COMNAVSURFOR asked CNA to investigate the cumulative impact of manning and infrastructure cuts on surface ship readiness. We observed: Substantial surface ship manning reductions, mostly in lower pay-grades; No evidence of an adverse impact from schoolhouse computer-based training; Poor access to computers/internet may be adversely affecting onboard training; SIMA/RMC manning cuts have lowered opportunity for maintenance shore duty; A gradual decline in ATG manning. We analyzed trends in surface ship readiness and observed a decline in some readiness metrics (CASREPs, CSMP backlog, etc.). We found some evidence that the resource reductions have harmed ship readiness.

Recent violence suggests that extremism in Northern Africa continues to be a challenge for the region. There has been a rise in the number of attacks, with militants spreading into new areas, such as Mauritania. Additionally, regional groups have linked up with Al-Qaeda, form-ing Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). There are also reports that fight-ers from the region who went to Iraq and Afghanistan may be returning home, with new, deadlier skills. Compounding these challenges is the fact that this part of the world includes vast and remote desert areas where criminal and terrorist elements can easily move about, undetected by authorities.

Climate change has the potential, even likelihood, to fundamentally transform our understanding of homeland security, public safety, and especially our capacities and capabilities to adapt to emergencies. In this report, the focus is on how climate change will interact with migration, both as cause of large-scale population displacements and, in turn, as consequence of shifting settlement patterns.

It is costly for the Navy to make changes to relative reenlistment and accessions (R&A), both in terms of spending needed to achieve desired results, and in terms of the effects of the changes on current and future readiness. In stable endstrength and economic environments, R&A spending will also tend to be stable. External events that require the Navy to modify R&A policy will change current relative expenditures, but will also change the downstream shape of the force and influence future readiness levels. Using standard statistical techniques and 25 years of data, we developed a set of simulation models that project the effects of various R&A strategies on total, average, and marginal costs, and their effects on future distributions of senior and junior enlisted personnel. We found that average reenlistment costs were nearly double that of accession costs. More importantly, marginal reenlistment costs were four times that of marginal accession costs. Amounts varied by rating. But, in general, reducing reenlistments relative to accessions saves the Navy substantial amounts of money. However, this strategy results in measurable changes in the seniority distribution of personnel in ways that could diminish Navy readiness and necessitate future costly changes in R&A policy.

We examined how the services screened accessions for language aptitude. We collected data on who is currently tested for aptitude with the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB), and on performance in language training, as well as information on possible indicators of language aptitude for officer and enlisted accessions. Based on our analysis of the relationship between these factors and scores on the DLAB, we identified ways that the screening process could be improved, by either reducing screening costs or increasing success rates in language training. We also made recommendations of what kinds of information should be collected to support additional analysis and reporting requirements.

We examined the impact of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on retention and benefit use behavior for the Navy. We used historical data on increased educational benefits offered through the Navy College Fund (NCF) to estimate the impact of educational benefits on retention and benefit use. We found that increased educational benefits had a significant but small effect on reenlistment behavior, but a large effect on benefit use. Selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) had a strong effect on reenlistment rates and could be used to counteract any adverse effects through small increases in SRBs were needed. We also analyzed survey data of enlisted and officers on intentions to use benefits and whether offering benefit transferability could increase retention. The survey showed that the Post-9/11 GI Bill would lower retention for officers and enlisted personnel, but that benefit transferability could actually increase retention, especially for married personnel. Thus, it is unlikely that any increases in SRB rates will be needed to counteract any adverse retention effects from increased benefits.

This report is a summary of remarks speakers and participants made at a conference CNA held in partnership with Wilton Park and Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), with additional support from Department for Transport, Thales, and Aegis Research and Intelligence Maritime Security.

Policy Options and the US Withdrawal from Iraq

This study examines the exposure of countries around the world to climate effects in the near (2020-2025) and long (2040-2045) terms, and combines this with estimates of their likely future resilience to those effects. Analysis is based on secondary sources. The end result is a list of countries most vulnerable to political and/or humanitarian crises as a result of climate change effects. We find that the greatest likelihood of crises is found in north and central Africa and South Asia, with the Andean countries of South America increasingly threatened over the long term due to glacial loss.

The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) manages diverse expeditionary capabilities and combat support elements. NECC leadership has been concerned that officers are not developing sufficient expeditionary warfare expertise. . This study develops potential career path options that allow development of officers with expeditionary warfare experience who remain viable in their originating communty. Our analysis finds that the lack of opportunities to re-tour in expeditionary warfare, specifically for Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs), has hindered the development of experienced officers. A career path that allows SWOs to return to NECC for a follow-on tour, while not violating Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) business rules, requires officers to fill a NECC sea billet during time typically used for shore duty. This could hinder the ability of officers to fulfill other obligations, such as graduate education or joint requirements. We also find that the billet base is sufficient to provide sufficient experienced expeditionary warfare officers, while still allowing reasonable selection rates for the Navy to fill those billets.

Neil MacFarquhar's initial assessment of the impact of President Obama's June 4 speech at Cairo University.

U.S. policy makers lack sufficient understanding of the populist Islamist milieu in the Middle East and fail to take into account the Islamists? long-term objectives and extended time frame. This is particularly evident in the context of national elections. The observer originally spoke on the basis of non-attribution but agreed that we might make limited distribution of his comments if we preserved his anonymity.

Since 2001 CNA has maintained a database that records the replenishment activity of the combat logistics force (CLF) fleet of ships. Each entry in this database represents a single event between a CLF ship and a ship or port customer. This paper addresses these events and the data on the activity of CLF ships during at-sea periods.

This report summarizes the major themes and discussions from a conference held in March 2009, on China's participation in anti-piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa region.

This manual describes the use and maintenance of the Personnel Inventory Aging and Promotion (PIAP) model and discusses its development, structure, and outputs. Additionally, the manual provides guidance for interpreting the model?s result. The PIAP model can be used to examine the effect of various manpower policy implementations and their future consequences to the Navy?s personnel profile. The user may analyze how policy changes will affect promotion tempo, promotion rates, likelihood of promotion, time in service, time in grade, separation rates, and future gaps between requirements and personnel. The PIAP model resides in an Access database and includes an Excel workbook that compiles, processes, and formats the data for analysis.

A workshop designed to identify new and emerging threats associated with increased flow of cocaine from South America to Europe via West African transit routes and explore options for stemming the flow of drugs through the region. Panelists and workshop participants, drawn from the U.S. Government, European counterpart organizations, and the analytic community, brought extensive knowledge of the region and functional expertise in counter-narcotics operations to the day-long discussion.

We investigated the personnel inventory that would be necessary to meet the Navy?s manpower requirements for the 313-ship Navy. We find that at any time over the 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Service?s immediate manpower requirements could be satisfied with an endstrength of only 322,000. However, we estimated that the Service?s minimum viable long-term personnel inventory will be between 332,000 and 334,000. One reason for the higher long-term requirements is that the Navy will have to add about 3,500 enlisted shore billets to maintain reasonable sea/shore flows for all ratings. Another reason is that the Service will need to add about 2,000 enlisted billets to support a viable ?agricultural tail?-the base of the personnel pyramid that is necessary to grow the Service?s more senior enlisted ranks. In addition, we believe that the Navy?s current manpower requirement plans are based on an overly optimistic assessment of the Service?s ability to cut billets from the shore establishment; we expect that a more realistic assessment adds about 2,000 Sailors to the minimum viable personnel inventory. Finally, several changes in the fleet plan that are being considered will increase manpower requirements by a few thousand.

In support of the IT ?Deep Dive? led by CNO-N12, a CNA team spent 4 days in Hawaii holding discussion groups with Navy Information Systems Technicians (ITs) on duty there. The focus of the discussions was the persistent shore IT manning shortfall. We had a total of 88 participants in 11 discussion groups over 4 days. The groups included ITs serving on both shore duty and sea duty. Most of the participants were serving on shore duty.The recommendations from the discussion groups tended to follow seniority lines. Those who were more junior emphasized pay issues. Their priorities were AIP eligibility for IT shore duty in Hawaii (#1) and SRB/LSRB and COLA/BAH (#2). Those who were more senior (and had presumably decided to ?stay Navy?) cited career issues as priorities: choice of follow-on assignment after duty in Hawaii (#1), reclassifying IT shore duty in Hawaii as OUTUS duty for sea/shore rotation purposes (#2), and special consideration of the arduous nature of Hawaii shore duty by IT advancement boards (#3).

Summary of a joint CNA-INSS roundtable discussing China's 2008 Defense White Paper.

Typically, Navy programs experience some level of concurrency.That is, production of the weapon system happens while some portions of the design are still being completed. The consensus among many acquisition officials is that both too much or too little concurrency is bad for a program and leads to excessive cost growth. Statistical analysis of 28 programs using SAR data show that concurrency alone is a poor predictor of cost growth. However, low levels of concurrency do seem to be associated with higher cost growth.

Scientists now believe that climate change could lead to essentially ice-free summers in the Arctic Ocean within as few as 25 years. CNA was asked to review the changing situation in the Arctic and to assess the operational implications for the Navy. The study was requested to support the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Navy (Safety) asked CNA to undertake three tasks in support of the Department of Navy?s safety program. The first task was to examine recent trends in lost time due to mishaps. The second was to look at Navy personal motor vehicle fatalities to identify contributing risk factors. The third was to investigate Navy and Marine Corp safety lesson?s learned programs. This annotated brief reports on findings drawn from interviews conducted at three lessons learned programs.

This study estimates the economic burdens borne by the family and friends who provide non-medical care, support, and assistance to seriously wounded, ill, and injured (WII) service members. Caregivers of the WII face many economic challenges as a result of being a caregiver. These include making housing/location changes, inability to meet existing financial obligations, additional/new financial obligations, and additional childcare arrangements. Many of these challenges are a result of caregivers having to permanently or temporarily forgo earnings and benefits to be a caregiver. We estimate that about three out of every four caregivers had to quit or taken time off from either work or school. For those working or in school prior to caregiving, this figure is 85 percent. We estimate that (1) the average earnings and benefits of caregivers is $3,200 per month, (2) about 720 new WII service members need a caregiver each year, and (3) service members need a caregiver an average of 19 months. Given these figures, the average earnings and benefits losses for a caregiver are $60,300. Across all 720 caregivers, annual economic losses are $43.4 million.

