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Your search for Force Development found 182 results.

Russian Combat Air Strengths and Limitations

/analyses/2023/05/russian-combat-air-strengths-and-limitations

Report explores Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) failure to win air dominance in Ukraine in 2022, why Russian air force results differed from Western expectations.

Air Force (UkrAF) aviation, ground-based air defense (GBAD), intelligence, maintenance, and capability development commanders. In compiling this report, the authors also inspected and disassembled ... Russian Combat Air Strengths and Limitations Russian Combat Air Strengths and Limitations Report explores Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) failure to win air dominance in Ukraine in 2022, why Russian air force results differed from Western expectations. Lessons from Ukraine about Russian Combat Air Strengths and Limitations One of the defining features of the February 2022 Russian invasion

PRC Writings on Strategic Deterrence

/analyses/2023/04/prc-writings-on-strategic-deterrence

Military technology innovations have bred PRC and PLA concerns as to the sustainability of China’s approach to strategic deterrence, recent writings suggest.

crisis or war in the immediate term, but to establish longer-term strategic stability conducive to China’s national security and development. PRC writings (similar to Western writings) usually define ... the US-China strategic balance. Viewed in this context, some recent PLA force modernization decisions could be understood as an attempt to restore asymmetric strategic stability, which they depict

Addressing AI Challenges in Human Machine Teaming

/analyses/2021/10/addressing-ai-challenges-in-human-machine-teaming

Our review of DON strategy documents indicates that DON is paying insufficient attention to the full range of DOTMLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, facilities, and policy) implications that these technologies will have. In particular, more attention needs to be paid to the Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (MPT&E) to enable human-machine teaming.

/reports/2021/10/Underwater-Machine.jpg Systems, Tactics, and Force Development /centers-and-divisions/cna/stf Approved for Public Release by Kim Deal, Chief Research Officer. 7 DSI-2021-U-030517-Final ... and educated force in the world.” MPT&E reform  is not addressed, but there is an unambiguous statement regarding the need to reform technology acquisition by developing  “innovative systems, modernizing ... . THE PROJECT OVERMATCH MEMORANDUM In this document, the CNO recognizes the need for “Distributed Maritime Operations through a teamed manned/unmanned force.”  He presents Project Overmatch strictly

Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Key Concepts

/analyses/2020/04/russian-strategy-for-escalation-management-key-concepts

This report examines evolving debates within the Russian military on questions of “escalation management,” or intra-war deterrence.

in deterrence. A reasonably mature system of deterrence emerged as the product of decades of debates and concept development, designed to handle the spectrum of Russian security requirements, from ... of force, and deterrence by defense. Russian military thought tends to characterize these types of activities as demonstrative, damage inflicting, and retaliatory. This study focuses on the first two

Improving the DOD Manpower Management Workforce

/analyses/2020/07/improving-the-dod-manpower-management-workforce

The process for determining and validating requirements, associated manpower, and the workforce mix necessary to achieve an organization’s mission requires specialized knowledge, skills, and abilities. Unlike other career fields, however, there is no common training or certification process that ensures minimum standards and competencies among personnel performing manpower functions. This project examines whether the goal of common training and standards for all personnel performing manpower management (MM) functions in DOD is achievable and desirable. We find evidence that there are MM training gaps and inefficiencies in DOD and that, in general, MM functions are similar enough to allow standardized training and education. The data necessary to show that improving the quality of MM workforces will improve MM processes and outcomes is lacking, however. We recommend that DOD collect the necessary data to further examine the impact of MM workforce quality on MM outcomes and processes.

of Total Force labor necessary for a given activity. It ensures that there are enough people with the right capabilities to achieve the mission, while considering which type of labor is the most cost ... , such a mapping of the MM workforce to outcomes is not possible. Accomplishing this would require the development of metrics that inform the quality of the work being done. We recommend that DOD collect

How Moscow Understands War

/analyses/2020/11/how-moscow-understands-war

In this CNA Occasional Paper, Andrew Monaghan examines Russian military strategy. Monaghan frames an analysis of Russian military strategy in terms of sustained Russian debate about the changing character of war, especially since the mid 2010s, and how this debate has recently turned to focus on military strategy in modern conditions. It makes several key arguments. First, history permeates the contemporary Russian debate, featuring both in the way that military experience is rendered into didactic lessons of history to advance military science, and in the arc of the theoretical development of Russian military strategy—it is not possible to parse today’s discussion without knowledge of this history. Second, military strategy is specifically and clearly defined in the Russian lexicon as the “highest sphere of military art,” the art of higher command comprising the bridge between the theory and practice of war. Military strategy is explicitly subordinate to state policy. Third, there are constraints on military strategy, particularly in terms of the implementation of plans. Moscow’s re-examination of military strategy has important implications for Western audiences. While many are focused on Moscow’s measures short of war, this paper highlights the importance that the Russian military still accords the use of armed force. Moreover, it suggests the need to move beyond thinking in terms of the blurring of the lines between war and peace, to the blurring of the lines between the offensive and the defensive.

