Achieving the desired overall force composition in the Navy requires accessing the right mix of recruits—enlisted and officer, active and reserve. To do this, the Navy must have details about the available recruitable population, including where specific types of people are located. The Commander of Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) asked CNA to help improve the methods and models which currently geographically allocate recruiting goals. NRC uses econometric models to guide to allocate goals for recruiting enlisted personnel, and employs a less rigorous method for officers. These models consider a variety of factors, but they have limitations. There has not been a review of the enlisted model since the late 1990s, and the current model does not consider all the components of the recruiting market that the Navy may want to examine. The Navy's method for allocating officer recruiting goals has been developed in less detail, and has not been evaluated recently. Additionally, recruiting goals are tied to Navy Recruiting Districts (NRDs), which are quite large, thus preventing precise allocation of manpower and advertising funds for recruiting purposes. More precise goaling models can facilitate NRC's ability to restructure recruiting in the future.

Non-citizens are a potentially valuable enlisted recruiting pool—a large number are eligible for enlistment and, compared to citizen recruits, they are more likely to be diverse, possess language and cultural skills of strategic military interest, and complete the first term. We examine citizenship attainment among non-citizen recruits and find that non-citizens who are in the Air Force; who are minorities, female, better educated, or married or have dependents; or who score higher on the AFQT are more likely to become citizens. We also find that time-to-citizenship is longer for minorities but shorter for those who have more education or higher AFQT scores. Finally, since July 2002 (when the citizenship application waiting period for servicemembers was effectively eliminated), we find that average time-to-citizenship is longest in the Marine Corps and shortest in the Army. This analysis produces four policy implications. First, the services should pursue strategies to recruit non-citizens. Second, DOD and USCIS would benefit by sharing administrative data. Third, the Army's, Navy's, and Air Force's basic training naturalization programs demonstrate that groups of non-citizen recruits can be naturalized efficiently. Fourth, the efficacy of the basic training naturalization process is boosted by involving recruiters in the process.

The U.S. Navy promulgated over 35 "capstone" strategy, policy, concept and vision documents between 1970 and 2010, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This summary volume of a larger study series briefly describes and analyzes each major document, in slide handout format.

The Navy promulgated several "capstone" strategy, policy, concept and vision documents between 2001 and 2010, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This volume provides the context within which these documents were written, including global and national political, economic, military, naval, inter-service and academic events and trends, in slide handout format.

Non-citizens are a potentially valuable enlisted recruiting pool—a large number are eligible for enlistment and, compared to citizen recruits, they are more likely to be diverse, possess language and cultural skills of strategic military interest, and complete the first term. We examine citizenship attainment among non-citizen recruits and find that non-citizens who are in the Air Force; who are minorities, female, better educated, or married or have dependents; or who score higher on the AFQT are more likely to become citizens. We also find that time-to-citizenship is longer for minorities but shorter for those who have more education or higher AFQT scores. Finally, since July 2002 (when the citizenship application waiting period for servicemembers was effectively eliminated), we find that average time-to-citizenship is longest in the Marine Corps and shortest in the Army. This analysis produces four policy implications. First, the services should pursue strategies to recruit non-citizens. Second, DOD and USCIS would benefit by sharing administrative data. Third, the Army's, Navy's, and Air Force's basic training naturalization programs demonstrate that groups of non-citizen recruits can be naturalized efficiently. Fourth, the efficacy of the basic training naturalization process is boosted by involving recruiters in the process.

The Navy promulgated several "capstone" strategy, policy, concept and vision documents between 2001 and 2010, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This volume comprehensively analyzes each major document of the period, including origins, context, content, criticisms, and effects, in slide handout format.

The U.S. Navy promulgated over 35 "capstone" strategy, policy, concept and vision documents between 1970 and 2010, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This volume provides introductory, historical, background and supplementary material useful in understanding Navy strategy, in slide handout format.

The Navy promulgated over 35 "capstone" strategy, policy, concept and vision documents between 1970 and 2010, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This study compares and contrasts these documents in a number of dimensions, both of form and substance, in slide handout format.

The Navy promulgated over 35 "capstone" strategy, policy, concept and vision documents between 1970 and 2010, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This study compares and contrasts these documents in a number of dimensions, both of form and substance, in large-slide format.

The U.S. Navy promulgated over 35 "capstone" strategy, policy, concept and vision documents between 1970 and 2010, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This volume provides the context within which these documents were written, including global and national political, economic, military, naval, inter-service and academic events and trends, in slide handout format.

