

The Navy Role in Confronting Irregular Challenges

Implementing the Navy Vision for CIC

A. Fritz • A. Freedman • P. Hausmann

CRM D0024427.A2/Final

March 2011

Approved for distribution:

March 2011

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Barry Howell".

Dr. Barry Howell
Director, Warfare Capabilities and Employment Team
Operations and Tactics Analysis

This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue.
It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Specific authority: N00014-05-D-0500.
Copies of this document can be obtained through the Defense Technical Information Center at www.dtic.mil
or contact CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123.

Copyright © 2011 CNA. All Rights Reserved

This work was created in the performance of Federal Government Contract Number N00014-05-D-0500. Any copyright in this work is subject to the Government's Unlimited Rights license as defined in DFARS 252.227-7013 and/or DFARS 252.227-7014.

Contents

Executive summary	1
Our analytical approach	1
Navy strategic concept for CIC	2
Navy role in CIC	2
GPF and SOF are complementary.	2
Way ahead for CIC force planning	3
The Navy should plan and train for interagency and host nation (HN) coordination.	4
The Navy should determine its capacity for CIC	4
DOTMLPF Implications of Navy CIC should be assessed.	4
Introduction	7
Scope of our analysis	8
Our analytical approach	8
Joint doctrine and the Navy Vision.	8
Navy CIC capabilities	9
Navy CIC forces	9
Implications	10
Summary of our approach	10
Terminology	10
Key characteristics of Navy CIC	13
The Navy Vision for CIC	13
The maritime environment	14
Navy CIC results.	15
Preventive security.	15
Building partner capacity	15
Countering manifest threats	15
Navy CIC missions and goals	16
Long-term Navy CIC goal: cooperative security and stronger partnerships	17
Navy CIC missions and supporting pillar.	18

Role of information dominance	20
Linkages	20
Joint elements in the Navy Vision	20
“Irregular challenges” and “irregular warfare”	21
Joint Operating Concepts	22
CIT JOC	22
SSTRO JOC	24
CS JOC	25
Joint elements in the Navy Vision.	25
Navy CIC capability areas	27
Organizing principles of Navy CIC	27
Organizing principles derived from the maritime nature of the Navy	28
Organizing principles derived from a focus on preventive security, building partner capacity, and countering manifest threats.	29
Organizing principles based on the Navy CIC mission set.	29
Navy CIC capabilities.	30
Joint IW capabilities as foundations of Navy CIC capabilities	30
Deriving eight Navy CIC capability areas	31
CIC Capability area: Navy CIC campaign design.	32
CIC Capability area: Navy CIC preparation of the environment	32
CIC Capability area: Integration of Navy CIC activities with interagency and multi-national partners.	33
CIC Capability area: Navy CIC host nation development	33
CIC Capability area: Navy CIC operations to disrupt, deny, and defeat adversaries	34
CIC Capability area: Navy CIC strategic communications	35
CIC Capability area: Sustaining of the Navy CIC campaign	35
CIC Capability area: Assessment of Navy CIC plans and operations.	36

Deriving unit-level CIC capabilities	36
Criteria for determining whether a capability is useful for CIC	36
Review of terminology	41
Navy forces that provide CIC capabilities	43
What Navy forces provide which CIC capabilities?	43
How do Navy forces contribute to CIC missions?.	43
Implications for burden sharing	49
The Navy role in confronting irregular challenges.	49
Host nation contributions	50
Conclusions	53
Navy CIC strategic concept	53
What is the Navy role?	53
What is the role of Navy GPF?	54
What is the role of NSW?	55
What are the roles of other Navy forces?	56
GPF and SOF are complementary	57
Way ahead for CIC force planning	57
The Navy should plan and train for interagency and HN coordination	57
The Navy should determine its capacity for CIC	58
The Navy should examine CIC-related DOTMLPF	59
Appendix A: Joint IW capability areas	61
Appendix B: Joint capability areas	71
Capabilities are broadly applicable	74
Capabilities are widely shared among Services	74
Capabilities are vaguely defined	74
Glossary	77
References	81
Bibliography	83
List of tables	85
Distribution list	87

This page intentionally left blank.

Executive summary

The U.S. Navy has initiated efforts to confront irregular challenges (CIC) associated with regional instability, insurgency, crime, and violent extremism. A key document for understanding how the Navy will do this is the Chief of Naval Operations' *U.S. Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*. However, it remains unclear which of the Navy's capabilities are most useful for CIC actions and how Naval forces can best contribute to the CIC effort. This makes force planning for CIC problematic. Therefore, the Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) asked CNA to assess the Navy Vision in order to identify:

- Which Naval capabilities and forces are uniquely or most suitable for addressing irregular challenges
- How general purpose forces (GPF), not simply special operations forces (SOF), can contribute more directly to meeting irregular challenges
- What overarching changes the Navy should consider in order to more effectively confront irregular challenges in the future.

This paper is in response to NIWO's request.

Our analytical approach

We began by using the Navy Vision to understand how the Navy views its CIC missions and goals and how it has incorporated Joint elements into them. We then derived "organizing principles" for Navy CIC based on these findings and the Navy's maritime nature. We used these principles to create Navy CIC capability areas—descriptive statements about the different actions the Navy will likely need to take in order to successfully conduct CIC campaigns in the future and the capabilities it would require in order to do so.

As a result, we gained an understanding of what Navy CIC capabilities and capability areas are based on the Navy’s strengths and maritime characteristics. We used that understanding to identify Navy unit-level capabilities. We then identified actual units and platforms that provide those capabilities. Ultimately, this allowed us to understand not only which Navy units contribute to CIC actions, but also what roles they play in Navy CIC missions and what larger force-planning implications are involved.

Navy strategic concept for CIC

Our assessment identified and tied together Navy units, the Navy CIC missions they support, the results they enable, and the long-term goal of enhanced cooperative security and stronger partnerships. Figure 1 illustrates these connections.

Navy role in CIC

Based on our analysis, we describe the Navy role in confronting irregular challenges as follows:


The Navy has the lead for maritime SFA/FID, maritime security, and maritime stability operations, and is a crucial supporting force for COIN and CT efforts. By focusing on these missions it provides preventive security, helps build partner capacity, and helps counter threats that manifest themselves in fragile maritime areas or in situations where a long-term, scalable, and flexible set of capabilities is required. All of these actions enhance long-term cooperative security and help build stronger partnerships.

This statement captures and describes the “comparative advantages” of the Navy in CIC efforts.

GPF and SOF are complementary

We found that neither GPF nor SOF if acting alone can meet the needs of all Navy CIC operations. Navy SOF capabilities are enabled by GPF units, which provide C2, planning, and HQ functions as well as high- end surface platforms, such as CVNs, SSNs, and surface combatants. But, although most Navy CIC operations may focus on providing preventive security and building partner capacity (BPC), some

Figure 1. Navy strategic concept for CIC



will require action by niche SOF capabilities to counter irregular threats or precisely engage terrorists or insurgents. In sum, GPF and Navy SOF units are complementary when it comes to Navy CIC operations. Both are necessary for success.

Way ahead for CIC force planning

Our work revealed a number of next steps that the Navy should take if it is to effectively incorporate CIC efforts into its force-planning efforts.

The Navy should plan and train for interagency and host nation (HN) coordination

Our analysis indicates that future CIC operations are likely to include or require interagency and international cooperation. Thus it is important that the Navy adjust its planning and operations to promote and accommodate coordination with other U.S. and HN government agencies. This implies that the Navy should examine whether its current training, operations, priorities, and exercises are designed to accommodate and promote coordination with other U.S. and HN government agencies and, if not, how they should be adjusted to do so.

Furthermore, the Navy should examine the capabilities of likely partner nations, given potential future CIC operations. Such an effort could help the Navy better understand what CIC capabilities it should focus on providing, determine how to plan and program for them, and know what capabilities host nations will likely contribute.

The Navy should determine its capacity for CIC

This study has focused on determining which of the Navy's capabilities are useful for CIC efforts. We have asked, "How will the Navy conduct CIC?" A corollary question is "How much CIC can the Navy conduct?" In other words, central questions facing Navy planners for CIC revolve around understanding not only the Navy's CIC capabilities but also its CIC capacity. Thus, the Navy should endeavor to determine how many CIC operations it can conduct today (and for how long), how much capacity it will need in the future, and how it can achieve that capacity in the most effective and efficient way. It must also determine what options exist for prioritization of different CIC capabilities, what trade-offs might exist, and what level of risk they might entail.

DOTMLPF Implications of Navy CIC should be assessed

A greater focus on CIC efforts implies a range of organizational and other changes within the Navy. If the Navy is to rebalance its forces towards CIC efforts, a number of questions need to be answered about the potential changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities

(DOTMLPF). These include determining whether there are any existing gaps in DOTMLPF that would hinder a greater focus on CIC across the Navy; what, if any, DOTMLPF changes are needed to facilitate future GPF support to, and conduct of, CIC operations; and what changes are needed to ensure that the Navy supports a comprehensive U.S. government approach to CIC.

This page intentionally left blank.

Introduction

The U.S. Navy (USN) has recently initiated efforts to confront irregular challenges associated with regional instability, insurgency, crime, and violent extremism, in cooperation with other Joint military, U.S. government, and coalition partners.

A key document for understanding how the Navy will do this is the CNO's *U.S. Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*. According to that Vision, the Navy will confront irregular challenges by conducting a wide variety of missions, such as foreign internal defense (FID) and security force assistance (SFA), stability operations, counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), and other such actions that lead to enhanced partner capacity and stable regional outcomes.

Furthermore, the Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) is operationalizing the Navy Vision by reorienting Navy approaches to irregular challenges, rebalancing investments, and refining Naval operations and external partnerships. NIWO seeks to reach an end-state wherein the Navy meets irregular challenges by using flexible, agile, and multi-mission assets and by emphasizing cooperative security and comprehensive government approaches. The goal is a navy that can mitigate the causes of insecurity and instability by working from the maritime domain with Joint and international partners.

However, because the Navy Vision is expressed in an overarching strategic document, it remains unclear which of the Navy's capabilities are most useful for reaching this goal and how Naval forces can best contribute to that effort. The Navy Vision does not explicitly connect specific and discrete Naval forces to CIC missions and goals, making force planning for CIC problematic. Therefore, NIWO asked CNA to assess the Navy Vision in order to identify:

- Which Naval capabilities and forces are uniquely or most suitable for addressing irregular challenges

- How general purpose forces (GPF), not simply special operations forces (SOF), can contribute more directly to meeting irregular challenges
- What overarching changes the Navy should consider in order to more effectively confront irregular challenges in the future.

Scope of our analysis

We bounded the problem in two ways in order to make it analytically tractable:

- We minimized our reliance upon past Navy actions and existing planning scenarios in order to avoid “steering by our wake.”¹
- Because many Navy capabilities are likely to be useful for meeting both irregular challenges and conventional ones, we concentrated on those capabilities that we assess to be primarily useful for CIC efforts. Thus, we did not address Navy capabilities that are likely to be used primarily for conventional operations but that may also likely play a role in CIC operations (such as large-scale logistics, ballistic missile defense, and so forth).

Our analytical approach

Our approach was designed to ensure that our findings would be objective and transparent.

Joint doctrine and the Navy Vision

Because the Navy will confront irregular challenges within both a national and a Service context, we began by outlining the overarching national military policy and the Joint elements that influenced the Navy Vision. To do so, we examined Joint and national publications — primarily *Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept*, version 2.0 (CIT JOC), *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept* (SSTRO

1. Although we did use the existing Steady State Security Posture (SSSP) vignettes, we did not rely on them extensively.

JOC), and *Military Contribution to Cooperative Security Joint Operating Concept* (CS JOC).² These publications give the existing Joint perspective, which the Navy Vision adapted and expanded upon to reflect the Navy perspective.

We then examined the Navy Vision to understand how the Navy views its CIC missions and goals and how it has incorporated Joint elements into them. Based upon these efforts, we then derived “organizing principles” that would indicate how the Navy will likely conduct CIC operations in the future.

Navy CIC capabilities

Next, we used the organizing principles we had derived to create “Navy CIC capability areas”—descriptive statements of what actions the Navy will likely need to take in future CIC campaigns and what capabilities it will likely need in order to do so.

We based these Navy CIC capability areas on the Joint capabilities identified in the CIT JOC, which we modified using our organizing principles. By doing so, we could take into account not only the maritime nature of the Navy and its other inherent characteristics, but also the Navy-specific CIC mission set and goals identified in the Navy Vision.

