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Impacts on Field Training Recruitment and Retention

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The Center for Justice Research and Innovation led an internally funded initiative at CNA from October 2020 to September 2021 and conducted case studies of six agencies’ Field Training Officer (FTO) programs. During this assessment, CNA examined common practices and policies that law enforcement agencies use within their field training, such as the qualifications an officer must have to become an FTO, and we assessed the quality and effectiveness of communication between trainers and trainees. In this resource, we identify several considerations and recommendations for agencies to develop, implement, and sustain their FTO programs with regards to recruiting FTOs and retaining those who demonstrate the ability to be successful and impactful trainers.

NATO Ally Contributions to the Space Domain

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The emphasis U.S. NATO allies place on space operations presents multiple avenues for the U.S. and its NATO allies to increase and expand capabilities across a range of military space capabilities.

Russian Approaches to Competition

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Russian strategy is best characterized as offensive, seeking to revise the status quo, resulting in an activist foreign policy. The strategy does not eschew selective engagement in areas of mutual interest, but it is not premised on accommodation, concessions, or acceptance of the current balance of power. Instead, it emphasizes building the military means necessary for direct competition, and using them to enable indirect approaches for pursuing state objectives. Direct means range from conventional and nuclear force modernization, expansion of force structure in the European theater, exercises, brinksmanship, and use of force to attain vital interests. They deter US responses, threaten escalation, and create freedom of maneuver for Russian foreign policy. These are principally ways of compressing the opponent, and focusing on the main theater in the competition, which for Moscow is Europe. Indirect means in turn include military deployments abroad to peripheral theaters, covert action, use of proxies and mercenary groups, political warfare and information confrontation. These instruments are interrelated, with direct approaches, tied closely to military capability or classical forms of deterrence, enabling the indirect approach, which is the principal way by which Moscow pursues political aims. The logic of Russian strategy is that absent the ability to generate strong economic or technological means, Moscow is best served with approaches that reduce US performance by disorganizing its opponent's efforts, reducing cohesion, and employing asymmetric means in the competition.

Maritime Sabotage and Implications for Strategic Competition

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Warring sides have undertaken sabotage operations throughout history to generate battlefield effects, with varying degrees of success. In many cases, the forces conducting these operations have been special operations forces, their predecessors, or intelligence agencies. CNA initiated a quick-look study to examine past instances of sabotage in order to derive lessons and best practices for the future conduct of such operations. To increase the utility of the study for US Navy and US Marine Corps organizations, and because of the dearth of prior research on the topic, we focused our efforts on examining sabotage in the maritime domain. We generated a dataset of maritime sabotage instances dating back to World War II and analyzed this dataset according to a set of coding variables. These coding variables allowed us to perform both descriptive analysis of the dataset, as well as exploratory analysis.

The Psychology of Disinformation Case Studies

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The absorption and spread of disinformation is a pervasive phenomenon across a wide variety of topics and media. Most disinformation research focuses on the source (who created it?) and the environment in which it exists (what platform/medium transmits the information?). Recognizing that disinformation primarily works in an individual person’s mind, this report describes four normal, routine psychological mechanisms that are associated with the absorption and spread of disinformation. We then describe real-world case studies—focusing on activities linked to COVID-19, and to campaigns coordinated by US adversaries including Russia, China, and Iran—to illustrate the way these mechanisms can be manipulated to aid the spread disinformation. The report concludes with multi-pronged recommendations that DOD can use to address the vulnerabilities associated with these psychological mechanisms so as prevent the spread of disinformation and protect both US servicemembers and the country.

The PLA and Intelligent Warfare Preliminary Analysis

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China’s army, the PLA, is exploring “intelligent warfare” using AI and autonomous weapons, CNA analysis of PLA writings shows. The US should prepare accordingly.

Psychology of Disinformation Key Psychological Mechanisms

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We explore the underlying psychological principles facilitating the absorption and spread of disinformation and outline options for countering disinformation grounded in in cognitive and social psychological literature.

Reimagining Defense Strategy

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This event continued a conversation begun at CNA’s September 16, 2021, National Security Seminar, titled “Planning for Tomorrow’s Threats: Overcoming Obstacles to Organize, Adapt, and Innovate.” In this event, we heard insights on defense strategy from Christian Brose, Chief Strategy Officer of Anduril Industries, a defense technology company. Mr. Brose shared his perspective as a former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Chairman John McCain. He is also the author of The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare. Dr. Carter Malkasian, from CNA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The event was recorded and is available online.

Preparing for Tomorrows Threats Overcoming Obstacles

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Preparing for future threats is a vital concern for US strategists. Innovation is one way to confront the threats we may face in the future, but achieving innovation presents organizational, cultural, decisionmaking, and technological challenges. To help strategists and policy-makers navigate these obstacles, CNA’s National Security Seminar (NSS) convened three experts to share their perspectives from their service at different offices within the Pentagon: General James T. Conway (US Marine Corps, ret.), the 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps; Dr. Jamie M. Morin, former Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) at the Department of Defense; and Dr. Francis G. Hoffman, Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University, who was instrumental in authoring the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The discussion, moderated by CNA’s Dr. Carter Malkasian, was divided into two parts: the first identified obstacles to innovation, and the second looked at how to overcome those obstacles. The event was recorded and is available online.

AI and Autonomy in Russia Issue 23

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CNA provides information and analysis of the field of civilian and military AI in Russia and how Russia is applying AI to its military capabilities. Issue 23.