The Navy promulgated several strategy, policy, concept and vision documents between 1970 and 2010, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This volume provides the context within which these documents were written, including global and national political, economic, military, naval, inter-service and academic events and trends, in large-slide format.

The Navy promulgated several "capstone" strategy, policy, concept and vision documents between 1970 and 1980, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This volume provides the context within which these documents were written, including global and national political, economic, military, naval, inter-service and academic events and trends, in slide handout format.

The Navy promulgated several "Maritime Strategy" documents between 1981 and 1990, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This volume provides the context within which these documents were written, including global and national political, economic, military, naval, inter-service and academic events and trends, in slide handout format.

The Navy promulgated several "capstone" strategy, policy, concept and vision documents between 1970 and 1980, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This volume comprehensively analyzes each major document of the period, including origins, context, content, criticisms, and effects, in slide handout format.

The Navy promulgated several "Maritime Strategy" documents between 1981 and 1990, to provide direction to the service and explain its value to its civilian political leaders as well as to external audiences. This volume comprehensively analyzes each major document of the period, including origins, context, content, criticisms, and effects, in slide handout format.

The CNA 2010 Year in Review highlights some of the research, in unclassified form, form the 2010 calendar year. This review includes: CNA analysts working to save lives in Afghanistan; our continuing, broad-based study of China and how its emergence as a world power affects the United States and other nations; support of efforts in homeland security, educations and health to work with the Federal Aviation Administration. You'll also see our special relationship with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps reflected in this brief overview.

For nearly two decades, scholars and intelligence analysts have been predicting North Korea's collapse and the impending catastrophe that could follow. The years have come and gone and the Pyongyang regime remains, albeit economically weaker and by some accounts politically shaky. Consequently, this paper does not make any such predictions, but instead discusses some of the more likely crisis scenarios that could unfold in North Korea and, if so, would demand that countries in the region institute emergency response measures to deal with the consequences.

The Marine Corps Fitness Report (FitRep) system provides the official evaluation and record of an officer's performance. Given the FitRep's importance in determining fair and equal opportunity for career progression and continuation, it is crucial that the system be reviewed periodically. The Marine Corps implemented the current FitRep system in 1999 to address concerns about grade inflation, and the system has not received a thorough examination since then.

On August 4, 2011, CNA convened a conference of leading international security, foreign policy, and maritime strategy experts at the Army and Navy Club in Washington, DC. Its purpose was to examine U.S. grand and naval strategy in light of new domestic and international dynamics, and to discuss the strategic principles that should inform the Nation and its naval services in the coming decades. This report provides a record of that conference. It includes: •The conference agenda, premises, and questions •The conference proceedings •Selected conference papers •Participant biographies The conference concluded that naval forward presence will continue to be an important and unique contribution to U.S. military and foreign policy. Forward presence provides political and military decision-makers with a range of flexible and scalable options that can be tailored to a specific situation and context. Combat-credible forward presence helps assure allies of U.S. commitments and deter current and potential adversaries, and provides quick-response capabilities in a military or humanitarian crisis. In addition, it contributes to intelligence gathering, foreign military cooperation, familiarization with foreign areas, and strong ties with military and political leaders.

A grand strategy outlines the objectives a state seeks and provides guidance on how the state can achieve them. Discussions on the best grand strategy for the United States have taken on renewed salience in recent years in light of the rapidly changing strategic environment. Proposals for the most appropriate American grand strategy fall into four categories: hegemony, selective engagement, offshore balancing, and integration of American strategy into collective efforts. These categories differ markedly in their implications for the country, the U.S. armed forces, and the U.S. Navy. Two other categories-isolationism and world government-are not serious candidates in the current discourse. In thinking through the implications of each possible grand strategy, Navy leaders should ask two sets of questions: First, is major war essentially a thing of the past? Second, if major war remains possible, what is the best way to sustain a peaceful international environment conducive to American interests? There is no "right" answer to these debates, which turn on assessments of human behavior that are inherently unpredictable. Nonetheless, each involves tradeoffs and assessments of future opportunities and risks which the American people and their leaders should understand.