The Distributed Engineering Plant (DEP) within Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) tasked CNA to conduct a Bottom Up Review (BUR) of the DEP program. The stated goal was to establish more transparency and traceability of clients' requirements through the DEP testing process. In order to address this concern, we examined the process steps, roles and responsibilities, and information-sharing tools involved in DEP combat system interoperability testing. Our analysis shows that one key to tracing clients' requirements through the testing process is additional engagement with the client through collaboration -- DEP personnel involved earlier in test planning and clients participating later into the testing cycle. We have developed or modified several tools to assist in promoting this collaboration: (1) Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for key stakeholders during each process step, (2) A matrix that DEP clients can use to make explicit connections between test objectives and st design, and (3) Targeted analysis that carries original client requirements through the analysis and reporting phases of testing.

Modeling and simulation (M&S) is used to support military training, acquisition, and programmatic decisions, but relatively few M&S resources are reused throughout the life cycle of an acquisition program or shared across programs or between the service. This study outlines a business model that balances the government?s desire for increased awareness of, and access to, reusable M&S software and technical data at a fair price, with industry?s need to protect its intellectual property and receive compensation commensurate with the true value of its M&S products.

The National Guard Youth Challenge (ChalleNGe) program is a quasi-military residential program for young high school dropouts. The ChalleNGe model includes a number of core components, with a focus on academics, physical fitness, and service. In this research, we examine how various aspects of the ChalleNGe model affect cadets, detail the types of schools cadets previously attended, and report on the military performance of those ChalleNGe cadets who go on to enlist. We find no evidence that cadets? characteristics have an impact on how well ChalleNGe works; the program successfully serves cadets from a wide variety of backgrounds, many of whom previously attended poorly-performing school districts. Our research indicates that militarism is a central element of the ChalleNGe program. Graduation rates are higher at more militaristic programs; also, among cadets who enlist, those from more militaristic programs have better first-term performance. Finally, while enlisted cadets still struggle to adapt to the military during the second and third years of enlistment, the first-term attrition of ChalleNGe cadets continue to decrease over time.

Deterrence and Influence: The Navy's Role in Preventing War

This paper provides recommendations to appropriate US Navy offices on the drafting of US Navy ?capstone? documents. It is part of a larger study of the drafting and influence of all US Navy capstone documents since 1970. The larger study has been published in slide format as Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts (1970-2009 ) (CNA MISC D0019819.A1/Final February 2009). This paper provides a detailed set of recommendations intended to be useful to Navy decision-makers and staff officers charged with developing the current and next generations of US Navy capstone documents.

No abstract

This paper highlights 9 major differences between Al Anbar and Afghanistan (particularly southern Afghanistan) and considers their implications for the Marine Corps.

The Report on the Second KIM- CNA Conference.

At the request of the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), CNA convened an executive panel composed of retired senior uniformed and civilian executives with significant experience in managing acquisition programs and portfolios from an AF, defense, and industry perspective. Under the direction of CNA, the executive panel, supplemented by CNA acquisition experts, made a broad-ranging, top-to-bottom assessment of the current state of AF acquisition. We interviewed, in-depth, 48 current and former senior acquisition officials and executives from the AF, the office of the Secretary of Defense, the Navy, and private industry. This paper reports the findings and recommendations based on those interviews, augmented by fact checks and data analysis. Specifically, we made 24 recommendations, and 21 sub-recommendations organized around two broad categories with six topic areas: People--Culture, Senior leadership, and workforce and structure; and Process--Acquisition process and policy, Requirements, and Budget discipline.

The DASN(Safety) asked CNA to identify individual risk factors that contribute to motor vehicle fatalities across the Navy. We conducted a statistical analysis, characterizing the relationship of various demographic factors and career events to these outcomes. We looked separately at motorcycle accidents, an area of interest because of the growing numbers of motorcycle deaths among military personnel. The objective of the study is to determine, in an analytically sound manner, the factors that explain vehicle fatality rates. The hope is that this will aid in selecting tools and interventions to reduce deaths.

The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, Training, & Education (N1)) for the eighth year, asked CNA to organize a conference for the Navy manpower and training community leadership and the research organizations that support that community. The goal of the conference was to help researchers better leverage their resources, provide more useful products, and improve the overall research program. The theme for the Eighth Annual Navy Workforce Research and Analysis Conference held in May 2008, was ?Leading the Change: The Research Community in the Navy?s Strategic Vanguard.? Ms. Anita Blair, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), Acting, RADM William E. Landay III, Chief of Naval Research, and VADM Mark E. Ferguson III, Chief of Naval Personnel began with plenary sessions. Ms. Blair presented the DoN Human Capital Strategy?s vision and strategic objective. RADM Landay delivered the keynote presentation, which focused on the Office of Naval Research (ONR) science and technology work. VADM Ferguson presented ?The Role of Research and Analysis in Achieving FIT?, a total force concept for delivering the right Sailor to the right job. Researchers presented briefings in breakout sessions on manpower, personnel, training, education, diversity, quality of life and related topics.

During the course of the project, Sino?Japanese relations have improved, although the rivalry is, if anything, intensifying. When the project was first conceived in early 2006, relations were close to an all-time low. Japan?s Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro refused to yield to pressure from China and the Republic of Korea to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and demonstrate a ?proper appreciation for Japan?s history.? At the same time, Japanese officials were furious with Beijing for tolerating anti-Japanese riots in March and April 2005, and for having orchestrated a sustained effort to thwart Tokyo?s attempt to gain a permanent UN Security Council seat. In Beijing, policy initiatives to improve relations with Tokyo ground to a standstill after President Hu Jintao failed in his personal attempt to persuade Koizumi to be more responsive on the ?history? issue.

The overall goal of this study is to determine if there are areas in the Navy?s shore manpower that have seen increases relative to the overall decrease in Navy shore manpower, and to develop an understanding of those relative increases. From 1993 to a 2012 projection, the Navy?s shore manpower (military and civilian combined) has decreased by 37.5 percent. There are categories of shore manpower that have increased relative to this 37.5 percent drop. In some cases these increases can be justified by increases in the workload drivers for the category of shore manpower; in other cases they cannot.

At their 15th year of service, military personnel who are eligible and intend to serve for 20 years must choose either: (1) High-3 retirement plan or (2) A reduced retirement (REDUX) and a $30,000 bonus paid at the 15th year of service. This paper is designed to help servicemembers make that decision. We describe the REDUX/bonus option as an early, partial cash-out of the servicemember?s retirement pension that the member pays back in the form of reduced retirement checks over his or her entire lifetime. We calculate how much the servicemember will ?pay back? (the reduction in pension benefits) and we calculate the implied APR or interest rate for this loan. For example, an E-7 who retires at age 38 with 20 years of service is paying an implied interest rate of 14.3% and would see his or her retired pay reduced by $357,860 if he or she lived to 79 years. Even if the servicemember received the bonus tax free, the repayment amount is over 10 times the amount of the loan ($30,000). If the servicemember lives to 85, the repayment amount would be $473,216. For virtually all servicemembers, choosing REDUX/bonus is a bad (and costly) decision.

The War Gaming Department (WGD) of the Naval War College (NWC) asked CNA to identify key game-design issues and to develop recommendations for more effectively representing the linkage between the strategic, operational/strategic, and operational levels of war, especially as applied to future Navy Title X Global War Games (GWG). We researched existing wargame systems and interviewed leading wargaming practitioners, both in government and in industry, to learn how others have conducted multi-level games in the past and to discuss their ideas about how to improve techniques in the future. We synthesized our research and experience into specific recommendations for the design of a game structure and processes that the NWC could use as a starting point for designing future GWGs.

The War Gaming Department (WGD) of the Naval War College (NWC) asked CNA to identify key game-design issues and to develop recommendations for more effectively representing the linkage between the strategic, operational/strategic, and operational levels of war, especially as applied to future Navy Title X Global War Games (GWG). We researched existing wargame systems and interviewed leading wargaming practitioners, both in government and in industry, to learn how others have conducted multi-level games in the past and to discuss their ideas about how to improve techniques in the future.

This paper models cumulative cost and schedule for research and development contracts using the non-linear Rayleigh distribution. Parametric estimation, using the actual data to date of an executing contract, yields independent forecasts of final contract cost and schedule that give early warning of potential execution difficulties to decision-makers. Overall contract cost and schedule risk can also be calculated. The model was rigorously tested and validated against 107 completed development contracts drawn from the DOD database over a 35 year period. A software application was also developed to graphically portray trends and includes automated business insights. In addition, a plan assessment module was developed to evaluate plan realism. This module can be used to assess the realism of a contractor's offer during source selection and to assess plan realism early in contract execution, even before actual cost data are available. The module may also be used to assess the realism of research and development funding profiles.

Differentiating Between Partner Capacity Building Efforts for Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Missons.

In past years, the Navy produced a periodic report containing officer continuation rates for officers with 6 to 11 years of commissioned service (YCS). That report has not been well maintained. In particular, the continuation rate calculations for aviators have been neglected. As reliance on the report diminished, each officer community manager (OCM) developed different continuation rates that were not comparable across communities. At present, when the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (N1) asks for officer continuation rates, there are no standard definitions or calculation methods across officer communities. N104 and BUPERS-3 asked CNA to develop a semiannual officer retention report that would standardize continuation rate reporting across the communities. This is the first report; it covers the unrestricted line only. Using officer personnel database extracts, we standardized the definitions for the beginning and ending fiscal year officer inventories. We also standardized the calculation method for the continuation rates. We asked each OCM to review our work. Ultimately, our sponsors would like to adopt our definitions and computing methods and have a data analysis group in the Navy, most likely the Navy Manpower and Budget System (NMPBS), take over the preparation of the report.

CNA convened several of the country?s leading experts on Persian history and contemporary Iran for a workshop to examine some of the factors shaping Iranians? view of themselves and of the West. In Iran, the past is very much present?tangibly, in the pre-Islamic and Islamic monuments, which are among the world?s cultural treasures, and metaphorically, in the collective consciousness.

