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SAC created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PACOM, FCOM, ALCOM, EUCOM, NELM, CARIBCOM, LANTCOM designated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1943</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1946</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USN EC created</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>1947</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAFE becomes specified command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USEUCOM absorbs EUCOM, part of NELM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONAD created</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1948</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1949</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USNEC created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USEUCOM absorbs EUCOM, part of NELM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NELM, CARIBCOM, LANTCOM designated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1950</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1952</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAFE becomes specified command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USEUCOM absorbs EUCOM, part of NELM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1954</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1956</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USSTRICOM created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CARIBCOM designated USOUTHCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1957</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1958</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NELM becomes NAVEUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East Force created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MSTS created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1962</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1963</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USSTRICOM / MEAFSA absorbed in USREDCOM, USEUCOM, PACOM, LANTCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1965</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1971</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1973</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADCOM assumes CONAD functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALCOM absorbed in ADCOM and PACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1975</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>1977</strong></td>
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<td><strong>1987</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>1989</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USCENTCOM created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USSPACECOM assumes ADCOM functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USSOCCOM, USTRANSCOM FORSCOM created USREDCOM abolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1990</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1992</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1993</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USSTRATCOM created; SAC absorbed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USACOM designated, assumes joint integrator, trainer, provider, USLANTCOM, FORSCOM missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1995</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fifth Fleet created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WESTHEMGRU created</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The most significant events regarding changes in the UCP and Navy component are shaded.

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Figure 10. Defense organizational milestones and major changes to the UCP, 1946–1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defense organization changes</th>
<th>UCP changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security Act</td>
<td>1946 SAC created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key West and Newport Agreements</td>
<td>1947 Outline Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Act Amendment</td>
<td>1948</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950 USNEC created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1951 USAFE is specified command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952 NELM made USEUCOM component</td>
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<td>1953</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1954 CONAD created</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1956 USNEC gone; USAFE in USEUCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1957 FECOM gone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1958</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960 JSTPS created alongside SAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961 LANTCOM gains sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962 USSTRICOM created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963 NELM out as specified command</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975 USSTRICOM gone; REDCOM created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976 PACOM gains IO, S. Asia, Aleutians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977 CONAD now ADCOM; ALCOM gone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978 MAC is specified command</td>
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<td>1979</td>
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<td>1982</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983 USCENTCOM created</td>
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<td>1984</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985 USSPACECOM created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986 ADCOM gone</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987 SOC-, TRANS-, FORSCOMs created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988 USOCCOM gains SPECWARGRUs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989 USCENTCOM gains Gulfs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992 USSTRATCOM created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993 USLANTCOM becomes USACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995 USCENTCOM gains Arabian Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996 S. American waters to USOUTHCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997 Caribbean shifts to USOUTHCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998 USEUCOM, USCENTCOM gain NIS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
The most important legislative and executive branch milestones for the development of the UCP were:

- 1947: Formalizing of the JCS and service executive agency
- 1948: Agreement on service roles and missions
- 1953: Placing service secretaries in the operational chain
- 1958: Full operational command and the demise of executive agency
- 1986: Creation of combatant command (COCOM) concept.

The Navy and defense organization

Since World War II (and before), the Navy—unlike the Army and the Air Force—consistently opposed the unification and centralization of the defense establishment. This opposition was just as consistently overruled, however.94 The history of defense unification and joint organization since World War II has essentially been one of incrementally increasing centralization and jointness in the face of dogged but ultimately unsuccessful Navy opposition.95

94. The Marine Corps has opposed unification as well, first as a subordinate element within the Navy and gradually as a service of equal stature within the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense. One important analyst, discussing the 1945–1946 period, identified a “‘Navy Department coalition’ consisting of the Secretary of the Navy, the senior admirals, the Marines and the naval aviators” pitted against a “‘War Department coalition,’ consisting of the Secretary of War, the senior Army ground forces generals, the Army Air Forces generals, and President Truman.” See Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 57.

Especially in the early post-Cold War years, this Navy opposition was motivated in part by fear: fear that the Navy's organizational health and integrity would suffer as a result of increased unification and centralization and specifically fear that naval aviation and the Marine Corps would lose significant functions—functions deemed essential by the Navy for the proper prosecutions of the nation’s sea campaigns.

The Navy's forward battle fleet deployment concept

The early post-WWII period saw the development and implementation of a new U.S. Navy force deployment concept: Permanently forward-deployed sea-based battle fleets fully ready for the entire spectrum of naval warfare, supported by a base of ships, aircraft, and manpower continually rotating from the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts. This concept still drives the U.S. Navy in 1999, with the continual forward deployment of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleets.

The Seventh Fleet grew out of a similarly named fleet that had been forward deployed in combat during World War II and never came home. The Sixth Fleet grew out of the residue of U.S. Navy forces deployed to the Mediterranean during the war. The Fifth Fleet was not established until the 1990s, but can trace its roots back to the late 1940s.

Direction of and support for these unique new fleet structures has been the primary function of all Navy administrative and operational component commanders since World War II. 96 Forward fleet deployment formed a basis for many Navy positions regarding the UCP.

96. Note the sharp contrast between this fleet operational concept and that of the normally shore-based, surge-capable, non-rotational and non-forward deploying United States Fleet of the 1920s and 1930s. See also CAPT Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret), “The Navy's Search for a Strategy—1945–1947,” Naval War College Review 49 (Spring 1996) 102-108.
Creating the first plan

At the end of World War II, the services were at odds over the structure of the unified commands. The impetus for the establishment of a post-war system of unified command over U.S. military forces worldwide stemmed from the Navy's dissatisfaction with the divided command structure in the Pacific. Throughout late 1945 and 1946, the JCS sought to find a solution to the problem of divided Army-led and Navy-led commands in the Pacific, as well as command problems in other areas. General Eisenhower was now Army Chief of Staff. (Note that under his World War II command in North Africa and Europe, U.S. Navy forces had been "a component of a component" (i.e., under a Royal Navy admiral as naval component commander). Eisenhower proposed a plan that eventually became the UCP.

After intense JCS deliberation, President Truman approved the first such plan in December 1946—the Outline Command Plan (OCP) (subsequent such plans have been called Unified Command Plans (UCPs). The OCP continued the wartime practice of putting unified commands under JCS authority, with service chiefs as "executive agents" for commands where they had a preponderance of interest.

At the same time, the JCS issued a directive requiring each theater commander to establish a "joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the services under this command in key positions of responsibility." This represented a victory of the World War II Nimitz CINCPOA staff model over the MacArthur SWPA and Eisenhower SHAPE staff models.


98. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 11.

99. Each UCP, when issued, is a classified document, although portions may be unclassified. Many early versions have been declassified.

100. Futrell, Vol I, 195.
There has been a certain continuity among combatant commands over time. As table 5 shows, the 1946 commands clearly had their roots in World War II, and foreshadowed the commands of today.

Figure 11 shows the OCP of 1946. Figure 12 shows changes by 1953.

Starting off: the Outline Command Plan of 1946

The Outline Command Plan established the following seven commands: The Far East, Pacific, Alaskan, Northeast, Caribbean, and European Commands, and the Atlantic Fleet. The plan also acknowledged the earlier establishment of an eighth command—the Strategic Air Command—under direct JCS supervision.

Figure 11 depicts the geographical areas and chain of command laid out in the OCP. Note that these graphic renderings are interpretations of a text. The OCP document itself was all text, with no supplemental maps or diagrams provided. Most subsequent UCPs, when published, would have maps appended, although some of the boundaries were ill-defined—often no doubt purposely.

Under the 1946 OCP, theater commanders responsible to the JCS were appointed. The JCS gave responsibility to the theater commanders for strategic direction of the armed forces assigned. The theater commanders were assisted by their own joint staffs composed of representatives from all assigned component commands. The component commands, as had been the case in World War II, were to deal directly with their respective service headquarters in Washington on all matters not directly linked to joint operations, especially logistics, training, and administration.

By 1947, all of these commands had been established save the Northeast Command (set up in 1950). And a ninth command—Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM)—had been added.

Figure 11. The first UCP: the Outline Command Plan of 1946

Note: From J.C.S. 1259/27, 11 December 1946, signed by the President 16 December 1946.
Figure 12. The UCP in 1953, with naval components

Water area under Navy CINCs | Water area under two CINCs

President

Secretary of Defense

Designated Service Secretary as Executive Agent

Designated Service Chief

Key

CINCFE | CINCPAC | CINCAL | CINCARIB | COMSAC | CINCNE | CINC LANT | LANC E | CINC SAFE | CINC NELM

COM NAVFE | COM ALSEAFRON | COM CARSEAFRON

Fleet Component & Logistic Support

(19XX) Year Command stood up

Unified and Specified Commanders | Navy-led commands

* Double-hat

Note: Based on a map enclosed with JCS SM 1419-53, 24 July 1953 (JCS 1259/292, 23 July).

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Table 5. Ancestry of 1999 combatant commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Pacific Ocean Areas</td>
<td>• Pacific Command</td>
<td>• US Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Western, Hawaiian Sfs</td>
<td>• Alaskan Command</td>
<td>• Alaskan Command (PAC Sub-Unified Cmd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• SE Asia Cmd (US-UK)</td>
<td>• Southern Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• RN Eastern Flt (UK)</td>
<td>• Caribbean Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Northern Pacific Area</td>
<td>• Far East Command</td>
<td>• USFOR/USFOR (PAC Sub-Unified Cmds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Alaskan Sea Frontier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Alaskan Department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 11th Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Southwest Pacific Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Caribbean Defense Cmd</td>
<td>• Caribbean Command</td>
<td>• US Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gulf &amp; Caribbean Sea Frontiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• South Atlantic &amp; Southeast Pacific Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Atlantic Fleet</td>
<td>• Atlantic Command</td>
<td>• US Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Eastern Sea Frontier</td>
<td>• US Northeast Command</td>
<td>• US Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Royal Navy Cmds (UK)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Newfoundland &amp; Greenland Base Com-</td>
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<td>mands</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Allied Expeditionary Force, Europe (US-UK)</td>
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<td>• US European Command</td>
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<td>• Allied Command Mediterranean (US-UK)</td>
<td>• Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic &amp; Mediterranean</td>
<td>• US Central Command</td>
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<td>• Middle East Command (UK)</td>
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<td>• US Strategic Air Forces Europe</td>
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<td>• 20th Air Force</td>
<td>• Continental Air Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Army Defense Commands</td>
<td>• Army Defense Cmds</td>
<td>• US Space Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Continental Air Forces</td>
<td>• USAF Air Defense Cmd (None included in OCP)</td>
<td>• US Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Naval Transportation Service</td>
<td>• Military Sea Transportation Service</td>
<td>• US Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Naval Air Transport Service</td>
<td>• Military Air Transportation Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Air Transport Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Army Transport Cmds</td>
<td>• Service subordinate echelon SOF commands</td>
<td>• US Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Service subordinate echelon SOF commands</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Navy vision and the OCP

Three OCP commands were composed almost exclusively of naval forces and were commanded by Navy officers: in the Atlantic, Pacific, and NELM AORs. These formed a kind of “Navy UCP within the UCP,” with the CNO exercising executive agency for each.

Preserving this “Navy UCP within the UCP” became a principal Navy goal during the Cold War.

Note that in 1946–1947:

• NAVEU includes the eastern Atlantic as well as the Mediterranean, and was separate from EUCOM.

• PACOM was an operational backwater that did not include East Asia or the Western Pacific

• The forces in China (including the ancestor of the Seventh Fleet) reported to the JCS

• The Middle East and Indian Ocean were not AORs of any concern.  

Note also the striking continuity with the Navy vision of 1941, even with the enormous disruptive experiences of the war, illustrated earlier in figure 5:

• An Atlantic Fleet focus on the western Atlantic

• A Pacific Fleet focus on the Central Pacific

• A recognition of Royal Navy interests in the Northeast Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean.

The Navy’s “UCP within a UCP” tracked well with the 1941 vision of a “Two-Ocean Navy’ plus something else.” The “something else” that would now emerge, however, would be a new NELM, not a resurrected Asiatic Fleet.

102. Subsequent chapters will include full discussions of these issues.
NELM in the late 1940s clearly had pride of place in U.S. Navy strategic thinking. While the PACOM and Atlantic Fleet AORs seemed at the time to be backwaters, the Mediterranean was then a principal cockpit of the Cold War, and—at least in the Navy's eyes—the centerpiece of potential counter-offensives against the Soviets, in peacetime, crises, and war.103

Making it legal: the National Security Act of 1947

The Navy had opposed service unification in Washington, although it had no objection—in principle—to unification in the field. Despite Navy opposition, however, on 18 September 1947 the National Security Act of 1947 became law.104

Among its many provisions, the Act created the position of Secretary of National Defense and institutionalized the JCS and the Joint Staff. Almost in passing, the Act charged the JCS to

... establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security.

Despite a great deal of detail on many other aspects of the new national defense organization, this was the only reference by the Congress to combatant commands. The Act contained no reference to the


Nevertheless, the National Security Act provided for the first time a statutory basis for the establishment of combatant commands.

The Navy from here on began to resist strongly an Army embrace that naval officers saw as misguided, since they continued to believe that generals misunderstood the proper strategic, operational, or tactical employment of ships at sea in war. For the Navy, "mutual cooperation" was a command principle to be preserved; "unity of command" was a principle to be espoused occasionally in theory but avoided whenever possible in practice.

Dividing the pie: the Key West and Newport Agreements of 1948

In large part as a result of Navy agitation, in 1948 the JCS concluded agreements among themselves at Key West and Newport that clarified Service roles and functions. The Navy was unhappy with the outcome of the Key West Agreement, but found the Newport Agreement a suitable compromise.

The Agreements confirmed JCS authority to

establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security, and to authorize commanders thereof to establish such subordinate unified commands as may be necessary.

Moreover, _executive agency was now formalized:_ The JCS were to designate, as necessary, one of their members as their executive agent for (a) a unified command, (b) certain operations, and specified commands.

And to
determine what means are required for the exercise of unified command, and to assign to individual members the responsibility of providing such means.

Thus, the CNO continued to act as executive agent for the Atlantic and Pacific Commands and for U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

The emphasis in these documents was the division of functions among the services. Closer joint operational cooperation on missions in the field took a back seat to inter-departmental wrangling in Washington over roles and functions. Moreover, formal endorsement of the device of executive agency ensured heavy service dominance over the combatant commanders, who remained dual-hatted as commanders of the predominant service component in the unified command.

**CJCS is born: the Amendment of 1949**

In 1949, the National Security Act was amended to centralize the National Military Establishment and strengthen the position of the Secretary of National Defense. He was renamed the SECDEF and the Department was renamed the Department of Defense (DOD), now an executive department headed by a Secretary with strengthened budgeting responsibilities. Further, the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) was created, the authorized size of the Joint Staff was doubled, and the Secretary of the Navy and the other service secretaries left the cabinet.

As in 1947, the Act cited as one of the duties of the JCS: “establishment of unified commands in strategic areas.”
The Navy saw the 1949 legislation as overturning much of the success it had had in watering down the Army's push toward defense centralization in the 1947 legislation. The Navy in early and mid-1949, however, was on the defensive on many bureaucratic and legislative fronts. (This was at the same time as the cancellation of the Navy's new super-carrier, leading up to the "Revolt of the Admirals.") The Navy was in no position to effectively block the amendments.\textsuperscript{106}

In August 1949, General Omar Bradley—former Chief of Staff of the Army and no supporter of naval tactical aviation or a robust Marine Corps—was appointed the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**First changes: the UCP evolves**

The OCP had given the unified and specified commanders only operational responsibilities. In 1948, however, the JCS had also made each responsible for

\[\text{coordination of logistic and administrative support of the component forces of their unified command.}\textsuperscript{107}\]

The OCP was not changed formally for six and a half years. In 1953 it was renamed the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP) and superseded by the first of several formal changes—five in the 1950s, two in the early 1960s, two in the early 1970s, and one in the early 1980s—plus numerous revisions to those changes.\textsuperscript{108} During this time the UCP's provisions gradually became more joint and less protective of traditional service prerogatives. Progress was not steady, however. Changes promoting unification were often imposed by Congress and the White House.

\textsuperscript{106} For a post-Cold War analysis of these inter-relationships, see Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, Chapter V: "'Chaos and Conflict and Carnage Confounded': Budget Battles and Defense Reorganization," 159-208.

\textsuperscript{107} Cole et al., *The History of the Unified Command Plan*, 16.

\textsuperscript{108} See ibid., Appendix II, 131, for a listing of successive UCPs, with dates and reference numbers.
As figure 12 shows, by 1953:

- LANTCOM and LANTFLT had taken over responsibility for the eastern Atlantic and Arctic.
- NELM had formalized its authority as a specified command for the Middle East, but had become subordinate to a new USEUCOM for its European missions.
- The Indian Ocean had been divided among the three maritime CINCs.
- PACOM has taken over much of FECOM's AOR and missions in East and Southeast Asia.

The dwindling fortunes of NELM and the rising stars of LANTCOM and PACOM both drive and reflect a shift of U.S. Navy attention from the Mediterranean back to the Pacific and north to the Norwegian Sea (and a concomitant shift in Army emphasis from Northeast Asia to Central Europe).109

Note that figure 12 also depicts the support rendered by CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT, as force providers, to the other naval components. This force provider relationship will continue, although for simplicity it is not depicted on subsequent maps.

Service secretaries in the chain: the 1953 reorganization

The demands and opportunities occasioned by the Korean War (1950-1953) brought an end to the most virulent period of Cold War interservice conflict. The Navy's concern for its institutional health and well-being was only somewhat dampened, however. The year 1953 brought with it a new administration—that of President Dwight D. Eisenhower—and with it Eisenhower's long Army-colored interest...

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in increasing jointness and decreasing the independence of and infighting among the services. Eisenhower promptly initiated action to reorganize the Defense Department, with the concurrence of Congress.\textsuperscript{110}

Eisenhower’s 1953 Defense Reorganization transferred authority over the unified commands from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, who in turn designated individual military departments, and their secretaries, as executive agents. The SECDEF, not the JCS, was now in the business of assigning executive agency.

Under this system, the CNO and other uniformed service chiefs continued to play a major role in directing the activities of individual unified and specified commands, although now as subordinates to their service secretaries rather than as members of the JCS. Thus, the CNO retained his role as executive agent for the Atlantic and Pacific unified commands and for the U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean specified command. But he now reported to SECNAV vice the JCS.

The JCS still retained their advisory role, and their authority to establish and delete commands and change the UCP, however.

\textbf{The first true joint combatant command: CONAD}

In 1954, the JCS created a new type of combatant command, with a unique approach to Service component. When the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) stood up in 1954, it was designated a “joint” rather than a “unified” (or “specified”) command. As CINCONAD explained this at the time, all other multiservice commands consist of forces from each of the services and

\begin{quote}
 it is customary for the overall commander to operate his forces through the component commanders by issuing his orders to them and having them, in turn, pass the instructions to their subordinate units. The air defense procedures are so vitally concerned with the time of reaction that in
\end{quote}

Continental Air Defense operations, the units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are operated directly by me and my subordinate commanders. In other words, the Army, Navy, and Air Force provide the units for air defense purposes, but the actual control of these units in the air battle is a responsibility which I must carry out as Commander in Chief of the Continental Air Defense Command.\textsuperscript{111}

CINCONAD thus received more wartime authority over Air Force, Army, and Navy forces than was true of other CINCs. The Air Force, Navy, and Marines acceded to CINCONAD's requirement to centralize control of all operations down to the assignment of targets to individual antiaircraft batteries. The Army—with far more at stake—was less forthcoming.\textsuperscript{112}

The death of executive agency: the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act

President Eisenhower grew increasingly dissatisfied with the defense reorganization he had effected in 1953. He was particularly concerned that fierce interservice rivalries had been rekindled, especially over service responsibilities for intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missile development and deployment.

Accordingly, the administration submitted a Reorganization Act to Congress in 1958. It passed with few changes. The provisions of that Act governed U.S. defense organization for over a quarter of a century, until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. \textit{The Act established a new chain of command running from the NCA through the JCS to the unified and specified commanders}. The Act had numerous other provisions, many of which lie outside the focus of this paper. The Act, for example, doubled again the authorized strength of the Joint Staff. (At the same time, the President and SECDEF replaced the joint committee system


\textsuperscript{112} For details on the origins and growth of CONAD, and Navy relationships, see the subsequent section on air defense and space commands.
with the structure of a conventional military staff—the J-directorates.\textsuperscript{113}

The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act rendered the position of CINCONAD no longer unique. All commanders of unified and specified commands were given “full operational command” authority over the forces assigned to them, and in 1958 CONAD was redesignated a unified command.\textsuperscript{114}

The 1958 reorganization eliminated executive agency altogether, but also placed the JCS back in the operational chain of command, albeit with ambiguous powers. Thus, the CNO could continue to exercise informal executive agency authority over two unified commands—LANTCOM and PACOM—and one specified command—NELM—the “Navy UCP Within the UCP.”

Moreover, the Act now passed authority to establish unified and specified commands from the JCS to the SECDEF.\textsuperscript{115}

"The last CNO" and the UCP

As the individual who served (1955–1961) at the apogee of post-war CNO operational autonomy and power, Arleigh Burke has been aptly termed “the last CNO.”\textsuperscript{116} During the first two thirds of Burke’s term, the Secretary of the Navy as the Secretary of Defense’s executive agent for CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCNELM delegated much of this responsibility to Burke. Burke’s term saw the demise of the Far East Command as a rival to PACOM and the successful retention by CINCPAC and CINCLANT of the Navy’s strategic, air defense, and air transport forces. The commanders of the three combatant commands for

\footnotesize{113. The evolution of the Joint Staff can be traced in Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.}

\footnotesize{114. For elaboration on the effect of the reorganization of 1958 on the JCS and their relationship with the combatant commanders, see Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 27-29.}

\footnotesize{115. For the Congressional debate on truly unified combatant commands, see Ries, The Management of Defense, 173-180.}

\footnotesize{116. Rosenberg, “Arleigh Burke,” in Bradford, Quarterdeck and Bridge.}
which Burke exercised the SECNAV’s joint agency were also Burke’s chief subordinates in the Navy service chain—the three “Fleet CINCs.” Communications were straightforward and simple.  

* * *

*Toward the end of Burke’s tenure, however, the power of the CNO and the simplicity of Navy command arrangements began to erode.*

Burke opposed the 1958 reorganization, but was overruled. According to his biographer, the “hands on” CNO

was reluctant to see operational command of the U.S. Navy removed from the control of the Chief of Naval Operations. Only naval officers, he believed, were familiar enough with the unique requirements of operations at sea to direct them with the dispatch that was needed in far-flung crisis situations. He was deeply worried about the prospect of a unified military service, in which command of naval forces might fall to an Army or Air Force officer who knew nothing about seafaring.  

Burke’s point of view was in direct contrast to that of the President, who believed thus:

*First, separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led, and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.*

117. For a case study of Burke’s position in the chain of command and exercise of command and control in 1958, see Bouchard, *Command in Crisis, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis.”*


Thus Eisenhower wanted more centralization and control from the top, strengthening the corporate bonds among the JCS and increasing the command authority of the unified and specified commanders.

The cumulative effect of Eisenhower’s Reorganization Act of 1958 and other contemporary actions eventually reduced the power and flexibility of Burke and subsequent CNOs throughout the operational sphere.120 The 1958 Act repealed existing provisions of public law under which the Chief of Naval Operations commanded naval operating forces. Also in 1958, as a price to pay for the demise of FECOM, the positions of CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT were split. This distanced CINCPAC from the CNO in the Service chain just as the Reorganization Act eliminated the CNO’s role as executive agency in the combatant command chain.

Then, in 1963, the demise of NELM as a specified command cut a major water area and naval force out of the “Navy UCP Within the UCP” and limited the CNO’s relationship to CINCUSNAVEUR to the service chain.

Centralizing communications

Up until the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, actual command and control of the unified commands was exercised via the medium of service command centers responsive to the service chiefs as executive agents. During and just after World War II, the Navy command center had been in the World War I-era Main Navy Building on the Washington, DC, Mall. The Army—and later the Air Force—command centers were in Virginia at the Pentagon—a War Department building through 1947.121 After the CNO and OPNAV moved into the Pentagon in 1948 (following years of reluctance to do so), there

120. The changing position of the CNO in the chain of command from 1958 through 1973 can be traced in the four case studies in Bouchard, Command in Crisis.

121. On “Main Navy” and the physical layout of Navy decision-making, see Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 51-2; and 1-170.
were three separate global communications systems operating from that building. A modicum of coordination was exercised by the JCS, who maintained a Joint War Room.

As a result of the Defense Reorganization Act as well as revolutionary advances in command, control, and communications technology, in 1962 Secretary of Defense McNamara established a National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon, along with alternative command centers elsewhere. This was the first step in the evolution of a Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), which had the NMCC as its primary component. Henceforth, the NCA, the JCS, and the CJCS had no need to be beholden to the individual services or their chiefs in communicating with the unified and specified commanders.

Also, in 1960, Eisenhower's last Secretary of Defense (and a former Secretary of the Navy), decided to create a Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to supervise the merger of growing Navy, Air Force, and Army landlines and fixed radio nets. This was a result of the services' inability to agree among themselves on the management of a joint military communications network. DCA stood up in 1961, under the next administration.


124. The evolution of the communications infrastructure as used in crises from 1958 through 1973 is traced in Bouchard, Command in Crisis, especially 64, 95-100, 141, and 163-4.

The first Director, DCA was a Navy rear admiral. He and his immediate successors originally reported directly to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. Later, in the 1970s, the JCS were taken out of the DCA’s chain of command. Since its inception, DCA has expanded both its responsibilities as well as its capabilities.

By the 1990s, these institutions had matured into basic components of the nation’s military organizational infrastructure, and had put into service successive generations of hardware and software systems. In 1991, the DCA was renamed the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). In 1996, WWMCCS was replaced by the Global Command and Control system (GCCS) as the joint command and control system of record.

The 1950s and 1960s: the UCP keeps on changing

While there were no major legislative changes to defense organization affecting the UCP between 1958 and 1986, the UCP and other defense institutions continued to evolve.

As figures 13 and 14 show, the 1950s and 1960s saw the following:

- The disappearance of the Northeast Command
- The creation of a new Strike Command (USSTRICOM) with responsibilities in the Middle East and Africa
- A transformation in Latin America: From a CARIBCOM focused on the Panama Canal approaches, to a U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) overseeing military assistance programs in Central and South America.

126. For the early days of DCA, see CAPT D. A. Paolucci USN (Ret), Norman Polmar, and John Patrick, A Guide to U.S. Navy Command, Control and Communications (Santa Fe Corporation, 1 July 1979), 58-59.

127. For DISA’s mandate, see DOD Directive 5105.19.

Figure 13. The UCP in 1958, with Navy components

Note: Based on a map enclosed with JCS SM-643-58, 8 September 1958.

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Figure 14. The UCP in 1963, with Navy components

Note: Based on a map enclosed with JCS SM-1400-63, 20 November 1963.
The 1970s and early 1980s

Figures 15 and 16 show the further development of the UCP:

- ALCOM disappeared.
- The unified CONAD was changed to the specified Air Defense Command (ADCOM).
- USSTRICOM was reduced to the Readiness Command (REDCOM).
- The Military Airlift Command (MAC) was designated a specified command.
- PACOM continued to expand.
- LANTCOM took over the Southeast Pacific.
- A new U.S. Central Command was carved out for the Middle East.
- Most of Africa came under the aegis of USEUCOM.129

Public debate

The essential debates over the UCP since the OCP in 1946 had normally been conducted in secret and behind closed doors, among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the civilian leadership of the Pentagon. These debates were usually unknown outside military circles, even among otherwise knowledgeable senior civilian officials.130 Nevertheless, every decade or so saw a public commission recommend drastic changes to the UCP. These recommendations received brief attention within the community of defense specialists, were rejected

129. These developments will be treated in more detail in later chapters dealing with individual commands.

130. See, for example, the claim by senior civilian Pentagon official Timothy W. Stanley that "In post-war discussions, unified command in the field, which was accepted in principle, engendered relatively little dispute as to detail," in American Defense and National Security (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1956), 71.
out of hand by the Pentagon and the Administration, and faded rapidly into oblivion.

The most important of these commissions were:

- The 1960 Symington Commission, which advocated a consolidation into *four unified commands*: strategic, tactical, continental defense, and civil defense (the Strategic Command would be headed by a Navy admiral).

- The 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, which called for concentration of all operating forces into *three unified commands*: Strategic, Tactical, and Logistics.

- A 1977-80 Defense Organization Study, which argued that the unified commands were too weak and their service component commands too strong.

**Open floodgates: UCP changes in the late-Cold War and post-Cold War eras**

**New commands of the 1980s and 1990s**

The UCP revision of 1984 saw the creation of the first “functional” command since SAC had been set up in 1946:

- The U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM).

USSPACECOM was followed swiftly by additional functional commands:

- The Special Operations Command (USSOCCOM) in 1985
- The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in 1987

As detailed later, the Navy opposed the creation of each command.
Figure 15. The UCP in 1975, with naval components

Water Areas Under Navy CINCs

Key:
- (19XX) Year Command stood up
- □ Unified and Specified Commanders
- □ Navy-led commands

Note: Based on a map enclosed with JCSSM-356-75, 27 June 1975.

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Figure 16. The UCP in 1983, with naval components

Note: Based on a map enclosed with the JCS Unified Command Plan of 1983.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act

In the early 1980s, a groundswell of pressure emerged to change the joint system wholesale, and especially to strengthen the position of the combatant commanders with respect to their service components. Recently retired Air Force and Army leaders publicly called for reform. Previous public studies were dusted off and recycled.131 Intense Congressional interest was generated in the issue, and extensive Congressional hearings were held.

The Navy resisted making changes. The Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, weighed in heavily in opposition to any new legislation. ADM Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations, reported he was deeply offended by what he saw as slanderous criticisms of the JCS. “While I am a naval officer first,” Hayward said, “I am also well aware of my obligations and responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I find scant difficulty in fulfilling my service obligations and those of the JCS objectively and simultaneously.”132

The Navy continued to be particularly concerned that CINCs (and CINC staff officers), who were Army or Air Force officers, would ignore or mis-use the sea areas and naval forces placed under them unless their naval component commanders could appeal to the CNO to exert his influence.

The Administration was as opposed to legislation as the Navy. It formed a new commission—the Packard Commission—to come up with in-house reforms of its own, and began to implement them through Executive Order. These reforms included measures to increase the authority of the unified and specified commanders and to improve their communications with the NCA.

Despite Administration and Navy opposition, however, the Act became law in 1986. (Opponents of “reform,” chiefly the Department of the Navy and its secretary, John Lehman, through sympathetic

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members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, offered 87
amendments intended to water down the thrust of the bill, but these
had little success). 133

The Act greatly enhanced the authority of the CJCS at the expense of
the corporate JCS, established the position of Vice Chairman,
bestowed wide new powers on the commanders of the unified and
specified commands, and provided for actions and procedures to
increase the prestige and rewards of joint duty for officers.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, as perhaps its central feature, clearly and deliber-
ately took the JCS (and therefore the CNO) out of the operational chain of com-
mand. In place of the 1958 Reorganization Act’s “Full operational command,”
the Goldwater-Nichols Act vested in the unified and specified com-
batant commanders a new, unique, and separate command authority: “Com-
batant Command” (COCOM). 134 Figure 17 captures the essence of
Goldwater-Nichols in this regard.

**Mandating UCP reviews**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also mandated biennial UCP reviews and
gave the CJCS the authority to act as an instrument of change.
Accordingly, following passage of the Act, the UCP has been reviewed
the first post-Goldwater-Nichols review, the Chairman was specifically
charged by the Act to review 10 particular combatant command organ-
izational issues. All 10 issues were addressed in detail in the 1987
review by the Chairman in consultation with the other members of
the JCS. In part as a result of the Chairman’s review, USSOCOM and
USTRANSCOM were stood up in 1987.135


134. For detailed analyses of COCOM see Bryant, *What is Combatant Com-
mand?*, and Karen D. Smith, *Combatant Command Authority and Naval
Forces*, CNA MFR 98-1647, (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses,
29 December 1998).

135. For a discussion of the Goldwater-Nichols mandate and the state of
play as of 1989, see *Defense Reorganization: Progress and Concerns at JCS
and Combatant Commands*, GAO/NSIAD-89-83 (Washington DC: U.S.
In legislation subsequent to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Congress—especially Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME)—directed the standing up of a Special Operations combatant command. This was the first instance of the Congress specifically mandating creation of a particular combatant command. It was also the first instance of a combatant command being granted programming, budgeting, and budget execution authority.

Issues specified in the Goldwater-Nichols Act but not immediately resolved in 1987 continued to be addressed in subsequent reviews. These reviews resulted in the standing up of USSTRATCOM in 1992 and the adjustment of the boundaries of USPACOM, USCENTCOM, and USOUTHCOM.

**General Powell’s “Base Force” vision**

General Colin L. Powell USA became the twelfth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1989, and served through September 1993. The first true post-Goldwater-Nichols Chairman and a former National Security Advisor, General Powell came to the chairmanship
with his own well-thought-out vision for the future of the U.S. armed forces—the "Base Force."\footnote{136}

The "Base Force" was a vision of both future U.S. military \textit{force levels} and future U.S. military \textit{force packages}. Regarding the latter, General Powell—in his final and most mature conception—subdivided the "Base Force" as shown in figure 18.

Publicly, GEN Powell was explicit in stating that:

\begin{quote}
This is a force sizing tool and not a blueprint for a new command structure.\footnote{137} 
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, his constant reiteration of these "force packages and supporting capabilities" publicly and privately—reflected in large part in at least one Joint Staff effort to revamp the UCP—belied this public assertion.\footnote{138} In General Powell's vision, a command structure with an Atlantic Command, a Pacific Command, a Strategic Command and a Contingency Command made a great deal of sense. To implement it, of course, would mean—among other things—the collapsing of USLANTCOM, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM into one unified Atlantic combatant command similar to that already organized in the Pacific.

While, as we will see, GEN Powell was able to help create a new Strategic Command and to empower the struggling Transportation Command, he was never able to stand up an Atlantic Command or


\footnote{137. GEN Colin L. Powell USA, \textit{National Military Strategy of the United States} (Washington DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992), 19.}

\footnote{138. In 1990, the Joint Staff J-5 unsuccessfully proposed a six-command UCP including Strategic, Contingency, Transportation, Americas, Atlantic and Pacific Commands. See Cole et al., \textit{The History of the Unified Command Plan}, 107-8.}
Contingency Command that reflected his vision. His constant public repetition of his "force packages," however, contributed to the opening of UCP debate to a wider public, fostered by Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Figure 18. The Base Force framework: 1992

![Diagram of the Base Force framework]


**Public debate and analysis**

By the 1980s, the pace of public debate on the UCP had picked up. Debates on the UCP became a routine part of public policy discourse, and figured prominently in discussions about overhauling the
national security establishment. Table 6 shows five major public sets of recommendations to change the UCP during the late Cold War and early post-Cold War period. There were lots more.\textsuperscript{139} A sixth set could well emerge from the 21st Century National Security Study Group (NSSG).\textsuperscript{140}

In support of these efforts, various formal studies were commissioned, to provide potential analytical bases for what was often otherwise a largely political process.\textsuperscript{141}

**Recent changes: breaking with the past**

By 1989, UCPs had been running to 28 pages. Joint Staff officers characterized them as “Christmas trees,” festooned with qualifiers hung on them by the Navy and other services to protect their prerogatives. In 1992, then-CJCS General Colin L. Powell USA, in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), cut the UCP in half to 14 pages.\textsuperscript{142} (It had only crept up to 18 pages by 1998.)

\textsuperscript{139} The recommendations of the latest of these—the National Defense Panel (NDP) Report of 1997—are used as a starting point in the companion paper to this one. See Maureen A. Wigge et al., *The Unified Command Plan: Charting a Course for the Navy*, CRM 98-165.

\textsuperscript{140} This panel, also called the Boren-Rudman (later Hart-Rudman) Commission after the two former senators who chair it, had been initiated by then-Representative and House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) in 1997. It is due to report out in stages between 1999 and 2001. Details are at the NSSG website, www.nssg.gov.


\textsuperscript{142} Cole et al., *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 116.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Recommendations &amp; issues for consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1986 | Goldwater-Nichols Act<sup>a</sup> | - Unified strategic command  
- Unified special operations command  
- Unified transportation command  
- Unified Northeast Asia command  
- Expanded Central Command land, water areas  
- Expanded Southern Command water area  
- Alaska inclusion in PACOM  
- Expanded REDCOM mission and area  
- Revised CENTCOM-REDCOM relationship  
- USFORCARIB eliminated |
| 1988 | Vander Schaaf Report<sup>b</sup> | - No U.S. Forces Caribbean  
- No CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters  
- dual-hat USCINCPAC and CINCPACFLT  
- No Western Army Command  
- No U.S. Naval Forces Japan  
- Unified transportation command  
- No Forces Command  
- Command boundary changes |
| 1993 | C/CS (Powell) Report<sup>c</sup> | - Unified command for U.S.-based forces  
- SPACECOM & STRATCOM possibly consolidated |
| 1995 | Commission on Roles & Missions (CORM) Report<sup>d</sup> | - Unified joint training & integration command  
(to include PACOM West Coast Forces)  
- CINC geographic responsibilities review,  
(to include unified Northeast Asia Command) |
| 1997 | National Defense Panel (NDP) Report<sup>e</sup> | - Unified joint forces command  
- USACOM eliminated  
- Unified logistics command  
(out of TRANSCOM & DLA)  
- Enhanced USSPACECOM  
- Americas command;  
- (SOUTHCOM subordinated)  
- EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM realigned |

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The 1993 UCP revision created a new hybrid command—one that was both functional and geographic—out of what had been the strictly geographic theater command of USLANTCOM. The new command—USACOM—with pretensions to become a global joint force integrator, sparked a new era of debate that continued through 1999, with USPACOM and other CINCs continuing to oppose divestiture of their own joint force integrator responsibilities.

In 1995, the internal Defense Department debate over UCP revision took place in the shadow of the more public deliberations of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, set up by Congress. The UCP change of 1995 yielded a significant overhaul of parts of the UCP, truncating the “Navy UCP Within the UCP” still further by transferring significant water areas in the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the waters around Latin America gtp, USPACOM and USACOM to USCENTCOM and USSOUTHCOM.143

The UCP in 1999

The changes promulgated in early 1998, by comparison, prompted by the 1997 review, were far smaller, and their naval implications smaller still:144 All the republics of the former Soviet Union save Russia were

143. For a summary of the 1995 changes, see Navy Times (February 19, 1996), 12. UCP issues of the day were presented in Marvin Pokrant, Considerations Germane to Possible Revisions of the Unified Command Plan; and CAPT Donald P. Loren, “The UCP: Time to Change,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (August 1995), 11-14. For a radical set of recommendations to change the UCP in 1997, see COL Pasquarett and LTC Kievit, A Blueprint for a Bold Restructuring of the Organization for National Security.

doled out to USEUCOM and USCENTCOM; and the responsibilities of these and several other commands were tidied up and clarified.\(^{145}\)

Figure 19 shows the UCP as approved by President Clinton in 1998.

**Marine Corps components**

Note that figure 19 shows five new commands: Marine Corps components under the five geographic CINCs. This reflects an important change of the 1990s: *Navy component commanders were no longer the sole spokesmen before the combatant commanders for the Fleet Marine Forces.*\(^{146}\)

**What was: Marines subsumed under Navy componency**

In the early days of U.S. joint commands (i.e., during World War II and the first post-war decades), all significant naval operating forces had been directed by U.S. Navy fleet commanders. These fleet commanders were initially either dual-hatted as their own unified commanders (in the Pacific and Atlantic), or were designated as specified commanders (in the Mediterranean). Each fleet commander had a Commander, Fleet Marine Force (FMF) assigned under him as a type commander in the Navy service chain. Using the Navy service chain of command, the FMF commander had direct access to the fleet commander. Since the fleet commander was also the joint operational combatant commander, the FMF commander had direct access to him as well.

As the UCP changed and dual-hatting of admirals was eliminated, however, so did the relationships between the FMF commanders and their ultimate joint combatant commander. Thus when CINCUS-NAVEUR lost his status as CINCNELM, a specified commander, in

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145. For details on the UCP as of 1999, we refer the reader back to the third section of this paper, "How Things Are: the Navy and the UCP Today."

146. For background on the origins of Marine Corps componency, see LtGen Jefferson Davis Howell USMC and LtCol Kerry K. Gershaneck, USMC (Ret), "Componency: the Path to Operational Success," *Marine Corps Gazette* (February 1997), 64-70. Much of the following derives from their analysis.
Figure 19. The UCP of 1998, with Navy and Marine Corps components

1963, Commander, Fleet Marine Forces Europe now had to go through a layer—CINCUSNAVEUR himself—for access to his ultimate operational commander—now USCINCEUR. Likewise, when CINCPAC separated from CINCPACFLT in 1958 and USCINCLANT from CINCLANTFLT three decades later, the Pacific and Atlantic FMF commanders lost their direct access to their unified commanders. Marine Corps inputs to the unified commanders henceforth were filtered through predominantly Navy staffs prior to submission.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Marine Corps had steadily been asserting its coequal status as an independent naval service, throughout the post-war period. Given the many other changes that had occurred in the relationship of the Marine Corps to the Department of the Navy, and the other armed services, it was only natural—and inevitable—that the Marines would seek to provide their own service component commanders to each geographic unified CINC, rather than continue to be represented at the component level by Navy admirals.

What changed: Marines as components

The 1990–1991 Gulf War was the proximate cause of change. In 1990, General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, designated LtGen Walter E. Boomer, the Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), as Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Central Command (MARFORCENT). In part as a result of this experience, the Commandant of the Marine Corps concluded that each combatant commander should be assigned a Marine component and be allocated Marine forces for the execution of his missions. The Marines also felt after the Gulf War that they had been inadequately represented before the CINC, and that assigning both Service component and operational warfighting responsibilities to the same Marine general officer and his staff had resulted in neither job being done optimally.

Consequently, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific and U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic were established by USCINCPAC and USCINCLANT in July 1992. Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific was also designated as Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command (designate) and Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Korea (designate). Similarly,
Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic was also designated as the Marine component commander for USCINCEUR and USCINCSO.\textsuperscript{147}

These new Marine components also retained their Fleet Marine Force type command designations under the Navy component commanders as well.

**History and Marine componecy**

It is important to note that, in setting up these new Marine component commands, the Marine Corps was largely uninformed—and certainly unencumbered—by much of the historical baggage related in this paper.\textsuperscript{148} This is not true of the Navy.

UCP issues of strong Navy interest—such as control of nuclear weapons, naval aviation, Navy space and special warfare assets, Navy airlift, the waters around South America, etc.—had been of only peripheral Marine Corps concern.

**Analysis: what the Navy wanted and why**

**Organizing internally**

The Navy believed it had broken the code on designing an optimal internal organization for operations. Navy internal organization of its operating forces continued to be based on the two interrelated concepts that have been developed since early in the century: type commands and task organizations. As we saw above, these concepts—and their interrelationships—were solidified during World War II. They continued to be the basis for how the Navy organized its operating forces during the Cold War and, indeed, in 1999.

\textsuperscript{147} On Marine Corps componecy generally, see *Componecy* (MCWP 0-1.1, (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 5 June 1998).

\textsuperscript{148} As an illustration, note that previous CNA studies on Marine Corps componecy required no companion historical analysis analogous to this one.
Figures 20 and 21 show the concepts as officially promulgated in 1985, just prior to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In terms of the Navy's internal organization, they are little different a dozen years later.

The remarkable stability of this internal Navy organizational construct for its operating forces is due to its utility. By 1943, the Navy had designed a system for organizing optimally for multiple forward fleet operations. There has been no need to change since.

Organizing externally: classic Cold War Navy views

The Navy's attitude

As in so many areas, nobody has summed up the Navy's attitudes toward joint command in the field better than RADM J.C. Wylie, arguably the Navy's pre-eminent Cold War strategist and author of one of the few books on military strategy by a naval officer. The following extracts from Admiral Wylie's Military Strategy convey classic Navy attitudes nicely—especially Navy interpretations of the views and motivations of the other services:149

Where the sailor and the airman are almost forced, by the nature of the sea and the air, to think in terms of a total world . . . the soldier is almost literally hemmed in by his terrain.

From this fact of terrain as a limited element has come the concept of "theater" in the soldier's strategy, a terrain division somehow arbitrary to the sailor or the airman but sound and logical if we move into the soldier's headquarters.

But recognize at the same time that, while to the soldier [terrain] is fundamental, to the sailor or to the airman it need be only the goal at which one must arrive. It need not also be the same terrain in which one starts.

[The Army’s theory of strategy] may explain the soldier’s tacit (and sometimes not too tacit) opinion that air and naval forces exist primarily to transport the soldier to the scene of action and support him after he gets there. . . . The soldier is impatient with the navy when the navy finds tasks that might interfere with taking the soldier where he wants to go, where the enemy army is, and keeping his supplies coming steadily.

The sailor can sail away and sink the enemy ships and control the seas and even extend his influence ashore, all with his own ships and his built-in air strength and his own specialized troops in the naval service.

But the soldier cannot function alone. His flanks are bare, his rear is vulnerable, and he looks aloft with a cautious eye. He needs the airman and the sailor for his own security in doing his own job.

This may give some further insight into the soldier’s concept of strategy as this affects his ideas of organization for war. In order to do his own job best, the soldier feels he should control the forces that must function in his support.

It has been the sailor, with some help from the airman, who has questioned the soldier’s concept of organization. It was this basic difference of concept that gave rise to the heated defense organizational arguments of the late forties and the fifties in the United States.

And, Admiral Wylie concluded:

The sailor, much less dependent than the soldier on outside help, felt he could do his soldier’s job in a maritime situation more effectively and efficiently without the organizational intrusion of other services into his, the sailor’s, business. And in doing that, the sailor argued, quite correctly, that he has never failed to meet the soldier’s need.

Geography and functions

The Navy, as we have seen, was always wary of placing naval forces under the command of Army and Air Force generals. The Navy believed that the optimum use of those forces was only possible if their commanders were themselves naval officers, trained and experienced in the exercise of sea power. They saw the assignment of
Figure 20. Navy operating forces administrative chain of command, 1985

**President of the United States**

- Secretary of Defense
- Secretary of The Navy
- Chief of Naval Operations
- Fleet Commander-in-Chief
  - Type Commander
  - Group Commander
  - Ship Squadron / Air Wing Commander
- Individual Unit Commanding Officer

**Forces Reporting Directly to CNO**

- CINCPACFLT
- CINCLANTFLT
- CINCUSNAVEUR *

- SURFACE, AIR, SUBMARINE, TRAINING
- CARRIER
- CRUISER-DESTROYER
- AMPHIBIOUS
- SUBMARINE **
- SERVICE

**Notes**

* CINCUSNAVEUR does not have administrative control of forward deployed CINCLANTFLT units, but does report to the CNO on administrative matters.

