skip to main content
Article Podcast Report Summary Quick Look Video Newsfeed triangle plus sign dropdown arrow Case Study All Search Facebook LinkedIn YouTube
George StewartScott M. FabbriAdam B. Siegel
Download full report

Based on the past 10 years, who should the Navy train? Past experience sug­ gests that most Flag officers of operational commands (both afloat and ashore) should be viewed as potential CJTFs or Naval component commanders. They and their staffs should be candidates for appro­ priate schoolhouse and exercise training. In addition, Naval officers of lower ranks can find themselves serving as action officers on joint staffs or liaison officers to a wide variety of organizations, such as country teams, foreign military components, and non-governmental organizations (such as the Red Cross).

Based on the last ten years, what sorts of operations can we expect a Navy-led JTF to conduct? Experience suggests that more often than not, the operation will be sea based. It is also more likely than not to involve either combat operations or an uncertain security environment We do not expect Navy-led JTFs to play a prominent role in humanitarian assistance operations within the continental United States. This last restriction will probably limit, without eliminating, the number of Navy-ledJTFs dealing solely with humanitarian assistance operations.

What major issues should training cover for Navy CJTFs and their staffs? During our review of the past 10 years of JTF operations, some issues came up time and time again. This repetition suggests that trainers should provide CJTFs and their staffs with the following information:

  • Training in coordination with organizations outside the JTF's chain of command, and information on how some of the more commonly encountered organizations, such as UN relief agen­ cies and the State Department, operate.
  • Doctrine for humanitarian assistance operations, particularly as it relates to staff responsibilities, determination of end-state, measuring progress, logistics issues, and legal issues.
  • Joint Crisis Action Planning procedures capable of being exe­ cuted on extremely short notice (time scale of a few days).
  • Doctrine for assuming responsibility of ongoing operations from another command structure or turning over operations to other military and non-military organizations.
Download full report



  • Pages: 186
  • Document Number: CRM 94-42
  • Publication Date: 7/11/1994