Maintaining a corps of highly skilled Marines is critical to the success of the Marine Corps. Such a force is the result of well-conceived and designed training programs. CNA?s training analyses are designed to help the Marine Corps develop and maintain such programs. Our analyses tend to fall into two categories- training assessment, and the economics of training. In our training assessment studies, we attempt to answer the following questions, ?Is what is being taught, being learned?? and ?Is what is being taught, what needs to be taught?? We use a skills-based approach to identify the core skills that a Marine needs to acquire through specific training and to assess whether the training teaches those skills. The second type of training study we undertake explores the links between manpower and the training pipeline. In one sub-set of studies, we focus on the rates and causes of attrition, particularly for first-term non-EAS Marines, and on critical indicators that the Marine Corps can use to better track manpower throughout the training pipeline. A second sub-set focuses on how long it takes to train a Marine, and the effect of the training process on manpower.

BUMED Future Plans and Strategy Office (M5) asked CNA to investigate how to best incorporate NGOs into health-related HCA (HRHCA) missions. In this study, we assessed previous sea-based HRHCA missions from 2005-2007, identified NGO resources that Navy could leverage for future HRHCA missions, explored differences between NGOs, and identified strategic, operational, and tactical barriers to Navy-NGO coordination. Finally, we recommend a planning framework for Navy to incorporate NGOs in sea-based HRHCA missions.

This paper documents the process used to develop the Navy Shore Facilities Investment Model (SFIM) that assigns a performance quality value to existing buildings and structures and then calculates the improvement value to the baseline year of selected project investment portfolios over the future year defense plan. An introduction and copy of the prototype software tool that uses these models and data to produce standard reports is included.

The Global War on Terror has become the Long War, and the increase in operational tempo that enlisted Marines and Marine officers have experienced since 9/11 is expected to continue. Although the Corps exceeded its aggressive FY07 endstrength goal, we continue to monitor the relationship between deployment tempo and retention. We analyze how deployment tempo, measured by deployed days and number of deployments, influences reenlistment and retention. We look at the reenlistment decisions of enlisted Marines between FY04 and FY07 and the retention decisions of Marine officers between December 2006 and December 2007. We find that additional deployments to the Iraq/Afghanistan country groups decreased first-term reenlistments during the FY04-FY07 period. Focusing just on FY07, we find that additional deployments to the Iraq/Afghanistan country groups are predicted to increase reenlistment for Marines with dependents and decrease reenlistments for Marines without dependents. For FY04-FY07 and just FY07, we find that an additional 100 days deployed in non-crisis areas has no statistically significant effect on reenlistments for first-term Marines with dependents but decreases reenlistments for Marines without dependents. Among career Marines and Marine officers, we find that additional deployed days have either no effect or a small positive effect on retention.

As the Marine Corps continues its growth toward an active-duty endstrength of 202,000, it needs to reduce the rate of separations (including end-of-active-service (EAS) and non-EAS separations) for enlisted Marines and officers. In this document, we examine separation rates over the FY00 to FY07 period and assess their patterns. We find that, despite high operational tempo, average separation rates for enlisted personnel, warrant officers, and commissioned officers were actually lower in FY07 than in FY00. There were, however, small increases in separation rates for some subgroups, including females, retirement-eligible aviators, and ground officers with 7 to 10 years of completed service. Still, the overall pattern of separation rates indicates no worrisome trend.

The Enhanced Billet Analysis Tool (BAT V2) is a Microsoft Access application that allows manpower analysts to quickly determine how changes to the force structure and/or shore infrastructure affect the Navy?s overall manpower requirements. BAT V2 provides four major capabilities to help analysts study current and future manpower requirements. First, using data from the Total Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS), it can determine how changes to the force structure (and shore infrastructure) affect manpower requirements and costs within the FYDP. Second, it can estimate how changes to the force structure (and shore infrastructure) affect shore manpower requirements and the size of the Navy?s Individuals Account (e.g., enlisted student billet requirements). Third, it can forecast future manpower requirements beyond the FYDP (out to 30 years). And, fourth, it provides the capability to examine the effects of changing manpower requirements for individual force structure units or shore activities on the Navy?s total requirements. This last capability also allows users to define manpower requirements for future platforms (not yet in TFMMS) and include these platforms in scenarios to forecast future requirements.

In April 2008, CNA convened some of America?s leading experts on Africa from across a wide spectrum of disciplines and perspectives.

In June 2008, in Shanghai, CNA China Studies held a joint conference with the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, on the current status and future prospects of the U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship. Conferees included academics, policy-makers, and practitioners from both the U.S. and China. Report captures six key themes discussed at the conference, including the increasing complexity of the bilateral economic relationship; the role that public perception in both countries plays in shaping the relationship; the misunderstandings that each country has of the other?s intentions; ongoing debates about the bilateral trade imbalance and revaluation of the Chinese renminbi; the purpose and prospects of the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED); and the importance of clarifying both countries? economic priorities and goals.

In this CNA Information Memorandum (CIM), we present a primer on ground combat models with a brief history of combat modeling, a survey of some recent models used by the Department of Defense (DoD). Because many DoD combat models use Lanchester-type equations in their attrition calculations; we discuss examples of Lanchester-type equations and their limitations. The second part of the report focuses on a multiagent-based model, EINSTein (or Enhanced ISAAC Neural Simulation Toolkit, ISAAC refers to Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat). We review a few recent CNA studies using EINSTein to show how EINSTein can be used to examine small-unit ground combat. To get interested readers started with using EINSTein, we show a brief tutorial on setting up and using the program to explore some basic ground combat scenarios.

This is a report of a workshop on ?Russia, China, and India: Strategic Interests in the Middle East? held on 24 July 2008 in Tampa, Florida, for the benefit of U.S. CENTCOM. The all-day session was conducted under the non-attribution rule. Current and former high-level U.S. government officials and regional experts offered their views on the three countries? strategic interests in the region and on Russian and Chinese competition for influence and access to resources in Central Asia.

The distinguished American academic Raymond Hinnebusch, Director of the Centre for Syrian Studies and Professor of International Relations and Middle East Politics at the University of St. Andrews (UK), recently spoke at a France/U.S. dialogue in Paris co-sponsored by CNA and the Forum du Futur. Dr. Hinnebusch agreed to update his very thoughtful and salient presentation, ?What Does Syria Want?? so that we might make it avail-able to a wider audience. The views expressed are his own and constitute an assessment of Syrian strategic think-ing. Raymond Hinnebusch may be contacted via e-mail at: rh10@st-andrews.ac.uk

The objective of this study was to characterize the variety of factors associated with motor-vehicle deaths among Marines. The study points to a number of risk factors (career events and characteristics of individual Marines) that are highly associated with deaths.

This study examines the operational effects of 1206 "global train and equip" programs in Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, Sao Tome and Principe.

Conference report on Transatlantic Dialoge convened by CNA and the French public policy NGO Forum du Futur on Lebanon in Paris, held May 15-16, 2008.

No abstract

The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) asked CNA to conduct background research on Millennials (also known as Gen Y, the Internet Generation, Generation Next, Echo Boom, etc.) to explore the potential impact of targeted policies, including compensation and retirement, on this cohort. In light of these tasks, we set out to examine the following question: Are there characteristics and challenges so specific to Millennials that the military must develop targeted policies in order to appeal to this generational cohort? The report presents an extensive review of current literature, identifies empirical evidence from various data sources, and explores how employers are responding to changing workforce expectations may or may not be driven by generational characteristics. Based on our research and some general findings, the report offers a number of conclusions that may prove helpful to military decision makers.

We evaluate the ?best value? accession source among the Unrestricted Line (URL) Navy officer accession programs. The three biggest officer accession programs are the Naval Academy (USNA), the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS). We evaluate the Navy?s current practice of seeking to access officers from these three sources in roughly equal shares. First, we evaluate the cost-effectiveness of deviations from the ?one-third? plan. Second, we examine whether officers are more likely to achieve certain career milestones if they came from one particular accession source. Finally, we look at how the accession sources provide the URL with racial/ethnic and gender diversity. Our evaluation of ?best value? among the accession sources shows that no single source dominates. We also provided analytical support to the USNA submarine accessions working group and to the Navy Diversity Directorate (N134). The working group made recommendations to increase the visibility and desirability of the submarine community and to change the service selection process. To support N134, we analyzed data on recent applications to USNA and to the NROTC scholarship program and find that both programs will have to substantially increase the number of minority applications to reach diversity goals.

The National Guard Youth Challenge (ChalleNGe) program enrolls young high school dropouts into a system that combines classroom instruction with a quasi-military environment. Most graduates also earn a GED (or other credential) while enrolled. We find evidence that the first term attrition rate of ChalleNGe graduates has fallen over time. In addition, there are significant differences between programs both in terms of program completion and eventual military attrition of those who enlist. This variation may arise from differences either in how the program is implemented or in the population served by the program. We find both factors influence outcomes ? those who come from more advantaged neighborhoods not only perform better in the ChalleNGe program but also perform better in the military if they enlist, and programs with a higher degree of militarization have higher graduation rates. Finally, we make the case that non-cognitive skills are likely to be a driving factor in explaining the performance of ChalleNGe cadets.

The Operational Environmental Readiness Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO-N456) asked CNA to examine whale strandings and Navy operations in southern California, to quantify the level of sonar activity taking place and see if there is any indication of a link between sonar use and strandings. Looking separately at gray whales (present seasonally) and all other species, our analysis found no correlation between navy exercises and whale strandings in the southern California area.

In this paper we study a large new dataset of procurement auctions of varying formats, totalling over $50 million for over 3,500 commodities conducted by the Department of defense (DoD) during the period 1999-2007. Subsequent to Vickrey's (1961) seminal statement of the revenue equivalence theorem, theory has shown that revenue rankings are quite sensitive to the variation in underlying assumptions regarding the structure of the auction game. Additionally, previous empirical studies of field auction data have found limited instances of revenue equivalence in real-life bidding situations. We find some evidence that open-bid auctions dominate (yield lower procurement cost) for semiconductors, switches, and fittings, with savings from using open bidding ranging from 4 to 8 percent. We cannot reject revenue equivalence of the two formats for vehicle parts. Thus, our fixed-effects regression estimates suggest small revenue differences between open and sealed-bid auctions for all four product classes studied, though even in our handful of commodity classes, the realtive performance of auction formats is not uniform.