to advance military science, and in the arc of the theoretical development of Russian military strategy—it is not possible to parse today’s discussion without knowledge of this history. Second ... the use of armed force. Moreover, it suggests the need to move beyond thinking in terms of the blurring of the lines between war and peace, to the blurring of the lines between the offensive ... questions, the current Russian discussion serves to highlight the role of armed force as a central element of Russian military strategy. Second, it is time to move beyond thinking of Russian activity

Russian Combat Aviation

/analyses/2020/12/russian-combat-aviation

In this CNA Occasional Paper, Leonid Nersisyan analyzes developments in Russia’s combat aviation fleet from 2006 to 2019. The report provides an in-depth assessment of Russia’s tactical, strategic, and army aviation forces, detailing key combat aircraft and munitions procured by the Russian Air Force and Navy. Additionally, Nersisyan discusses the ongoing modernization program, prospective fixed-wing and helicopter acquisitions, and related challenges that the fleet may face in the coming years.

from 2006 to 2019. The report provides an in-depth assessment of Russia’s tactical, strategic, and army aviation forces, detailing key combat aircraft and munitions procured by the Russian Air Force ... . This paper provides an overview of Russian combat aviation modernization and procurement efforts from the period 2006 to 2019, and discusses how the recent endeavors follow from Russian Air Force ... , the paper examines the key combat aircraft and attack helicopters that the Russian military developed or procured from 2006 to 2019. It also considers the future development and potential acquisitions

AI and Autonomy Understanding and Mitigating Risks

/analyses/2018/08/ai-and-autonomy-understanding-and-mitigating-risks

Given the rapid and significant advances in AI, the strong interest in leveraging this technology from advanced militaries, and the urgent concerns voiced in the media, we examined commonly held concerns of AI and autonomy in war. We found that these concerns, on further examination, were not quite what they seemed on first blush. Some concerns were inconsistent with the current state of the technology, such as assuming that general AI is feasible when most estimates place this development many decades away (if ever). Others do not adequately consider the way military systems are actually structured and conducted, in which AI-enabled and autonomous systems would operate as part of a larger process for delivering the use of force. This larger context helps address concerns about accountability and discrimination. Note that we did not argue that these concerns are spurious—they have value because they can lead to much needed debates and discussions regarding ethical issues of this emerging technology. However, we emphasized that the real risk in a military context (expressed in operational outcomes such as civilian casualties and fratricide) is low from these commonly held concerns. This is important from a risk management perspective because a mismatch between efforts to mitigate risk and the actual sources of risk could lead to the pursuit of ineffective solutions.

this development many decades away (if ever). Others do not adequately consider the way military systems are actually structured and conducted, in which AI-enabled and autonomous systems would operate as part of a larger process for delivering the use of force. This larger context helps address concerns about accountability and discrimination. Note that we did not argue that these concerns are spurious ... not consider the way military systems are actually used (which is as part of a larger process for delivering the use of force). These concerns are not spurious—they can lead to much-needed debates

Surface Warfare Program

/centers-and-divisions/cna/stf/surface-warfare

Independent CNA assessments of how ship systems perform, how to improve that performance through tactical innovation, and what new systems to procure to enable high-end fleet capabilities.

objective feedback to better defend the fleet case-study CNA Surface Warfare | Systems, Tactics, and Force Development https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZffqJNRt3k0 small gray full Analyst Dr. Rahul

Field Training Programs in Law Enforcement

/analyses/2021/10/field-training-programs-in-law-enforcement

CNA studied six police officer field training programs around the United States to highlight promising practices and identify areas for improvement.

in an officer’s career; Time spent with a field training officer (FTO) is vital to a trainee’s career development and helps shapes the culture of an agency. Recently, American policing has seen a shift in its public perception as a result of highly publicized officerinvolved use of force incidents. Some of the involved officers have been field training officers. Research shows that trainees