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Tracking Outcomes of Voluntary Military Education Programs Review

/analyses/2021/04/tracking-outcomes-of-voluntary-military-education-programs-review

The Department of Defense (DoD) provides education benefits to Servicemembers and their spouses. Two such benefits are the Tuition Assistance (TA) program, designed to decrease the financial burden of higher education for military members, and the My Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) scholarship program, a workforce development program designed to assist eligible military spouses in pursuing training, licenses, credentials, certifications, and associate degrees in support of developing portable employment and careers. A dearth of information on the educational and financial outcomes of TA and MyCAA users prompted Congress to mandate, in the 2014 DoD Appropriations Bill, a study to document the aggregate graduation rates, financial indebtedness, and loan default rates of these military families. Here, we summarize information from the TA and MyCAA literature. However, because little information is currently available, we also explore the civilian higher education literature on tuition reimbursement, graduation rates, student debt, and loan default rates. This provides the relevant background information needed for the quantitative portion of this study, in which we will collect and analyze available data on educational outcomes for TA and MyCAA users.

Tracking Outcomes of Voluntary Military Education Programs Review Tracking Outcomes of Voluntary Military Education Programs: A Literature Review The Department of Defense (DoD) provides education ... for TA and MyCAA users. The Department of Defense (DoD) provides education benefits to Servicemembers and their spouses to decrease the financial burden of higher education for military Servicemembers ... Policy asked CNA to conduct this congressionally mandated study. In this preliminary report, we summarize the TA and MyCAA literature—including research on these programs’ use and outcomes. Because

Countering Domestic Violent Extremism

/analyses/2021/03/countering-domestic-violent-extremism

Domestic violent extremism (DVE) is a pressing concern for defense and national security policy-makers. In order to define the issue, place DVE in historical context, and suggest steps to address the problem, CNA’s National Security Seminar convened three of its experts for a discussion titled “Countering DVE: Drivers, Challenges, and What Comes Next.”

Countering Domestic Violent Extremism Countering Domestic Violent Extremism Domestic violent extremism (DVE) is a pressing concern for defense and national security policy-makers. In order to define ... , Challenges, and What Comes Next.” Domestic violent extremism (DVE) is a pressing concern for defense and national security policy-makers. In order to define the issue, place DVE in historical context ... —including DVE inspired by antigovernment, anti-fascist (or antifa), and environmental ideologies. DVE is part of the US political landscape Dr. William Rosenau, CNA’s senior policy historian

AVF Investments in Recruiting

/analyses/2020/05/avf-investments-in-recruiting

Enlisted recruiting is the heart of the All‑Volunteer Force (AVF). The young men and women the Services recruit will define what the military force will look like in numbers and characteristics. Because the military is a hierarchical organization—that is, people enlist in the military as youth and advance through the ranks as they age—the Services must find recruits with the attributes that will make them successful Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines today and in the future.

defense is compromised.  But recruiting can be challenging. Senior leaders should recognize the following: The recruiting environment is fluid, and some elements, such as the economy and the size ... they tailor the “sale” changes over time. They must stay engaged with other policy initiatives, such as military pay and benefits and policies related to changing social norms, because these can have

Proxy Warfare

/analyses/2019/07/proxy-warfare

Proxy warfare—that is, conflict in which a “major power instigates or plays a major role in supporting and directing to a conflict but does only a small portion of the actual fighting itself”—is receiving new attention from policymakers, analysts, and practitioners. This study uses a series of four case studies on US involvement in proxy war (the “Secret War” in Laos, the Contras in Central America, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the Syrian Defense Forces) to develop a set of key themes. These themes, in turn, form the basis of a set of rules of thumb to guide senior decisionmakers as they contemplate the future use of proxy forces. Finally, this report discusses implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces, which are likely to play an increasingly important role in supporting U.S. proxies.

studies on US involvement in proxy war (the “Secret War” in Laos, the Contras in Central America, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the Syrian Defense Forces) to develop a set of key themes ... following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress granted the Department of Defense, and US Special Operations Command, significant authorities to organize, train, equip, and advise proxy forces. However ... —their relatively low cost, their disposability, and their deniability— suggests that their continued use will prove to be an attractive foreign policy option for the United States and its rivals

Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean

/analyses/2018/03/great-power-competition-in-the-indian-ocean

U.S. Navy planners should assume that the PLA Navy’s presence in the western Indian Ocean will grow, and that new bases and places will be organized to support its expanded presence. U.S. authorities can no longer assume unencumbered freedom of action when electing to posture U.S. naval forces offshore of the Horn of Africa and other East African hotspots. If China’s interests are involved and differ from Washington’s, the Chinese could dispatch their own naval forces to the water offshore of the country in question. The U.S. Navy faced similar circumstances between 1968 and 1991, when the United States and the Soviet Union competed for friends, political influence, maritime access, and bases in the western Indian Ocean region. This paper briefly discusses this period in order to provide some historical context for what might occur in the future. As Mark Twain purportedly quipped, “History does not repeat, but it often rhymes.”