N-13 asked CNA to study operational stress and postdeployment behavior in Seabees. Seabees experience two forms of operational stress: GWOT deployments and regularly-scheduled deployments to Guam, Okinawa, and Spain. Enlisted Seabees have many more alcohol- and drug-related behaviors than do officers, so the following results concern enlisted personnel. Active duty GWOT unit deployments are not associated with later negative behaviors, unless length of deployment is considered. Alcohol-related events are more likely after long (> 6-month) GWOT deployments than after shorter ones. Incidents related to alcohol and drugs occur both soon after return from deployments (6 months). Reservists express more negative emotions after return from GWOT deployments than do active duty. Reservists had 30 to 45 total incidents per year (alcohol- or drug-related) from 2003 to 2007, but alcohol incidents of reservists are underreported. We recommend that the Navy seek ways to expand support for active duty who return from GWOT deployments of more than 6 months, and that support efforts continue for more than 6 months after return from GWOT. We recommend an expansion of support for returning GWOT reservists and more detailed study of reservists and Individual Augmentees.

For officers in Navy Medicine, this paper provides demographic representation baselines derived from the US population, the civilian medical labor force, and the potential patient pool. Focusing on the civilian labor force, it identifies three demographic trends that are affecting and will affect representation in Navy Medicine: The civilian equivalents of Navy Medicine's officer corps are aging and becoming increasingly female and increasingly foreign. To become more representative of the population, Navy Medicine can pursue two strategic directions simultaneously: it can expand its share of the existing recruiting pool and/or it can expand the recruiting pool.

This study provides analysis in support of development of an education strategy for URL officers. The primarily focus is graduate education, but we also consider undergraduate education. For graduate education, we conclude that the Navy should have a strategic goal of providing advanced education that meets Navy goals and needs, without sacrificing warfare proficiency or officer and family quality of life. We find there are many reasons for graduate education and every officer should have an opportunity for graduate education that is focused on Navy needs. Officer careers are varied and contain little time for graduate education. In addition, career paths inhibit graduate education utilization. So, the Navy should examine the timing of education and expand varied education delivery options, including resident, non-resident, online and short certificate programs, to provide education that fits into officer careers and facilitates education utilization. The Navy should expand PME to broaden officers? knowledge of the Navy beyond their communities. Finally, the Navy should take steps to remove institutional barriers, such as commands having no incentives to support graduate education.

This report details the data analysis done to support the development of an education strategy for Navy URL officers. The Navy is a technical institution, and is believed that URL officers must have a technical background to succeed. Within an officer's career, however, there is a shift in job requirements from tactical proficiency to decision-making and critical thinking. Our analysis finds that the proportion of URL officers with a technical undergraduate degree has not declined in recent years. Recent increases in female accessions have not caused a drop in the proportion of officers with technical degrees. Previous results have shown that technical officers are more likely to pass initial training, but there are no further impacts on an officer's career. The graduate education data show that URL officers typically obtain degrees early in their careers and most officers have a graduate degree by the time they are commanders. We show that there is limited time in the URL officer's career path for in-resident graduate education. Aviators have the least room in the career path for graduate education. We also find that the utilization of graduate education is very low, in part due to problems with the assignment process.

A standard method of comparing military and civilian compensation is to focus on the cash portion of the compensation package. Studies have shown that on average, Regular Military Compensation (RMC) compares favorably with the earned income of the 70th percentile full-time civilians of similar education levels. However, looking only at cash ignores differences in the relative value of military and civilian non-cash benefits, and is akin to assuming they are equal. We show that military benefits are more valuable using 2005 data to estimate the differences in the relative values of three important benefits: the State and FICA military tax advantages, the health care benefit, and the retirement benefit. We add these differences in values to military cash compensation to form a more accurate ?benefits-equal comparison of military and civilian compensation packages. The top line dollar amount estimated by this method is called Military Annual Compensation (MAC), and compares favorably with the 80th percentile earned income for comparable civilians. Our analysis finds that the annual values of the military benefits are greater by amounts ranging from roughly $3,700 to $28,000, depending upon rank and length of service. Future comparisons of military and civilian compensation packages should include non-cash benefits.

CNA conducted a study for the Chief of Naval Personnel in support of the development of an Education Strategy for the Navy. One major issue is the undergraduate education of officers, in particular, the need for a technical education background. This paper reports on analysis directed at looking for empirical evidence that a technical education has an impact on tactical proficiency. Using 1) a sample of laser-guided bomb (LGB) data on combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 2) a sample of destroyers and submarines that either won a Battle E Award or did not, we find no evidence that a tactical education enhances tactical performance. Officers with technical educations did not hit more targets in OEF/OIF than their counterparts with nontechnical educations. Similarly, destroyers and submarines that won a Battle E did not have a higher percentage of officers with technical education backgrounds.

The current military retirement system dates back to 1947, when Congress implemented a common 20-year system for all services and for officers and enlisted personnel alike. Over the years, critics have charged that the system is (1) excessively costly and unfair to taxpayers, (2) inefficient, (3) unfair to the vast majority of entrants who do not serve long enough to receive any benefits, and (4) inflexible and hampers force management. The purpose of this paper is to provide the 10th QRMC with a discussion of the issues relating to the military retirement system. To set the stage for the discussion that follows, the first main section outlines what a personnel system should do. Here, the purposes of compensation and personnel policy are reviewed and certain institutional constraints that influence the structure of the military compensation system are identified. The next section highlights the structure of the current compensation system and the outcomes that result from this structure. The third main section evaluates the past criticisms of the retirement system. The fourth section discusses the retirement reform recommendations of several past commissions and identifies the broad features of a revised system.

Increased requirements for the Navy Reserve in support of the Global War on Terror have not been distributed evenly across communities; some Limited-Supply/High-Demand (LS/HD) skills are experiencing difficulties in meeting mission requirements. We develop metrics to measure and monitor the Reserve Component's capacity to meet LS/HD missions and suggest strategies to mitigate manning shortfalls. We construct a model that estimates the ratio of the number of mobilizable reservists that will be available for each mobilization requirement in each quarter for the next 3 years. Working with our sponsor, we established a threshold of 6 mobilizable reservists for each requirement to indicate when a skill is LS/HD. We predict the ratio for 42 enlisted ratings and 14 officer designators. According to our estimates, 31 enlisted ratings and 4 officer designators either already are, or will be, LS/HD within the next 3 years in one or more paygrades. We then illustrate with the Builder (BU) rating how to conduct sensitivity analyses to see the effect on capacity and help identify strategies for improvement. Specifically, we show what would happen to the ratio if continuation rates were increased, if recruiting were increased, or if the mission were decreased.

We examined the impact of changing recruit quality and recruiting resources on the first term performance of Navy sailors. We identified two key performance measures: completion of enlistment and promotion rates. We found that education, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, and time in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) affected these performance outcomes. We constructed scenarios to examine how changing these factors would affect first term performance, based on the Navy?s recent history on recruit quality and DEP policy. We found that changing recruit quality had a small impact on completion rates, but a much larger effect on job performance, as measured by promotion rates. When we examined DEP policy, we found that changes in DEP time produced larger changes in first term performance than recruit quality. We compared three alternatives for absorbing a shortfall in recruiting resources: decreasing the size of the DEP, lowering AFQT standards, and enlisting more non-graduates with high AFQT scores. We found that recruiting more high AFQT non-graduates would have the smallest long-term impact on performance.

The large size and cost of the Navy's shore establishment make it imperative that the Navy have an effective and efficient shore manpower requirements determination process (SMRDP). Such an SMRDP implies having both the right number and right mix of shore personnel. N12 asked CNA to develop recommendations for how to make the Navy's SMRDP more effective and efficient. The Navy's current SMRDP has several serious problems, including poor management oversight and lack of accountability, little to no standardization between (and possibly within) Budget Submitting Offices (BSOs), unqualified staff with major roles in SMRDP, overstaffing and staffing with incorrect personnel, and failure to give good incentives to BSOs. In this study, CNA developed several recommendations, including: building a set of SMRDP guidelines for all BSOs to follow, not applying the sea requirements process to shore requirements, making all Rotation and Career Progression billets subject to cost analysis and review, taking a harder look at all billets ineligible for competition by tradition or DoD decision, aligning incentives of BSOs and Navy for use of military manpower, using activity-based costing or similar methodology to calculate actual (not estimated) cost of activities, and increasing training for staff involved in shore manpower requirements determination.

This study, sponsored by Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command, identifies the future missions, concepts of operations, and capability requirements for the Iraqi Navy, and recommends a force structure for 2015 and beyond. We found that the Iraqi Navy will need two patrol boats; six fast, armed shallow-draft boats; three harbor patrol craft; three armed helicopters; coastal artillery; fixed radar; automatic identification systems; forward-looking infrared equipment; specialized units for diving, mine countermeasures, and explosive ordnance disposal; and equipment to provide flexible and secure command, control, and communications. This study was well received by the sponsor and the Iraqi Navy, and the Iraqi Minister of Defense has incorporated our recommendations into the navy's force structure plan for 2008-2020.

As part of its research support for the 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, CNA was asked to analyze various quality of life (QoL) programs. Based on our review of the existing literature, we focus on more traditional QoL programs, such as commissaries. Using data from the DMDC's December 2006 Status of Forces Survey, we find that those who use the community center, child care, or commissary are much more likely to intend to stay in the military compared with those who have the programs available and do not use them. Use of any QoL program represents a type of engagement in the military and should therefore be encouraged. The majority of servicemembers expressed a preference for keeping access to specific QoL programs open to family members instead of a cash voucher system. However, we find that servicemembers undervalue the cost of their benefits, both in how much they perceive their benefits cost the military and in how easy they think it would be to find similar income and benefits in the civilian world. In the case of retirement plans, those who were satisfied with the current system were much more likely to plan to continue serving in the military.