Non-citizens are a potentially valuable enlisted recruiting pool—a large number are eligible for enlistment and, compared to citizen recruits, they are more likely to be diverse, possess language and cultural skills of strategic military interest, and complete the first term. We examine citizenship attainment among non-citizen recruits and find that non-citizens who are in the Air Force; who are minorities, female, better educated, or married or have dependents; or who score higher on the AFQT are more likely to become citizens. We also find that time-to-citizenship is longer for minorities but shorter for those who have more education or higher AFQT scores. Finally, since July 2002 (when the citizenship application waiting period for servicemembers was effectively eliminated), we find that average time-to-citizenship is longest in the Marine Corps and shortest in the Army. This analysis produces four policy implications. First, the services should pursue strategies to recruit non-citizens. Second, DOD and USCIS would benefit by sharing administrative data. Third, the Army's, Navy's, and Air Force's basic training naturalization programs demonstrate that groups of non-citizen recruits can be naturalized efficiently. Fourth, the efficacy of the basic training naturalization process is boosted by involving recruiters in the process.

In 1915, the Allies attempted to force open the Dardanelles Straits in the face of an integrated Turkish and German defense (sea mines plus covering fire), using first their navy and then their army, with disastrous results. An analysis of the navy portion of this campaign identified a number of lessons at the strategic and operational levels pertaining specifically to risk assessments, strategic communications, proper strategic and operational planning, operational leadership, and operational art. These lessons were juxtaposed with a modern attempt by a belligerent such as Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, yielding a number of points to consider when thinking through the implications of a Strait of Hormuz closure as well as corresponding recommendations for U.S. policy-makers, strategists, and planners.

CNA began examining the relationship between operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and retention in FY03, based on the Commandant's concerns that high wartime OPTEMPO might negatively affect Marines and their families—reducing their retention and the Corps' ability to sustain itself. This iteration of the Marine Corps OPTEMPO and Retention study continues this work. The project sponsor is the Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC, M&RA). The FY10 numbers show that, for the first time since FY04, there was a year-to-year decrease in the percentage of First-term Alignment Plan (FTAP) Marines who have deployed. We also find that the reenlistment rates of FTAP Marines with dependents are less negatively affected by deployments than are those of first-term Marines without dependents. In this iteration, we conducted structured interviews with Marines in Okinawa, Hawaii, and Twentynine Palms. This report details the concerns expressed by these Marines, and makes recommendations for improving policy related to promotions, reenlistments, and training.

N14 asked CNA to examine recent trends in the training of recruits before their first fleet assignments. To study the efficiency of the training pipeline, we follow the flow of Sailors to the fleet between FY95 and FY09 as it is affected by length of time spent in bootcamp and training. Specifically, we examine two major issues. The first is the time that it takes recruits to reach their first fleet assignments. This includes both looking at the trends in the length of time to the fleet over the last 14 years and investigating how the time to the fleet is spent. The second issue we address is pre-fleet attrition. We review the trends and timing data for patterns that provide useful insights.

The Director, Manpower Management Division, requested that CNA study ways to address chronically short (CS) and high-demand/low-density (HD/LD) specialties, taking requirements as given, and identify policy actions that could mitigate shortages. We defined a "Gold Standard" (GS) recruit as one who could qualify for all of the CS and HD/LD specialties in terms of characteristics in manpower databases. The GS recruit scores 110 or above on the General Technical section of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), 105 or above on the Mechanical Maintenance section, 115 or above on the Electronics section, is a high school diploma graduate, and has no felony, serious, or drug waivers. This is a conservative standard for two reasons: (1) These recruits quality for all CS and HD/LD specialties (not just one), and (2) Over half of accessions enter with drug waivers, many of whom qualify for HD/LD or CS PMOSs. We found that the Corps has enough accessions and Marines with the qualifications (e.g., high test scores, Class 1 Physical Fitness Test (PFT) scores) to fill HD/LD and CS specialty needs. We recommend that the Marine Corps consider the advantages and disadvantages of several alternative courses of action that could eliminate specialty shortfalls.

This unique document comprehensively surveys the record of USN and USAF cooperation and rivalry since the beginning of the 20th century, with special emphasis on the period from 970 to 2010. It also identifies and analyses the principal drivers toward cooperation and rivalry, grouping them into four categories: Conceptual and operational, organizational, material, and personal. It makes some judgments on the evolution of the relationship, showing that while Navy-Air Force inter-service rivalry has at times been particularly intense, and while those aspects of the relationship have indeed become ingrained in the cultures of each service, there has also been a long history of close cooperation, which can be built upon by the two services as they develop a closer relationship today. The 1990s, in particular, were a watershed period, beginning with the experience of both services in Operation Desert Storm. The study provides context and perspective for decision-makers and staffs concerned with contemporary and future U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force relationships (e.g., The AirSea Battle concept and Navy-Air Force headquarters staff Warfighter talks.) It also provides a basic resource and primer for further research and analyses by students and analysts by students and analysts of naval and military affairs.