** Submarine group commanders do not have administrative control of submarine squadrons. The administrative chain of command for submarines passes directly from the type to the squadron commander. When submarines are administratively assigned to groups, the group commander exercises his administrative responsibilities as a squadron commander while retaining his operational responsibility as a group commander.

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Source: *Organization of the U.S. Navy (NWP 2 (Rev. C)), March 1985, 4-3. This was the last edition of this official publication.*

Naval ships and aircraft to CINCs from other services as a recipe for misuse.

Much of the history of the UCP involves debates over how commands should be organized. Such disputes often pitted the Navy, which normally wanted commands organized by geographic areas of responsibility, against the Army and Air Force, which normally advocated forming commands according to assignment of mission and forces (i.e., functional groupings of forces). The Army push for assigning command by forces or functions was a position related to its advocacy of a DOD under strong centralized direction. Behind the Navy's insistence upon command by geographical area lay its desire for a loosely
Figure 21. Navy operating forces operational chain of command, 1985

Source: Organization of the U.S. Navy (NWP 2 (Rev. C)), March 1985, 4-4.

coordinated DOD organization that would preserve service autonomy.\footnote{150}{Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 1, 12.} The Navy saw command by forces or functions as restricting service prerogatives, while command by areas as preserving them.

The Navy argued that command relationships had to reflect the reality that Navy warships were not tied to functions but constantly steamed from one area of responsibility to another.\footnote{151}{Ibid.} The Navy also clearly preferred geographic areas comprised of mostly land or

150. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 1, 12.

151. Ibid.
mostly water to those with healthy doses of each. The Navy maintained that Cold War and other missions necessitated the creation and maintenance of discrete oceanic or maritime theater commands.

**"In support of"**

The Navy had a clear preference for naval commanders “operating in support of” other commands rather than being subordinated to them. Navy maritime theater commanders maintained they would “operate in support of” “Air-Land” theater commanders whenever such support was needed. The Navy could cite the numerous instances of such inter-theater support throughout its history, while its opponents could cite the highly publicized instances when such support was less than optimal (e.g., at the Battle of Leyte Gulf). This Navy view, of course, has its roots in the pre-World War II Navy advocacy of coordinated but separate Service operations.

An October 1946 internal War Department staff paper nicely captured the Army view of the initial Navy position regarding naval component in unified commands:

> The Navy is unwilling in fact to place what is called “a fleet” under other than a naval commander. This stand means there cannot be true unified command of the three services unless the joint commander is a naval officer. The Navy are [sic] willing to assign certain naval forces to other than a naval commander, but fleet units operate in support, that is by cooperation.152

**Organizing externally: notional Navy-preferred UCPs**

**The Navy’s “Dream Teams”**

Figures 22 and 23 depict notional Navy Cold War “preferred UCPs.” They are derived from our understanding of classic Navy Cold War positions, and are meant to be illustrative only. They do not represent—to our knowledge—any particular specific Navy UCP proposals.

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They reflect a basic Navy policy of establishing, maintaining, preserving and expanding the “Navy UCP within the UCP concept.” The concept comprised the forces—especially naval forces—and areas of operations—especially water areas—of the three “Navy CINCs”—CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and CINCNELM—each under the continued executive agency of the CNO, and each with operational control over not only ships (including strategic missile submarines) and aircraft (including transports), but also over its own naval intelligence, naval logistics, sea-based air defense, space, and naval special warfare assets.

That said, Navy UCP goals did shift over time, however. Army insistence on depriving the Navy of command of the Mediterranean drove the Navy to echo Army approaches and demand Navy command of littoral land areas—while resisting any further Army encroachments on the “world ocean.”

**The initial Navy “dream team”**

The initial Navy UCP vision was driven by the old 1941 vision of a “Two-Ocean Navy” plus something else,” reflected in a Navy-controlled “UCP within a UCP.” The Navy sought—and had achieved by 1947—creation of a Navy command in the Pacific, a Navy command in the Atlantic, and a Navy command in the Royal Navy AORs of the eastern Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. The Navy then sought to maintain these commands, while expanding the Pacific Command to take over water areas in east Asia. That expansion succeeded, but the maintenance of an independent Navy-controlled NELM command failed. Consequently, the Navy successfully sought to cede NELM’s eastern Atlantic responsibilities to LANTCOM and to divide NELM’s Indian Ocean responsibilities between PACOM and LANTCOM.

The Mediterranean—and the Baltic—had to be ceded, however, to the Army-dominated USEUCOM.

In these early years—the 1940s and 1950s—the Navy had been content to allow the Army supremacy on the ground if the navy could be assured of supremacy on the water. Consequently the Navy had viewed Army command of joint forces in Germany, Japan, Korea, and the Panama Canal Zone as proper, with the understanding that Navy
responsibility for the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean would be recognized.

Figure 22 seeks to depict this idea graphically.

The later Navy "dream team"

By the 1960s, the Navy recognized the unreality of this approach. USEUCOM had achieved a hammer-lock not only on the land area of Europe, but also on the Mediterranean, Black, and Baltic Seas. And a succession of Army-dominated commands held sway over the Middle East, including the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, however, USNEC, FECOM, and ALCOM had all died, with many of their responsibilities accruing to PACOM and LANTCOM.

The Navy line now shifted to one that contrasted the "Central Front" areas—mainly Europe, but also conceptually the Mediterranean and the Middle East—with "Third World" areas—mainly the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas and littorals, but also Africa and Latin America. Under this conceptualization, the former areas—the "Central Front"—were conceded to have become the domain of "heavy," "garrison," "World War III" Army and Air Force forces; the latter areas—the "Third World"—were, however, the proper domain of "mobile," "flexible," and "crisis-response-oriented" Navy and Marine Corps forces.

Figure 23 shows this revision of the Navy's ideal UCP concept—an illustration of a Navy-preferred ideal UCP that drove Navy planners from the late 1950s through the early 1990s. Only USCINCEUR (and not a second Army commander) was granted supremacy in land-water theaters of Europe and the Middle East. USLANTCOM and USPACOM, however, would reign supreme in both the land and water areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. As we will see, the Navy was successful in adding significant land areas to USPACOM's AOR, but unsuccessful regarding USLANTCOM. Faced with this situation, the Navy fall-back position was to ensure that LANTCOM (1) remained a maritime theater commander, and (2) pushed its boundaries to the shorelines of Europe, Africa, and Latin America.
Figures 22 and 23 also show how the Navy adapted its goals in the face of changes in the structure of the chain of operational command. In the early years, the Navy sought—and fought—to retain the concept of "executive agency," whereby the CNO would continue be designated the executive agent for PACOM, LANTCOM, and NELM. He would therefore remain, in fact as well as in title, the "chief of naval operations." Following the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, however, and the demise of executive agency, the Navy shifted to a policy goal of retaining a JCS (but not CJCS) role regarding the unified and specified commanders, with the CNO using both his JCS membership and service administrative responsibilities to continue to influence USCINCPAC and USCINCLANT and to constrain the other CINCs.

Throughout both periods, the Navy’s goals also included having the geographic CINCs retain functions such as special operations, space support, and air defense, and the service secretaries and chiefs retain the responsibility for airlift and sealift. The Navy had no desire to see specified commands such as SAC and ADCOM expanded to include Navy components. Neither did the Navy wish to see the emergence of joint transportation, space, or special operations commands.

Note also that little in the world of organizational design conforms exactly to pure models. There are always anomalies, due to personal preferences, bureaucratic considerations, tactical, and even common sense. Thus—as we will see—the Navy (in the late 1950s) briefly pushed for a unified space command, and the Navy placed some of its forces—including jet fighters—under CONAD (also in the 1950s).

The result

By 1999, most of the Navy’s cherished historic positions on UCP organization had been defeated.

The UCP in 1999 designated five geographical CINCs, each of whom—save CINCUSACOM—had a theater made up of both land and water areas. Five functional CINCs were designated as well (including one—CINCUSACOM—who was simultaneously a geographic CINC). These functional CINCs were re-assigned strategic submarine, space, special operations, and lift assets from CINCUSACOM and USGINC PAC. Joint force integration functions were assigned to USACOM.
Figure 22. Notional Cold War Navy "preferred UCP": 1940s and 1950s

Water and Island Areas Under Navy CINCs

National Command Authorities

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appropriate Service Chief Designated to Act as JCS Executive Agent

Chief of Staff of the Army

CNO

Chief of Staff of the Air Force

European Command

Other Army-Led Geographic Commands

North Atlantic Command

Pacific Command

Atlantic Command

Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic & Mediterranean

Strategic Air Command

Other Air Force-Led Geographic Commands

Naval Sealsift Command

Naval Airlift Command

Naval Space Activities

Key

Joint Commands

Navy-led Commands

Support

All Fleets and Forces include:
- Air defense forces
- Naval Special Warfare forces
- Air & sea logistics forces
Figure 23. Notional Cold War Navy "preferred UCP": 1960s through 1990s

Key
- Joint Command
- Navy-led Commands
- Strong connections

Water, Land and Island Areas Under Navy CINCs

National Command Authorities
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
  - CNO
- Naval Sea Lift Command
- Naval Space Command
- USCINCPAC
  - CINCPACFLT
  - COMSUBPAC
  - C7F
- CINCAD (specified)
- CINCSAC (specified)
- Army-led JTF
- USCINCLANT
  - CINCLANTFLT
  - COMSUBLAN
- USCINCEUR
  - LATAM Subunified Command
  - CINCUSNAVEUR
  - C6F
  - CMEF

All Fleets and Forces include:
- Air defense forces
- Naval Special Warfare forces
- Air and sea logistics forces
The only Navy position that has prospered over time has been the maintenance and expansion of the U.S. Pacific Command.

Navy views in the 1990s: division and change

Since the end of the Cold War, Navy views on UCP changes have been more divided and less passionate. Defenders of Navy-unique knowledge of sea power, the unity of the world oceans, and Navy autonomy have argued for continued articulation of classic Navy positions. Other officers, especially those with significant joint staff experience, have argued that it has inevitably become time for a change—although there is not always agreement on what that change entails.

Recycling the old

The debate was epitomized—and joined—on the pages of the Naval Institute Proceedings in 1991. The redoubtable—and influential—RADM J. C. Wylie USN (now retired), the Navy's most articulate strategic thinker during the Cold War, published his splenetic "Heads Up, Navy," a counter to what he saw as an attack on Navy UCP positions and the Navy itself by then-CJCS GEN Colin Powell.153

RADM's Wylie's concerns included "sweetness and light and happy jointness," an Air Force "yearning to have operating command of something," "a dying European command," "long-standing Atlantic Fleet maritime operating tasks," "protection of trade," "a command arrangement where the Army can muscle in on command of the Atlantic Feet" and "power grabs pure and simple."

Inventing the new

Responding to RADM Wylie were two serving officers and contemporary Navy strategic planning specialists—LCDR Sam J. Tangredi and CDR Donald P. Loren.154

LCDR Tangredi counseled the Navy: “instead of fighting jointness, we should not just embrace it, but capture it, take it over, and run with it.” He called for “the dominance of the admirals within the joint arena.”

CDR Loren maintained that RADM Wylie had “unintentionally resurrected interservice paranoia and archaic thinking,” and that “we no longer have the luxury of dividing the world into many spheres of military concern.”

These divided views have characterized the internal Navy debate ever since. They are most evident in the divisions within the Navy during the creation of the two new combatant commands of the 1990s—USSTRATCOM and USACOM. In both cases, the Navy was divided. While some within the Navy saw the creation of these two commands as just two more defeats for their service, others—as we will show—saw them as the beginning of new opportunities.
V. The individual combatant commands and their Navy components: how they came to be

Previous sections contained our brief overview of the development of the UCP as a whole. We now turn to the development of the individual commands—the heart of this paper.

Previous maps and charts in this paper showed how the UCP as a whole evolved. Figure 24 summarizes how each individual combatant command and naval component evolved. In effect, it reduces the entire narrative of this paper to one graphic.

In the following chapters, we trace the origins of each of the nine current combatant commands and their Navy components. We provide nine individual series of charts illustrating these stories; these charts are derived from figure 24 and the earlier maps and charts.

Overview

The following chapters detail the individual histories of each of the nine combatant commands and their Navy components existing in 1999. They are presented in the order in which they were created. The histories of the other unified and specified commands that have come and gone over time are also covered, but in the context of one or more of the commands in existence in 1999.

Note that, unlike some of the material presented previously, this is virgin territory. To the best of our knowledge, no other publication has assembled, organized, and analyzed this material in this manner.

We have cited our numerous sources appropriately throughout, both to provide traceability of our data and to aid further research by readers. Once again, however, we note that we did not burden the footnotes with endless repeated citations of The History of the Unified
Figure 24. Evolution of combatant commands and Navy components

Geographical Commands

Far East Command
NAVFE

Alaskan Command
ALSEAFRON

US Pacific Command
PACFLT

Northeast Command
...

US Atlantic Command
LANTFLT

European Command
...

US European Command
NELM/NAVEUR

US Air Forces Europe
...

Caribbean Command
CARIBSEAFRON

15th ND/USNAVCARIB

US Southern Command
...

NAVSO
LANTFLT

NELM

US Strike Command/MEAFSA
MIDEASTFOR
LANTFLT

US Central Command
...

NAVCENT

Functional Commands

Strategic Air Command
...

US Strategic Command
LANTFLT

PACFLT

Continental Air Defense Cmd
...

NAVFORCONAD

Aerospace Defense Command
...

US Space Command
...

NAVSPACECOM

Readiness Command
...

Forces Command
...

Military Airlift Command
...

US Transportation Command
...

MSC

US Special Operations Cmd
...

NAVSPECWARCOM

40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s

Note: For details on dates combatant commands were established, disestablished, and changed, see Cole et al.,
History of the Unified Command Plan, 127-129

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Command Plan, the standard reference. When the origin of an important fact or assertion in the text is missing from the notes, it was probably derived from the joint history.

The commanders in chief

This is chiefly a history of organizations, not of individuals. Those seeking biography must look elsewhere. A listing of commanders in chief of all the unified and specified commands from 1947 through 1997 can bridge the two. Such a list is provided in the official history of the Department of Defense. It will not be reprinted here.


VI. USPACOM über alles

Overview

The organizational history of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)—and of its Navy component, the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)—is long and complex. The central trend, however, has generally been one of enormous growth and increased power and responsibility at the expense of other commands. The Navy has sought to maintain a coherent oceanic theater, under Navy command.

USPACOM started as a geographic backwater. However, over time USPACOM has swallowed up a Far East Command (FECOM) and an Alaskan Command (ALCOM) and taken over territories previously unassigned Indian Ocean waterspace. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, USPACOM expansion has halted and, indeed, reversed.157

The Navy has acted in Washington as the advocate for USCINCPAC and its naval component, CINCPACFLT, successfully arguing for abolition (and against re-creation) of other combatant commands in the Asia Pacific region (e.g., FECOM and ALCOM).

Up until 1958 USPACOM and its Navy component were the same entity. As of 1999, USCINCPAC remains the only geographic combatant command position filled only by officers of a single service: the Navy. This reflects both the premier role that preservation of the position has played in Navy thinking, and the premier role assigned to naval forces in carrying out the command’s missions.

USPACOM’s evolution is depicted in figures 25 through 28. Figures 29 and 30 provide significant milestones and timelines.

Figure 25. Out of the action: U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1947–1951

Figure 26. Spectacular growth: U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1951–1972

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Figure 27. *Continued expansion:* U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1972–1989

Figure 29. U.S. commands in the Pacific: organizational milestones

**Pacific Command**
- POA & SWPA created
- Allied SEAC created
- SEAC disestablished
- PACOM, FECOM & ALCOM created
- NAVWESPAC quits China, chops to PACOM
- Korean War, 7th FLT chops to FECOM
- PACOM gains Philippines, Taiwan, Marianas, Bonins from FECOM
- Formosa (later Taiwan) Defense Command created
- 7th FLT chops back to PACOM
- PACOM gains Japan & Korea from FECOM
- PACOM gains NORPAC from ALCOM
- PACOM splits from PACFLT
- MACV created
- ALCOM loses Navy component
- PACOM gains S. Asia & C. IO from USSTRICOM & LANTCOM, Aleutians
- PACOM gains W. IO from LANTCOM
- Taiwan Defense Command abolished
- PACOM (redesignated USPACOM) gains China, NKorea, Mongolia, Madagascar
- ALCOM re-created under USPACOM
- USPACOM loses Gulf of Aden & Oman to USCENTCOM
- JTF-5 (later JIATF West) created
- USPACOM loses SSBNs to USSTRATCOM
- USPACOM loses W. Arabian Sea to USCENTCOM

**Pacific Fleet**
- Pacific Fleet created
- Asiatic Fleet disappears
- 3rd, 5th, 7th Fleets created
- 5th Fleet relocates to West Coast
- NAVJAP (later NAVFE) created
- NAVFE and ALSEAFRON become FECOM & ALCOM components
- 1st Task Fleet created, 3rd & 5th Fleets disestablished, 7th Fleet becomes NAVWESPAC
- CINC PACFLT gains Western, Hawaiian SEAFRONS
- NAVWESPAC becomes 7th Task Fleet (later 7th Fleet)
- 7th Fleet begins Formosa Patrol and Korean War operations
- Formosa (later Taiwan) Patrol Force created
- COM 1st FLT deploys to South China Sea
- NAVFORPAC operational
- NAVFE becomes NAVFORJ
- CINC PACFLT loses CINC PAC hat
- NAVFORV created
- 7th Fleet flagship homeported in Japan
- ASDEFORPAC (later ASWFORPAC) created
- Tonkin Gulf incidents, 7th Flt VN ops intensify
- BARFORPAC abolished
- NAVFORV created
- 7th Fleet IO deployments begin
- ALSEAFRON abolished
- NAVFORV disestablished
- 3rd Fleet created from 1st Fleet & ASWFORPAC at Pearl Harbor, 7th Fleet carrier homeported in Japan
- SURFPAC absorbs surface TYCOMs
- Sea Frontiers abolished
- Taiwan Patrol Force abolished
- Naval Districts abolished
- COM 3rd Fleet moves afloat
- MDZ PAC created
- USCG Cdr 17th CG District becomes ALCOM component (USNAVAK)
- COM 3rd Fleet moves to San Diego
- USPACOM loses Gulf of Aden & Oman to USCENTCOM
- USCENTCOM

Note: The most significant events regarding changes in the UCP and Navy compenency are shaded.
Sequence of commands

We begin our historical surveys of the individual combatant commands with USPACOM. The Pacific Command was among the first unified commands to be created under the Outline Command Plan (OCP) of 1946, the first version of the UCP. Indeed, determination of its missions and boundaries was the proximate cause for the issuance of that document.

Figure 30. Sequence of joint and Navy component commands in the Pacific

Re-dividing the Pacific

During 1945 and 1946, Pacific command organization was not only the proximate cause of the OCP, but also the main obstacle its completion lines had to be drawn among:

- A geographically organized Pacific Command (PACOM), under command of a Navy admiral

158. Cole et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1, 11-12.
- A Far East Command (FECOM) that was functionally organized for the occupation of Japan, under the command of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

- An Army Air Forces-commanded Alaskan Command (ALCOM) focused increasingly on air defense.\(^{159}\)

The Navy argued that at war's end FADM Nimitz had continued to be both CINCPACFLT and CINCPOA, and therefore the actual overall commander of the entire Pacific Theater. The Army—and General of the Army MacArthur, who was now Commander in Chief, Army Forces Pacific and Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) in Northeast Asia—disagreed.\(^{160}\) The Navy favored maintaining a single command over the entire Pacific Theater (excluding Japan, Korea and China), whose commander would have a joint staff and would exercise "unity of command" over all U.S. forces in the theater.\(^{161}\)

Whether to place the Bonin and Mariana Islands under PACOM or FECOM became a particular initial bone of contention: The Navy saw all Pacific Islands as one strategic entity, while the Army insisted that FECOM be able to draw upon military resources in the Bonins and Marianas depending on its mission.\(^{162}\)

Once agreement was finally reached, PACOM, FECOM, and ALCOM were the first commands created by the JCS under the Outline Command Plan signed by the President in December 1946. All three were established effective 1 January 1947. The executive agents for these

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159. These unified commands were the post-war extensions of the Pacific Theater area commands that had been set up during World War II and disestablished in late 1945—Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas Command and General MacArthur's South West Pacific Area Command.

160. LCDR Sestak, "The Seventh Fleet," 42.

161. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 11.

162. Ibid., 1.
commands were the CNO, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, respectively.  

PACOM, FECOM, and ALCOM

In the initial Outline Command Plan, FECOM included all U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Bonins. CINCFE was given control over local forces and facilities in the Marianas and Bonins, while civil administration and logistics there fell under CINCPAC. CINCFE was also to prepare for contingency operations in China.

ALCOM was commanded initially by a two-star (and later by a three-star) Army Air Forces (later Air Force) general. He had responsibility for Alaska, the Aleutians, and surrounding waters.

CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT was responsible for what was left of Pacific defense and—under the JCS and the CNO—for implementing U.S. policy in China and contiguous waters, exclusive of Commander, Naval Forces Far East (COMNAVFE) areas of concern. (A glance at the map will show what a strategic backwater this initial PACOM AOR was.) No unified command was specifically assigned responsibility for Southeast Asia, then largely governed and defended by the returning European imperial powers.

CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT also had a significant civil responsibility. First as naval military governor and then after July 1947 as High Commissioner (HICOM) for the United Nations Trust Territory of the

163. More detail on the struggle to create the commands in the Pacific is in Clark G. Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 524-531. ADM Towers was the first CINCPAC.

164. For the World War II roots of ALCOM, see Federal Records of World War II: Volume II: Military Agencies (Washington, DC: General Services Administration, 1951), 726, 737-8 and 745.

165. LCDR Sestak, “The Seventh Fleet,” 45. The British-led combined Southeast Asia Command set up during World War II had just been disestablished on November 30, 1946.
Pacific Islands, he governed all the far-flung Central Pacific islands of Micronesia that Japan had ceded after the war. This was a job the Navy wished to retain, rather than turn over—as it soon would (in 1951)—to the Department of the Interior.\footnote{Authority over Saipan, however, was turned over somewhat later.} Consequently, this naval government role was one that took up much CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT time and energy.\footnote{See, for example, Jurika, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam,151-158. CINCPAC’s role as military governor of the Pacific Islands is detailed in LCDR Dorothy E. Richard USN, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (3 vols). See especially Volume II, Chapter VI, “The Pacific Command,” 94-104.}

CINCPAC, a four-star admiral, also exercised direct command of the Pacific Fleet as CINCPACFLT, from his headquarters in Hawaii. Thus, he commanded what had been the Navy's premier fighting fleet even before its establishment in 1941, but what was now a far less significant force. ADM John Towers, the first CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT, personally devised a new joint staff for PACOM. Whereas ADM Nimitz, as CINCPAC/CINCPACOA, had merely absorbed Army and AAF officers into his Navy staff, Towers brought his Army and Army Air Forces component commanders onto a new joint staff.\footnote{Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers, 530.} A senior officer from an Army Air Forces airlift command performed the function of Army Air Forces component commander, although with no dedicated staff for that role.\footnote{For a thumbnail history of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), see Charles D. Bright (ed), Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Air Force (New York: Greenwood Press, 1997), 445-6.}

In the Far East Command as organized under General MacArthur at Tokyo there were component commanders for the Navy—COMNAVFE—and the Air Force. General MacArthur himself, however, retained direct command of FECOM Army units, wearing a second hat as Commanding General, Army Forces Far East (CG
AFFE).\textsuperscript{170} As had been true during World War II, his staff was essentially an Army staff, except for a Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), which had Air Force and Navy representation.\textsuperscript{171}

CINCPAC also took responsibility for U.S. military relations with Australia and New Zealand. CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT ADM Radford hosted the Australian Chief of Naval Staff for talks in Hawaii in 1948, and in 1951 concluded the secret Radford-Collins agreement—since amended several times—that divided naval responsibilities in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean among the three navies.\textsuperscript{172}

As CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC initially had two major operational commands: The First and Seventh Fleets. Meanwhile General MacArthur, as FECOM commander in Japan, directed a tiny remnant—NAVFE—of what had been ADM Nimitz’s enormous wartime Third and Fifth Fleets.

The creation of NAVFE

After World War II ended, what remained of the Pacific Fleet’s Third Fleet had at first briefly supported the occupation of Japan but had then gone back to the West Coast for eventual disestablishment. The Pacific Fleet’s Fifth Fleet supported the occupation longer but it too returned home, in March 1946, leaving some of its forces behind in Japan. The Fifth Fleet was retained on the West Coast of the United


\textsuperscript{171} Cole et al., \textit{History of the Unified Command Plan}, 21.

States for a while as an eastern and central Pacific Fleet striking ("surge") force before it too was disestablished in January 1947.\footnote{173. The Fifth Fleet, under ADM Spruance, had been a four-star command since March 1944, but reverted to three-star command in January 1946. Its counterpart as a striking fleet on the East Coast was the Eighth Fleet (to be discussed later).}

Meanwhile, a naval component for the occupation of Japan, Naval Activities Japan (NAVJAP), had been created in January 1946 in Tokyo under General MacArthur as SCAP, a combined commander. COMNAVJAP was a vice admiral. He inherited the few remaining forces in Japan and many of the duties of the departed Fifth Fleet.\footnote{174. COMNAVJAP had also been preceded by a U.S. Pacific Fleet Liaison Group with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (FLTLOS-CAP), headed by a Rear Admiral, established in August 1945, and dissolved in January 1946. \textit{Reports of General MacArthur: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase: Volume I Supplement.} Prepd by his General Staff (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 277-9.}

COMNAVJAP controlled all allied combat vessels in Japanese waters and naval bases ashore.\footnote{175. On the U.S. Navy in Japan during the early post-war period, see Chief Aviation Machinist's Mate M.D. Ingram USN, "The United States Navy in Japan, 1945-1950," U.S. Naval Institute \textit{Proceedings}, 78 (April 1952), 379-383; and Roger Dingman, "The U.S. Navy and the Cold War: The Japan Case" in Craig L. Symonds et al. (eds.), \textit{New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers Presented at the Fourth Naval History Symposium, United States Naval Academy, 25-26 October 1979} (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 291-311.} When FECOM was established in January 1947, COMNAVJAP gained another hat as COMNAVFE, General MacArthur's unified command naval component commander, with headquarters in Tokyo.\footnote{176. \textit{Reports of General MacArthur: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase: Volume I Supplement.,} 88. COMNAVFE moved to Yokosuka in 1952.} Despite an operational area co-extensive with that of CINCFE, COMNAVFE had few afloat forces. Nevertheless, reporting to COMNAVFE were Commander, Naval Forces Philippines (COMNAVPHIL) and the Commander of the Mariana
Islands (COMMARIANAS)—the latter reporting to COMNAVFE for the operational control of local naval forces and to CINCPAC for civil, military, and naval government functions that did not come under COMNAVFE.177

Upon establishment of FECOM and NAVFE in January 1947, responsibility for U.S. Navy destroyer patrols in Korean waters, which had belonged to Seventh Fleet since the Japanese surrender, now came under COMNAVFE command.

The Pacific Fleet, while having its own missions to perform and not in operational command of any of these FECOM and NAVFE forces, nevertheless had to provide and support them logistically from out of its own resources.

**PACFLT’s numbered fleets**

As noted above, as CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC initially had two major operational commands: the First Fleet (initially identified as the First Task Fleet) in the Eastern Pacific, and the Seventh Fleet (from 1947 to 1949 designated U.S. Naval Forces, Western Pacific (NavWesPac) and from 1949 to 1950 the Seventh Task Fleet) off China.

During 1946—also as noted above—CINCPAC had also constituted a West Coast-based striking fleet—the Fifth Fleet—upon that fleet’s redeployment from Japan. The Fifth Fleet—like its sister, CINCLANTFLT’s new Eighth Fleet on the East Coast—would be disestablished as of January 1947, at the same time the new Outline Command Plan took effect. These “surge fleets” were disestablished in favor of the build-up of something quite new—forward-deployed striking fleets—what would become the Seventh and Sixth Fleets.

This marked the birth and rapid demise of the Navy’s only major postwar flirtation with the “Home Fleet” or “surge” operational concept that had guided it before World War I and between the wars.

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The Seventh Fleet (NavWesPac)

Meanwhile, at the end of the war, the same Seventh Fleet that had served as “MacArthur’s Navy” had taken up a new round of duties in and around China, which was plunging into the throes of civil war. In an ironic role reversal, it then came under the peacetime authority of the Pacific commander, the successor to FADM Nimitz, GEN MacArthur’s World War II rival.  

The position of the Seventh Fleet in the late 1940s was quite complex. The Navy and CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT maintained that the Seventh Fleet worked for CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT and was responsible for operations throughout the Pacific, with the exception of operations related to the occupation of Japan.

General MacArthur as CINCFE and SCAP argued that the Seventh Fleet was his once it entered Japanese waters, and should be assigned to his command in time of war. He believed that the Seventh Fleet should have come completely under his jurisdiction, and in fact succeeded in having the JCS earmark it for his operational control should an emergency arise.

178. Operational control of the Seventh Fleet had passed from General MacArthur as CINCSWPAC to FADM Nimitz as CINCPAC/CINCPOA in August 1945, following the Japanese surrender. The Seventh Fleet had passed from the direct administrative command of FADM King as COMINCH to FADM Nimitz as CINCPAC a few months earlier. Also, the Seventh Fleet reverted from being a four-star to a three-star command in November 1945 (it had been a four-star command since April). These changes in command relationships were reflected in changes in mission, geographic focus, and force composition. CINCPAC’s Seventh Fleet—restyled U.S. Naval Forces Western Pacific between 1947 and 1949—turned from combat in the Southwest Pacific to support of U.S. policy in and around China, and then to operations in Southeast Asia. And despite its greatly reduced overall force levels, it was now assigned, for the first time, Essex-class fast attack carriers. On the Seventh Fleet and China, see Edward J. Marolda, “The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1952” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: George Washington University, 1990).
Also, until 1949 COMNavWesPac was a “sector commander” for all U.S. military activities within and surrounding China, reporting to the JCS through the CNO—who delegated much of this responsibility, in turn, to the Pacific Fleet commander.179

Despite this tri-partite command arrangement, COMNavWesPac acted as part of the Pacific Fleet up until the Korean War, taking direction from Hawaii and the CNO (who acted as a JCS Executive Agent despite never having been designated formally as such).180

NavWesPac operated increasingly in Southeast Asian waters during this period. Mainland Southeast Asia and surrounding waters had long been a preserve of the navies of the European colonial powers. During the waning days of World War II they had been the domain of the now defunct British-led allied Southeast Asia Command, and the British, French, and Dutch fleets remained very active in the area after the war. Despite the fact that this area was not mentioned in the OCP, however, the U.S. Seventh Fleet operations were conducted under CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT aegis.181

What the Navy wanted and why

The Navy rankled under all of these divisions and commands—and Army and Air Force generals. To the Navy, the Pacific represented one large coherent oceanic theater, a theater in which U.S. defense interests were centrally defended by the proper application of

179. On the tortuous relationships among Naval Forces Western Pacific, CINCFE and CINCPAC, see LCDR Sestak, “The Seventh Fleet.” According to Sestak, while the CNO and CINCPAC acted as if Naval Forces Western Pacific was theirs to deploy and employ, this was not supported by appropriate joint policy directives.

180. See Secretary of the Navy, Annual Report for FY 1948, (Washington DC: USGPO, 1949), 4. We are not talking about a very large fleet here. During this period NavWesPac was slashed from 34 surface combatants and 2 carriers in 1947 to 5 small surface combatants in 1949. A carrier was re-added in early 1950. See Sestak, “The Seventh Fleet,” 41-46, 51-52.

seapower. It had felt that dividing the ocean into fiefdoms hurt the conduct of potential future operations there, and that putting Army and Army Air Forces officers in charge of those fiefdoms was unsound, since they were far less capable at applying the nation's sea power effectively than naval officers.

During the late 1940s, as we saw earlier, the Navy's focus in the world had shifted from the Pacific to the Mediterranean. This was a reflection of national policy. It was not unrelated, however, to the truncated nature of the PACOM AOR at that time, or to the new autonomy that the Navy had achieved for NELM in European and adjacent waters.

**The Korean War and the operational primacy of FECOM**

In February 1950, the JCS removed Korea from CINCFE's area of responsibility, rendering it "unassigned." Nevertheless, the first U.S. military reactions to the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 were made using General MacArthur's command. In July, at the request of the United Nations, the President directed General MacArthur to establish a United Nations Command (UNC) to conduct operations against the North Koreans. From that point on, General MacArthur, as CINCFE, supported the operations of the UNC, which he commanded as CINCUNC.

General MacArthur generally fought the war through his FECOM service components, including NAVFE. NAVFE now subsumed the Seventh Fleet, which had passed from CINCPAC to CINCFE operational control in accordance with long-standing JCS policy. This arrangement created its own set of problems to be solved:

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182. At the start of the war, COMNAVFE VADM C. Turner Joy had in and around Japan a five-ship amphibious task force, a cruiser, four destroyers, a Seventh Fleet submarine on loan, ten minesweepers, and some support ships. COMSEVENTHFLT VADM Arthur Struble had in the South China Sea one fleet carrier, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines, two maritime patrol aviation squadrons, and various support ships. When OPCON of the Seventh Fleet passed to CINCFE, General MacArthur, for the first time in his career, had finally achieved OPCON over a U.S. Navy fleet carrier.
• CINCPAC, ADM Arthur W. Radford, had potential trouble spots in his own designated and self-identified areas of responsibility for which he would need Seventh Fleet assets.

• COMNAVF, lacking an aviation section on his staff, would have problems controlling carrier striking forces and patrol squadrons.

• The Seventh Fleet commander was senior to the incumbent COMNAVF.183

Also, COMNAVF had evolved as a “housekeeping command,” with activities limited to the peaceful routine of an occupation force. Naval base facilities in Japan were minimal. There was no logistics command, and no forward representative of Service Force Pacific Fleet present to plan, coordinate, or procure.184 Thus, CINCPACFLT and COMSERVPAC evolved a role in logistic support and personnelreadiness, backstopping COMNAVF.185

For his amphibious assault on Inchon in September 1950, GEN MacArthur constituted a directly reporting joint task force (JTF) — Task Force 7 — comprising all FECOM naval air and surface forces, and both Army and Marine Corps troops.186 The initial JTF commander was the Seventh Fleet commander, who following the landing passed


184. Field, 46.


186. Air support was provided by naval forces only, from three carriers and two CVEs. The organizational model for JTF 7 was a small-scale version of that used by ADMs Nimitz and Spruance in the Central Pacific during World War II. See Gatchel, Eagles and Alligators, 35.
command to an Army general.\textsuperscript{187} The Seventh Fleet staff acted as initial JTF headquarters.\textsuperscript{188}

Seventh Fleet naval strike and close air support operations throughout the Korean War were conducted within exclusive delineated sub-regions, or "route packages." This arrangement was at Navy insistence and over Air Force objections.\textsuperscript{189}

In 1952, after General MacArthur had left FECOM, the headquarters of Army Forces Far East was fully staffed and placed on a par with the other two component staffs. The Far East Command was now given a truly joint staff.\textsuperscript{190}

The war ended with an Armistice in 1953. Henceforth, command arrangements for the Korean Peninsula would come in two varieties: peacetime (styled "Armistice") and wartime, as will be outlined later.

**PACOM begins to expand**

Throughout the early and mid-1950s—even during the Korean War—the Navy, the Marine Corps, and CINCPAC strove to have FECOM disestablished and its assets transferred to PACOM. Failing that, they tried to shrink FECOM’s area of responsibility and pry naval forces away from CINCFE operational control, especially the Seventh Fleet.

\textsuperscript{187}. On the position of COMNAVFE in the chain of command, see Field, 174. But see also the analyses of RADM Leonard F. Picotte USN (Retired) and CAPT Kendall King IUSN (Retired), "Amphibious Redux," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1997), 63; and ADM Blandy, "Command Relations in Amphibious Warfare," 581.


\textsuperscript{189}. Aviation relationships in Korea are explored in RADM James A. Winnefeld USN (Ret) and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), Chapter 5 "Korea, 1950-1953: The Renewed Clash of Service Air Command and Control Doctrines."

In early 1950, the JCS had added the Volcano Islands to FECOM. In 1951, however, during the war and over the strong objections of CINCFE, the JCS shifted responsibility for the Volcanos, Bonins, and Marianas, as well as the Philippines and Taiwan, from FECOM to PACOM.\footnote{191} The Navy had successfully argued that since the Communist conquest of China, the enemy threat was no longer confined to Northeast Asia, where CINCFE exercised command. Indeed, since the beginning of the war, the Seventh Fleet had acquired heavy responsibilities in the Taiwan Strait as well as off Korea. Naval leaders urged that CINCPAC be charged with responsibility for meeting that new threat in Northeast, East, and Southeast Asia. They also reasoned that because naval forces formed the first line of defense for Taiwan and the Pescadores, overall command should rest with a naval officer.\footnote{192}

In theory, the JCS would be required in a crisis to decide which commander—CINCPAC or CINCFE—to assign the Seventh Fleet, the only sizeable U.S. naval force west of Pearl Harbor. In practice, the JCS gave CINCFE continued “first dibs” on the Seventh Fleet by providing that “Support of United States Forces in Korea and Japan—including the Ryukyus—has overriding priority over defense of Formosa, Pescadores, and Philippines.” Consequently, for as long as the Korean War lasted, CINCFE kept the Seventh Fleet and its carrier task forces most of the time.

\section*{Defending Taiwan}

Seventh Fleet task forces under CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT operational control had patrolled the Taiwan Strait since the start of the Korean War in 1950. In March 1952, CINCPAC now formally took over operational control of the Seventh Fleet for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. During the war, CINCPAC would occasionally be able to arrange for a display of force in the Taiwan Strait by a special task force of three carriers, just to let the Chinese know the U.S. was prepared to defend Taiwan. In the meantime, Commander, Seventh

\footnote{191. Ibid.}

\footnote{192. Marolda, “The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War,” 301.}
Fleet prepared contingency plans for defense of Taiwan and was prepared to carry out such other missions that CINCPAC might order.\textsuperscript{193}

At the end of the war, in March 1953, a formal Formosa ("Taiwan" in 1955) Patrol Force was constituted under CINCPACFLT. This force became, in turn, the Navy service component of the Formosa Defense Command, a subunified command under CINCPAC, created in December 1953. The initial Commander, Formosa Defense Command was also the Commander, Seventh Fleet. Besides providing for the patrol of the volatile Formosa/Taiwan Strait, the command also provided a chain of command from CINCPAC to Commander, Seventh Fleet independent of the latter's residual Korean duties, for which he reported to CINCFE, not CINCPAC.\textsuperscript{194}

In 1957, however, the command received its own full-time commander—but still a Navy vice admiral—and changed its name to the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, with operational control of all U.S. forces committed to the defense of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{195} This arrangement endured for two decades. The command was disestablished—and America's defense agreement with Taiwan abrogated—in 1979, during America's normalization of relations with mainland China.

Defending Southeast Asia

Meanwhile, the Navy and CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT were seeking the expansion of the latter's domain into Southeast Asia, which had initially been unmentioned in the OCP. That region—formerly the domain of the European colonial and naval powers, was increasingly comprised of newly independent nations with very weak at-sea defense capabilities, as well as one of the Cold War's epicenters—French Indochina.

\textsuperscript{193} Jurika, \textit{From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam}, 278.

\textsuperscript{194} Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War," 300-303.

\textsuperscript{195} Packard, \textit{A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence}, 415; Bouchard, \textit{Command in Crisis}, 63. For a case study of how the national chain of command functioned in 1958 in the Pacific during crisis, see Bouchard, \textit{Command in Crisis} "The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis."
An early 1951 attempt to have CINCPAC represent the U.S. at a conference in Singapore with Southeast Asian British and French military leaders was turned down by the JCS.\textsuperscript{196} At the end of the year, however, CINCPAC toured French Indochina, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore, conferring with British and French military leaders.\textsuperscript{197} Meanwhile, the JCS had directed CINCPAC to plan for U.S. naval and air assistance to the French in Indochina, should this be required, a planning responsibility that was to continue over the next several years.\textsuperscript{198}

The JCS finally formally assigned Southeast Asia to CINCPAC's jurisdiction during the Korean War, after years of naval deployments to the area.\textsuperscript{199}

In 1954 the CNO attempted to get the JCS to create a Southeast Asia Defense Command as a subordinate unified commander under CINCPAC. VADM William Phillips, Commander, First Fleet and commander of a short-lived multicarrier Fair Weather Training Force in the South China Sea in 1954, was to be the Commander of this force, with headquarters in Saigon. Although a staff was established for planning purposes in San Diego, with Army, Air Force, and CIA personnel assigned, it was never deployed to Saigon.\textsuperscript{200} The command never stood up, although the area remained part of PACOM's area of responsibility.

### Trying to take over FECOM

Once the Korean Armistice was signed in July 1953, the Navy and PACOM sought the return of the Seventh Fleet to CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT's operational control, while FECOM sought to retain it in

\textsuperscript{196} Jurika, \textit{From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam}, 343-4.

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 266-274.

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 345, 353, 367, 425-6.

\textsuperscript{199} Sestak, "The Seventh Fleet," 53.

case fighting on the peninsula should flare up again. The struggle took place both in the Pacific and in Washington. During the 1953 interservice wrangling over the first Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Army and Air Force criticized the Navy for proposing to divert forces from CINCFE to CINCPAC.  

In 1954, at JCS direction, the Air Force established a Pacific Air Force as the Air Force component command under CINCPAC, with headquarters in Hawaii. Also in 1954, peacetime OPCON of the Seventh Fleet was finally transferred back to CINCPAC by CINCFE. COMNAVFE continued to have OPCON, however, over Navy amphibious forces in the Far East and of UN and U.S. Navy units charged with the patrol of Korean waters. COMNAVFE also had command over Navy shore bases in FECOM. In 1954 NAVFE gave logistic support to the evacuation of Vietnamese civilians from North Vietnam to the South, and in 1955 assisted in the evacuation of Nationalist Chinese troops and civilians from the Tachen Islands.

After CINCFE’s peacetime control was abolished in late 1954, however, the Navy refused to cooperate on contingency war-planning with the CINCFE staff, particularly concerning carrier air strikes.

Taking over FECOM at last

In 1957, with the Korean Armistice holding and the Japanese Occupation terminated, the JCS disestablished FECOM—over Army protests. (The Chief of Staff of the Army had argued instead in vain for an expansion of FECOM into Southeast Asia.) PACOM gained control of FECOM’s area and missions. A subordinate unified command

201. The issue was settled by JCS agreement to review the allocation of forces after D-Day, should war occur. See Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume V: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954* (Washington DC: Joint Staff Historical Division, 1986), 96, 101.


under CINCPAC was established in Japan: Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (COMUSFORJ), under an Air Force three-star general. CG, USARPAC became governor of the Ryukyu Islands.

The senior U.S. Army officer in Korea was designated Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA), a subordinate unified commander directly subordinate to a Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific (CG USARPAC) and therefore subordinate to CINCPAC. He was also named CINCUNC. Later, as command arrangements in the Pacific evolved, COMUSKOREA/CINCUNC would also command a binational command made up of forces from the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United State—Combined Forces Command (CFC).205

As the only subordinate unified commander with four-star rank, and with an alternate command structure established for crises and war, COMUSKOREA—later COMUSFORK—has had a unique relationship even in peacetime with his nominal superior, USCINCPAC. The United Nations Command (UNC) and Combined Forces Command (CFC), as commands that discharge the combined wartime responsibilities of COMUSFORK, are not PACOM subunified commands and maintain direct links to the U.S. (and South Korean) NCAs.

In 1957, PACOM also gained from ALCOM the mission of protecting sea lines of communication in Alaskan waters. In addition, PACOM also received responsibility for the Pacific waters off the Panama Canal from CARIBCOM, including the area around the Galapagos Islands. This last would prove a relatively short-lived acquisition, however.

The change in the command fortunes of PACOM in the early and mid-1950s was not unrelated to changes in the Navy's focus in the world. Henceforth, the Pacific would loom far larger in the Navy's strategic world view, and the Navy would champion Pacific elements of U.S. strategy. At the same time, of course, the Army had replaced the Navy as the predominant service in Europe, and the powers of NELM had been seriously truncated.

205. For a simplified rendering of the complex chain of command in Korea, see AFSC Pub 1, 2-42.
Splitting from CINCPACFLT

In 1956, the unified PACOM/PACFLT staff had split into two parts.206 The next year, CINCPAC, whose responsibilities had just been enlarged at the expense of FECOM and ALCOM, was ordered to give up his direct command of the Pacific Fleet. This was over the objections, however, of the CNO. After a transitional period during which CINCPAC delegated this command to the Deputy CINCPAC, the Deputy position was abolished and replaced in January 1958 by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), as the naval component command of PACOM.207

A new command layer was thus inserted between the commanders of the First and Seventh Fleets and CINCPAC (which would be paralleled in the Atlantic a generation later, in 1985, but at Navy request). CINCPAC headquarters physically moved from Makalapa (and CINC-PACFLT headquarters) to Camp H. M. Smith—still nearby.

From NAVFE to USNAVFORJ

USFORJ was created as a subordinate PACOM unified command in 1957 out of the old Japanese core of FECOM. At the same time, NAVFE was redesignated the subordinate unified command's naval component, Naval Forces Japan (NAVFORJ)—to be redesignated USNAVFORJ in 1962. COMNAVFORJ had some ships and aircraft assigned, as well as the Navy shore activities in Japan.

These force levels, composition, and missions fluctuated over time. During the 1960s, COMUSNAVFORJ commanded the Navy's intelligence-gathering ships deployed off the Northeast Asian Pacific littoral, including the ill-fated Pueblo, captured by the North Koreans in 1968.

206. Packard, A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence, 404.
207. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 27.
From the 1970s on, the great increase in forward homeporting of Seventh Fleet ships in Japan resulted in increased US NAVFORJ missions and capabilities regarding shore support. By 1999, the Forward-Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) homeported in Japan made up most of the Seventh Fleet, including the command ship, a carrier battle group, and an amphibious ready group.

Defending Korea in peace and war

Navy fleet activities ashore had been set up in Korea during the Korean War. Most of these activities were disestablished shortly after the 1953 Armistice, with the Navy in Korea represented chiefly by a Naval Advisory Group. In 1957, with the reorganization of the Far East Command, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea (COMNAVFORK) established his headquarters in Seoul and assumed collateral duty as Chief, U.S. Naval Advisory Group Korea. COMNAVFORK became the Navy component commander to the new subordinate unified command commander, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA), who in turn reported to CINCPAC in peacetime (i.e., assuming the Armistice would hold).

