

Trafficking Golden Crescent Drugs into Western China:

An Analysis and Translation of a Recent Chinese
Police Research Article

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Trafficking Golden Crescent Drugs into Western China:

An Analysis and Draft Translation of a Recent Chinese Police Research Article

Key Findings

- A 2009 open source Chinese police article—translated in this report—presents an unusually detailed picture of the Chinese police’s growing concerns about the trafficking of Golden Crescent* drugs into western China. The article spotlights China’s anxieties about:
 - The growing links between domestic Chinese traffickers—especially Xinjiang residents—and Central Asian-based international drug rings
 - The increasing role of Nigerians and other nationalities in this trade, and the challenges this trend creates for Chinese investigators
 - The evolving transport routes these traffickers use to cross the Chinese border
 - The increasing sophistication of these international traffickers.
- The exploitation of such open source Chinese police publications can support analyses of Asian drug trends and can facilitate exchanges with Chinese government officials and policy specialists about sensitive topics such as drug trafficking

Introduction to the Research Article and the Authors

In the past decade, Chinese law enforcement officials have grown increasingly concerned about the inflow of heroin and other illegal drugs from Afghanistan and the broader “Golden Crescent” region into western China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). A 2009 open source article in a Chinese police journal presents an unusually detailed picture of these police concerns. The authors, public security analysts Guo Jie and Mei Songlin, are researchers in the criminal investigation studies department of the Xinjiang region’s top police academy, located in the regional capital of Urumqi. Their article appears in the police academy’s academic journal, one of the more authoritative publications that would address this relatively narrow law enforcement policy issue.

The article analyzes the increasing scale and organization of Golden Crescent drug smuggling into western China, especially the growing links between domestic Chinese

* Chinese law enforcement sources define the “Golden Crescent” (*jin xin yue*; 金新月) as the illegal drug-producing regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.

traffickers and Pakistan-based and Central Asian-based international drug rings. The increasing role of Africans in this trade—especially Nigerians—is an important theme for these authors. The authors identify the major highway, air, and rail routes along which Chinese and Central Asian authorities have detected drug smuggling cases. They also spotlight what they see as increasing professionalism and sophistication in drug smuggling techniques over the past five to ten years.

This publication contains a good deal of rare data, including previously unpublished police statistics, information about the predominant routes used by smugglers, traffickers' improving techniques and technological adaptations to Chinese law enforcement methods, the changing national and ethnic profiles of drug traffickers, and the rise of domestic drug selling networks within China.

This article also hints at some, though not all, of the institutional challenges that Chinese law enforcement forces confront in dealing with cross-border drug smuggling, including the increasing problem of interrogating smugglers who only speak “obscure” African and Central Asian languages that are presumably unfamiliar to police officials in Xinjiang. This article does not, however, discuss several other sensitive institutional shortcomings of China's counternarcotics system. It does not mention what some Chinese officials see as a shortage of trained police personnel, especially in impoverished regions like Xinjiang. Nor does it address potential problems of coordinating law enforcement policy between Central and local-level Chinese officials. Nor does it note the reportedly high levels of corruption by local Chinese officials who act as so-called “protective umbrellas” for traffickers and other criminals.

The Golden Crescent Drug Threat to China—Growing Scale and Shifting Organization

Guo and Mei's central point is that the threat China faces from Golden Crescent drugs—especially heroin—has risen steadily since 1991 and especially since 2005. Over the past decade, Chinese police evaluate that the drug trafficking challenge from this region has surpassed that from Golden Triangle drugs. They believe that China is now one of the four major international transshipment routes for illegal drugs flowing out of the Golden Crescent.

