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Your search for Force Development found 175 results.

Improving the DOD Manpower Management Workforce
/analyses/2020/07/improving-the-dod-manpower-management-workforce
The process for determining and validating requirements, associated manpower, and the workforce mix necessary to achieve an organization’s mission requires specialized knowledge, skills, and abilities. Unlike other career fields, however, there is no common training or certification process that ensures minimum standards and competencies among personnel performing manpower functions. This project examines whether the goal of common training and standards for all personnel performing manpower management (MM) functions in DOD is achievable and desirable. We find evidence that there are MM training gaps and inefficiencies in DOD and that, in general, MM functions are similar enough to allow standardized training and education. The data necessary to show that improving the quality of MM workforces will improve MM processes and outcomes is lacking, however. We recommend that DOD collect the necessary data to further examine the impact of MM workforce quality on MM outcomes and processes.
of Total Force labor necessary for a given activity. It ensures that there are enough people with the right capabilities to achieve the mission, while considering which type of labor is the most cost ... , such a mapping of the MM workforce to outcomes is not possible. Accomplishing this would require the development of metrics that inform the quality of the work being done. We recommend that DOD collect
How Moscow Understands War
/analyses/2020/11/how-moscow-understands-war
In this CNA Occasional Paper, Andrew Monaghan examines Russian military strategy. Monaghan frames an analysis of Russian military strategy in terms of sustained Russian debate about the changing character of war, especially since the mid 2010s, and how this debate has recently turned to focus on military strategy in modern conditions. It makes several key arguments. First, history permeates the contemporary Russian debate, featuring both in the way that military experience is rendered into didactic lessons of history to advance military science, and in the arc of the theoretical development of Russian military strategy—it is not possible to parse today’s discussion without knowledge of this history. Second, military strategy is specifically and clearly defined in the Russian lexicon as the “highest sphere of military art,” the art of higher command comprising the bridge between the theory and practice of war. Military strategy is explicitly subordinate to state policy. Third, there are constraints on military strategy, particularly in terms of the implementation of plans. Moscow’s re-examination of military strategy has important implications for Western audiences. While many are focused on Moscow’s measures short of war, this paper highlights the importance that the Russian military still accords the use of armed force. Moreover, it suggests the need to move beyond thinking in terms of the blurring of the lines between war and peace, to the blurring of the lines between the offensive and the defensive.
to advance military science, and in the arc of the theoretical development of Russian military strategy—it is not possible to parse today’s discussion without knowledge of this history. Second ... the use of armed force. Moreover, it suggests the need to move beyond thinking in terms of the blurring of the lines between war and peace, to the blurring of the lines between the offensive ... questions, the current Russian discussion serves to highlight the role of armed force as a central element of Russian military strategy. Second, it is time to move beyond thinking of Russian activity
Russian Combat Aviation
/analyses/2020/12/russian-combat-aviation
In this CNA Occasional Paper, Leonid Nersisyan analyzes developments in Russia’s combat aviation fleet from 2006 to 2019. The report provides an in-depth assessment of Russia’s tactical, strategic, and army aviation forces, detailing key combat aircraft and munitions procured by the Russian Air Force and Navy. Additionally, Nersisyan discusses the ongoing modernization program, prospective fixed-wing and helicopter acquisitions, and related challenges that the fleet may face in the coming years.
from 2006 to 2019. The report provides an in-depth assessment of Russia’s tactical, strategic, and army aviation forces, detailing key combat aircraft and munitions procured by the Russian Air Force ... . This paper provides an overview of Russian combat aviation modernization and procurement efforts from the period 2006 to 2019, and discusses how the recent endeavors follow from Russian Air Force ... , the paper examines the key combat aircraft and attack helicopters that the Russian military developed or procured from 2006 to 2019. It also considers the future development and potential acquisitions
AI and Autonomy Understanding and Mitigating Risks
/analyses/2018/08/ai-and-autonomy-understanding-and-mitigating-risks
Given the rapid and significant advances in AI, the strong interest in leveraging this technology from advanced militaries, and the urgent concerns voiced in the media, we examined commonly held concerns of AI and autonomy in war. We found that these concerns, on further examination, were not quite what they seemed on first blush. Some concerns were inconsistent with the current state of the technology, such as assuming that general AI is feasible when most estimates place this development many decades away (if ever). Others do not adequately consider the way military systems are actually structured and conducted, in which AI-enabled and autonomous systems would operate as part of a larger process for delivering the use of force. This larger context helps address concerns about accountability and discrimination. Note that we did not argue that these concerns are spurious—they have value because they can lead to much needed debates and discussions regarding ethical issues of this emerging technology. However, we emphasized that the real risk in a military context (expressed in operational outcomes such as civilian casualties and fratricide) is low from these commonly held concerns. This is important from a risk management perspective because a mismatch between efforts to mitigate risk and the actual sources of risk could lead to the pursuit of ineffective solutions.
