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ai and autonomy in russia: Issue 41, June 27, 2022

/our-media/newsletters/ai-and-autonomy-in-russia/issue-41-a

of such maritime drones can augment the Russian Navy’s capabilities by providing fire support for amphibious assault operations, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to detect and eliminate ... Russian drone operations is on the list of the American military aid to Ukraine. Kalashnikov manufactures two of Russia’s only loitering munitions, the KUB and Lancet models. Earlier in the war ... . The system has been under trial operation since 2021, but this will be the first time that autonomous navigation systems are used in commercial operations. New cell network built in Sverdlovsk planned

pla update: Issue 13, August 27, 2023

/our-media/newsletters/pla-update/issue-13

PLA Update, Issue 13, is a CNA China Studies Program monthly newsletter, with summaries of Chinese media coverage of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

and a shakeup in the PLA Rocket Force's (PLARF) top leadership. We next turn to recent activities of the PLA Navy (PLAN), including its operations and exercises with the Russian navy, a PLAN hospital ... Force, and Eastern Theater Command Navy. The crew are reportedly capable of performing examinations, treatments, and operations in areas including general surgery, orthopedics, obstetrics ... and media includes the reported numbers of patients seen and medical operations performed in each country, which are summarized in the table below: Country visited Dates Patients seen

AI in Russia Issue 10

/analyses/2020/09/ai-in-russia-issue-10

This report, the tenth in a series of biweekly updates, is part of an effort by CNA to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information and analysis of the field of civilian and military artificial intelligence (AI) in Russia and, in particular, how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. It relies on Russian-language open source material.

into the following sections: Introduction to this Special Issue on Army-2020 The Army Forum Since its Inception Official Statements at Army-2020 Systems Exhibited at Army-2020 AI Conference at Army-2020 Other Relevant Panels at Army-2020 The following preview shows the first item in this issue: Introduction to this Special Issue on Army-2020 This issue of AI ... the inception of the Army forum in 2015, featured over 5,000 weapons systems and technologies, including those of the RF armed forces science troops (special recruits from Russia’s universities who serve

ai and autonomy in russia: Issue 37, May 2, 2022

/our-media/newsletters/ai-and-autonomy-in-russia/issue-37

their coordinates to the Russian MRLS and artillery units, which delivered the final strike that supposedly destroyed the rest of this force. This tactic and concept of operations that utilizes UAVs as “eyes ... situation with the help of special radars that form an image of the sea surface. Based on the information received, artificial intelligence will predict the ice situation and automatically build the best route. The information will be transmitted to the captain of the ship or broadcast to the headquarters of marine operations on the NSR. There are no such civil unmanned carrier-based radar systems

pla update: Issue 1, February 4, 2022

/our-media/newsletters/pla-update/issue-1

PLA Update, Issue 1, is a CNA China Studies Program monthly newsletter, with summaries of Chinese media coverage of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

guided-missile frigates in nearby waters, helicopter flight training in the airspace of Hong Kong, and drills involving the garrison’s armored units, special operations troops, signal corps, and medical units ...   across the country to hold special political work sessions to explain the results of the plenum and its implications for the military. The sessions aimed to reaffirm the military’s loyalty to the Party ... for PLA units, called upon the military to remain loyal to the CCP and Xi, continuing to implement Xi’s reform policies. Major operations, activities, and exercises PLA initiates 2022 training

Preparing for Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response in Large-Scale Combat Operations

/analyses/2024/08/preparing-for-civilian-harm-mitigation-and-response-in-large-scale-combat-operations

Civilian harm mitigation and response requires a comprehensive approach. This report makes recommendations for mitigation, response, learning, analysis, and reporting.

.” As the US considers how best to prepare for a large-scale combat operation (LSCO) against peer adversaries, the Office of Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict in the Office of the Secretary ... Preparing for Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response in Large-Scale Combat Operations Preparing for Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response in Large-Scale Combat Operations Civilian harm mitigation ... the lives of civilians on the battlefield through a combination of compliance with international law and practical steps in planning and operations. However, in the past 20 years, the US and its allies have

The Navy At A Tipping Point

/analyses/2010/the-navy-at-a-tipping-point

For the past 60 years, since roughly the outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. response to that war, the Navy has had a consistent strategy for the structure, deployment, and posturing of the fleet. American maritime dominance has been based on forces that were deployed forward and always ready to respond quickly to emerging situations in areas of vital interest to American foreign policy. Because of the perceived need to be able to respond at the highest levels of warfare throughout the Cold War, those forces were built, trained, and equipped to be “combat credible” against capable challengers. “Combat credible” meant the ability to project power against advanced air defenses, conduct and enable littoral/amphibious operations in opposed environments, and establish blue-water dominance against highly capable surface, sub-surface, and air threats.

, littoral combat, and special operational forces (SOF), and routinely had over 10,000 sailors ashore in CENTCOM to support operations there. If the Navy hoped that reductions in the demand signal would ... littoral/amphibious operations in opposed environments, and establish blue-water dominance against highly capable surface, sub-surface, and air threats. In the post-Cold War environment, and since 9/11, evidence illustrates that the demand signal for naval forces has not waned. In fact, the Navy continues to be tasked with a range of operations, from disaster response to peacetime engagement and shows

Training in the Russian Armed Forces

/analyses/2023/09/training-in-the-russian-armed-forces

Performance by Russian soldiers in Ukraine and other assessments show that reforms in Russian military training since 2009 have been only partly successful.

associated with the high turnover rates among enlisted personnel. Perhaps most importantly, Russian troops gained valuable combat experience during operations in the Donbas and Crimea (2014–2015) and in Syria ... , and an emphasis on simulation training as a low-cost substitute for field exercises. Russian forces performed well in Crimea and Syria, but those operations were limited in scope and had clearly defined and achievable objectives. The recent operations in Ukraine were larger in scope and required significant coordination between services across multiple fronts to achieve objectives

Russian Combat Air Strengths and Limitations

/analyses/2023/05/russian-combat-air-strengths-and-limitations

Report explores Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) failure to win air dominance in Ukraine in 2022, why Russian air force results differed from Western expectations.

operations over Ukraine. For external analysts, areas of VKS weakness have generally been possible to infer from the absence of visible operations and destructive effects. Examples of visible weakness include the VKS’s inability to effectively conduct suppression and destruction of enemy air defense (SEAD/DEAD) operations, or to project fixed-wing or rotary strike sorties over most of Ukraine ... small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and handheld cameras have provided a rich, albeit fragmentary, source of information on the tactics and nature of operations being undertaken by both sides at each

Maritime Sabotage: Lessons Learned and Implications for Strategic Competition

/analyses/2021/10/maritime-sabotage-lessons-learned-and-implications-for-strategic-competition

Warring sides have undertaken sabotage operations throughout history to generate battlefield effects, with varying degrees of success.

operations throughout history to generate battlefield effects, with varying degrees of success. Warring sides have undertaken sabotage operations throughout history to generate battlefield effects, with varying degrees of success. In many cases, the forces conducting these operations have been special operations forces (SOF), their predecessors, or intelligence agencies. During World War II ... heavily on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, resulting in a current dearth of experience with sabotage against nation-state targets. In light of SOF’s history with sabotage and recent