As the U.S. and coalition forces prosecute the Global War on Terrorism and support other contingency operations around the world, the demand for Navy manpower to augment deployed forces from all Services has increased dramatically. These manpower augmentation requirements represent unfunded, unplanned, but necessary allotments of Navy personnel to augment existing units and organizations so that Navy and Combatant Commanders can effectively perform their assigned missions. Active duty Servicemembers who are pulled from their current commands and sent on TAD orders to fill these requirements are known as Individual Augmentees (IAs). With this increased demand has come concern about the Navy's ability to continue to effectively provide manpower to support these requests. To help the Navy address these concerns, CNA examined two issues. The first was whether Servicemembers with particular characteristics were more likely to be selected for IA assignments. Some characteristics, such as paygrade and occupation, may be explicit requirements of the IA request, while others, such as race/ethnicity and marital status, are not. The second issue was whether IA assignments have affected the career progression of active duty Servicemembers. Of particular interest are the effects on retention, promotion, and sea/shore rotation for active duty enlisted Sailors and officers.

At their 15th year of service, military personnel who are eligible and intend to serve for 20 years must choose (1) High-3 retirement plan or (2) a reduced retirement (REDUX) and $30,000 bonus at the 15th year of service. This paper is designed to help servicemembers make that decision. We describe the bonus in the second choice as an early, partial cash-out of the servicemember's retirement pension, as the member with pay back the bonus in the form of reduced retirement checks over the entire lifetime. We calculate how much the servicemember will "pay back" (the reduction in pension benefits) and we calculate the implied APR or interest rate for this loan. For example, an E-7 who retired in 2006 at age 38 is paying an implied interest rate of 14.0% and would see retired pay reduced by $344,434 if he or she lived to 79 years. Even if the servicemember received the bonus tax free, the repayment amount is over 10 times the amount of the loan ($30,000). If the servicemember lives to 85, the repayment amount would be $455,463.

The Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13) sponsored this study to help determine to what extent enlisted sea tours are completed and extended, the sources of incomplete tours, and what policy options might effectively increase completions. A 2002 CNA study raised alarm regarding the percentage of tours that were not completed. We were asked to update the study and improve understanding of tour completion. First, we examine the proper metrics for evaluating the success of a tour. We then compute the percentage of incomplete tours and examine factors which cause variations in completion rates and in the sea time contributed by each tour. Finally, we discuss policy options that would be the most effective in increasing the amount of sea time.

This study is part of an analysis of lateral entry as a personnel management tool for Navy enlisted personnel and officers. For officers, a critical personnel management challenge is that retention rates for women are substantially lower than those for men, particularly in the unrestricted line (URL) communities. Traditional retention tools, such as continuation bonuses, do not appear to be closing the gap in the male/female retention rates. Likewise, the observable characteristics that affect female stay/leave decisions do not translate into feasible accession or retention policies. However, survey and focus group results for both male and female officers suggest that taking time away from the active duty career to achieve a better work/life balance could help retention so long as career progression is not hindered. These breaks in service, called off-on ramps, could help achieve a better work/life balance and improve retention, although some laws and traditions must be modified to accommodate the off-on ramps. We reviewed the male/female retention rate differences in the Surface Warfare, Judge Advocate General, and Meteorology/Oceanography communities. Although the retention patterns are different across the communities, and community leaders cite different management challenges, we find that all three communities could benefit from off-on ramp programs.

The Aegis Fire Controlman FC(A) community is currently undermanned at sea. This is largely because the Navy accessed Sailors to fill total FC(A) billets, which were too few due to a shortage of FC(A) shore billets. The Navy wants to have enough shore billets to accommodate projected sea-shore rotation needs. However, the Navy is concerned that adding non-FC related shore billets will decrease readiness and retention. In this study, CNA studied the effects of shore billets on retention and promotion of FC(A) sailors. We found that those who served in CONUS non-instructor, non-high-skill billets had relatively poor retention to 123 months and promotion to E-6 by 109 months. Instructors and recruiters tended to have higher promotion and retention rates, while those in non-instructor high-skill billets did not show significantly higher promotion and retention rates than those in CONUS non-instructor, non-high-skill billets. From these results, we recommend that the Navy remilitarize instructor billets when possible and continue to aggressively pursue sea duty incentives like Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP). The Navy should also allow willing FC(A) Sailors to serve in recruiter, OCONUS, or non-FC instructor billets.

This CRM summarizes 37 Air Force servicemembers' perceptions of the role of group diversity in determining group performance in the combat environment. The summary is based analyses of interview transcripts that were coded to separately analyze respondents' perceptions about the impact of diversity and the skills, knowledge, and experience needed to manage it. According to our analysis, the two main ways diversity was perceived to affect mission capability were in terms of group dynamics and mission accomplishment. Discussions about group dynamics related to communication, group cohesion, and trust. Discussions about mission accomplishment related to having the right people or skills to perform the tasks at hand and/or having a wide enough range of perspectives to generate creative, appropriate solutions to problems. Respondents' perceptions about diversity management indicated that the required skills can and should be purposefully developed with training and through career experience. In general, the training should provide tools to both leverage diversity for benefits and manage it to avoid costs. Some training should provide information about relevant other groups and emphasize respect for differences. Most training, however, should focus on concrete aspects of process management.

The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, Training & Education (N1)) has for the seventh year, asked CNA to organize a conference for the Navy manpower and training community leadership and the research organizations that support that community. The conference was held in May of 2007 and like previous conferences it was a success. Once again, the goal of the conference was to help researchers better leverage their resources, provide more useful products, and improve the overall research program. The theme of the Seventh Annual Navy Workforce Research and Analysis Conference was "The Road to a 2025 Total Force." The title of the keynote address by ADM Patrick M. Walsh, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, was "Navy 2025—Our Role in Joint Ops and Around the World." Researchers presented briefings in breakout sessions on manpower, personnel, training, education and related topics such as: Thinking about the Navy's Future, Civilian Workforce Issues, Officer Education Issues, Reserve Issues, Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Recruit, Attrition, Retention, Compensation, Diversity, and the Supply Chain. This conference report summarizes each of the breakout sessions.

This Conference was the first in a series of collaborative events between CNA and KIMS. The primary objective of the series is to assist in improving the working relationship between the US Navy and the Republic of Korea Navy. The concept is to provide a Track II venue where retired and serving officers from both navies, along with civilian experts, can meet in a scholarly/unofficial atmosphere that permits a candid exchange of views on strategic outlooks and shared interests associated with the maritime domain. This conference was specific deliverable associated with the CNA project entitled "Asset Utilization and Shaping," sponsored by Commander Fleet Forces Command in the FY-05 CNA Annual Plan. This task to explore ROKN-USN cooperation is in support of Commander Pacific Fleet. Establishing a relationship with maritime/defense oriented ROK think-tanks was undertaken at the express request of then Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Gary Roughhead.

Our starting point, of course, has to be wargaming itself. What is it? Too often, people in this business use the term loosely, to describe everything from the activity of thousands of real troops and vehicles maneuvering across hundreds of square miles, to the largely intellectual activity of a couple of guys crouched over a paper map and pushing around tiny cardboard squares. What I am going to be talking about here are REAL wargames, not field exercises, analytical models, or computer simulations without players (what I call cazwhips). Real wargames involve human beings making decisions and dealing with the consequences of those decisions, but not the action of actual forces.

To help the Navy study manpower requirements within its support infrastructure, CNA developed the Shore/Support Module to augment the capabilities of the Billet Analysis Tool (BAT). This module, when used in conjunction with BAT, will provide manpower analysts with more robust estimates of how changes to the force structure affect the Navy's overall manpower requirements. The Shore/Support Module estimates the effects of force structure changes on manpower requirements in several of the Navy's shore/support infrastructure's work function areas—namely, the individuals account, training, maintenance, and health care services. For the individuals account, it estimates the student billet requirements for A-school training, NEC training, and Recruit training. In the area of training, it estimates instructor requirements for A- and C-school training. For maintenance functions, it estimates billet requirements at intermediate and depot-level maintenance activities that result from changing the number of ships, submarines, and aviation squadrons. And, for health care services, it estimates manpower requirements for the segment of the health care force that provides medical care to nondeployed active duty Servicemembers and their dependents but is not directly tied to medical mobilization requirements during wartime or in support of contingency operations.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps wants to ensure that Marines reflect the racial and ethnic characteristics of society. This paper examines the accession, representation, success, and retention of black and Hispanic Marines in the Corps' active component. We find that black Marines' accession and representation shares have fallen and currently are below the relevant black shares of the U.S. population. In contrast, the accession and representation shares of Hispanic Marines have generally increased over time. We also assess the occupational distribution of black and Hispanic Marines and find that they are more likely to be concentrated in support occupations. Next, we examine retention and Quality of Life for black enlisted Marines. We find that their retention behavior indicates that they have found satisfying careers in the Corps. The Corps offers black Marines steady jobs with good economic security, and black male Marines are as likely to be married as their white counterparts. Finally, we determine the prevalence of leadership and promotion opportunities for black and Hispanic Marines. We find that black and Hispanic Marines constitute a larger share of the Corps' top enlisted ranks than suggested by their accession shares and they have done very well in officer promotions.

This conference brought together experts, scholars, practitioners, and leaders in the Muslim community to discuss unity and authority in the Muslim world today. Specifically, participants considered these issues within the context of the current "caliphate debate" an ongoing discussion among some members of the Muslim community over the establishment of a modern-day caliphate.

The TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to evaluate how DoD is meeting the congressional mandate of ensuring that its senior military healthcare professionals possess the required executive competencies before assuming command or key positions. DoD and the Services established a joint medical executive skills development program (JMESDP) to meet these obligations. The foundation of that program focused on 40 executive competencies that represent unique skills military health care executives must possess. We evaluated various components of the five medical executive education courses currently offered within the MHS as well as JMESDP. We found that DoD uses a multipronged approach through job experience, education, training, professional certification, and core competency development. We also found that the definitions of the core competencies are vague and difficult to evaluate precisely. Currently, no uniform standards for medical executive skill attainment exist beyond general objectives listed in the core curriculum. Nevertheless, we found that the MHS is satisfactorily meeting its obligation. We offered recommendations to improve MHS's ability to meet those objectives in the future, including strengthening HA/TMA oversight of JMESDP activities and formally designating the Joint Medical Executive Skills Institute as the training resource for the JMESDP.