The result is an understanding of what Navy CIC operations and capabilities both play to the Navy’s strengths, overall capabilities, and maritime characteristics, and are based on the Navy Vision.

Navy CIC forces

To identify which Navy units and platforms fit into and contribute to Navy CIC efforts, we used the Navy CIC capabilities we had derived earlier to identify Navy unit-level capabilities and then linked them to the actual units and platforms that provide those capabilities. This allowed us to understand not only which Navy units contribute to CIC actions, but also what roles they play in Navy CIC missions.

2. The full range of Joint and other documents that we consulted for this section are listed as references and in the bibliography.

Implications

In our final phase we drew out the implications of our analysis for the Navy's overarching CIC strategy, force planning, and way ahead.³ By determining the connections between specific Naval forces and CIC missions and goals, we provide NIWO with a starting point for CIC-related force planning. Furthermore, our analysis outlines how the operational burden will likely be shared among the Navy and other Services, U.S. government agencies, and host nation partners.

Summary of our approach


Figure 2 is a graphic summary of our analytical approach.

Terminology

This report undertakes a number of incremental steps to arrive at its conclusions. In those steps, our analysis uses a variety of Navy and Joint terms that build upon and incorporate each other. These terms sound similar but have crucially different meanings. Therefore, before continuing on to the next section, we will introduce these terms and outline their roles in our analysis and how they build upon each other. In a later section, we will present our definitions of these terms in more detail as determined by our analysis.

-
3. Copies of our initial report were provided to a variety of stakeholders for their comment. Copies were provided to the following Navy commands: Commander 2nd Fleet, Commander 3rd Fleet, Commander 4th Fleet, Fleet Forces Command, Marine Special Operations Command, Naval Forces Africa Command, Naval Forces Central Command, Naval Forces European Command, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, and Naval Special Warfare. We also provided copies to the following Joint or Secretary of Defense offices for their comments: Air Force Irregular Warfare Office, Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Force Development, Partnership Strategies and Stability Operations, Special Operations and Strategy; Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Expeditionary Warfare; Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces; and Joint Forces Command.

Figure 2. Analytical approach



- **Navy CIC missions:** These are the missions that the Navy will need to undertake in order to meet irregular challenges. We identify these missions through a reading of the Navy Vision, and use them as building blocks for the rest of our analysis.
- **Navy CIC results:** These are the results of Navy CIC missions which contribute to the long-term goal of Navy CIC.
- **Navy CIC long-term goal:** Identified by our analysis, this is a single overarching long-term Navy CIC goal, which Navy CIC results support and enable.

- **Joint IW capabilities:** These are the sets of capabilities that the Joint force will use to conduct its Joint IW missions.
- **IW Broad capability:** These are the specific Joint capabilities that make up each Joint IW capability.
- **Joint capability area (JCA):** A JCA is a tiered list of capabilities that the military Services can provide in service to national goals, and which make up each IW broad capability.
- **Navy CIC capability area:** These are the Navy equivalents of the Joint IW capabilities, which together define the range of actions and capabilities required for a Navy CIC campaign.
- **Navy CIC unit-level capabilities:** These are the specific capabilities that Navy units require in order to conduct the Navy CIC capabilities.

In the following sections, we explain how we identified and defined each of these terms, and we use them to discuss our analysis and its conclusions.

Key characteristics of Navy CIC

In this section we discuss how we determined the key characteristics of Navy CIC by examining the Navy Vision, the inherent characteristics of the Navy (such as its maritime nature), and select Joint elements that the Navy Vision has incorporated. Specifically,

- We define the key aspects of how Navy CIC will most likely manifest itself, based on the guidance included in the Navy Vision as well as the fundamental maritime characteristics of the Navy.
- We outline how certain Joint elements relate to, and are reflected in, Navy CIC.
- We use this understanding to derive specific Navy CIC missions, their results, and the long-term goal of these actions.

Together, these efforts provided a crucial first step linking specific Navy assets and capabilities to CIC operations.

The Navy Vision for CIC

The Navy Vision provides the basis for Navy CIC actions and planning by:

- Emphasizing the maritime, globally forward deployed, and agile nature of the Navy and how this affects its CIC actions and posture.
- Focusing Navy efforts on confronting irregular challenges and the results of doing so: preventive security; building partner capacity; and, if needed, countering those threats that do manifest themselves.
- Deriving a set of Navy-specific missions that, while derived from Joint doctrine, emphasize enhanced cooperative security and stronger partnerships as the primary long-term goal of Navy CIC operations.

The maritime environment

The key characteristic of the Navy is that it is the Service primarily responsible for sea-based warfare, which affects how it approaches irregular challenges.⁴ The Navy's Maritime Strategy defines the key attributes of the Navy based on its maritime nature:⁵

- Global reach—The Navy is forward deployed, expeditionary, and not tied to fixed sites.
- Access—The Navy enjoys freedom of movement and thereby the ability to operate in denied or contested areas.
- Persistence—Navy assets can be on-station and combat ready for long periods of time; thus, they contribute directly to preventive security efforts.
- Scalability—The Navy is a distributed force that can rapidly aggregate and disaggregate assets and capabilities.
- Rapid response/multi-mission—Navy assets can rapidly redeploy and are typically versatile, multi-mission-capable platforms.
- Cooperative relationships—The Navy is well positioned to leverage its forward-deployed assets for military-to-military exercises, HA/DR missions, and other cooperative efforts with host nations.

Thus, the Navy will confront irregular challenges in ways that leverage its global reach, access, persistence, scalability, rapid response, and cooperative relationships.

-
4. The Coast Guard and Marine Corps obviously both operate in the maritime environment as well, but both have very different roles, missions, and characteristics from those of the Navy.
 5. These are not necessarily unique to the Navy — other Services also have global reach, persistence, and so forth. However, these are the comparative advantages that Navy has, based on its maritime nature. In the same way, the Army has advantages based on its land focus, and the Air Force has advantages based on its focus on air operations.

Navy CIC results

A close reading of the Navy Vision and NIWO documents reveals three overarching results that result from Navy CIC missions and which contribute to the long-term goal of enhancing cooperative security: preventive security, building partner capacity, and countering manifest threats.

Preventive security

By enhancing maritime security, the Navy can prevent an explicit irregular threat from occurring in the first place. Because preventing irregular threats is as important as defeating them, using Naval and partner nation forces to conduct preventive security is critical. It leads directly to the ultimate goal of enhanced cooperative security.

Building partner capacity

By building up the security capacity of friendly nations, the Navy can increase their legitimacy and improve their ability to meet their security responsibilities. This will help them head off irregular challenges before they require U.S. forces to intervene.

Countering manifest threats

Preventive security and building partner capacity do not involve actual combat operations. However, the Navy does not relinquish its role as a warfighting Service that can directly counter irregular threats when and if they do manifest themselves. Thus, in those cases where preventive security and building partner capacity fail to prevent irregular threats, the Navy can deal with irregular adversaries using direct and, where possible, precise methods.

Because of the emphasis on preventive security and building partner capacity, precision is likely to be a key element of Navy CIC efforts to counter irregular threats. This is because if irregular challenges do arise, the Navy must attempt to confront them while maintaining, or not endangering, the legitimacy of its partners and its own actions. Imprecise methods risk collateral damage or other unintended consequences that might turn the populations in the region against the U.S, or their own governments. This is not to say that the Navy won't use any and all necessary methods to confront irregular challenges

directly when needed; it only means that if a choice is possible, precision is preferred. The precise nature of such Navy efforts also differentiates them from conventional direct actions, where precision is not necessarily critical.

Note that the other results of Navy CIC actions — preventive security and building partner capacity — also help to counter threats. In fact, all three of these results are complementary. Increased partner capacity allows for decreased US involvement. In situations where partners lack their own ability to maintain security and confront irregular challenges, then US forces can assist by providing preventive security. Both these results help prevent threats from manifesting themselves in the first place. But if such threats do come about, then the Navy can support efforts such as COIN and CT that directly counter threats.

Navy CIC missions and goals

How will the Navy achieve these results, and will it have an ultimate goal? The Navy Vision notes:

The U.S. Navy will meet irregular challenges through a flexible, agile, and broad array of multi-mission capabilities. We will emphasize Cooperative Security as part of a comprehensive government approach to mitigate the causes of insecurity and instability. We will operate in and from the maritime domain with Joint and international partners to enhance regional security and stability, and to dissuade, deter, and when necessary, defeat irregular threats.

The Navy Vision outlines the Navy's approach to CIC not only to show how it will conduct CIC operations but also to promulgate a message about *why* the Navy will do so. Although such vision documents are typically short and thereby provide little in the way of specific operational guidance, the Navy Vision does contain the foundation of a nascent Navy CIC strategy — including CIC missions, an overarching CIC goal, and the causal links between them. Based on our reading of the Navy Vision, we present these core concepts below.

Long-term Navy CIC goal: cooperative security and stronger partnerships

The Navy Vision makes it clear that the ultimate goal of Navy CIC actions is to enhance cooperative security and create stronger partnerships with other nations before irregular challenges arise. For example, the Vision notes:

We will promote Cooperative Security to mitigate instability in regions with limited governances that give rise to irregular challenges.

Thus, while relevant Joint doctrine is concerned with very broad goals, the Navy Vision focuses on increasing cooperative security as a means to prevent irregular challenges from arising in the first place.

Irregular challenges can arise in uncontrolled or ungoverned spaces. Such spaces allow state and non-state actors to employ informational, economic, technological, and kinetic methods against civilian populations and targets to achieve their objectives, influence populations, and undermine governance. Such maritime-based irregular challenges can include piracy, maritime terrorism, trafficking, smuggling, violent extremism, proliferation, and other illegal activity in the maritime/littoral domain.

The usefulness of cooperative security and stronger partnerships for countering such challenges is based on three axioms:

1. It is preferable to prevent wars than to fight them.
2. Wars can be prevented only in cooperation and partnership with other nations.
3. The more capable and stable our partners are, the less likely it is that irregular challenges will arise.

In other words, in terms of CIC, the Navy is concerned primarily with enabling other nations to solve their own problems.

This is not to say that the Vision denies the necessity of concrete military action to defeat irregular threats. Rather, it means that the Vision focuses on cooperative security as the ultimate goal to prevent such threats from arising, while retaining the capability and willingness to resort to more focused and straightforward action if cooperative security is insufficient.

Navy CIC missions and supporting pillar

The Navy Vision discusses a wide variety of potential CIC-related missions. One of the more specific directives is this:

We will enhance proficiency and effectiveness in security force assistance, maritime security, stability operations, information dominance, and other force applications necessary to support U.S. and partner counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense operations.

This statement provides a useful starting point for understanding how Navy CIC missions differ from Joint IW missions. We did not create new definitions of Navy CIC missions—rather, we assessed the Joint IW missions in light of the Navy as a maritime Service, to arrive at an understanding of how these Navy CIC missions each focus on different aspects of Navy CIC actions and how they contribute to the overarching long-term goal of cooperative security.

We understand these core Navy CIC missions as follows:

- **Maritime SFA:** Assistance and training of host nation maritime forces, including maritime FID⁶
- **Maritime security:** Unilateral U.S. Navy actions to enhance maritime security
- **Maritime stability operations:** Assistance and promotion of host nation maritime infrastructure and economic development⁷
- **COIN/CT:** Direct and indirect actions taken by Naval and host nation forces against insurgents/terrorists, typically in support of SOCOM efforts.

6. This is the maritime equivalent of Joint security force assistance and foreign internal defense, and is a large component of efforts to build partner capacity. We combine SFA with FID because, as noted above, they are often discussed together in Joint doctrine and, from a maritime perspective, they are functionally similar.

7. This is the maritime equivalent of Joint stability operations. The goal of such operations is primarily economic in focus and aims at providing programs to build host nations' maritime Services, and promote maritime economic development.

By limiting the Navy CIC mission set to these four missions and focusing on their differences, we could be faithful to the logic outlined in the Navy Vision and NIWO documents while retaining the links to Joint doctrine. We also could emphasize how these four manifestations of Navy CIC are different without getting bogged down in extremely detailed and often debatable definitions.

It is also important that in taking this approach we defined not only what Navy CIC missions are, but also what they are **not**. In other words, we bounded Navy CIC missions to only these four mission sets. Missions outside of these, such as HA/DR, we judged not to be CIC in nature.⁸ This was a crucial analytical step because it allowed us to clearly identify the issues we were concerned with and to concentrate our analysis on them. If we had not done this, the analytical issues would likely have become so broad as to be intractable. Bounding the problem in this manner allowed us to attack it logically, objectively, and transparently, and ultimately to draw a clear logical chain connecting the Navy Vision to specific Navy capabilities and assets.