and to Europe via the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Chinese strategists are well aware of the fact that potentially hostile naval forces are present in numbers in these waters. For example, its 2015 defense white ... Road, it was necessary for Beijing to back away from its long-standing policy of criticizing other nations’ overseas bases as a feature of hegemonic behavior. Beijing has come to appreciate the value

Redefining Human Control

/analyses/2018/03/redefining-human-control

This report examines the issue of human control with regard to lethal autonomy, an issue of significant interest in United Nations discussions in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) forum. We analyze this issue in light of lessons and best practices from recent U.S. operations. Based on this analysis, we make the case for a wider framework for the application of human control over the use of force. This report recommends that CCW discussions currently focusing on process considerations, such as human control, should instead focus on outcome—namely, mitigation of inadvertent engagements. This allows consideration of a more complete set of benefits and risks of lethal autonomy and better management of risks. The report also describes best practices that can collectively serve as a safety net for the use of lethal autonomous weapons. It concludes with concrete recommendations for how the international community can more effectively address the risk of inadvertent engagements from lethal autonomy.

civilians. Fortunately, these empirical insights point the way toward a more comprehensive solution: a safety net woven from best practices in targeting, policy and testing, with the consideration ... encountered or can easily be identified—including the underwater and air-defense domains. Another element of context is self-defense: should LAWS be handled differently if they are acting in defense of humans

To Counter China’s Economic Threat to US Industry, Seek Resilience, Not Deterrence

/our-media/indepth/2024/11/counter-chinas-economic-threat-with-resilience-not-deterrence

Economic deterrence, a priority in the National Defense Industrial Strategy, is vague and difficult. To compete with China, economic resilience is preferable.

National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) is what DOD describes as a “first of its type” document for strengthening the defense industrial base. By clearly articulating industrial policy objectives ... Indo-Pacific countries that are subject to intense economic and diplomatic influence from China. Labeling a portion of Washington’s defense industrial policy as “deterrence” bolsters China’s argument ... Counter China’s Economic Threat with Resilience, Not Deterrence Economic deterrence, a priority in the National Defense Industrial Strategy, is vague and difficult. To compete with China, economic

Global Issues Beckon Japan’s New Prime Minister

/our-media/indepth/2020/10/global-issues-beckon-japans-new-prime-minister

When Yoshihide Suga succeeded Shinzo Abe as Japan’s prime minister on September 14, many observers anticipated a shift in the government’s focus. Will Suga be pulled in two directions?

& Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division. With over 35 years of Federal service prior to his retirement, Dr. Linehan’s career with the Department of Defense focused on Asian security affairs. When Yoshihide ... , defense-centric foreign policy and the transformation of Japan’s national security policy. Suga, in contrast, is known for his expertise in domestic policy and might be expected to turn inward to tackle ... brother, Nobuo Kishi (defense minister), Toshimitsu Motegi (foreign minister), and Abe’s former foreign minister and recent defense minister, Taro Kono, as minister for administrative reform — one of Suga

Maternity Leave: More Weeks for Mothers Can Mean More Weeks Worked

/our-media/indepth/2020/03/maternity-leave

Longer paid maternity leave in the Navy increased the number of female sailors who reenlist, reducing what had been a small but persistent gender gap in reenlistment rates in a cost-effective manner.

Readiness Division. In 2015, the Department of the Navy tripled the amount of fully paid leave available to new mothers from 6 to 18 weeks. And though the Department of Defense forced the Department of the Navy to eventually scale back their leave to 12 weeks in order to create a consistent policy across the services, the large increase in maternity leave created a quasi-experiment on the impact ... the effect that the expanded maternity leave policy — combining the 18- and 12-week policies — had on the reenlistment of female sailors. The results of this study indicate that longer paid maternity

Is the U.S. Close to War with China?

/our-media/indepth/2022/08/is-the-u.s.-close-to-a-war-with-china

Adm. Michael McDevitt provides context to understand the chances of war or peace between China, Taiwan and the U.S. following Nancy Pelosi’s visit.

with China over Taiwan? Does the U.S. have a defense obligation to Taiwan? Why does China care so much about Taiwan? In 1949 the Chinese Civil War essentially ended when the Chinese Communist Party ... , and by 1955 had signed a defense treaty with the Republic of China (ROC). In the United Nations, Washington led a successful attempt to keep Mao’s People's Republic of China (PRC) out ... as the sole legal Government of China. The Carter Administration also simultaneously terminated official diplomatic relations with the government in Taiwan and abrogated its defense treaty. Since