this development many decades away (if ever). Others do not adequately consider the way military systems are actually structured and conducted, in which AI-enabled and autonomous systems would operate as part of a larger process for delivering the use of force. This larger context helps address concerns about accountability and discrimination. Note that we did not argue that these concerns are spurious ... not consider the way military systems are actually used (which is as part of a larger process for delivering the use of force). These concerns are not spurious—they can lead to much-needed debates
China’s New Military Leadership
/our-media/indepth/2022/11/chinas-new-miliatry-leadership-possible-strengths-and-weaknesses
By examining the newly selected leaders of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), their backgrounds and professional competencies, we can better understand how they may influence the trajectory of the PLA’s development over the next five years.
, we can better understand how they may influence the trajectory of the PLA’s development over the next five years. /images/InDepth/2022/10/CCP-Conference-resize.jpg China’s New Military Leadership ... officers who will guide the People's Liberation Army (PLA) through its next five years of modernization. By 2027 — the PLA's centenary — the force is required to make progress in dozens of tasks outlined ... of China's Central Military Commission (CMC), their backgrounds and professional competencies, we can better understand how they may influence the trajectory of the PLA's development over the next five
3 Steps Toward Transforming the Department of Defense
/our-media/indepth/2020/10/3-steps-toward-transforming-the-department-of-defense
The Future of Defense Task Force of the House Armed Services Committee recently released a roadmap to prepare the U.S. Department of Defense for the battlefield of the future.
a federally funded research and development center to plan for a Department of the Space Force. CNA was selected for the project, and we began trying to design based on the National Defense Authorization ... 3 Steps Toward Transforming the Department of Defense The Future of Defense Task Force of the House Armed Services Committee recently released a roadmap to prepare the U.S. Department of Defense ... . Hoar's major focus of analysis was Marine Corps and Navy command reorganization and training issues. The Future of Defense Task Force of the House Armed Services Committee recently released
How Can Special Operations Forces Contribute to Strategic Competition?
/our-media/indepth/2023/06/how-can-special-operations-forces-contribute-to-interstate-competition
In his testimony, Jon Schroden discussed what special operations forces need to change to become an effective force in interstate competition.
development, and force employment faster than any other part of DOD, which should lend it an inherent advantage in generating innovative capabilities and force packages designed for competition today ... How Can Special Operations Forces Contribute to Interstate Competition? In his testimony, Jon Schroden discussed what special operations forces need to change to become an effective force ... War. Additionally, special operators are developing new capabilities that can be used for the competition, including foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and counterthreat finance
Three Smart Design Choices for the New Space Systems Command
/our-media/indepth/2021/04/three-smart-design-choices-for-the-new-space-systems-command
Space Force unveiled its design and intentions for the Space Systems Command. It will make some notable changes from the way the Air Force did business.
Three smart design choices for the new Space Systems Command Space Force unveiled its design and intentions for the Space Systems Command. It will make some notable changes from the way the Air Force ... second year of existence, the Space Force unveiled its design and intentions for its primary acquisition organization, the Space Systems Command. While the new command is largely an outgrowth of the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, it will also make some notable changes from the way the Air Force did business. These changes make good sense today and set the Space Force up
Japan’s F-35B Sea Trials Aim to Boost Interoperability with US, Partner Navies
/our-media/indepth/2024/11/japans-f-35b-sea-trials
Successful tests of the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter on a Japanese ship bring Japan closer to a future of close collaboration with the US Navy and Marine Corps.
on the British carrier. During Kaga’s recently completed development test, a British pilot landed a Royal Air Force F-35B on the ship’s deck for the first time. Competitor reactions to Japan's ... . Darlene Onuorah is an Associate Research Analyst with CNA's Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Program . On November 6, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force announced the completion of tests ... Yoshihiro said that Kaga’s certification process marked an unprecedented strengthening of relations with the US Navy. Tokyo has been motivated to bolster Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF
New Leadership For a New Generation
/our-media/indepth/2022/08/new-leadership-for-a-new-generation
Jonathan Schroden examines how special operations commanders can adjust their leadership styles to attract and retain millennials and Generation Z cadets.
and preferences that differ markedly from those that came before them. Given that SOF comprise a multigenerational force, questions emerge of how older special operators might understand the needs of younger SOF and what the strengths and weaknesses are of different leadership styles across generations within the force. To understand if or how leadership styles may need to change to motivate younger ... or not they believed SOF have a single or consistent philosophy of leadership across the force. However, there is no such philosophy articulated in SOF doctrine or official publications, nor