The authors also see a major shift in the organization of this traffic. They contend that large-scale international drug-smuggling rings have increasingly come to dominate this trade, replacing what they characterize as the small-scale, piecemeal drug trafficking from this region that was typical in the 1990s and early 2000s.¹ Moreover, they see international drug rings increasingly linking up with domestic Chinese drug-traffickers,

¹ These same police analysts address the increasing scale and changing organization of Golden Crescent trafficking in somewhat more detail in another recent article: Du Wei, Guo Jie, and Mei Songlin “The Effect that the ‘Golden Crescent’ Drug Problem is Having on Our Country,” (Lun ‘Jin Xin Yue’ Dupin Wenti Dui Woguo de Yingxiang; 论 ‘金新月’ 毒品问题对我国的影响), *Fazhi yu Shehui (Legal System and Society)*, August 2009, pg. 201.

who transship these drugs from Kashgar and Urumqi in Xinjiang on to the major cities of China's east coast—Shanghai, Beijing and especially Guangzhou. From there the heroin is either sold domestically or is further processed, shipped back out of China, and sold by gangs operating in Southeast Asia.

Chinese Police Identify Key Drug Shipment Routes

The article provides an overview of the major highway, air, and railway links that traffickers use to move drugs into Xinjiang, and notes several major shipping cases that Chinese, Pakistani, and Afghan police have cracked.

- Golden Crescent drug traffickers move heroin to Kashgar and Urumqi primarily via several highway routes from Pakistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and by air from Islamabad, Peshawar, Karachi, Lahore, Kabul, and Dubai.
- Guo and Mei do not indicate that northern routes across the Kazakh or Mongolian borders are significant avenues for drug shipment into Xinjiang.
- They also assert that international railway lines, in contrast to highways and air routes, are “not especially prominent” avenues for moving drugs into Xinjiang in recent years.
- Guo and Mei believe, however, that a newly opened China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail extension (which transits right through the heart of the region in which the authors claim that most trafficking takes place) will present new challenges for law enforcement.

The “Internationalization” of Traffickers’ Backgrounds Raises New Institutional Challenges for Law Enforcement

The article notes an “internationalization” of the ethnic backgrounds of drug smugglers coming into Xinjiang. The authors assert that Central Asians and Africans—especially Nigerians—are playing an increasing role in smuggling drugs into and back out of China. By 2006 the “main body” of foreign drug smugglers encountered by Xinjiang police were from Pakistan and Nigeria, with others coming from Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries, Ghana and other African states, and Southeast Asia.

This report also strongly suggests that the broadening ethnic backgrounds of cross-border traffickers are creating growing institutional and linguistic obstacles for Chinese police in their investigations and interrogations. Guo and Mei do not see this “internationalization” of traffickers as accidental, and they complain about the increasingly “obscure” languages spoken by these traffickers. They charge that “these deliberately create a linguistic obstacle to prevent [traffickers] from confessing the facts of the crime, and delay the progress of [our] interrogations, and set up barriers to in-depth investigation of cases.”

Traffickers' Increasing Sophistication Creates Technical Challenges to Detection

Guo and Mei assert that drug traffickers are demonstrating increasing sophistication in concealment, processing, and packaging drugs that transit the Chinese border. Much of this sophistication focuses on the concealment of drugs inside the bodies of human “mules,” within the frames of vehicles, and among large shipments of commercial commodities. Guo and Mei note, in particular, the increasingly “professional” quality of drug packaging used by traffickers, including packaging that is resistant to detection and physical deterioration as it is carried within the human body. Chinese police also report that drug gangs are “continuously” adapting their techniques to counter Chinese law enforcement operations as a result of “active inquiries about the investigatory and inspection methods and tactics used by [Chinese] departments” that these drug rings are making.

Challenges Created by the Rise in Chinese Domestic Drug Networks, Especially Among Xinjiang Citizens

Although the bulk of Guo and Mei’s article focuses on the role of foreign drug rings coordinating drug trafficking, the final sections concede that networks of thousands—probably tens of thousands—of Xinjiang citizens are playing an increasing role in trafficking Golden Crescent drugs throughout China. Guo and Mei cite nationwide and provincial figures that indicate a sharp increase in the number of these Xinjiang residents who have been arrested for trafficking in other provinces from 2000 onward. They attribute this trend to a variety of factors—economic difficulties in China’s impoverished interior, ethnic tensions, recidivism and drug addiction among ex-criminals, and other forces.

