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Your search for Counterinsurgency found 22 results.

Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan
/reports/2012/unconventional-warfare-and-counterinsurgency-in-pakistan
Much has changed in the government’s thinking over the last 11 years. Yet the transition remains largely hesitant and partial. U.S. and NATO forces are pulling back from Afghanistan, and the Taliban is poised to regain at least some of its former power. At the same time, India has modernized its military and strengthened its alliances with the western powers. These trends create strong incentives for the military to, at the very least, retain the unconventional warfare option. The challenge for the Unites States going forward will be to ensure that Pakistan continues to move in the right direction and does not revert back to its earlier policies.
Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: A Brief History Much has changed in the government’s thinking over the last 11 years. Yet the transition remains largely hesitant and partial. U.S. and NATO forces are pulling back from Afghanistan, and the Taliban is poised to regain at least some of its former power. At the same ... approach to counterinsurgency involved using military operations to put pressure on various Taliban factions and the tribes that supported them, followed by overtures of peace. The Pakistani government
A Brief History of CNA
/about-us/history
CNA is the oldest research and analysis organization in the United States that is an FFRDC, a federally funded research and development center. Our founder, Philip Morse, introduced the concept of operations research to the U.S. in order to address the German U-boat threat during World War II.
for Naval Analyses adapted to new challenges. Analysts built up expertise in counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict, for example. In all, some 85 analysts deployed to combat zones in the first
Lewis_L
/experts-poc/lewis_l
Areas of expertise include lethal autonomy, reducing civilian casualties, identifying lessons from current operations, security assistance, and counterterrorism.
described the study as "the first comprehensive assessment of the problem of civilian protection." His other areas of expertise include counterinsurgency and high value targeting in Iraq, Afghanistan
Are We Winning
/reports/2014/are-we-winning
In more than a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States’ armed forces have encountered myriad challenges in their efforts to execute simultaneous counterinsurgency campaigns. Assessing progress on the ground—what we will refer to here as “operations assessment”—has proven an especially challenging task. For CNA analysts, as well as uniformed operations research and systems analysis (ORSA) personnel, the operations assessment process has grown in importance and consumed increasing analytic resources over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). While there have been new and innovative approaches to operations assessment in recent years, there has also been a great deal of relearning old lessons from previous eras (under different conditions). This relearning is, at least in part, attributable to the lack of a comprehensive history of operations assessment.
challenges in their efforts to execute simultaneous counterinsurgency campaigns. Assessing progress on the ground—what we will refer to here as “operations assessment”—has proven an especially challenging ... and practice of the concept take on a significance that was unprecedented. As the United States became immersed in a counterinsurgency fraught with ambiguities, nascent operations research and systems ... with hindrance after hindrance as the shortcomings of this approach became more apparent. The disconnect between counterinsurgency theory and the assessments process that had plagued operations assessment
The Role of Special Operations Forces in Global Competition
/reports/2017/the-role-of-special-operations-forces-in-global-competition
Nations have a variety of options for exerting influence, such as through diplomatic, military, or economic means. In recent years, some nations have shifted to more ambiguous activities for exerting global influence, in attempts to achieve benefits normally obtained through conventional war, but without triggering such a war. In this report, we explored a different way of thinking about these ambiguous activities and their implications, which suggested a need to shift U.S. focus away from preparing to win tomorrow and toward winning today. From this shift, we described a different approach to U.S. activities in such competitive environments. We also identified the unique qualities of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the military force having the best alignment with these different activities.
, with regional and cultural expertise. SOF have focused on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and direct action missions over the past decade, but in order to address the ambiguous activities occurring today
Renewal of Navys Riverine Capability A Preliminary Examination
/reports/2006/renewal-of-navys-riverine-capability-a-preliminary-examination
The Director of Deep Blue (OPNAV N3/5) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to help the Navy define the maritime domain in which riverine operations may take place, the potential missions and tasks appropriate for a riverine force, and the resource implications related to the Navy’s decision to establish a riverine capability. This report examines riverine history; defines the maritime domain as it applies to brown-water operations, identifies where riverine operations might occur; and identifies operational and functional tasks that might be employed by a riverine force. It also examines how well the U.S. Navy’s projected riverine capability fits across a range of military operations. We found that the U.S. Navy has a long and varied but episodic history of riverine operations, which are inherently joint and often combined. Ground and air combat units along with different types of naval units routinely work together. While riverine craft are usually the centerpiece of any riverine operation, they do not perform significant riverine missions by themselves. Riverine operations are also complex: they involve frequent close combat and the employment of combined arms.
methodology might be used, we examined how riverine resources might support four operational tasks across a range of three military missions: security assistance, counterinsurgency (COIN)/global war
coming in from the cold: The Congo Crisis: The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba
/our-media/podcasts/coming-in-from-the-cold/episode-23-the-congo-crisis-the-assassination-of-patrice-lumumba
On this episode of Coming in from the Cold, Pamela Faber returns along with Judd Devermont the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). They discuss the Assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the first elected Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and its implications for Central Africa.
and the Middle East. She focuses on terrorism and counterterrorism, insurgency and counterinsurgency, failed and fragile states, non-state armed groups, transnational challenges, and issues of governance
Maritime Sabotage: Lessons Learned and Implications for Strategic Competition
/reports/2021/10/maritime-sabotage-lessons-learned-and-implications-for-strategic-competition
Warring sides have undertaken sabotage operations throughout history to generate battlefield effects, with varying degrees of success.
heavily on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, resulting in a current dearth of experience with sabotage against nation-state targets. In light of SOF’s history with sabotage and recent
Maritime Sabotage and Implications for Strategic Competition
/reports/2021/10/maritime-sabotage-and-implications-for-strategic-competition
Warring sides have undertaken sabotage operations throughout history to generate battlefield effects, with varying degrees of success. In many cases, the forces conducting these operations have been special operations forces, their predecessors, or intelligence agencies. CNA initiated a quick-look study to examine past instances of sabotage in order to derive lessons and best practices for the future conduct of such operations. To increase the utility of the study for US Navy and US Marine Corps organizations, and because of the dearth of prior research on the topic, we focused our efforts on examining sabotage in the maritime domain. We generated a dataset of maritime sabotage instances dating back to World War II and analyzed this dataset according to a set of coding variables. These coding variables allowed us to perform both descriptive analysis of the dataset, as well as exploratory analysis.
and counterinsurgency operations, resulting in a current dearth of experience with sabotage against nation-state targets. In light of SOF’s history with sabotage and recent renewed interest in the subject, CNA
Russian Forces in Southern Military District Rev
/reports/2021/08/russian-forces-in-southern-military-district-rev
An in-depth assessment of Russia’s Southern Military District, which consists of robust forces spanning the North Caucasus region, along with Rostov, Volgograd, Stravropol, Dagestan, and Crimea.
to address a gamut of threats and contingencies, ranging from peacekeeping missions and counterinsurgency operations, through local wars, to high-tempo conventional operations against technologically superior