It is important to note that the Navy CIC missions in this list are different from those identified as Joint IW missions. As noted above, the CIT JOC identifies five Joint missions (CT, UW, FID, COIN, and Stability Operations) while we identified four slightly different ones for the Navy (maritime SFA, maritime security, maritime stability operations, and COIN/CT). These lists are different due to the maritime nature of the Navy, and its focus on irregular challenges rather than irregular warfare. Given these different perspectives, it is natural that Navy CIC missions would be slightly different from those used in Joint doctrine.

8. This is not to say that the Navy will not engage in HA/DR or other such missions that might help confront irregular challenges or have positive effects on cooperative security, building partner capacity, and countering of irregular threats. However, for the purposes of force planning we limited ourselves to these four missions only. Doing so prevented the “mission creep” that could have resulted from a more expansive definition of CIC missions.

Role of information dominance

Information dominance is mentioned throughout the Navy Vision as well as other Navy doctrine. While often termed a mission, it is typically discussed as an enabling function. Without information dominance, each of the other Navy CIC missions would typically be less effective and in some cases would be completely ineffective. But, by itself, information dominance does not encompass obvious mission goals or contribute directly to the ultimate goal of enhanced cooperative security. Thus, it seems clear that information dominance is best viewed as a supporting pillar for all four Navy CIC missions, rather than as a mission in itself. In our analysis we treated it this way, which later allowed us to link it directly to assets.

Linkages

Based on the above examination of the Navy Vision, Navy CIC efforts follow a clear logic in their overarching goal, their results, and their missions. Enhanced cooperative security and stronger partnerships are the direct result of preventive security and building partner capacity efforts. These efforts are supported by the missions of maritime SFA, maritime security, and maritime stability operations.

Likewise, when irregular challenges are not prevented and must instead be directly confronted, the Navy can counter them. It will do so through COIN/CT efforts.

To enable all of these CIC missions, the Navy will need to maintain information dominance.

Joint elements in the Navy Vision

It is important to recognize that the Navy Vision for CIC did not emerge in a vacuum—it was created in the context of ongoing national and Joint debates on the future of warfare. The Vision therefore incorporates Joint elements and adapts them, where appropriate, to the Navy perspective and priorities. Therefore, the Navy Vision for CIC is largely compatible with, though not identical to, the larger body of Joint Doctrine on Irregular Warfare.

To convey the intricacies of the Navy Vision, it helps to briefly outline the most relevant Joint elements that it reflects.

“Irregular challenges” and “irregular warfare”

National, Joint, and Service policy documents typically refer to “irregular warfare” (IW) or, in some cases, to the need to counter “irregular threats.” The Navy Vision, on the other hand, uses the term “irregular challenges.” These terms, while similar, are not the same, and to avoid confusion between the two it is important to note their differences and similarities.

In the Joint context, IW is defined as:

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will. [1]

The Navy Vision does not specifically define irregular challenges. However, based on our interpretation of the text of the Vision we understand irregular challenges to be those challenges that manifest themselves in uncontrolled or ungoverned spaces, and that permit others to employ informational, economic, technological, and kinetic methods against civilian populations and targets to achieve their objectives, influence populations, and undermine governance. That is the definition we use for purposes of this analysis.

Based on this understanding, “irregular challenges” can include piracy, maritime terrorism, trafficking, smuggling, violent extremism, WMD proliferation, and other illegal activity in the maritime domain.⁹

9. This is not intended to be a definitive list; we are merely giving examples. Furthermore, irregular challenges are unlikely to be constant. That is, future irregular challenges may be very different from the ones the Navy is facing today.

It is clear then that “irregular challenges” (IC) is a more precise and focused term than “irregular warfare.” In fact, whereas IC is a specific term, IW is notable for its very broadness — it covers both state *and* non-state actors, who may *or may not* employ the *full* range of military and *other* capabilities.¹⁰

Because this definition is so broad, it is exceedingly difficult to use for bounding and scoping out an understanding of IW that is useful for force planning.

The Navy Vision, on the other hand, focuses its perspective on the practical aspects of irregular challenges to the nation and how the Navy can help meet them. Thus, it is concerned with how irregular challenges manifest themselves *practically*, and how the Navy can prevent them from manifesting and confront them if they have arisen.

Joint Operating Concepts

A Joint Operating Concept (JOC) is a DoD publication that describes how the Joint force will conduct future operations and identifies the broad military capabilities needed to do so successfully. The Navy Vision adapts concepts primarily from three JOCs: *Irregular Warfare’s Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept (CIT JOC)* [1]; *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept (SSTRO JOC)* [3]; and *Military Contribution to Cooperative Security Joint Operating Concept (CS JOC)*[4].

CIT JOC

The CIT JOC outlines what missions and actions the Joint force will need to take in order to counter irregular threats, and what capabilities it will need to do so [2]. Because the Navy Vision builds upon the CIT JOC by emphasizing cooperative security and stronger partnerships, it is useful to outline the five missions that the CIT JOC defines:

10. In part because this definition is so broad, it has led to continuing debates about how IW manifests itself operationally and how it differs from more conventional conflicts. In fact, because of this, the exact meaning of the term “irregular warfare” remains a matter of debate. See, for example, pages 8-11 of [2].

counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO).

Counterterrorism: CT is defined as “lethal and non-lethal operations against terrorists and their networks to deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorists and their enablers, such as recruiters, financiers, facilitators, and propagandists” [2]. The Joint force is expected to capture or kill the terrorists, or otherwise remove their influence on the population. CT operations often take place either before or during FID and COIN activities.

Unconventional warfare: UW is designed to “coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary guerilla force in a denied area.”¹¹ Because UW relies on land-based action, the US Navy is unlikely to play a leading role (although it could easily support the mission).

Foreign internal defense: FID is formally defined as follows:

FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. [5]

The purpose of FID is to enable:

A host nation to prevent, deter, and defeat a variety of irregular threats, including criminal activity, insurgency, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents... [The Joint force] may, if requested, also support civilian-led efforts to improve the Host nation’s governance and development capacity. [2]

Training host nation security forces (both military and non-military) is therefore usually the most important part of FID activities.

Security force assistance (SFA) is often mentioned in concert with FID. In the Joint lexicon, SFA is defined as “activities that directly support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions” [6]. However, FID is

11. Pending JP 1-02 definition.

typically a response to an internal threat, whereas SFA may be provided during peacetime, during conventional conflict, or in response to an external threat. From a maritime perspective, FID and SFA are often discussed together and are functionally very similar.

Counterinsurgency: COIN, by definition, is concerned with defeating an insurgency, either unilaterally or with a partner nation. The primary focus is thus on security and the disruption of the insurgency's support network. To a lesser extent, Joint forces "will also help build the Host nation's ability to provide security and support development and governance to gain or maintain its legitimacy" [2].

Stability operations: According to the CIC JOC, SO are performed in order "to establish or re-establish order in a fragile state where the threat of violence exists" [1]. It continues:

The focus of Joint force activities will be to provide a safe and secure environment to support other government agency programs to build Host nation capacity. When conditions require, the Joint force will conduct activities to provide essential services, enable good governance, and foster economic development. [2]

SO overlap with FID, since both activities involve building host nation security forces.

SSTRO JOC

The SSTRO JOC covers both future military operations in response to crises and military theater security cooperation. It lists six major mission elements or "lines of operation": establish and maintain a safe, secure environment; deliver humanitarian assistance; reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services; support economic development; establish representative, effective governance and the rule of law; and conduct strategic communication. The SSTRO JOC emphasizes two things: the importance of building host nation capabilities and capacity in order to reduce the drivers of instability and the likelihood of potential conflict; and the military's role in support of a larger comprehensive government approach.

CS JOC

The CS Joint Operating Concept discusses how DoD forces will support a comprehensive government approach to cooperative security efforts. CS is the set of continuous, long-term integrated and comprehensive actions among U.S. and international governmental and nongovernmental partners that maintain or enhance stability, build partner capacity, prevent or mitigate violent extremism and militancy, and enable other operations if such crises do occur. Such actions are part of a general “shaping” effort, aimed at strengthening U.S posture and building up regional security and regional transnational and partner nation capacity and capabilities.

Joint elements in the Navy Vision

Table 1 shows those elements from the Joint SSTRO, CS, and CIT JOC publications that are incorporated into the Navy Vision.


Table 1. Joint elements incorporated into the Navy Vision for CIC

SSTRO	CS	CIT JOC
Humanitarian Assistance (HA)	Regional BPC	Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
Economic Development	Multi-national Cooperative Security	Stability Ops (SO)
Infrastructure	Thwarting violent extremism and militancy	Counter-Insurgency (COIN)
Host Nation Governance Secure Environment		Counter-terrorism (CT)

Figure 3 illustrates the logical connections, or the conceptual map, between the missions, results, and overarching long-term goal that we derived from our dissection of the Navy Vision for CIC. This is a graphical representation of how the Navy missions of maritime SEA/FID, maritime security, and maritime stability ops help produce the preventive security and building partner capacity. COIN/CT efforts, on the other hand are more of a supporting role for the Navy, and help counter irregular threats if they manifest themselves. All of these missions are supported by the Navy’s information dominance efforts.

Furthermore, preventive security, building partner capacity, and countering manifest threats are all key building blocks for the long-term goal of enhanced cooperative security and stronger partnerships.

Figure 3. Conceptual map of Navy Vision for CIC



In the next section we discuss how we used these linkages to identify Navy unit-level capabilities that are typically relevant to confronting irregular challenges.

Navy CIC capability areas

In this section, we discuss how we derived Navy CIC capability areas by creating, and then using, organizing principles based on the maritime nature of the Navy, the Navy CIC mission set, and the key characteristics of the Navy Vision that we had identified earlier. We used these Navy CIC capability areas to identify those Navy unit-level capabilities that typically contribute to Navy CIC efforts as defined by the Navy Vision. In this way we were able to link Navy units directly to overall CIC efforts.

Organizing principles of Navy CIC

In order to derive Navy CIC capabilities in a systematic, objective, and transparent manner, we first asked ourselves, “What are the fundamental organizing principles that affect how the Navy will most likely conduct its CIC actions?” To answer that question, we examined the three characteristics of Navy CIC that make it unique when compared to the other Services:

- The maritime nature and associated inherent characteristics of the Navy
- The Navy’s focus on confronting irregular challenges (rather than irregular warfare) and how this results in preventive security, building partner capacity, and countering manifest threats
- The Navy’s long-term CIC goal of cooperative security and building partnerships through the mission set of maritime SFA, maritime security, maritime stability operations, and COIN/CT.

Based on these characteristics, we derived a list of 12 “organizing principles” for Navy CIC actions. These principles are statements that differentiate Navy CIC from other actions and Services. They help us understand which Navy CIC operations play to the Navy’s strengths,

overall capabilities, and maritime characteristics, and are congruent with the Navy Vision. They thus provide a link between overarching Navy policy and Navy CIC operations.

Organizing principles derived from the maritime nature of the Navy

As noted in the previous section, the Navy Vision emphasizes the maritime nature of the Navy. This nature, as well as other inherent characteristics of the Navy, has implications for how Naval forces will confront irregular challenges. Specifically, the maritime nature of the Navy implies the following about Navy CIC actions:

1. They will take place in the maritime domain.
2. They will not be limited to fixed sites, but can occur at a variety of different governmental levels in host nations and off of expeditionary Navy platforms.
3. They will not be limited to controlled areas, but may extend to contested maritime and littoral areas.
4. They may be conducted over long periods of time from on-station Navy platforms, which will give the Navy the freedom to “outlast” potential threats and engage in persistent preventive security operations.
5. They can be rapidly scaled up or down to meet different levels of threats or preventive security requirements, with a variety of widely capable multi-mission assets: This means that Navy CIC forces can be committed as needed — even as individual and independent platforms, rather than as large and interdependent groupings of forces.
6. They enable ad hoc and quick-turnaround military-to-military exercises, HA/DR missions, and other cooperative efforts with host nations as needed, enhancing prospects for preventive security operations.

Organizing principles derived from a focus on preventive security, building partner capacity, and countering manifest threats

The Navy will focus on preventive security and building partner capacity. If these fail, it will directly counter irregular threats—if possible, in ways that do not endanger cooperative security arrangements or relationships between partners and the United States. These modes of action have practical implications for Navy forces in CIC missions.