Although Guo and Mei see a trend toward increasingly tight organization among these domestic Chinese trafficking networks, the language they use to describe domestic Chinese drug trafficking networks still does not portray these groups as being nearly as well-organized and powerful as the international rings with which they collaborate. Guo and Mei’s views on this point may reflect the realities of these trafficking rings. They may also, however, reflect the long-standing hesitancy of Chinese law enforcement officials to concede that domestic organized crime in China might be reaching the levels of organization or power seen in Russia, Nigeria, Pakistan, or other highly corrupted societies.

Indications of Sino-Pakistani and Sino-Afghan Law Enforcement Cooperation

Guo and Mei’s article does not directly address the issue of China’s international law enforcement cooperation against drug trafficking. The case data used in their analysis, sourced to Pakistani and Afghan police, appear to indicate that Chinese police analysts are at least able to rely upon cooperation with these countries’ police forces to obtain

important data and other intelligence about drug-smuggling trends. Although Guo and Mei do not indicate the source of their information about the major highway, air, and rail routes used by traffickers from Central Asia, this information may also reflect similar cooperation with other Central Asian or Middle Eastern authorities.

**Draft Translation of Chinese Police Analysis on
Illegal Drug Smuggling from the Golden Crescent into
China’s Xinjiang Region**

<p>Article Title: “Overall Trends in the Smuggling and Infiltration of ‘Golden Crescent’ Illegal Drugs into Xinjiang”</p>	<p>Original Chinese Title: <i>Jinxinyue dupin dui Xinjiang zuosi shentou zongti taishi</i>; 金新月毒品对新疆走私渗透总体态势</p>
<p>Source Publication: <i>Journal of the Xinjiang Police Officer’s Academy (Xinjiang jingguan gaodeng zhuanke xuexiao xuebao</i>; 新疆警官高等专科学校学报).</p>	<p>Volume/Issue: January 2009, Volume 29, No. 1, pp. 8-10.</p>
<p>Authors: Guo Jie (郭杰) and Mei Songlin (梅松林)</p>	<p>Authors Institutional Affiliation: Xinjiang Autonomous Region Police Officer’s Academy, Investigation Department, Urumqi, Xinjiang, 830013.</p>

BIOGRAPHICAL/INSTITUTIONAL NOTES: Footnotes on page one identify Guo Jie as a male Uyghur born in 1957 now working as an “office-rank” professional researcher in the Investigation Department of the Xinjiang Police Academy. Mei Songlin is identified as a female of Dahaner ethnicity born in 1960 and serving as a lecturer in the Investigation Department of the Xinjiang Police Academy. Research support for this article was provided by a Ministry of Public Security’s Theory and Soft Science Research Support Program project entitled “Research on the Penetration of ‘Golden Crescent’ Drugs into Xinjiang,” research grant number 2007LLYJXJQT037.

ENGLISH ABSTRACT (as printed in original text)

“With the significant increase of opium yield in Afghanistan, drug trafficking groups home and abroad colluded with each other to build up an international passage into Xinjiang by organizations and deliberately. A situation has come into being where commands are from abroad, permeation into central Asia, transferring in Xinjiang, and wholesale in Guangdong and Shanghai. The penetration of drugs into Xinjiang has many outlets and is secret, professional, and international. The threat of drugs from ‘Golden Crescent’ has exceeded that from the traditional drug area ‘Golden Triangle’. The narcotics control in Xinjiang faces a huge test and challenge.”

ARTICLE TEXT

ONE: THE SITUATION CONCERNING THE SMUGGLING AND INFILTRATION OF GOLDEN CRESCENT DRUGS INTO XINJIANG.