The Department of the Navy Office of Information has recently released its Social Media Handbook designed to provide information needed to safely and effectively use social media. This paper discusses the use of the Handbook for crisis communication and points out the need for a methodology that will help to find appropriate people with whom to share information for particular aspects of a crisis during Humanitarian Assistance missions.

In this slow economic period, with high reenlistment rates, the balance between reenlistments and accessions will be reliant on the effects of the Navy's R&A policy on future manning. Specifically, if reenlistment rates are high in the short run, the Navy might want to increase reenlistments and reduce accessions to compensate. The problem is that decreasing accessions results in small cohorts. At some time, the economy will improve and reenlistment rates will return to normal. By then, it is at least theoretically possible that those accession cohorts will be too small to fill available vacancies without promoting a large number of inexperienced servicemembers. Using results from the statistical analysis of 27 years of Navy Enlisted Master Records (EMR), we constructed a simulation model to test whether reducing accessions would eventually lead to future manpower shortages, result in an inexperienced workforce, or otherwise damage the manpower and personnel (M&P) system. We see from the results of our simulation scenarios that, reducing accessions by as much as 15 percent would challenge the M&P system, but would not break it. The M&P system's requirements and advancement rules have built flexibility into the system, which allow it to adjust to reasonable reductions in accessions.

This paper explores the trade-offs of conscription versus an all volunteer force in Afghanistan. The main question is whether instituting conscription in the Afghan army is advisable or not. The Afghan military today is an all volunteer force. This study concludes that conscription is not the best option for Afghanistan. Manpower needs do not require it, and the Afghan government lacks sufficient capacity and legitimacy to implement it effectively. It is highly likely that a draft would further divide the country and alienate the population in the very areas where the insurgency is strongest. Conscription would vitiate the effectiveness of the army while yielding few rewards. A professional, all volunteer force is better suited to Afghanistan's unique conditions. A professional army will be necessary to defeat the insurgency and stabilize the country, which is the army's most important mission. A capable, cohesive, and professional army is vital for the continued viability of Afghanistan's national government.

This paper takes numerous studies that CNA has conducted over the past twenty years on disaster relief and engagement operations and synthesizes the major themes and driving factors for each type of operation and across both operational types. This synthesis reveals that issues such as personal interactions; specified objectives and the creation of partnership are critical across both operational types.

The "U.S. Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges" outlines the idea that the Navy will confront irregular challenges (CIC) and promote cooperative security and strengthen partner nations by conducting foreign internal defense, security force assistance, stability operations, counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, and similar actions. At the request of the Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO), CNA identified which Naval forces and platforms are uniquely or most suitable for CIC operations and the capabilities they require to do so. We also assessed the specific ways in which general purpose forces, rather than just special operations forces, can contribute more directly to CIC efforts, and what overarching changes the Navy should consider in order to more effectively do so in the future. Our analysis helps formulate the way ahead for Navy CIC, defines more clearly the Navy's role in a comprehensive government approach in this area, and provides programmatic guidance to increase the Navy's capabilities and capacity for CIC efforts.

Over the past decade, Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contracts have become increasingly prevalent across the Naval Aviation Enterprise. We examined what effect these contracts have had on Navy aviation costs and requirements. We compared the costs to support almost 6,000 parts that came under a PBL arrangement with other parts on the same aircraft that remained under traditional support. Statistical evidence suggests that after adjusting for readiness differences, PBLs have not increased cost relative to traditional support; the largest savings from PBLs are for items with lower total expenditures. PBLs have contributed to improved readiness. Contract characteristics associated with savings include longer contract length and fewer platforms supported. Awarding the contract competitively is also associated with higher savings. There is concern that PBL contract renewals will cost more than the initial contract because the contractor has an incumbent advantage. However, we find that PBL renewal contracts tend to produce cost outcomes similar to initial contracts, suggesting that the concern about renewals may not be occurring in practice. Finally, we calibrate a budget model to illustrate that the budgetary inflexibility introduced by PBLs may be somewhat lower than commonly believed.