A focus on cooperative security and building partner capacity implies that:

7. The Navy will use its forces to directly shore up, support, and promote friendly host nations that are under threat from irregular adversaries.
8. Navy forces and personnel will position themselves to build up the capacity of partner nations through training and other supporting actions.

A focus on countering manifest threats in ways that minimize damage to cooperative relationships implies that, when irregular threats are not successfully deterred,

9. Naval forces will be used to conduct “coercive diplomacy”—using limited and targeted force specifically to persuade an irregular adversary to stop or end a course of action it is embarked on.
10. Naval forces will, where possible, rely on precision weapons so as to minimize collateral damage and other unintended consequences that could endanger host nation regimes and their support for the United States.

Organizing principles based on the Navy CIC mission set

In the previous section, we used the Navy Vision to derive a Navy CIC mission set. These missions are maritime SFA, maritime security, maritime stability operations, and COIN/CT. Information dominance is a supporting pillar of all four missions.

These missions have implications for Navy CIC actions. Specifically,

11. Navy CIC actions will concentrate their efforts on promoting host nation littoral and other maritime forces capabilities as well as maritime infrastructure and economic development.
12. If host nation maritime forces are unable to provide adequate maritime security, U.S. Naval forces can provide additional maritime security to help alleviate deficiencies.

Next, we discuss how we used these 12 principles in conjunction with Joint IW capabilities to help identify Navy-specific CIC capabilities.

Navy CIC capabilities

We used three steps to identify Navy CIC capabilities. First, we derived the above organizing principles of the Navy, to understand what implications the fundamental nature of the Navy holds for its conduct of CIC. Second, we used the eight Joint IW capabilities identified in the CIT JOC as a foundation on which to create detailed descriptions of equivalent Navy CIC capability areas based on these organizing principles. Third, we identified the specific unit-level capabilities that support each of these Navy CIC capability areas.

Joint IW capabilities as foundations of Navy CIC capabilities

To ensure that the Navy CIC capabilities we derived would be logical, objective, and transparent, we adapted the IW capabilities identified in the CIT JOC to the Navy CIC construct. The CIT JOC was useful in this way because it provided a comprehensive and accepted framework of the capabilities needed to undertake an entire IW campaign. By adapting those capabilities to Navy CIC, we could derive an objective and comprehensive understanding of the capabilities needed by the Navy to undertake an entire CIC campaign.

The CIT JOC capabilities are arranged in eight sets that span the potential operations that Joint forces, including the Navy, may be called upon to execute. Each of these in turn comprises additional “IW broad capabilities.” Furthermore, each of these broad capabilities itself comprises more-specific Joint capability area (JCA) tasks.

We do not go into detail on these schema here, rather appendix A provides detail on the Joint IW capabilities and their IW broad capabilities and Appendix B provides detail on the JCAs.

We adapt these Joint IW capabilities and their IW broad capabilities and JCAs which comprise them to Navy CIC requirements and Navy characteristics — this allows us to identify the capabilities that Navy CIC requires when it confronts irregular challenges.

Deriving eight Navy CIC capability areas

To derive each Navy CIC capability area, we examined each of the eight Joint IW capabilities and examined it with our previously derived organizing principles in mind. Not all principles are relevant to each of these Joint capabilities. But by using those that are relevant we could take each Joint capability and derive a qualitative but detailed Navy CIC capability area description. Essentially, we use the organizing principles to describe and understand how the Navy will conduct each of those Joint IW capability areas — which resulted in eight Navy CIC capability areas:

1. Navy CIC campaign design
2. Navy CIC preparation of the environment
3. Integration of Navy CIC activities with interagency and multinational partners
4. Navy CIC host nation development
5. Navy CIC operations to disrupt, deny, and defeat adversaries
6. Navy CIC strategic communications
7. Sustaining of the Navy CIC campaign
8. Assessment of Navy CIC plans and operations.

The detailed descriptions we derived for each of these are given below.

CIC Capability area: Navy CIC campaign design

The Navy will design its CIC campaign by assessing the drivers of instability and their effects on the population and potential enemies, and use this to create a CIC campaign that addresses these drivers with flexible, as-needed maritime/littoral operations. It will do this using its ISR, C2, and HQ capabilities and information networks from the seabase or with expeditionary deployed forces in conjunction with host nation personnel.

CIC Capability area: Navy CIC preparation of the environment

The Navy will conduct operational and intelligence preparation of the CIC environment primarily by gaining and maintaining unobtrusive offshore maritime access. As part of this effort the Navy will take advantage of the information, intelligence, and logistical infrastructure HNs can provide.

For example, offshore Navy platforms can unilaterally establish a command and control (C2) structure at sea to support an HN while remaining out of the eye of its public. Such a sea-based C2 organization can be tailored to suit almost any situation, from a large footprint (CSG, ESG, command ship) to a smaller footprint (e.g., an LCS or a clandestine platform, such as an SSGN) and can provide the ability to organize, maneuver, and sustain a tailored force that can organize, collect, and analyze intelligence information to prepare for ongoing operations. The seabase can also provide the C2 maritime base to support operations run by Joint military and multinational operations as well as support other government agencies, such as the Department of State.

Fleet port visits are also an ideal opportunity to meet with the host nation's government and military leaders, and can provide concrete support by means of expeditionary training activities and construction projects. Additionally, combined exercises offer the chance to assess the host nation's maritime strengths and weaknesses as well as to promote goodwill by helping train HN personnel. Regional cooperation can be enhanced by encouraging personnel exchange and training. Not only would this allow the United States to gain an understanding of the regional environment, it also would promote understanding and potential cooperation between regional navies. These efforts would also provide an opportunity to establish and refine the

sea-based command and control organization to be in place for any future campaign. Information sharing with allied navies would enhance our understanding and increase regional maritime security. This would also help develop intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planning options for CIC campaigns.

CIC Capability area: Integration of Navy CIC activities with interagency and multi-national partners

The Navy will integrate its CIC activities with interagency and multi-national partners by sharing information, integrating planning efforts, and synchronizing execution of operations with them. With its ability to establish robust, persistent forward-deployed maritime C2 anywhere in the maritime domain, it has the means to quickly and easily share information and liaison with multi-national and nongovernmental partners. It can do so by acting as the sea-based maritime component for a Joint/coalition maritime command or as the sea-based location of higher headquarters. Large-deck or command ships can fulfill these roles: they have ample room and the communications infrastructure for hosting USG and coalition staff and providing JTF capabilities. Navy forces can also easily exchange LNOs with interagency and multi-national organizations in order to increase coordination and foster unity of effort.

CIC Capability area: Navy CIC host nation development

The Navy will help HNs develop by assisting their maritime security forces, helping them plan and execute legitimacy-enhancing communications, and supporting them in these and other efforts to address root grievances among the population.

Naval vessels are especially useful platforms for such activities because of their mobility and small footprint. Almost any HN can embark personnel with U.S. Navy forces to train or forge partnerships without overtly aligning themselves with U.S. values, which may be at odds with internal HN politics. Furthermore, the Navy can effectively contribute expeditionary training, greater maritime security, and maritime civil affairs support. These efforts can include training HN personnel in:

- Port security
- Maritime law

- Medical skills
- EOD (mine detection and clearance)
- Intelligence collection and fusion
- Construction (underwater and on land)
- Law enforcement (VBSS)
- Small boat operations.

Maritime security operations can be used to support host nations that do not have the capability or capacity to secure their littorals themselves. These operations can be conducted by forward-deployed U.S. Navy forces, alone or in partnership with coalition partners and host nations. When conducted with host nation partners, the operations can also serve as meaningful training events and opportunities to foster maritime security cooperation between regional nations. Maritime security operations can include:

- Harbor surveys
- Regional cooperation
- VBSS
- Small boat operations
- Navy diving and salvage
- Mine clearance.

CIC Capability area: Navy CIC operations to disrupt, deny, and defeat adversaries

The Navy will disrupt, deny, and defeat irregular adversaries through kinetic and non-kinetic means and cyber operations.

This capability area is the manifestation of the Navy's focus on the need to counter irregular threats when preventive security and building partner capacity do not forestall them. The Navy has a range of precision strike capabilities that can be globally forward deployed. In particular, the large decks provide the airwing strike capability (fixed and rotary), the surface and subsurface fleet have the Tomahawk

Land Attack Missile (TLAM) as an overland strike option, and the riverine units provide in-country kinetic strike options. Additionally, NSW units can operate from both surface and subsurface platforms to provide covert direct action. These activities emphasize the need to employ precision strike capabilities when conducting CIC operations in order to avoid collateral damage. This also implies the need for battle damage assessment (BDA) to assess potential collateral damage.

Furthermore, the need to maintain effective computer network defenses are important in CIC operations since irregular adversaries may use the internet for information dissemination and computer network attack.

CIC Capability area: Navy CIC strategic communications

The Navy will influence populations by coordinating strategic communications and actions with HN, interagency, and NGO partners, as well as by conducting information and civil affairs operations. These activities will all be conducted primarily from the seabase since the Navy can leverage its forward presence to communicate the U.S. government's message. Port visits and combined exercises provide an ideal opportunity to meet with local government and military leaders, provide expeditionary training activities, and support development projects. The use of the seabase also provides an unobtrusive means to conduct information and psychological operations. Additionally, the seabase provides a maritime HQ that can be used as the location to integrate development actions and communication strategies with partners.

CIC Capability area: Sustaining of the Navy CIC campaign

The Navy will sustain its and the HN's CIC actions, and will provide transportation and personnel recovery for the same, primarily from the seabase as well as integrated with HN logistics chains. The seabase is ideally suited to be a maritime headquarters; it can host and integrate host nation, multinational, USG, and NGO partners. The large decks also provide a base to support the logistics required for training and other interactions with the partner nations.

CIC Capability area: Assessment of Navy CIC plans and operations

The Navy will assess local and regional effectiveness of its CIC operations, and incorporate that feedback into its plans, using its maritime-based C2, ISR, and HQ functions. Data used for assessment can also be collected from HN interactions, including meetings with officials (civil and military), exchange of HN LNOs, and feedback (e.g., surveys and interviews) from training classes, operators, and the HN population. Finally, because CIC actions are often focused on population responses, additional assessment (such as BDA) becomes important, as a way to ensure that the Navy's actions are not counter-productive.

Deriving unit-level CIC capabilities

We then identified which specific Navy forces would conduct these tasks in these capability areas during a Navy CIC operation.

First, we used the Steady State Security Posture (SSSP) vignettes to derive an initial list of unit-level capabilities.¹² We then expanded upon this list using Navy briefs on recent Partnership Station (Africa and Pacific) experiences. This resulted in an extensive list of potential Navy CIC unit-level capabilities that we judged to be typically useful for Navy CIC as described in the Navy Vision and as we have outlined earlier.

Criteria for determining whether a capability is useful for CIC

One area of potential debate revolves around the question of whether any single unit-level capability is useful for conducting conventional warfare, for confronting irregular challenges, or for both.

12. The SSSP vignettes were useful for this purpose because they are Joint Staff derived and approved future planning scenarios [7]. Thus they are an external source of information outlining which Navy forces provide which capabilities. We identified over 30 SSSP vignettes that include Navy CIC actions as we have described them above. Each of those vignettes identifies what capabilities will be needed to conduct the operations required. Those capabilities formed our initial list that we built upon. Because the details of the vignettes are classified, we do not provide them here.

As mentioned in the introduction, we specifically did not address Navy capabilities that are likely to be used primarily for conventional operations even if they are also likely to play a role in CIC operations. For example, we did not identify such capabilities as large-scale logistics, ballistic missile defense, and nuclear or other large-scale strike capabilities as typically useful for CIC operations. This is not to imply that these capabilities cannot play a role in such operations; rather it means that *in general* they are not likely to be as useful as the Navy unit-level CIC capabilities we identified.

In table 2, we show the resulting Navy unit-level CIC capabilities, and indicate how they contribute to CIC outcomes. We also indicate which Navy CIC capability area(s) and missions each capability will typically support.