In recent years, following the gradual contraction in the production of illegal drugs in the Golden Triangle region, illegal drug production within the Golden Crescent—which has Afghanistan as its core—has climbed year after year (*zhunian pansheng*; 逐年攀升). Afghanistan has already become the world's leader in opium poppy cultivation and opium production. Spurred by violence and [market] demand, Golden Crescent heroin has become the most attractive substitute for Golden Triangle heroin. Foreign drug selling groups illegally entrenched in the Golden Crescent have stepped up their drug-running into our country, and Xinjiang in the Northwestern border province region has been “bearing the brunt of the attack.” With the unceasing increase in cultivation, processing, and transshipment activities in Afghanistan, Xinjiang has already become one of the four major export transit routes for illegal drugs from the Golden Crescent. The illegal drug situation in the Golden Crescent Central Asia region already constitutes an ongoing threat to Xinjiang.

In terms of geographical conditions, Xinjiang's borders are adjacent to eight countries in Central Asia and South Asia, it has 17 Category One open border entry points (*yi lei kaifang kou'an*; 一类开放口岸), and it is regarded as our country's bridgehead and important gateway to the markets of Central and South Asia. Through many years of development, Xinjiang has already formed trade routes that combine highways, railways, and airlines. Transnational drug trafficking groups have coveted Xinjiang for a long time (*chuxian yijiu*; 垂涎已久), and hope, via these convenient trade routes, to “borrow the road to Xinjiang” in order to achieve their evil goals of crossing borders to sell drugs transnationally. Xinjiang's special geographical position, long borderlines, and cross-border ethnic and religious linkages would be extremely easy for international drug traffickers to keep an eye on, and with regard to East Asian drug trafficking networks, Xinjiang is becoming the link-up point to get through to Afghanistan, from which illegal drugs originate.

Following the great increase in Afghan opium production levels and the progressive opening up of many international drug trafficking routes out of Afghanistan through our territory, there has been a dramatic increase in the Golden Crescent heroin that has come across Xinjiang's border. These [drugs] quickly snapped up the illegal drug exchanges and consumption markets in Xinjiang, and soon this heroin even exceeded the market position of traditional Golden Triangle heroin. Xinjiang is now the frontline base in the campaign to block up the source and dam up the river (*duyuan jieliu*; 堵源截流), and Xinjiang's anti-drug work is facing enormous tests and challenges.

As we look at the situation of Golden Crescent drugs being smuggled into Xinjiang, we can clearly divide the time into two stages: from 1991 to 2004, and from 2005 to the present.

From June 4, 1991—when Xinjiang cracked its first case of smuggling illegal Golden Crescent drugs across the border—until 2004, the concerned government departments in Xinjiang cracked more than 20 cases involving illegal drugs, and have uncovered and seized a total of:

- 127.550 kilos of Golden Crescent heroin, opium, and marijuana (*mayan*; 麻烟),
- More than 66 tons of the precursor chemical acetic anhydride (*cusuangan*; 醋酸酐) being smuggled out of the border.
- 800,000 tabs of the psychoactive drug amfepramone (*jingshen yaopin anfeilatong*; 精神药品安非拉酮)