In the service chain, COMNAVFORK reported to CINCPACFLT, who reported in turn to the CNO.

As the command structure in Korea evolved over time, COMNAVFORK also became United Nations Command Navy Component

208. On COMUSNAVFORJ and USS Pueblo, see Trevor Armbriester, A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), especially 117 and 185. The division of responsibilities between COMUSNAVFORJ and COMSEVENTHFLT and the lag in communications between the two during the crisis have been the subject of much criticism. This criticism played in the arguments leading to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. See especially the Locher Report, 357-9.

Commander, peacetime (Armistice) Combined Forces Command Deputy Naval Component Commander (under a ROK Admiral as Commander), and Commander, Combat Coordination Group Korea. His most time-consuming job, however, was as Senior Member, U.N. Armistice Commission.

In 1992, new command arrangements went into effect in Korea, re-organizing the Combined Forces Command (CFC): COMSEVENTH-FLT gained a revised potential responsibility—should the Armistice fail—as wartime Commander, Combined Forces Naval Component Command as well as COMNAVFORK. Should a crisis or war erupt on the Korean Peninsula, this designation would place COMSEVENTH-FLT directly under the U.S. commander in Korea in the U.S. operational command chain, as well as in the Combined Forces Command (CFC) Korea chain of command as commander of all U.S. and ROK naval forces assigned. The peacetime two-star COMNAVFORK incumbent would then become his wartime deputy.

All these hats and responsibilities for COMNAVFORK belie, however, what has in fact in peacetime been a very small activity with very constrained resources.

**PACOM and continental air defense**

In 1958 a new command, Barrier Force Command Pacific (BARFOR-PAC), became fully operational under CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT. Charged with providing early warning of Soviet bomber attack on the United States across the Pacific, it deployed a force of U.S. Navy radar picket ships and aircraft across the mid-Pacific. The Navy insisted it be organizationally a part of PACOM, to avoid its assets being swallowed up by the Air Force-dominated joint Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), set up in 1954.

Enduring for less than a decade, BARFORPAC’s chapter in the PACOM story is a brief one. It (and its counterpart command in the

211. For a glimpse of NAVFORK during the 1960s, see Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, 120.
Atlantic, BARFORLANT) will be discussed more fully in the context of the nation’s unified air defense and space commands below.

**Fighting the Vietnam War**

Command over U.S. forces engaged in the war in Vietnam was exercised by CINCPAC, in whose command area the scene of operations lay and by CINCSAC, who retained command of SAC forces employed in the war. CINCPAC’s command authority was delegated to Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV); Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF), and CINCPACFLT.²¹²

During the Vietnam War, the Army tried and failed to gain approval either for creating an independent unified Southeast Asia Command or for raising MACV to unified command level, with PACOM in a supporting role. Instead, COMUSMACV—always an Army general—remained a joint sub-unified commander under CINCPAC from 1962 to 1973, largely controlling forces and operations within South Vietnam. COMUSMACV was his own Army sub-unified component commander throughout the war, and received an Air Force sub-unified component commander in 1964.

COMUSMACV’s Navy sub-unified component commander for advisory, in-country, and coastal operations was at first the chief of the Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam. When Marine units landed in South Vietnam in 1965, their commander became the naval component commander, a post he held until 1966. At that time, problems inherent in the formation of Navy units for inshore patrol the previous year led to the appointment of a Navy flag officer to the post of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam.²¹³ He was made responsible, as COMUSMACV’s Navy component commander, for operations on South Vietnamese inland waters and along the South Vietnamese coast.²¹⁴ The Marines formed their own component.

²¹⁴. COMNAVFORV was disestablished in 1973.
Meanwhile, CINCPAC delegated to his own unified command service components, PACFLT and PACAF, responsibility for conducting air and naval operations against North Vietnam and Laos. As in Korea, Vietnam was divided into areas termed “route packages,” with sole responsibility for strike operations in each area assigned to the Seventh Fleet, PACAF units based in Thailand, and MACV in South Vietnam. The Navy supported this approach to the division of joint strike operations responsibilities, although many in the Air Force opposed it. It had the virtue of enabling aviators to become thoroughly familiar with the special characteristics of their operating areas. It also, of course, preserved the institutional autonomy of the components involved.215

CINCPACFLT also retained responsibility for Seventh Fleet naval gunfire and air strike operations into South Vietnam. Control of B–52s remained under CINCSAC, but B–52 targets in South Vietnam were selected by COMUSMACV, refined by CINCPAC, and approved in Washington.216

Thus, command of U.S. forces in, around, and over Vietnam was divided, even for individual services. COMNAVFORV did not have control over the Marine forces in Vietnam or over the Seventh Fleet ships engaged in bombing the North and providing amphibious and gunfire support operations in the South.217 Also, despite the establishment of a Navy component responsive directly to COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT remained influential as the Navy Fleet CINC resourcing that component, while at the same time both directing and resourcing the activities of the Seventh Fleet. Accordingly, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet Service Force (SERVPAC) had operational command over Naval Support Activities in Da Nang and Saigon, which also came under the operational control of COMNAVFORV and COMUSMACV.

215. For an analysis, see Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air Operations, Chapter 6, “Vietnam, 1965-1968: Regression and Progress.”

216. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 37.

217. This divided command structure came under great criticism after the war as a major cause, in the eyes of some, of the U.S. loss of South Vietnam.
This recitation of convoluted formal command relationships is hardly the whole story, however. Actual relationships did not always work the way official “wiring diagrams” indicated. COMUSMACV often bypassed CINCPAC to deal directly with superiors in Washington, DC, including the President and Secretary of Defense, who played active parts in daily operations.\(^{218}\) In essence, CINCPAC conducted the air war and surface naval operations, while COMUSMACV took charge on the ground.

Throughout the Vietnam War, the Navy sought to retain the position of CINCPAC for one of its admirals. In 1964, an Air Force candidate appeared who looked like he might break the Navy’s lock on the job. Even the Commandant of the Marine Corps sided with the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff on this issue. The Secretary of Defense, however, sided with the CNO, and an admiral was appointed, as usual.\(^{219}\) In 1972, Army efforts to claim the billet for the incumbent COMUSMACV, General Creighton Abrams, likewise failed.\(^{220}\)

*In 1999, the position of USCINCPAC remains the only geographic combatant commander position to have gone to only one service through all the years of the UCP.*

**Creating the Third Fleet**

While the Vietnam War was winding down, the operational structure of CINCPAC’s naval component commander, CINCPACFLT, underwent a major change. In 1973 CINCPACFLT disestablished his

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\(^{219}\) See H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*, (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 82-83, 361; and ibid., “Dereliction of Duty,” *Air Force Magazine* (January 1998), 71. McMaster claims that in return for the Secretary’s support, the CNO—ADM David McDonald—became the Secretary’s willing accomplice in subsequent decisions about the Vietnam War.

\(^{220}\) Cole et al., *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 2.
Antisubmarine Warfare Force Pacific. This was a separate major operational force that had been created a little over a decade earlier, mirroring an earlier Atlantic Fleet organization. Its centerpiece had been the antisubmarine warfare carrier—the CVS—a ship type that was now rapidly going out of the inventory.221

CINCPACFLT also disestablished the First Fleet, a mainstay of Navy operational organization since the 1940s. To replace these two organizations, he created a new Third Fleet, with headquarters ashore at Pearl Harbor. Commander, Third Fleet would move afloat onto a command ship in 1986 and become more operationally oriented. The commander, the staff, and the command ship would relocate to San Diego in 1991.

The Third Fleet would become a factor in discussions regarding UCP changes in the 1990s, when it added new responsibilities in support of the U.S. Central Command. Also, the Third Fleet would become the principal trainer of all U.S.-based U.S. naval forces deploying to the USPACOM AOR, as well as many of the forces deploying to the USCENTCOM AOR and some of those deploying to the USOUTHCOM AOR. This made it a bone of contention in the 1990s between those seeking to continue to assign COCOM of U.S. West Coast naval forces to USCINCPAC and those seeking to change their assignment to USACOM or a new “Joint Forces Command.”

**PACOM continues to grow**

With the Vietnam War ending, PACOM continued to grow at the expense of its neighbors. It received responsibility for the Aleutians from ALCOM in 1972. It also took formal responsibility for part of the Arctic Ocean. At that same time, with the disestablishment of the MEAFSA unified command (discussed in greater detail below), CINCPAC also assumed responsibility for the countries of Southern Asia and much of the Indian Ocean.

It went like this: In 1976 CINCPAC received responsibility for the rest of the Indian Ocean, including the Gulfs of Aden and Oman. PACOM now stretched—as the saying went—"from California to Kenya." In 1983 PACOM picked up vastly more responsibility—for China, North Korea, Mongolia, and Madagascar. Also in 1983, PACOM was redesignated the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).

The only exception during this period of general growth was in the far Southeastern Pacific. After having gained the waters surrounding the Galapagos Islands in 1957 from the old CARIBCOM, CINCPAC ceded them along with all waters off the west coast of Latin America to LANTCOM in 1972.

At about the same time, in 1975, as part of a worldwide effort to reduce headquarters, the Army had abolished its component command in the Pacific, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), replacing it with a U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group.222 Also, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Army and Air Force had no success in various attempts to replace PACOM with the Pacific Fleet as a specified command and/or to create new unified Northeast Asia and/or Southwest Pacific Commands.

Then, in 1989, PACOM finally swallowed ALCOM.

The Alaskan Command phoenix

As discussed above, a separate unified Alaskan Command (ALCOM), including the Aleutians, had been set up under the initial Outline Campaign Plan of 1946. The Commanding General, Army Air Force—later the Chief of Staff of the Air Force—was assigned as JCS executive agent. ALCOM’s headquarters were at Elmendorf Air Force Base, near Anchorage. Although it possessed full responsibility for its area of operations, its actual focus was normally on air defense.223


Unlike most other combatant commanders, the Air Force officer serving as CINCAL was normally an officer of three-star rank.

ALCOM slowly lost responsibilities to PACOM, and eventually disappeared after three decades. In 1957, ALCOM lost to PACOM the mission of protecting sea lines of communication in Alaskan waters. In 1970, the CNO pressed for the abolition of ALCOM and the division of its responsibilities between PACOM and CONAD. This attempt was unsuccessful, but, in 1972, responsibility for the Aleutians and the sea areas contiguous to ALCOM passed to CINCPAC. ALCOM was finally disestablished in 1975, with its air defense responsibilities passing to the Aerospace Defense Command.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 mandated that the Chairman consider giving responsibility for Alaska to USPACOM. A subordinate unified Alaskan Command—under USPACOM—was finally activated in 1989. This would have come sooner had it not been for the need to assuage the opposition of Ted Stevens, Alaska's powerful Republican senator, to control of Alaskan defense by "Pineapple Admirals" in Hawaii.\(^{224}\)

**Alaska Navy componency**

Alaska Navy componency proved to be an organizational football, passed from command to command. Despite the tiny number of actual Navy forces involved, the story of Alaska Navy componency, like that of ALCOM itself, is one of the most complex of the entire post-war period.\(^{225}\)

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During World War II, the Pacific Ocean Areas included a North Pacific Area, the Navy commander of which also commanded whatever operational forces CINCPOA allocated to his area. There was also an Alaskan Sea Frontier (ALSEAFRON) and a Naval District, reporting back to Washington. These also had forces assigned.

The Pacific Fleet disestablished the North Pacific Force at the end of 1946 and ALSEAFRON became the Navy component of the new unified ALCOM. With the Caribbean Sea Frontier, it was one of two Navy sea frontiers to be designated as Navy components in the new joint OCP command structure. CINCPACFLT provided logistic and component support to ALSEAFRON’s forces, which were even more meagre than those assigned to NAVFE. Post-World War II Navy activity in and around Alaska centered chiefly on coastal defense, using maritime patrol aircraft operating from a naval station at Adak, in the Aleutians. By assigning componenty to a Sea Frontier, the Navy stressed the coastal nature of ALCOM’s responsibilities at sea—in Navy eyes.

In 1971, however, as part of a Navy-wide disestablishment of Sea Frontier commands, CINCAL lost his naval component. Alaskan coastal defense responsibilities passed to the Seventeenth Naval District, then to the Thirteenth Naval District, and in 1980—when the Naval districts themselves were disestablished—to COMTHIRDFLT.226

In 1986, the Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area became Commander, Maritime Defense Zone Pacific, under CINCPACFLT, acting within the framework of a worldwide Navy-Coast Guard agreement setting up joint Maritime Defense Zones. He formally relieved COMTHIRDFLT of responsibility for coastal defense in the Pacific, including Alaska, and set up a subordinate Maritime Defense Zone Sector in Alaska (commanded by a Coast Guard district commander) and in the Aleutians (commanded by a Navy reserve officer).

226. A similar evolution had taken place in the Caribbean in 1957, when the Fifteenth Naval District replaced the Caribbean Sea Frontier as CARIBCOM’s naval component. See discussion below.
When, in 1989, ALCOM became a subordinate unified command of USPACOM, the position of commander of its Navy component, U.S. Naval Force Alaska (USNAVAK) was established (although not formally until 1990). Uniquely for a U.S. Navy component commander, the position now went to a U.S. Coast Guard rear admiral, the Commander of the 17th Coast Guard District and of the Maritime Defense Zone Sector Alaska. (A bid by COMTHIRDFLT to gain OPCON of USNAVAK was vetoed by USCINCPAC.)

This remains the status of ALCOM Navy componency as of 1999. COMUSNAVAK's responsibilities are limited, however, to coastal defense, including port security. They do not include directing maritime forces conducting blue-water operations, Navy battle forces in ports or havens, or maritime patrol aircraft operating from Alaskan airfields.227

Expanding in the Indian Ocean

Meanwhile, from the 1940s to 1963, CINCNEELM—not CINCPAC—had responsibility for naval operations throughout most of the Indian Ocean.228 In 1963, responsibilities in that ocean were divided among LANTCOM, PACOM, and a new STRIKECOM/MEAFSA. With the disestablishment of STRIKECOM/MEAFSA, CINCPAC also assumed responsibility for all of Southern Asia and much of the Indian Ocean, with CINCLANT responsible for the remainder.

In 1972 and 1976 CINCPAC received responsibility for the rest of the Indian Ocean, including the Gulfs of Aden and Oman, at the expense of LANTCOM. In 1983, a now re-designated USPACOM also gained Madagascar, reflecting the primacy over islands then afforded by the JCS to the maritime CINCs.

This acquisition by PACOM (and therefore PACFLT and SEVENTH-FLT) of Indian Ocean geography was mirrored by an increase in

227. With the end of the Cold War, the Navy drew down its presence in Adak, closing the base entirely in 1997.

228. This will be discussed in more detail below, regarding Middle East commands
PACOM (and therefore PACFLT and SEVENTHFLT) Indian Ocean deployments. These were not unrelated trends. In 1970 a Seventh Fleet cruiser (but at the time styled a “frigate”) had made a surveillance sweep into the Indian Ocean, beginning a program of occasional forays into the area. In 1971 an ASW Task group operated in the Indian Ocean, followed by deployment of a CVBG and an ARG during the Bangladesh Crisis of 1971–1972. By 1973, the Seventh Fleet was regularly deploying task forces into the ocean, under the operational control of CINCPAC. By 1979 these Seventh Fleet deployments provided almost a permanent presence; in 1999 this tempo had slackened only moderately.

Down from the peak: shedding functions and geography

In 1983, 1989, and again in 1995, some unusual events occurred: USPACOM contracted geographically—three times. The eastern boundary of a new USCENTCOM was created and then expanded at USCINCPAC’s expense: First, USPACOM lost Afghanistan and Pakistan, then the Gulf of Aden and Oman, and finally the Arabian Sea and a section of the Indian Ocean running south from Pakistan to near Diego Garcia, and then west to the coast of southern Kenya. While therefore losing responsibility for the Seychelles, USPACOM retained responsibility for Diego Garcia itself, however. Cession of the water areas to USCENTCOM had been among the issues recommended for resolution by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

In 1988, USPACOM (and USLANTCOM) lost combatant command of their CONUS-based Navy special warfare forces to the new U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), established the preceding year. In 1992, USPACOM (and USLANTCOM) likewise transferred combatant command of their ballistic missile submarines and other strategic forces to the newly stood up U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).

USPACOM had apparently reached—and passed—its zenith.

229. See Carus et al. From MIDEASTFOR to Fifth Fleet, 66-67.
230. See the section below on Special Operations Command.
231. See section below on USSTRATCOM.
Changing the meaning of naval componency

In the 1990s, CINCPACFLT’s role as USCINCPAC’s Navy component commander changed. This resulted in part from implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and in part from the end of the Cold War. Emphasis was now placed on the CINCPACFLT’s roles as a force provider to USCINCPAC and other CINCs. His responsibilities as a warfighting component commander under USCINCPAC were downgraded.

More important, USCINCPAC instituted a “two-tiered” command and control concept which—simply put—assigned USPACOM operations to joint task force commanders working directly for USCINCPAC, without utilizing the intervening command layer of component commanders like CINCPACFLT.232 These prospective JTF commanders included the commanders of the numbered fleets. Thus, CINCPACFLT’s direct warfighting responsibilities declined.

On the other hand, in his Navy service force-provider function, CINCPACFLT provided most of the ships and logistics and much of the coordination for Navy deployments to the U.S. Central Command and USNAVCENT. CINCPACFLT also provided ships on occasion to USSOUTHCOM, for operations on the west coast of South America. CINCPACFLT also has functioned since 1992 as one of the Navy component commanders of USCINCSTRAT.

Lastly, CINCPACFLT became a Navy component commander vice a naval component commander. The Marines stood up their own component command—U.S. Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) in 1992. They also retained, however, their “type command” position within CINCPACFLT’s command organization as Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC).

As of 1999, USCINCPAC and CINCPACFLT remained responsible for most of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and much of the Arctic Ocean, including their islands, especially Madagascar and Diego Garcia. USCINCPAC and CINCPACFLT were also responsible for the land area of all Asia-Pacific and South Asian countries south of the former Soviet Union and east of Pakistan, as well as the defense of Alaska and the Aleutians (minus air defense).

Korea is included in the USPACOM AOR during peacetime, but wartime command arrangements for the Korean peninsula would give USPACOM supporting missions instead.

Also as of 1999, USCINCPAC remained the only geographic combatant command position never to have been filled by anyone other than an officer from a single service. That service was the Navy.233

233. For a wiring diagram of the USPACOM and Korean peninsula organizations, see the latest printed (1997) or web site (1999) edition of the joint Staff Officer’s Guide (AFSC Pub 1).
VII. USEUCOM, NELM, and NAVEUR: the Navy loses water

Overview

The highlight of the organizational history of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and its Navy component is the early—and ultimately successful—struggle by USEUCOM to bring U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic (NELM, later NAVEUR) under its authority. This was the first major instance of a true land-sea theater being created under the UCP.

The Navy acted as the advocate for NELM, arguing for its continued independence as a specified command and for Navy professional predominance in what it saw as a maritime theater with inter-connected water areas. This position as regards the Mediterranean eroded throughout the 1950s; by 1963 the Navy had lost the battle.

Inter-allied relations were always an important part of the job for whomever occupied the Navy’s European headquarters in London. With the creation of NATO, these relations became entangled in the larger web of inter-allied command relationships. Throughout, the U.S. Navy had sought to maintain a position of influence within an alliance whose civilian and military staffs were more conversant with non-naval issues.\(^{234}\)

Since 1963, USEUCOM/NAVEUR history has been marked by generally unsuccessful struggles to retain the Middle East, and by an ultimately successful campaign to move into Africa. The Navy sided with USEUCOM/NAVEUR on the former issue, but with USLANTCOM on the latter—thus winding up on the losing side in each instance.

Changes in command boundaries are in figures 31 through 34. Figures 35 and 36 provide significant organizational milestones and timelines.

\(^{234}\) See, for example, Henry H. Gaffney, *An Outline History of NATO*, CIM 425.10 (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, August 1995).
Figure 31. *Moving in alongside the Royal Navy: U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1947–1953*

Figure 33. *Taking over the Middle East too: U.S. European Command and U.S. Naval Forces Europe, 1972–1983*

Figure 34. *Leaving the Middle East but moving into Africa: U.S. European Command and U.S. Naval Forces Europe, 1983–1998*
Figure 35. U.S. commands in Europe: organizational milestones

Unified & Specified Commands

AFHQ established

USFET established

USFET becomes EUCOM

NAVEASTLANTMED (later NELM) becomes Specified Command

NELM loses EastLant Med Approaches to LANTCOM

USAF becomes Specified Command

NELM becomes both Specified Commander and USEUCOM component

USEUCOM absorbs EUCOM, NELM, USAFE

USEUCOM / NELM lose EastLant to LANTCOM

USEUCOM gains Portugal from LANTCOM

1st USAF USCINCEUR (until 1962)

NELM abolished as Specified Command

USCINCEUR HQ moves to Germany from France

USEUCOM gains Middle East from USSTRICOM / MEAFSA

USEUCOM gains Baltic republics

USEUCOM gains more former Soviet republics

US Navy officer designated DEPUUSCINCEUR

Navy Commands

1940

Special Naval Observer to London Squadron 40-T disestablished

1942

Special Naval Observer becomes COMNAVEU

1943

NAVAW (later NAVMED) and 8th & 12th Fleets created

1944

8th Fleet disestablished

1945

NAVFORGE created

1946

NOREURFOR created; NAVFORAZORES abolished

1947

NAVEU / 12th Fleet becomes NAVEASTLANTMED (later NELM)

1948

NAVMED becomes 6th Task Fleet (later 6th Fleet)

1951

CINCELM becomes NATO CINCSOUTH at Naples also

1952

NELM also becomes USEUCOM component

1953

CINCELM and NATO CINCSOUTH hats split

1956

NELM becomes SUOMANTFLT also

6th Fleet flagship homeported in France

NOREURFOR disestablished

1958

SUOMANTFLT redesignated USCOMEASTLANT

1960

NELM becomes NAVEUR as USEUCOM component

1963


1966

6th Fleet flagship homeport moves to Italy

1967

6th Fleet flagship homeport moves to Italy

1972

DESRON homeported in Greece

1975

DESRON homeport in Greece disestablished

1977

CINCUSNAVEUR becomes 3-star billet

1983

NATO CINCSOUTH again becomes CINCUSNAVEUR also. Remains in Naples. CINCUSNAVEUR again becomes 4-star billet

1993

1998

CINCUSNAVEUR redesignated COMUSNAVEUR

USECOMNAVEUR AOR

6th Fleet AOR expanded to match USECOMNAVEUR AOR

Note: The most significant events regarding changes in the UCP and Navy component are shaded.
Sequence of commands

USEUCOM is the subject of our second historical survey of the individual combatant commands. USEUCOM grew out of EUCOM, which was among the first unified commands to be created under the Outline Command Plan of 1946. EUCOM was established in March 1947, following the establishment of PACOM, FECOM, and ALCOM by two and a half months.

Figure 36. Sequence of joint and Navy component commands in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Command</th>
<th>NAVGER</th>
<th>US Air Forces Europe</th>
<th>US European Command</th>
<th>NELM/NAVEUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s

Existing Command  Joint  Navy
Former Command
Existed in early 1999 (Bold)
Former Unified or Navy Command (Plain)
Former Specified Command (Italic)
Combatant Command (underline)

Note: The figure shows commands and components as they became subsumed under the UCP. All these commands had roots extending back to World War II, as will be discussed in the text.

The Army creates EUCOM

A European Command (EUCOM) was designated as part of the original Outline Campaign Plan in 1946 and was formally created in 1947. This command was a direct descendent of those set up in Europe under General Dwight D. Eisenhower during World War II. When Eisenhower’s last combined headquarters (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, or SHAEF) was dissolved at the end of the
war, the JCS designated Eisenhower as Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater (CG USFET).\textsuperscript{235}

That theater, however, did not include the Mediterranean or the United Kingdom. There, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, ADM Ernest King, still had a minuscule residual U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEU) /Twelfth Fleet organization ashore and afloat reporting directly to him. This command had originally been set up in 1942 and had never been under joint or allied command. Meanwhile, the U.S. task forces in the great combined armadas that had landed the allied forces under Eisenhower and Wilson in Italy, Normandy, and the south of France in 1943 and 1944 had been dispersed, mostly to the Pacific.

The new EUCOM of 1947 had the Chief of Staff of the Army as JCS executive agent. In effect, CG USFET became CINCEUR. It was nominally a unified command, but was almost wholly of Army composition and responsible essentially for the occupation of the American zone in Germany. No Army component headquarters was set up. EUCOM’s Navy component was Naval Forces Germany (NAVFORGER)—a small outfit with administrative, harbor security, and river patrol responsibilities supporting the occupation.

The Navy creates NELM

Meanwhile, the NAVEU/Twelfth Fleet command headquartered in London had modernized and increased its afloat force level considerably, especially in the Mediterranean and the waters around the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{236} In 1947 NAVEU was re-designated Naval Forces

\textsuperscript{235} The Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean (SACMED), a British Army general, continued along with his combined U.S.-UK headquarters staff and command structure until 1947, when the Italian Peace Treaty was signed. During this period, U.S. Navy forces in the Mediterranean came under his operational control when carrying out duties related to the allied safeguarding of the Italian city of Trieste, on the Adriatic, from the Yugoslavs.

\textsuperscript{236} For details on the rapidity of the transition (and further references), see Swartz, “The Navy’s Search for a Strategy, 1945-1947,” 102-108.
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NAVEASTLANTMED, later shortened to NELM). The new and growing wide-ranging naval presence and deterrence missions of NELM differed markedly from the occupation duties of the Army (and Navy) EUCOM forces in Germany.

NELM's main operational arm was in the Mediterranean. Since the end of World War II, that command—U.S. Naval Forces Mediterranean (NAVMED)—had increased in size and power. The rank of its commander was elevated from rear admiral to vice admiral. In 1948 it was re-designated the Sixth Task Fleet, and in 1950 it became the Sixth Fleet—the name it has retained ever since.

In addition, since 1946 CINCNELM also commanded a small Northern European Force of cruisers and destroyers, working out of the United Kingdom; and since 1949, an even smaller Persian Gulf Force—to be renamed the Middle East Force in 1950. (The Northern European Force would later disappear during the Suez Crisis of 1956, when its remaining destroyers were sent to reinforce the Middle East Force. They never returned.)

The UCP takes NELM aboard

Although NELM had not been formally designated as a specified command in the original 1946 Outline Campaign Plan, its existence

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237. In February 1946, the remains of the Navy's World War II Mediterranean command (U.S. Naval Forces North African Waters or NAVNAW) had been re-designated U.S. Naval Forces Mediterranean (NAVMED).


239. The Middle East Force will be discussed further below, in the section on Middle East commands.
and existing relationship to the JCS were explicitly mentioned. Later, the CNO argued successfully for its designation as a separate JCS-directed command, alongside EUCOM and LANTCOM. It was so designated in November 1947, with the CNO as JCS executive agent. NELM exercised administrative command over NAVFORGER and operational command over naval forces provided from the Atlantic Fleet in the Mediterranean, the eastern Atlantic, and—later—the Indian Ocean.

Thus, the U.S. Navy achieved in the early post-war era something it never had achieved during World War II—a major autonomous U.S. Navy operational command in the formerly Royal Navy-dominated eastern Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean, alongside other U.S. Navy commands in the western Atlantic and Pacific. NELM started off in many ways a mirror and shadow of the Royal Navy, using that Navy’s operating areas as a template. Like the Royal Navy, it had its headquarters in London, its operational heart in the Mediterranean, and responsibilities in the northeastern Atlantic and—through the Suez Canal—the Indian Ocean.240

NELM had become the “something else” in the post-1941 Navy vision of a “‘Two Ocean Navy’ plus something else,” replacing the old Asiatic fleet. In fact, during the late 1940s, NELM had become the centerpiece of Navy strategy and operational organization. The Navy’s newest and best ships deployed to the Mediterranean, and the Navy’s brightest and most aggressive admirals were assigned there.

The Air Force creates USAFE

In 1950 the JCS established Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE) as a specified command as well, with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force as JCS executive agent.241

Thus there were, in 1950, in effect three separate service combatant commands in and around Europe, with separate functions and responsibilities.

The NATO ACE overlay

In 1949, however, the North Atlantic Treaty had been signed and in 1951 the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) was established. General Eisenhower, the first SACEUR, demanded and received from President Truman, for alliance purposes, the operational command of all U.S. forces in Europe, regardless of service. This included CINCNELM, when acting in an alliance capacity.

The CNO, ADM Forrest Sherman, acquiesced in this decision, which he knew was beyond his ability to influence. ADM Forrest Sherman, before becoming CNO, had been the architect of the new U.S. Navy forward-deployed main battle fleet concept. He had skippered its prototype—the Sixth Task Fleet in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, he well understood that resistance to Eisenhower's demand for command over the Sixth Fleet as allied SACEUR would be futile. The President was hardly going to stand up to Eisenhower—whom he desperately wanted to take the job of SACEUR—over the issue of Navy command of the Sixth Fleet. Accordingly, Sherman "rolled"—to the chagrin of ADM Robert B. Carney, the incumbent CINCNELM (and a future CNO).

Eisenhower was not, however (nor did he desire to be), CINCEUR—a position held by a separate U.S. Army general. Therefore, his authority extended only through the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command structure for Allied

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Command Europe (ACE). Eisenhower set up in Paris a headquarters for ACE, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and designated a Royal Navy admiral as his initial subordinate theater commander for Northern Europe, CINCNORTH.

In June 1951, ADM Carney now also became one of Eisenhower’s NATO theater commanders, Commander in Chief, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), shifting his principal headquarters from London to a command ship in Naples, Italy. Carney wore both hats only for a year, however, in part because of Eisenhower’s disapproval of such dual-hatting. In June 1952 he relinquished his position as CINCNELM to his deputy, and the two positions were split. They would remain so for a generation.242

USEUCOM takes over everybody

Despite Eisenhower’s NATO authority, NELM remained a completely independent specified command in the U.S. command structure. In regards to Europe, this continued only briefly, however. The NATO change had started NELM on the slippery slope to European naval componency. Eisenhower’s successor, General Matthew Ridgway, desired to wear both the SACEUR and CINCEUR hats. Accordingly, in mid-1952, the JCS directed establishment of a U.S. European Command as a unified command, with the Chief of Staff of the Army as executive agent and with the old EUCOM, NELM, and USAFE as service components. Most of the old largely Army EUCOM was now redesignated as U.S. Army Forces Europe (USAREUR).

Moreover, SACEUR/USCINCEUR set up a new joint U.S. staff, separate from SHAPE, under a new Deputy CINC. Because the SAC/CINC would devote the bulk of his efforts to his NATO role, the Deputy CINC—a four-star general like the CINC/SAC—was delegated considerable authority on the U.S. side. Since 1952, SACEUR/USCINCEUR has always been a U.S. Army officer, with the exception of the 1956–1962 stint of USAF General Lauris Norstad. While the

242. The complex story of the creation of NATO’s Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) command is related in Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea.
first Deputy CINC was an Army officer, all subsequent deputies—except those serving during Norstad’s tenure as CINC—had been Air Force officers until 1998. In that year, for the first time, a U.S. Navy officer—ADM Charles S. Abbot, the former Sixth Fleet commander—became Deputy CINC at Stuttgart.

USEUCOM headquarters was temporarily opened in Frankfurt, Germany in 1952, then shifted to France, near Paris, in 1954, and finally back to Germany—Vaihingen, near Stuttgart—in 1967.

CINCNELM and CINCUSAFe retained their specified commander status for currently assigned missions outside the USCINCEUR AOR. For NELM—and for the CNO as NELM’s JCS executive agent—during the next decade this meant operations in the Middle East (i.e., in countries east of Libya and south of Turkey and in the Arabian and Red Seas, the Persian Gulf, and the Bay of Bengal). Thus, it would be CINCNELM, not USCINCEUR, who would be the principal U.S. combatant commander deploying forces during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Lebanon Crisis of 1958.

What the Navy wanted and why

The Commander in Chief Atlantic is in position . . . to apply the power of his maritime strength . . . through the sea on either flank. . . . The Sixth Fleet, for instance, is basically an Atlantic unit potentially applied at present through the CinCSouth.243

The Navy thought dividing the Mediterranean (and the Baltic) from the North Atlantic was a mistake. To the Navy, the proper application of the nation’s seapower across the Atlantic required naval commanders to have the freedom to swing their forces from the Mediterranean

to the north and back again, as needs dictated. A line on the water at Gibraltar made little sense.\textsuperscript{244}

Also, throughout the remainder of the Cold War, the Navy and NAVEUR chafed under the air-ground, Central Europe focus of successive USCINCEUR/SACEURs. These officers invariably resisted Navy attempts to flexibly re-deploy naval forces in the Mediterranean to other theaters, especially the carriers. Besides that, they displayed little expertise or interest in their naval warfare responsibilities, and seldom acted as advocates for significant U.S. Navy force enhancements.

For example, examination of the March 1986 statement before Congress by USCINCEUR yields no mention—let alone any appreciation—of the capabilities or needs of either his Sixth Fleet or its area of operations—the Mediterranean and Southern Europe.\textsuperscript{245}

With this in mind, one can understand the shift in U.S. Navy strategic focus in the mid-1950s to the Pacific and the Norwegian Sea. While

\textsuperscript{244} This was true even in the 1990s. ADM Paul David Miller USN, as SACLANT and the first CINCUSACOM, argued for flexibility to deploy the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic into—and out of—the Mediterranean, exclaiming: "Oceans have no boundaries! That water doesn't come up to the Strait of Gibraltar and say: 'Oh, Oh, this is a gate here—I can't flow back and forth'" See his \textit{End of Tour Interview} (Norfolk VA: U.S. Atlantic Command Headquarters, Office of the Command Historian, December 1997), 15-16.

\textsuperscript{245} The choice of this example is deliberate but illustrative. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was debated in Congress and passed in 1986. March 1986, when the testimony was given, was five months after Sixth Fleet aircraft in the Mediterranean had forced down the \textit{Achille Lauro} hijackers and one month after the initial Sixth Fleet Gulf of Sidra Freedom of Navigation operations aimed at Libya. The CINC's only stated naval interest in his testimony was sealift, mentioned once in passing. Army and Air Force forces, systems, requirements, and commands received far more coverage. See "Statement of General Bernard W. Rogers, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command," in 99th Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. Senate, \textit{Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services on the DOD Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987: Part II: Unified Commands}, (March 11,12, 1986), 768-779.
strategic and policy considerations certainly helped drive this shift, organizational factors were not absent.

Making the shoreline the boundary

From World War II up through the creation of NATO, the AORs of NELM and its predecessors had extended westward out into the eastern Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea, and up into the Arctic. Waters off Africa, including the Canaries, had been transferred to LANTCOM, however, in 1948. Now, with an Army (and NATO) general as unified commander, however, a much larger change would occur.

The new NATO ACE did not extend westward beyond the shoreline of Western Europe. In 1953, the U.S. and NATO command boundaries were made more congruent, and NELM ceded the eastern Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, and North Sea to LANTCOM/LANTFLT. Also, specifically, the revised UCP of 1953, promulgated by SECDEF, ceded NELM's ASW responsibilities in the North Atlantic to LANTCOM.246 Thus, when NELM became a component command of USEUCOM, a U.S. Navy commander would still retain control of the North Atlantic.247

CINCNELM did in fact retain logistic and other responsibilities in the eastern North Atlantic and Arctic, but now in a complex dual-hatted arrangement whereby he gained a new, non-European hat. He was now, in addition to being CINCNELM (a subordinate of USCINCEUR), placed under CINCLANTFLT as Subordinate Commander Atlantic Fleet (SUCLANTFLT) (in 1958 restyled U.S. Commander, Eastern Atlantic (USCOMEASTLANT)). This complex arrangement would continue through 1999, although by then the Deputy CINCUSNAVEUR would wear the dual hat.

Getting the eastern Atlantic and Arctic out from under USEUCOM was an issue of very great importance to the Navy. The Navy had


focused principally on the Pacific in World War II and on the Medi-
terranean in the first several years after the war. In the early 1950s, the 
strategic importance of the eastern Atlantic for the United States had 
greatly increased from the backwater it had been in the late 1940s. 
Not only was it now the terminus of the ocean highway from the 
United States to its new NATO partners, but it also led in the far north 
to Russia’s Kola Peninsula, where the Soviets were basing an increas-
ing share of their armed forces, especially their fleet and most espe-
cially their fleet’s new submarines, ocean-raiding cruisers, and land-
based aviation.248

The template for NELM was now no longer the Royal Navy and the World War 
II experience, but NATO and the Cold War. The headquarters staff, how-
ever, never moved from London. Despite numerous schemes over the 
years to move it, NAVEUR headquarters mostly remained in London 
as of 1999.

The new Cold War template necessitated, however, the fragmentation 
of NELM’s waterspace. NELM was now responsible only for the Baltic 
Sea in the north and the Mediterranean and Black Seas in the 
south—two unconnected sea areas separated by the European conti-
inent. NELM’s Sixth Fleet operated only in the Mediterranean—with 
occasional forays into the Black Sea. Infrequent U.S. Navy Baltic oper-
ations were controlled directly out of London. Mostly, however, the 
Baltic was left to the new West German Navy and other West 
European naval allies.

From NELM to NAVEUR

In 1956, CINCUSAFE lost his dual-hatted status as a specified com-
mander. Henceforth, he would only be a USEUCOM component 
commander. CINCNELM, however, continued to serve also as a spec-
ified commander for the Middle East for several more years. In 1960, 
CINCNELM/USCOMEASTLANT had to take on the concurrent title 
of Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUS-
NAVEUR), when acting as the Navy component commander under 
USCINCEUR.

248. See, for example, Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy, 77.
NELM continued to function as an independent specified command for Middle East operations until 1963, when the specified command and the NELM designation were both finally abolished.  

Henceforth the CINC was—like CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR—solely a USEUCOM component commander, styled after CINCUSNAVEUR (and USCOMEASTLANT). Operational control of the Middle East Force moved from CINCNELM/CINCUSNAVEUR to the new USCINCSTRIKE/CINCMEEAFSA.

As a subordinate USEUCOM component commander, CINCUSNAVEUR’s responsibilities changed as USCINCEUR’s responsibilities changed. Thus, from 1972 to 1983, when USCINCEUR had responsibility for the Middle East and Persian Gulf, so too did CINCUSNAVEUR, regaining OPCON of the Middle East Force during this period. Later, in the 1980s, CINCUSNAVEUR, as a subordinate of USCINCEUR, became responsible for operations in most of sub-Saharan Africa. That region had been unassigned to any CINC for a decade, despite a Navy preference for USCINCLANT. The JCS gave USEUCOM the job in 1983.

During the 1980s and 1990s, USCINCEUR also took on increasing responsibilities in Eastern Europe:

- The East European Warsaw Pact nations were added to the USEUCOM AOR in 1983.
- The three former Soviet Baltic republics were added in 1993.
- Finally, in 1998, six more former Soviet republics in eastern Europe and the trans-Caucasus were added to USEUCOM in a UCP revision.

For CINCUSNAVEUR, this meant increased responsibilities in the Black and Baltic Seas.

249. See the discussion of the U.S. Central Command below for more detail.

250. For two case studies of how the national and naval chains of command worked in the Mediterranean during crises in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see Bouchard, *Command in Crisis*, chapters on “The 1967 Arab-Israeli War” and the “1973 Arab-Israeli War.”
Re-integrating the NATO and U.S. naval hats

In 1977, the rank of the CINCUSNAVEUR incumbent was downgraded for the first time since 1942 to vice admiral. The Navy had been under pressure to reduce four-star flag billets, and CINCUSNAVEUR’s four-star status was deemed expendable. In 1986, however, ADM William J. Crowe—then serving as NATO CINCSOUTH—re-united the NATO CINCSOUTH and U.S. CINCUSNAVEUR positions after a 30-year break. In addition to re-combining the two jobs, this action also elevated CINCUSNAVEUR to four-star rank again.

Following the SACEUR/USCINCEUR model, ADM Crowe and his successors focused principally on their NATO responsibilities. Two separate staffs in two separate locations were maintained. The CINCs kept Naples as their primary (and NATO) headquarters. They delegated considerable authority as U.S. fleet commander in chief and Navy service component commander to their two-star deputies (and their CINCUSNAVEUR staffs) in London.

After the Cold War and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, maintaining a senior U.S. naval commander in Naples who was also a NATO commander proved quite useful to U.S. policy. Consequently, there were few in the U.S. government who were unopposed to an abortive French initiative in 1996–1997 to designate a European as NATO CINCSOUTH, instead of a U.S. Navy admiral.

In 1994, the NATO command structure began to be downsized and adjusted to the post-Cold War environment. As part of the changes, Allied Command Channel disappeared. SACEUR’s area of responsibility was expanded westward somewhat, to encompass the English Channel, the North Sea, and waters off the Norwegian Coast, as part of a new major ACE subordinate command, Allied Forces Northwest Europe.

While the boundary between LANTCOM and USEUCOM had been shifted considerably eastward in 1953 to make it more congruent with that between ACLANT and ACE, no similar adjustment westward on the same principle was made (as of 1999). Consequently, the 1998 UCP shows the USACOM area of responsibility as still extending from
the East Coast of the United States north of Miami all the way to the West European and West African shorelines.

Interestingly, the incumbent USCINCEUR as of 1999, GEN Wesley Clark USA, had previously been USCINCSO, and as such had just presided over the expansion of USSOUTHCOM into the Latin American littoral waterspace and the Caribbean at the expense of USACOM.

**Late developments**

Three developments in the late 1990s bring this organizational history up to date:

In 1998, consideration was given to changing the title of Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (COMUSNAVEUR). This was in response to a Joint Staff directive eliminating the title of “commander in chief” for all commanders other than combatant commanders, worldwide. The change never occurred, however.

Also in 1998, plans were put in train to make the Sixth Fleet’s AOR boundaries congruent with those of NAVEUR and USEUCOM. That is to say, the Sixth Fleet AOR would now include the Baltic and such other waters (e.g., in the Eastern Atlantic) as might come USEUCOM’s way in future UCP revisions. This policy change was implemented in 1999.

Finally, yet another initiative was under study in 1998-1999 to move the command’s headquarters staff from London to Naples.

**1999**

As of 1999, USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR remained responsible for the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas, as well as the land area of Europe west of Russia, parts of the Middle East, and all of Africa west of Egypt, the Sudan, and Kenya. USCINCEUR is also Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), a major NATO commander, and as such is responsible for the defense of Allied Command Europe (ACE). As SACEUR, his command boundaries on land
embrace only the territories of NATO's European members. At sea, however, his area of responsibility includes not only the Mediterranean, Baltic, and Black Seas, but also a small portion of the eastern Atlantic not assigned to him in his U.S. hat as USCEUR.251

251. For wiring diagrams of the USEUCOM and ACE organizations, see the latest printed (1997) or web site (1999) edition of the Joint Staff Officer's Guide (AFSC Pub 1).
VIII. The USSOUTHCOM Cinderella

Overview

The organizational history of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)—and of its predecessor Caribbean Command (CARIBCOM)—is largely the history of a struggle with the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) for dominance in the Caribbean and Latin American littoral waters. In the end, USSOUTHCOM won; LANTCOM became something different—USACOM.

The Navy acted in Washington as the chief opponent of USSOUTHCOM and the advocate for LANTCOM, arguing for LANTCOM expansion at the expense of USSOUTHCOM, and for the abolition of USSOUTHCOM, or at least its subordination to LANTCOM as a subordinate unified command.252

During the Cold War, the Navy/LANTCOM position often carried the day. As long as the Navy could stress the importance of Latin American and Caribbean sea lanes to the trans-oceanic sea lines of communications (SLOCs), its position would often be supported. While CARIBCOM and later USSOUTHCOM were never in fact abolished, they often came close, and they were granted little water area. By the mid-1990s, however, with the Cold War's end and lessened concern for the SLOCs, the Navy and LANTCOM would finally lose this battle.

Throughout the entire post-World War II period, the Navy, CARIBCOM, and USSOUTHCOM tried a variety of mechanisms to implement U.S. Navy componency in the theater, none of which has proven particularly satisfactory or long-lived.

Geographical boundary changes are depicted in figures 37 through 40. Figures 41 and 42 provide organizational milestones and timelines.

252. The historical portions of the manual United States Southern Command, produced by USSOUTHCOM staff (circa 1992), provide a good basic reference.
Figure 37. *Focus on the Canal*: U.S. Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier, 1947–1957


Key
- LANTCOM Naval Bases
- Gtmo: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
- Tr: Trinidad
- RR: Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico
Figure 39. *Finally adding some blue water:* U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1996–1997

Figure 40. *Adding more blue water:* U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1997–1998
Figure 41. U.S. commands in Latin America: organizational milestones

### Joint Commands

- **1940**: Navy Panama SEAFRON under Army Caribbean Defense Command
- **1941**: CARIBCOM created to defend Panama, Antilles and sea approaches
- **1947**: CARIBCOM loses Caribbean & Panama, sea defense role to LANTCOM
- **1949**: CARIBCOM loses Antilles, water areas and defense role, gains CA & SA MDAP role
- **1950**: 1st 4-star CINCARIB
- **1957**: CARIBCOM becomes USSOUTHCOM
- **1960**: CARIBCOM becomes USSOUTHCOM (LANTCOM gains SE Pacific from PACOM)
- **1962**: 15th ND (Panama) designated CARIBCOM component vice CARIBSEAFRON; Coco Solo closes
- **1964**: 15th ND (Panama) also designated USNAVCARIB as component
- **1969**: USNAVCARIB re-designated USNAVSO NAVSCIATTS created in Panama
- **1972**: Last USN afloat forces leave Panama

### Navy Commands

- **1940**: Special Service Squadron disestablished
- **1941**: Caribbean & Panama Coastal Frontier Commands (later Sea Frontiers) created
- **1942**: SE Pacific Cmd created under CNO double-hat of CRUDIV 3, later of PANSEAFRON
- **1957**: CARIBCOM loses Caribbean Sea Frontier becomes CARIBCOM component; Panama Sea Frontier disestablished
- **1959**: SUBRON 6 leaves Panama
- **1960**: LANTCOM / LANTFLT UNITAS deployments begin
- **1961**: LANTCOM / LANTFLT UNITAS deployments begin
- **1962**: 15th ND (Panama) also designated USNAVCARIB as component
- **1965**: USNAVCARIB re-designated USNAVSO NAVSCIATTS created in Panama
- **1970**: Last USN afloat forces leave Panama
- **1971**: USNAVSO abolished; LANTFLT becomes Navy component
- **1972**: LANTFLTDETSO created
- **1973**: WESTHEMGRU created
- **1974**: WESTHEMGRU designated LANTFLT Exec Agent for USSOUTHCOM component issues
- **1975**: WESTHEMGRU designated LANTFLT Exec Agent for USSOUTHCOM component issues
- **1976**: WESTHEMGRU designated LANTFLT Exec Agent for USSOUTHCOM component issues
- **1977**: WESTHEMGRU designated LANTFLT Exec Agent for USSOUTHCOM component issues
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- **1998**: WESTHEMGRU designated LANTFLT Exec Agent for USSOUTHCOM component issues
- **1999**: WESTHEMGRU designated LANTFLT Exec Agent for USSOUTHCOM component issues

Note: The most significant events regarding changes in the UCP and Navy componentcy are shaded.