The Veterans' Disability Benefits Commission (the Commission) asked The CNA Corporation (CNAC) to help assess the appropriateness of the benefits that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides to veterans and their survivors for disabilities and deaths attributable to military service.1 Specifically, the Commission is examining the standards for determining whether a disability or death of a veteran should be compensated and the appropriateness of benefit levels. The overall focus of this project is to provide analyses to the Commission regarding the appropriateness of the current benefits program for compensating for loss of average earnings and degradation of quality of life resulting from service-connected disabilities for veterans. We also evaluated the impact of VA compensation for the economic well-being of survivors and assessed the quality of life of both service-disabled veterans and survivors.

Lateral entry in the labor force is when an employee is hired and placed in an above-entry level position. We examine the possibility for lateral entry in the Navy enlisted force. We analyze two groups of possible lateral entrants: prior service (PS) and non-prior service (NPS) recruits. We examine the experience of PS Sailors upon return to active duty. We find that PS Sailors can be demoted and have slower career progression upon their return compared to similar Sailors who do not have a break in active duty service. We also find that the pool of potential NPS lateral entrants is quite large. However, it will be a financial challenge to bring certain experienced workers into the Navy, such as those in technical occupations. In addition, the current military compensation system is not conducive to lateral entry. We recommend that the Navy build a set of consistent, streamlined policies for returning Navy veterans and recognize skills and experience gained in earlier Navy service or in the civilian sector. In addition, the Navy needs to continue to advocate for military compensation reform and expand the search for lateral entrants beyond PS personnel.

The Synthesis of Marine Corps Analysis study is a CNA-Initiated study designed to synthesize our approaches and findings in three key areas of CNA analysis: operational assessment, organizational analysis, and real-world operations. This is the second of three reports, and focuses on organizational analysis. The goal of organizational analysis is to determine those structures that best meet the demands and requirements of and for a specific organization. CNA's approach to organizational analysis focuses on building an analytical foundation that can be used to determine whether a particular organizational structure is better-suited to meet the demands, requirements, and resources of an organization. CNA's predominant approach is a functions-based approach that focuses on "form following function" and enables an organization to measure itself against specific responsibilities and objectives (what is required). It is not meant to represent a static approach. In more complex cases, we incorporate other approaches including process-analysis. Further, we expect that we will continue to refine and advance our approaches to these types of analysis.

The naval cognate of the National Guard, with both state and federal service obligations, the Naval Militia played a significant role in the nation's maritime preparedness for more than a quarter of a century before being largely replaced by the Naval Reserve and passing virtually out of existence. In the post-Cold War period, and particularly since the onset of the Global War on Terrorism, interest in the Naval Militia has been rising, and the institution has been revived or is in the process of being revived in several states. In some other state the topic is somewhat controversial, as some complex legal and political issues may be involved. On the whole, however, reinstituting the Naval Militia may be of considerable benefit to the nation, the states, the reservist, and the naval service, providing a "force multiplier" in domestic emergencies and homeland defense.

Since September 11th, 2001, the Marine Corps has involuntarily activated considerable numbers of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) to support Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This presidential mobilization of the Reserves represents the longest period of involuntary activations since the formation of the All-Volunteer Force. In this paper, we examine how this increase in operational tempo has affected the composition of and retention in the SMCR. We take two approaches in our analysis. First, we use descriptive statistics to understand changes in the SMCR between September 2001 and September 2006. Second, we use survival analysis to determine the effect of activation on a reservist's decision to stay affiliated with the SMCR.

CNA and the Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMiSS), the analytical group within the Italian equivalent of the U.S. National Defense University (CASD), agreed to conduct a joint project in 2006 on European and American views of the security situation in Europe, with particular regard for the situation around the Mediterranean Sea. The CeMiSS leader of the project contributed a paper on Italian foreign policy. Daniel Whiteneck compared European and American views on the security situation. H. H. Gaffney discussed hard and soft power, noting that it represents a spectrum, not a dichotomy. Thaddeus Moyseowicz covered the experience and future of multilateral organizations in the Mediterranean context, and Mark Rosen discussed the questions of international regulation of the sea spaces.

If selection and classification policies do not provide a solution, where else should the Navy turn? Interviews of SWOs conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School have suggested that cultural factors and the difficulty to maintain a life-work balance are critical motivators of female SWO retention. The Navy has proposed pilot programs, such as sabbaticals and other off-on ramps, to ease the difficulty of maintaining a life-work balance. However, such proposals need broader approval from the Department of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget.

The Director of Medical Resources, Plans, and Policy Division (N931) asked The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to conduct an assessment of the feasibility of converting OCONUS active duty Navy medical billets to civilians. This feasibility assessment focuses on the impact of executing billet conversions as they relate to costs, quality of care, access to care, recruitment and retention, and medical readiness. Based on the billets provided for us consideration for conversion, we estimated the costs of the military billets and the costs of non-military personnel options for these same billets, including hiring local nationals; dependents of military assigned OCONUS; relocating civil service or contract employees from CONUS; and expanding the preferred provider network overseas. We estimated potential costs savings using an incremental approach starting with potential savings estimates without regard to whether the conversions are feasible. Then, we applied various feasibility constraints to provide cost savings estimates in more realistic scenarios based on the availability and actual likelihood of acquiring qualified substitutes for military health professionals. Although there are opportunities to civilianize some Navy active duty OCONUS medical billets, we find that there are substantial risks involved with the magnitude of the conversions as defined by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

On 22-23 February 2007, The CNA Corporation's Project Asia hosted a two-day conference exploring the state of relations between China and Russia, their future prospects, and the implications for U.S. interests.

On February 3, 2006, The CNA Corporation's Project Asia held a one-day conference entitled Asia and the Science and Politics of Pandemics. This conference brought together a broad group of policy-makers, health care professionals, and academics to discuss the political and scientific issues of prevention and planning for a possible pandemic in Asia. The goal of the conference was to focus on Asia as a potential epicenter of emerging diseases, discuss the response capacities of various Asian health systems, and explore health crises as political issues for regional governments in Asia.

The Marine Corps devotes about 65 percent of its budget to personnel costs. Accurate and meaningful measures of effectiveness are needed to ensure the efficient and effective running of the manpower process and to identify possible problems. Thus, manpower performance indicators (MPIs) have been developed to measure performance to provide decision-makers with up-to-date information on a Marine Corps website. The annotated briefing describes 3 types of indicators. The first set of indicators is designed to measure stress on the force. These include rates of domestic and child abuse, divorce, desertions, suicides, attrition, and positive drug tests. They also include information on lost leave, the percentages of Marines receiving family separation allowance, and the number of Marines involved in exercise or unit training each month. The second set of indicators is for entry-level training. The indicators, by military occupational specialty, show average the length of entry-level training and the number of Marines trained in every 12-month period for the last two years. The third set of indicators is for Civilian Marines, both in the appropriated and non-appropriated workforce. These indicators allow the user to look at characteristics of the workforce (age, gender, race/ethnic background, prior military service, etc.).

In most cases, the cause of strandings is unknown. Some identified causes include disease; parasite infestation; harmful algal blooms; injuries from ship strikers or fishery entanglements; and exposure to pollution, trauma, and starvation. A handful of mass strandings of marine mammals coincided in time and location with Navy sonar operations at sea. Although a conclusive "cause and effect" relationship has not been established, there is concern that military sonar could cause marine mammals, particularly beaked whales, to strand.

In April 2005, the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved a concept for distributed operations (DO). Taking that concept, the paper looks at what changes to manpower policies and processes would be necessary to ensure that the outlined DO requirements for sergeant Rifle Squad Leaders in their 5th through 7th year of service will be met.

The Human Performance and Acquisition Assessment Branch (N-173) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to determine whether conversions of Navy courses to computerized self-paced format have decreased time to train, and, if so, whether these savings were achieved at the expense of students' subsequent Navy success in C-School or later. To answer these questions, we analyzed the results of three A-School course conversions. We found that (1) converting courses to computerized self-paced format resulted in significant decreases in time to train (2) these savings were achieved with no apparent ill effects on students' success in C-School or later Navy career progression (3) the Navy should expect that converting courses to computerized self-paced format will result in reductions in time to train of 10 to 30 percent, (4) decreases in time to train results in significant savings, both in man-years and monetary terms, (4) time awaiting transfer, after training, increased for some converted courses, (6) Navy Education and training should give priority to converting courses and content that have long course lengths and high student throughput. Further savings could occur by addressing the increase in time awaiting transfer (AT) that occurred after some courses.

OPNAV N81 asked CNA to conduct a study to analytically determine the global capabilities, capacity, size, and distribution requirements for the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community. To do this, we used DoD and Navy guidance for the community and direct input from the fleet to assess the Navy's "demand signal" for FAOs.

At their 15th year of service, military personnel who are eligible and intend to serve for 20 years must choose (1) High-3 retirement plan or (2) a reduced retirement (REDUX) and $30,000 bonus at the 15th year of service. This paper is designed to help servicemembers make that decision. We describe the bonus in the second choice as an early, partial cash-out of the servicemember's retirement pension, as the member with pay back the bonus in the form of reduced retirement checks over the entire lifetime. We calculate how much the servicemember will "pay back" (the reduction in pension benefits) and we calculate the implied APR or interest rate for this loan. For example, an E-7 who retired in 2006 at age 38 is paying an implied interest rate of 13.6% and would see retired pay reduced by $331,316 if he or she lived to 79 years. Even if the servicemember received the bonus tax free, the repayment amount is over 10 times the amount of the loan ($30,000). If the servicemember lives to 85, the repayment amount would be $438,116.

The Navy would like to control its reenlistments using a timely and responsive process that allows it to meet endstrength, encourage qualified Sailors to lateral into undermanned skills and retain the highest quality Sailors. In March 2003, the Navy implemented its Perform-To-Serve (PTS) program as one step toward achieving this goal. PTS is a centrally controlled, application-driven reenlistment system for Zone A Sailors. In this study, done at the request of Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13), we analyze how the PTS program contributes to the Navy's overall system of reenlistment policies and processes.