Since 2005, General Secretary Hu Jintao, Luo Gan, Zhou Yongkang and other Central leading comrades have on several occasions issued important directives on the problem of illegal drug smuggling from the Golden Crescent region. They have demanded that [lower level officials] adopt effective measures and halt the expansion of illegal drug smuggling from the Golden Crescent. The [Xinjiang] Autonomous Region's Anti-Drug Commission and the Regional Public Security Bureau have also taken very seriously the work of investigating drug smuggling, and they have ceaselessly increased their investment and strengthened their professional work (in this area). They have built up their corps, and also continued deepening anti-drug propaganda work regarding the "people's war against drugs," "activities to build drug-free counties and cities," all aimed at the Golden Crescent. Given the reality that drug smuggling and infiltration are becoming more prominent every day, such departments as the Public Security Border Defense, Railway Security, Transport Security, and Aviation Security, the Customs departments, the Post Office, and other departments—all under the direct leadership of the [Xinjiang] Autonomous Region Public Security Bureau's Anti-Drug Corps (*jindu zongdui*; 禁毒总队)—have strengthened their campaign to "block up the source and dam up the river," and struggle forcefully against the Golden Crescent. They have achieved definite results in blocking and intercepting illegal drugs outside of the border (*dupin dujie zai jingwai*; 毒品堵截在境外), investigating and seizing [drugs] in the border regions, and organizing and carrying out stern blows anti-drug crime activities that have as their key elements "attacking gangs," "cracking major cases," "destroying networks," "arresting drug lords" (*duxiao*; 毒枭), and "seizing drug money" (*ji duzi*; 缉毒资). In 2005 Xinjiang Police forces cracked nine Golden Crescent cases and detained 14 suspected criminals, and seized 14.215 kilos of heroin. In 2006 the number of cases rose to 24, they detained 76 suspected criminals, and seized 65.140 kilos of heroin—these numbers were, respectively 2.67 times higher than 2005, 3.29 times higher, and 7.17 times higher. In 2007 they also cracked 29 cases related to the Golden Crescent, arrested 50 suspected criminals, of whom criminal suspects from foreign countries numbered 29, and seized 147.386 kilos of heroin and 4,848 kilos of marijuana. The amount of illegal drugs seized already has exceeded the entire total for 2006. From January to September of 2008, Xinjiang Police forces had already cracked 22 Golden Crescent related cases and detained 43 criminal suspects, of whom 29 were of foreign citizenship, and seized 76.232

kilos of heroin. Among these cases, on September 20, 2008, the People's Armed Police Xinjiang Public Security Border Defense Brigade's (*zongdui*; 总队) Border Inspection Station at Kunjerab (aka Konjirap [Chinese *Hongqilapu*; 红其拉甫]), as part of the "Open Road 2008" concentrated anti-drug operation, discovered 17 kilos of illegal drugs in the body of a passenger car entering the border from the Pakistan side. From this, we can clearly see the seriousness of the trend of smuggling and infiltrating Golden Crescent illegal drugs into Xinjiang.

TWO: THE BASIC SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SMUGGLING AND INFILTRATION OF GOLDEN CRESCENT ILLEGAL DRUGS INTO XINJIANG.

Based on an analysis by Golden Crescent illegal drug cases that have been cracked by Xinjiang police in the past two years, [we can see that] illegal drug smuggling and infiltration into Xinjiang is no longer a matter of a few piecemeal, unconnected illegal drug sales, as it was in the past. Instead, it is now a matter of international narcotics trafficking groups who are organized and who are moving with a plan to open up [trade] routes and establish networks—and this potential danger is now in the process of being transformed into a present danger. Illegal drug trafficking gangs inside [China's] border are linking up with those outside the border, and are directing a "Central Asian infiltration" from outside the border. Once inside Xinjiang [these drugs] are changing hands to Guangdong and Shanghai collection and distribution structures. Xinjiang has already become a border crossing route and transfer point. Based on an analysis of cases that have already been cracked, the activities of drug trafficking groups outside the border smuggling illegal drugs into Xinjiang have the following characteristics.

1. The objective of transporting drugs is to travel through Xinjiang on to Guangdong, Shanghai, and other places.

According to several reports provided by the Pakistani police, it has been revealed that out of a group of 22 cases of attempted smuggling of illegal Golden Crescent drugs to China that were cracked by Pakistani police in 2005, those involving Xinjiang numbered 13, or 59.09 per cent of the total. In 2006, out of 58 such cases cracked in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Xinjiang-related cases accounted for 55.17 percent. Of the Xinjiang Golden Crescent drug cases investigated and handled during those two years, most of them were using Xinjiang as a transfer point (*zhongzhuan dian*; 中转点) or as a "point of consumption" (*xiaofei di*; 消费地), the remainder moved [the drugs] on to Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing and other such places, with the greatest concentration of them moving along on the route from Urumqi on to Guangzhou. After the drugs arrived in Guangzhou, they were primarily transferred to Nigerians and other persons of African citizenship (*Ni ri li ya deng feizhouji renyuan*; 尼日利亚等非洲籍人员) to be sold.