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Sequence of commands

USSOUTHCOM is the subject of our third historical survey of the individual combatant commands. USSOUTHCOM grew out of CARIBCOM, which was among the first unified commands to be created under the Outline Command Plan of 1946. CARIBCOM was established in November 1947, following the establishment of PACOM, FECOM, ALCOM, EUCOM, and NELM.

Figure 42. Sequence of joint and Navy component commands for Latin America

CARIBCOM: defending the canal

A Caribbean Command (CARIBCOM) was designated in the initial Outline Campaign Plan in 1946, to comprise U.S. forces in Panama and the Antilles. CARIBCOM grew out of the U.S. Army’s Caribbean Defense Command, activated to defend the Panama Canal in early 1941 and assuming operational responsibility over some of the naval
forces in his area after the Pearl Harbor attack. CARIBCOM was activated in November 1947 at Quarry Heights, in the Panama Canal Zone, with the Chief of Staff of the Army as JCS executive agent.

CARIBCOM assumed command of all U.S. forces in the Caribbean islands and the Panama area except for certain fleet units and facilities that were placed under the operational control of LANTCOM and the Atlantic Fleet. It also slowly increased military assistance responsibilities in Central America and northern South America, an area of influence of the old Caribbean Defense Command.

The focus of CARIBCOM was slowly shifted, however, from the Caribbean Sea to the Latin American mainland. In 1950 the JCS, at the CNO's recommendation, gave CINCLANT the mission of protecting Caribbean sea lines of communication, through Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier (COMCARIBSEAFRON)—otherwise designated as CARIBCOM's naval component. Then, in 1955, CARIBCOM lost the waters north of the Antilles and the Bahamas to LANTCOM.

**CARIBCOM turns itself inside out**

In 1957 CINCARIB became a land-oriented CINC. He lost all the Caribbean islands and all his water, while gaining responsibility for the Central and South American land masses. He transferred to CINCLANT responsibility for defending the U.S. against attack through the Caribbean and for security of bases and possessions in that sea. PACOM took over responsibilities for CARIBCOM's Pacific water areas.

On the other hand, CINCARIB became responsible for representing U.S. interests and administering the Mutual Defense Assistance


Program (MDAP) in all of Central and South America (minus Mexico). He would also continue to administer MDAP in the Caribbean islands.

Thanks in part to Navy opposition to his very existence, CINCARIB never achieved the status of his fellow CINCs. The Commanding General of the Army Caribbean Defense Command during World War II had been a three-star officer, and the CINCARIB position remained at that level, unlike most other CINCs, who each wore four stars. CINCARIB did not achieve four-star status until 1961 (it would lose it once more from 1975 to 1983, again with Navy approval).

Choosing a Navy component for CARIBCOM

The Army's Caribbean Defense Command, CARIBCOM's World War II ancestor, had been one of the very first American commands to receive joint responsibilities. Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the President directed establishment of joint commands in Panama, under an Army commander, and in Hawaii, under a Navy commander. Accordingly, the Navy placed the Panama Sea Frontier (PANSEAFRON) under the operational control of the Caribbean Defense Command for the duration of the war. PANSEAFRON was normally commanded by a rear admiral.255

After the war, when CARIBCOM was stood up as a joint command, the Navy assigned another Sea Frontier command—the Caribbean Sea Frontier (CARIBSEAFRON)—as CARIBCOM's naval component. COMCARIBSEAFRON—a vice admiral—had his headquarters in San Juan, Puerto Rico. PANSEAFRON was disestablished, its land and water areas becoming a subordinate sector of CARIBSEAFRON. With the Alaskan Sea Frontier (ALSEAFRON), CARIBSEAFRON became one of two Navy Sea Frontiers to become Navy components of joint commands designated in the OCP. Also as with ALSEAFRON, by assigning componenty to a Sea Frontier, the Navy stressed the coastal nature of CARIBCOM's responsibilities at sea—in Navy eyes.

Compared to the naval forces assigned to LANTCOM, PACOM, NELM, and even FECOM, CARIBCOM's initial Navy assets were meager. In 1948, they consisted of a squadron of eight submarines and a tender in Panama, and maritime patrol air (MPA) squadrons in Panama, Trinidad, and Puerto Rico.

When CARIBCOM left the Caribbean (and therefore Puerto Rico) in 1957, the Navy changed its Navy component. CARIBSEAFRON was replaced by the Fifteenth Naval District, headquartered at Fort Amador in the Panama Canal Zone. It was normally commanded by a rear admiral. Like the new, transformed CARIBCOM, the Fifteenth Naval District had even less blue water capability than did the old CARIBCOM and CARIBSEAFRON. (As was recounted above, a similar evolution would occur in Alaska in 1971, when the ALCOM naval component would change from being the Alaskan Sea Frontier to the Seventeenth Naval District).

The scant U.S. Navy forces assigned to Panama and CARIBCOM during the period dwindled even further, as requirements in more forward theaters increased. The submarine squadron left Panama in 1949. The last Navy surface units left Panama in the 1960s. Amphibious ships that worked out of Panama in the 1950s were gone by the 1970s. A Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) was established in Panama in 1963, however, offering courses to students from all over the region. It remained there through the 1990s.

What the Navy wanted regarding CARIBCOM and why

The Caribbean Command made no sense to Navy officers. The Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean were part and parcel of the North Atlantic, as the Navy saw it—part of a large oceanic theater of war and peace. The Navy had the central role to play here, especially to keep

256. Things therefore had actually gone full circle. Command of the Fifteenth Naval District had been an additional duty of the old COMPANSEAFRON. This position had been the naval component commander of CINCARIB's World War II predecessor, the Caribbean Defense Command, as discussed earlier.
open the vital sea lines of communications from the Army’s Gulf terminals to Europe, and from the Panama Canal.

Besides that, to the Navy the area had little importance, other than as a pre-deployment training ground. It regarded the Caribbean as a potential force sink that could drain off forces needed elsewhere and forward.

**USSOUTHCOM: in the Navy’s cross-hairs**

In keeping with its re-orientation from the Caribbean to Central and South America, CARIBCOM was redesignated the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in 1963. The Commander, Fifteenth Naval District now used the title of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) when acting as USSOUTHCOM’s naval component commander.

The Navy, however, continued to oppose USSOUTHCOM’s existence. In 1970, the CNO formally proposed USSOUTHCOM be abolished, with its responsibilities going to LANTCOM. (The Army and Air Force would have moved those responsibilities to another unified command of the period, USSTRICOM.) The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the disestablishment but was overruled by President Nixon. USSOUTHCOM stayed. (To reinforce LANTCOM’s claim on all things Latin American, however, the Navy did manage to have LANTCOM receive responsibility for all the waters bordering Central and South America. This included the Southeast Pacific, transferred from PACOM to LANTCOM in 1972.)

A subsequent attempt by the Navy in 1974–1975 to abolish USSOUTHCOM and move its responsibilities to LANTCOM was also beaten back. The position of USCINCSO, however, was down-graded again from four stars to three in 1975, and USSOUTHCOM lost all its service component staffs, their functions being taken over by

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257. Details are in Cole et al., *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 35.
258. Ibid., 99-41.
259. Ibid., 44
subordinate units. Headquarters, USNAVSO was accordingly dis-established on 31 December 1975. Navy componency responsibilities, such as they were, devolved to U.S. Naval Station Panama. 260

What the Navy wanted re: USSOUTHCOM and why

Throughout the succeeding years, the Navy and LANTCOM attempted, although without success, to turn USSOUTHCOM into a subordinate unified command under CINCLANT. The Navy’s arguments were that USCINCSO and the SOUTHCOM staff:

- Had little or no understanding or interest in naval issues or the use of naval forces.
- Had little real knowledge or understanding of Latin American issues.
- Were almost completely focused on Panama and/or Central America. 261

In addition, the Navy and LANTCOM saw themselves as trans-governmental protectors and supporters of Latin American navies in danger of being swallowed up by their far more powerful domestic Army rivals. The U.S. Navy and LANTCOM valued these navies, however, as useful allies in a potential war at sea against a globally deployed Soviet Navy.

Fallout from the Panama Canal decision

In 1977 and 1978, the United States and Panama ratified a treaty aimed at transferring control of the Panama Canal, the U.S. Canal Zone, and all U.S. military facilities in Panama to the Panamanians by 1999, using a multiphased process. In 1978, those portions of the

260. Ibid., 47.

261. The formulation is that of CAPT Patrick Roth USN (Ret). CAPT Roth served on the OPNAV staff and dealt with Navy politico-military issues in the 1980s.
Panama Canal Zone not needed for defense or operation of the Canal were turned over to the Panamanians.

All subsequent developments in USSOUTHCOM would be heavily influenced by this process. For example, in part to ensure a senior military presence in Panama during the turnover (and in part due to the increased number of available general officer billets in the Reagan Administration military) the position of USSCINCSOUTH was redesignated a four-star billet once again, in 1983.

In 1985, COMUSNAVSO was re-established as the Navy one-star component commander to USCINCSO. Operational naval forces returned to Panama with the establishment there of Special Boat Unit 26 in 1987, Naval Special Warfare Unit 8 in 1988, and Mine Division 127 in 1990.

The reborn COMUSNAVSO didn’t last long, however. In 1991, USCINCSO saw no need for such a full-time officer and gave up the COMUSNAVSO flag billet. The CNO, concerned that Navy views needed to be heard in Panama, directed CINCLANTFLT to pick up additional duties as USSOUTHCOM Navy component commander.262 USNAVSOUTH was accordingly disestablished yet again and replaced by a staff detachment, CINCLANTFLTDET SO, located at Rodman Naval Station, Panama.

Gaining littoral waters (finally)

In 1981, USCINCSO, although supported by the Army, had been blocked in a bid to add Mexico to his area of responsibility. Instead, he lost military assistance responsibilities in the Caribbean nations to LANTCOM. This was, however, the high-water mark in LANTCOM’s supremacy over USSOUTHCOM in the Caribbean and the Latin American littoral.

In their long battle with the Navy and USLANTCOM, the Army and USSOUTHCOM ultimately prevailed. The Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened the positions of all CINC’s, including USCINCSO. The

262. Roth interview.
Cold War ended in 1990, and with it the chief justification for USLANTCOM cognizance over the Caribbean. In addition, USCINCSO's new responsibilities in the Drug War (begun in the late 1980s), as well as the victory over Manuel Noriega in Panama in 1989–1990 in Operation Just Cause, gave him a visibility and clout in Washington that he had previously lacked.

Accordingly, the 1995 UCP revision called for transfer of the water areas around Latin America to USSOUTHCOM in January 1996, followed by transfer of the Caribbean in 1997. Both these transfers came to pass, despite continued lobbying against the change by successive Navy and Marine CINCUSACOMs. Cession of the Caribbean to USSOUTHCOM had been among the issues recommended for resolution by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Thus, the Caribbean, which had been at the heart of the old CARIBCOM established in 1947, was returned to its origins. USSOUTHCOM became again what its predecessor had started as—a truly regional CINC with responsibility over both land and related littoral water areas.

On the other hand, 1997 also saw the appointment of a U.S. Marine Corps officer to head USSOUTHCOM—the first time the Army had not provided the commander since CARIBCOM was first organized. Also in 1997, the headquarters of USCINCSO shifted from Quarry Heights, Panama to Miami.

263. On the Goldwater-Nichols-enhanced position of USCINCSO vis-a-vis his subordinate commanders as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Operation Just Cause: Panama (Washington DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 1-3 and 72-74.

264. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Atlantic Command were not alone in their opposition. Caribbean island nations and Latin American navies also expressed their concerns. See, for example, Griffith, “Caribbean Geopolitics and Geonarcotics: New Dynamics, Same Old Dilemma,” 51.

only USSOUTHCOM service component still headquartered in Panama—moved from Panama, to Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{266}

Despite all this activity and the increase in its responsibilities, however, USSOUTHCOM remained in 1999 the smallest of the nine unified commands in terms of numbers of personnel and missions assigned.

**Enter the WESTHEMGRU**

In 1995, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet created a new entity in the Navy service chain of command: the Western Hemisphere Group (WESTHEMGRU), headquartered at Mayport, Florida. This was a 16-ship force of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates homeported in Mayport and Pascagoula, Mississippi. It was created largely for Navy service budget and training reasons, and was placed under the ADCON of the Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMSURFLANT), as part of the Operating Forces of the Navy.\textsuperscript{267}

WESTHEMGRU was intended to lift the burden of conducting counter-drug missions and multinational exercises from other LANTFLT ships. These ships had previously been dispatched to the Caribbean a few weeks at a time in between six-month deployments to the Mediterranean and/or the Persian Gulf. WESTHEMGRU surface ships were not expected to make six-month deployments as part of battle groups, and accordingly received modified—and cheaper—training. From its inception, WESTHEMGRU prepared the forces that, under the Commander, South Atlantic Force (COMSOLANT),

\textsuperscript{266} In 1999, the Air Force component commander, Commander, Southern Air Force, was headquartered at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, in Arizona. The Marine component commander, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces South (COMMARFORSOUTH) was headquartered in North Carolina.

\textsuperscript{267} The origins of WESTHEMGRU are reported in Jack Dorsey, “Navy’s successful drug-hunting fleet becoming sleeker, commander says,” Virginian Pilot, (14 August 1997), B3.
sailed on the annual UNITAS deployments around South America and West Africa Training Cruises (WATC) to Africa.268

In 1996, CINCLANTFLT confirmed Commander, WESTHEMGRU as his “Executive Agent” for USSOUTHCOM Navy component issues, and later designated him “Commander, Naval Forces U.S. Southern Command (Forward) (NAVSOUTH Forward).”269 In these capacities, COMWESTHEMGRU was to be under the OPCON of CINCLANTFLT.270

CINCLANTFLT also assigned WHEMGRU operational control of all ships and aircraft operating in the USSOUTHCOM AOR excluding MCM ships and Second Fleet ships in training.271 At the same time, he made COMWHEMGRU the reporting senior for COMSOLANT.

As of 1999, USCINCSO—and CINCLANTFLT as his Navy component commander—were responsible for the Atlantic, Pacific, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico waters around Central and South America and the West Indies, as well as those land areas themselves, south and east

268. On USCINCSO’s emerging relationship with the UNITAS deployment, including historical background, see Patrick H. Roth, An Analysis of the UNITAS Deployment (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, CIM 529/September 1997), especially 12 and 29-33. See also the section on UNITAS in the following chapter of this paper, which discusses the Atlantic commands.

269. CINCLANTFLT unclassified message 021905Z December 1996, “Realignment of Navy Functions In Caribbean And LATAM Area.” As of December 1996, COMWESTHEMGRU was also an ISIC under CINCLANTFLT for assigned ships, COMNAVFOR for Joint Task Force Panama, and a Task Force Commander under Commander, U.S. Second Fleet.

270. For an argument (thinly substantiated) for reconstitution of a discrete Navy service component commander under USCINCSO, see CDR Marvin E. Butcher USN, “Time for Real Reform,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (April 1997), 55.

of Mexico. (CINCLANTFLT, as Navy component commander of CINCUSACOM as well as USCINCSO, was also responsible for the rest of the Atlantic and its islands). USCINCSO and CINCLANTFLT remained responsible as well for the defense of the Panama Canal.

CINCLANTFLT delegated much of his authority as Navy component commander to the Commander, Western Hemisphere Group.272

IX. LANTFLT, LANTCOM, and USACOM: from most naval to most joint

Overview

The organizational history of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM, formerly USLANTCOM) has been complex. It has involved efforts to achieve and maintain unified command status and to create and maintain Army and Air Force components; expansion beyond U.S. Navy World War II AORs into the eastern Atlantic and Arctic; an early international confrontation with the British over the NATO Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) structure; continual struggles over responsibilities in and around Latin America with USOUTHCOM; occasional arguments over responsibilities in Africa; and recent jousting among the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the services and those unified commands designated as joint force integrators.273

The Navy historically acted as an advocate for the old USLANTCOM, arguing for expansion of its geography to encompass one coherent oceanic theater and more. With the designation of the new USACOM as principal joint force provider, trainer, and integrator in 1993, the Navy has largely been supplanted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as guardian of the Atlantic Command’s interests.

Throughout much of their history, the unified and Navy component commanders were the same person. The hats were separated in 1985.

Changes in command geography are depicted in figures 43 through 46. Figures 47 and 48 provide organizational milestones and timelines.

Figure 43. *Growing in all directions: U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1947–1963*

Figure 44. *Leaving Africa but expanding in the Indian Ocean: U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1963–1972*
Figure 45. Gone from the Indian Ocean but moving west and north: U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1972–1996

Figure 46. Transformation: Leaving the Latin American littoral and going joint: U.S. Atlantic Command, 1996–1998
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Atlantic Command</th>
<th>Atlantic Fleet</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM created</td>
<td>Patrol Force becomes Atlantic Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains EASTLANT Med approaches from NELM</td>
<td>AOR largely NW and SW Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains Caribbean-Panama Sea defense role from CARIBCOM</td>
<td>TF-23 becomes SOLANT</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICEDEFOR created</td>
<td>1941</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCLANT adds SACLANT hat</td>
<td>1943</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains EASTLANT from NELM</td>
<td>1944</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFORAZ created</td>
<td>1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNEC abolished</td>
<td>1946</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains Caribbean from CARIBCOM, CARIBSEAFRON is now also ANTHEF</td>
<td>SOLANT designated 4th Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains S-S Africa</td>
<td>8th Fleet created, SOLANT disestablished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains Arabian Sea, W. Bay of Bengal from NELM, loses S-S Africa to STRICOM / MEAFSA</td>
<td>2nd Task Flt (later 2nd Flt) absorbs 8th Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM Army, AF components designated</td>
<td>CINCLANTFLT also designated CINCLANT</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTCOM becomes MEAFSA component</td>
<td>CINCLANTFLT gains Eastern SEAFRON</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains SE Pacific from PACOM, loses N-C IO to PACOM</td>
<td>1950</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTCOM loses W. IO to PACOM</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caribbean CJTF created</td>
<td>1952</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCJTF &amp; ANTHEF combined into USFORCARIB</td>
<td>1953</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTCOM (redesignated USLANTCOM) gains Greenland</td>
<td>1954</td>
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<tr>
<td>USLANTCOM splits from LANTFLT</td>
<td>1955</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFORCARIB disestablished</td>
<td>1956</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-4 created</td>
<td>1957</td>
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<tr>
<td>USLANTCOM loses SSBNs to USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>1958</td>
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<td>USLANTCOM redesignated USCOM</td>
<td>1959</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st USMC CINCUSCOM / SACLANT</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-4 becomes JIATF-East</td>
<td>1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACOM loses SA water areas, UNITAS to USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<td>USACOM loses Caribbean to USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACOM becomes DOD joint warfighting experimentation executive agent</td>
<td>1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHEMGRU created</td>
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Note: The most significant events regarding changes in the UCP and Navy component are shaded.

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Sequence of commands

USACOM is the subject of our fourth historical survey of the individual combatant commands. USACOM grew out of LANTCOM, which in turn grew out of the Atlantic Fleet, one the first commands to be designated under the Outline Command Plan of 1946. LANTCOM itself was established in December 1947, following the establishment of PACOM, FECOM, ALCOM, EUCOM, NELM, and CARIBCOM.

Figure 48. Sequence of joint and Navy component commands in the Atlantic

Note: The figure shows commands and components as they became subsumed under the UCP. The Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT) had a history extending back before World War II.

Blue-water roots

The Atlantic Fleet, which had been re-established as a Navy fleet in 1941 and had fought World War II under a four-star admiral in Norfolk, was included in the original Outline Campaign Plan in 1946. The CNO pushed for a full joint unified command in the Atlantic, but the Army and Air Force opposed CINCLANTFLT command over
ground and air forces. This controversy, eventually to be settled in the Navy's favor, delayed establishment of the Atlantic Command as a unified command, with the CNO as JCS executive agent, until December 1947.274

In any event, CINCLANTFLT was dual-hatted as CINCLANT but had no significant Army or Air Force units assigned (and no designated Army or Air Force component commanders until 1966). A single staff served both the Atlantic Fleet and Atlantic Command. This staff was overwhelmingly Navy and Marine Corps, with only a few Army and Air Force members assigned to provide their services' perspectives on joint issues. No other unified command was so closely tied to a single service.275

CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT's initial main combat arm was a new striking fleet—the Eighth Fleet—created on the East Coast in February 1946 to deploy quickly and powerfully, if required, to the Mediterranean.276 The size of the post-war Atlantic Fleet shrank drastically, however, while the Navy built up Naval Forces Mediterranean (the future Sixth Fleet) as a new in-theater striking force in that sea. Consequently, the Eighth Fleet was disestablished at the end of 1946 and its remaining forces absorbed into the Atlantic Fleet's East Coast force, the Second Task Fleet.277

In April 1948, the Atlantic Fleet and Atlantic Command headquarters moved to the former Navy hospital at the Norfolk Naval Station, where they and their successors have remained.278

275. Hirrel, United States Atlantic Command (draft), 2.
276. Its PACOM/PACFLT West Coast striking fleet counterpart was a revitalized Fifth Fleet, discussed earlier.
278. Hirrel, United States Atlantic Command, 2-3.
Expanding to the east (I)

LANTCOM responsibilities grew. When first established, the command AOR covered only the western, central and southern Atlantic—areas in which the U.S. Navy had operated in World War II. It included neither the Eastern Atlantic and Norwegian Sea nor the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.279

Then, in 1948, its boundary with NELM was shifted eastward, expanding the LANTCOM area of responsibility to include the waters around the Cape Verde, Canary, and Madeira Islands.280

Expanding to the south

In changes to the UCP suggested by the CNO and approved by the JCS in 1950, CINCLANT was given the missions of protecting Caribbean sea communications, to include antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations and the control, routing, and protection of shipping. Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier (COMCARIBSEAFRON)—dual-hatted as a subordinate of both CINCARIB and CINCLANT—would perform these missions for CINCLANT. Additionally, CINCLANT was charged with furnishing CINCARIB with sealift in an emergency.281

In 1952 the JCS centralized LANTCOM, U.S. Northeast Command (USNEC) and NELM antisubmarine warfare responsibilities in the North Atlantic under CINCLANT. Also, as we have seen, CINCLANT acquired increased responsibilities in the Caribbean in 1955 and 1957. The 1957 transfer of the entire remaining Caribbean to LANTCOM resulted in LANTCOM’s standing up a subordinate unified command, the Antilles Defense Command (ANTDEFCOM).282 Its commander was also COMCARIBSEAFRON.

279. For a somewhat stylized map of the early LANTCOM boundaries, see Maloney, Securing Command of the Seas, 53.

280. Unclassified extract from Domayb, Naval Logistics Operations and Structure in the Mediterranean Theater, 16-17.


282. Hirrel, United States Atlantic Command, 10.
The NATO ACLANT overlay

In 1952, CINCLANT had taken on a new responsibility as a Major NATO Commander (MNC). He became the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). As such, he was co-equal to SACEUR (who was also, as we have seen, USCINCEUR). This was an unprecedented event in the Atlantic. Unlike in Europe and the Pacific, no such unified supreme allied or joint commander or command structure had existed in the Atlantic during World War II. Accordingly, negotiations with the Royal Navy and others over new Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) subordinate command responsibilities and boundaries were particularly acrimonious and protracted.283

ACLANT extended from the East Coast of the United States to the coastline of western Europe—minus the English Channel, southern and eastern North Sea, and the waters around the United Kingdom. ACLANT consequently included the eastern Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea—areas that under the U.S. command structure came under CINCNELM.

Expanding to the east (II)

In 1953, as discussed earlier, the U.S. and NATO command boundaries were made more congruent, and CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT added the eastern Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, and North Sea to his AOR. Thus, although NELM had become a component command of USEUCOM in 1952, a U.S. Navy commander now still retained responsibility for operations throughout the North Atlantic.284

This represented a major shift in responsibility for the sole service component of LANTCOM, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Since its creation in 1941, before U.S. entry into World War II, that fleet had been principally a western Atlantic force. During the war the eastern Atlantic had been chiefly the domain of the Royal Navy. After the war, the Royal

283. See Sean Maloney, Securing Command of the Seas, for all the details.

Navy had been supplanted—at least in American eyes and organization—by NELM. Now the Atlantic Fleet would unambiguously have responsibility—for the first time—for the entire Atlantic Ocean theater.

(As of 1999, it would retain this 35-year-old position in the north Atlantic, although it lost western Atlantic waters around Latin America to USSOUTHCOM in the 1990s.)

**What the Navy wanted and why**

The Navy saw the Atlantic as a coherent ocean theater—a theater that would be rendered even more coherent if it included the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and the Arctic. Command of the theater was naturally expected to reside in a Navy officer, who should be able to draw upon Army and Air Force forces to support him whenever he thought it necessary, especially in the many islands of his domain.

The principal military problems in the Atlantic were countering the Soviet navy and air force, helping out in northern Europe, and ensuring everything that had to get across the ocean to Europe got across. The Soviet buildup of its military forces on the Kola Peninsula and the American commitment to defend northern Europe certainly helped drive U.S. Navy strategy to focus increasingly on the Norwegian and Barents Seas. The organizational dimension, however, was also a driver. Like in the Pacific and unlike in the Mediterranean, in North Atlantic and Arctic waters U.S. Navy forces served a CINC who was a Navy admiral, not an Army general.

Crisis response in the Caribbean and naval presence in South America and Africa were considered subsidiary missions, but ones that the Navy had great expertise in. The Navy resented the implication that somehow it was less competent than the Army or Air Force at providing leadership or forces to handle crises in the Caribbean and Africa.

**Early warning interlude**

In its early days, LANTCOM briefly shared responsibilities in the Arctic and the far northwest Atlantic with the Air Force-dominated
U.S. Northeastern Command (USNEC) (1950-1956). This command was responsible for the air defense of the northeast approaches to the United States, including Greenland, Newfoundland, Labrador, and eastern Canada.\textsuperscript{285} It also initially had certain ASW responsibilities in the North Atlantic, responsibilities it ceded to LANTCOM at SECDEF and JCS direction in 1953.\textsuperscript{286}

USNEC’s responsibilities for air defense were eventually overshadowed by new responsibilities for early warning of air and missile attack, and the command was eventually absorbed into the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) in 1957. LANTCOM would pick up USNEC’s residual Arctic maritime responsibilities, and eventually the Greenland AOR.

Meanwhile, in 1957 a new Navy command, Barrier Force Command Atlantic (BARFORLANT), became fully operational under CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT at Argentia, Newfoundland.\textsuperscript{287} Charged with providing early warning of Soviet bomber attack on the United States over the Atlantic, it deployed a force of U.S. Navy picket ships and aircraft strung out across the North Atlantic. The Navy insisted it be organizationally a part of LANTCOM, to avoid its assets being swallowed up by the Air Force-dominated Continental Air Defense Command.

Enduring for less than a decade, BARFORLANT’s part of the LANTCOM story is a brief one.\textsuperscript{288}

\textsuperscript{285} The story of USNEC is related below in the section on air defense and space commands.

\textsuperscript{286} Cole et al., \textit{History of the Unified Command Plan}, 21-22.

\textsuperscript{287} This was a counterpart command to BARFORPAC, established a year later and discussed briefly above in the section on the Pacific.

\textsuperscript{288} The Barrier Commands will be discussed more fully below, in the context of the nation’s unified air defense and space commands.
Passing Iceland around the services

U.S. forces had occupied Iceland during World War II, after a 26-ship Atlantic Fleet task force had landed a Marine brigade there in July 1941. Following the war, Iceland had been assigned to LANTCOM's AOR. During the early Cold War, however, specific responsibility for commanding the defense of the island was passed by the JCS and CINCLANT from service to service. It finally wound up with a Navy commander in the early 1960s.

CINCLANT had set up its very first subordinate unified command—the Iceland Defense Force (ICEDEFOR)—in 1951, under an Army general. When the NATO and ACLANT command structure was organized, COMICEDEFOR also became commander of the new NATO Island Command (ISCOM), Iceland.

Army responsibilities in Iceland soon dwindled (the Army left in 1959). The job of COMICEDEFOR/COMISCOM Iceland was turned over to an Air Force general, and the Air Force retained responsibility to provide the commander until 1961, when the Navy took it over. COMBARFORLANT moved from Argentia to Keflavik and became COMICEDEFOR/COMISCOM Iceland as well. The billet was still occupied by a Navy admiral as of 1999—the only Navy subordinate unified commander in the entire U.S. combatant command structure.

Back to the Azores

The Portuguese-owned Azores had been an important air and sea antisubmarine warfare and transportation base during World War II, largely under British aegis. U.S. Navy forces there (NAVFORAZORES) were controlled by U.S. Naval Forces Europe out of London. They left by 1946.

In March 1953, the United States re-established a base in the Azores, however. Portugal was now a NATO ally. All of its territory and many of its forces came under SACLANT. Used initially as a refuelling stop but increasingly for antisubmarine warfare, the islands constituted U.S. Forces Azores (USFORAZORES), the second of the
sub-unified commands within LANTCOM, headed by an Air Force
general officer.289

By the 1990s, however, the Cold War requirement for an operational
mid-ocean base had receded. The flag billet of COMUSFORAZORES
was offered up to head a new staff section (J–7) on a transformed
USACOM staff.290 In 1999, the command continued to be headed by
an Air Force colonel.

South Atlantic Force reborn

A U.S. Navy operational command structure in the Caribbean and
South Atlantic had evolved during World War II.291 It included Sea
Frontiers in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, and a South
Atlantic Force (SOLANT). Having grown out of a pre-war Atlantic
Fleet task force, SOLANT, headquartered in Brazil, reported to
CINCLANTFLT throughout the war. SOLANT had also been design-
nated the Fourth Fleet from 1943 to 1945, and the Tenth Fleet briefly
in 1946.

CINCLANTFLT disestablished SOLANT in 1946, but re-created it in
Trinidad in 1958. COMSOLANT moved his headquarters from
Trinidad to Puerto Rico in 1966, and continues in existence as of
1999.


1 October 1993 (Norfolk VA: Headquarters, Commander in Chief,

291. For a fuller chronology of U.S. Navy wartime post-war activities in Latin
America, see Roth, *The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps in Latin America:*
1776-1994
LANTFLT and antisubmarine warfare

The Atlantic Fleet, as LANTCOM’s principal component, had three major conventional operational missions:292

- Preparation and training of forces bound for the Mediterranean and other forward-deployment areas
- Constitution of a striking fleet—the Second Fleet—for forward operations on the European littoral
- Antisubmarine warfare.

Organizational arrangements for the first two missions stayed pretty stable. Organizational arrangements for antisubmarine warfare operations sometimes changed significantly, however. The most important change was the constitution in 1957 of the Anti-Submarine Defense Force, Atlantic (ASDEFLANT), which later became the Anti-Submarine Warfare Force, Atlantic (ASWFORLANT).293

This was a major separate operational force, commanded by a vice admiral and co-equal in organizational status with the Second Fleet. It was essentially composed of hunter-killer task groups that ranged throughout the ocean, each group centered on an antisubmarine warfare carrier (CVS). The command went out of existence as a major separate force in 1973, with the phasing out of the Navy’s CVS fleet and the creation of multipurpose CVs and CVNs.

CINCLANT’s brief African tour

LANTCOM had had, since at least the early 1950s, responsibility for all Atlantic and Indian Ocean waters around Africa as far as Kenya. The early 1960s saw the American government pay increasing attention to sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, LANTCOM was given increased African responsibilities, but only for a short time.

292. The strategic nuclear deterrence mission will be discussed more fully below in the section on strategic commands.

293. The Navy’s early and mid-Cold War ASW posture in the Atlantic is described in Sea-Based Anti-Submarine Warfare 1940-1977.
In 1960, the Secretary of Defense gave CINCLANT the responsibility for plans and operations pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa, amended in 1961 to include sea evacuation operations. SECDEF also instructed CINCLANT to establish a small joint task force headquarters (JTF-4) under an Army lieutenant general, to serve as his executive agent for Africa and, if necessary, as the nucleus of a theater headquarters.\footnote{Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 30-31.}

The CNO and CMC argued that CINCLANT be given full responsibilities for sub-Saharan Africa similar to those assigned to all unified commanders. The other service chiefs and the Secretary of Defense thought differently, however. As will be discussed below, LANTCOM had to transfer these African responsibilities to a new Middle East, Africa and South Asia (MEAFSA) combatant command in 1963. But LANTCOM inherited—from the now defunct NELM—the Arabian Sea and the western Bay of Bengal (a responsibility it would only get to keep, however, for less than a decade).

These changes in the organization charts were reflected in new operations at sea: CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT put COMSOLANT in charge of a bi-annual program of AMITY cruises to Africa, begun in 1958; the annual UNITAS international deployments around South America, begun in 1960; and CINCLANT’s portion of the Indian Ocean (when that in fact existed, in the 1960s).\footnote{Richard K. Smith et al., Cold War Navy, 17-10, 17-11.} The SOLANT AMITY cruises lapsed in the 1960s. UNITAS would endure, however, as of 1999 as the longest, and largest, continuous U.S. military operation and presence mission in South America—albeit now under USSOUTHCOM aegis.\footnote{See Roth, An Analysis of the UNITAS Deployment, especially 30-31.}

Cuba

In 1961 and again in 1962, CINCLANT faced increased planning requirements for Cuba and the Congo. CINCLANT, the Navy, and the Marine Corps unsuccessfully attempted to have the JCS activate Army and Air Force components—which every other unified commander
possessed—for LANTCOM. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Commander of the Air Force Tactical Air Command (COMTAC) assumed the duties of CINCAFLANT on his own initiative, and CINCLANT designated COMTAC and the Commanding General, Continental Army Command (CG CONARC) as interim Air Force and Army component commanders for contingency planning.

Nevertheless, the JCS mandated that the five Army divisions assigned to CINCLANT for the Cuban Missile Crisis be designated TF-Cuba, not ARLANT. It was not until 1966 that COMTAC and CG, CONARC were designated as the wartime Air Force and Army component commanders for CINCLANT. The Atlantic Fleet remained the only peacetime component of LANTCOM.

Naval forces during the crisis were directly controlled by CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT, who received Washington direction—despite the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act—from the CNO operating out of the OPNAV command center in the Pentagon. CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT set up a Blockade Force under the Commander, Second Fleet, and an Antisubmarine Force under the Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Force, Atlantic—each a vice admiral.

The Cuban Missile Crisis would be the most significant operation conducted by the Atlantic Command. The command would also direct major U.S. operations in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and Haiti in 1994 (as well as a number of minor


298. On national and naval command and control during the Cuban Missile Crisis, see the case study in Bouchard, Command in Crisis, “The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.” See also Curtis A. Utz, Cordon of Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington DC: Naval Historical Center, 1993).

299. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 32.
operations). The location of these operations reflects the strong Caribbean crisis-response focus of the command during the mid- and late Cold War, alongside planning for operations against the Soviets in the North Atlantic and Arctic.

First try at a joint force integrator

In 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had created a new unified U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida). Its missions were to conduct joint training, develop joint doctrine, train the general reserve, and plan contingency operations as directed by the JCS. CINCSTRIKE also took on a concurrent title and responsibilities in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (MEAFSA) as CINCMEAFSA in 1963. As mentioned above, CINCMEAFSA thereby gained LANTCOM’s African responsibilities.

Except for the assignment of a few Navy and Marine Corps officers to the headquarters and OPCON of the Middle East Force, no naval forces were initially assigned to USSTRICOM. From the beginning, Army officers dominated USSTRICOM. The CINC was always a four-star Army general. The Navy, however, gradually increased its presence on the USSTRICOM staff. In 1961, the staff had only two


301. MEAFSA will be discussed below, in the context of the origins of USCENTCOM.

Navy officers and one Marine. By 1967 those numbers had grown to 50 and 30, respectively.303

The Navy (and Marine Corps) continued to successfully oppose assigning any of their forces to this new command. The Navy argued that its flexibility would suffer in a command tailored to Army and Air Force requirements.304 Thus, only the Army’s Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command (TAC) were assigned to STRICOM, commanded by an Army general as CINC with an Air Force general as deputy. In the event he was given a contingency mission requiring Navy or Marine forces, the new CINC-STRIKE envisioned he would ask the CNO to assign an appropriate naval component to work with his headquarters.305

Eventually, in 1966, CINCLANTFLT was made USSTRICOM’s naval component, but for planning purposes only. Even this was over Navy opposition.306 As such, he took the title Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (CINCUS-NAVMEAFSA). The Middle East Force continued to report directly to USCINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, although its forces and support came almost exclusively from CINCLANTFLT as well.

In 1970 a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended merging LANTCOM and USSTRICOM into a tactical or general purpose command, incorporating all CONUS-based general purpose forces assigned to organized combat units. This idea surfaced 20 years too early, however, and nothing came of it.

304. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 32.
306. Lovelace and Young, Defining U.S. Atlantic Command’s Role in the Power Projection Strategy, 3.
From USSTRICOM to USREDCOM

In 1971 USSTRICOM was finally replaced by a new U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM). In essence, USREDCOM was a redesignated USSTRICOM divested of its MEAFSA responsibilities. In 1974 the Navy and Marine Corps unsuccessfully recommended replacing USREDCOM with a joint training and exercise headquarters. Instead, the JCS and SECDEF gave REDCOM the additional task of conducting planning and providing joint task force headquarters and forces for contingency operations, as well as planning for disaster relief and emergency evacuations in sub-Saharan Africa, Mexico, and other unassigned areas.

USCINCREDS kept his role limited and did not accomplish major initiatives in joint doctrine and integration. When the new U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was activated in 1987 as a combatant command, budgetary constraints meant that another combatant command had to disappear. REDCOM was the obvious choice. At the same time, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) was designated a specified command. The idea of a Unified Command as joint force integrator would lay dormant again for a few more years.

LANTCOM high water

Meanwhile, in the UCP adjustments that had taken effect on 1 January 1972, upon the disestablishment of CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFA, CINCLANT lost its less-than-a-decade-long responsibility for the north central Indian Ocean to CINCPAC. It gained responsibility, however, for all waters—Atlantic and Pacific—around South America—waters it would keep for over two decades.

In 1976 LANTCOM lost the remainder of its Indian Ocean responsibilities to PACOM. It also failed in attempts to secure for itself the responsibilities of USSOUTHCOM ashore, despite support for this move by the Navy. On the other hand, the Navy beat back an Army

and Air Force attempt in 1971 to redesignate LANTCOM as a specified command, and did so again in 1974–1975.\textsuperscript{308}

In 1978 LANTCOM, through COMSOLANT, resumed routine naval presence operations off West Africa, initiating annual surface ship West African Training Cruises (WATC). These were closely coordinated with SOLANT’s ongoing annual UNITAS deployments around South America.\textsuperscript{309}

**Focus on the Caribbean**

In 1979, in the wake of the discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, President Carter ordered CINCLANT to establish a Caribbean Combined Joint Task Force (CCJTF) as a subordinate unified command, with headquarters in Key West. While the CCJTF concentrated its efforts on Cuba and the northern Caribbean, LANTCOM’s other subordinate organization in the Caribbean, the Antilles Defense Command (ANTDEFCOM), performed a similar mission in the southern Caribbean.\textsuperscript{310}

In 1981, over the opposition of the Army (which argued to transfer Caribbean responsibilities to USCINCSO), CINCLANT was permitted to combine the two into the United States Forces Caribbean (USFORCARIB), with headquarters in Puerto Rico, and to take security assistance responsibilities in the Caribbean nations from USCINCSO. The rationale was the primacy in the region of the mission to protect sea lines of communication in wartime.\textsuperscript{311}

This was the high-water mark in LANTCOM’s organizational supremacy over USSOUTHCOM in the Caribbean and the Latin American littoral.

\textsuperscript{308} Cole et al., *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 44.

\textsuperscript{309} U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (May 1979), 50.

\textsuperscript{310} Cole et al., *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 70.

\textsuperscript{311} Ibid., 72-73.
In 1982, LANTCOM made an unsuccessful bid to have USSOUTHCOM made a subordinate Army-oriented unified commander under LANTCOM, alongside or consolidated with USFORCARIB. These differences in views continued throughout the 1980s, between the Army and the Navy, USSOUTHCOM and LANTCOM, and devotees of pan-Atlantic SLOC networks and Caribbean contingencies.

Disestablishment of the command was one of the issues recommended for resolution in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In 1989, with the regional situation changed, USFORCARIB was finally abolished.

Picking up Greenland

The air defense of Greenland had earlier been part of the now defunct USNEC AOR. With the demise of USNEC in 1956, CINCONAD and later CINCAD inherited USNEC's air defense responsibilities for the island. Otherwise, military missions in Greenland went unassigned, despite CINCLANT's responsibility to defend the island in his capacity as SACLANT.

Finally, in 1983 (and over Army opposition), Greenland was added to the LANTCOM AOR, to add coherence to the Atlantic as a maritime theater in any future war with the Soviets.

312. Ibid., 83.
313. See, for example, the 1987 opposing points of view between USCINCSO GEN Galvin and USCINCLANT ADM Baggett, in Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 100th Congress, February 23, 1987 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1987): 914-15.
315. Cole et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 27, 79, 81, and 84.
Grenada and the clamor for jointness

In 1983, the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) was redesignated as the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM).

In that same year, reacting to a coup in the independent southern Antilles island of Grenada, the JCS ordered USCINCLANT—ADM Wesley McDonald—to protect American citizens there and stabilize the internal situation. The resultant operation—Urgent Fury—involved a joint invasion of the island. Such an operation had not been foreseen; planning therefore had to start from scratch and move quickly.

With the CJCS designated by SECDEF as his direct operational superior, ADM McDonald set up a Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct the operation. It was headed by the Commander of the U.S. Second Fleet, and the Second Fleet staff acted as JTF headquarters.

The operation achieved its objectives. In its aftermath, however, it was much criticized in the press, the Congress, among defense pundits, and within the defense establishment. Deficiencies in JTF jointness, the operational chain of command, and communications interoperability across services were frequently cited as causes of real (and alleged) mistakes made on the island.

USLANTCOM henceforth became a focal point for discontent with joint command arrangements worldwide.316

Splitting from LANTFLT

The Grenada operation proved to be the last significant action where USLANTCOM and LANTFLT headquarters were integrated. Proposals to separate the two headquarters—and the two commanders—

had surfaced as early as 1969, under ADM Ephraim P. Holmes. Advocates of separation believed that the combined responsibilities of SACLANT, USCINCLANT, and CINCLANTFLT were more than one officer could handle effectively. All efforts at separation, however, encountered questions of manpower and costs.

In 1985, the positions of USCINCLANT/SACLANT and CINCLANTFLT were finally split. Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman was a strong advocate of the split. With the support of the CJCS, Lehman overcame the reluctance of the Secretary of Defense, and accomplished the act.

The Navy disestablished its Naval Material Command, making the necessary new four-star billet available. Initially the admiral filling the position of CINCLANTFLT also acted as deputy USCINCLANT, but this arrangement lasted only a year, when separate billets were authorized. The old USCINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT staff reorganized to operate separately, but both resultant new staffs continued to use the facilities at the old Norfolk compound.

Note that, unlike the situation in the Pacific a quarter of a century earlier, it was now the Navy—albeit the civilian Secretary and his cohorts—that now argued for the unified commander-component commander split. Indeed, some in the uniformed Navy leadership opposed the split.

317. Hirrel, United States Atlantic Command (draft), 32.
319. Hirrel, United States Atlantic Command (draft), 32.
320. See, for example, ADM Harry D. Train II USN (Ret), Oral History (U.S. Naval Institute Oral History Program, 2 October 1996), 466-8.
In with the new: transforming into USACOM

The enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 and the appointment of General Colin Powell as CJCS in 1989 brought about a major change of course at USLANTCOM.\textsuperscript{321} Goldwater-Nichols placed greater emphasis on joint military operations, and sought to downgrade the role of the individual services in planning and conducting military operations. General Powell took the initiative in recreating a CONUS-based command designed to both deal with contingencies and perform the function of \textit{joint force integrator}—shades of the old USSTRICOM and USREDCOM.

General Powell believed that, while the unified command system worked well overseas, CONUS forces were too service-oriented. Drawing upon the experiences of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, he rejected Marine Corps arguments that a CONUS-based command that was globally oriented could not acquire regional expertise.

Because it was CONUS-based and its Cold War mission had been greatly reduced—and because he wanted the Navy on board—Powell selected U.S. Atlantic Command as his joint force integrator.\textsuperscript{322} The incumbent USCINCLANT, ADM Paul David Miller, enthusiastically agreed. Miller was backed by two of his principal staff deputies, who later became CINCs of the Atlantic Command themselves: MajGen John J. Sheehan USMC and RADM Harold W. Gehman USN.\textsuperscript{323}

On 1 October 1993, an expanded USLANTCOM—now styled USACOM—was created. It had as its components Air Combat Command (ACC), Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT), the Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), and FORSCOM (which lost its status as the last specified command).\textsuperscript{324} This was the first time the Atlantic

\textsuperscript{321} The principal reference for the transformation of the Atlantic Command, including Navy views, is McClintock, \textit{Establishment of United States Atlantic Command}.

\textsuperscript{322} Cole et al., \textit{History of the Unified Command Plan}, 112.

\textsuperscript{323} Hirrel, \textit{United States Atlantic Command}, 34.

\textsuperscript{324} General Powell had been Commander in Chief of Forces Command before assuming the Chairmanship.
Command had permanent, peacetime COCOM of major elements from all four services.

The Army had wanted USACOM to control West Coast Navy and Marine Forces as well. Like USSOUTHCOM, however, the Army argued against giving USACOM any area responsibilities. Powell decided to do just the opposite. Thus, USACOM/ACLANT uniquely melded area, functional, and allied responsibilities. As the joint force integrator, it was intended to open a new chapter in the evolution of the joint system.

From 1994 to 1997, for the first and only time, a non-Navy officer (albeit a naval officer—a Marine Corps general) served as USACOM/SACLANT: Gen John Sheehan, who had formerly served under ADM Miller on the USLANTCOM staff and had backed the change. Sheehan would be succeeded by ADM Harold Gehman, likewise an alumnus of the Miller USLANTCOM team.