The Navy is intent on maintaining and improving retention of its most qualified Sailors. As part of this effort, the Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13) requested an analytical review of the reenlistment program. The objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the current program and to identify changes that would result in a more responsive and cost-effective system. We begin our evaluation by specifying goals and criteria that a good reenlistment system should meet. We then analyze the extent to which current reenlistment policies and processes meet these goals. Finally, where deficits are found we recommend policy changes that may improve the reenlistment system.

This study assessed soldier perspectives on the reliability and durability of their weapons in combat. 2,608 surveys were conducted with soldiers returning from OEF and had engaged in a firefight using the M9 pistol, M4 and M16 rifles, and the M249 light machine gun. The study utilized dynamically generated survey technology in order to screen for relevant sample criteria and automatically adjust for each soldier. The survey covered issues related to weapon reliability and durability including training/experience, maintenance/cleaning, stoppages, accessories, and environment. The study found that most soldiers indicate satisfaction and confidence in the reliability and durability of their weapons. Soldiers are most satisfied with the M4 and least with the M9. 21% of the soldiers reported weapon malfunctions while engaging the enemy. Qualification level and training do not have an effect on reported stoppages. Soldiers who had trained in an environment similar to theater are more likely to be confident in weapon reliability. Rebuilt weapons are reported to require more repairs than non-rebuilt weapons. Weapon cleaning and lubrication practices show little relationship to stoppages and repairs. Most soldiers recommended weapons and ammunition with more power/lethality, higher quality magazines, and reduced size and weight for the M16 and M249.

The operational excellence of the Navy's logistics support system in supporting its own fighting forces is well documented. As the Department of Defense moves closer towards the concept of an integrated joint fighting force, joint logistical efforts will play a key role in the success of future military campaigns. This research examines the feasibility of better integrating current Navy logistics supply distribution practices and organizational structure into the joint theater logistics (JTL) environment. In particular, the report explores the evolving maritime element of JTL and identifies those areas where the Navy could become a greater supplier of JTL support to the other services and Combatant Commanders in both the near and long-term timeframes. Based on this research, five near-term actions were identified that the Navy should consider implementing. In addition, four long-term efforts were also identified that would allow the Navy to become a more central player in JTL support. The key short-term effort involves the increased production and packaging of potable water for forces ashore whereas the key long-term effort would focus on acquiring additional high-speed vessels for both common user logistics tactical lift and maritime force protection support.

The Navy has two pays designed to help attract and retain aviation officers: Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) and Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP). In principle, these tools provide the Navy with the capability to offer compensation to aviators in order to meet its requirements. This study examines the empirical relationship between financial incentives and retention of aviation officers, as well as the relationship between civilian labor market conditions and aviator retention. Our analysis suggests that increases in relative military pay do lead to increases in pilot retention. Responsiveness to compensation is highest for propeller pilots and lowest for helicopter pilots. In contrast, we do not find any statistical evidence of a relationship between pay and Naval Flight Officer retention. We suspect that this is due to the lack of variation in retention over the time period on which we focus, rather than to the absence of a behavioral response. We also observe a negative relationship between civilian labor market conditions and pilot retention. In principle, increases in ACCP can offset the deleterious effect of a healthy civilian airline industry on pilot retention. For Naval Flight Officers, we do not find any statistical evidence of this relationship.

The Sixth Annual Navy Workforce Research and Analysis Conference, sponsored by OPNAV (N1), continued to build on the goal of the Chief of Naval Operations to develop a new human capital strategy for the Navy. The theme for this year's conference was "Enhancing the Navy Workplace: A Competency-Focused and Performance-Based Culture." This report organizes the presentations from the conference under the Department of the Navy Total Force Strategy through ten enablers required for total force integration: Compensation and Incentivization Strategy, Strategically Focused Education and Training, Active-Reserve Integration, Workforce Diversity, Sea Warrior, Human Systems Integration, National Security Personnel System, Policy and Legislative Initiatives, Workforce Planning, and Information Systems.

The Marine Corps strives to maintain a diverse officer corps. Recently, however, the number of black officers it accesses has fallen dramatically. We evaluate the Marine Corps' ability to increase the number of black officers accessed through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Course (NROTC), which is viewed as a source of high-quality officers who have good potential for future advancement in the Marine Corps. Among other measures, we recommend that the Marine Corps better promote NROTC and increase its own visibility within NROTC, consider additional scholarships that consider economic hardship, and evaluate NROTC unit and affiliate placement.

Since the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force, there have been concerns that the military might be particularly attractive to disadvantaged groups. We examine this issue using the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 to compare background characteristics of two groups of male high school seniors: those who said they were joining the military after graduation (prospects) and those who said they were joining the labor force after graduation (non-prospects). We find no evidence that prospects are disadvantaged compared with non-prospects. We extend the analysis using the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 to compare labor market and educational outcomes of male high school graduates who enlisted with those who joined the labor force. We find that enlistees are more likely to attend post-secondary education and that, conditional on doing so, they earn approximately 10 percent more than non-enlistees. The wage result should be viewed as suggestive because small sample sizes did not allow a comprehensive analysis.

The Marine Corps developed a website to provide information regarding deptempo, deployments, operations, and other metrics that could prove useful for unit commanders. We used these Manpower Performance Indicators (MPIs) to generate profiles of selected units in order to display how the information can be put to good use, and to detail what sort of information can be found. We have annotated two of these unit profiles, one for a battalion and one for a squadron, while the profiles for additional units are provided in an appendix.

The Veterans' Disability Benefits Commission (the Commission) has asked The CNA Corporation (CNAC) to provide a study of the issues involved in offering a one-time lump sum payment instead of the current lifetime monthly compensation payments to selected disabled veterans. This topic is of great interest because of the potential benefits both to veterans and to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). In conducting this study, we explored the following questions: What are the advantages and disadvantages of a lump sum program to both disabled veterans and VA? What can we learn from other government lump sum programs? What are the key elements in the design of a lump sum program? Who would be eligible for a lump sum (i.e., which diagnoses and disability ratings)? What would be the cost and savings of a lump sum program? Throughout this report, a repeated theme is the close connection between how the lump sum program would be designed and what its ultimate effects would be. For most elements in the design of a lump sum program, it is not clear which of several alternative approaches would best meet the dual goals of serving veterans better and reducing costs for VA.

The Department of the Navy wants to recapitalize but finds that it does not have as much buying power as it used to. Last year, CNA examined the trends in the Navy's budgets and prices to understand why the Navy could not buy as many weapons platforms as it used to: the study found that the Navy had less to spend on procurement than before and that the Navy's mix of ships and aircraft cost more on average now than before. To reverse the trend and buy more platforms, the Navy needs to devote more money for procurement and/or buy less expensive platforms. This study examined various initiatives or savings opportunities (total of 17) that would allow the Navy to allocate more money for procurement. Taken together, the total savings from these initiatives are about $7 billion to $10 billion (or 5 to 8 percent of the Navy's annual budget). We assessed the risk associated with these initiatives and deemed most to be minimal to moderate risk in terms of cost uncertainty, effects on readiness, or other effectiveness measures. Nonetheless, tough decisions must be made and cultural and other barriers must be overcome before the Navy may reap the savings.

In late 2005 the Wargaming Department of the Naval War College asked CNA to help it develop a new approach to wargaming, one that provides structured and disciplined techniques for accommodating "Fourth-Generation Warfare" (4GW) and related new operational concepts. Even before the end of the Cold War there were claims that the established ways of making war were becoming obsolete. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, these claims have become more widespread, influenced by the rush of events, the rise of new threats, and technological developments. The proponents of the 4GW concept have raised important issues that are complicating the debate as to what is the best way to prepare to defend ourselves. The purpose of this paper is to explore some of these ideas.

This annotated briefing focuses on the detailing process, information technology (IT), and implications for NEC utilization. It was completed as part of CNA's project on NEC utilization. The analysis involved in-depth interviews with Detailers and their supervisors as well as other players in the detailing process.

In building POM programs to meet future mission requirements, Navy force planners evaluate numerous force structure alternatives. Two key considerations in evaluating these alternatives are manpower requirements and costs. The Director of Total Force Programming and Manpower (N12) is responsible for determining the manpower requirements and costs of each alternative. Doing this using the current manpower database systems and tools, however, is a laborious, time-intensive process. To better support manpower planning and programming efforts, N12 needs an analytical tool that can quickly determine the manpower implications of force structure changes. To meet this need, CNA developed the Billet Analysis Tool (BAT). BAT is a Microsoft Access application that uses data from the Navy's Total Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS) to determine the manpower implications of changes to the Navy's force structure, shore/support infrastructure, and manning level policies. It calculates, for a user-defined scenario, the change in billet requirements and authorizations for each component of the total force: active duty, full-time support (FTS), Selected Reserve (SELRES), and government civilians. Results can be aggregated and displayed at various levels of detail down to the rating/designator and paygrade levels. The tool also calculates manpower costs using both programming and composite cost rates.

There is concern that requirements for the Navy's military manpower are being developed with insufficient attention to cost. In this sense, today's requirements may be called "fiscally uninformed." While today's requirements may be sufficient to accomplish the mission, it is important that they accomplish the mission at lowest cost. In this study, we describe the current manpower requirements determination process, identify why requirements are not fiscally informed, and develop ideas for more market-based, cost-informed requirements determination. We find some evidence that supports expectations of how cost incentives affect activities' decisions. Military manpower requirements would become more fiscally informed if the people making the decisions about requirements and authorizations faced the same resource tradeoffs as the Navy. We propose two general variants of more market-based processes for military manpower requirements. In each process, end users pay for the manpower they use, and have greater financial fungibility, or the ability to exchange programmed funds in one appropriation for another. An initial step toward fiscally informed requirements would be to make prices (or programming rates) more granular by manpower type. Flexible-price mechanisms, such as auctions, would result in better prices but may be more difficult to implement.

This annotated briefing focuses on the development of metrics to estimate NEC reutilization rates and associated cost savings, and an NEC taxonomy Navy Detailers could use to match skills and job requirements. It was completed as part of CNA's project on NEC utilization. The analysis involved the development of a longitudinal dataset used to reconstruct NEC training and use patterns.

