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Not-Just-Money

/analyses/2018/08/not-just-money

Russian military journalist Alexei Nikolsky analyzes the macroeconomic conditions and budgetary constraints that affect Russia's military.

Gender Issues Post-Bootcamp Pre-Fleet Losses

/analyses/2018/08/gender-issues-post-bootcamp-pre-fleet-losses

This report provides the Navy with a more detailed understanding of why there is a sizable gender gap in attrition rate in highly technical fields, such as Advanced Electronics and Computer Fields, Nuclear, and some Cryptologic Technician specialties.

State of Russian Chinese Defense Cooperation

/analyses/2018/08/state-of-russian-chinese-defense-cooperation

In this CNA Occasional Paper, Russian East Asia expert Vasily Kashin examines the current state of Russian-Chinese defense and security cooperation, Russia’s approach to developing it, and the possible outcomes of a further Russia-China rapprochement. He highlights the historical antecedents to the unprecedently long period of close ties between the two countries, focusing on the mutual advantages derived by both countries from defense industrial cooperation. The paper describes the gradually depending nature of bilateral military cooperation across a number of domains, including arms sales and joint exercises. The paper also addresses Russia’s evolving views on China’s increasing global role and the potential for an even closer Russia-China strategic alliance in the future, concluding that although the two countries are not ready for Western-style cooperation in defense technology, they are gradually moving toward a security partnership characterized by greater integration and interdependence.

AI and Autonomy Understanding and Mitigating Risks

/analyses/2018/08/ai-and-autonomy-understanding-and-mitigating-risks

Given the rapid and significant advances in AI, the strong interest in leveraging this technology from advanced militaries, and the urgent concerns voiced in the media, we examined commonly held concerns of AI and autonomy in war. We found that these concerns, on further examination, were not quite what they seemed on first blush. Some concerns were inconsistent with the current state of the technology, such as assuming that general AI is feasible when most estimates place this development many decades away (if ever). Others do not adequately consider the way military systems are actually structured and conducted, in which AI-enabled and autonomous systems would operate as part of a larger process for delivering the use of force. This larger context helps address concerns about accountability and discrimination. Note that we did not argue that these concerns are spurious—they have value because they can lead to much needed debates and discussions regarding ethical issues of this emerging technology. However, we emphasized that the real risk in a military context (expressed in operational outcomes such as civilian casualties and fratricide) is low from these commonly held concerns. This is important from a risk management perspective because a mismatch between efforts to mitigate risk and the actual sources of risk could lead to the pursuit of ineffective solutions.

Russian Air Campaign in Syria

/analyses/2018/06/russian-air-campaign-in-syria

In this CNA Occasional Paper, Anton Lavrov, a noted Russian expert on military air operations, examines the successes and failures of Russia’s air operation in Syria. He identifies the key structural changes and capability upgrades that made the operation possible. The operation allowed the Russian military to test new equipment and to rotate personnel through the theater of operations in order to gain battle experience. As it continued, the force became more effective, as its leaders learned how to operate in a battle environment for the first time in almost 30 years. The Russian Aerospace Forces’ actions in the conflict increased the combat effectiveness of Russia’s small contingent of forces in Syria and allowed government forces to attain success on the ground. The conduct of the operation can be used as a means of understanding the capabilities and tactics that the force may be expected to use in future operations.

Relationship-Between-Colocation-and-Reenlistment-in-the-Navy-Technical-Background

/analyses/2018/05/relationship-between-colocation-and-reenlistment-in-the-navy-technical-background

This document provides the technical background for the analysis presented in the The Relationship Between Colocation and Reenlistment in the Navy (Vol. 1) and includes the summary results and provides conclusions and recommendations.

Relationship-Between-Colocation-and-Reenlistment-in-the-Navy-Vol1

/analyses/2018/05/relationship-between-colocation-and-reenlistment-in-the-navy-vol1

Report on how colocation of dual-military couples positively effects reenlistment in the Navy.

Memes in US Government Influence Campaigns

/analyses/2018/04/memes-in-us-government-influence-campaigns

The term meme was coined in 1976 by Richard Dawkins to explore the ways in which ideas spread between people. With the introduction of the internet, the term has evolved to refer to culturally resonant material—a funny picture, an amusing video, a rallying hashtag—spread online, primarily via social media. This CNA self-initiated exploratory study examines memes and the role that memetic engagement can play in U.S. government (USG) influence campaigns. We define meme as “a culturally resonant item easily shared or spread online,” and develop an epidemiological model of inoculate / infect / treat to classify and analyze ways in which memes have been effectively used in the online information environment. Further, drawing from our discussions with subject matter experts, we make preliminary observations and identify areas for future research on the ways that memes and memetic engagement may be used as part of USG influence campaigns.

Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean

/analyses/2018/03/great-power-competition-in-the-indian-ocean

U.S. Navy planners should assume that the PLA Navy’s presence in the western Indian Ocean will grow, and that new bases and places will be organized to support its expanded presence. U.S. authorities can no longer assume unencumbered freedom of action when electing to posture U.S. naval forces offshore of the Horn of Africa and other East African hotspots. If China’s interests are involved and differ from Washington’s, the Chinese could dispatch their own naval forces to the water offshore of the country in question. The U.S. Navy faced similar circumstances between 1968 and 1991, when the United States and the Soviet Union competed for friends, political influence, maritime access, and bases in the western Indian Ocean region. This paper briefly discusses this period in order to provide some historical context for what might occur in the future. As Mark Twain purportedly quipped, “History does not repeat, but it often rhymes.”

Redefining Human Control

/analyses/2018/03/redefining-human-control

This report examines the issue of human control with regard to lethal autonomy, an issue of significant interest in United Nations discussions in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) forum. We analyze this issue in light of lessons and best practices from recent U.S. operations. Based on this analysis, we make the case for a wider framework for the application of human control over the use of force. This report recommends that CCW discussions currently focusing on process considerations, such as human control, should instead focus on outcome—namely, mitigation of inadvertent engagements. This allows consideration of a more complete set of benefits and risks of lethal autonomy and better management of risks. The report also describes best practices that can collectively serve as a safety net for the use of lethal autonomous weapons. It concludes with concrete recommendations for how the international community can more effectively address the risk of inadvertent engagements from lethal autonomy.