Is war in Iran bringing China and Russia closer together? Some analysts emphasize the common interests China and Russia share in their approach to the US-Israel war against Iran. These can be seen in parallel actions at the UN and a shared opposition to outside efforts at regime change in authoritarian states. Others see the instability in global energy markets leading Beijing to opt for more extensive energy ties with Moscow. As for Russia, Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, contends that “Energy trade in renminbi coupled with Western sanctions and China’s industrial dominance will leave the Kremlin with few options but to crawl even further into Beijing’s pocket.”
But the conflict also has highlighted some real differences between the two strategic partners. Russia has greater economic and political incentives to support Iran’s resistance. By contrast, China has more to lose economically and politically in the continuation of the war. Despite their common political stance on American and Israeli intervention, practical realities of the conflict have laid bare some of the fault lines in Sino-Russian relations.
Military Support for Iran
Although it appeared initially that China and Russia were keeping their distance from the current conflict, as with the 12-day war, recent reporting has found evidence of their military support for Iran. Certainly, the Iranian government has given that impression— Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi commented approvingly that Iran had “good cooperation” with Russia and China, including “politically, economically, even militarily.” The foreign minister emphasized that Russia in particular was helping Iran “in many different directions,” adding that their partnership was “not a secret.”
Russia, which signed a strategic partnership agreement with the Iranian government in January 2025 and received Iranian military aid for the Russian war on Ukraine, has been sharing intelligence, drone technology and strategy with Iran, the Wall Street Journal reported. This has boosted Iran’s response to US and Israeli attacks, compared to the 12-day war. CIA Director John Ratcliffe confirmed that Russia and China were sharing intelligence information with Iran.
Although the Chinese government emphasizes the need for diplomacy to end the conflict in Iran, China also plays a role in perpetuating it, albeit less directly than Russia. In early March two sanctioned Iranian vessels picked up chemicals from the Chinese port of Zhuhai, which likely included sodium perchlorate, used in rocket fuel. According to French intelligence experts, China has provided Iran with access to the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, which could explain the improved accuracy of its targeting compared to last year.
Differences in the Degree of Exposure to Trade in the Persian Gulf
One of the most important differences in Chinese and Russian interests at stake in the war is their degree of exposure to the interruption of trade from the Persian Gulf. China is better positioned than one might expect to ride out a short-term interruption of energy supplies due to strategic oil reserves lasting up to 4 months, declining reliance on fossil fuels overall, and plentiful coal—increasingly used in coal-to-gas conversion—and some newly imposed controls on energy exports.
But the closure of the Persian Gulf impacts much more than energy. In recent years, China has been sourcing most of its helium—needed for semi-conductor production—from Qatar. Previously PRC companies purchased helium from the US but shifted to the Qatari market due to supply security concerns. Similarly, half of China’s sulfur imports come from the Persian Gulf. The interruption in the supply of this chemical impacts China’s production of fertilizer just as planting season begins. Russia, a major energy exporter and producer of helium, has none of these concerns.
A Different Calculus about the Costs and Benefits of the War in Iran
Despite some speculation about the advantage to Beijing of US distraction from the Indo-Pacific, China is more economically vulnerable in long term. The conflict also has major negative political repercussions, already leading to the postponement of a long-awaited summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. As a result, China’s diplomatic efforts have more urgency. In this process, China must balance its partnership with Iran with its growing ties to the Persian Gulf States, as well as its longstanding relations with Israel.
For Russia, the economic and military benefits keep accumulating—first a welcome increase in the price of oil and then some respite on sanctions on oil exports to India. Above all, the Trump administration is now focused on Iran, not Ukraine, reducing pressure on Russia to come to the negotiating table. The need for military equipment for Operation Epic Fury also further reduces the supply available to Ukraine. However, as Mark Katz has observed, the longer the war continues, the greater the diplomatic risks to Russia. He points out that Ukraine now has an opportunity to demonstrate expertise in drone interception to the Gulf States and find a new source of international support. At the same time, the Gulf States may come view Russia as a part of their security problem and opt to comply with Ukraine-related sanctions.
Chinese officials seem well aware of the divergence in interests with Russia, which pull the two strategic partners in opposite directions—China hoping for a rapid conclusion of hostilities and Russia for their continuation. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated on March 8, “China and Russia are strategically independent. We always respect each other's core interests, do not impose our will and agenda on each other, and adhere to the principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting of third parties.” This is a far cry from the February 2022 “no limits partnership” joint statement by the two countries.
From Russia’s perspective, the war in Iran also helps redress a perceived imbalance between the two countries, due to China’s increased economic vulnerability. Some experts see an opportunity to boost Russia’s international profile at China’s expense. Alexei Maslov from Moscow State University described China as “lacking any serious leverage,” given its dependence on trade flows in the Persian Gulf. Vasily Kashin of the Higher School of Economics, who previously characterized China as Russia’s quasi-ally, was highly critical of China’s lack of support for Iran, terming Beijing’s response “passive and cautious.” According to Kashin, China opted for “a path that leads to minimal short-term costs in acute crises,” instead of acting like a great power and displaying willingness to confront its adversaries.
These fault lines between Russia and China do not mean that their partnership is inconsequential or weakening. The war, however, has highlighted some of the structural economic differences between the two countries and revealed a divergence in their current foreign policy priorities.