II. Drug transshipment lines follow many routes.

The first route is via public highway through border entry points. Since 2000, the Xinjiang Border Defense, Customs, and other departments have cracked more than 20 cases of drug smuggling through border entry points via public highways.

The major public highways that are used for drug smuggling are:

- From Pakistan—to Kunjerab [Konjirap] (Hongqilapu; 红其拉甫)—to Kashgar (*Kashi*; 喀什)—to Urumqi.
- From Tajikistan—to Karasu (*Kalasu*; 卡拉苏)—to Kashgar (*Kashi*; 喀什)—to Urumqi.
- From Kyrgyzstan—to Tuergate (吐尔尕特)—to Kashgar—to Urumqi
- From Kyrgyzstan—to Irkeshtam [aka Ilkshtam, Ilkstan*] (*Yierkeshidan*; 伊尔克什坦)—to Kashgar—to Urumqi.
- From Bishkek (*Bishekaike*; 比什凯克) to Urumqi.

Among these cases, the key border entry point for drug smuggling has been Kunjerab (Konjirap/Hongqilapu) on the China-Pakistan border, where illegal drugs being smuggled across the border from Pakistan were seized on repeated occasions. On October 5, 2006, the Customs Department in Kunjerab, while doing an inspection of some goods being brought across the border from Pakistan, seized 6.406 kilos of heroin concealed in 12,384 bottles within ten cases of depilatory cream (*cangni zai 10 xiang tuomaoshuang neide 12,384 ping dupin hailuoyin 6.406 qianke*; 藏匿在 10 箱脱毛霜内的 12,384 瓶毒品海洛因 6.406 千克).

The second route is via aviation links. Since 2005, the airports in Urumqi, Kashgar, and other places inside Xinjiang have continually seized illegal drugs from the Golden Crescent. Between June and September of 2005, Xinjiang police at the Urumqi International Airport and the Kashgar International Airport cracked five cases of smuggling illegal drugs, detaining 12 suspects, and seizing 6.5 kilos of heroin, all of which were being brought in by persons flying in from Islamabad (*Yisilanbao*; 伊斯兰堡) and Peshawar (*Baishawa*; 白沙瓦) in Pakistan. The air routes from Islamabad and Peshawar in Pakistan to Urumqi and Kashgar have become a keypoint air route involved in drugs. At the same time, drugs have been repeatedly discovered being smuggled into

* A Chinese government website provides the following information about the highway port of Ilkshtan: “As a highway port, the port [of Ilkshtan] is situated in Wuqia County of Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture and neighbors on Aosh State, Kirghizia Republic. Since 1906, non-governmental trade exchanges have been conducted through the port, so it has a long history of trading. From July 1997 on, it has been opened for temporary passage of goods. The port is opened for the last ten days of every month. It is anticipated that annually 300,000 [tons of] goods and 200,000 people can pass the port after the port has been built.” <http://www.xjdc.gov.cn/english/environment/p-Ilkshtan.htm>.

Xinjiang from such airports as Karachi and Lahore in Pakistan, Kabul in Afghanistan, and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (*alianqiu, dibai*; 阿联酋, 迪拜).