A subsequent change to the UCP, in 1997, clarified the role of USACOM further regarding homeland defense and joint force integration. USACOM was specifically tasked with providing military support for domestic crises and with guarding the air and maritime approaches to the continental United States.

The 1997 UCP change also called upon USACOM to conduct more true integration of forces from the four services in warfighting exercises, rather than merely include these forces nominally in the same exercise. In 1998, under congressional pressure to enhance USACOM's role as joint force trainer and integrator, the CJCS transferred five joint activities to USACOM command and control: the Joint Warfighting Center, the Joint Communications Support Element, the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, the Joint Battle Center, and the Joint Warfighting Analysis Center. CINCUSACOM was now

325. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 7, 114
326. As reported in Inside the Pentagon (December 25, 1997), 1-2.
being styled the executive agent for all "joint warfighting experiments."327

Disavowing NATO entanglements

Some in the Navy, like CNO ADM Frank Kelso, an ex-SACLANT/USCINCLANT—had opposed the change on the grounds that it would have negative effects on the U.S. position within NATO. ADM Kelso, supported by the Marine Corps and USCINCEUR/SAEUR, wanted CINCLANTFLT to pick up the SACLANT hat, so that SACLANT would remain a Navy officer.328 The change in LANTCOM/USACOM's mission presented the possibility that an officer from a service other than the Navy might serve as CINC for Atlantic Command, as well as NATO's SACLANT.

Because the provisions for creating ACLANT specified that a U.S. Navy officer would be the SACLANT, the United States had to obtain agreement from the other NATO nations that an officer from a different service might command ACLANT.329 General Powell canvassed NATO defense chiefs (most of whom were not themselves Navy officers) and unsurprisingly found that none insisted upon SACLANT always being a naval officer.330 So U.S. Navy objections on that score were overruled.

Also, at the same time that LANTCOM was becoming ACOM, NATO was itself revamping its military command structure. The resultant revision did away with CINCCHAN as a major NATO Commander and extended SACEUR's authority out over the entire North Sea, English Channel, and western approaches to the United Kingdom. Thus, in his SACEUR hat, USCINCEUR now had a much different, AOR, including a significant slice of the eastern Atlantic. As

327. This move was extensively reported in the national security trade press. See, for example, "Cohen Signs Plan Giving Atlantic Command Joint Experimentation Role," in Inside the Pentagon (May 21, 1998), 1-2.
328. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 115.
329. Hirrel, United States Atlantic Command (draft), 35.
USCINCEUR, however, he remained—as of 1999—hugging the west European coast.\textsuperscript{331}

**The Navy opposes the change**

While ADM Miller and his staff may have welcomed the change from USLANTCOM to USACOM, much of the Navy was against it. ADM Henry Mauz, the CINCLANTFLT, initially vehemently opposed the plan because “USACOM as an entity threatened the Navy’s two-fleet [Atlantic and Pacific] structure.” ADM Frank Kelso, the CNO, and a former USCINCLANT, adamantly rejected Miller’s notion of dropping the title of “CINC” for the Navy’s fleet commanders.\textsuperscript{332}

VCNO Stanley R. Arthur summed up mainstream Navy thinking: “No matter how you cut it, Navy is a \textit{net loser}.”\textsuperscript{333}

Such Navy recalcitrance might have carried the day in earlier times. It did not in the 1990s. USACOM emerged. USLANTCOM faded into history. Also, Navy thinking itself was shifting and fragmenting: One of ADM Mauz’s successors as CINCLANTFLT, ADM J. Paul Reason USN, later advocated a Joint Forces Command and a unitary fleet command structure.\textsuperscript{334}

**Out with the old: shedding functions and geography**

In 1988, USLANTCOM (and USPACOM) had lost combatant command of their CONUS-based Navy Special Warfare forces to the new

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{331} These changes are described and analyzed in William T. Johnson, “Reorganizing NATO Command and Control Structures: More Work in the Augean Stables” in Thomas-Durell Young (ed.), \textit{Command in NATO After the Cold War: Alliance, National and Multinational Considerations} (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 1997), 9-28.
  \item \textsuperscript{332} McClintock, \textit{Establishment of United States Atlantic Command}, 34.
  \item \textsuperscript{333} Ibid., 50.
  \item \textsuperscript{334} ADM J. Paul Reason USN (with David G. Freymann), \textit{Sailing New Seas}, (Newport RI: Naval War College Press, March 1998).
\end{itemize}
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCCOM), established the preceding year. In 1992, USLANTCOM and PACOM likewise transferred combatant command of their ballistic missile submarines and other strategic forces to the newly stood up U.S. Strategic Command.

As discussed above, the 1995 UCP revision called for transfer of the water areas around Latin America and in the Caribbean to USSOUTHCOM. These transfers came to pass in 1996 and 1997. Along with the water went oversight of the UNITAS deployment as well. Thus, the long seesaw between the two commands over Latin America ended in 1997 as a victory for USSOUTHCOM. In 1996 and 1997, USCINCAOCOM tried to make a reclama to this change, but was unsuccessful.

As of 1999, CINCUSACOM and CINCLANTFLT remained responsible for the broad reaches of much of the Arctic Ocean and the North and Southeast Atlantic and their islands, especially Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores. These water areas reached right up to the shorelines of Europe and Africa and included the North Sea, the English Channel, and the western approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar. CINCUSACOM also carried out increasing responsibilities for the joint training and readiness of most U.S. forces based in CONUS. CINCUSACOM was also Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), a major NATO commander, with ACLANT command boundaries in the Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer differing from those of USACOM.

335. See section on origins of USSOCCOM below.
336. See section on origins of USSTRATCOM below.
CINCLANTFLT, as Navy component commander of USSOUTHCOM as well as USACOM, was also responsible for the Atlantic, Pacific, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico waters around Central and South America and the West Indies—areas no longer in the USACOM AOR.338

338. For wiring diagrams of the USACOM and ACLANT organizations, see the latest printed (1997) or web site (1999) edition of the Joint Staff Officer's Guide (AFSC Pub 1).
X. U.S. commands for the Middle East: they come and they go

Overview

The U.S. Central Command was the late-comer among the five geographic CINCs existing in 1999. Created in 1983, it inherited an area—the Middle East and the Persian Gulf—that had been battered around and/or divided and re-divided among various unified and specified commanders since 1946, with little long-term continuity of command. Long an area of largely maritime access and Navy pre-eminence, the region has now become a focus for all the services, with the Navy often in a secondary role.

Originally the domain of NELM, the Navy's lone specified command, the area went to a new Commander in Chief Middle East, Africa, South Asia (CINCMEAFSA) in 1963, despite Navy objections to this change (and most subsequent changes) to its status. Most of it then passed to USEUCOM in 1971. In 1980, however, a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was established, with planning responsibilities for the area. It, in turn, evolved into USCENTCOM in 1983.

Until the creation of USCENTCOM, Navy component responsibilities in the area were largely the domain of CINCNELM and its successor, CINCUSNAVEUR—first as a specified command and later as a USEUCOM component. In the dozen years following USCENTCOM's establishment, Navy component took several different forms and was remarkably transformed, culminating in 1995 in the creation of a three-star Navy component commander, dual-hatted as the numbered fleet commander, with headquarters in-theater ashore.

The progression is depicted in figures 49 through 52. Figures 53 and 54 provide significant organizational milestones and timelines.
Figure 49. A U.S. Navy specified command: U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1947–1957

Figure 50. *First try at a joint theater command:* U.S. Strike Command/Middle East, Africa, South Asia Command; and the Middle East Force, 1963–1972
Figure 51. *Partition: A separate U.S. command in the Middle East disappears: 1972–1983*

Figure 52. *Growing like a weed: U.S. Central Command and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, 1983–1998*
Figure 53. U.S. commands in the Middle East: organizational milestones

### Unified and Specified Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAVEASTLANTMED (later NELM) becomes specified command.</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes Mideast, Red &amp; Arabian Seas; Persian Gulf</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NELM takes title SPECOMME as ME Cdr.</td>
<td>1956</td>
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<tr>
<td>NELM loses title SPECOMME</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NELM disestablished; MIDESTFOR, Mideast, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, SS Africa to USSTRICOM / MEAFSA Arabian Sea to LANTCOM</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez Canal closed</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRICOM / MEAFSA disestablished</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM, NAVEUR gain MIDESTFOR, Middle East, Red Sea, Persian Gulf</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM / PACOM split IO remainder</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez Canal reopened</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM gains whole IO from LANTCOM</td>
<td>1976</td>
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<tr>
<td>USEUCOM retains MIDESTFOR, Middle East, Red Sea, Persian Gulf</td>
<td>1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hostages seized at US Embassy, Teheran</td>
<td>1978</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDJTF created under REDCOM</td>
<td>1979</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDJTF placed under JCS</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM created</td>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>JTFME created</td>
<td>1983</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM gains Gulfs of Aden &amp; Oman from USPACOM</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTFME disestablished</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Task Force SWA formed</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVCENT / MIDESTFOR moves ashore; loses flagship</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM gains W. Arabian Sea from USPACOM</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<td>USCENTCOM to gain &quot;Stans&quot;</td>
<td>1999</td>
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### Navy Commands

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<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUSNAVEASTLANTMED creates TF 126, US Naval Force Persian Gulf (later Persian Gulf Force) CVTFs cruise in IO / PG</td>
<td>1947</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf Force becomes MIDESTFOR Flagship assigned CVTF cruises in IO / PG</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDs augment MIDESTFOR flagship</td>
<td>1956</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th FLT CVTF IO cruise</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCLANTFLT is USSTRICOM / MEAFSA component for planning (CINCUSNAVMEAFSA)</td>
<td>1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th FLTs begin IO cruises</td>
<td>1966</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN activities established on Diego Garcia</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th FLT CVBG cruises in Persian Gulf</td>
<td>1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>Routine 7th FLT IO presence begins</td>
<td>1978</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDNAVFOR created at Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTPF stationed at Diego Garcia</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDNAVFOR becomes NAVCENT; gains MIDESTFOR</td>
<td>1982</td>
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<tr>
<td>C 7th FLT designated COMNAVCENT at Bahrain</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMIDEASTFOR designated COMNAVCENT</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVCENT becomes 3-star billet</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVCENT / MIDESTFOR moves ashore; loses flagship</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th FLT created; COMNAVCENT designated COM 5th FLT</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The most significant events regarding changes in the UCP and Navy component are shaded.

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Sequence of commands

USCENTCOM—the last of the five geographical combatant commands (as of 1999) to be created—is the subject of our fifth historical survey of the individual commands. USCENTCOM was not created until 1983, but had been preceded as a command with Middle East responsibilities by NELM, created in 1947, and MEAFSA, created in 1963.

Figure 54. Sequence of joint and Navy component commands in the Middle East

Note: The figure shows commands and components as they became subsumed under the UCP. Originating in 1949 and continuing in existence in 1999, the Middle East Force (MISEASTFOR) was never, strictly speaking, a naval component of a unified command. It served, however, as an independent naval operating force under the Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (CINCMEAFSA) from 1963 through 1971. For more detail, see the text.
It all began with NELM

From the origins of the UCP in 1946 until 1963, responsibility for the conduct of operations in the Middle East was vested in CINCNELM. From 1946 until 1963, responsibility for the conduct of operations in the Middle East was vested in CINCNELM. He commanded, from London, the powerful Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean (since 1948), a small Northern European Force (from 1946 until 1956), and the tiny Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and Bay of Bengal (since 1949). In addition to the permanent MIDEASTFOR, CINCNELM also periodically conducted visits and cruises throughout the Indian Ocean, beginning with a 1947 inspection trip to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and a 1948 cruiser-destroyer cruise to India and Pakistan.

CINCNELM also took command of numerous other U.S. Navy ships in the Middle East region transiting the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and, occasionally, the Persian Gulf. In 1948 and again in 1949, for example, an Essex-class carrier and its escorts visited the Gulf. CINCNELM also had control over amphibious groups operating in and near the Gulf in 1956 and 1958.

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340. Carus et al., From MIDEASTFOR to Fifth Fleet, 36-7, 41.
The Middle East Force acorn starts to grow

From 1949, the heart of the U.S. Navy operational presence in the Middle East "East of Suez" was the Middle East Force. No part of the operating forces of the Navy experienced as many changes in its higher operational command and control during the Cold War and early post-Cold War eras than this small force of surface combatants. Table 7 summarizes those changes.

This force grew out of a Persian Gulf Force of U.S. Navy tankers established in 1948 (Task Force 126). Then, in 1949, a new small staff and a warship were added. The ship was one of three specially modified new seaplane tenders that would be routinely rotated to the Gulf to ensure that one was always on station. Support for this tiny force was obtained from a Royal Navy base on the British-protected Arab island of Bahrain. Later in 1949 the force changed its name to the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR). In 1951 the position of Commander, Middle East Force was upgraded from captain to rear admiral.

Until the late 1950s the Middle East Force consisted of just one ship, the command ship. Then this ship—a seaplane tender—was permanently augmented by two rotating Atlantic Fleet destroyers—a pattern that continued through the late 1970s. If war broke out, however, plans called for a Pacific Fleet carrier-amphibious force to steam to Bahrain, where it would come under CINCNELM command.341

### Table 7. Middle East Force operational relationships over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Commander/Component</th>
<th>Commander/Component</th>
<th>Other operational commander</th>
<th>Commander Middle East Force (Bahrain)</th>
<th>Middle East Force composition</th>
<th>Flagship</th>
<th>Others a</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flagship</td>
<td>2 DD</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963–1971</td>
<td>CINCSTRIKE/CINCS-</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forward deployed AGF (converted AVP)</td>
<td>1966–72</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEAFSA (MacDill AFB FL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972–1983</td>
<td>USCINCEUR (Stuttgart GE)</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forward 2 DD to 1979; AGF (converted LPD)</td>
<td>1979–86</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983–1990</td>
<td>USCINC- CENT (MacDill AFB FL)</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forward 5 DD to 1986–78; Up to 18 DD/M/A</td>
<td>1987–90</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990–1991</td>
<td>USCINC- CENT (Riyadh) (Gulf War)</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forward Various surface combatants, MCM, auxiliaries</td>
<td>1990–91</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1991–1995</td>
<td>USCINC- CENT (MacDill) (CMEF (Bah))</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forward deployed AGF till '93 Bahrain ashore 93–95</td>
<td>1994–95</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995–Present</td>
<td>USCINC- CENT (MacDill) (CMEF)</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td>Surface combatants, MCM, Auxiliaries</td>
<td>1995–95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:** IIII/***//****//**** = Ranks: CAPT through ADM; Principal source: Carus et al., *From MIDEASTFOR to Fifth Fleet*; a. Rotating forces.
NELM’s demise

CINCNELM became a European-focused naval component commander under USCINCEUR in 1952, but he also kept his status as a specified commander for the Middle East. To differentiate the two roles, in 1956 CINCNELM began styling himself Specified Commander, Middle East (SPECOMME)—over the objections of the Army and the Air Force. From 1960 to 1963, he became CINCNELM for his Middle East functions and CINCUSNAVEUR for his European component responsibilities.342

Throughout the late 1950s the Army and Air Force argued for creation of a unified Middle East Command or transfer of the area to USCINCEUR. The Navy and Marine Corps countered that the experiences in Suez in 1956 and Lebanon in 1958 demonstrated the necessity for retaining a maritime specified commander (i.e., CINCNELM) unencumbered by NATO responsibilities.343

CINCNELM took his responsibilities during those crises seriously and visibly: As COMUSNAVCENT would do a generation later, CINCNELM deployed forward into the theater himself during crises, in each instance riding a Navy command ship, with his staff embarked.

Nevertheless, the Navy eventually lost this fight. CINCNELM yielded his status as a specified commander in 1963, reverting solely to component commander status as CINCUSNAVEUR under USCINCEUR.

What the Navy wanted and why

The Navy viewed the Middle East as essentially a maritime theater that should be under the command of a naval officer. It also saw the area as a secondary zone of military activity, capable of easily being attached to the Atlantic, the Pacific or—in a pinch—the Mediterranean naval commands. Because there could be little in-theater support available to sustain U.S. forces there, including a fleet, and

343. Ibid.
because almost all such support had to come from the Atlantic, the
Pacific, or the Mediterranean, the Navy saw no sense in making it a
theater separate from one or more of those.

The Navy certainly resented the idea that whatever naval forces that
would deploy to the region should come under the command of an
officer of another service whose knowledge and skills at applying sea
power in an essentially maritime theater were lacking. As for peace-
time operations, the Navy considered its Middle East Force com-
manders to be the epitomes of American military diplomats, and
their port visits as the "main battery" of American peacetime presence
in the area.

Enter—and exit—CINCSTRIKE and CINCMEAFSA

In 1963, however, the new U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM), dis-
cussed above, was given regional as well as functional responsibilities.
At a time when intervention in the Congo seemed possible, the Army
and Air Force had proposed making USSTRICOM responsible for
planning and operations in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
South Asia (MEAFSA). The Navy and Marine Corps fought this
change. The CNO saw it as unnecessary; CINCNELM was thoroughly
familiar with Middle Eastern problems, and the likelihood of a major
military confrontation in Africa struck him as remote.344

SECDEF Robert McNamara, however, sided with the Army and Air
Force, expanding CINCSTRIKE's responsibilities to include
MEAFSA.

Thus, MEAFSA inherited the old NELM responsibilities and forces.
As MEAFSA's area included the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, CINC-
STRIKE/CINCMMEAFSA took over operational control of the Middle
East Force from CINCNELM. COMTAC and CG CONARC became
CINCMMEAFSA's Air Force and Army component commanders; in
1966 CINCLANTFLT became his naval component commander, but
for planning only. In this relationship, CINCLANTFLT assumed

344. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 34.
another hat: Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (CINCUSNAVMEAFSA).

The relationship was complex: COMIDEASTFOR, while under CINCMEAFA OPCON throughout this period, was not designated the MEAFSA naval component commander, nor did he have an operational relationship with CINCLANTFLT as CINCUSNAVMEAFSA, the designated MEAFSA naval component commander for planning purposes. COMIDEASTFOR, however, had basic administrative and logistic ties with CINCLANTFLT, which provided and maintained the destroyers that rotated through the MIDEASTFOR.

In any event, actual U.S. operations ignored the existence of CINCMARSH/CINCUSMEAFSA: USEUCOM, not USSTRICOM, coordinated the hostage rescue mission in the Congo in 1964, because USEUCOM provided the transports that carried the Belgian paratroopers conducting the evacuation. In 1967, for similar reasons, USEUCOM conducted the non-combatant evacuation operations from Middle East countries during the Arab-Israeli War. In both cases, the unified command with the nearest forces, not USSTRICOM, executed the mission.

At the end of 1971, as we saw earlier, USSTRICOM/MEAFSA was disestablished after a brief run. This was in part due to the strong urging of the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The Middle East partitioned

As the CNO had advocated, USSTRICOM/MEAFSA's Middle East responsibilities—including the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and the Middle East Force—went to USEUCOM, and therefore to its Navy component, NAVEUR. CINCUSNAVEUR—the old CINCNELM—was back in the Middle East operations business again, but this time as a subordinate of USCINCEUR. This arrangement would last almost a decade, despite efforts by CJCS ADM Thomas Moorer—opposed by the Navy and other services—to establish a new mobile Joint Task Force Command for the area.345 During this period the

345. Cole et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 44.
MIDEASTFOR command ship was upgraded from a small converted World War II-era seaplane tender to a large converted post-war amphibious ship.

During part of this period, while USEUCOM looked to be a coherent European and Middle Eastern entity on the map, the truth was quite the opposite in the water. The Suez Canal—essential for sea transits between the Mediterranean and Red Seas—had been blocked since the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. It was not cleared until 1975, four years after USEUCOM took over much of the Middle East region, including the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, responsibility for the Indian Ocean was first divided between LANTCOM and PACOM and—after 1976—assigned to PACOM only. The winding down of the Vietnam War and the increase in perceived U.S. national interests in the Indian Ocean littoral were reflected in an increasing program of PACOM Seventh Fleet warship deployments into that ocean from the east, starting in 1971. By 1979, U.S. Seventh Fleet naval presence in the Indian Ocean was all but permanent.

The RDJTF’s short run

From 1977 to 1979, the JCS debated setting up a Rapid Deployment Force for use in the Persian Gulf region. The Army and Air Force favored assignment of the former MEAFSA countries to USREDCOM, while the Navy and Marine Corps pushed for a CONUS-based joint task force headquarters with worldwide responsibilities. (This was a reversal of the Navy’s usual role of arguing for geographic vice functional commands.) The SECDEF sided initially with the naval services, and in March 1980, a CONUS-based RDJTF was established, within USREDCOM headquarters but as a separate subordinate

346. Ibid., 47-48.
element under USCINCREDS operational control. Although normally only the head of a planning headquarters without operational forces assigned in peacetime, COMRDJTF was authorized to obtain a large slice of such forces from the services and CINCs in various specified crisis and wartime circumstances, and command them in operations.

The JCS appointed Marine Major General P. X. Kelley as the first Commander of the RDJTF. Debates over command relationships of the RDJTF continued among the services, however. In August 1980, the Secretary of Defense directed the RDJTF to focus exclusively on Southwest Asian contingencies. In 1980 also, equipment for RDJTF forces was prepositioned on board a seven-ship force at Diego Garcia. In 1981, after months of acrimony between COMRDJTF and CINCREDS, the COMRDJTF switched bosses: He was no longer subordinate to CINCREDS. Now he worked directly for the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

From its inception, the RDJTF had a naval component: the Rapid Deployment Naval Force (RDNAVFOR). This small planning staff was created out of the CINCPACFLT staff in Hawaii, and was collocated with that staff. Meanwhile, the Middle East Force remained under the operational control of USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR. Plans and future contingencies were the responsibility of the RDJTF; current small-scale operations in the Middle East were still the domain of the CINCs.

The grudging birth and weaning of USCENTCOM

The period 1980 to 1983 saw the transition and development of the RDJTF—a functionally based joint task force with planning and future contingency responsibilities—into the geographically based U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)—a full-blown unified command with OPCON over forces in-theater. The Navy and Marine Corps both acted—ultimately unsuccessfully—to divert this transition. The Navy feared losing the “dedicated water” of the Indian Ocean to a command not headed by a naval officer, and thus losing
control of naval forces operating in these waters to an officer not experienced in their proper employment.\textsuperscript{348}

The RDJTF was replaced by USCENTCOM in 1983. The new USCENTCOM AOR was carved out of land areas in Africa and southwest Asia formerly the responsibility of USEUCOM and PACOM, as well as African areas unassigned in the UCP. USCENTCOM also gained operational control of the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East Force. In deference to the Navy, however, the remainder of the Indian Ocean remained in the USPACOM AOR.

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated examination of transferring Indian Ocean areas to USCENTCOM from USPACOM. In the 1987 UCP review, however, the CNO bid to have the Red Sea and Persian Gulf transferred to USPACOM, while the Chief of Staff of the Air Force favored giving USCINCCENT the North Arabian Sea. The CNO’s rationale was in accordance with classic Navy thinking: Treating the Pacific and Indian Oceans as a single strategic entity enhanced efficiency and flexibility; USCINCCENT could not carry out his mission without command of the seas stretching all the way back to the California coast, which was CINCPAC’s responsibility.\textsuperscript{349}

The JCS decided on the status quo at the time, although two years later the Gulfs of Aden and Oman were shifted from USPACOM to USCENTCOM. A decade later the UCP was indeed changed to transfer the rest of the North Arabian Sea from USCINCPAC to USCINCCENT. USCENTCOM now had—like USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USEUCOM—an integrated land and water theater.

Command of USCENTCOM (and of its predecessor, the RDJTF) rotated among Marine Corps and Army generals. The last COMRDJTF and first USCINCCENT was promoted while in the latter job to four-star rank. All of his successors were to be four-star officers. The Navy, however, made a bid for the command billet in 1988. CJCS ADM William Crowe and the Marine Corps commandant supported the

\textsuperscript{348} Starobin and Leavitt, \textit{Shaping the National Military Command Structure}, 37; Cole et al., \textit{History of the Unified Command Plan}, 77.

\textsuperscript{349} Cole et al., \textit{History of the Unified Command Plan}, 106.
Navy, but the Army and Air Force wanted a general. The Secretary of Defense decided in favor of Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, in part at the urging of the National Security Advisor, Army General Colin Powell, and his confidant, Pentagon official Richard Armitage.  

General Schwarzkopf, like his immediate predecessors as COMRD-JTF and USCINCENT, had his headquarters in Tampa, Florida, at MacDill Air Force Base. In 1990, when war came in his region, however, he deployed his headquarters forward to Saudi Arabia—just as his distant predecessors as CINCNELM had deployed forward to the Eastern Mediterranean during the Suez and Lebanon crises of 1956 and 1958.

Creating USNAVCENT

(Author's note: This is another tortuous tale, rivalling in complexity the stories of Naval Forces Southern Command and Naval Forces Alaska related earlier).

As was noted briefly above, when the RDJTF was formed at Tampa in 1980, a Navy component staff was designated in Hawaii, under RADM Stanley Arthur. This was the Rapid Deployment Naval Force (RDNF). RADM Arthur also retained his earlier position as the U.S. Pacific Fleet plans officer. Thus, a Navy component commander was created who at the same time was an officer serving on the staff of another Navy component commander. When the RDJTF was transformed in 1983 into USCENTCOM, the two positions were split, but the new Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) remained at Pearl Harbor as a one-star officer (sometimes a


351. Successive COMRDJTFs and USCINCENTs have craved having their headquarters—or at least a forward element—located forward, within the USCENTCOM AOR. Until the Gulf War, that was not politically possible. Since the Gulf War, COMUSNAVCENT headquarters at Bahrain also can act as forward headquarters for the entire command.
captain). Nominally COMIDEASTFOR’s operational commander, COMUSNAVCENT, functioned essentially as a minor logistics and planning commander supporting MIDEASTFOR operations.  

Maintaining firm relations with his superior—located six time zones away in Tampa, Florida—was difficult for COMUSNAVCENT. He had far closer relations with CINCPACFLT—with whom he shared a building in Hawaii and from whom he drew much of his logistic support and forces.

Meanwhile, the importance of the Middle East and Persian Gulf to U.S. national security grew. The Iran-Iraq Tanker War of the 1980s occasioned U.S. combat operations in the Gulf. The Navy objected to USCENTCOM controlling those operations from a headquarters remote from the theater and with allegedly too little understanding of naval issues. The Navy wanted the MIDEASTFOR subordinated to the Seventh Fleet.

In deference to the Navy position, in 1987 ADM William Crowe, CJCS and himself a former COMIDEASTFOR, agreed to create Joint Task Force Middle East (JTFME), another layer of command. COMJTFME was the two-star commander of the Seventh Fleet Indian Ocean battle group operating outside the Gulf, with COMIDEASTFOR directly subordinated to him, but exercising tactical control of U.S. naval forces inside the Gulf. Early the next year the two positions of COMJTFME and COMIDEASTFOR were consolidated into one flag officer with one staff. The CJTFME staff rode the MIDEASTFOR flagship and included a U.S. Air Force deputy commander and a joint staff, one-quarter of which was non-Navy.

352. Carus et al., From MIDEASTFOR to Fifth Fleet, 131.
353. Interview, December 1998: Dr. Marvin Pokrant, COMUSNAVCENT/COMSEVENTHFLT CNA field representative
354. Carus et al., From MIDEASTFOR to Fifth Fleet, 91.
The Gulf War and its aftermath

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the incumbent one-star selectee COMUSNAVCENT moved his headquarters to Bahrain, but was re-designated as Commander, Naval Logistics Supply Force (COMNAVLOGSUPFOR). He was relieved as COMUSNAVCENT by the three-star commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, VADM Henry Mauz. Mauz retained his numbered fleet command hat as a subordinate of USCINCPAC and CINCPACFLT along with his new Navy component hat as a subordinate to USCINCCENT.357 Mauz was therefore the USCENTCOM Navy component commander during Operation Desert Shield in 1990. (He was in turn relieved later as COMUSNAVCENT and COMSEVENTHFLT by VADM Stanley Arthur, in time for the latter to participate in Operation Desert Storm in 1991.) Mauz and Arthur directed Persian Gulf operations from the Seventh Fleet command ship, which had re-deployed into the Gulf.

Two weeks after the Iraqi invasion, the JTFME was disestablished. The incumbent two-star Navy commander continued to serve as COMIDEASTFOR, however, a subordinate force commander under COMUSNAVCENT. COMIDEASTFOR’s role was enhanced when he was given command of all maritime interdiction operations against Iraq. The deputy commander JTFME, an Air Force general, moved to U.S. Air Force, Central Command (USCENTAF) headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he became Director of Campaign Planning.

Following the war, COMUSNAVCENT headquarters did not return to Hawaii. Command of USNAVCENT shifted from the three-star COMSEVENTHFLT to the two-star COMIDEASTFOR, but stayed forward in the Gulf on board the MIDESASTFOR command ship. COMNAVLOGSUPFOR was relocated to USCENTCOM headquarters at Tampa and designated as Naval Forces Central Command, Rear (NAVCENT Rear). In 1992, at the urging of USCINCCENT,

357. Mauz’s appointment was principally the subject of discussions between two combatant commanders, USCINCCENT and USCINCPAC, with the CNO and CINCPACFLT apparently playing limited roles. Interview, December 1998: Dr. Marvin Pokrant, COMUSNAVCENT/COMSEVENTHFLT CNA field representative.
COMUSNAVCENT/COMIDEASTFOR was upgraded to a three-star position. In 1993 he moved his headquarters ashore in Bahrain.

The Navy embraced the upgrading, citing the action as an immediate task to be taken to implement its basic post-Cold War policy directive, ... From the Sea. 358

A Fifth Numbered fleet

In 1994 and 1995, the incumbent COMUSNAVCENT, VADM John Scott Redd, and other Navy leaders pressed for the establishment in the theater of a numbered combat fleet command. 359 They were successful, and in 1995 the forces under COMUSNAVCENT were designated the U.S. Fifth Fleet as well. This was the first new U.S. Navy numbered fleet designation since the Third Fleet superseded the First Fleet in 1973, and the first new numbered fleet entity since the re-creation of the Seventh Fleet in 1949. 360 The positions of COMUSNAVCENT and COMFIFTHFLT were held by the same three-star

358. Sean O'Keefe, ADM Frank B. Kelso II, and Gen C.E. Mundy, Jr. USMC, ... From the Sea (Washington, DC: Navy Department, September 1992).


officer—the first time a numbered fleet commander and a Navy component commander had been so dual-hatted.

A subordinate USNAVCENT/FIFTHFLT command, Destroyer Squadron Fifty, inherited the designation of Middle East Force, thus continuing a usage that had begun almost half a century before. 361 In 1996, two mine-countermeasures ships were forward deployed in the Gulf, and assigned to the Middle East Force. Meanwhile, the COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT staff remained split between Bahrain (where the Commander, the N2, the N3, the N4 and N6 were located) and Tampa (where the two-star rear admiral Deputy Commander—as well as the N1, N5, N7 and N8—were located).

**Standing up JTF-SWA**

While the NAVCENT command structure was being sorted out, in August 1992 USCINCCENT stood up Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to take tactical control of continuing air surveillance operations over southern Iraq following the Gulf War. 362

Commanded by an Air Force major general and with a largely Air Force staff, JTF-SWA initially had the local Navy battle group commander for a Deputy. Navy officers were also designated as Deputy J-2 and Deputy J-3. CJTF-SWA used both USCENTAF and USNAVCENT carrier aircraft for his surveillance missions, whichever was present in theater. This arrangement was still in place as of 1999, although the Naval Reserve now furnished the Deputy CJTF-SWAs, on 90-day rotating tours. 363 Commander, JTF-SWA had reported directly to the CINC from the time of its inception until 1996. Then, as a consequence of the Khobar Towers bombing, CJTF-SWA was subordinated

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361. Carus et al., *From MIDEASTFOR to Fifth Fleet*, 132-3.


to the CENTAF commander. (As a service component commander, 
COMCENTAF is responsible for the force protection for JTF-SWA.)

Expanding north into Central Asia

The 1997 UCP revision expanded USCENTCOM even more. Under 
its terms, the USCENTCOM AOR was scheduled to expand into the 
four former Soviet Central Asian Republics (the "stans") in 1999. 
NAVCENT's missions in this landlocked area seemed few, but the 
area does border on a sea—the Caspian—albeit a shrinking one, 
outside traditional U.S. Navy interests.

1999

As of 1999, USCINCCENT and COMUSNAVCENT were responsible 
for the Red Sea and Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf, the Gulfs of Aden 
and Oman, and most of the Arabian Sea, as well as land areas in 
Southwest Asia and East Africa east of Libya, west of India, north of 
Tanzania, and south of the former Soviet Union. USCINCCENT was 
scheduled to take over responsibility for the former Soviet Central 
Asian republics in 1999.

COMUSNAVCENT was dual-hatted as the Commander of the U.S. 
Fifth Fleet, which maintained a permanent presence of warships in 
the Indian Ocean, often reinforced by one or more carrier battle 
groups and amphibious ready groups.364

364. For a wiring diagram of the USCENTCOM organization, see the latest 
(AFSC Pub 1).
XI. USSPACECOM and its forebears: the Navy in the shadow of the Air Force

Overview

The U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) was established as a functional unified command in 1985. It evolved out of earlier Air Force and Army-Air Force commands with North American air defense responsibilities, and swallowed up a small Navy space component. The Navy resisted participation in all these endeavors, but preferred joining Air Force-dominated joint commands to ceding missions completely to the Air Force as DOD single acquisition manager.

The Navy had been an early participant in air defense efforts, but eventually disentangled its forces from them. The Navy goal throughout was to ensure its sea-based air defense capability remained assigned operationally to LANTCOM, PACOM, and the fleets, which had the right knowledge and skills to operate Navy systems at sea.

In 1983, the Navy created its own Naval Space Command (NAVS­PACECOM), in its service chain. The Navy opposed creation of USSPACECOM, fearing degradation of fleet space support. This proved untenable. NAVSPACECOM became a USSPACECOM component.

Figure 55 provides a timeline of organizational milestones. Figure 56 shows the sequence of commands.

365. The historiography of the Navy and USSPACECOM, like the history itself, is dominated by the Air Force. The most useful basic references are Air Force official histories of Air Force Air Defense commands and Air Force space activities.
Figure 55. Air defense and space commands: organizational milestones

Joint Commands

- AAF ADC created 1946
- ALCOM created 1947
- Key West Agreement assigns service air defense responsibilities 1948
- USNEC created 1950
- CONAD created 1954
- CONAD & LANTCOM absorb USNEC 1956
- ARPA created 1957
- NORAD created 1958
- NASA created 1958
- Air Force rejects USN unified space command proposal 1959
- NRO created 1960
- NASA puts USN astronaut in space 1961
- USAF gains all space acquisition responsibilities 1962
- DCA created 1963
- 1st DSCS satellite 1966
- All services regain space system development responsibilities 1970
- Multi-service FLTSATCOM development approved 1971
- CONAD & ALCOM disestablished 1975
- 1st FLTSATCOM satellite launched 1978
- USAF Space Command created 1981
- SDI proposed 1982
- USSPACECOM created; double-hat of USAF Space Cmd 1985
- ADCOM disestablished 1986
- USSPACECOM & USAF Space Cmd hats split 1992
- 1st NOVA navigation satellite 1992

Navy Commands

- NRL launches captured German missiles 1946
- BUAER proposes satellite testing 1947
- NAVFORCONAD created 1954
- First coastal SOSUS arrays operational 1955
- LANTFLT & PACFLT AD Barrier Commands created 1956
- NRL launches Vanguard satellite 1957
- Navy space programs absorbed by NASA 1958
- NRO created 1959
- NASA launches GRAB recon satellite 1960
- NAVSPASUR established 1961
- 1st at-sea astronaut recovery 1961
- 1st shore-to-ship SATCOM relay 1962
- Naval Astronautics Group (later NAVSOC) created 1963
- 1st operational TRANSIT navigational satellite 1965
- NAVFORCONAD disestablished 1966
- LANTFLT & PACFLT AD Barriers phase out 1966
- USN designated overall FLTSATCOM Program Manager 1970
- USN designated overall network operations center (NAVSPASUR) 1971
- USSPACECOM created; double-hat of USAF Space Cmd 1981
- Naval Space Command created 1985
- USSPACECOM & USAF Space Cmd hats split 1986
- Fleet Surveillance Support Command created 1992

Note: The most significant events regarding changes in the UCP and Navy component are shaded.
**Sequence of commands**

USSPACECOM is the subject of our sixth historical survey of the individual combatant commands. USSPACECOM grew out of CONAD, created in 1954. CONAD was one of the first new commands to be created after those that had been established under the old Outline Command Plan of 1946.

Figure 56. Sequence of joint and Navy component commands with missions regarding continental air defense and space

Note: The figure shows commands and components as they became subsumed under the UCP. The Alaskan Command's roots extended back to World War II. The Naval Space Command (NAVSPACECOM) was set up as a Navy shore establishment command in 1983, two years before it became the naval component of the new U.S. Space Command.

**Air defense and space operations**

In the early days of the Cold War—especially during the Eisenhower Administration—there was a heightened interest in the air defense of the United States. At the same time, the country was beginning research and development programs for military systems in space. Both these developments had their organizational side, and both
were reflected in the UCP. The two tracks eventually would merge, as we will see.

**Air defense after the war**

The story starts with continental air defense.

The Outline Command Plan (OCP) of 1946 reflected the adoption of forward occupation and forward defense as a new basic principle of U.S. defense policy. FECOM, EUCOM, CARIBCOM, and NELM were all located overseas, while SAC was conceived of as an intercontinental strike force. Nevertheless, the OCP charged CINCPAC and the Atlantic Fleet to defend the United States against attack through the Pacific and Atlantic, and ALCOM and USNEC to defend against attack through Alaska and the Arctic. For these latter two commands, that meant mainly air defense.366

Meanwhile, the Navy had tactically deployed radar picket ships and airborne early warning aircraft, in response to Japanese kamikaze attacks late in World War II. Consequently, Navy technology and resources were coveted by Army Air Forces commanders concerned with continental air defense post-war. In 1946 the Navy rebuffed an attempt to have its shore- and harbor-based fighter, radar warning, and antiaircraft artillery forces assigned in an emergency to a new Army Air Forces Air Defense Command (ADC).367

Later, as part of the 1948 Key West Agreements on service roles and functions, the Navy—like the Army—was given a collateral role in

366. ALCOM was discussed above, in the section on USPACOM. USNEC will be discussed below, in this section. For a thumbnail history of ALCOM’s air component, the Alaskan Air Command (AAC), whose duties have chiefly involved air defense, see Bright, *Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Air Force*, 57-8.

providing air defense forces, while the Air Force was assigned primary responsibility for continental air defense. In July 1950, an Army Anti-aircraft Command was created and in January 1951 the Air Force designated ADC as a permanent Air Force major combat command.

Some Navy cooperation might be forthcoming, but not Navy agreement to a joint command. The Navy agreed to cooperate with the Air Force by providing sea-based air defenses to help protect the U.S. coastlines against enemy bombers. ADM Louis Denfeld (CNO from 1947 to 1949), however, had stated that:

... a routine and continuing peacetime commitment of naval forces to continental air defense is not intended.\(^{368}\)

In 1949 the Navy opposed Army and Air Force recommendations for a unified command to defend the United States.\(^{369}\)

Later, the Navy, under ADM Forrest Sherman (CNO from 1949 to 1951), became somewhat more forthcoming. Sherman expressed special concern that the Navy do its share in providing for the air defense of the United States. Joint maneuvers were held and the Navy supplied aircraft and picket ships for air defense duty.

Still, the Navy's priority—like that of many in the Air Force—was to carve out a role for itself in the strategic offensive role, not to assist the Air Force in air defense.\(^{370}\) Also, the Navy treated continental air defense as incidental to its functions of controlling the seas and defending coasts, and had no forces specifically programmed for this task, although it was prepared to contribute fighter aircraft to continental defense when necessary.\(^{371}\) Following Sherman's untimely

\(^{368}\) Schaffel, 110.


\(^{370}\) Schaffel, *The Emerging Shield*, 110, 119.

death in 1951, the Navy under CNO William Fechteler began to drag its heels again.\footnote{372}

**ASW as air defense**

The Navy was not doing nothing, however. By 1953 the Navy's principal continental defense concern was the Soviet submarine fleet. Soviet submarines were not only a serious threat to shipping but soon would be able to launch guided missiles against continental land targets. In addition to deploying LANTFLT and PACFLT hunter-killer and convoy escort forces at sea, the Navy sought to counter this threat by setting up, under the fleet commanders, networks of low frequency sound waves (LOFAR) underwater cables and stations to detect Soviet submarines.\footnote{373}

Recognizing the growing urgency of continental defense, the Navy had established a special task group to test other means of warning against air, missile, or submarine attack. The Navy was also providing two experimental radar picket vessels in 1953 for the Air Force, and was considering a plan to operate such ships in conjunction with its own shorebased AEW aircraft to provide a combined warning barrier against both air and submarine attack. A Navy plan in the summer of 1953 called for 133 AEW/ASW aircraft and 36 picket ships to be deployed by CINCLANT and CINCPAC by 1955.\footnote{374}

Navy plans clashed with those of the Air Force. The Navy was looking to set up barriers at sea in the Atlantic and Pacific suitable to counter submarines as well as aircraft. The Air Force was looking to set up a centralized continental air defense system with seaward extensions,

\footnote{372. Schaffel, *The Emerging Shield*, 155, 220. Schaffel credits Navy reluctance to commit to an expensive picket vessel program with figuring prominently in the Air Force decision to develop its own airborne early warning capability, culminating in the 1970s in the E–3 AWACS aircraft program.}

\footnote{373. The ancestor of SOSUS. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Volume V, 115-116.}

\footnote{374. Watson,116, 122.}
under Air Force operational control. At the end of the day, both approaches would be taken simultaneously: There would be two sets of radar barriers in ocean waters:

- One contiguous with the command and control net of the Air Force’s Air Defense Command
- The other connected to that early warning system but commanded by CINCLANT and CINCPAC.375

Creating CONAD and new Navy commands

Effective air defense of North America—which had been a low national military priority during the Truman Administration—became a cornerstone of the new Eisenhower Administration’s “New Look” defense policy instituted in early 1953.376

The Soviets detonated their first hydrogen bomb in August 1953. This galvanized the Eisenhower Administration to act—spurred on by some elements in the Air Force and by some civilians associated with the Air Force establishment. The question of a command structure for continental defense, however, was left entirely to the JCS.377

In 1954 a Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) was established, and designated a “joint” (vice unified or specified) command, with the Secretary of the Air Force as executive agent under the Secretary of Defense. As a “joint” commander, CINCONAD was able to pass orders directly to his components’ subordinate commanders.378

375. Watson, 124-126, 133.
377. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume V, 147.
378. Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 245.
The name Continental Air Defense Command was adopted on the insistence of the CNO, ADM Robert B. Carney. The Air Force had wanted it to be simply the “Air Defense Command,” but ADM Carney objected that this would imply it had worldwide—and oceanic—responsibilities.

The new command consisted initially of the U.S. Air Force Air Defense Command, the U.S. Army Antiaircraft Command, and Naval Forces, Continental Air Defense Command (NAVFORCONAD)—a naval command composed of the forces of the contiguous naval radar coverage system. Forces of the seaward extensions of the early warning system (as distinct from contiguous forces) were to continue under CINCLANT and CINCPAC. The early warning installations in Alaska and Greenland were to continue under CINCAL and CINCNE.

The Air Force was itself ambivalent as to any new priority being afforded to air defense. Partisans of the Strategic Air Command believed it would undermine the effectiveness of—and resources allocated to—that organization.

The Commander, U.S. Air Force Air Defense Command, the major component commander, became dual-hatted as the CINC. A Navy rear admiral was designated both Deputy CINC for naval forces in air defense and COMNAVFORCONAD. Army and Navy officers were assigned to CONAD headquarters.

In 1956, partly as a result of Army protests, the JCS and the Secretary of Defense split off the position and staff of CINCONAD from those of his Air Force component command (as they would also do shortly thereafter).

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379. Carney had just previously been the CINCNELM who had been briefly dual-hatted as NATO CINCSOUTH, and then brought in under USCINCEUR as a Navy component commander. See the earlier discussion of USEUCOM and its component commanders above.


thereafter in the Pacific as well). As a result of the change, more Navy (and Army) officers filled staff positions at Headquarters CONAD.  

**NAVFORCONAD and the barriers**

Navy attitudes of the era were captured by ADM John J. Hyland, who would command the CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Barrier Command in 1960:

> When the concept was first suggested, the Navy disagreed in the Joint Staff that it was essential. But when it became clear that someone was going to do it and it really was a chore over the sea, the Navy decided that it would be better to do it themselves rather than for some other service to do it. That’s how the Navy got the job. ... I thought this whole operation was unnecessary.  

NAVFORCONAD included only “naval forces of the continuous radar coverage system,” as well as certain designated Navy and Marine Corps fighter aircraft in wartime. The Navy, however, was successful in retaining its other early warning forces—the forces of the seaward extensions of the early warning system—under CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT and CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT. These

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387. The Fleet CINCs also retained control of the nascent LOFAR (later SOSUS) network of fixed underwater submarine monitoring cables. SOSUS in its early days continued to be considered a homeland defense system, to counter Soviet submarines approaching U.S. shores. See *Sea-Based Anti-Submarine Warfare 1940-1977*. 

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commanders both set up their own Barrier Commands in 1956.\textsuperscript{388} A complex system of mutual support was set up to manage command inter-relationships.\textsuperscript{389}

CONAD set up two radar barriers in 1954 to guard the Atlantic and Pacific flanks of the United States. An Inshore Barrier consisted of Air Force ground-based air surveillance radars, “Texas Towers,” and Air Force EC-121 airborne early warning aircraft (derived from the Navy WV-2). Offshore Atlantic and Pacific Contiguous Barriers, under COMNAVFORCONAD operational control, included radar picket destroyers (DERs), radar picket ships (AGRs), and WV-2 airborne early warning aircraft, backed up by blimps.\textsuperscript{390}

A third barrier set was commanded by CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT and CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT. These were two Barrier Forces of DERs and WV-2s, strung out across the oceans as extensions of the DEW line. While reporting to CINCLANT and CINCPAC operationally, they were integrated into the CONAD Air Force-dominated air surveillance network.\textsuperscript{391}

The Navy also placed jet fighter squadrons under Air Force operational control for continental air defense—normally in Southern California but occasionally at Key West.

\textsuperscript{388} Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 189, 243. For JCS discussions on the seaward extensions of the air defense network in the Atlantic and Pacific, see Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume VI: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-1956 (Washington DC: Joint Staff Historical Office, 1992), 275-281. Also see Smith et al., Cold War Navy, 11-18, -19, -21.