Table 2. Navy unit-level CIC capabilities

Unit-level capability	Result typically supported (Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity, or Countering Manifest Threats)	Navy CIC capability area typically supported						Navy CIC Missions typically supported
		Campaign design Prep. of Environment	Integrate activities	HN Development	Defeat adversaries	Influence populations	Sustain campaign Assess	
C2 for training & exercise support	Building partner capacity		X	X		X	Maritime SFA, Maritime Stability Ops	
C2 for information operations	Preventive Security	X	X	X		X	Maritime Security, Info Dominance	
C2 for interagency and HN information sharing	Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity	X	X	X		X	Maritime Security, Info Dominance	
C2 for Riverine/Harbor operations	Preventive Security, Countering Manifest Threats	X	X		X		COIN/CT, Maritime Security, Info Dominance	
C2 for ISR/Intel Fusion	Preventive Security, Countering Manifest Threats	X	X		X		COIN/CT, Maritime Security, Info Dominance	
C2 for SOF operations	Countering Manifest Threats				X		COIN/CT, Info Dominance	
Civil-military operations, training, and exercises	Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity	X		X		X	Maritime SFA, Maritime Security, Maritime Stability Ops	
Diving, salvage, and rescue operations	Building Partner Capacity			X		X	Maritime SFA, Maritime Security, Maritime Stability Ops	
Engineering and construction support	Building Partner Capacity	X		X		X	Maritime SFA, Maritime Stability Ops	
Harbor, port, and infrastructure security operations	Preventive Security	X		X	X		COIN/CT, Maritime Security	

Table 2. Navy unit-level CIC capabilities

Unit-level capability	Result typically supported (Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity, or Countering Manifest Threats)	Navy CIC capability area typically supported						Navy CIC Missions typically supported
		Campaign design Prep. of Environment	Integrate activities	HN Development	Defeat adversaries	Influence populations	Sustain campaign Assess	
Harbor port, and infrastructure security training and exercises	Building Partner Capacity			X				Maritime SFA
HQ support for sealift vessels	Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity	X	X				X	Maritime SFA
HQ support to SOF	Countering Manifest Threats	X	X		X			COIN/CT, Maritime Security
ISR dissemination	Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity	X	X	X	X	X		Maritime SFA, COIN/CT, Maritime Security, Info Dominance
Lift of materiel and personnel	Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity						X	Maritime SFA, Maritime Stability Ops
Littoral security operations	Preventive Security	X			X			COIN/CT, Maritime Security
Littoral security training and exercises	Building Partner Capacity			X				Maritime SFA
LNO exchange functions	Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity	X	X	X				Maritime SFA, Maritime Security
Maritime and littoral surveillance	Preventive Security	X			X			COIN/CT, Maritime Security, Info Dominance
Maritime and littoral surveillance training and exercises	Building Partner Capacity			X				Maritime SFA
Maritime force C2 functions	Preventive Security, Countering Manifest Threats	X	X	X	X	X	X	COIN/CT, Maritime Security, Info Dominance
Maritime HQ functions	Preventive Security	X	X	X	X	X	X	COIN/CT, Maritime Security
Maritime ISR planning, analysis and production	Preventive Security	X	X			X	X	Maritime Security, Info Dominance

Table 2. Navy unit-level CIC capabilities

Unit-level capability	Result typically supported (Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity, or Countering Manifest Threats)	Navy CIC capability area typically supported							Navy CIC Missions typically supported
		Campaign design	Prep. of Environment	Integrate activities	HN Development	Defeat adversaries	Influence populations	Sustain campaign	
Maritime ISR collection	Preventive Security, Countering Manifest Threats	X	X	X	X	X	X		COIN/CT, Maritime Security, Info Dominance
Maritime JTF functions (incl. interagency and NGO)	Preventive Security		X	X	X	X		X	COIN/CT, Maritime Security
Medical support	Preventive Security				X		X		Maritime Stability Ops
Mine detection and clearance	Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity		X		X				Maritime SFA, Maritime Security, Maritime Stability Ops
Mine detection and clearance training & exercises	Building partner capacity				X				Maritime SFA
MIO operations	Preventive Security		X		X	X			COIN/CT, Maritime Security
MIO training and exercises	Building partner capacity				X				Maritime SFA
Population health assessment and support	Preventive Security						X		Maritime Stability Ops
Precise ISR	Countering Manifest Threats					X			COIN/CT, Maritime Security, Info Dominance
Precision strike	Countering Manifest Threats					X			COIN/CT
Riverine patrol operations	Preventive Security		X			X			COIN/CT, Maritime Security
Riverine patrol training & exercises	Building Partner Capacity				X				Maritime SFA
Special reconnaissance	Preventive Security, Countering Manifest Threats		X			X			COIN/CT, Maritime Security, Info Dominance
Specialized underwater construction	Preventive Security, Building Partner Capacity		X		X				Maritime SFA, Maritime Stability Ops

Review of terminology

As noted earlier, this report has used a variety of similar sounding terms. Below, we review the meanings that we have now assigned to those terms, based on our analysis.

- **Navy CIC missions:** There are four Navy CIC missions: maritime SFA, maritime security, maritime stability operations, and COIN/CT. In addition, these missions are enabled by information dominance, which we refer to as a supporting pillar. These are the activities that, based on our assessment of the Navy Vision, the Navy will need to undertake in order to meet irregular challenges.
- **Navy CIC results:** Our analysis identified three results of Navy CIC missions, which further contribute to the ultimate goal of Navy CIC. These results are preventive security, building partner capacity, and countering manifest threats.
- **Navy CIC long-term goal:** Our analysis identifies one overarching long-term Navy CIC goal: enhanced cooperative security and stronger partnerships.
- **Joint IW capabilities:** These are the eight sets of capabilities that the Joint force will use to conduct its Joint IW missions, ranging from “Design the IW campaign,” to “Assess plans and operations.” These are distinct from Navy CIC capability areas, and are detailed in appendix A.
- **IW broad capability:** IW broad capabilities are the specific Joint capabilities that each Joint IW capability comprises. For example, the Joint IW capability of “Design the IW campaign” comprises three IW broad capabilities (these are shown in table 8, in appendix A).
- **Joint capability area (JCA):** JCAs are a tiered list of capabilities that the military Services can provide in service to national goals.¹³ Each IW broad capability comprises a set of tier 1

13. Appendix B discusses the JCAs in more detail, and lists all the JCA capabilities and sub-capabilities and their definitions.

through tier 3JCAs (these are shown in table 8, in appendix A, and the JCAs are discussed in appendix B).

- **Navy CIC capability area:** These are the Navy equivalents of the Joint IW Capabilities that we have derived here in our analysis. Like the Joint IW capabilities, there are eight Navy CIC capability areas, each of which is described above (page 32 through page 36) and which together qualitatively define the range of actions and capabilities required for a Navy CIC campaign.
- **Navy CIC unit-level capabilities:** These are the specific capabilities that Navy units require in order to conduct the Navy CIC capabilities. The Navy unit-level capabilities derived by our analysis were given in table 2.

In the previous section we showed how we used the Navy Vision to derive Navy CIC missions, their results, and an overarching long-term goal. We then showed how this enabled us to derive Navy CIC capability areas and then link these to their constituent Navy CIC unit-level capabilities.

In the next section we discuss how we used this information to link Navy units, platforms, and force groups directly to Navy CIC unit-level capabilities, and then assigned those units and platforms to specific Navy CIC missions.

Navy forces that provide CIC capabilities

In the previous sections we showed how we derived Navy CIC capability areas and CIC missions, and how we identified those unit-level capabilities relevant to Navy CIC operations. In this section, we discuss how we:

- Matched Navy CIC units, platforms, and force groups to unit-level capabilities
- Assigned those units and platforms to Navy CIC missions.

These efforts enabled us to understand precisely how Navy assets contribute to Navy CIC operations.

What Navy forces provide which CIC capabilities?

In table 3, we present our assessment of which Navy forces provide the CIC capabilities we derived (discussed in the previous section).

How do Navy forces contribute to CIC missions?

After we had matched unit-level CIC capabilities to Navy CIC missions and matched Navy units and platforms to unit-level CIC capabilities, we could see a clear chain of logic that matches Navy units and platforms directly to Navy CIC missions. We summarize the results of this effort for all Navy CIC units in table 4.

In the next section, we examine what these results imply for Navy burden sharing with other Services, agencies, and partner nations in CIC operations.

Table 3. Navy CIC forces and their CIC capabilities

Force	Units	CIC Capabilities provided
GPF	CSG (Carrier Strike Group)	C2 for training and exercise support C2 for information operations C2 for interagency and HN information sharing C2 for ISR/Intel Fusion C2 for SOF operations HQ support for sealift vessels HQ support to SOF ISR dissemination LNO exchange functions Maritime force C2 functions Maritime HQ functions Maritime ISR planning, analysis, and production Maritime JTF functions (incl interagency and NGO) Precision Strike
	CVW (Carrier Wing)	Precise ISR Maritime ISR Collection Maritime and Littoral Surveillance
	TLAM Firing Units	Precision strike
	LCC (Amphibious Command Ship)	Maritime JTF functions (incl. interagency and NGO) C2 for information operations C2 for interagency and HN information sharing Maritime force C2 LNO exchange functions
	ARG (Amphibious Ready Group)	C2 for training and exercise support C2 for information operations C2 for interagency and HN information sharing C2 for ISR/Intel Fusion C2 for SOF operations HQ support for sealift vessels HQ support to SOF ISR dissemination LNO exchange functions Maritime force C2 functions Maritime HQ functions Maritime ISR planning, analysis, and production Maritime JTF functions (incl interagency and NGO) Lift of materiel and personnel MIO operations MIO training and exercises Population health assessment and support Medical support
	ACE (Marine Air Combat Element)	Precise ISR Maritime ISR Collection Maritime and Littoral Surveillance

Table 3. Navy CIC forces and their CIC capabilities

Force	Units	CIC Capabilities provided
	CG/DDG (Guided Missile Cruiser/Destroyer)	Littoral security operations Littoral security operations training & exercises Maritime and Littoral surveillance Maritime and Littoral surveillance training & exercises MIO operations MIO operations training & exercises
	MTT (Maritime Training Team)	Civil-military operations, training, and exercises Littoral security operations training & exercises Maritime and littoral surveillance training & exercises
	MPA (P-3, P-8A and similar and future Maritime Patrol Aircraft platforms)	Maritime and littoral surveillance Maritime and littoral surveillance training & exercises Maritime ISR collection Precise ISR
	MSRON (Maritime security squadron)	Harbor, port, and infrastructure security operations Harbor, port, and infrastructure security operations training & exercises MIO operations (with LCS or ARG)
	NECC HQ Det	C2 for Riverine/Harbor operations
	IET (Intelligence Exploitation Team)	Maritime ISR collection
	HSV (High Speed Vessel)	Littoral security operations Littoral security operations training & exercises Maritime and littoral surveillance Maritime and littoral surveillance training & exercises Lift of materiel and personnel
	LCS (Littoral Combat Ship)	Littoral security operations Littoral security operations training & exercises MIO operations Maritime and littoral surveillance Maritime and littoral surveillance training & exercises MIO operations training & exercises
	PC (Patrol Craft)	Littoral security operations Littoral security operations training & exercises Maritime and littoral surveillance Maritime and littoral surveillance training & exercises
	RIVRON (Riverine Squadron)	Riverine patrol operations Riverine patrol operations training & exercises
	MCM (Minesweeper)	Mine detection and clearance Mine detection and clearance training & exercises
	MDS CO (Mobile Diving and Salvage Company)	Diving, salvage, and rescue operations
	UCT (Underwater Construction Team)	Specialized underwater construction

Table 3. Navy CIC forces and their CIC capabilities

Force	Units	CIC Capabilities provided
	NMCB (Naval Mobile Construction Battalion)	Engineering and construction support
	EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit)	Mine detection and clearance Mine detection and clearance training & exercises
	FD-PMU (Forward Deployable Preventive Medicine Unit) and Infectious disease team	Medical support Population health assessment and support
	MCAT (Maritime Civil Affairs Team)	Civil-military operations, training, and exercises C2 for training and exercise support C2 for interagency and HN information sharing Littoral security operations training & exercises Maritime and littoral surveillance training & exercises Harbor, port, and infrastructure security operations training & exercises
	LHD (Amphibious Assault Ship)	C2 for training and exercise support C2 for interagency and HN information sharing LNO exchange functions Maritime force C2 functions Maritime HQ functions Maritime ISR planning, analysis, and production Maritime JTF functions (incl interagency and NGO) Lift of materiel and personnel
	SSN (Attack Submarine)	C2 for ISR/Intel Fusion Maritime ISR planning, analysis, and production Maritime ISR collection Precision strike (TLAM firing unit and via SOF insertion/extraction)
	SSGN (Guided Missile Submarine)	C2 for ISR/Intel Fusion Maritime ISR planning, analysis, and production Maritime ISR collection C2 of SOF (planning and execution via SOF insertion/extraction) Precision strike (TLAM firing unit and via SOF operations)
	UAS (Unmanned Aerial System, such as BAMS)	Maritime and littoral surveillance Maritime ISR collection Precise ISR