Since 2007, in the wake of increasingly forceful arrests in the [Xinjiang] region aimed at blocking aviation drug smuggling routes, international drug smuggling groups outside China's borders have been in the process of thinking up and seeking new routes and channels for smuggling in drugs. Looking at the Golden Crescent drug cases cracked since 2007, we can see that there has been an increase in foreign international drug organizations switching their routes (*zhuan dao*; 转道) for shipping drugs, boarding flights Dushanbe in Tajikistan toward Xinjiang. During just the period from June 11 to June 28 2008 the Urumqi Customs Bureau Anti-Smuggling Departments discovered three cases of moving drugs from Dushanbe to Urumqi, detaining 3 people and seizing 10.167 kilos of heroin. Moreover, the mode of transport for moving the drugs was in each case stowing the drugs in the carry-on luggage rack (*xinglixiang jiaceng*; 行李箱夹层).

The third route is by means of railway. By looking at the situation of Golden Crescent drug smuggling cases cracked in Xinjiang in recent years we can see that the use of railroad lines to smuggle drugs has not been especially prominent. At present, there are two international railway lines that transit Xinjiang—one route is via the Western Spur of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway in our country and the connecting line in Kazakhstan; that is, from Urumqi through Alashankou to the Kazakh capital of Almaty all the way to the end of the line in Rotterdam (*Lutedan*; 鹿特丹) in Holland. The second route is the Asia-Europe Railway (*di er tiao ya ou tielu*; 第二条亚欧铁路). On March 25 2001 the Customs Service in Alashankou seized 2.95 kilos of heroin on an international train on this line; the drug traffickers confessed that they had already transported 9 kilos across the Chinese border on four previous trips. Another route—the Southern Xinjiang Railway's western extension project's China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railroad (*zhongjiwu tielu*; 中吉乌铁路)—has already opened, and this will inevitably become a new problem that Xinjiang will encounter in trying to investigate and shut down the smuggling of drugs across the border.

III. The personnel who transport illegal drugs are becoming more internationalized.

At present, there is a very apparent trend toward the internationalization of the personnel who transport illegal drugs from the Golden Crescent. They have expanded from the past, when they primarily used persons of Pakistani nationality, to increasingly using persons of Afghan, "Central Asian," African, and other nationalities, and this is gradually transforming into Golden Crescent drug lords in Central Asian and related countries carrying out the direction and organization of Pakistani, Afghan, and other persons to move the drugs across the border into Urumqi. In Urumqi they change hands, or are moved directly on to Guangzhou, where they are transferred to African personnel who carry out processing on them for sale within [China's] borders, or move them out of the border to international drug trafficking networks that sell the drugs in Southeast Asia. In 2005, 14 suspects of foreign nationalities who were implicated in illegal drugs from the Golden Crescent were detained in Xinjiang. Since 2006 the criminal suspects detained by

the Afghan police for selling drugs in Xinjiang were all citizens of third countries, including Ghana, Thailand, and Pakistan. Among them are a number of persons who have records of entering our borders on multiple occasions. The cases of drug smuggling cracked by Xinjiang in 2006 reveal that Pakistani-nationality and Nigerian-nationality drug sellers were the main body of criminals who were smuggling Golden Crescent illegal drugs into Xinjiang. Intelligence reveals that within Pakistan are a number of West African nationality illegal drug smuggling gangs, with Nigerians as their main element, who are smuggling illegal drugs to our country. Among the foreign drug traffickers seized by Pakistan are persons from 40 or more countries including Nigeria, Thailand, Tanzania, South Africa, Afghanistan, and Guinea (*Jineiya*; 几内亚). Among these, persons of Nigerian nationality constituted 60 per cent of the total.

IV. The tactics and methods used to keep illegal drug transshipments covert are changing in many ways.

The “covertization” of methods for illegal drug transshipment. Illegal drug trafficking organizations from the earliest times have employed the luggage and goods of travelers entering and exiting borders to move illegal drugs. Today, this trend has developed to the point of using every method including transportation vehicles with large shipments concealed inside, large shipments of goods containing contraband (*da zong huowu jiadai*; 大宗货物夹带), transshipment inside the human body (*ren ti fan yun*; 人体贩运) and other methods, so that the means of transshipping drugs to become more covert by the day. At the same time drug trafficking organizations are actively inquiring about the investigatory and inspection methods and tactics used by our departments, and continuously transforming their methods for concealing illegal drugs.

