By traditional definitions, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan are considered “landlocked.” But they share a coastline—and naval competition—with Russia and Iran on the Caspian Sea. At this moment, investing in maritime security should be an essential goal for each of these nations and their partners outside the region to strengthen their role in the global economy and develop alternative energy export and trade routes via the Caspian. At stake is their independence from more powerful neighbors.
Events are aligning to make this the right time to focus on Caspian maritime security. Last week, the US launched a task force to limit imports to Iran via the Caspian. Over the past year, both Russia and Iran have faced setbacks in their naval posture in the sea. At the same time, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan are making naval investments, creating an opportunity for the United Sates and its allies to help develop the maritime capabilities of these three nations and advance their security at relatively low cost.
Historically, Russia has dominated the Caspian. Russia’s Caspian Fleet has actively contributed to Russia’s war against Ukraine through missile launches. Since 2024, Ukraine has repeatedly taken aim at the Caspian Flotilla’s bases and ships, successfully landing several blows that have damaged Russian military and economic assets. Meanwhile, Iranian naval assets on the Caspian have also been struck by Israeli air strikes this year.
External powers cannot directly increase their presence to take advantage of degraded Russian and Iranian forces. The 2018 Aktau Convention prohibits foreign navies from the Caspian. And in 2025, naval leaders from Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan signed a strategic agreement on Caspian Sea security declaring that external powers should not be involved in internal Caspian affairs.
Russia and Iran’s Caspian setbacks do, however, create an opportunity for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to stake more assertive, confident security postures in the Caspian. The agreements limiting foreign presence do not preclude foreign arms acquisitions and likely do not apply to training, exercises, and other forms of support. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan appear particularly well positioned to take advantage of the moment.
Such security is essential to the growing importance of the Caspian as a trade route for energy and minerals, especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Kazakhstan has increased shipments of oil from the Caspian to the Mediterranean via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to avoid Russian transit. Both the United States and the European Union have signed agreements, particularly with Kazakhstan, to expand access to critical minerals, and the Caspian is the sole route out of the region that does not require transit through Russia, China, Iran, or Afghanistan. In a recent Senate hearing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that a potential subsea TransCaspian Pipeline, would be “in the best interests of the United States and its allies.”
Strength and deterrence in regional military and maritime strategy
The military and naval doctrines of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan already point toward building military strength, naval presence, and deterrence—without clearly naming potential adversaries. Kazakhstan’s doctrine urges the development of its military to deter aggression and defend its borders and its “national interests in the territorial sea and continental shelf of the Caspian.” Azerbaijan’s maritime security strategy of 2013 singles out as high-priority threats the deteriorating military balance on the Caspian, foreign interference in internal affairs, and competing territorial claims of other states.
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan are at various stages of naval recapitalization, with the help of Israel in the 2010s and Türkiye today. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have both acquired fleets of Israeli Sa’ar 62 offshore patrol vessels that, in the Azerbaijani variant, include a robust sensor suite and eight vertical launching system cells for anti-ship missiles. Since 2020, Türkiye has taken over as the preferred partner. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are cooperating with Ankara to produce and deploy Turkish uncrewed maritime systems in the Caspian for sensing, counter-mine, and, potentially, strike roles. Additionally, Turkish shipyard Dearsan runs naval shipbuilding projects at both Turkmenistani and Kazakhstani shipyards, building patrol ships and a frigate.
Concept development
This ongoing fleet modernization means that the US and its European allies can focus on supporting Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan in developing national maritime concepts and additional capabilities instead of offering retired ships. Caspian maritime security concepts could range substantially from a low-end of monitoring and presence to a high-end of presenting a serious and credible deterrent to Russian and Iranian disruption or aggression.
At a minimum, national maritime concepts should couple extensive sensing through the Caspian in peacetime with the ability to maintain crewed presence around shipping lanes and pipeline routes during periods of higher tension to deter opportunistic attacks. In peace, the goal should be to threaten attribution of any sabotage to deter it in the first place. In crises, the goal should be to maintain sufficient presence to complicate attacks on civilian shipping and raise costs and risks for an attacker. This lower end concept is likely suitable for all three countries as one that defends their interests without directly challenging Russia or Iran. Given the economic importance of the Caspian, cooperative monitoring should be feasible, particularly if Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan invest in the port and pipeline infrastructure that would deepen their connection to Azerbaijan. Already, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have conducted at least one joint naval exercise focused on joint naval operations and responding to asymmetric maritime threats.
At the high end, some of these states may at some point be willing to develop concepts and forces to deter aggression through the capability to deny Russia and Iran use of the Caspian or to destroy assets at sea or in ports. This would be a far more delicate political balancing act for Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, or Azerbaijan. But the potential to respond to an aggressor in extreme circumstances could expand both the security of their Caspian economic investments and their negotiating leverage with Russia and Iran on other issues.
Both high- and low-end concepts would be valuable to the US and Europe. The low-end concept’s focus on monitoring would advance a more reliable transit route for moving Central Asian resources to Western markets. Even just one state developing a more assertive concept could further limit Russian and Iranian threats to east-west Caspian trade. It could also prevent them from taking north-south Caspian trade for granted and thus force them to make their own investments in reconstituting their Caspian Sea capabilities at the cost of spending elsewhere.
US Caspian Security Cooperation
US security cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus should focus on developing the maritime capabilities of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. To date, US security cooperation in Central Asia has emphasized counterterrorism, border security, and professionalism. However, helping these states translate investments in hardware into maritime capabilities will be an essential contribution to US regional strategic goals of creating real economic opportunities for the US and Central Asia and dilemmas for US adversaries .
In addition to continuing standard professional military education, the US should work with European allies, particularly Türkiye, to bring target country officers to relevant exercises outside the Caspian. Exercises on the Caspian would then be opportunities for local forces to put what they have learned into practice while US and ally advisors observe and evaluate—discreetly, given the possible political sensitivities around external “interference.” The relatively small size of these navies means that personnel development should provide outsized effects.
The US and its allies have a rare opportunity to capitalize on a trifecta of opportunity in the Caspian: Russian and Iranian setbacks, growing trade, and naval investments by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to advance their own security. With targeted support, these three nations can make the Caspian safer for energy and mineral exports to the West while creating obstacles to Russian and Iranian dominance over these waters.