\textsuperscript{389} On Navy participation in CONAD, see Wolf, 275-289.

\textsuperscript{390} See Bouchard, “Guarding the Cold War Ramparts,” for details. COMNAVFORCONAD ran his barriers through two subordinate commands: Naval Forces Eastern CONAD Region and Naval Forces Western CONAD Region.

\textsuperscript{391} The operational chains of command went from the maritime unified commanders to the fleet commanders in chief to the antisubmarine warfare forces to the barrier forces.
The short life of USNEC

The original Outline Campaign Plan of 1946 had called for establishment of a Northeast Command, covering Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland, and the Arctic airways. It was to build on the Greenland and Newfoundland Base Commands established during World War II. The Northeast Command's establishment was delayed, however, by political complications with the Canadian government. In 1948, the Navy had argued—unsuccessfully—that it become a specified Air Force command under the JCS, not a unified command (i.e., that no naval forces be taken away from the Atlantic Command and assigned to it).

The command was eventually established in 1950 as the U.S. Northeast Command (USNEC), headquartered at Fort Pepperrell, near St. John's, in Newfoundland. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force acted as its JCS executive agent, and there was no Navy component. The Air Force general commanding was, unlike most other combatant commanders, an officer of two-star or three-star rank. Its principal component was an Air Force major command, the Northeast Air Command (NEAC), and its principal activity was construction of a sensitive air base at Thule, Greenland, supported logistically by Atlantic Fleet convoys. The command was soon abolished, however, in 1956, and its air defense functions taken over by CONAD, which finally itself became a unified command in 1958.

Along with USNEC, the Alaskan Command (ALCOM) also had originally been assigned air defense responsibilities in the 1946 OCP. Due in part to strong congressional support, however, ALCOM would retain its separate organizational identity until 1975.

392. Greenland was—and still is—in 1999—a Danish dependency. Newfoundland had been a British dependency. It did not join Canada until 1949.

393. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 16-17.

NORAD and the peaking of continental air defense

In 1957, a combined U.S.-Canadian command, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), was established to defend the continental United States, Canada, and Alaska against air attack. NORAD took over command of a series of early warning radar lines that had been built in the 1950s across Canada (the Pinetree, Mid-Canada, and DEW Lines), as well as U.S. and Canadian air force interceptor squadrons. CINCONAD became dual-hatted as CINCNORAD.395

That same year, the Soviets launched the Sputnik satellite, sparking a long series of Army, Air Force, and even Navy programs in ballistic missile defense. In the 1960s, the Soviets began to deploy long-range land-based and intermediate-range sea-based nuclear ballistic missiles.

A strategy and organization for early warning against bomber attack for continental air defense now gave way to a strategy and organization for early warning against missile attack for ensuring Strategic Air Command retaliation. Along with the establishment of NORAD, the deployment of the Soviet missiles marked the beginning of a decline in the fortunes of CONAD and of the continental air defense mission generally. More important, new space systems being deployed secretly in the early 1960s could better provide surveillance and early warning coverage than the barriers.

The earlier CONAD early warning networks across Canada and at sea were seen as obsolete. Construction was begun on new Air Force Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) in Alaska, Greenland, and the United Kingdom. These became operational in the early 1960s and were assigned to CONAD.

The Navy backs out of CONAD

In 1960, the Navy secured the approval of the JCS to withdraw all but four of its 36 destroyer-escort radar picket ships from air defense duty, over the objections of CINCONAD. The Navy's argument?

395. On the origins of NORAD, see Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs.
The ships having the least effect on the fighting capability of the Navy were selected to be decommissioned. 396

Half the ships were assigned other duties, especially ASW, while half were decommissioned to fund modernization of other warships. 397 The CINCLANT and CINCPAC seaward extensions would phase out during 1965; and COMNAVFORCONAD would decommission that same year, after little more than a decade of life. 398

Thus ended a brief but significant U.S. Navy contribution to continental air defense. 399

The Navy looks to Space

While the above story of continental air defense was unfolding, a parallel story was also unfolding regarding the military uses of space. 400 We will now turn to that story. As we will see, the two stories will eventually converge and intertwine.

Sailors have steered by the stars for centuries. In that sense, the U.S. Navy can be said to have been interested in space since its inception. In 1844, the U.S. Naval Observatory was founded—the first Navy organization dedicated to space observation.


399. In the 1990s, the concept of a revived major Navy contribution to what would now be called U.S. “homeland defense” would be touted again, especially by Frank Gaffney, a civilian defense expert and former government official.

More recently, the Navy had almost certainly been the first service to have conducted studies on the development of artificial satellites in space. The main thrust of the Navy's early space research came from the Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAER). BUAER's studies of the German rocket program led to the formation of a BUAER Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility of Space Rocketry (CEFSR) in October 1945. CEFSR envisioned a testing program to determine the feasibility of artificial satellites, with the intent to launch a liquid hydrogen-oxygen single-stage satellite. 401

Various efforts to procure Navy and even Army Air Forces collaborative funding of CEFSR proposals came to naught, however. The Navy had little money for such ventures, and the Army Air Forces—especially Maj Gen Curtis LeMay—was opposed to collaborating with the Navy in an area that it felt represented an extension of strategic air power. 402 The AAF declined to collaborate with the Navy on a satellite project and instead competed for the exclusive assignment of space missions. 403 By 1948 the Navy left the field of satellite research temporarily to the Air Force's Project RAND, after the Air Force rebuffed an attempt by Navy Admiral Dan V. Gallery to place the Navy as a joint sponsor of the RAND effort. 404

Navy interest in space then rekindled in the 1950s. A number of scientific and research projects were carried out by NRL, the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the Navy-funded Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL).

As far back as 1945, NRL had carried out a review of the technical feasibility of satellites but had concluded that it would be too ambitious.

402. Ibid. The story is also in Spires, Beyond Horizons, 14-15 and 27.
an enterprise for its limited resources. From 1946 to 1952, NRL participated in the launching of 63 captured German V-2 rockets 100 miles into the upper atmosphere for high-altitude sounding research and experimentation.

When the captured V-2s started to run out, NRL developed the Viking rocket. A Viking would reach an altitude of 158 miles by May 1954. Building on Viking's success, the ill-starred Vanguard "civilian" scientific satellite project of the late 1950s was conducted under NRL aegis—although with dollars from outside the Navy budget. The Navy Vanguard program also included the NRL-developed Minitrack satellite radio-tracking and telemetry network.

NRL also played a significant role in the early development of what became a Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM) to support fleet movements and the Minitrack-descended Naval Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR)—an electronic fence from Georgia to California to monitor Soviet fleet satellites, commissioned in 1961.

APL developed the first Navy Navigation Satellite System (TRANSIT) for the Navy—the first U.S. satellite system built in response to an operational requirement, and the first navigation system to use radio signals from satellites. The first satellite was launched in 1959, and the first operational satellite would be deployed in 1963. Full operational capability would be reached in 1968, with 36 TRANSIT-related satellites launched. TRANSIT had been first conceived to support

406. Spires, Beyond Horizons, 17.
precise navigation requirements of fleet ballistic missile submarines, but evolved to serve the entire fleet—and other services as well. A Navy Astronautics Group would be set up in 1962 to operate TRANSIT to support fleet movements. TRANSIT was to provide Navy and civilian users with a highly reliable, precise, all-weather global navigation system for 32 years.

In 1960, the NRL built and launched the first Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB) Experiment satellite—the first U.S. electronic signals intelligence satellite. In the 1960s and continuing into the early 1970s, the Navy would carry out antisatellite research, mostly involving use of the Polaris missile.

Throughout this period, the Navy’s position regarding space was as described in 1959 by the Secretary of the Navy:

The Navy’s aim in relation to space can be simply stated: To use space to accomplish naval objectives and to prevent space from being used to the detriment of those objectives.

The Navy went into space to support its fleets.

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408. Some American observers believe the launching of TRANSIT spurred Soviet antisatellite system research and development, as a form of Soviet strategic antisubmarine warfare.

409. The history of the Transit program is described in some detail in “The Legacy of Transit,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, XIX (January-March 1998), 5-65.

410. The existence of this satellite was declassified in 1998, in remarks by Mr. Keith Hall, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), at the NRL 75th Anniversary event.


The Air Force pulls ahead

From the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, all three services had nascent (and often competing) space programs. The Army and Navy were in the lead, with the Air Force the least active of the three. Relations among the services regarding space were reasonably amicable, with some exceptions (such as the 1946-1948 Air Force rebuff to the Navy's bid for satellite cooperation, and tensions over the DOD's choice of the Navy's Vanguard for the public "civilian" satellite launch). By early 1958, the Navy—and the Army—had had far more experience in space than the Air Force.

In the late 1950s, however, the Air Force began to pull away from the pack. In 1950, the Secretary of Defense had assigned it responsibility for long-range strategic missiles, including ICBMs. That assignment led to eventual responsibility for development of the large rockets needed to launch earth satellites. Later in the decade, responding to President Eisenhower's policy to push peacetime strategic reconnaissance, the Air Force developed in secret a military reconnaissance satellite, the WS-117L (later called SAMOS). Thus, unlike the Navy, which was driven by a plethora of fleet requirements, the Air Force entered the space age on the coattails of ICBM development and President Eisenhower's determination to protect the nation from surprise attack through secret satellite reconnaissance.

Also, bureaucratic relations were no longer amicable. Interservice rivalry was to intensify throughout the mid- and late 1950s. The U.S. need to respond to the development of Soviet missiles had not only fueled U.S.-Soviet rivalry, but also U.S. interservice rivalry. President Eisenhower and others regarded this rivalry as a recurring hindrance to the development of U.S. space systems, resulting in a duplication of research and ultimately a dilution of the national effort.

415. Ibid., 21. See also the later section of this study on U.S. strategic commands.
416. The analysis and phraseology are from Spires, Beyond Horizons, xv.
intense competition among the services regarding missile and space systems and missions became a prime motivation for Eisenhower’s efforts at defense re-organization in 1958.\textsuperscript{417}

In 1959, the Air Force introduced a new term—“aerospace”—into the lexicon.\textsuperscript{418} By the early 1960s, the Air Force had clearly become the pre-eminent U.S. military service in space—effectively designated as the executive agent for most military space development programs and projects.\textsuperscript{419} Before 1960, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Army, and the Navy had carried out all but two of the American space launches. In 1960, however, the Air Force began its dominance of the space launch business with 14 of the 29 service-sponsored flights that year, and the trend would continue.\textsuperscript{420}

\textbf{Enter ARPA, NASA, and the NRO}

Air Force pre-eminence in space hadn’t happened easily, however. In 1957, in the wake of the Soviet launch of the \textit{Sputnik} satellite and in part as a result of his frustration with interservice rivalries, a new Defense Department agency had been created by the President, separate from the services, with responsibility for all defense space projects. This was the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). ARPA’s creation had been supported by the Army and bitterly resented and opposed by the Air Force, with the Navy position somewhat in between.\textsuperscript{421} Although the services retained their missile programs, they all lost their independent space programs to the new agency.

The loss was only temporary, however. ARPA served as the national space agency through much of 1958, but all existing and exploratory

\textsuperscript{417} Divine, \textit{The Sputnik Challenge}, analyzes the linkages.

\textsuperscript{418} Spires, \textit{Beyond Horizons}, 54.

\textsuperscript{419} This theme is fully explored in ibid.

\textsuperscript{420} Spires, \textit{Beyond Horizons}, 162.

space projects under ARPA control were transferred back to the services in 1959. The Air Force got its SAMOS military satellite back, plus responsibility for the Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS). The Navy got the TRANSIT navigational satellite system. 422

In the post-Sputnik U.S. domestic political and administrative fire-storm, the "ARPA fix" was superseded by the "NASA fix." A civilian National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had been advocated by President Eisenhower and created by Congress in 1958. 423 NASA took over pre-existing military-run "civilian" programs and facilities like NRL's ill-fated Project Vanguard, as well as most of the Navy's corporate knowledge of space programs (and more than 400 Navy scientists and engineers). 424 While this transfusion of Navy talent would provide the foundation for NASA's distinguished space science programs, it was a major setback for the Navy's competitive position among government entities in space. NASA's absorption of Navy—and Army—space assets would help propel the Air Force toward the military space mission.

Finally, in 1961, President Eisenhower created a consolidated National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), with aegis over the design, manufacture, and operation of the nation's reconnaissance satellites. Reconnaissance satellite programs, like the Air Force's SAMOS, the CIA's CORONA, and the Navy's GRAB (which was transferred to the NRO in 1961)—would henceforth be considered national, not military, assets. Against Air Force wishes, NRO became a civilian office under the Secretary of the Air Force but not assigned to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force or any Air Force command.

The NRO was staffed by the CIA, Air Force, and Navy; they each would keep their separate program identities within it until the 1990s. NRO's heavy Air Force staffing and its location organizationally

422. Ibid., 593.


424. Spires, Beyond Horizons, 65.
within the Department of the Air Force secretariat, however, ensured large Air Force interest in space and organization over the coming years. But while the Air Force from here on in would dominate the other services in space—in part because of the NRO—the Air Force officers assigned to the NRO would become isolated from their fellows. The regular blue-suit Air Force would come to view them as creatures of the NRO or of the CIA, whose service loyalties were suspect. 425

NRO’s existence and mission were secret. They would only be publicly acknowledged decades later—in 1992. 426

The CNO fails to unify space

Meanwhile, there were a few abortive attempts to create a unified military space command—an idea whose time would not come, however, for another generation. These attempts date at least as far back as 1957–1958, when the Rockefeller Committee on Government Reorganization recommended creation of unified commands to shift “operational responsibilities” out of the services and directly under the JCS. This recommendation was opposed by the CJCS, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the CNO, ADM Arleigh Burke. 427

In 1959, however, ADM Burke now proposed that a joint unified space agency be created, to pre-empt the Air Force’s campaign for cognizance over the nation’s military roles in space. The Army sided with the Navy. 428 The Air Force adamantly opposed such a move, however, and the idea was shelved. 429


426. Historical data on the NRO are available at the NRO website.


428. Ibid., 169.

429. See also George B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 20.
In early 1960 Admiral Burke again proposed a joint space agency. The Army again supported the Navy, but the Secretary of Defense (a former Secretary of the Navy) sided with the Air Force. Thus, for a second time, the Air Force deflected an Army-Navy challenge to its growing military role in space.  

The Air Force becomes almost supreme in space  

In 1961, with a new administration, the new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, directed the Air Force to assume responsibility for development and acquisition of all future military space systems. The Air Force was by now responsible for 90 percent of the military space effort. The Navy was only allowed to continue basic and preliminary space research and operate its existing satellite systems. This directive caught the Navy completely by surprise. The directive for all intents and purposes made the Air Force the leading military space service and effectively muted the rivalry among the three services that had plagued the second Eisenhower Administration.

Meanwhile, the Navy contributed naval aviators to become astronauts in the national man-in-space programs now run by NASA. Navy CDR Alan Shepard made the first U.S.-manned space flight in 1961. Half the astronauts in the manned space program came from the Navy, including six men who walked on the moon. Navy CINCs—through the fleet ASW and barrier commands—also took responsibility for astronaut recovery—operations at sea that recurred from 1961 to 1975.

Man-in-space—whatever its political and scientific benefits—was a military side-show, however. The Air Force had become designated as the primary service involved in military space research and development, although it still did not have the sole responsibility it craved. By 1974, it would achieve the upper hand in the development of the

430. For details, see Spires, *Beyond Horizons*, 76-77, 84.
431. Ibid., 99.
432. Ibid.
next generation of navigation satellites (i.e., Navy-developed TRANSIT’s successor)—the Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS). 434

**From a unified CONAD to a specified ADCOM**

Meanwhile, the nation’s air defense institutions were slowly evolving into its military space institutions, and new military space institutions were being created.

In 1960, SECDEF assigned operational command of all space surveillance and the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS) to CONAD and operational control to NORAD. In 1961 NORAD assumed operational command of the Navy’s Space Surveillance (SPASUR) east-west minitrack radar fence and its data-processing facility at Dahlgren, Virginia. 435 The Navy kept technical control of NAVSPASUR, however, and of the TRANSIT navigational satellite system. 436 In 1963, CINCONAD also picked up the potential mission of attacking space satellites from earth (using an Army Nike Zeus unit on Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific). 437

CONAD—a unified command since 1958—was itself disestablished in 1975 in a spasm of post-Vietnam defense cost-cutting. Its functions were assumed by a new Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM), an Air Force-only specified command. ADCOM also assumed the air defense responsibilities of the Alaskan Command, which was abolished the same year. 438 As reflected in its name, however, the new ADCOM saw itself as the kernel around which a powerful Air Force-dominated space command would be built.

434. GPS grew out of a joint Air Force-Navy program utilizing Air Force signal structure and frequencies and Navy Timation satellite orbits. See Spires, *Beyond Horizons*, 149-151. The NRL-developed cesium clock was at the core of GPS. The first GPS satellite was launched in 1978.


438. Ibid., 42, 46, 47.
Navy resurgence in space

The Navy regained space system development responsibilities in 1970. The Navy and Army had successfully challenged the Air Force’s monopoly on space development. In the Navy’s view, the 1961 directive had become outdated and only served to prevent wider exploitation of space for important military requirements. Unconvinced by Air Force counterarguments, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, in September 1970, issued a new directive declaring that new space systems would be acquired and assigned no differently than any other defense systems. Ongoing programs, however, would remain unaffected.439

This directive rekindled Navy interest in ocean surveillance, navigation, and communications satellite systems. With this new license, in 1971 the Navy began to develop a new tactical fleet satellite communications system—FLTSATCOM—in association with the Air Force.440 The Navy provided funding and ground terminals; the Air Force served as the Navy’s agent in acquiring and operating the systems, and received use of a portion of the system’s capacity.441 The first FLTSAT was launched in 1978; the system was fully operational by 1980.

NAVSAPCECOM: better late than never

As Navy space activities and space policy settled out, one pattern became evident: The Navy preferred to live off the expenditures of others—especially the Air Force, putting relatively little of its own money into space efforts. The Navy objected to Air Force policy monopolies, not Air Force funding.

439. Spires, Beyond Horizons, 172.
440. The association with the Air Force was driven by procedures still in place that were left over from the earlier McNamara directive. Otherwise, the Navy would have developed and deployed the satellites on its own.
441. Spires, Beyond Horizons, 145.
Also, Navy activity regarding space was organizationally fragmented. For example, the Naval Astronautics Group at Point Mugu, California, reported to the Chief of Naval Material (CHNAVMAT), while the Naval Space Systems Activity in Los Angeles reported to Commander, Naval Electronic Systems Command (COMNAVELEX).442

The Navy did not provide organizational coherence or visibility to its space operations until the early 1980s. It finally did so in reaction to mounting interest by elements in Congress and the Air Force in unifying all Service space activities. In 1981—under great pressure from the civilian Secretary of the Navy, the CJCS, and others—a Navy Space Systems Division was created in OPNAV under a rear admiral to centralize Navy policy and programmatic efforts in space. Also in 1981, the Navy convened the first annual Naval Space Symposium in Monterey, California. In 1982, a flag officer was assigned to head a new Navy Space Project Office within the Naval Material Command’s Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX).

The Naval Space Symposium at Monterey was a real wake-up call for the Air Force, as its leaders understood what some in the Navy were thinking of doing in space.443 In 1982 the Air Force activated its own Air Force Space Command—the first major organizational change in military space affairs since the creation of the NRO in 1961.

Then in 1983, a Naval Space Command (NAVSPACECOM) was activated at Dahlgren, Virginia, where NAVSPASUR had already been established. NAVSPACECOM’s first commander was a naval aviator captain with astronaut experience. NAVSPACECOM was charged with consolidating and directing a variety of space operations and systems supporting the fleet, as well as coordinating with the Air Force and NASA. Initially, NAVSPACECOM managed the Navy’s communications satellites. Other functions were added over time.


While the creation of NAVSPACECOM was intended to consolidate the Navy’s existing space activities, it was also clearly designed to parry Air Force and ADCON attempts to control all Defense Department space assets under a unified command.\textsuperscript{444} To emphasize the point, in 1985 the Navy restructured its Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX) (responsible for systems acquisition) and created a Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) in its stead.

Finally, a USSPACECOM

The early 1980s saw the consolidation of joint as well as service space organizations. The Air Force and Navy Space Commands originally lacked any formal organizational connecting links. In 1983, however, CINCAD recommended establishment of a unified space command. The Air Force supported such a command, which it would of course dominate, but the other services—including the Navy—saw no reason to change the status quo.\textsuperscript{445} The Navy continued to view space systems as supporting fleet operations, not as operationally employable in their own right. Navy leaders opposed the creation of a unified space command.\textsuperscript{446}

\textsuperscript{444} Stares, \textit{The Militarization of Space}, 220.

\textsuperscript{445} Cole et al., \textit{History of the Unified Command Plan}, 96. For an alternative view, see Spires, \textit{Beyond Horizons}. Spires believes that the Navy probably continued to want a unified space command, as it had in ADM Burke’s day, as an alternative to Air Force monopoly in space. According to Spires, “the price for the Navy’s acceptance of an Air Force Space Command apparently was Air Force agreement to form a unified command” (\textit{Beyond Horizons}, 205-6, 217). Yet Spires later acknowledges “the Navy itself remained generally unenthusiastic about a unified structure that would be dominated by the Air Force” (\textit{Beyond Horizons}, 219). Spires apparently bases his analyses on the observations of Brig Gen Van Inwegen USAF (Ret.), “The Air Force Develops an Operational Organization for Space,” in Hall and Neufeld, \textit{The U.S. Air Force in Space}, 143.

Navy opposition to the creation of a unified space command was overruled however. Strong congressional pressure was exerted for such a command. The political leadership of the Reagan Administration, committed to the President's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also favored the move.\textsuperscript{447} Accordingly, the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) was established in 1985.\textsuperscript{448} (ADCOM was disestablished the following year.)\textsuperscript{449} This was the world's first and only military space command.\textsuperscript{450} NAVSPACECOM became USSPACECOM's Navy component. In 1988, in keeping with his CINCONAD roots, USCINCPACE picked up the ballistic missile defense mission as well.\textsuperscript{451}

As was true of his predecessors—CINCONAD and CINCAD—USCINCPACE became CINCNORAD as well. (The Navy and Marine Corps unsuccessfully opposed this move.)\textsuperscript{452} USPACECOM was established—also like those predecessors—in Colorado Springs, Colorado, colocated with the Air Force Space Command. Its first commander—like all subsequent commanders as of 1999—was an Air Force general. Its first deputy commander was a Navy vice admiral, a practice also continuing through 1999. Besides being dual-hatted as CINCNORAD, USCINCPACE was also triple-hatted as his own Air Force component commander from 1985 to 1986, and again from 1992 through today (1999).

\textsuperscript{447} Cole et al., \textit{History of the Unified Command Plan}, 95.

\textsuperscript{448} On hand for the ceremony was retired CNO ADM Arleigh Burke, who had unsuccessfully championed the cause of a unified space command in 1959 and 1960. Spires, \textit{Beyond Horizons}, 219.

\textsuperscript{449} The Air Force had inactivated ADCOM as an Air Force major command in 1980. ADCOM continued as a U.S. specified command serving as the U.S. component of NORAD until 1986, when it was replaced by U.S. Element NORAD. Spires, \textit{Beyond Horizons}, 195.


\textsuperscript{451} Cole et al., \textit{History of the Unified Command Plan}, 97.

\textsuperscript{452} Ibid.
The Air Force and Navy Space Commands became service components of the new unified command, upon its establishment. USSPACECOM's initial Army component, a four-officer Space Planning Group, became a full-fledged Army Space Command in 1988.\textsuperscript{453}

Thus, the Navy, successful in the 1950s in keeping the bulk of its assets out of the Continental Air Defense Command, by the 1980s was unable to successfully resist joint command and control of its space assets. Yet the Navy clearly saw this as a lesser evil than the takeover of all military space programs and operations by the Air Force.

Establishment of a unified U.S. Space command, however, did not end interservice disagreements. Nor did it end the concern among some U.S. Navy officers that space support for Navy functions and for fleet missions could only receive short shrift under an Air Force-dominated joint command structure.\textsuperscript{454} This concern was particularly acute during 1985-1988, when NRO Director Pete Aldridge kept his NRO hat after he "fleeted up" to become Secretary of the Air Force.

An important and contentious issue examined during the 1997 UCP review—and debated through 1999—was that of designating space as a regional AOR in its own right. COMUSSPACECOM advocated this concept, but it failed to resonate with his colleagues.\textsuperscript{455}

\textsuperscript{453} Collins, Military Space Forces, 75.

\textsuperscript{454} See, for example, the debate that raged on the pages of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in 1995: CDR William J. Toti USN called for breaking up USSPACECOM in "Who Needs the Space Command?," CXXI,(April 1995), 38-41; Maj Gen Robert S. Dickman USAF responded in the May issue, 14-16, calling for an end to the "backstabbing, innuendo, false claims, posturing, and so on"; see also August, 19-20, and October, 27-29.

\textsuperscript{455} For press reports see "Space as Regional 'AOR' Seen Unlikely to Appear in Command Plan Revision," Inside the Pentagon (September 4, 1997), 1; and "Revised Document Avoids Radical Changes: Command Plan Revision Will Not Declare Space a CINC's Regional Area," Inside the Pentagon, XIII (November 27, 1997), 1, 4. For analyses of the issue, see the companion paper to this report, Maureen A. Wigge et al., The Unified Command Plan: Charting a Course for the Navy, CRM 98-165; and Lt Col Paul L. Bailey USAFR, "Space as an Area of Responsibility," Airpower Journal (Winter 1998), 81-88.
NAVSPACECOM as a component

Since establishment of the position, COMNAVSPACECOM has been a one-star flag officer, in contrast to the eventual Army component commander—a three-star general, and the Air Force component commander—usually another hat of the four-star USCINCSPACE himself.456

NAVSPACECOM provides facilities for and staffs a command center 24 hours a day to serve as the Alternate Space Control Center to USSPACECOM’s primary center in Colorado. COMNAVSPACECOM commands the Naval Satellite Operations Center (NAVSOC) (descended from the Navy Astronautics Group mentioned above) at Point Mugu, California; the Fleet Surveillance Support Command (set up in 1986 to operate and maintain the Navy’s Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR)); and a number of detachments.

1999

As of 1999, USSPACECOM—with NORAD—was responsible for warning and surveillance operations against air attacks on the United States, for space operations, and for planning for missile defense. USCINCSPACE, as CINCNORAD, was responsible for U.S.-Canadian aerospace surveillance and warning, and the air defense of North America.

NAVSPACECOM operates assigned space systems for surveillance and warning, and provides spacecraft telemetry and on-orbit engineering support.

456. The disproportionate nature of USSPACECOM’s service components is evident from comparing their personnel and budgets: The Air Force Space Command had 37,797 people assigned in 1998 and a Fiscal Year 1999 budget of $1.7 billion. In comparison, the Naval and Army Space Commands had 521 and 625 people assigned and FY 99 budgets of $79.7 million and $51 million, respectively. (The Navy money goes mostly to SPASUR.) Source: Air Force Magazine: Space Almanac Issue (August 1998), 29.
Meanwhile, the Navy has continued to regard its operating forces as the largest user of—and certainly the most dependent on—U.S. space satellite systems, while itself funding only a small fraction of those systems.457

457. For a wiring diagram of the USSPACECOM and NORAD organizations, see the latest printed (1997) or web site (1999) edition of the Joint Staff Officer’s Guide (AFSC Pub 1).
XII. USSOCOM and NAVSPECWARCOM: reluctant Navy SEALs join the joint pod

Overview

The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was created in 1987. Over Navy protestations, it included the fleet commanders’ Sea-Air-Land commandos (SEALs). The Navy had wanted the combatant command of its special operations forces—especially the SEALs—to remain with the geographical CINCs, especially USPACOM and USLANTCOM, to better support the fleet.

USSOCOM had been called into existence by congressional leaders unhappy with what they saw as too low of a priority attached to special operations within the Department of Defense. Few elements within the Department had favored establishment of such a command. Even after the command was constituted, the Navy resisted assigning fleet special warfare units to USSOCOM’s Navy component until overruled by the Secretary of Defense.

During World War II, the Navy had developed its own unique special warfare units—especially the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs)—to participate in amphibious assaults. During the Cold War these had first been supplemented—and later eclipsed—by teams of SEALs.

Figure 57 provides a timeline of organizational milestones. Figure 58 shows the sequence of commands.

458. The story of the creation of SOCCOM, including Navy views, can be found in Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997); and United States Special Operations Command, 10th Anniversary History (MacDill AFB, FL: USOCCOM History and Research Office, 16 April 1997). Except where otherwise noted, these were the principal sources for this section.
Figure 57. Special operations commands: organizational milestones

Joint Commands

MACV-SOG activated 1964
MACV-SOG inactivated 1972
Operation RICE BOWL (Iran) 1980
Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada) 1983
Joint Special Operations Agency created 1985
Cohen-Nunn Amendment 1986
USSOCOM created 1987
USSOCOM gains USLANTCOM & USPACOM NAVSPECWARGRs 1988
Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) JSOTF 1989

Navy Commands

1942 Scouts and Raiders formed
1943 1st NCDUs formed for Europe
1st UDTs formed for the Pacific
1962 1st SEAL teams formed
1980 SEAL Team 6 formed
1983 UDTs combine with SEALs
1985 NAVSPECWARCEN created
1986 NAVSPECWARCOM created
1987 1988 1989
1993 First Cyclone-class PC commissioned

Note: The most significant events re: changes in the UCP and Navy component are shaded.

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Sequence of commands

USSOCOM is the subject of our seventh historical survey of the nine individual combatant commands existing in 1999. USSOCOM was created in 1987.

Figure 58. Joint and Navy component special operations commands

Amphibious beginnings: the UDTs

The Navy’s 1999 special warfare community—SEALs, SEAL Delivery Teams, and Special Boat Units—traces its origins back to 1942, when the first teams of Navy Scouts and Raiders were formed to facilitate the allied landings in North Africa.459

In 1943, Naval Combat Demolition Units (CDUs) were formed for service in Europe, especially Normandy. At the same time, in the Pacific, Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) were created. The CDUs and UDTs were teams of combat swimmers (“frogmen”) whose mission was to conduct underwater reconnaissance and obstacle clearance missions as part of naval amphibious operations. In

459. For the origins and history of the SEALs, see especially Orr Kelly, Brave Men—Dark Waters: The Untold Story of the Navy SEALS (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992).
1944-1945, Navy personnel performed similar tasks in China, anticipating a possible allied invasion there.

After the war, the UDTs continued as small parts of the Navy’s Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Amphibious Forces. They served in Korea and conducted various Cold War exercises and operations around the world.

Dawn and growth of the SEALs

During the early 1960s, each service was tasked to develop its own counterinsurgency force. Accordingly, the Navy formed some of its UDT personnel into specially trained SEAL teams—the first in 1962. The SEALs deployed worldwide during the 1960s and 1970s, but especially to Vietnam, where some of their exploits became legendary.

The Vietnam War largely ended for U.S. forces, however, in 1973. The UDTs and SEALs at first reverted to being treated as poor stepchildren by the rest of the Navy. In the early 1980s, however, they successfully tied themselves to the Navy’s fleets and to fleet missions implementing the “Maritime Strategy.”

Also, in 1980, a highly classified SEAL Team specializing in hostage rescue was reportedly formed—SEAL Team Six. SEAL Team Six reported directly to a secret joint command, which in turn reported directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

460. Kelly, Brave Men—Dark Waters, 214; Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 65-68.

461. There is no unclassified official documentation on a SEAL Team Six. For an unofficial treatment, see Kelly, 181-204. For memoirs by the first two commanding officers of SEAL Team Six, see CAPT Richard Marcinko USN (Ret.), with John Weisman, Rogue Warrior (New York: Pocketbooks, 1992); and CAPT Robert A. Gormly USN (Ret.), Combat Swimmer: Memoirs of a Navy SEAL (New York: Dutton, 1998).

In 1983, the UDTs went away: All existing UDTs were redesignated SEAL teams and SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams. Navy SEALs were now charged with both amphibious and special warfare missions. They were assigned both operationally and administratively to the fleet commanders (for administrative purposes, they were part of the two Surface Forces, organized into one Naval Special Warfare Group for each). There was no unified naval special warfare organization, any more than there was a unified naval aircraft carrier or submarine organization. In 1985 a Naval Special Warfare Center (NAVSPECWARCEN) was created in Coronado, California, however, centralizing basic and advanced SEAL training.

Congress creates USSOCCOM

Joint special operations had little in the way of history, other than the joint Special Operations Group (SOG) attached to Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) during the Vietnam War. The impetus for creating a U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) came largely from Capitol Hill in the early 1980s, in the wake of the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt in April 1980, the 1982 terrorist bombing of a Marine barracks in Lebanon, and problems—real and alleged—associated with the 1983 invasion of Grenada. In part to head off congressional initiatives to set up such a command, the JCS created instead a Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) in 1984.

The ploy did not succeed. Pressure from Congress intensified, especially by Senators Nunn and Cohen. This pressure came at the same

463. The consolidation of UDTs with SEALs and the eventual placing of both under USSOCOM is regarded by some as having seriously degraded very-shallow-water reconnaissance and neutralization of mines and obstacles during amphibious operations. See Scott Truver and CDR Richard Nagle USN (Ret.), “Foundering on Rocks, Shoals & Mines,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1997, 52.


465. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 97-98.
time as and was reinforced by the hearings leading to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In October 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, passed over the objections of the Department of Defense. The legislation was drafted largely by Jim Locher, the influential Senate staff member behind the Goldwater-Nichols Act. For the first time, Congress had mandated that the President create a unified combatant command. Moreover, Congress passed two additional bills over the next two years to ensure proper implementation of their wishes.

The Reagan Administration set up USSOCOM at MacDill Air Force Base, near Tampa, Florida, as a unified command in 1987. At the same time, USREDCOM—as discussed earlier—was disestablished at MacDill, and many of its assets and staff infrastructure—including its first Commander in Chief (who was also the last USCINCRED) were transferred to the new command. JSOA was also disestablished, its functions assumed by USSOCOM or realigned within the Joint Staff.466

From its creation through 1999, USSOCOM has been commanded by a succession of four-star U.S. Army generals, although the post of CINC is nominally nominative. From its inception, the command had Army, Navy, and Air Force service components. The commander of the first was always a three-star general and the commanders of the other two were always two-star officers.

There has been no Marine component. The Marines successfully maintained that their Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)s) obviated direct participation in the command. The first MEU(SOC) deployed in 1986.467

466. *Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 65.

The Navy tries to stay outside

The SEALs and the rest of the Navy unsuccessfully fought their inclusion in USSOCOM "tooth and nail." The Navy saw the SEAL teams as organizations integral to fleet operations, especially amphibious landings. In this the SEALs were considered to have much more in common with the rest of the fleet than with Army and Air Force SOF units, which—in the words of one Navy spokesman—“cannot immediately go out and support operations.”

Fleet commanders found the SEALs useful and the SEALs were happy with their integration into fleet operations. The Navy had rediscovered the value of its SEALs in the early 1980s and did not want to give them up, nor did many of the SEALs want to go. Moreover, the SEALs disliked becoming what they saw as a small part of a large, Army-dominated organization—a “tiny cog in the big green machine.”

USCINCSOC when appointed was mandated by law to control all active and reserve special operations forces located in the United States. This included a new Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) in San Diego, set up in 1987, as its Navy component. The only organization the Navy assigned to NAVSPECWARCOM initially, however, was the NAVSPECWARCEN—a training command. It did not include the two fleet Naval Special Warfare Groups or other operational units. These stayed under CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT, as USPACOM and USLANTCOM Navy components. The Navy held that they were integral and organic fleet organizations.

468. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 68. See also Gormly, Combat Swimmer, Chapter 24.


Nevertheless, USCINCSOC wanted these groups, and—despite strong Navy protests—SECDEF Weinberger ordered them transferred to NAVSPECWARCOM in 1988.471

Organizing for operations

As finally organized in the 1980s, U.S. special warfare forces fell under the combatant command of USCINCSOC. When deployed overseas, however, they normally reported operationally to a geographic CINC. Most reported through the special operations component commander assigned to each CINC—general or flag officers coequal to the service component commanders.472 For operations, these special operations component commanders can organize Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs). SEALs can deploy in Naval Special Warfare Detachments that work for these component commanders—COMSOCEUR, COMSOCSO, etc. They also still deploy, however, in detachments that work for the forces under numbered fleet commanders—and therefore for the Navy component commanders.

USCINCSOC is not only a force provider. He can—himself—also deploy and directly operate forces overseas, including Navy SEALs. These forces—said to include SEAL Team Six—are organized into Special Mission Units (SMUs).473

471. See especially Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 158-162; and Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 100.


Thus, as of 1999, Navy SEALs can be assigned to USSOCCOM, to theater Special Operations Commands reporting to geographic combatant commanders, and to deploying fleet battle groups and amphibious task groups.\textsuperscript{474}

**USCINCSOC as a "service chief"**

With congressional pressure, USCINCSOC was given unique authority to oversee promotion, assignment, retention, and professional development of Special Forces personnel. He bore responsibility not only for developing and acquiring material, supplies, and services peculiar to special operations but also programming, budgeting, and budget execution authority. A year later, Congress gave USCINCSOC acquisition authority as well. \textit{No other combatant commander has exercised such authority}. Thus, in the case of special operations, the line between combatant command and service branches of the chain of command was blurred even further.

As an example, the more than a dozen Patrol Coastal (PC) \textit{Cyclone-} class ships that started to enter the fleet in 1993 were funded by USCINCSOC, not by the Navy Department. These ships are manned, however, by Navy personnel. Their design represented a compromise between proponents of two different missions for the ships: coastal patrol and interdiction, and naval special warfare support.\textsuperscript{475}

1999

As of 1999, USCINCSOC was responsible for providing combat-ready special operations forces to other unified combatant commands, but

\textsuperscript{474} For details of the complexities inherent in these relationships, see LCDR Bill Hamblett USN, "Revitalizing Naval Special Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute \textit{Proceedings} 123 (June 1997), 43-47.

\textsuperscript{475} Compromises can yield troubled aftermats. See the discussions in Jack Dorsey, "Despite Praise for Their Performance, Navy to Give Seven of its 13 Patrol Boats to the Coast Guard," \textit{Norfolk Virginian-Pilot} (July 15, 1998); and Kelly, \textit{Brave Men, Dark Waters}, 248-9.
also for exercising command of selected special operations missions himself if so directed by the NCA.

His naval component, NAVSPECWARCOM, encompassed all Navy special warfare forces, principally but not exclusively the SEALs. Unlike any other CINC, USCINCSOC retained authority over portions of the DOD program and budget.

Special operations forces deployed overseas, including SEALs, normally come under the operational control of CINC special operations component commanders. Numbered fleet commanders also can have SEALs assigned to them, especially for amphibious operations.  

476. For a wiring diagram of the USSOCOM organization, see the latest printed (1997) or web site (1999) edition of the Joint Staff Officer's Guide (AFSC Pub 1).
XIII. The road to USTRANSCOM: ceding airlift, then sealift to a joint command

Overview

Transportation remained a common-user single-service responsibility rather than a CINC responsibility throughout most of the Cold War. A U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was finally created in 1987, over strong Navy protestations. The Navy feared degradation of vital logistic support to the fleet.

The main transportation issue of the late 1940s and early 1950s had been unification of all independent service sealift and airlift into two single-service organizations reporting to service chiefs: the Navy’s Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) (later the Military Sealift Command or MSC); and the Air Force’s Military Air Transport Service (MATS) (later the Military Airlift Command or MAC). The Navy had unsuccessfully opposed these consolidations, and struggled especially to keep all its land-based airlift capacity from being swallowed up by Air Force commands.

Later, the Navy likewise opposed consolidation of all airlift, sealift, and Army transportation into one unified combatant command. It was ultimately unsuccessful here too, in the face of congressional, administration, and Air Force pressure. Since creation of USTRANSCOM as a combatant command in 1987, the MSC has been its Navy service component. The Navy also lost in its bid to confine USTRANSCOM responsibilities to wartime only.

Figure 59 provides a timeline of significant milestones in the organization and re-organization of joint, unified, specified, and Navy commands for transportation starting in World War II. Figure 60 shows the sequence of specified and unified combatant commands and Navy componenty.
Figure 59. U.S. transportation commands: organizational milestones

Joint, Unified & Specified Commands

- War Shipping Administration created
- JANATC created
- JMTC created
- MATS created at Andrews AFB
- USN units assigned
- MATS designated single air transport mgr
- USN transfers aircraft to MATS
- MATS HQ moves to Scott AFB
- Army MTMTS (later MTMC) created
- MATS becomes MAC
- Navy participation in MAC ends
- MAC designated a Specified Command
- JDA established
- USTRANSCOM created
- JDA disestablished
- MAC terminated as Specified Command
- USTRANSCOM peacetime mandate strengthened

Navy Commands

- NATS created
- NATS abolished
- Fleet Logistic Support Wings (later Air Wings) created
- MSTS created
- NTS abolished
- Fleet Logistic Air Wings abolished
- Remaining USN transport squadrons transferred to FLT Cdrs
- USN MATS squadrons organized into Naval Air Transport Wings
- Naval Air Transport Wing LANT disestablished
- Naval Air Transport Wing PAC disestablished
- MSTS becomes MSC
- MSC retires last US troop transports
- MSC becomes USTRANSCOM

Note: The most significant events regarding changes in the UCP and Navy component are shaded.

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Sequence of commands

USTRANSCOM is the subject of our eighth historical survey of the nine individual combatant commands existing in 1999. USTRANSCOM was created in 1987, replacing MAC as a combatant command.

Figure 60. Sequence of specified, unified, and Navy component transportation commands, under the UCP.

Note: The figure shows commands and components as they became subsumed under the UCP. A Military Air Transport Service (MATS) was created in 1948. It became the Military Airlift Command (MAC) in 1966, but was not designated a specified command under the UCP until 1977. A Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) was created in 1949. It became the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in 1970, but was not designated the naval component of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) until 1987. Details are in the text.

Consolidating sealift and airlift

As was discussed earlier, traditionally the Army and Navy had usually—but not always— maintained their own separate sea transportation establishments. During World War II, both services acquired separate sealift fleets. The Navy's was the Naval Transportation Service, or NTS, under the Vice Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. The services also established large new separate airlift
organizations as well. The Navy's was the Naval Air Transport Service, or NATS, headquartered at Moffett Field, California. Various joint boards and committees and civilian transportation agencies were set up to coordinate the services' airlift and sealift activities.

Following the war, the separate service lift functions would be consolidated into unified single-service-run commands that served joint users and reported through service chains of command, but outside of the UCP.

Making MATS

Airlift was the first function to be so consolidated. Through the first half of 1946, the Army Air Forces' Air Transport Command (ATC) proposed that ATC operate all scheduled air transport, regardless of service supported, including that of NATS. The Navy counter-proposed a joint task force arrangement on common-interest routes. An interservice battle was joined that was not settled until 1948, when Secretary of Defense Forrestal (himself a former Secretary of the Navy and Navy partisan)—strongly backed by President Truman and elements in Congress—sided with what was now part of the new U.S. Air Force. Forrestal directed creation of a consolidated Military Air Transport Service (MATS) to operate all air transport required by the

477. At the end of June 1945, there were 2,897 transport and utility aircraft on the Navy list, including over 100 land-based, four-engine R5D-1 (DC-4) Skymasters. James C. Fahey, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet: Victory Edition (New York: Ships and Aircraft, 1945), 53.


armed forces, particularly all fixed and regularly operated air transport routes.⁴⁸⁰

While there had been some consideration given to making the MATS commander a naval officer, it was decided to give the post to an Air Force major general, with a Navy rear admiral as his deputy. Coming under the command and direction of the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, and including both Navy and Air Force aircrews, MATS operated as both a USAF major command and a National Military Establishment (later Department of Defense) agency.⁴⁸¹ The Navy's NATS was disestablished, after six and a half years of service.

What the Navy wanted and why

The Navy saw airlift as a vital logistic support function of the fleet, and decried having to be supported by a centralized, Air Force-run command with little understanding of Navy strategic, operational, and especially tactical needs. The Navy sought throughout to retain whatever organic airlift capability it could within its fleets or—failing that—in its reserve elements. (It is still trying.)

Grudgingly joining MATS

MATS headquarters was originally established at Andrews AFB, near Washington, DC, but was moved to Scott AFB, near St. Louis, MO, in 1958. MATS did not initially have a budget of its own until 1951. Between 1948 and 1951, it was dependent on Army, Navy, and Air Force funds. Navy and Air Force units in MATS continued to operate under their own service rules, and thus it was initially more a coordinated than an integrated organization.⁴⁸²

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Even with consolidation, MATS was not the only U.S. military airlift organization in existence. The function of airlift for airborne operations was initially kept as a separate Air Force responsibility outside of MATS. The Navy was also allowed to keep responsibility for some air transport (primarily non-scheduled) that it deemed essential to naval operations. The Navy also kept its seaplane transports and responsibility for seaplane transport development. All personnel, property, and facilities of NATS were transferred to MATS except those needed to support these excluded missions. New Navy Fleet Logistic Support Wings, Pacific and Atlantic, were created out of what was left of NATS to support the Navy missions and to maintain organizational integrity. Two thousand, seven hundred and thirty six naval personnel and 45 aircraft moved from NATS to MATS, still wearing Navy blue.

MATS' first major operation was the Berlin Airlift of 1948. MATS transferred two Navy squadrons—VR–6 and VR–8—from the Pacific to Germany to participate. During eight months in Germany, these squadrons flew 45,990 hours and carried 129,989 tons of cargo into Berlin.483

Despite the creation of MATS, special-purpose airlift aircraft proliferated in all the services, including the Navy. Also, in July 1950, in addition to its organic airlift capabilities, the Navy instituted a contract air service—called QUICKTRANS—to facilitate logistical support within the United States. By 1957 the Navy had 40 four-engine aircraft assigned to MATS and 112 transport planes (including 35 four-engine aircraft) assigned to the Fleet Logistic Support Wings. In 1959, eight C–54 (DC–4) cargo aircraft were being used by the QUICKTRANS contractor.484

Calling attention to the many duplicative air transport services that existed, the Hoover Commission on Governmental Organization recommended in 1955 that the Secretary of Defense merge all the airlift


services within DOD (except for administrative aircraft, which ought to be "drastically reduced" in number) into MATS. In December 1956, the Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the single manager for airlift services within the Department of Defense. The Navy transferred 15 four-engine aircraft from the Fleet Logistic Support Wings to MATS, and the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command (TAC) effected a similar transfer. Subsequently, MATS received most of the rest of the Navy’s aircraft from the Fleet Logistics Support Wings as well as the TAC heavy troop carrier transports. Nevertheless, some 920 Air Force and Navy transport aircraft still remained outside the control of MATS.