V. The Processing Techniques [for Handling Illegal Drugs] are Becoming Increasingly Professionalized.

Based on an analysis of the internal and external packaging of these illegal drugs, some of the heroin has been processed and packaged by foreign international drug trafficking groups using professional packaging equipment; their granules are uniform and even, the packages are shaped like dates (*leisi zao zhuang*; 类似枣状), and they possess the capacity to weaken the effectiveness of fluoroscopy. The internal packaging is white transparent plastic, although for the external packaging they use beige-colored [lit. “rice yellow colored”] plastic. They are acid-resistant (*kang suan xing*; 康酸性), and can last a long time without suffering deterioration from human gastric juices (*wei ye*; 胃液).

VI. The Languages [of the Traffickers] are Proliferating

Because of the many languages that are mixed together [among the traffickers]—including English, Urdu, Persian, African tribal languages (*buluo yuyan*; 部落语言), Pakistani and Afghan dialects—their contacts are increasingly secretive (*lianxi geng wei*

yinmi; 联系更为隐秘) and interrogation is extremely difficult. Looking at the examples from a group of Golden Crescent illegal drug cases that have been cracked, the criminal suspects who have been detained have used African tribal languages, Afghan Pashtu, and other “obscure” (*shengpi*; 生僻) languages. These deliberately create a linguistic obstacle to prevent [traffickers] from confessing the facts of the crime, and delay the progress of [our] interrogations, and set up barriers to in-depth investigation of cases.

VII. The Problem of Xinjiang Citizens Bringing Drugs [into China’s Interior] from the Outside is Getting Increasingly Severe.

Based on incomplete statistics from the Ministry of Public Security, between 2000 and 2005, thirteen provinces, cities and regions including Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou have detained a total of 6,284 Xinjiang residents selling drugs outside of the [Xinjiang] region. Based on statistics from the Yunnan Public Security Bureau, in 2002 Yunnan detained 317 persons of Xinjiang residency outside their region selling drugs, and by 2006 that figure had spiked upward to 892 persons. These illegal drug sellers had largely come from the three Xinjiang localities of Yili, Kashgar, and Hetian (Hotian).

In the years from the middle 1980s down to the present, as persons of Xinjiang residency began selling drugs outside of their region, no matter the scale of their activities, the degree of harm they caused has continually been transforming. In the 21st century, a few unemployed persons, some criminals who consume drugs and have been released after serving their terms, and even some peasants from very remote, backward areas, under the influence of a few persons from their region who, early on, became extremely wealthy in drug-trafficking, have one-by-one flowed into interior regions to traffic in illegal drugs. We have seen the phenomenon of the old luring in the new, the large luring in the small. They form their own systems with tight organization to traffic in narcotics, and engage in theft, all as a group. They take advantage of the special characteristics of minority ethnicities, and develop a set of measures to flee arrest and counter investigations/interrogations, and make it very difficult to carry out in-depth investigations and arrests. These persons of Xinjiang residency who are going outside of their region to traffic in narcotics are gradually showing a clear trend toward turning themselves into networks and large groups. There are roughly several thousand persons of Xinjiang residency engaged in drug trafficking in Yunnan province, and they are already showing signs of professionalization, and development into clannish organizations. Quite a few persons have made the transition from working as “mules” to becoming drug lords in their own right. Following the strengthened attack against illegal drugs in the Golden Crescent region, some persons of Xinjiang residency who traffic outside of their region have taken advantage of regional conditions and have already set up drug trafficking branch networks (*fenxiao wangluo*; 分销网络), establishing links with foreign drug traffickers. The opening of routes to transport drugs from the Golden Crescent into [our] borders is putting great stress upon the work of the police as they try to investigate and control this problem.

END OF TRANSLATION