Table 3. Navy CIC forces and their CIC capabilities

Force	Units	CIC Capabilities provided
NSW	SOC-Riverine/SBU, Mk V, RHIB dets	Harbor, port, and infrastructure security operations Harbor, port, and infrastructure security operations training & exercises Riverine patrol operations Riverine patrol operations training & exercises
	SEAL Platoon	Precision strike Special reconnaissance
	NSWTG/U (NSW Task Group/Unit)	C2 for SOF operations C2 for ISR/Intel Fusion HQ support to SOF
Other	Hospital ship	Medical support Population health assessment and support
	Naval Component Command Staff (NAVCENT, NAVEUR, NAVSOUTH, etc)	C2 for training and exercise support C2 for information operations C2 for interagency and HN information sharing C2 for ISR/Intel Fusion Civil-military operations, training, and exercises ISR dissemination LNO exchange functions Maritime force C2 functions Maritime HQ functions Maritime ISR planning, analysis, and production Maritime JTF functions (incl interagency and NGO) MIO training and exercises

Table 4. Navy units linked to Navy CIC missions

Force	Units	Navy CIC Missions supported				
		Maritime SFA	Maritime Security	Maritime Stability Ops	COIN/CT	Info. Dominance
GPF	CSG/CVW	X	X		X	X
	TLAM Firing Units				X	
	LCC	X	X		X	X
	ARG/ACE	X	X	X	X	X
	CG/DDG	X	X	X		X
	MTT	X	X		X	
	P-8A and similar platforms		X		X	X
	MSRON	X	X		X	
	NECC HQ Det	X	X		X	
	IET				X	X
	HSV	X	X	X	X	X
	LCS	X	X		X	X
	PC	X	X		X	X
	RIVRON	X	X		X	
	Minesweeper MCM	X	X	X		
	MDS CO	X	X	X		
	Underwater construction	X		X		
	NMCB	X		X		
	EOD	X	X	X		
	FD-PMU and Infectious disease team			X		
MCAT	X	X	X		X	
LHD	X	X	X		X	
SSN		X		X	X	
UAS (such as BAMS)	X	X		X	X	
NSW	SOC-Riverine/SBU, Mk V, RHIB dets	X	X		X	
	SEAL Platoon		X		X	X
	NSWTG/U		X		X	X
Other	Hospital ship			X		
	Naval Component Command staffs	X	X	X	X	X

Implications for burden sharing

As described in the previous sections, we used the Navy Vision to derive Navy CIC missions and goals. From there we derived Navy CIC capabilities and then identified how Navy units and their unit-level capabilities contribute to Navy CIC missions. These efforts essentially identified which CIC efforts should have the Navy as the lead Service. In so doing, we determined that these findings have important implications for Navy burden sharing with other Services, agencies, and partner nations in CIC operations. This helps us understand how the Navy might share CIC efforts with other Services and thus the Navy's role in CIC overall.

The Navy role in confronting irregular challenges

The 12 organizing principles we derived (see the Capabilities section) provided a guide for understanding the role of the Navy in Joint operations based on its maritime nature, its focus on cooperative security and stronger partnerships, and its unique CIC mission set.

Based on those principles, the Navy should be the lead Service for maritime CIC action in denied or contested areas and situations, or where a long-term, scalable, and flexible set of capabilities is required by, for example, long-term counterterrorism or maritime security operations that rely on ongoing HN support. Furthermore, the Navy, as a forward-deployed force, will often be the most effective lead for initial, ad hoc, and rapid CIC response efforts. In essence, these characteristics are the “comparative advantages” of the Navy in Joint CIC efforts.

The other Services also have their own comparative advantages. The Marine Corps and Army are both focused on the land-based aspects of IW (not CIC) operations. The Marine Corps emphasizes the readiness of USMC forces to deploy and enter denied areas quickly and provide a versatile initial force that can deal with an array of potential

irregular threats. The Army, with its large capacity and range of civil capabilities, is focused on providing a wide range of support and assistance to partner nations and rebuilding host-nation institutions, including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the operational environment. Air Force assets are naturally focused on airborne ISR, PSY-OPS, precision strike, training and equipping of partner nation air defenses and personnel, and so forth. The Coast Guard may be involved in order to provide civilian law enforcement or an unobtrusive yet robust maritime capability.

The uniformed Services are not the only capability providers for these types of operations. In fact, the nature of such operations often requires a comprehensive government approach.¹⁴ This refers to increased coordination between the military and civilian branches, as well as NGOs and other important actors in the irregular environment. The purpose of using such an approach is to minimize redundancies, limit stovepipes, and take advantage of the distinct efficiencies, capabilities, and skillsets of different organizations across all national governmental agencies.

For this reason, the Department of State (DoS) is also likely to be involved in these operations. It can provide political, cultural, and local knowledge and intelligence, as well as expertise in reconstruction operations [8].

Host nation contributions

A second aspect of burden sharing involves host nation contributions. Host nation forces can provide a variety of CIC capabilities under the right circumstances, and integrating them would promote increased HN capability. Also, in some cases, HN forces might perform more effectively than the U.S. Navy, due to their local expertise and unique capabilities.

We divide potential HN contributions into three categories: partnered, unilateral, and variable. Partnered capabilities require the

14. This is sometimes termed a “whole-of-government” approach.

HN's approval and participation, because they require resources outside the control of the U.S. Navy. Unilateral capabilities are those high-technology capabilities that can be performed by U.S. Navy forces alone, due to their unique capabilities or skillsets. Variable activities can be performed either in partnership with the HN or alone, depending upon the HN's capabilities, willingness, and other factors. In such cases the Department of State will often coordinate the HN and the Navy. Table 5 lists the Navy CIC capabilities that are most likely to fall into each of these three categories.

Table 5. What CIC capabilities might host nations contribute?

CIC Capabilities provided	Yes (Partnered)	No (Unilateral)	Maybe (Variable)
C2 for training and exercise support	X		
C2 for information operations		X	
C2 for interagency and HN information sharing	X		
C2 for Riverine/Harbor operations	X		
C2 for ISR/Intel Fusion		X	
C2 for SOF operations		X	
Civil-military operations, training, and exercise support	X		
Diving, salvage, and rescue operations			X
Engineering and construction support	X		
Harbor, port, and infrastructure security operations			X
Harbor, port, and infrastructure security training & exercises	X		
HQ support for sealift vessels			X
HQ support to SOF		X	
ISR dissemination		X	
Lift of materiel and personnel			X
Littoral security operations			X
Littoral security training & exercises	X		
LNO exchange functions	X		
Maritime and littoral surveillance			X
Maritime and littoral surveillance-training & exercises	X		
Maritime force C2 functions		X	
Maritime HQ functions			X
Maritime ISR planning, analysis, and production			X
Maritime ISR collection			X
Maritime JTF functions (incl. interagency and NGO)		X	
Medical support			X
Mine detection and clearance operations		X	

Table 5. What CIC capabilities might host nations contribute?

CIC Capabilities provided	Yes (Partnered)	No (Unilateral)	Maybe (Variable)
Mine detection and clearance-training & exercises	X		
MIO operations		X	
MIO-training and exercises	X		
Population health assessment and support			X
Precise ISR		X	
Precision strike		X	
Riverine patrol operations			X
Riverine patrol training & exercises	X		
Special reconnaissance		X	
Specialized underwater construction		X	

While the unilateral and partnered categories are self-evident, the “variable” category in table 5 deserves some further thought. These capabilities might be exercised with or without HN partnership, dependent upon the HN’s capabilities and will to participate. For instance, “small boat operations” depend upon a fleet of small boats. If an HN has none, clearly the Navy will not partner with it to perform these operations. Additionally, if the HN has small boats but is wary of risking its relationship with anti-U.S. neighbors, it might decline an offer of partnership in a small boat operation.

Assessing HN capabilities is often a difficult and opaque process. Frequently, an HN will unintentionally report old and/or unreliable data to the Navy. Insufficient data on ports or shipping lanes is a major impediment to partnered operations, such as the Africa Partnership Station. Furthermore, if data exists, the Navy may not have access to it.

One question that should be asked when planning a CIC operation is: “What HN capabilities do we need to assess, and how do we assess them?” CNA has recently conducted two independent studies on this issue [9, 10]. The two studies both found that in order for the Navy to have a true global presence, it must begin a comprehensive effort to catalogue partner nations’ CIC capabilities and priorities.

In our next section we conclude our report by assessing what Navy-wide changes are implied by our analyses.

Conclusions

Navy CIC strategic concept

Our analyses allowed us to derive an overall Navy CIC strategic concept. Figure 4 illustrates the connections between Navy CIC forces, CIC missions, their results, and the ultimate long-term goals of Navy CIC operations. The ultimate goal of this strategic concept, which is enhanced cooperative security and stronger partnerships, encompasses and includes NIWO’s own endstate of successful CIC—namely, that the U.S. Navy has met irregular challenges through flexible, agile, and broad multi-mission capabilities in the maritime domain, working with Joint and international partners. Such efforts emphasize cooperative security as part of a comprehensive government approach to mitigate the causes of insecurity and instability and enhance regional security and stability.


What is the Navy role?

Based on our analysis, here is one way to state the Navy’s role in confronting irregular challenges:

The Navy has the lead for maritime SFA/FID, maritime security, and maritime stability operations, and is a crucial supporting force for COIN and CT efforts. By focusing on these missions it provides preventive security, helps build partner capacity and helps counter threats that manifest themselves in fragile maritime areas or in situations where a long-term, scalable, and flexible set of capabilities is required. All of these actions enhance long-term cooperative security and help build stronger partnerships.

This statement captures and describes the “comparative advantages” of the Navy in CIC efforts.

Figure 4. Navy CIC strategic concept



What is the role of Navy GPF?

Table 6 lists the Navy GPF units that play key roles in Navy CIC efforts, as identified by our analysis.

It is clear from this list that the preponderance of Navy forces involved in CIC efforts are GPF units. Such units include high-end surface platforms and groups of platforms (e.g., CSG, ARG), as well as other highly capable and specialized sub-surface and air (e.g., SSNs, P-8s, UAS). This broad utility of GPF is a function of the preventive security and BPC efforts that Navy CIC is largely focused on, and which many GPF units directly contribute to.

Table 6. Navy GPF units' contributions to CIC

Units	CIC Capabilities provided
CSG	C2 for information operations
CVW	C2 for interagency and HN information sharing
TLAM Firing Units	C2 for Riverine/Harbor operations
LCC	C2 for ISR/Intel Fusion
ARG	C2 for SOF operations
CG/DDG	C2 for training and exercise support
MTT	Harbor security operations
P-8A and similar platforms	Harbor security operations training & exercises
MSRON	HQ support for sealift vessels
NECC HQ Det	HQ support to SOF
IET	ISR dissemination
HSV	Lift of materiel and personnel
LCS	Littoral security operations training & exercises
PC	LNO exchange functions
RIVRON	Maritime and littoral surveillance
MCM	Maritime and littoral surveillance training & exercises
MDS CO	Maritime force C2
Underwater construction team (UCT)	Maritime HQ functions
NMCB	Maritime ISR collection
EOD	Maritime ISR planning, analysis, and production
FD-PMU and Infectious disease team	Maritime JTF functions (incl. interagency and NGO)
MCAT	Medical support
LHD	MIO operations
SSN	MIO training and exercises
UAS (such as BAMS)	Population health assessment and support
	Precise ISR
	Precision strike

Furthermore, GPF units are clearly enablers of larger, more robust and longer-term CIC efforts, through their C2- and ISR-related capabilities. CVNs have been used repeatedly in the past as necessary enabling assets for CIC types of operations. Contrary to general belief, such high-end platforms clearly provide a crucial role in Navy CIC in addition to their more traditional combat role.

What is the role of NSW?

NSW forces have more of a niche role to play. When CIC operations require specific action to counter irregular threats, such as precision strike, special reconnaissance and ISR, and operations that are likely to be in direct contact with insurgents or terrorists, it is SOF units that are likely to provide the required capability.

Furthermore, NSW units maintain a variety of capabilities that contribute to COIN/CT and maritime SFA missions in an indirect manner.