This study evaluates how potential disruptions at critical waterways, referred to as chokepoints, could affect the U.S. economy and economies around the world. While our methods could be used to understand the importance of any chokepoint, we focus on the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Turkish Straits, and the Panama Canal. We find that a few of the world's industrialized countries would enter a sudden, steep recession if a major oil disruption occurs at the Strait of Hormuz and the countries with large strategic reserves do not share them with the rest of the world. We argue that if the United States were to act militarily in order to negate the adverse economic impact of a maritime oil chokepoint disruption, the campaign should reopen the chokepoint within 90 days from the start of the disruption. However, it is unclear whether the current response strategies of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Navy would be able to meet this goal. Among other things, we recommend that the Navy be prepared for contingencies in Southeast Asia if an extensive prolonged disruption to the Strait of Hormuz is unmitigated.

Congress directed the Department of Defense (DoD), in section 2845 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010, to conduct a study to assess the feasibility of developing nuclear power plants on military installations. This study was conducted to meet this requirement. The study shows that small nuclear power plants can contribute to DoD missions by increasing energy assurance while reducing carbon emissions and reliance on fossil fuels for electricity; significant time and resources will be required to resolve key issues in SMR safety, certification, licensing and sitting; and that the estimated cost of electricity produced by a small nuclear plant make this a viable option if the DoD does not pay first-of-a-kind expenses.

OSD-Accession Policy asked us to identify ways in which the Services can minimize the risk of misconduct separation and early attrition among waivered recruits. If the Services can identify recruit characteristics associated with these negative outcomes, they can use them as an additional screen. We obtained Service FY99-FY08 waiver and personnel information from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). We first characterized the demographic and military characteristics of waivered recruits. Next, we examined whether accession-related characteristics (such as ship month) or other personal characteristics (such as Tier 1 status) are associated with lower risk of misconduct separation or early attrition for waivered recruits. Performance measures included 6-, 24-, and 48-month attrition, as well as the likelihood of being a fast promoter to E5. For the Navy and the Marine Corps, we analyzed some additional performance indicators. Overall, we found that waivered recruits are not inherently risky and often perform better than Tier II/III recruits. There are, however, still ways in which the Services could minimize the "riskiness" of the waivered population. For example, some waiver combinations are more likely to lead to early attrition; additional screening or mentoring of these recruits could potentially decrease their attrition risk.

This study employs underexploited Chinese law enforcement publications to analyze China's rising concern over increasing illegal drugs flows from the "Golden Crescent" region—Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran—into western China's Xinjiang region. Chinese law enforcement sees Golden Crescent drugs as a major threat to society and a key financial support to terrorism, ethnic separatism and extremism. But law enforcement officials and analysts are encountering growing challenges in their efforts to stanch these drug flows.

At their 15th year of service, military personnel who are eligible and intend to serve for 20 years must choose either: (1) High-3 retirement plan or (2) A reduced retirement (REDUX) and a $30,000 bonus paid at the 15th year of service. This paper is designed to help servicemembers make that decision. We describe the REDUX/bonus option as an early, partial cash-out of the servicemember's retirement pension that the member pays back in the form of reduced retirement checks over his or her entire lifetime. We calculate how much the servicemember will "pay back" (the reduction in pension benefits) and we calculate the implied APR or interest rate for this loan. For example, an E-7 who retires at age 38 with 20 years of service is paying an implied interest rate of 14.6% and would see his or her retired pay reduced by $375,215 if he or she lived to 79 years. Even if the servicemember received the bonus tax free, the repayment amount is over 10 times the amount of the loan ($30,000). If the servicemember lives to 85, the repayment amount would be $496,166. For virtually all servicemembers, choosing REDUX/bonus is a bad (and costly) decision.

In recent years, China's law enforcement officials have shown growing concern over the increase in illegal drug trafficking from Afghanistan and the "Golden Crescent" region into China's western region of Xinjiang. This report provides an analysis and a draft translation of a 2009 open source Chinese police article which presents an unusually detailed picture of China's concerns about this drug trafficking. The article spotlights China's anxieties about growing links between domestic Chinese traffickers-especially Xinjiang residents-and Central Asian-based international drug rings; the increasing role of Nigerians and other nationalities in this trade, and the challenges this trend creates for Chinese investigators; the evolving transport routes these traffickers use to cross the Chinese border, and: the increasing sophistication of these international traffickers. Such open source Chinese police publications can support analyses of Asian drug trends and facilitate exchanges with Chinese government officials about sensitive topics such as drug trafficking.

This essay provides a broad-brush commentary on some of the salient elements of China's external strategy, speculates about some of the challenges Beijing faces in executing its external strategy, and tables some implications. Before doing so, however, it offers five sui generis characteristics of strategies, because they inform the framework used to think about China's external strategy.