In 1957, with the transfer of the bulk of their aircraft gone, the Fleet Logistics Support Wings were closed down. The remaining Navy transport squadrons were organized into Fleet Tactical Support Squadrons (VR) and reassigned to operate directly under the fleet commanders. Meanwhile, the Navy squadrons in MATS were organized into Naval Air Transport Wings, one for the Pacific and one for the Atlantic.

Ending participation in MATS

As a result of the 1956 SECDEF directive, MATS’ rules and regulations were made applicable to both Air Force and Navy elements. In 1962, some 4,000 Navy personnel, comprising five squadrons, were operating as part of MATS. A Navy administrative unit was located at MATS headquarters.

In 1965, however, the Secretary of the Navy, Paul Nitze, reiterated an earlier request to Air Force Secretary Harold Brown that they recommend withdrawing all Navy personnel from MATS. Nitze reasoned

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488. On MATS support for the Navy by the 1960s, see LCDR Rebentisch, “MATS’ Role in Naval Logistics,” 76-87.
that the Navy contribution to MATS had shrunk from 36 to 14 percent, with a concomitant reduction in advancement opportunities for the Navy officers assigned there. Secretary Brown agreed and in 1966 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara approved the proposal. Forty-eight Air Force-owned, Navy-operated C-130s were transferred to Air Force units by 1967, and all Navy wings and squadrons in MATS were decommissioned.489

MATS becomes MAC becomes a specified command

MATS was gradually shifting its mission from scheduled airlift to combat airlift support. In 1962, Congressman Mendell Rivers unsuccessfully introduced legislation to redesignate MATS as the Military Airlift Command (MAC), and transfer control from the administrative chain and the Secretary of the Air Force to the operational chain through the JCS, as a specified command.490 In 1966, at the behest of Congress, MATS was redesignated MAC, although efforts to make the command a JCS specified command as well failed.

The Navy still maintained its own aging transport fleet. When the Navy requested funds in the early 1970s to modernize these aircraft, however, the civilian leadership of the Defense Department turned it down flat.491 Instead, in 1974 the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to consolidate all strategic and tactical military airlift under the MAC commander, who would become a specified commander for airlift. None of the services, including the Navy—or the Air Force—agreed with this decision, which would shift operational responsibility for MAC from the Secretary of the Air Force and shift airlift assets from the Tactical Air Command and other Air Force commands to


490. LCDR Rebentisch, “MATS’ Role in Naval Logistics,” 84.

MAC. The SECDEF was firm, however. Navy efforts to overturn this decision, including appeals to friendly members of Congress, were to no avail.

After much delay, MAC became a specified command for airlift in 1977. MAC was to receive almost all military transport aircraft except for Navy carrier onboard delivery (COD) and Marine KC–130 tanker aircraft. Nevertheless, in 1999, the Navy still retained a large fleet of “Operational Support Airlift” (OSA) transport aircraft.

## Sea-lifting everyone with the Navy: MSTS and MSC

We now turn to sealift. Throughout World War II, four organizations had controlled sealift—the Army Transport Service, the Naval Transportation Service, the War Shipping Administration, and the Fleet Service Forces. Navy preparation for and interest in its World War II point-to-point sea transportation role had been minimal. NTS had operated very few ships itself; for the most part its operating role

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492. Underwood, 9. see also Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 48-49.


494. A 1995 study identified 136 OSA Navy aircraft, 55 percent of which were in the Active Navy and 45 percent in the Naval Reserve. These included 27 C–9s, 14 C–130s, and 11 P–3 variants. See Tim Graves and James East, Support to the Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces: Operational Support Airlift, IDA Paper P-3119, (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 1995). In 1995 the Commission recommended transfer of all such OSA aircraft, except Navy C–9 aircraft, to the Air Force, to be followed by significant force reductions. USCINTRANS would manage and schedule the resulting centralized OSA Fleet in support of all the Services and CINCs, and coordinate the scheduling of Navy C–9s. See John P. White et al., Directions for Defense; Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Washington DC: May 24, 1995)3-21–3-22.

495. For a general history of Army troop transport, see Ronald R. Liston, “The Army’s Unknown Navy, Parts I and II,” Sea Classics, XXX (September and October 1997), 49-55 and 36-43.
was assumed by the War Shipping Administration. Amphibious transports and fleet auxiliaries had been assigned directly to the fleets. 496

Nevertheless, obeying the Secretary of Defense’s mandate, in 1949 the Navy became the nation’s single manager for military ocean transportation. A Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) was created, headed by a Navy vice admiral reporting to the Secretary of the Navy. The command assumed responsibility for providing sealift and ocean transportation for all military services as well as for other government agencies. 497

To effect the consolidation, the Water Transport Service of the Army’s Transportation Corps was transferred to MSTS. MSTS received 92 ships from Navy commands, and was in the process of receiving 115 from the Army when the Korean War broke out in June 1950—a war that kept the new service quite busy and swelled its fleet to 467 ships operating around the world. 498 Approximately 10,000 civil service personnel employed as crews aboard its vessels by the Army were also transferred to MSTS and continued to serve aboard ex-Army ships, alongside the commissioned Navy ships of the former NTS manned by military crews. 499 The last MSTS Navy military crew went ashore in the 1960s, after which all MSTS ships were manned by civil service or contract civilian crews.

In 1958 the MSTS charter was expanded to include operation of the Navy’s scientific support ships, vessels that would be involved in


oceanographic research, missile tracking, communications, and other sensitive missions.

MSTS troop transports went out of service in the late 1960s, although they were used right up to 1973 to transport Korean troops to and from Vietnam. Henceforth, U.S. troops would be moved almost exclusively by air.\(^5^0^0\)

MSTS was renamed the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in 1970, bringing the name in line with MAC’s. While MAC became, as we have seen, a specified command, MSC remained a Navy command, reporting to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Starting in the 1970s, to save money by substituting civilian mariners for uniformed officers and sailors, more and more of the Navy’s underway replenishment force were transferred from the fleets to MSC’s civilian-manned Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF). Thus, MSC acquired an increasing number of fleet oilers, fleet stores ships, ocean-going tugs, underwater surveillance ships, ammunition ships, and combat stores ships. These ships, mostly civilian-manned, provided direct support to the fleet. The Navy was loath to see them placed under the command of a joint transportation czar concerned with overseas lift but with no understanding of direct fleet operational support.

_The Navy’s buildup of its NFAF increased its animosity toward creation of a unified joint transportation command._

In 1980, the Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) stood up at Diego Garcia to support RDJTF Middle East operations. NTPF ships

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500. During 1994, however, a former MSTS transport then serving as a state maritime college training ship was again used to carry troops. As part of the first U.S. troop sealift in 25 years, the _Empire State_ (formerly _Barrett_) helped remove the last 2,000 U.S. troops from Mogadishu, Somalia, to Mombasa, Kenya, in company with a Greek-flagged ship. Use of sea-lift had been chosen as a safety measure because of the difficulty in securing the Mogadishu Airport and air space over Somalia. See Winn.

B. Frank, “Farewell to the Troopship,” _Naval History_ (January/February 1997), 45.
were manned by MSC. NTPF was the forerunner of several MSC Maritime Prepositioning Forces set up around the world toward the end of the Cold War.

### Creating USTRANSCOM despite the Navy

The 1980s saw heated bureaucratic and political battles in Washington over the creation of a joint transportation command. The Navy led the charge against standing up the command, but eventually was overruled. By 1987, USTRANSCOM would be a reality.⁵⁰¹

In 1979, the Defense Department had established the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) to give the service transportation agencies a direct reporting chain to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JDA, however, with a two-star officer at its helm, did not have directive authority. In 1981 the JCS recommended integration of the Army’s Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and the Navy’s MSC into a unified joint transportation command. (MTMC was previously styled MTMTC and had been created out of earlier Army organizations in 1965.) The Army and Navy—especially the Navy—lobbied as services so effectively against a joint command on Capitol Hill, however, that the Defense Authorization Act in 1982 specifically prohibited using any funds for such a purpose.⁵⁰²

Secretary of the Navy John Lehman personally fought hard against a unified transportation command.⁵⁰³ Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the ongoing Packard Commission on Defense Management, CJCS ADM William Crowe, and the Air Force, however, were all strongly in favor. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act lifted the 1982

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⁵⁰¹. The creation of USTRANSCOM, including Navy views, is the subject of Chapter I and Appendix I of James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, *So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint History Office and United States Transportation Command Research Center, 1995).


legislative prohibition and indeed mandated JCS examination of the issue, with a view toward creating a combatant transportation command.

A U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was finally established in 1987 at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, the home of MAC. The JDA was disestablished, and MAC lost its specified command status a year later.

Empowering USTRANSCOM

After USTRANSCOM was established, MAC became the USTRANSCOM Air Force service component. MAC’s commander became the new USCINCTRANS, an Air Force four-star general, dual-hatted as his own Air Force component commander. That component, MAC, would later be transformed into the Air Mobility Command (AMC). MTMC and MSC, commanded by two-star officers, became the Army and Navy components.  

It soon became apparent, however, that in reality USTRANSCOM had been created half-baked. The services had been allowed to retain their single-manager charters for their respective transportation modes—air, land, and sea. Even more restrictively, the Navy had been successful in limiting USCINCTRANS authority primarily to

504. AFSC Pub 1.
505. Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, 3.
506. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 101-104.
wartime. USTRANSCOM’s Service components retained operational command over their forces, controlled procurement and industrial funds, and bore responsibility for performing Service-unique missions. During Operation Desert Shield, the deployment to Saudi Arabia in 1990, the vague nature of USTRANSCOM’s responsibilities during situations short of war created confusion.

ADM Crowe’s successor, General Colin Powell, worked with Secretary of Defense Cheney and Cheney’s Special Assistant, David Addington, however, to push through a charter that gave the USCINTRANS a peacetime as well as a wartime mission, and made him the single manager of defense transportation assets in place of the Service secretaries. Despite strong Navy opposition, Powell was successful. In 1993 a new Defense Department directive gave USCINTRANS combatant command of the TRANSCOM component commands in time of both peace and war and made him DOD “single-manager for transportation, other than service-unique or theater-assigned

507. In a delicious example of “where you sit is where you stand,” the OPNAV officer who had spearheaded the successful effort to limit USTRANSCOM’s mandate to only wartime had been RADM Paul D. Butcher USN, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations (Code OP-06B, later N3/N5B). RADM Butcher went on to become Commander, Military Sealift Command and then Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM. In this last job, now-VADM Butcher opined that limiting TRANSCOM to wartime responsibilities had been “one of the dumbest things” he had ever done in his career. VADM Butcher, as DCINC during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, now took the position that it was in the nation’s best interest for USTRANSCOM and its component commands to operate in peacetime as they would during crises, contingencies, and war. The story is in Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, 3-4.

508. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 103.

509. For the interservice battles over empowering USTRANSCOM in peacetime, see a study by one of the participants, COL Donald W. Lamb USA, “TRANSCOM: A Look at the Process of Organizational Evolution,” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 1992). Also Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 105-6.
transportation assets. The service secretaries were no longer single-managers for transportation.

1999

As of 1999, USTRANSCOM was responsible for providing common-user U.S. military transportation worldwide, in peace and war. Its Navy component command, the Military Sealift Command, was responsible for military sea transportation worldwide. USTRANSCOM assets in a geographic CINC’s AOR remained assigned to USCINCCOM unless otherwise directed by SECDEF.

511. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 104.
512. For a wiring diagram of the USTRANSCOM organization, see the latest printed (1997) or web site (1999) edition of the Joint Staff Officer’s Guide (AFSC Pub 1).
Overview

The Navy long fought the creation of a unified U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), fearing Air Force misuse and lack of appreciation of Navy assets. It stopped fighting in the early 1990s; the command was born in 1992.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Navy’s ultimately successful fight to put (and command) at sea a share of the nation’s nuclear deterrence and warfighting missions had been at the heart of the intense interservice battles over unification. Part and parcel of that success was the limiting of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to Air Force components only, and retention of U.S. Navy nuclear capabilities by the fleet commanders. The Navy was forced to agree, however, to creating joint targeting and planning institutions. The Navy continued to fight vociferously on this issue throughout the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War, however, lowered the stakes and fears in Navy circles. In 1992 a new U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) inherited operational control of all strategic nuclear forces from SAC and the Atlantic and Pacific Commands. The Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, which had acted as Navy service components for the latter two commanders, now performed the same functions for the new command. Leadership of USSTRATCOM rotated among Air Force generals and Navy admirals.

Figures 61 and 62 provide organizational milestones and timelines.

Figure 61. U.S. strategic commands: organizational milestones

Strategic Commands
- US Strategic AFs in Europe created under CCS
- 20th AF in Pacific created under JCS
- US Army Strategic AF created
- SAC designated a Specified Command
- Operation Crossroads: Nuclear Weapons Effects JTF
- Key West Agreement confirms USN nuclear role
- CG, SAC redesignated COMSAC
- COMSAC redesignated CINCSAC
- JSTPS created, LA NTCOM gains SSBNs
- 1st SIOP in force, includes CVs, SSBNs
- USAF airborne command posts begin permanent alerts
- PACOM gains SSBNs
- SECDEF announces SIOP to delete CVs
- USSTRATCOM created
  - LANTFLT and PACFLT are Navy components
  - USPACOM & USLANTCOM lose SSBNs
  - SAC disestablished
  - STRATWING One created
  - 1st USN USCINCSTRAT
  - President announces missile de-targeting
  - STRATWING One gains airborne command post mission

Navy Commands
- 1942
  - SUBPAC & SUBLANT TYCOMs standardized
- 1943
  - USN creates Office of Special Weapons
- 1944
  - 1st USN aircraft modified for nuclear weapons
- 1945
  - LANTFLT & NELM deploy
  - 1st Med nuclear strike CVTG
- 1946
  - PACFLT deploys 1st Pac nuclear strike CVTG
- 1948
  - Navy Special Projects Office created
  - SUBRON 14 established as 1st USN SSBN squadron
  - 1st SSG Regulus missile patrol
- 1949
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1950
  - 1st forward SSBN refit site (Holy Loch) opens
- 1951
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Pacific
- 1952
  - LANTFLT and PACFLT TACAMO squadrons commissioned
- 1953
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1954
  - 1st forward SSBN refit site (Holy Loch) opens
- 1955
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1956
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1957
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1958
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1959
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1960
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1961
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1962
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1963
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1964
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1965
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1966
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1967
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1968
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1969
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1970
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1971
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1972
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1973
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1974
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1975
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1976
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1977
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1978
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1979
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1980
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1981
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1982
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1983
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1984
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1985
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1986
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1987
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1988
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1989
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1990
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1991
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1992
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1993
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1994
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1995
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1996
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1997
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars
- 1998
  - 1st SSBN deploys in Med
  - SUBLANT deploys 1st SSBN in Atlantic
  - COMSUBLANT upgraded to 3 stars

Note: The most significant events regarding changes in the UCP and Navy component are shaded.

CNA Historical Paper Series (1999)
Sequence of commands

USSTRATCOM is the subject of our last historical survey of the nine individual combatant commands existing as of 1999. As of that time, USSTRATCOM was the very youngest combatant command, having been established in 1992. It is descended, however, from SAC, which could arguably be considered the very oldest. SAC had already stood up when the Outline Command Plan of 1946 brought it under JCS control.

Figure 62. Sequence of specified, unified and Navy component strategic commands

Note: The figure shows commands and components as their nuclear missions became subsumed under the UCP. Establishment of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets (LANTFLT & PACFLT), and the Atlantic and Pacific Commands (LANTCOM & PACOM), all predated their nuclear mission assignments in the early 1950s.

Gestation and birth of SAC

Throughout the interwar period and World War II, the Army Air Forces (AAF) and its organizational predecessors within the Army had sought administrative and operational autonomy for their forces, most especially their long-range heavy bombers. By the end of the war, they had managed to create and deploy two strategic bombing commands independent of the joint theater commanders. These
were the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, reporting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), and the Twentieth Air Force (20AF) in the Pacific, reporting to the JCS. In both cases, the executive agent was the AAF chief, General of the Air Force Henry “Hap” Arnold.514

After the war, the AAF brought its bombers home, creating a new Strategic Air Force, later the Strategic Air Command (SAC).515 The AAF advocated a SAC controlled by one commander and operating globally. The Navy insisted that SAC not control forces normally based in other commands.516 As a result, SAC was designated the first organization under the UCP that controlled the forces of only a single service. President Truman’s approval of the OCP on 14 December 1946 recognized SAC and brought it under JCS control. SAC thus became the first example of what would later be designated a “specified command” (although the term did not come into use until 1951). It was technically the first combatant command to be organized under the authority of the post-war JCS, and its birth pre-dated that of the independent Air Force itself by a year. The JCS did not, however, issue a formal directive to SAC or formally assign the Chief of Staff of the Air Force as its executive agent for SAC until 1949.517

Putting nukes on carriers

The Navy had participated in a small but significant way in the development and delivery of the first U.S. nuclear weapons in 1945.518 A


515. On the origins and history of SAC, see J.C. Hopkins, The Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946-1981 (A Chronological History), (Offutt AFB NB: Strategic Air Command, 1982).

516. Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 3.


518. See Al Christman, Target Hiroshima: Deak Parsons and the Creation of the Atomic Bomb (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998).
month after AAF aircraft dropped the bombs on Japan, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal established the Office of Special Weapons within OPNAV, to foster future atomic weapon development and delivery by the Navy itself. That office, among other duties, oversaw Operation Crossroads in 1946—the joint nuclear weapons testing program at Bikini. The head of the Special Weapons Office, VADM W. H. P. Blandy, was designated the Commander of Joint Task Force One, which conducted the tests.519

Much of the debate between the Navy and its antagonists in the Air Force, DOD, and Congress during 1946 through 1950 stemmed from Navy resistance to SAC’s achieving a monopoly over the deployment and planned employment of the nation’s nuclear weapons.520 The Key West and Newport Agreements of 1948 confirmed for the Navy—and therefore for Navy specified commands and components of Navy-dominated Unified Commands—a share of both air power and nuclear weapons delivery missions.521

The Navy had two principal goals regarding nuclear weapons in the first Cold War decade:

- To acquire and maintain naval nuclear attack capabilities, against targets in the Soviet Union and elsewhere


521. The Key West Agreement allowed the Navy “targets of naval interest.” The targets were never formally listed in atomic annexes to joint war plans. Navy carrier task forces retained freedom of action to attack targets as the tactical situation required. Joint coordination centers were established in 1952 to deal with this situation and to avoid target duplication, but this arrangement never satisfied SAC. David A. Rosenberg, “A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours: Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-1955,” International Security, VI (Winter 1981/2), 8.

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To keep those capabilities under the operational and administrative command and control of the CNO and the fleet commanders, like other weapons in the nation's naval arsenal.

Consequently, the Navy resisted Air Force and other efforts to keep it out of the nuclear weapons business, or to place targeting of Navy nuclear systems under the control of SAC and Air Force officers. The Navy resented in particular the votes by the non-Navy members of the JCS against a new supercarrier in 1949—seen as critical to future Navy nuclear delivery capabilities. (The carrier was accordingly cancelled by the SECDEF in 1949, precipitating the events leading to the “Revolt of the Admirals.” During the Korean War, however, a subsequent SECDEF reversed this decision. The result would be the first of the Forrestal class CVAs, commissioned in 1955.)

The nuclear bomb delivered by carrier-based aircraft was the Navy's initial nuclear weapons effort. The development in the late 1940s and early 1950s of a Navy carrier nuclear delivery capability confirmed the Navy's nuclear role. The Navy saw these initial nuclear attack capabilities as essentially tactical and naval, designed to both destroy Soviet naval bases and fleet concentrations as well as to provide support to forces on the ground. Navy nuclear-capable carrier task forces were seen to be flexible, mobile striking and support forces fulfilling tactical missions. As such, they should be, the Navy argued successfully, integrated with other naval forces under the fleet commanders.

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In 1948 the Navy modified P2V Neptune land-based patrol planes for service on carriers as nuclear-capable aircraft. They were soon supplemented and then replaced by the first Navy aircraft designed for the nuclear attack role: the AJ–1 Savage.

The Navy’s position on the tactical nature of its nuclear weapons changed in 1953 with the arrival of a new administration and a new national defense policy: Eisenhower’s “New Look.” While the Navy had earlier been critical of “massive retaliation” as a military doctrine, now that it had become national policy, the Navy embraced it too. The Navy began to regard its carriers as also part of the nation’s strategic deterrent nuclear arsenal, alongside the Air Force bombers and the missiles then under development. The Navy did not discard its view, however, that the nuclear-capable carrier aircraft were principally to be used in tactical roles.

In 1951, the Navy deployed its first nuclear strike-capable carrier task force to the Mediterranean. In 1953 the first such task force deployed forward in the Pacific. The Navy had acquired a global nuclear capability. Forrestal, as we have seen, commissioned in 1955, followed by a dozen and a half other big-deck nuclear-capable carriers over the years. AJ–1 Savage aircraft were subsequently succeeded as carrier nuclear strike aircraft by A–3 Skywarriors and A–5 Vigilantes.

**Putting nukes on submarines**

In the late 1950s, a new element rekindled the flames of interservice conflict—ballistic missile delivery systems for nuclear weapons. In 1950 the Air Force received responsibility for developing the nation’s


intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).\textsuperscript{527} In 1955 the Secretary of Defense assigned the Air Force responsibility for developing a \textit{land-based} intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)—a missile that would emerge as Thor. He also assigned responsibility to the Army and the Navy for the joint development of an IRBM that could be either land- or sea-launched. A Joint Army Navy Ballistic Missile Committee (JANBMC) was created to coordinate the Army’s efforts with those of the Navy’s Special Projects office (SP), under RADM William Raborn.\textsuperscript{528}

The Army-Navy marriage proved short-lived, and broke up at the end of 1956. The Army went on to develop the large, liquid-fueled Jupiter IRBM. The Navy pursued a smaller, solid-fueled missile.\textsuperscript{529} (The Navy had been developing both cruise and ballistic missiles since the end of World War II. In September 1947, the carrier \textit{Midway} had launched a German V-2-rocket.)\textsuperscript{530} The results of the Navy’s sea-launched IRBM efforts were the Polaris submarine-launched nuclear-guided missile (SLBM) and the \textit{George Washington}-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)—first deployed in 1960.\textsuperscript{531}

The Air Force integrated its IRBMs and ICBMs into SAC. The problem of fitting new Navy Polaris IRBM-firing submarines into the

\textsuperscript{527} We noted this development earlier as eventually providing the impetus for U.S. Air Force dominance in space, through the development of rockets powerful enough to put payloads in space.

\textsuperscript{528} There is much literature on the missile development programs of the services. For an early treatment, see Wyndham D. Miles, “The Polaris,” in Emme (ed.), \textit{The History of Rocket Technology}, 162-175.

\textsuperscript{529} For Navy decision-making leading up to Polaris, see Vincent Davis, \textit{The Politics of Innovation}, Chapter IV: “The Development of Fleet Ballistic Missiles,” 31-42.

\textsuperscript{530} See the discussion earlier on Navy V-2, Viking, and Vanguard missile development, in the section on space commands.

nuclear command structure provoked a heated debate. The CNO, ADM Arleigh Burke, argued that because the operations of Polaris submarines had to be coordinated with other naval forces, the submarines must be allocated by area to the Atlantic Command, European Command, and Pacific Command.\(^3^\) The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, totally disagreeing, proposed putting all long-range missiles, their launch platforms, and heavy bombers under one U.S. Strategic Command.\(^3^\)

### Compromising on joint command

The Navy was successful in avoiding creation of a joint operational strategic command at that time. In 1960, the SECDEF decided against making SAC a unified command and the Air Force failed to gain control over the deployment of all strategic nuclear weapon systems.

The Navy could not, however, resist the establishment of joint planning institutions for the employment of the nation’s strategic weapons. CINCSAC became dual-hatted as the Director, Strategic Target Planning. In that capacity, he was supported by a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) with a Navy deputy, at SAC headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. The JSTPS coordinated the process of identifying and prioritizing nuclear targets and then of matching weapons against them.\(^4^\) CINCs with strategic nuclear forces—like CINC-LANT and CINCPAC—had representatives at JSTPS.\(^5^\)

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\(^{3^\text{2}}\) Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 3.


Admiral Burke fought vigorously but in vain against creating the JSTPS, even carrying his case to the President.\textsuperscript{536} When the President moved to impose strategic nuclear unity himself, however, Burke quickly sent some of the Navy’s best officers to Omaha to join the staff and try to guard against what he saw as SAC’s targeting excesses.

Even so, the resultant initial JSTPS products—the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) approved in 1960—as well as subsequent products were informed by SAC “first-strike” concepts, not the Navy’s “finite deterrence” views.\textsuperscript{537}

The Navy had opposed the compiling of a SIOP, but had lost that battle too.\textsuperscript{538} The SIOP was to plan the use of the entire panoply of the nation’s strategic nuclear weapons. The Navy thus lost control of its own strategic nuclear targeting.\textsuperscript{539} Subsequently, the Navy allowed the Air Force to dominate the JSTPS.\textsuperscript{540}

In 1964, the secretary of defense announced that the nation’s strategic nuclear force no longer included aircraft carriers.\textsuperscript{541} The carriers

\textsuperscript{536} Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 3.


\textsuperscript{538} On Navy views of the SIOP, see Rosenberg, “Origins of Overkill,” 64-65.

\textsuperscript{539} On Navy participation in the SIOP, see especially LCDR Sestak, “The Seventh Fleet,” 24-33.

\textsuperscript{540} For example, in 1972, 65 percent of the JSTPS staff were from the Air Force, while only 25 percent were from the Navy and Marine Corps combined. See Mariska, “The Single Integrated Operational Plan,” 34. Further, the officers the Navy sent to Omaha were, in most cases, no longer competitive for promotion. For details, see CAPT Linton F. Brooks USN, “Dropping the Baton,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings CXV (June 1989), 32-36.

were said to have lost their “strategic-retaliatory” alert role, retaining instead their conventional and nuclear tactical missions. These missions were the domain of the U.S. and NATO regional combatant commanders and their Navy components, not SAC.\textsuperscript{542} Henceforth, according to SECDEF, the only Navy systems in the SIOP would be the SSBNs and their SLBMs.

**SSBNs under the fleet commanders**

In the spring of 1960, the Navy had presented a proposal for the command and control of Polaris submarines. The plan called for the Polaris boats to be placed under the operational control of CINCLANT, designating Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet as an operational command reporting to CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT, as well as an administrative type command reporting to CINCLANTFLT. This placed the SSBNs in the combatant command operational chain but under the control of a naval officer. In late July this scheme was approved by SECDEF Thomas S. Gates (who had himself been SECNAV until six months previous).\textsuperscript{543}

Operational control of Navy fleet ballistic missile submarines as well as Navy attack submarines was henceforth vested in the commanders of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Submarine Forces (COMSUBLANT and COMSUBPAC). The rank of the submarine force commander in the Atlantic—which would receive the majority of the SSBNs—was upgraded from rear admiral to vice admiral.\textsuperscript{544} To ensure close

\textsuperscript{542} Although the SECDEF announced removal of the carriers from the SIOP, the Mediterranean-deployed CVAs remained under SACEUR for planning and exercise purposes, committed to support NATO forces in ACE’s Southern Region. See Kennedy, *History of the Strategic Arms Competition, Supporting Study: U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the Strategic Role: Part III*, III-8. The CVAs’ nuclear weapons were targeted in SACEUR’s plans. This could not be executed, however, independently of the SIOP, so the carriers were still tied in fact to the SIOP. (Interview, Dr. H.H. Gaffney, former OSD official, November 1998).

\textsuperscript{543} Rosenberg, “American Post-war Air Doctrine and Organization,” 303.

\textsuperscript{544} Paolucci, “The Development of Navy Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems,” 217.
coordination with CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT, COMSUBLANT was relocated from New London, Connecticut, to Norfolk, Virginia.

The first Atlantic Fleet ballistic missile submarine patrol commenced in November 1960, as we have seen. The first Pacific Fleet patrol began in December 1964.\textsuperscript{545} Given the range of their missiles, the boats operated out of forward refit sites at Holy Loch, Scotland, Rota, Spain, and Guam. The Holy Loch and Rota sites' afloat units reported directly back operationally to COMSUBLANT in Norfolk.

With improvements in missile technology, the ranges of successive Navy SLBMs increased. Toward the end of the Cold War, the range of the Trident D–5 missile—a descendent of Polaris—allowed the forward refit sites to be closed—the last in 1992.

Communications to the SSBNs were provided by land-based VLF and LF transmitters. Because of concerns with the survivability of these fixed sites in a nuclear exchange, they were augmented in 1968 by two Navy TACAMO squadrons flying long-range land-based aircraft that deployed an airborne VLF antenna and served as a relay platform.

What the Navy wanted and why

Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Navy continued to resist efforts to bring the SSBN fleet under the operational control of SAC or a joint command dominated by Air Force officers. The Navy believed:

- SSBNs had to be operated at sea, especially in wartime, by the same commands operating naval general purpose forces at sea (the Navy planned for open ocean battles, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, and required professional and clear water-space management doctrine, tactics and procedures).

\textsuperscript{545} Also, three Polaris submarines were assigned to NATO (and thus to SACEUR) starting in the early 1960s. They operated from Holy Loch and conducted patrols in the Mediterranean. With the advent of Poseidon, the commitment was changed to targeting and alerting authority for a specific number of warheads.
Survivability, assured response, and urban-industrial targeting had to be stressed in strategy, doctrine, and plans; the Air Force stressed "promptness" and counter-military (especially counter-nuclear) targeting.

Non-naval officers would misunderstand the nature of sea-power and therefore would misuse Navy forces, including Navy strategic forces.546

Once JSTPS had been invented, it was difficult to see what problem was being solved by further consolidation.547

Continuing to resist joint command

The Symington Committee of 1960, which advised president-elect Kennedy, recommended a unified strategic command be created, commanded by a Navy admiral.548 Nothing came of this proposal, embedded as it was in a larger recommendation to radically restructure the UCP wholesale.549 During 1982–1983, a proposal was again made to centralize the handling of all nuclear weapons within a strategic nuclear forces command. At that time, and again in 1987, the JCS considered and rejected a unified strategic command on grounds that the SAC/JSTPS/LANTCOM/PACOM/ACE system worked satisfactorily.550

546. For example, in his book America is in Danger, Gen Curtis LeMay USAF, the long-time CINCSAC, listed American alert strategic forces but included only one Polaris missile per SSBN. His rationale was that the missiles fire sequentially so only the first was "really" alert. The charitable explanation is that he failed to understand how SSBNs work.

547. The formulation of Navy beliefs is that of Ambassador Linton Brooks. As Captain Brooks USN, he was a central figure in U.S. Navy nuclear force planning policy during the 1980s.


The 1987 review was conducted as a result of congressional prodding, including specific tasking to examine the issue contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. There was, however, at that time no support from either the Services or the combatant commanders for such a change.\textsuperscript{551} Congressional pressure—and even the Goldwater-Nichols Act—was not sufficient to consolidate the American strategic weapons arsenal.

Finally: a USSTRATCOM

The end of the Cold War, however, considerably reduced the relative importance of the strategic nuclear arsenal in the early 1990s. Because the strategic nuclear mission mattered less, SSBN operational autonomy and Navy command of the SSBN force were no longer seen as Navy basic interests by the CNO—ADM Frank Kelso, himself a nuclear submariner. Ballistic missile submarines no longer appeared to be the “crown jewels” to the Navy leadership in the 1990s as they had appeared to their predecessors a generation ago. Also, ADM Kelso was a broad-gauged and cooperative officer who saw the Navy’s post-Goldwater-Nichols role as a joint one. He was not a man to waste his energies on arcane turf battles he believed had little intrinsic importance.\textsuperscript{552}

The CJCS, General Powell, and his Director for Plans, LtGen George Butler USAF (subsequently CINCSAC and the first USCINCSTRAT), took the lead in pushing through a reorganization and creating a new unified command, the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).\textsuperscript{553} At Navy insistence, Navy representation on a new unified command staff was pegged at 355; the Navy and Air Force would alternate in filling the USCINCSTRAT billet; and USCINCSTRAT would not also be a Service component commander.

\textsuperscript{551} Gilmour, “From SAC to STRATCOM,” 47.
\textsuperscript{552} Ibid., 62.
\textsuperscript{553} Ibid., 54. For Gen Butler’s views, see General George Lee Butler USAF, “Disestablishing SAC,” \textit{Air Power History} (Fall 1993), 4-11.
Not all the submarine community—especially influential retired submariners—endorsed Kelso’s thinking. With the Navy divided and more interested in other matters, and with the pressure exerted by GEN Powell and General Butler, creation of USSTRATCOM (with headquarters at the former SAC headquarters at Offutt AFB) finally became a done deal. The head of the active duty submarine community, VADM Roger Bacon, publicly endorsing the move, decried the previous low Navy participation in nuclear weapons targeting and policy, and urged naval officers to seek assignment at Offutt.

USSTRATCOM was stood up on 1 July 1992 and, simultaneously, SAC ceased to exist. In July 1993, at CINCUSACOM’s suggestion, COCOM of heavy bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft was shifted from USSTRATCOM to USACOM. (General Butler’s concept had been to have USSTRATCOM pick up conventional deterrence missions also, using the now conventionally-equipped bombers. This did not fly.) In 1994, General Butler was relieved as USCINCSTRAT by ADM Henry G. Chiles, Jr., the first Navy admiral to hold the position.

Unique among unified commanders, USCINCSTRAT was given two Navy service component commanders—CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT—each of whom exercised operational control over ballistic missile submarines through his submarine type commander—COMSUBPAC and COMSUBLANT, respectively. Meanwhile, the SIOP still exists, and targeting is still done in the same spaces in Omaha as before.

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557. Although JSTPS had been theoretically a separate entity, most Air Force officers assigned to it had been dual-hatted in SAC. Thus, it was easy for JSTPS to disappear when SAC became USSTRATCOM.
STRATWING ONE: The Navy picks up a mission

After over three decades of keeping SAC's strategic command posts aloft, the Air Force was directed to hand that mission over to the Navy's newer E–6A aircraft and retire its four-engine EC–135 "Looking Glass" aircraft. Department of Defense rationale for this move was largely budgetary.

Accordingly, a U.S. Navy unit, Strategic Communications Wing One (STRATWING ONE), was established at Tinker AFB, OK in 1992.558 Operationally, the wing reported to USSTRATCOM and was to coordinate all TACAMO operations. The Navy's two TACAMO squadrons, VQ–3 and VQ–4, relocated to Tinker. Administratively the wing would report to CINCPACFLT via COMNAVAIRPAC.559

The TACAMO squadrons' original responsibility had been to provide communications relay to SSBNs. Now they were also to maintain the USSTRATCOM airborne strategic command posts. In 1998 they were operational. In October of that year, Navy STRATWING ONE aircraft picked up the full airborne strategic command post mission from a retiring Air Force unit.560

1999

In 1999, USSTRATCOM had primary responsibility for strategic nuclear forces in support of strategic deterrence, reconnaissance, and command and control. USSTRATCOM forces deployed to a geographic CINC's AOR remained assigned to USCINCSTRAT unless otherwise directed by SECDEF. USSTRATCOM had two Air Force and two Navy components. The Navy components were the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

558. Tinker also was the home of the U.S. Air Force E–3 AWACS aircraft, which share the same airframe with the E–6s.


In addition, USSTRATCOM deployed a fleet of airborne command post aircraft—flown by Navy aircrews.\(^{561}\)

\(^{561}\) For a wiring diagram of the USSTRATCOM organization, see the latest printed (1997) or web site (1999) edition of the *Joint Staff Officer's Guide* (AFSC Pub 1).
XV. Command interrelationships

We have concluded our narrative of the origins and development of the UCP and the Navy's relationship to it. We began by examining events and attitudes prior to promulgation of the first UCP in 1946. We then looked at the history of the UCP as a whole, and followed with a more detailed examination of the origins of each of the combatant commands existing in 1999.

Here we will discuss some important aspects of intercommand relations, before concluding this paper with observations, analyses, and recommendations.

Relationships across combatant commands

Exclusive attention to interservice arguments surrounding each revision of the UCP can leave the impression that the combatant commanders' relationships with one another have been predominantly hostile. While it is true that continual revision of the UCP had pit the commanders and their staffs against each other as regards command missions and boundaries, it is also true that much cooperative work has gone on among them as well, as regards plans and operations.

We noted earlier some important instances of such cooperation during World War II. These examples have had their counterparts throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War period, including the following:

Plans

Examples of cooperation among the services regarding "Plans" include:

- The designation since 1953 of CINCNEILM as Subordinate Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (SUCOMLANTFLT).
(CINCNELM would later become CINCUSNAVEUR (and COMUSNAVEUR); SUCOMLANTFLT would later be redesignated USCOMEASTLANT.) This has enabled CINCNELM/CINCUSNAVEUR/COMUSNAVEUR to act as a subordinate to CINCLANTFLT in matters of logistic support in the Northeast Atlantic.

• The planned wartime “swing” of PACOM naval forces to LANTCOM, USEUCOM, and NELM, throughout the Cold War. During the early and mid-1950s, this included all PACOM carriers. 562

Operations

Examples of cooperation among the services regarding “Operations” include:

• The administrative and logistics support through the Navy service chain of NAVFE by CINCPACFLT (until the demise of FECOM). Thus in his Service chain role as CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC had the responsibility to support CINCFE’s Navy component. At the same time, of course, in his unified command role as CINCPAC and in his Navy component role as CINCPACFLT, he was seeking the demise of FECOM and NAVFE and the enlargement of the PACOM and PACFLT areas of responsibility.

• The chopping of the Seventh Fleet from PACOM to FECOM OPCON and back again during the Korean War, and the role played by CINCPACFLT and COMSERVPAC during the Korean War in logistic support and personnel readiness,

562. The Navy, however, sought throughout the Cold War to reduce or abandon “swing” in favor of keeping the forces in the Pacific, for wartime operations against China or the Soviet Far East. See Sestak, “The Seventh Fleet,” 15, 72-81.
backstopping COMNAVF E and supporting the Seventh Fleet, when chopped to CINCFE.563

- The reinforcement during crises of COMNAVEU/CINCNELM/CINCNELM/CINCUSNAVEUR's forces by those of CINCLANTFLT. These began with the deployments of a battleship and then a carrier to Turkey and Greece in 1946 and continued through the Cold War period, especially during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Lebanon crisis of 1958, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and the 1973 Middle East War.564

- The routine rotational deployment of forces by CINCLANTFLT to COMNAVEU/CINCNELM/CINC/COMUSNAVEUR since 1948.

- The provision by CINCLANTFLT and CINCNELM of forces to augment those of CINCPACFLT and COMNAVF E during the Korean War, 1950–53.

- The continuous support by CINCLANTFLT and CINCNELM/CINCNELMUSNAVEUR's Sixth Fleet since 1956 for the Atlantic Fleet destroyers deploying to the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) via the Mediterranean, despite OPCON of MIDEASTFOR

563. ADM Arthur Radford was CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT during the Korean War. In his memoirs, he nicely captured the job of a Navy Service chain Fleet CINC supporting another unified commander: "The general public, and even many intelligent and otherwise knowledgeable high government officials, have little appreciation of the important follow-up actions that must be taken to insure that important orders can be carried out. For example: combat ships recommissioned in the United States came through Pearl Harbor on their way west. Here the Pacific Fleet staff gave them a final inspection, clearing them for the western Pacific and combat or holding them for further training or repairs. If there were a disagreement of serious importance I decided it, particularly in the case of carriers, which I personally inspected if I possibly could." Jurika, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, 232.

changing from CINCNELM to CINCSMTRY/CINCMFAJ to USCINCEUR to USCINCGENT.

- The establishment for three decades, beginning in 1960, in the United Kingdom and Spain—countries in the USEUCOM and NAVEUR AOR—of Atlantic Fleet Submarine Force squadron headquarters and tenders in support of USLANTCOM forward SSBN deployments.

- The provision by CINCLANTFLT of forces to augment those of CINCPACFLT during the Vietnam War, 1964–1973.

- The extensive cooperation between COMNAVFORV (under COMUSMACV) and COMSEVENTHFLT (under CINCPACFLT) regarding naval gunfire support and amphibious support for the former by the latter, and the resourcing by CINCPACFLT and his Service Force of NAVFORV during the Vietnam War.

- The USCINCEUR-CINCPAC Command Arrangements Agreement of July 1976, which assigned CMEF additional duty to CINCPACFLT to accomplish CINCPAC tasking, on a not-to-interfere basis with CMEF’s duties under USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR.

- The routine provision by CINCLANTFLT of forces to supplement those of CINCPACFLT in the Indian Ocean, starting in 1980.565

- The various arrangements worked out since establishment of USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT in 1983, whereby the Atlantic

and Pacific fleets have supplied USNAVCENT, the Middle East Force, and later the Fifth Fleet with naval forces.\textsuperscript{566}

- In a 1993 Command Arrangements Agreement (CAA) between USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT, CINCPACFLT was designated as USCENTCOM’s “naval resource/force coordinator.” As such, CINCPACFLT was designated the coordinating authority with CINCLANTFLT and CINCUSNAVEUR for the assignment, support, and training of all U.S. naval forces provided in support of USCENTCOM missions.

\section*{Component commanders and force providers}

Embedded in the listing above are many examples of Navy commands acting as \textit{force providers} to specified and unified commanders and their Navy components. The term “force provider”—nowhere formally defined—can cover three types of support relationships:

- \textbf{Between commands within the service branch of the chain of command:} This involves support by a command in the Navy Shore Establishment to a command in the Navy Operating Forces (e.g., Systems Command support to fleet Type Commanders).

- \textbf{Between commands within the combatant command branch of the chain of command:} This involves support by a combatant command or component of that combatant command to another combatant command or component (e.g., reinforcement by USACOM and the Atlantic Fleet of USEUCOM, NAVEUR, and the Sixth Fleet).

- \textbf{By service branch commands to combatant commands:} (e.g., support by CINCPACFLT, acting in his service capacity, to Naval

\textsuperscript{566} For a discussion and recommendations on the future of these relationships, see Gregory N. Suess, M. Lyall Breckon, W. Seth Carus, and LCDR Jeffrey C. Babos USN, \textit{Strategic Vision for the Pacific Fleet: Challenges, Opportunities and Strategies for the Future}, CRM 97-52 (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, August 1997), 52-53.
Forces, Central Command, acting in his combatant command component capacity.

This is a difficult issue to explain and even harder to analyze. Staffs (especially CINPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT) that engage routinely and heavily in the last two sets of relationships find it difficult to understand which formal relationship covers which actual act of force providing and support.

We here note the existence and importance of these intertwined relationships, and illustrate them—as of 1999—in figure 63. Note that the top map shows the operational AORs of Navy commanders as operational service component subordinates of their combatant commanders. The bottom map shows the "force provider" responsibilities of the Navy's two "major fleet commanders"—CINCLANTFLT and CINPACFLT.

However, explaining, disentangling, and analyzing all these relationships in more detail—let alone their development through history—lies beyond the boundaries of this study.567

Component relationships with combatant commanders and services: the role of stability and change over time

Immediate post-Cold War relationships between the Navy components and their combatant commanders all stem from World War II or post-World War II phenomena. Table 8 summarizes the dates the combatant commands existing in 1999 were established and the dates the current (as of 1999) relationship with their naval component commanders commenced.

Figure 63. Navy component commander and force provider AORs

Note: Top map shows CINC component commander operational AORs; bottom map shows force provider AORs.
By far the oldest and most stable such relationship is that between the Pacific Command and the Pacific Fleet, which dates back almost 40 years to when the two commands were split apart. By contrast, the relationships between the European, Central, and Southern Commands and their naval components went through several changes before reaching their 1999 status—achieved in each instance only within the preceding 15 years or so. Relations between the four functional combatant commands and their naval components have been stable since their inceptions, which in no case dates back more than a dozen years.

Relationships between each component and the Navy Department are, however, older—in some cases much older—than the relationships with the combatant commanders. They often stretch back to the nineteenth century. It is true that in three of the seven cases, the post-Cold War Navy Department command relationship did not predate that of the component relationship (see table 9). In all cases, however, an antecedent Navy command was in existence well before the creation of the combatant command.
Table 9. Navy service component-Navy department relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earliest antecedent Navy Department command established</th>
<th>Present Navy Department command established</th>
<th>Combatant command relationship established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Squadron (1815)</td>
<td>Naval Forces Europe (1963)</td>
<td>with European Command (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Squadron (1821)</td>
<td>Pacific Fleet (1941)</td>
<td>with Pacific Command (1947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Squadron (1841)</td>
<td>Atlantic Fleet (1941)</td>
<td>with Atlantic Command (1947)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the bonds of some command relationships—and therefore Navy positions regarding the UCP—have been reinforced by the long-standing nature of those relationships. This is especially true of the USPACOM-PACFLT relationship, and of most Navy service-branch relationships.

Headquarters locations

No policy has ever been promulgated regarding the relative geographic locations of unified combatant commanders and their service component commanders. Table 10 shows the locations of the post-World War II unified combatant command headquarters and the headquarters of their Navy service components.

Note that in the post-war era colocation has been the exception rather than the rule. The exceptions are important, however: The headquarters of the two largest Navy component commanders in terms of forces assigned in peacetime—LANTFLT and PACFLT—have been located quite near the headquarters of their unified combatant commanders. These unified command headquarters in fact had themselves been created by splitting off from the component staffs—CINCPAC from CINCPACFLT in 1958 and CINCLANT from CINCLANTFLT in 1985.
Table 10. Post-World War II combatant command and Navy component headquarters geographical relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unified combatant commander (location)</th>
<th>Navy component commander (location)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC/USCINCPAC (Honolulu HI)</td>
<td>CINCPACFLT (Honolulu HI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCFE (Tokyo JA to 1957)</td>
<td>COMNAVFJE (Tokyo JA to 1952; Yokosuka JA 1952–7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCAL (Anchorage AK to 1975)</td>
<td>Alaskan Sea Frontier (Kodiak AK to 1971); Thirteenth Naval District (Seattle WA 1971–5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCEUR (Paris FR to 1967), (Stuttgart GE after 1967)</td>
<td>USCINCEUR/CINCUSNAVEUR (London UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCARIB/CINCSO/USCINCSO (Panama to 1991), (Miami FL after 1997)</td>
<td>COMCARIBMSEAFRON (San Juan PR to 1957); 15 ND/COMUSNAVSOC (Panama to 1991); CINCLANTFLT since 1991 (Norfolk VA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANT/USCINCLANT/USCINCACOM (Norfolk VA)</td>
<td>CINCLANTFLT (Norfolk VA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCNE (Newfoundland)</td>
<td>(No Navy component)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCONAD (Colorado Springs)</td>
<td>COMNAVCONAD (Colorado Springs, CO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCCENT (Tampa FL), (1990–1 Gulf War: Riyadh SA)</td>
<td>COMUSNAVCENT (Honolulu HI to 1990); (1990–1 Gulf War: Afloat: Bahrain); (Bahrain &amp; Tampa FL after 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSPACECOM (Colorado Springs CO)</td>
<td>COMNAVSPECWARCOM (Dahlgren VA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCSOC (Tampa FL)</td>
<td>COMNAVSPECWARCOM (Coronado CA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINTRANS (St. Louis MO)</td>
<td>COMSC (Washington DC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCSTRAT (Omaha NB)</td>
<td>CINCLANTFLT (Norfolk VA); CINCPACFLT (Honolulu HI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shading indicates command disestablished by 1999.
One can surmise that such *proximity brings with it greater personal interaction and with it some degree of influence*, although that influence can flow in both directions. It can also help *foster an intense loyalty* on the part of the component command to its parent combatant command, reinforced by similar service affiliations of the CINC's and the maritime nature of the combatant command.
XVI. Analyzing the past: finding and interpreting patterns in the data

*Hardly a dazzling read, but an important one.*

Answering the questions

At the start of this paper we posed two questions:

- Just how did the Navy get here, anyway?
- How can knowing any of this help Navy and other planners now and in the future?