Typically, NSW forces operate in support of SOCOM operations. Therefore, when employing NSW forces to confront irregular challenges, the Navy is likely to be in a supporting, vice lead, role.

Table 7 shows the Navy SOF units that we identified and the roles that they play in Navy CIC efforts.

Table 7. Navy SOF units' contributions to CIC

Units	CIC Capabilities provided
SOC-Riverine/SBU, Mk V, RHIB dets SEAL Platoon NSWTG/U	Harbor security operations Harbor security operations training & exercises Riverine patrol operations Riverine patrol operations training & exercises Precision strike Special reconnaissance C2 for SOF operations C2 for ISR/Intel Fusion HQ support to SOF

What are the roles of other Navy forces?

In addition to the above, it is noteworthy that Navy hospital ships can play a key role in certain types of CIC operations by providing medical support and health assessment capabilities.

Furthermore the robust staffs of the Naval Component Commands (NCC), such as NAVCENT, NAVEUR, and so forth, provide crucial capabilities for CIC operations. These include not only the C2 of CIC operations, training, and exercises, but also critical HN and inter-agency exchange and LNO capabilities, but also various ISR functions, such as intel fusion and dissemination, and planning, analysis, and production of information.

GPF and SOF are complementary

The above discussion makes it clear that GPF or SOF, acting alone, cannot meet the needs of all Navy CIC operations. Navy SOF capabilities are enabled by GPF units, which act as C2, planning, and HQ providers (in addition to providing more conventional capabilities, such as logistics, that are required for SOF support). Conversely, although most CIC operations may focus on preventive security and BPC efforts for success, some will doubtless require direct action to directly and precisely eradicate terrorists or insurgents. In sum, GPF and Navy SOF units are complementary when it comes to Navy CIC operations. Both are necessary for success.

Way ahead for CIC force planning

Much of the value of this analysis is in understanding and clarifying the Navy's role (both GPF and SOF), and the meaning of the Navy Vision — the missions, results, and goal of the Navy as it confronts irregular challenges, and the linkages between its actions and the endstate it seeks.

However, our analysis also implies a number of next steps in the Navy's adoption of a CIC role and the force planning that such a role would require. In this section, we outline a series of issues that the Navy will likely need to address as it incorporates CIC efforts into its operations and planning.

The Navy should plan and train for interagency and HN coordination

Our analysis indicates that future CIC operations are likely to include or require interagency and international cooperation. Even if the operation in question is wholly maritime in nature, other U.S. government agencies and host nations are certainly likely to provide critical capabilities as well. Thus it is important that the Navy adjust its planning and operations to promote and accommodate coordination with other U.S. and HN government agencies. This implies a number of questions that the Navy needs to ask itself:

- How should the Navy train and alter its warfighting priorities to accommodate coordination with other U.S. and HN government agencies?
- Should the Navy increase its exercises, wargames, and security cooperation events with potential HN and U.S. partners, including other Services and agencies, in order to identify DoD-wide issues and capabilities?
- How should the Navy increase its representation at other Services, agencies, schools, and commands that are involved in BPC efforts—especially at non-DoD agencies, such as the Department of State and its related sub-agencies?
- Should the Navy create a formal mechanism for engaging with other Services, agencies, and host nations in order to promote and conduct exercises, wargames, and conferences that focus on CIC operations?
- Should the Navy attempt to catalogue partner nation capabilities and priorities? Such an effort could help the Navy better understand what CIC capabilities it should focus on providing, and plan and program for them.

The Navy should determine its capacity for CIC

This study has focused on determining which of the Navy’s capabilities are useful for CIC efforts. We have asked, “How will the Navy conduct CIC?” A corollary question is “How much CIC can the Navy conduct?” In other words, central questions facing Navy planners for CIC revolve around understanding not only the CIC capabilities but also the CIC capacity of the Navy. Such questions include:

- How many CIC operations can the Navy conduct today, and for how long? How does this differ across different types of operations?
- How much capacity will the Navy need in the future? How can it best achieve that capacity most effectively and efficiently?

- What options exist for prioritization of different CIC capabilities? What trade-offs might exist, and what level of risk might they entail?

The Navy should examine CIC-related DOTMLPF

A greater focus on CIC efforts implies a range of organizational and other changes within the Navy. If the Navy is to rebalance its forces towards CIC efforts, a number of questions need to be answered about the potential changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF):

- How would DOTMLPF be affected by a Navy focus on CIC? Are there any existing gaps in DOTMLPF that would hinder a greater focus on CIC across the Navy?
- What, if any, DOTMLPF changes are needed to facilitate future GPF support to, and conduct of, CIC operations?
- What changes in DOTMLPF are needed to enable the Navy's efforts in support of a comprehensive U.S. Government approach to CIC?

This page intentionally left blank.

Appendix A: Joint IW capability areas

The CIT JOC capabilities are arranged in eight sets which span the potential operations that Joint forces, including the Navy, may be called upon to execute.

These are:

1. Design the IW campaign.
2. Conduct preparation of the environment.
3. Integrate activities with interagency and multi-national partners.
4. Develop within the host nation an enduring capability to establish and maintain security, provide legitimate governance, and foster development programs that address root grievances.
5. Conduct operations to disrupt and defeat adversaries.
6. Control and influence populations and resources.
7. Sustain the campaign.
8. Assess plans and operations. [2]

Each of these in turn comprises additional “IW broad capabilities.” For example, in the CIT JOC, the capability “Conduct preparation of the environment” comprises two broad capabilities: “ability to conduct operational preparation of the environment,” and “ability to conduct intelligence preparation of the environment.”

Furthermore, each of these broad capabilities itself comprises more-specific Joint capability area (JCA) tasks. The JCAs are:

Collections of like DOD capabilities functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capability portfolio management,

and capabilities-based force development and operational planning.¹⁵

JCAs therefore are a tiered list of capabilities that the military Services can provide in service to national goals.¹⁶ The CIT JOC has therefore determined which of these JCAs make up the broad capabilities. Appendix B discusses the JCAs.

In table 8, we list the IW capability areas, their constituent IW broad capabilities, and the relevant JCAs, as derived from the CIT JOC [2].

15. Joint Chiefs of Staff definition.

16. Appendix B discusses the JCAs in more detail, and lists all the JCA capabilities and sub-capabilities and their definitions.

Table 8. IW capability areas (as given in the CIT JOC)

IW Capability area	IW Broad Capability	Relevant JCAs		
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
Design the IW Campaign				
	Ability to gather, assess, and share a holistic understanding of the environment that includes the drivers of instability, the root causes of conflict and the history behind them, the threats to security locally, nationally, and regionally, as well as the capabilities and actions of the Host nation to respond to these factors	Battlespace awareness	ISR	ISR planning and Direction Collection Analysis and Production ISR Dissemination
		Command and Control	Organize	Foster organizational collaboration
			Understand	Develop knowledge and situational awareness Share knowledge and situational awareness
		Net-centric	Enterprise services	Information sharing/computing
	Ability to evaluate and understand the potential effects from both population-focused action and enemy-focused action	Command and control	Understand	Develop knowledge and situational awareness
	Ability to project or modify IW campaigns with flexible force and operational constructs	Command and control	Organize	Structure organization to mission
			Planning	Apply situational understanding Develop courses of action Analyze courses of action
Conduct preparation of the environment				

Table 8. IW capability areas (as given in the CIT JOC)

IW Capability area	IW Broad Capability	Relevant JCAs		
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
	Ability to conduct operational preparation of the environment	Force application	Maneuver	Maneuver to insert
		Logistics	Deployment and distribution	Move the force Sustain the force
			Logistics services	Food service Basecamp service
		Command and control	Organize	Establish and maintain units of effort with mission partners Structure organization to mission Foster organizational collaboration
	Building partnerships	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions Build capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	
	Ability to conduct intelligence preparation of the environment	Battlespace awareness	ISR	ISR planning and Direction Collection Processing/exploitation Analysis/dissemination ISR dissemination
Integrate activities with interagency and multi-national partners				

Table 8. IW capability areas (as given in the CIT JOC)

IW Capability area	IW Broad Capability	Relevant JCAs		
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
	Ability to share information with other government agencies, multinational and nongovernmental partner	Net-centric	Enterprise services	Information sharing and computing
	Ability to integrate Joint force IW planning with other USG agencies to facilitate regional and global operations across Federal Agency and Department boundaries	Command and control	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners Structure organization to mission Foster organizational collaboration
Planning			Apply situational understanding	
Understand			Share knowledge and situational awareness	
Direct			Communicate intent and guidance	
Building partner-ships		Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	
	The ability to synchronize Joint force execution of IW activities with other USG agencies to facilitate regional and global operations across Federal Agency and Department boundaries	Command and control	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners Structure organization to mission Foster organizational collaboration
Direct			Task	
Monitor			Assess compliance with guidance	
Develop within the Host Nation an enduring capability to establish and maintain security, provide legitimate governance, and foster development programs that address root grievances				
	Provide Security Force Assistance	Building partner-ships	Shape	Build capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions

Table 8. IW capability areas (as given in the CIT JOC)

IW Capability area	IW Broad Capability	Relevant JCAs		
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
	The ability to enable partners to plan and execute communications strategies and match activities and messages so that the relevant population. Perceives the legitimacy of local and Host nation authorities Denies moral and physical support to adversaries and competing actors	Building partner-ships	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions Build capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions
	Ability to provide support to Host nation, multinational, other USG agencies and nongovernmental partners	Logistics	Deployment and distributions	Move the force Sustain the force Operate the JDDE
			Supply	Manage supplies and equipment Inventory management Manage supplied networks
			Maintain	Inspect Test Service Repair
			Logistic services	Food service Water and ice service Basecamp services Hygiene services
		Building Partner-ships	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions Partner with governments and institutions
Conduct operations to disrupt, deny and defeat adversaries				
	Ability to strike using kinetic means	Force application	Engagement	Kinetic means

Table 8. IW capability areas (as given in the CIT JOC)

IW Capability area	IW Broad Capability	Relevant JCAs		
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
	Ability to strike using non-kinetic means (includes ability to conduct offensive cyber operations to influence, disrupt, deny, and defeat adversaries' activities)	Force application	Engagement	Non-kinetic means
	Ability to conduct defensive cyber operations and computer network defense to influence, disrupt, deny, and defeat adversaries' activities	Net-centric	Information assurance	Protect data and networks Respond to attack/event
		Protection	Prevent	Prevent non-kinetic attack
Control and influence populations and resources				
	The ability to influence relevant populations by planning and executing coordinated communications strategies and by matching actions to messages so that the population—Perceives the legitimacy of local and Host nation authorities—Denies moral and physical support to adversaries and competing actors	Command and control	Planning	Apply situational understanding
		Building partnerships	Communicate	Inform domestic and foreign audiences Persuade partner audiences Influence adversary and competitor audiences
			Shape	Partner with governments and institutions
	The ability to conduct information operations	Building partnerships	Communicate	Influence adversary and competitor audiences
		Force application	Engagement	Non-kinetic

Table 8. IW capability areas (as given in the CIT JOC)

IW Capability area	IW Broad Capability	Relevant JCAs		
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
	The ability to conduct civil affairs operations	Building partner-ships	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions
		Protection	Prevent	Prevent kinetic attack
			Mitigate	Mitigate lethal effects
		Force support	Health readiness	Force health protection
		Logistics	Deployment and distribution	Sustain the force
Engineering	General engineering			
	The ability to integrate development actions with interagency, multinational and NGO partners	Building partner-ships	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions
Sustain the IW campaign				
	Ability to establish sustainment support	Logistics	Deployment and distribution	Sustain the force
	Ability to provide movement services	Logistics	Deployment and distribution	Move the force
	Ability to draw support from Host nation, multinational, other USG agencies and nongovernmental partners	Logistics	Supply	Manage supplier networks
			Operational contract support	Contract support Integration Contractor management
	Ability to conduct personnel recovery	Building partner-ships	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions
			Force application	Maneuver
		Engagement		Non-kinetic means
Assess IW plans and operations				

Table 8. IW capability areas (as given in the CIT JOC)

IW Capability area	IW Broad Capability	Relevant JCAs		
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
	Ability to conduct local and regional assessments of operational effectiveness	Command and control	Monitor	Assess effects Assess achievement of objectives Assess guidance
		Battlespace awareness	ISR	ISR planning and direction Collection Analysis and production
	Ability to modify the IW campaign	Command and control	Planning	Apply situational awareness Develop courses of action

This page intentionally left blank.

