THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA USES DIVERSE TOOLS TO ACCESS FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

THE PRC USES
LEGAL AND ILLEGAL
METHODS TO OBTAIN
UNSANCTIONED
ACCESS TO TARGETED
TECHNOLOGY
AND CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE.

- The PRC has a large "toolkit" it can use—often employing several tools at once.
- PRC methods continually evolve to evade or bypass other countries' legal and regulatory measures.
- When one method of technology acquisition fails, PRC actors will pursue another.
- The PRC can use these methods to impede supply chains by limiting exports from PRC manufacturers, taking control of overseas manufacturers, or hampering business operations.

WHAT TOOLS DOES THE PRC EMPLOY TO ACCESS FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY AND INFRASTRUCTURE?



PRC ACTIONS TO ACCESS FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY AND INFRASTRUCTURE FOLLOW A COMMON PATTERN

PRC national guidance provides insights into the types of technologies and infrastructure that the PRC is likely to target. This guidance is then turned into action by government organizations, companies, and individuals through a series of observable steps. Case studies below illustrate this process.

SONOBUOYS

Hydrophones and sonobuoys are key technologies that could help the PLA improve its antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. In 2014, a PRC national created an intermediary front company, LinkOcean Technologies, to acquire underwater technologies. LinkOcean exported hydrophones from the United States to the PRC without obtaining the required export licenses. End-users were concealed from the US manufacturer and illegally exported products were provided to two PRC universities that are closely associated with the PLA. In 2021, this individual was convicted of money laundering, making false statements, smuggling, and conspiracy to violate US export control laws.

UNDERSEA CABLES

Pacific Island nations have substantial unmet needs for internet connectivity. In 2018 the World Bank and Asian Development Bank agreed to fund the East Micronesia Cable project to connect the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, and Nauru. The cable would have joined to the HANTRU-1 trunk, which links Guam and the Marshall Islands and may carry sensitive US military communications. Huawei Marine Networks, a PRC firm now on the US Entity List, won the project with a very low bid. World Bank projects may not disqualify bids on criteria other than price unless they have been specified in advance. In 2021 the three recipient nations withdrew from the World Bank project.

FROM NATIONAL GUIDANCE TO TARGETED TECHNOLOGY


PRC government issues Five-Year Plans calling for deep sea mapping, maritime monitoring, and related capabilities.

PRC incentivizes individuals to buy, invest in, or steal technologies to improve ASW capabilities.

> PRC actors seek access to **US-made military hydrophones** and sonobuoys that monitor underwater acoustics.

PRC national creates front company to circumvent US export control laws.

US DOJ arrests PRC national for illegally exporting US goods to PLA-affiliated universities. At least \$100,000 worth of tech had already been transported to the PRC.



PRC government issues Digital Silk Road guidance and encourages PRC firms to build undersea fiberoptic cables.

PRC government provides financing that enables PRC firms to underbid other companies in infrastructure projects.

Huawei Marine Networks submits an artificially low bid on World Bank East Micronesia Cable project.

FSM expresses concern about Huawei Marine Networks bid, but is limited by World Bank procurement rules.

World Bank project is halted. US, Australia, and Japan agree to jointly fund the East Micronesia Cable instead.



Department of the Navy.

MANY OF CHINA'S ACTIVITIES OCCUR IN PLAIN SIGHT. PROTECT YOUR TECH BY KNOWING WHAT TO LOOK FOR!

For additional information, please contact: chinastudies@cna.org For additional CNA work on this topic, see: https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/cip/economic-statecraft