Executive Summary

Over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has sought to deepen its ties with the Pacific Islands. Beijing’s efforts to cultivate influence in the region have included expanding economic, diplomatic, and security ties with individual Pacific Island nations, as well as expanding its footprint in the region’s media landscape and broader information environment. In this report, we examine the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) efforts to shape the media and information environments of 15 Pacific Islands.

How does China seek to influence the media and information environments in the Pacific Islands?

China uses a complex mix of tactics to shape the Pacific Islands’ media landscapes and broader information environment, including internet connectivity. These tactics target three levels of the media landscape:

• State level. CCP tactics at the state level include signing bilateral media cooperation agreements; making PRC state-run media available to local audiences; and financing, building, and operating a local information and communications (ICT) infrastructure.
• Organizational level. CCP tactics at the organizational or media outlet level include content sharing and coproduction between PRC state-run media and local media outlets, attempts by PRC actors to invest in local media outlets, and PRC embassy engagement with the local press.
• Individual level. CCP tactics that target individual media practitioners include providing all-expense-paid trips to China and directly pressuring media practitioners to censor their reporting or publish specific content.

What is unique about China’s approach?

We were repeatedly asked during our research how China’s efforts to engage media in the Pacific Islands are different from what other countries are doing. Based on our research, China’s approach to engaging media in the Pacific Islands is distinct in the following ways:

• Objectives. Perhaps the greatest difference lies in the objectives of China’s efforts. Whereas support from long-standing partners such as Australia and New Zealand is focused on encouraging the development of free and independent media, China’s engagement with Pacific media is primarily aimed at promoting a positive image of China and shaping public discussion in ways that further China’s interests. With one of the most restrictive media environments in the world, China is poorly positioned to support the development of free, independent, and professional media.
• Scope. Beijing uses a wide variety of strategies, techniques, and actors—including its state-directed media complex and propaganda system—to shape the media landscapes of nearly every Pacific Island we researched. For a sense of scale, we identified activities aimed at engaging media at the state, organizational, and individual levels in at least 8 of the 15 countries that we examined.
• Lack of transparency. The way Beijing engages with Pacific Island governments and media lacks transparency. Details about bilateral media cooperation agreements are consistently unavailable. Unlike the region’s long-standing partners such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Japan, China does not make details about funding public, so it is unclear how much money Beijing is funneling into the region’s media and information landscapes.

Given that the objective of China’s assistance is to shape public discussion rather than support the development of independent and professional media, accepting such support carries the risk of eroding Pacific Island media practitioners’ autonomy and missing opportunities to develop more lasting solutions to the challenges they face.

How successful has China been?

Our research suggests that the CCP has had some success shaping local media discussion in the Pacific Islands, but this success has been relatively limited and uneven. These mixed results are likely due to a combination of factors that present China with both challenges and opportunities for pursuing its objectives in the media landscape.

 Factors that limit China’s impact on local media landscapes include the following:

• Limited resonance of state-run media. Chinese state-run media have not yet established a strong reach in the region and do not compete with established sources of news such as the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Radio New Zealand (RNZ), or Television New Zealand (TVNZ).
• Suspicion of China. Experts and media practitioners mentioned a variety of suspicions about China, including concerns that China seeks to export authoritarianism, exploit local economies, and capture political elites, and that it is anti-Christian.
• Strength of journalistic norms. Multiple Pacific journalists voiced their commitment to maintaining independence and journalistic integrity. Local media practitioners and experts described journalists in the region as “courageous,” “proud,” and unlikely to be susceptible to undue influence.
• Lack of interest in China. China’s efforts tend to focus on promoting stories about China. Our research suggests that local audiences are more interested in things that are happening closer to home and may not have a large appetite for China-centric news.
• Continued engagement of long-standing partners. Media development programs such as those led by ABC and TVNZ and new and innovative business models such as Pasifika TV continue to figure prominently in the regional media landscape and bolster the region’s independent press.

Despite these constraints, there are multiple factors that have the potential to work in China’s favor and bear close monitoring going forward. These include the following:

• Financial state of regional media. Local experts and media practitioners described the financial state of the region’s media as the worst in history. The dire straits of the region’s media outlets may make them more receptive to China’s offers of funds.
• Staffing challenges. Many subject matter experts cited high attrition rates in Pacific newsrooms, low salaries in the media sector, and inexperience among Pacific journalists as key challenges to Pacific media outlets’ resilience and survival.
• Frustration with long-standing partners. Some Pacific media practitioners expressed frustration with the types of support that they receive from long-standing partners such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and the time it takes those partners to respond to requested adjustments. They also expressed concern about the United States’ review of its foreign assistance programs and the impact that changes could have on the support that Pacific media receive.
• The decisions of Pacific Island governments. Perhaps the most significant factor is the decisions made by Pacific Island leaders. Several local experts and media practitioners suggested that China has had the greatest success shaping media discussion in countries where it has managed to cultivate close ties with the political elite, such as Solomon Islands, Nauru, and Kiribati.

Given the speed with which the region’s media landscape is evolving and the scope of the CCP’s efforts, China’s footprint could expand quickly, depending on how these factors play out over the near term.