Appendix B: Joint capability areas

One goal of our analysis was to understand which Naval capabilities and forces are uniquely or most suitable for use by the U.S. Navy against irregular challenges. Before we could do this, we had to define what we meant by “capabilities.” The Joint capability areas (JCAs) provided such a definition. They are:

Collections of like DOD capabilities functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capability portfolio management, and capabilities-based force development and operational planning.¹⁷

JCAs therefore are a tiered list of capabilities that together describe the entire range of actions that the military Services can provide in service to national goals.

The upper tier comprises nine broad capabilities:

1. Force Support
2. Battlespace Awareness
3. Force Application
4. Logistics
5. Command and Control
6. Net-Centric
7. Protection
8. Building Partnerships
9. Corporate Management and Support.

17. Joint Chiefs of Staff definition.

Each of these tier 1 capabilities is broadly described and comprises lower-tier and more specific capabilities. For example, JCA 1, “Force support” is defined as “the ability to establish, develop, maintain and manage a mission ready Total Force,” and comprises four tier 2 capabilities: “Force management,” “Force preparation,” “Human Capital management,” and “Health readiness.” Each of these tier 2 capabilities further comprises a number of tier 3 capabilities, most of which in turn comprise tier 4 capabilities. This pattern continues all the way down to the most specific level, tier 7 capabilities. All of these are enumerated to provide easy identification and reference: and the lower the tier, the more specific the capability.

To illustrate, table 9 shows how capability 1 (“Force support”) breaks down into constituent sub-capabilities.

Table 9. Illustrative JCA breakdown - Force Support

Capability ID	1st tier	2nd tier	3rd tier	4th tier	5th tier
1	Force Support				
1.1		Force Management			
1.1.1			Global Force Management		
1.1.1.1				Apportionment	
1.1.1.2				Assignment	
1.1.1.3				Allocation	
1.1.1.4				Readiness Reporting	
1.1.2			Force Configuration		
1.1.3			Global Posture Execution		
1.2		Force Preparation			
1.2.1			Training		
1.2.2			Exercising		
1.2.3			Educating		
1.2.3.1				Professional Military Education	
1.2.3.2				Civilian Education	
1.2.4			Doctrine		
1.2.5			Lessons learned		
1.2.6			Concepts		
1.2.7			Experimentation		
1.3		Human Capital Management			
1.3.1			Personnel and Family Support		
1.3.1.1				Community Support	

Table 9. Illustrative JCA breakdown - Force Support

Capability ID	1st tier	2nd tier	3rd tier	4th tier	5th tier
1.3.1.2				Casualty Assistance	
1.3.1.3				Mortuary Affairs	
1.3.1.4				Wounded, Ill, and Injured Support	
1.3.2			Personnel Management		
1.3.2.1				Manning	
1.3.2.2				Compensation	
1.3.2.3				Disability Evaluation	
1.3.2.4				Personnel Accountability	
1.4		Health Readiness			
1.4.1			Force Health Protection		
1.4.1.1				Human Performance Enhancement	
1.4.1.2				Medical Surveillance/Epidemiology	
1.4.1.3				Preventive Medicine	
1.4.1.4				In-transit Care	
1.4.1.4.1					In-transit Care within a Joint Operation
1.4.1.4.2					In-transit Care Outside a Joint Operation
1.4.1.5				Casualty Management	
1.4.1.5.1					Biomedical Support
1.4.1.5.2					Ocular Health
1.4.2			Health Care Delivery		
1.4.2.1				Comprehensive Care Delivery in Military Facilities	
1.4.2.2				Comprehensive Care Delivery via the Network	
1.4.3			Health Service Support		

The benefits of such a formal list of capabilities are that it allows an examination and comparison of capabilities across all the military Services, and provides planners with a well-defined set of terms for planning purposes.

Nonetheless, this list does not, by itself, directly help us understand which capabilities the U.S. Navy should concentrate on when confronting irregular challenges. This is because three difficulties remain with JCAs: they are broadly applicable, they are widely shared among Services, and they are vaguely defined.

Capabilities are broadly applicable

This analysis revolves around understanding which capabilities are useful for confronting irregular challenges. That, however, is not a straightforward task, because many, capabilities are applicable to a wide variety of situations, not simply those that apply to irregular challenges. For example, the capabilities “conduct kinetic strikes,” “collect signals intelligence,” and “persuade partner audiences” are likely to be useful in major theater wars, small-scale contingencies, and irregular conflicts.

Capabilities are widely shared among Services

All of the different military branches possess the same types of capabilities to one degree or another. For example, each military Service is able to conduct kinetic strikes, gather and analyze intelligence, and conduct command and control.

Because capabilities are shared among the Services and other parts of the U.S. government, it is not always obvious which capabilities are more appropriate for the Navy to use and which are more appropriate for other Services or agencies. It is difficult to determine which capabilities are more appropriate for the Navy, rather than some other Service.

Nonetheless, each branch of the U.S. military clearly has a different role in the service of the nation. For example, the U.S. Navy clearly focuses more on maritime issues than the U.S. Army, and this is reflected in its assets, resources, characteristics, training, and deployment.

Capabilities are vaguely defined

Third, because capabilities are usually vaguely defined, it is difficult to match them to specific resources or programs. Even the lowest-tiered (most specific) capabilities are typically too vaguely defined to indicate what specific resources are used to provide those capabilities.

For example, the tier 7 capability 3.2.1.2.1.1.1, “Force Application - Kinetic Means - Stationary Target - Point - Hardened” is defined as:

“3.2.1.2.1.1.1 Hardened (EKSSP) - The ability to kinetically engage targets reinforced (with armor, concrete, dirt, etc.) to protect against blast, heat, or radiation.”

Of course, this is intentional: if the capabilities were too specific, they would not be applicable across all the military Services. Furthermore, this approach intentionally separates capabilities from resources to encourage planners to innovate when they allocate resources, in order to meet challenges. In other words, by formalizing the entire range of U.S. military capabilities, the JCAs support DoD capability-based force planning efforts.¹⁸

18. Capability-based planning relies on assessing whether a military force possesses the capabilities required to meet likely operational requirements and tasks. This stands in contrast to threat-based planning, which assesses whether a military force can meet a specifically defined threat. For a comparison of the two approaches, see appendix B in [11].

This page intentionally left blank.

Glossary

ACE	Marine Air Combat Element
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BPC	Build Partner Capacity
C2	Command and Control
CG	Guided Missile Cruiser
CIC	Confronting Irregular Challenges
CIT	Confronting Irregular Challenges
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
CS	Cooperative Security
CSG	Carrier Strike Group
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CVW	Carrier Wing
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer
DoS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities

EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit
FD-PMU	Forward Deployable Preventive Medicine Unit
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GPF	General Purpose Forces
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HN	Host Nation
HQ	Headquarters
HSV	High Speed Vessel
IET	Intelligence Exploitation Team
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IW	Irregular Warfare
JCA	Joint Capability Area
JOC	Joint Operating Concept
JTF	Joint Task Force
LCC	Amphibious Command Ship
LCS	Littoral Combat Ship
LHD	Amphibious Assault Ship
LNO	Liaison Officer
MCAT	Maritime Civil Affairs Team
MCM	Minesweeper
MDS CO	Mobile Diving and Salvage Company
MIO	Maritime Interception Operations

MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MSRON	Maritime security squadron
MTT	Maritime Training Team
NCC	Naval Component Command
NECC	Naval Expeditionary Combat Command
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIWO	Navy Irregular Warfare Office
NMCB	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
NSW	Naval Special Warfare
NSWTG/U	NSW Task Group/Unit
PC	Patrol Craft
RHIB	Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
RIVRON	Riverine Squadron
SBU	Special Boat Unit
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SO	Stability Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSGN	Guided Missile Submarine
SSN	Attack Submarine
SSSP	Steady State Security Posture
SSTRO	Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations

TLAM	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
UCT	Underwater Construction Team
USMC	US Marine Corps
USN	US Navy
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VBSS	Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure

References

- [1] Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*
- [2] *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept*, Version 2.0, Department of Defense, 19 Jan 2010
- [3] *Military support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept*, Version 2.0, Department of Defense, Dec 2006
- [4] *Military Contribution to Cooperative Security (CS) Joint Operating Concept*, Department of Defense, Version 1.0, 19 Sep 2008
- [5] Joint Publication 3-22. *Foreign Internal Defense (DRAFT)*, Department of Defense, Jun 2009
- [6] DoD Instruction 5000.XX. *Security Force Assistance (DRAFT)*, Department of Defense, Mar 2010
- [7] *Scenario Data: Illustrative Steady State Security Posture for 2016 Multi-Service Force Deployment (U)*, DOD 1322-4680-09, Department of Defense, Secret//NOFORN, Jul 2009
- [8] *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*), United States Institute of Peace, 2009
- [9] Elizabeth Heider, *Tailoring Operations to Country Variables: An Operational Guide to APS Engagement*, Unclassified, Jan 2010 (CNA Research Memorandum D0021995.A2/Final)
- [10] James Wylie, et al., *Supporting the Cooperative Maritime Strategy: Toward a Prioritization Framework for Engagement (U)*, Secret/NOFORN, Jan 2010 (CNA Annotated Brief D0021309.A2/Final)
- [11] James East et al, *Suggested Coast Guard Force-Planning Framework*, (CNA Research Memorandum 99-75, Sep 1999)

This page intentionally left blank.

Bibliography

U.S. Department of Defense

U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare*, Directive 3000.07, 1 Dec 2008

U.S. Department of Defense, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication 3-24, 5 Oct 2009

U.S. Department of Defense, *Counterterrorism*, Joint Publication 3-26, 13 Nov 2009

U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Capability Areas” (definition), located at http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/cap_areas.htm

U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Feb 2010

U.S. Navy

Chief of Naval Operations, *The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*, Jan 2010

U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, *Africa Partnership Station*, Brief, APS MSS Symposium, 9 Apr 2008

U.S. Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, Oct 2007

U.S. Navy, *Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy*, Feb 2010

Other Services

U.S. Air Force, *Irregular Warfare*, Doctrine Document 2-3, Aug 2007

U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, Dec 2006

U.S. Army, *Stability Operations*, FM 3-07, Oct 2008

U.S. Army, *Security Force Assistance*, FM 3-07.1, May 2009

U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command and Special Operations Command Center for Knowledge and Futures, *Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare*, Aug 2006

U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, *Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment*, Jun 2007

Joint

Joint Force Development and Integration Division (JFCID), *Joint Capability Areas*, 12 Jan 2009

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Irregular Warfare*, Instruction 3210.06, 10 Jun 2010

List of tables

Table 1.	Joint elements incorporated into the Navy Vision for CIC	25
Table 2.	Navy unit-level CIC capabilities	38
Table 3.	Navy CIC forces and their CIC capabilities	44
Table 4.	Navy units linked to Navy CIC missions	48
Table 5.	What CIC capabilities might host nations contribute?	51
Table 6.	Navy GPF units' contributions to CIC	55
Table 7.	Navy SOF units' contributions to CIC	56
Table 8.	IW capability areas (as given in the CIT JOC)	63
Table 9.	Illustrative JCA breakdown - Force Support	72

This page intentionally left blank.

Distribution list

Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) (electronic)

OPNAV N3/N5 (electronic)

TACTRAGRULANT (electronic)

TACTRAGRUPAC (electronic)

NAVSPECWARDEVGRU (electronic)

CDR USAFRICOM (electronic)

CDR USCENTCOM (electronic)

CDR USEUCOM (electronic)

CDR USJFCOM (electronic)

CDR, USPACOM (electronic)

CDR, USSOCOM (electronic)

CDR USSOUTHCOM (electronic)

USSTRATCOM (electronic)

COMPACFLT (electronic)

COMUSFLTFORCOM (electronic)

COMUSNAVAFRICOM (electronic)

COMUSNAVCENT (electronic)

COMUSNAVEUR (electronic)

COMUSNAVSO (electronic)

COMJSOC (electronic)

COMNAVSPECWARCOM (electronic)

COMSECONDFLT (electronic)

COMTHIRDFLT (electronic)

COMFOURTHFLT (electronic)

COMFIFTHFLT (electronic)

COMSIXTHFLT (electronic)

COMSEVENTHFLT (electronic)

COMSTRKFORTRALANT (electronic)

COMSTRKFORTRAPAC (electronic)

COMSUBDEVRON TWELVE (electronic)

NECC (electronic)

DTIC

