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Your search for Deterrence found 68 results.

Russian Military in the Arctic
/reports/2020/09/russian-military-in-the-arctic
Since 2008, Russia has expanded its military presence in the Arctic—which it views as symbolically, strategically, and economically vital.
function of the displays of military capabilities and training is to communicate ambitions, power, determination, and competence in order to strengthen deterrence and influence potential adversaries ... perception in the Arctic as one of the primary driving forces for the regional military buildup. Third, it discusses the traditional role of nuclear defense and deterrence in the Arctic, which still ... the role of nonnuclear defense and deterrence, which has systematically expanded (in particular, since 2010). Fifth, the study analyses the relationship between nuclear and nonnuclear forces and missions
Peacetime Influence
/reports/1993/peacetime-influence
This paper discusses the importance of peacetime operations. Without a more systematic understanding of such operations and the influence they bring, Americans cannot make intelligent decisions about the use of the Navy in specific situations, about strategy, or even about force structure. We need to understand the environment in which the United States is attempting to exert influence and the broad peacetime roles of the military in that environment. We need to understand whom we are trying to influence and to do what. Only then can we consider the implications for the Navy.
projection, and strategic deterrence as the four basic missions of the Navy. That emphasis has faded, however. Although Navy officers and naval analysts have always known instinctively that navies were ... Mission Assessment process, with the exception of strategic deterrence, was oriented exclusively toward warfighting and gave no weight to the value of presence. Most Navy officers, whatever
ai and autonomy in russia: Special Issue, September 8, 2022
/our-media/newsletters/ai-and-autonomy-in-russia/special-issue
September 8, 2022 issue features translations of several Russian military journal articles that reflect on the use of AI and autonomy. All have been written since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
, and on a complex combination of various types of military forces and the methods of confrontation in a war implemented in this case: a global nuclear strike, nuclear deterrence, preventive actions, indirect ... in the future, no doubt, will play the role of a factor in the strategic deterrence of a potential adversary. Thus, with a decrease in the likelihood of unleashing a large-scale war, military
Russian Military Role in US-Russian Arms Control
/reports/2024/03/russian-military-role-in-us-russian-arms-control
Russian nuclear policy and arms control decision-making is influenced by the General Staff’s Main Operational Directorate, military leaders, and bureaucrats.
in limiting certain conventional capabilities, especially those at the intermediate-range level; and an emerging understanding that artificial intelligence could be transformative for nuclear deterrence ... of US deterrence, particularly if prospects of risk reduction are slim. /reports/2024/03/Russian-Military-Role-in-US-Russian-Arms-Control.pdf /reports/2024/03
Nuclear Arms Control Without a Treaty
/reports/2019/03/nuclear-arms-control-without-a-treaty
The United States must prepare to compete with Russia without a treaty that verifiably constrains intercontinental range nuclear weapons. This coming challenge stems from three changes in US-Russian relations.Recognizing these changing conditions, the report explores risks, uncertainties, and US policy options for a world in which there is significant competition between Washington and Moscow, but no bilateral strategic nuclear arms control treaty.
strategy and contributing to sustaining US extended deterrence and alliance solidarity. RISKS AFTER NEW START If New START expires without an imminent replacement treaty, the United States ... and investments in the 2030s, cloud assessments about an unconstrained US-Russian nuclear relationship over an extended period of time. Challenges to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Extended Deterrence
Insights for the Third Offset
/reports/2017/insights-for-the-third-offset
CNA conducts analysis for the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense (DOD), and other sponsors, ranging across policy, strategy, organizational processes, technical performance of military systems, and current operations. Because of the expected impact of autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI) to the character of warfare, CNA has created a Center for Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence to focus on these emerging technologies and their significant role in U.S. defense policy and all the military services. The Center combines CNA’s strengths and experience in conducting objective analysis of U.S. military operations with focused expertise in autonomy and other aspects of AI. This report, the first created by the new Center, takes lessons and insights from CNA’s body of work for the Navy and the joint force, including CNA’s field program of embedded analysts in military commands around the world. Though much of the emerging technology examined in this report is new, the approach of applying lessons from U.S. operations and institutional processes to key challenges in leveraging autonomy and AI continues CNA’S applied research paradigm of exploring many opportunities to resolve or work around challenges that have been seen before. The aim of this report is to anticipate challenges of “Third Offset” implementation based on past lessons, and then provide concrete recommendations for promoting the effective incorporation of autonomy, AI, and related technologies in U.S. military operations. This report discusses making autonomy and AI militarily effective from an acquisition and technology perspective, and how to pursue these capabilities in ways that are consistent with long-standing U.S. values and that promote broader U.S. national interests.
… to achieve a step increase in performance that the department [U.S. Department of Defense] believes will strengthen conventional deterrence.” Unlike past offset strategies, this approach must
Russias Approach to Cyber Warfare
/reports/2017/russias-approach-to-cyber-warfare
This paper is an attempt to address these issues as they pertain to a particularly potent cyber adversary: Russia. Russia’s cyber capabilities are highly advanced, and Moscow has demonstrated a willingness to employ offensive cyber in situations other than war to affect political and economic outcomes in neighboring states and to deter its adversaries.
is playing a greater role in conventional Russian military operations and may potentially play a role in the future in Russia's strategic deterrence framework. Although the Russian military has been slow
Making-Captains-of-War-CNOS-Studies-Group-1981-1995
/reports/2016/making-captains-of-war-cnos-studies-group-1981-1995
The Strategic Studies Group, created by the Chief of Naval Operations in 1981 to prepare Navy officers to think strategically, succeeded, this review finds.
services that the Joint Staff adopted and the Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) subsequently employed in exercises and operations. The next year, Watkins tasked SSG V (1985-1986) to extend deterrence
The-Impact-of-the-CNOs-Strategic-Studies-Group-1981-1995
/reports/2016/the-impact-of-the-cnos-strategic-studies-group-1981-1995
Condensed version of Making Captains of War summarizes the impact of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group in its first 15 years from 1981.
1980s. The SSGs were more influential in studying central Navy deterrence and warfighting concepts during the Cold War than in studying future trends and crisis response after it had ended. Lessons from
National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change
/reports/2014/national-security-and-the-accelerating-risks-of-climate-change
It is through this analytical prism that 11 retired Generals and Admirals came together in 2007, under the moniker of CNA’s Military Advisory Board, to examine the security implications of climate change. Their landmark report, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, was the first time that such an elite body of military leaders expressed their concern over the security implications of climate change. Now, seven years later, the Military Advisory Board has gathered again to re-examine the nexus of projected climate change and national security. This update reflects their decades of experience as risk managers and geopolitical security experts. With the foundation of CNA’s established analytical prowess, the report deserves strong attention from not only the security community, but also from the entire government and the American public. The update serves as a bipartisan call to action. It makes a compelling case that climate change is no longer a future threat—it is taking place now. It observes that climate change serves as a catalyst of conflict in vulnerable parts of the world, and that projected changes in global migration patterns will make the challenges even more severe. It identifies threats to elements of National Power here at home, particularly those associated with our infrastructure and our ability to maintain military readiness. The update makes clear that actions to build resilience against the projected impacts of climate change are required today. We no longer have the option to wait and see. We applaud this group of American patriots for this important update. We commend its reading in full and its recommendations to the Administration, to Congress, and to the American people.
for our national security. During our decades of experience in the U.S. military, we have addressed many national security challenges, from containment and deterrence of the Soviet nuclear threat