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Decades of War Applying Past Lessons to the Counter-ISIS Campaign

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To counter ISIS more effectively, the US can apply lessons learned from earlier operations in Iraq, as summarized in the Joint Staff’s “Decade of War Report.”

Population Representation in the Military Services-Fiscal Year 2017 Summary Report

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This summary of the 2017 Population Representation in the Military Services (PopRep) report highlights demographic and socioeconomic trends in the armed services.

Supply Chain Resilience of Groceries in Catastrophes

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In a U.S. earthquake or catastrophe, food supply chain resilience can rely on grocery sector supplies in the first weeks. Transportation is the key challenge.

Get Ready for the Second Phase of the Chinese Military

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2017 will see the Chinese armed forces undergo the second phase of organizational changes and institutional reforms that the PLA hopes to complete by 2020.

American Naval Policy in the Second Decade

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This paper provides a brief overview of U.S. Navy policy, strategy, plans and operations. It discusses some basic fundamentals and the Navy’s three major operational activities: peacetime engagement, crisis response, and wartime combat. It concludes with a general discussion of U.S. naval forces. It was originally written as a contribution to an international conference on maritime strategy and security, and originally published as a chapter in a Routledge handbook in 2015. The author is a longtime contributor to, advisor on, and observer of US Navy strategy and policy, and the paper represents his personal but well-informed views. The paper was written while the Navy (and Marine Corps and Coast Guard) were revising their tri- service strategy document A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, finally signed and published in March 2015, and includes suggestions made by the author to the drafters during that time.

Origins and Development of Cooperative Strategy

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On August 2, 2011, Admiral (ADM) Jonathan Greenert was confirmed to succeed ADM Gary Roughead as the U.S. Navy’s 30th Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), to take office the following month. Like his 29 predecessors, ADM Greenert faced issues of Navy readiness, personnel, acquisition, and resources. He was also troubled by the content and effect of the Navy’s existing strategy document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21), published by all three U.S. sea services back in October 2007.

Future of US India Naval Relations

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CNA conducted this study to determine how the United States can advance its naval and maritime relationship with India in the coming five to 10 years. U.S.-India defense relations, especially in the naval domain, have expanded in the past two decades and soared under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The study analyzes the key factors that have shaped the course of relations between the U.S. Navy (USN) and the Indian Navy and considers India’s possible future trajectories and how they may impact bilateral naval ties. CNA concludes that key factors affecting the evolution of the USN-Indian Navy relationship are mostly beyond the control of the two navies themselves. Despite the wider diplomatic and geopolitical circumstances, there are many overlapping areas of ongoing interest between the two navies that favor closer ties. Finally, drawing on an accompanying project paper, this study suggests viewing the increasing importance of the region west of India as a promising area of bilateral naval security cooperation.

Benefits of Body Worn Cameras

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Many community stakeholders and criminal justice leaders have suggested placing body-worn cameras (BWCs) on police officers improves the civility of police-citizen encounters and enhances citizen perceptions of police transparency and legitimacy. In response, many police departments have adopted this technology to improve the quality of policing in their communities. However, the existing evaluation evidence on the intended and unintended consequences of outfitting police officers with BWCs is still developing. This study reports the findings of a randomized controlled trial (RCT) involving more than 400 police officers in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD). We find that BWC-wearing officers generated significantly fewer complaints and use of force reports relative to control officers without cameras. BWC-wearing officers also made more arrests and issued more citations than their non-BWC-wearing controls. In addition, our cost-benefit analysis revealed that savings from reduced complaints against officers, and the reduced time required to resolve such complaints, resulted in substantial cost savings for the police department. Considering that LVMPD had already introduced reforms regarding use of force through a Collaborative Reform Initiative prior to implementing body worn cameras, these findings suggest that body worn cameras can have compelling effects without increasing costs.

United States and Gulf State Interests in the Post Arab Spring Maghreb

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The 2010-2011 Arab Spring caused upheaval in North Africa’s Maghreb region, which comprises Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. This upheaval elevated the Maghreb’s importance globally, including for the United States and the Gulf Arab states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar in particular. The Gulf Arab countries’ increased engagement in the Maghreb is the result of shifts within the internal politics of the Arab world. In the Maghreb, U.S. and Gulf state interests overlap to the extent that all players want stability, but each state has its own definition of what stability means. The U.S. and the Gulf states all support the Moroccan and Algerian regimes, but intra-Gulf rivalries are helping destabilize Libya, where different Gulf- backed proxy forces are exacerbating that country’s civil war. Moving forward, the United States and the Gulf states may find areas where their interests converge (e.g., stabilizing Tunisian politics, fighting terrorism, and promoting development) but also areas where they diverge, especially in Libya.

Sources of Resilience in the Lords Resistance Army

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The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Ugandan national Joseph Kony, has survived for over three decades despite a concerted effort to defeat it. The LRA was formed in the late 1980s in response to the historic marginalization of the Acholi people, inequitable treatment by the Ugandan government and uneven development across the country. The LRA became a powerfully destructive force in northern Uganda, with thousands of combatants killing over 100,000 people. Since 2006, the group has been largely degraded to less than 150 core combatants, and is currently in survival mode on the borders of the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan. Despite these setbacks, the LRA is still active in central Africa and serves as a lesson in resiliency and survival. In March 2017, U.S. Africa Command announced the end of its anti-LRA operations. Although some observers see the operation as a success, it failed to capture Kony or to eliminate the group. This paper argues that the LRA has two major sources of resilience: it positions itself within the nexus of four interconnected conflicts in the region, and it adapts its tactics to changes in its capabilities and environment. The resilience of the LRA has implications both for its potential resurgence and for other armed groups who may look to it as a template for survival.