All the preceding sections of this paper have provided an answer to the first question.

This concluding section is aimed at guiding the reader to answer the second question.

Conclusions: patterns in the data

From our survey of the history of the Navy and its relationship to the UCP, we can discern several patterns in the data, which yield *six conclusions*:

- The Navy held strong positions on the UCP and the combatant commands throughout the Cold War, and fought for them.
- These positions derived from a set of Navy patterns of thinking, or *paradigms*, regarding the proper deployment, employment, and administration of the nation's naval forces.

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• *The Navy lost* most of its major UCP battles down through the years. By the post-Cold War era, the Navy's traditional paradigms underpinning its UCP positions had become pretty much bankrupt.

• That having been said, it is *not clear that these losses had any appreciable effect* on the Navy's *institutional health*, which is one of the Navy's chief concerns.

• Maintaining Navy traditional positions on the UCP, however, can have *adverse effects* on the ability of Navy operational commanders to *contribute to and lead joint operations*.

• In determining its positions regarding changes to the UCP, the Navy of today and tomorrow must derive those positions from *paradigms that work* (i.e., that continue to maintain the Navy's institutional health but that also support the ability of Navy operational commanders to contribute to and lead joint operations).

We will elaborate upon each of these patterns and conclusions in turn.

**The Navy fights hard**

The Navy held strong positions on the UCP and the combatant commands throughout the Cold War, and fought for them.

The Navy fought hard because it believed deeply in its paradigms, because it thought it was under attack as an institution, and because fighting hard was the nature of bureaucratic warfare in Washington.

All of the above narrative shows this. There is no need to elaborate here any further.

**Navy positions come from Navy paradigms**

The Navy's strongly defended positions derived from a set of Navy beliefs, or paradigms, regarding the proper deployment, employment, organization, and administration of the nation's naval forces.
The Navy’s leaders held to its paradigms because these paradigms had suffused their own education, training, and experience. They enabled the Navy to make sense of a complex and often hostile international and domestic bureaucratic environment.

**Paradigms**

We recognize that this is a fairly overworked term. Nevertheless, it is an appropriate one to use here to label the phenomena we are describing. We use the term in the sense of *accepted model, or pattern*, following the classic usage of Thomas Kuhn in analyzing scientific paradigms in the 1960s and 1970s.\(^{569}\) Adapting Kuhn’s analysis to our own purposes, we consider that paradigms:

- Stand for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community (in our case, naval planners and decision-makers).
- Provide model problems and solutions to that community. From these spring particular coherent traditions, supplying the foundation for the community’s further practice.
- Most important for our discussion:
  
  Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.\(^{570}\)

**The Navy’s six paradigms**

Based on the historical record, the Navy has had at least six paradigms from which it has derived its UCP positions:

- A *professional paradigm* of exclusive knowledge and seapower skills
- A *force employment paradigm* of oceanic and transoceanic warfare
- A *force deployment paradigm* of global forward presence

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570. ibid., 23.
• An *infrastructure* paradigm dividing the fleet’s homeports between the *East and West coasts*

• A *force package* paradigm that organized naval forces into unitary task organizations on various scales

• An *organizational process* paradigm stressing *competition and fighting for autonomy* vice cooperation and searching for joint approaches.

We will examine each of these paradigms in turn.571

**The Navy *professional paradigm***

The Navy has claimed exclusive knowledge of the nation’s seapower skills, and has believed that the best way for that knowledge to be put at the service of the nation was through operational autonomy for naval forces under naval commanders. The Navy has believed that understanding and using seapower is a discrete profession, best implemented by a corps of trained, experienced, specialized professionals: the Navy’s men and women.

It is clear from this history that the U.S. Navy has striven mightily to ensure U.S. Navy commanders would work only for other U.S. Navy commanders or U.S. civilian political authorities. The U.S. Navy has chafed at ceding command of U.S. Navy operating forces to non-U.S. Navy joint or allied commanders.

Traditionally—and including during the Cold War—the Navy argued that:

• The nation’s knowledge and use of seapower could best be harnessed through independent, Navy-run commands.

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571. For another look (with a broader focus) at paradigms that have driven Navy policies through history, see Peter M. Swartz and E.D. McGrady, *A Deep Legacy: Smaller-Scale Contingencies and the Forces That Shape the Navy*, CRM 98-95/ August 1998 (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses).
• These commands can best contribute to joint military operations by coordinating and cooperating as the situation required with other forces ashore and in the air.

• Army and Air Force leaders, not so steeped in the profession of applied seapower, would misuse the nation's naval tools, if placed in control of them.

Left to its own devices, the Navy has wished to be left to its own devices.

**The Navy force employment paradigm**

Second, the Navy has argued that the nature of war at sea was *oceanic and transoceanic warfare.*

The Navy—faced principally with what it regarded as a global Soviet threat—argued throughout the Cold War that:

• War at sea was inherently global war.

• The nation required its fleets to be able to move unfettered across and between the world's oceans and seas.

• There were two main oceanic theaters of war—the Atlantic and Pacific—and naval forces in other seas should be part of the same command structure as the forces in those oceans, to facilitate swift transfers based on overall maritime needs.

• Few intercommand lines should be drawn on the sea, and none should divide oceans.

**The Navy force deployment paradigm**

Third, the Navy argued throughout the Cold War (and indeed through much of the nineteenth century) that the nation required *global forward presence.* This included:

• Keeping significant full-up ready-to-fire main battle fleets permanently—or almost permanently—forward in the Mediterranean, the western Pacific, and—since the late 1970s—the northwestern Indian Ocean (and since 1990, inside the Persian Gulf itself).
• Routinely deploying less significant task forces on a periodic basis to other locations, especially around South America, off West Africa, and into the Baltic and Black Seas.

• Giving lesser priority—indeed, short shrift—to close-in North American homeland defense coastal deployments—which can only detract from overseas deployments—except where directed by civilian authority, responding to public or congressional pressure.572

The Navy *infrastructure* paradigm

Fourth, the Navy had had a two-coast infrastructure paradigm since at least World War II and arguably since the end of the Mexican War. That paradigm is captured by the phrase *East and West Coast navies.*

Its main elements included, *inter alia:*

• Since the late 1930s, assigning significant numbers of ships to *homeports on each coast.*

• The building and maintenance of a considerable shore support infrastructure on each coast, including naval stations and shipyards. This division endured through all changes in total U.S. Navy force levels, and through the early post-Cold War Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) processes.

• Since 1941, the progressive centralization of the administrative organization of the fleet and its supporting shore establishment under *two major fleet CINCs*—CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT, complete with supporting type commander and shore activity structures.

• The growth and maintenance of considerable *domestic political constituencies* with vested economic interests in keeping significant fleet activities on each coast.

It's not the size of the fleet that matters

This requirement to maintain more or less duplicate fleet infrastructures on both coasts—not the total size of the fleet—has driven internal Navy fleet organization—and through it, Navy positions regarding the UCP. The basic organization of the operating forces of the Navy has remained remarkably stable, since 1941, despite enormous fluctuations in the size of the fleet (see figure 64).

Whether it comprised an 800-ship Navy, as in 1941, or a 6,800-ship Navy, as in 1945, or an 1,100-ship Navy, as in 1973, or a 330-ship Navy, as in 1999, the fleet has still been organized into two major oceanic fleets (each with an array of type commanders), one CINC-dom in Europe, and a sealift command. The only major change had been a focus on Indian Ocean operations since the 1970s and the creation of USNAVCENT.

Historically, there has been no relationship between the size of the fleet and the Navy's requirement to maintain separate service administrative organizations in the Atlantic and Pacific.

Put plainly, if the Navy did not go from a two-fleet to a one-fleet structure when it dropped in 1946 from 6,800 ships to 1,200 ships, or when it dropped from over 1,000 ships to just over 500 over the course of the next 35 years, it is difficult to argue in 1999 that the principal reason to consolidate the fleet command structure is a drop from 600 ships to 300.

The Navy force package paradigm

Fifth, the Navy organized its Operating Forces for operations by using task forces.

The Navy developed a task organization paradigm early in the twentieth century. In World War II a hierarchy of task organizations was created—numbered fleets, task forces, task groups, etc.—that endures to the present day. The paradigm is captured by the phrase task force. Its main elements included, inter alia:
Figure 64. U.S. Navy fleet size and operating forces organization over time

Source: Naval Historical Center website, 1998.
• Placing within the task force all the elements the task force commander needs to accomplish his mission, whatever their administrative affiliation.

• Ensuring the fleets were organized administratively into organizations that could easily transition into task forces.

• Ensuring both the administrative and operational chains put under naval commanders those specialized combat and support elements needed to accomplish the task forces missions.

The Navy believed its fleets needed certain combat and support capabilities, which could most efficiently be provided if they were organic to those fleets and the administrative structures supporting them. These capabilities included—in the Navy's view—Marines, SEALs, aircraft, transport shipping, logistics aircraft, and satellites.

Thus, the Navy always had Marines, although their roles have evolved over time. In the twentieth century, the Navy deployed a wide variety of aircraft to supplement and then complement the fleet. In World War II the Navy revolutionized sea warfare by developing and deploying an underway replenishment capability of enormous proportions and endurance.

The Navy also, in that same war, invented Combat Demolition Teams—which later became the UDTs and still later the SEALs—because it needed them to support the fleet on enemy shores. Likewise, the Navy of World War II stood up giant airlift and sealift fleets to move itself and its Marines. And after the war, the Navy launched systems into space to support fleet navigation, communications, and intelligence requirements.

During the Cold War the Navy struggled to keep these capabilities tied to the fleets organizationally—administratively and operationally—to ensure their support for those fleets when required. Navy administrative and operating forces got to retain their aviation, their Marines, and much of their underway replenishment capability—although not without bitter bureaucratic battles.

They eventually lost control, however, of much of the airlift, much of the sealift, many of the SEALs, and most of the satellites they
needed—to the Air Force and to new joint functional commands. The Navy unsuccessfully fought all these transfers, fearing they would mean losses of support to the fleets.

Later, as we have seen, the Marines formed themselves into components.

**The Navy organizational process paradigm**

Sixth, the Navy has stressed *competition and maintenance of autonomy* as techniques to achieve its aims. The Navy has felt threatened by what it has perceived as encroachments by the other services on what it regards as its proper turf—turf on which it has believed it alone had the competence defend the nation. The Navy has often reacted by fighting, resisting, arguing, stonewalling, and ignoring.

Deeply concerned that any lack of firm stands in bureaucratic battles would weaken the Navy's institutional health, Navy planners have believed that “If the Navy won't stand up for its views, then who will?” This has often provided justification for maintenance of lonely and ultimately unsuccessful positions well past the time they could usefully alter outcomes. It has also led to a focus on supporting Navy institutional goals, rather than looking out for Navy operational commanders in likely joint warfighting situations.

**The Navy keeps losing**

Lonely and ultimately unsuccessful positions have recurred more times than not. The Navy's array of underlying paradigms was usually not enough to sway the Navy's sister services or civilian superiors. Whatever the validity of its paradigms and despite the ferocity with which *the Navy defended them, the Navy's record of success in getting UCP decisions to go its way has—in the long run—not been good.*

**The box score**

What was the final (as of 1999) Navy “box score”? How did Navy desires ultimately fare in the UCP battles about CINCs and components?
Table 11 shows one way of looking at the record. In this table:

- The overall box score looks like 7 wins and 9 losses.
- Looking only at commands in existence in 1999, however, the score reads 1 win and 8 losses. That is to say, none of these commands except USPACOM looks like the Navy wanted it to look.

Figure 65 shows another way of looking at the record:

- Until the early 1960s, the Navy seems to have won and lost debates regarding the UCP in about equal measure.
- In the 1980s and 1990s, Navy positions have generally not carried the day. In short, the Navy has been losing recently.
- Since the 1970s, most Navy wins have involved the expansion of USPACOM. This seems to be the only Navy position to have carried the day recently.
- The Navy’s big successes were the retention of a Navy nuclear role, the abolition of FECOM, ALCOM, NECOM, and STRICOM/MEAFSA, and the concomitant aggrandizement of USPACOM and USLANTCOM.
- The Navy has not had a big win since 1989, when USPACOM got Alaska.
- The 1980s and 1990s saw most of the Navy losses: Creation of the Central, Space, Transportation, Special Operations, and Strategic Commands, and expansion of the Central and Southern Commands out into blue water.

The Navy held to its views for decades, but saw its position eroded and finally all but destroyed. With the exception of USPACOM, the UCP as of 1999 reflects the triumph of others’ agendas, not the Navy’s. And USPACOM—arguably the most satisfied combatant command as of this writing—found itself as of 1999 in the Navy’s traditional position of defending against change.

Why did the Navy lose?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant command</th>
<th>Traditional Navy position</th>
<th>Eventual outcome</th>
<th>Navy score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAC/USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>Navy nuclear role</td>
<td>Eventual unified command</td>
<td>Win, compromise, then Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(46–)</td>
<td>No unified command over SSBNs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM/USPACOM</td>
<td>Create, maintain, enlarge, and head with an admiral</td>
<td>Large important area headed by an admiral</td>
<td>Wins, minor losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47–)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECOM</td>
<td>Confine to Japan, minimize Navy forces, then abolish</td>
<td>Shrunken, then abolished</td>
<td>Loss, then Wins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47–57)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCOM</td>
<td>Minimize Navy forces, abolish</td>
<td>Shrunken, then abolished</td>
<td>Wins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47–75)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM/USEUCOM</td>
<td>Minimize Navy forces; Limit to land area</td>
<td>Took over Mediterranean, NELM, 6th Fleet</td>
<td>Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47–)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NELM</td>
<td>Keep as Mediterranean specified command</td>
<td>Made Navy component of USEUCOM</td>
<td>Losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47–63)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIBCOM/USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Abolish. If not, then minimize Navy forces; Limit to land area</td>
<td>Shrunken, then took over Caribbean Sea, LATAM ocean littorals</td>
<td>Wins, then Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47–)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM/USLANTCOM/USACOM (47–)</td>
<td>Create, maintain, enlarge, head with an admiral</td>
<td>Grew, then added functional duties, then shrank</td>
<td>Wins, then Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNEC (50–56)</td>
<td>Minimize Navy forces; abolish</td>
<td>Navy participation limited, then abolished</td>
<td>Wins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAD/ADCOM/USSPACECOM (54–)</td>
<td>Minimize Navy air defense forces; Keep Navy space assets in Navy Service chain; Back, then Oppose unified command</td>
<td>Most ships outside air defense command; Unified command blocked, then created, to include Navy space assets</td>
<td>Win, then Losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSTRICOM/USREDCOM/FORSCOM (62–93)</td>
<td>Prevent; then minimize Navy forces; then abolish</td>
<td>Little Navy participation, then abolished</td>
<td>Loss, then Wins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11. U.S. Navy views on the combatant commands (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant command</th>
<th>Traditional Navy position</th>
<th>Eventual outcome</th>
<th>Navy score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAC/ USTRANSCOM (77--)</td>
<td>Keep Navy land-based air transport; Keep MSC in Navy Service chain; Oppose specified, then unified command</td>
<td>Some Navy land-based air transport retained; Specified, then unified command created</td>
<td>Small win; then Losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCMEA/ RDJTF/ USCENTCOM (63-71, 80--)</td>
<td>Oppose creation; limit to land areas; abolish; achieve Navy flag command</td>
<td>Unified command created. Took over adjacent sea areas in stages. No Navy commanders</td>
<td>Losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM (87--)</td>
<td>Oppose creation; maintain SEALs in Navy Service and fleet chains</td>
<td>Unified command created; includes most SEALs</td>
<td>Loses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Commands existing in 1999 in **bold**.
Figure 65. Erosion of traditional USN Cold War era positions re: the UCP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Navy wins (selected)</th>
<th>Major Navy losses (selected)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAC &amp; LANT made unified commands</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATS abolished; MATS created</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains Caribbean missions</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM gains Philippines, Taiwan</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM regains 7th Fleet</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNEC disestablished</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC, LANT gain FECOM, Caribbean</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANT, PAC, NELM keep SSBNs</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM gains sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM gains IO, S. Asia, Aleutians</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCOM disestablished</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCOM re-created under PACOM</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM retains West Coast naval forces</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATCOM created</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM gains West Arabian Sea</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. American waters to SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean shifts to SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM gains Gulfs of Aden, Oman</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPACECOM created</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM created</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATCOM created</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSCOM strengthened</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM gains West Arabian Sea</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean shifts to SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCCOM gains SPECWARGRUs</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM gains Gulfs of Aden, Oman</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPACECOM created</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Because its paradigms were increasingly irrelevant to a changing world, and because the other services and civilian entities were able to mass sufficient countervailing bureaucratic clout. It certainly wasn’t from lack of conviction or willingness to fight for its beliefs.

The losses don’t hurt the Navy

Despite all this bad news, it is not clear that these losses have had any appreciable effect on the Navy’s institutional health, one of the Navy’s chief concerns in the debates over UCP revisions. Past Navy arguments for or against this or that UCP change often centered around “the future of the Navy” or the “Navy’s very survival as an institution” or other apocalyptic concerns.

This concern was not an unreasonable one during the early middle of the twentieth century—the period that saw the rise of global American joint operations and the creation of joint American military institutions, including the UCP. Attacks on the Navy’s institutional integrity started just after World War I with the dysfunctional fulminations against the Navy of Army Air Service General Billy Mitchell. They continued throughout the interwar period as the Army’s airmen fought to constrain land-based naval aviation. And they were reinvigorated after World War II with the attacks on naval aviation and the Marine Corps that culminated in the 1949 “Revolt of the Admirals.” As George Baer put it regarding the Navy of the late 1940s:

> Above all, Navy leaders wanted to avoid institutional fracture. Their nightmare was a breakaway of one of the Navy’s specialties or its absorption by another service.  

But all these attacks failed. By the 1950s—and certainly by the 1990s—the position of the Navy as an American institution became firm. The possibilities of the Navy being shorn of land- or sea-based aviation became nil. And the idea that the Marine Corps might be

573. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, 279.
reduced in influence or functions is—in the 1990s—indeed, laughable.574

In 1999 the U.S. Navy holds a position of importance, wealth, prestige, and technical excellence within the nation it serves that is unequalled by any other Navy in the world. By many measures of effectiveness, the Navy has been quite successful as an organization irrespective of the way in which it has been organized for joint operations.575 UCP change did not appreciably affect the Navy’s ability to carry out its functions, gain its share of the nation’s resources, innovate technically and tactically, or achieve high levels of Navy officer competence and professionalism.

Let us examine this judgment in more detail.

**The Navy deploys its fleets forward**

> Whatever the changes in the UCP, the Navy has been able to maintain its preferred fleet deployment posture.

The underlying Navy Cold War and post-Cold War operational paradigm of forward-deployed full-up main battle fleets in a few important forward hubs (and occasional smaller presence forces elsewhere) has been consistently implemented since the late 1940s. Despite all the changes that have been taken place in the UCP, this operational paradigm has not itself appreciably changed.

The Sixth and Seventh Fleets remained forward deployed in their respective AORs while CINCNELM and CINFE came and went. A

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574. Indeed, while the Navy has successfully resisted losing its operational connections to the Marine Corps, the Corps has successfully struggled for increased autonomy and organizational status within both the Navy Department and the DOD.

575. Col Theodore Gatchel USMC (Ret) came to a similar conclusion regarding organization for amphibious operations. Wrote Col Gatchel: “Relative advantages and disadvantages notwithstanding, all... models have been used successfully in actual amphibious operations. That leads to the conclusion that other factors [besides organizational models] are equally—or perhaps more—important in determining the success or failure of a landing.” See his *Eagles and Alligators*, 50-51.
Middle East Force has remained deployed in the Persian Gulf despite the comings and goings of NELM, STRICOM/MEAFSA, EUCOM, the RDJTF, and USCENTCOM (figure 7, provided earlier, illustrates this).

By the 1990s, not only had the Navy internalized the forward deployment paradigm as central to its strategic thinking, but so too had the joint establishment and the other services. There are many calls to change the UCP; there are few calls to redeploy the current numbered fleets.

The Navy puts ordnance on target

Whatever the changes in the UCP, the Navy has generally operated successfully.

As a warfighting, crisis response, and peacetime presence tool of the Republic, the Navy has been a success—before, during, and after the Cold War. Whether operating under a Navy admiral or an Army or Air Force or Marine Corps general, U.S. naval forces have generally carried out their assigned naval missions well.

The organizational chronicles presented in this paper have left out a great deal of important U.S. naval history. We have not discussed in any detail the Battle of Midway, the maintenance of the sea lanes to Europe during two World Wars, the landings to liberate captive nations, the assault at Inchon, the Cuban Missile Crisis quarantine, the closing of North Vietnamese seaborne infiltration to South Vietnam, the retaliatory air strikes on Libya, or the Tomahawk missile strikes on Baghdad and in Bosnia that may have catalyzed bringing the warring factions to the negotiating table.

These have all been operational successes. Each was organized differently from the others. Some were under the direction of officers not wearing Navy blue. In all, the Navy performed its assigned functions well.
The Navy gets a large budget share

Whatever the changes in the UCP, the Navy has gotten a large share of the nation’s resources. *There appears to be no correlation between budget largess and the Navy’s wins and losses in the joint organizational arena.*

For the Navy’s share of the post-war defense budget as it corresponds to key dates in the evolution of Navy componency, see figure 66. Note that there is little correlation:

- Before 1958, the Navy was organized within the joint command structure in a manner more to the Navy’s liking than any time since. Yet this was a period when the Army and especially the Air Force dominated the defense budget shares.

- After 1983, when the Navy dominated the budget shares, the Navy lost battle after battle regarding its place in joint organization.

Top flag billet numbers don’t seem to be affected

*Whatever the changes in the UCP, Navy flag officer numbers seem unaffected.* The number of four-star flag billets in the Navy seems to be affected more by other factors.

Figure 67 shows two relationships:

- The number of Navy combatant commanders as opposed to those from other services

- The number of Navy combatant commanders as opposed to other Navy four-star admirals.

Note that while the number of Navy combatant command CINCS remained fairly stable, the number of four-star flag billets fluctuated between 7 and 11, indicating other factors at work.

Why don’t UCP losses hurt the Navy?

*Answer: Because the U.S. Navy has successfully made its case to the nation, and because it has consolidated and cemented its organizational role as one of America’s great institutions.*
Figure 66. U.S. Navy defense budget share and joint organizational changes over time


* CB$ = Constant budget dollars expressed as March 1997 dollars (in billions).
Figure 67. Navy combatant commanders in relation to those from other services and other Navy four-star admirals

As we noted earlier, the U.S. Navy holds a position of importance, wealth, prestige, and technical excellence within America. It has achieved that position because it has produced for the nation in the past, and because the American people and their civilian leaders believe it will produce for the nation in the future. The U.S. Navy has been quite successful as an organization.

So perhaps the Navy should not make too much of a UCP organizational decision that went against it if in the same year the Navy’s budget was increased, or its recruitment and retention of skilled American young people soared, or—most important—its ships and aircraft carried out a combatant commander’s naval mission with skill and success.

But Navy positions can hamper Navy contributions

As we have seen, UCP changes don’t seem to affect the Navy’s institutional health, despite the Navy’s often passionate belief that they do.

Navy traditional positions on the UCP, however, can have adverse effects on the ability of Navy operational commanders to contribute to and lead joint operations. This is our sixth and last major conclusion.


Grenada 1983

In the former case, while the Navy devoted enormous energy to ensuring a Navy-dominated Caribbean remained separate from an Army-dominated U.S. Southern Command, it spent far less energy ensuring its Second Fleet commander had the resources, training, and expertise to lead a complex joint operation.

The Gulf War of 1990–1991

In the latter case, the Navy had expended large amounts of organizational capital to constrain the birth and emergence of USCENTCOM as a robust joint command. It had devoted far less thought and action, however, to ensuring that in the event of a major operational
contingency, Navy staff officers and the Navy component commander were optimally prepared for what was about to unfold.

Why has this occurred? We submit that, in their zeal to protect imagined Navy institutional vital interests and prerogatives, Cold War Navy leaders and planners sometimes helped create joint organizational structures within which Navy operational commanders could not function as effectively as they otherwise might have.576

Thus, we believe that, in developing and fighting for UCP positions, the Navy has often kept its eye on the wrong ball.

576. The other services have been guilty of this as well. This paper is about the Navy only, but we do not mean to imply through omission that this phenomenon was restricted solely to the Navy. Comparisons among the services are beyond the scope of this paper, except as they illuminate Navy issues.
XVII. Looking to the future

Forget the past: not a good idea. Study the past to the exclusion of looking at the future: not a good idea, either. What we need, of course, is balance to inform our judgments.577

General recommendations for the future: changing some Navy paradigms

In determining its positions regarding changes to the UCP, the Navy of today and tomorrow must derive those positions from paradigms that work, i.e., that continue to maintain the Navy’s institutional health but that also support the ability of Navy operational commanders to contribute to and lead joint operations.

Paradigm changes

Paradigms change. They do so in the sciences and they do so in many other fields as well.

As we noted earlier, paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the community of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.578 When a growing sense emerges in the community that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately, a paradigm change is inaugurated.

As we believe we have demonstrated, certain of the old Navy Cold War paradigms have not been successful in solving organizational problems that have become increasingly acute for the Navy—especially in


578. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 23.
ensuring optimum Navy contribution to joint operations. In such circumstances, therefore, Navy paradigm changes are called for.

In determining its positions regarding changes to the UCP, the Navy of today and tomorrow—no less than the Navy of the Cold War—must derive those positions from its paradigms. Paradigms drive Navy staff positions regarding UCP changes. Navy staffs need to continue to understand and accept current and prospective future Navy paradigms and continue to derive from them their positions regarding UCP issues.

Current and future Navy paradigms, however, do and should differ in many respects from those of the past. Some Navy paradigms are still standing the test of time and remain solid. Others changed at the end of the Cold War. Still others are in the process of changing or are about to change.

We will now examine what our analysis tells us some of those current and future paradigms—and paradigm changes—might be.

Change the professionalism paradigm

The Navy has prided itself on its knowledge and understanding of the proper employment of sea power to ensure the wellbeing and strength of the country. Slowly the Navy’s Cold War paradigm, however, has eroded. Goldwater-Nichols, the end of the Cold War, the experience of the Gulf War, the rise of joint Professional Military Education (PME), and the influence of powerful personalities have all contributed to this.

In its place the Navy has been putting—sometimes in fits and starts—a joint paradigm, whereby Navy professional knowledge and understanding can best be harnessed by contributing within joint command structures. The main element of this new paradigm is:

- Accepting jointness and Navy participation in joint operations as the central organizing characteristic of America’s armed forces, rather than Navy and other single-service paradigms and operations.
That being the case, the principles governing Navy positions in revising the UCP should continue to include the following measures:

- Design the staff and command structures of each joint command—geographic and functional—in such a way that naval professional knowledge, skill, and advice can be brought to bear on conducting operations at least as well as the knowledge, skill, and advice of the practitioners of air, ground, and other types of warfare.

- Ensure that, in forward theaters with significant naval forces assigned, combatant commanders who are not naval officers have powerful on-scene operational Navy component commanders to render advice regarding naval warfare, relatively unencumbered by force-provider duties. This is the lesson of the NAVEUR and USNAVCENT histories, and could well apply in the future to the Pacific, when command of USPACOM inevitably passes to an Air Force or Army officer.

Change the force employment paradigm

The Navy has in fact had a new force employment paradigm since a few years after the end of the Cold War. That paradigm is captured by the phrase joint littoral warfare. It has been embodied in three documents...From the Sea, Forward...From the Sea and Forward...From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept. Its main elements include, inter alia:

- Focusing on littoral operations, in which naval forces are principally used to directly participate in warfare ashore from positions offshore, at sea, rather than for maritime theater warfare.

- Understanding that future threats are likely to be regional or local in scope, rather than global.

That being the case, the principles governing Navy positions in revising the UCP should continue to include the following measures:

- Design coherent land-sea-air regional geographic theaters in which the power of naval forces "... from the sea" can best be brought to bear as part of joint task forces.

- Draw command boundary lines down the middle of oceans, rather than at shorelines.

The old employment principles—the inherently global nature of war at sea, maintenance and expansion of operationally coherent blue-water maritime theaters, reducing the number of lines drawn on the ocean—should continue to pass into history—unless and until a regional or global super-power arises to challenge U.S. sea supremacy.

**Keep the force deployment paradigm**

The Navy has had more or less the same force deployment paradigm since the end of World War II. The end of the Cold War did not appreciably change anything. For the foreseeable future, the deployment locations for the fleet do not appear to be changing, even as the total number of warships available to cover them declines.

That being the case, the principles governing Navy positions in revising the UCP should continue to include the following measures:

- Ensure that each major discrete naval forward operating area is neither too large nor too small, that is, that it be neither divided among CINC's nor diluted by combination with other areas

- Resist creation of a homeland defense command limited only to North America.

*The Navy must be prepared, however, for changes in employment patterns, whether driven by warship inventories, foreign policy developments, or public pressure. As these occur—and with the exception of the Indian Ocean commitment they have not occurred in any major way since World War II—the Navy should then alter its views on the proper number and dimensions of the geographic CINC AORs.*
Keep the infrastructure paradigm

The Navy will continue for the foreseeable future to have significant activities and ship homeport complexes on each coast. There is no changing or getting around this, for a host of domestic as well as international reasons.

That being the case, the principles governing Navy positions in revising the UCP should continue to include the following measures:

• Ensure that the administrative efficiency of the base, ship, and aircraft support complexes on both coasts is enhanced and not impaired —by any UCP changes.

• Ensure that the ability of the complexes on both coasts to support the global forward deployment operational posture of the fleet is enhanced and not impaired by any UCP changes.

The historical division of the fleet into East and West Coast elements separated by over 3,000 miles of the North American continent is not likely to pass into history soon. This is a powerful influence to perpetuate an Atlantic-Pacific split in U.S. Navy and joint organization.

Keep the force package paradigm

The Navy hierarchy of task organizations created in World War II—numbered fleets, task forces, task groups, etc.—endures to the present day. The creation of Joint Task Forces (JTF) is actually only an extension of this basic historical Navy paradigm. Within the JTF, the maritime component commander or Navy component commander will have his own task organization. The Navy has a continued need to place within Navy, naval, and joint task forces all the elements the task force commander needs to accomplish his mission, whatever their administrative affiliation.

That being the case, the principles governing Navy positions in revising the UCP should continue to include the following:

• Ensure force provider tails do not wag operational dogs. UCP divisions and assignments should be based primarily on joint operational requirements, and only secondarily on the
requirements or desires of commands in the service branch of the chain of command.

- Ensure the functional commands mandated in the UCP are so structured that Navy task force commanders can lay their hands on all the assets they need to carry out all their missions.

- Allow the core assets that he needs to carry out his central missions to be placed under the naval task force commander’s immediate operational control.

- Ensure the naval task force commander is divested of extraneous support forces the command and control of which will merely slow him down.

- Ensure, however, that UCP command structures allow timely and unconstrained access to those support forces when needed.

- Ensure that the operational task forces so constituted can be soundly backed up by the most efficient Navy administrative structure.

The Navy paradigm of task organization has been accepted by the other services and the joint military establishment. It will not soon pass into history. The Navy paradigm of fleet and type command administration has always been touted as supporting operations. This should apply no less to new joint operations as to earlier purely naval operations.

**Change the organizational process paradigm**

Competition is inherent in the way things are done in Washington, especially in the Pentagon and most especially historically as regards changes to the UCP. But what works in Washington can be irrelevant—or, worse, detrimental—to what happens in the field. The luxury of office-based interservice rivalry and competition is normally counterproductive in the field, especially where a CINC and a Joint

Task Force commander are trying to put together a cohesive joint force under tight time and resource constraints.

It is also poor preparation for same. Skills in bureaucratic in-fighting and one-upsmanship, whatever their utility in competing for scarce budget dollars or recruits, are not helpful in leading or participating in joint operations. Nor are they necessarily helpful in devising organizational structures that best enable those joint operations to be implemented.

The Navy has recently become far more cooperative in its outlook, seeking to join with other services in joint operations and other activities. The cooperative spirit shown by ADM Kelso in the creation of USSTRATCOM was a major milestone in the evolution of Navy thinking and action.

This being the case, the principles governing Navy positions in revising the UCP should continue to include the following:

- Seek common solutions to common problems
- Cooperate where possible.

The U.S. Coast Guard cooperates

There are, in fact other interorganizational paradigms beside fighting for turf in zero-sum games with the other services (although their existence will come as a great shock to some naval officers). One such paradigm is the coordination and cooperation model of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Navy’s fellow maritime armed service. The characteristics of that paradigm are laid out elsewhere, and it is not our purpose here to either detail or advocate them. Nevertheless, the existence of at least one alternative paradigm supports our contention that an

581. On comparisons between the service cultures of the Coast Guard and the Navy, including approaches toward interorganizational relations, see CAPT Patrick H. Roth USN (Ret) with Richard D. Kohout, *The U.S. Coast Guard: Purpose, Characteristics, Contributions, and Worth to the Nation*, CRM 97-17 (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, May 1997); and Henry H. Gaffney, Jr., *Relations with Russian Counterparts: Coast Guards and Navies*, CIM 491 (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, December 1996).
alternative interorganizational paradigm for the Navy is both desirable and possible.

**Changing Navy paradigms**

We repeat here the conclusion with which we opened this section earlier:

- Paradigms drive Navy staff positions regarding UCP changes.
- Navy staffs need to continue to understand and accept current and prospective changing future Navy paradigms, and continue to derive from them their positions regarding UCP issues.

Paradigms, as we noted earlier, must be successful in solving acute problems. *Navy* paradigms must be successful in solving acute *Navy* problems. A decision to change paradigms must be based less on past achievement than on future promise.

**A “Revolution in Command Affairs (RCA)”?**

“Revolution”—like “paradigm”—is an overworked term today. Nowadays it is fashionable to identify major shifts as “revolutions.” We have the “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)” and the “Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA).”582 Even a call for a “Revolution in Personnel Affairs (RPA).”583


Paradigm changes—the transitions to new paradigms—are revolutions, however, as Thomas Kuhn discussed in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.\(^{584}\) So the paradigm changes we describe and call for here might well be termed a “Revolution in Command Affairs (RCA).”

**The recommendations in context**

Again, we remind readers that the above analyses derive from our examination of the history of the Navy and the UCP, as laid out in these pages—an exercise in “applied history.” We note again that decision-makers and their staffs must place such historical analysis in a larger context.

We recognize that *inputs other than history must also be taken into account in making decisions*. We believe however, that this study demonstrates that historical analysis is a very useful input indeed—necessary if not sufficient.

**General recommendations: the bottom line**

To summarize all that has gone before: We believe our analyses show that history has a message to tell the Navy regarding changing the UCP. In this regard, the Navy should:

- Strive to create and maintain UCP command structures within which naval operational commanders of the future can optimally participate in and/or lead Joint Task Force operations.

- Focus less on creating or maintaining UCP structures that serve primarily to protect the institutional health of the Navy. The Navy’s institutional health is sound and the UCP is not an important variable in its determination.

- Accordingly, listen more to the views of the numbered fleet commanders on their command relationship requirements for future joint littoral operations, since they will be the Navy commanders actually participating in future joint littoral operations.

\(^{584}\) Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 90 and *passim*. 

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• Listen less to the views of the Navy component commanders and OPNAV, since they are principally concerned with resourcing, not operations.

• Let Navy commander operational requirements drive Navy positions on the UCP, not Navy resource sponsor and claimant requirements. In confronting the UCP from here on in, the CNO and the OPSDEP should fight for the perceived future needs of the Navy’s operational commanders.

Specific recommendations for UCP 1999 and beyond

Specific recommendations regarding Navy positions in the development of UCP 1999 are contained in the companion volume to this study: Maureen A. Wigge et al., The Unified Command Plan: Charting a Course for the Navy, CRM 98-165/November 1998.

The past and the future: extrapolating from the past

Many variables influence UCP revisions. Threats, capabilities, national policy, and the current UCP all play a role. So too do personalities, American military culture, domestic politics, and bureaucratic imperatives.

One other factor also is at work: the historical trend from the past. We do not maintain that this trend is the most significant influence, but—as we have seen in the main body of this paper—it is surely always present. During the Cold War, consolidation in the Pacific, periodic emergence of a command for the Middle East, and creation of coherent Atlantic and Pacific maritime theaters were all clearly discernible trends that “you could see coming” year after year.

What historical trends can we extrapolate today into the future from the stories we have just reviewed regarding changes in the UCP? We believe there are at least three:

• The movement away from using shorelines as combatant command boundaries
• The consolidation of "homeland" functions such as defense and predeployment preparation
• The loosening of strictures as to which service provides the commander in chief of a combatant command.

These trends allow us to make some specific predictions:

• The USEUCOM AOR will eventually expand to include the eastern Atlantic.
• The USCENTCOM AOR will eventually expand to include southeast Africa and the southwest Indian Ocean.
• USCOM—or a successor CONUS command—will eventually receive COCOM of West Coast naval forces.
• A U.S. Navy admiral will eventually be designated as USCINCSO
• An Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps general will eventually be designated as USCINCPAC.

Figure 68 provides a graphic depiction of these trends.

Figure 68. Past historical trends regarding the UCP, extrapolated into 1999 and beyond
While these trends may not all manifest themselves in changes in UCP 1999, they appear powerful enough to eventually result in changes to subsequent UCPs. We believe this to be true irrespective of the Navy’s adoption of the paradigm changes and recommendations outlined above.

Who should use this study and how

This study should prove useful to both doers and thinkers, especially:

- Planners and decision-makers
- Naval and national security analysts
- Historians.

Planners and decision-makers

As noted at the beginning of this study, it was principally written to aid Navy planners on Navy staffs and, through them, Navy decision-makers. It should also prove of value to Navy and non-Navy planners on joint and other staffs as well.

They should find it useful as:

- A sourcebook, to plumb for dates and facts and background data
- A think-piece, to debate the efficacy of its conclusions and recommendations

Naval and national security analysts

The study was also designed to reach a wider audience of students and analysts of naval and national security affairs, especially faculty, researchers, and students at war colleges, and the Naval Postgraduate School. They should find it useful as:

- A sourcebook, to plumb for dates, facts and further references
- A companion (and sometimes a corrective) to other policy analyses of the Cold War era, treating as it does the neglected field of organizational relationships
An example of policy-relevant “applied history,” to serve as a model for future work

A think-piece, to debate the efficacy of its conclusions and recommendations.

**Historians**

The study may also prove of interest to academic historians of naval and national security affairs. It was not written, however, principally for their benefit, nor does it conform completely to standard academic style and standards. Nevertheless, they may find it helpful as:

- An initial bibliographic sourcebook, especially for monographs not normally referenced in academic publications
- An outline of a strand of Cold War Navy history not otherwise treated by academic historians
- Justification for re-interpretation of some of their views on Navy Cold War history
- An example of policy-relevant “applied history,” in case they might want to try their hand at same
- An example of how graphic design—including maps, timelines, wiring diagrams, and tables—can help disentangle historical developments and aid in interpretation.

**What this history should do**

We noted at the start of this paper that a work of history can be many things:

- Entertainment (for the writer and/or for the reader)
- Basic research
- “Applied history.”

We said then that we viewed this study as an example of the last category. That is, it was designed to help naval planners solve certain
problems, and also to educate a broader community of naval professionals and analysts about their professions.

We also said that, regarding its education function, history can educate professionals in at least three ways:

• It can inspire.
• It can inform.
• It can empower.

We noted that, while we are uncertain that this paper can inspire, it is certainly intended to inform and empower staff officers and decision-makers seeking to develop cogent Navy positions on changing the UCP in 1999 and beyond.

We believe we have done this; that is, we believe we have presented an applied history that helps solve problems and educate, and that both informs and empowers.

Future research and analysis

We are confident that the foregoing is of use to the U.S. Navy and to naval and other national defense planners and analysts. We were probably able to uncover most of the “what” and a good deal of the “why” regarding the history of the Navy’s involvement with the UCP.

This has only been a beginning, however. As mentioned earlier, we were limited in our efforts by time and resources. Accordingly, we relied mostly on secondary sources, and used few primary sources and almost no interviews with event participants. Use of these other sources by future planners, analysts, and researchers should yield additional data—the rest of the “what” and the “why.” With that information, future analysts may well come to more nuanced or even different conclusions or recommendations.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Army Air Forces (WWII)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American-British Conversations (WWII)</td>
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<td>ABC-I</td>
<td>American-British Conversations Report #1 (WWII)</td>
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<td>ABDA</td>
<td>American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (WWII)</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<td>Allied Command, Europe (NATO)</td>
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<td>ACCHAN</td>
<td>Allied Command Channel (NATO)</td>
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<td>ACOS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>Air defense</td>
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<td>ADC</td>
<td>Air Defense Command</td>
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<td>Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<td>ADCON</td>
<td>Administrative control</td>
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<td>AEF</td>
<td>Allied Expeditionary Forces (WWII)</td>
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<td>AEW</td>
<td>Airborne early warning</td>
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<td>AF</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>AFCEA</td>
<td>Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association</td>
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<td>AFFE</td>
<td>Army Forces Far East</td>
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<td>AFHQ</td>
<td>Allied Forces Headquarters (WWII)</td>
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<td>AFSC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Staff College</td>
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<td>AFSOUTH</td>
<td>Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)</td>
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<td>AGR</td>
<td>Radar picket ship</td>
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<td>Alaskan Sea Frontier</td>
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<td>AMC</td>
<td>Air Mobility Command</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
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<td>ARADCOM</td>
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<td>ARG</td>
<td>Amphibious Ready Group</td>
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<td>Air Transport Command (WWII)</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System (USAF aircraft)</td>
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<td>Ballistic Missile Early Warning System</td>
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<td>BUAER</td>
<td>Bureau of Aeronautics</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>CB$</td>
<td>Constant budget dollars</td>
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<td>CCJTF</td>
<td>Caribbean Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>CCS</td>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff (WWII)</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Combat Demolition Unit (WWII)</td>
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<td>CEFSR</td>
<td>Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility of Space Rocketry</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
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<td>CIM</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
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<td>CINCAD</td>
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<td>CINCARIB</td>
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<td>CINCCFC</td>
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<td>CINCEUR</td>
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<td>CINCLANTFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet</td>
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<td>CINCLANTFLTDETSO</td>
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<td>CINCMAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command</td>
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<td>CINCMEEAFSA</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia</td>
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<td>CINCNAVEASTLANTMED</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (shortened to CINCNE in 1948)</td>
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<td>CINCNORAD</td>
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<td>CINCPAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV</td>
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<td>CVBG</td>
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<td>CVS</td>
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<td>Radar picket destroyer escort</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
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MARFORLANT  Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic
MARFORPAC  Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
MARFORSOUTH  Marine Corps Forces, South
MATS  Military Air Transport Service
MDAP  Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MDZ  Maritime Defense Zone
MEAFSA  Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia
Med  Mediterranean
MEF  Middle East Force
MEF  Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU(SOC)  Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MIDEASTFOR  Middle East Force
MSC  Military Sealift Command
MSTS  Military Sea Transportation Service
MTMC  Military Traffic Management Command
MTMTS  Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service
NACA  National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATS  Naval Air Transport Service (WWII)
NAVAIR  Naval Air Systems Command
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<td>OCP</td>
<td>Outline Command Plan</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational control</td>
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<td>OPSDEPS</td>
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<td>Operational support aircraft</td>
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<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PACAF</td>
<td>Pacific Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANSEAFRON</td>
<td>Panama Sea Frontier</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Patrol coastal (small surface combatant warship)</td>
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<td>PG</td>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
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<tr>
<td>POA</td>
<td>Pacific Ocean Areas</td>
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<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming and Budgeting System</td>
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<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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RAN  Royal Australian Navy
RDF  Rapid Deployment Force
RDJTF  Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
RDNAVFOR  Rapid Deployment Naval Forces
REDCOM  Readiness Command
Ret  Retired
RN  Royal Navy
RNZN  Royal New Zealand Navy
ROK  Republic of Korea
ROTHR  Relocatable over-the-horizon radar
SA  South America
SAC  Strategic Air Command
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)
SACLANT  Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO)
SBU  Special Boat Unit
SC  Supreme Commander (WWII)
SCAP  Supreme Commander, Allied Powers
SDI  Strategic Defense Initiative
SDV  SEAL delivery vehicle
SEAC  Southeast Asia Command (WWII)
SEAFRON  Sea Frontier
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<td>SEAL</td>
<td>Sea-Air-Land (Team)</td>
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<td>SEPAC</td>
<td>Southeast Pacific Area (WWII)</td>
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<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (WWII)</td>
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<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integration Operational Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea lines of communication</td>
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<td>SMU</td>
<td>Special Mission Unit (Special Operations Forces)</td>
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<td>Standard Navy Distribution List</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command, U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
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<td>Studies and Observation Group (Vietnam)</td>
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<td>SOLANT</td>
<td>South Atlantic Force</td>
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<td>Sound Surveillance System</td>
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<td>S-S</td>
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<td>Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine (Nuclear propulsion)</td>
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<td>TACAMO</td>
<td>“Take Charge and Move Out” (aircraft)</td>
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<td>Type commander</td>
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<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<td>Underwater Demolition Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>VLF</td>
<td>Very low frequency</td>
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<td>WESTHEMGRU</td>
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<td>WWMCCS</td>
<td>Worldwide Military Command and Control System</td>
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Pokrant, Marvin, *Considerations Germane to Possible Revisions of the Unified Command Plan*, CQR 95-1/January 1995

Roth, Patrick H., *An Analysis of the UNITAS Deployment*, CIM 529/September 1997


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