Address the escalating costs of noise and hearing loss by developing a life cycle cost model of noise on a navy Platform, and show how to apply the technique to the LHD Navy ship platform. The model developed allows the Navy to compute the return on investment of noise reduction methods for either an entire platform or individual hazardous noise spaces on the ship.

The NWC asked CNA to work with its staff to develop gaming techniques to address these warfare issues more effectively. We approached this problem along several avenues of research. Our research into the concepts embodied by the term Fourth Generation Warfare showed how important it is to distinguish what is new from what only seems new, and to understand the necessity of merging the two. In game design, the key elements with which the designer must work have always included time, space, forces (or resources), effects, information, and command. Implicit in these elements, which are primarily the "nouns" of the game designer's lexicon, is the underlying context of the game and the relationship of those nouns to the fundamental "verbs" of game design-the actions the players may take to change the state of the synthetic universe constructed in and by the game.

Given increasingly difficult recruiting conditions, we examine the feasibility of raising the Marine Corps' self-imposed cap of 1 percent on Category IV accessions. We limit our analysis to top Category IVAs (Cat. IVAs)–those scoring between 26 and 31 on the AFQT who are high school degree graduates. We use the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1997 to analyze the national population of Cat. IVAs. We find that the population of top Cat. IVAs is large enough to support an increase in the accession cap. Then, using CNA accession cohort data, we compare the attrition rates of top Cat. IVAs to bottom Cat. IIIB (AFQT between 31 and 41 and high school degree graduates) and Adult Education/1 Semester college recruits. Top Cat. IVAs have attrition rates, both from bootcamp and from the first term of service, similar to those of bottom Cat. IIIBs. We also find that Top Cat. IVA Marines have lower attrition than Adult Education/ 1 Semester College Marines.

This information memorandum describes the forecasting model for the Marine Corps' aviator inventory. The model is written in Excel Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and is contained within two workbooks. The paper details how a user can gather the data necessary for the model, as well as how to run the model. The appendices provide greater detail about the workings of the model's programs, as well as the actual code used.

In the sea base, the MPF(F) and Combat Logistics Force (CLF) will conduct the majority of the replenishment/sustainment operations 1. As the seabasing concept stresses the ability of these ships to throughput more logistics material, we focus primarily on the logistics technology needs of these ships. We define several terms below that we use throughout this document for brevity: � Logistics resupply: primarily pertains to Class I (subsistence), III (fuel), and V (ammunition), but includes all classes of supply [see appendix A] � Hold: dry cargo storerooms, reefers (refrigerated units), magazines, and cargo fuel tanks � Transfer station: Standard Tensioned Replenishment Alongside Method (STREAM) rig, flight deck, and well-deck � Underway replenishment (UNREP): includes both connected replenishment (CONREP) and vertical replenishment (VERTREP).

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) was tasked by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to review the Navy's seabasing concept, identify potential operational problems and propose science and technology (S&T) investments to produce new technologies or significantly improve existing ones. Formulation of such S&T recommendations requires clear definition of the concept and operational construct of the sea base. We began with a review of the literature that describes the sea base and the technologies that must be developed to make it possible. We supplemented the literature review with discussions with experts in the area of seabasing. We examined the composition of the sea base as a function of the type and scope of the contingencies that were addressed by the seabased forces and determined that all seabasing operations, large or small, required a common set of operational capabilities. The needed capabilities can be grouped into three categories: Logistics systems; Connectors; Logistics command and control (C2). We analyzed each of these categories of capabilities. In this report, we address logistics command and control. Analyses of the other categories are reported separately.

As the Armed Services continue to fight the Long War, recruiting conditions are likely to remain tough. With this in mind, we examine recent trends in Marine Corps bootcamp attrition, using both year-to-date attrition and cohort attrition rates. In addition, we document which bundles of recruit characteristics observable at the time of enlistment are associated with the completion of bootcamp. We then compare the relative attrition risk of recruits given their individual characteristics. We find that the recruits who pose the lowest attrition risk: sign contracts as high school seniors, ship in June through September or October through January, are high quality (i.e., Tier I and Category I-IIIAs), and meet the weight-for-height retention standard.

This report provides a reconstruction of the Navy's response to Hurricane Katrina from the perspective of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander-Katrina (JFMCC-Katrina). The role of JFMCC-Katrina was to support Joint Task Force-Katrina's relief and recovery operations, oversee all maritime operations, support JTF units operating from naval installations, and support the reconstitution of naval installations. To support these efforts, the Navy deployed a maritime force to the Gulf Coast. The capabilities that this force brought to the operation and their activities during the first weeks of the response are the focus of the first section of this report. The operational issues section, which follows, expands the discussion of these response capabilities by describing issues that limited JFMCC-Katrina's ability to coordinate relief operations.

As a CNA Self-Initiated Project, the author has brought together a series of strands of national security that he had been working on: the American Way of War, globalization and the U.S. Navy, the Global War on Terror, fleet architectures, the responses of U.S. forces to situations around the world, capabilities-based planning, and a study in anticipation of QDR-06 for the Office of Force Transformation. Of particular prior importance was work on the changing nature of warfare for the National Intelligence Council, where techniques for looking out to 2020 were developed. This paper is in some ways a summary of all that previous work: the state of the world, the state of conflict in the world, U.S. foreign policy, especially after 9/11, the global war on terror, the future of U.S. forces after Iraq, and how the U.S. Navy relates to all this. The paper is set "after Iraq," but at the time of writing, it was not clear when Iraq would be "over," and what "over" would look like.

The Navy began offering Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) for hard-to-fill billets in three geographic locations in June 2003. At that time, N13 asked CNA to analyze various components of the experiment. In this CNA report, we analyze different aspects of the experiment that are now possible because it is no longer in its initial stages. In particular, we conducted an analysis of (1) how overall manning has changed since AIP began, (2) how manning has changed in AIP locations that were selected early in the experiment, (3) differences in the quality, or other characteristics of Sailors in AIP locations, (4) changes in the rate at which Sailors selected for AIP jobs ultimately show up for those jobs, and (5) retention decisions of single-parent Sailors since AIP began.

In 2005, the Navy implemented changes to the Selected Reserve incentive program. The likely retention effects of these changes are not known, so we estimate the retention effect of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses to help the Navy determine the most efficient allocation of Selected Reserve Bonuses. In a companion document, CRM D0013385, we provide a discussion of how those parameters were estimated, our main findings, and the policy implications of our findings. In this memorandum, we list the full regression results.

We examine the relationship between sea duty and first-term reenlistment decisions from FY95 through FY04. Once we control for other factors, we find that Sailors with 4 and 5-year initial obligations are more likely to reenlist if they are rotating to shore rather than rotating to sea over the entire time period examined. Recently, however, there has been a convergence between these reenlistment rate trends that is not explained by any factors in our model. From FY99 to FY03, Sailors with 6-year initial obligations going to sea duty had higher first-term reenlistment than those going to shore duty even controlling for other factors. For Sailors with 4, 5, or 6-year initial obligations we find that a marginal increase in the amount of time expected to be spent on sea duty in the second term does not have a large negative effect on reenlistment. Finally, we find that increasing deployment spells reduces retention, especially since FY00. While we find that marginal changes in sea duty or deployments will not have large negative retention effects, significant changes may. Thus, we discuss how different compensation tools could be used to address any negative retention effects related to sea duty.

In recent years, the Navy has undertaken a number of alternative sea manning initiatives and experiments aimed at improving the speed and agility of Navy forces by increasing their operational availability. Through these initiatives, the Navy is developing new sea manning concepts to support the recently institutionalized Fleet Response Plan. In this paper, we examine the recent inventory of alternative sea manning initiatives and experiments that the Navy has been exploring. These alternative sea manning initiatives fall under two broad categories: rotational crewing, and optimal manning and extra manning pools. We present the evidence regarding how these initiatives work in practice and their relative impact on Sailors. We also consider the potential implications of these initiatives with regard to current manpower, personnel, and training processes and policies, the Sea Warrior program, and meeting surge demands under the newly institutionalized, Fleet Response Plan (FRP).

Statistical methods can be used to assess the risk posed by naval minefields to ships that are transiting or loitering in mined waterspace. However, there are psychological impediments to the effective use of this information, which can result in sub-optimal decision-making regarding whether or how to navigate in mined waters. This paper characterizes how specific heuristics (mental shortcuts used in addressing a situation) can affect decision-making, and offers palliatives that can improve the robustness of decision-making in a potentially mined environment.

The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to estimate the potential cost implications of a unified medical command. Note that this study is focused on the cost implications of such a command. Other factors may or may not favor a unified medical command such as interoperability and interchangeability of medical forces that are not measurable in terms of costs. While we recognize such issues, they are outside the scope of this study.

The study examines the manpower system for unrestricted officers, documenting the degree to which officer inventories did not match requirements and identifying options for addressing shortfalls. Using two different requirement measures, the study looks at the FY92-FY05 period to identify systematic shortages by primary military occupational specialty (PMOS). Next, the study analyzes promotion rates by PMOS to see if promotion rates differ. After controlling for officer quality, we found that differences in promotion rates by PMOS largely disappeared except for a few pilot occupations. In addition, the Marine Corps has used skill guidance precepts for promotion boards when the PMOS is short. We found that PMOSs included in skill guidance precepts were promoted at a higher rate and, for the most part, were promoted above the average rate.

In the past few years, Military Sealift Command (MSC) leadership has discussed with its civilian mariners (CIVMARs) the idea of increasing shore leave. CNA was asked first to analyze the existence and extent of an MSC attrition problem, and second to analyze the relationship between shore leave and attrition. In the first portion of the study, our analysis did not yield convincing evidence of a significant attrition problem. There has been no upward trend in the attrition rate, and there has been no drop in the experience level of CIVMARs. Accordingly, MSC decided not to pursue an increase in shore leave at this time. In the second portion of the study, we found a negative correlation between shore leave balances and attrition. We found that those mariners who attrite typically have lower shore leave balances, and those that stay typically have higher shore leave balances. Based on CNA's previous analysis of CIVMAR attrition we conclude that increasing shore leave would reduce attrition, given that shore leave is a form of compensation and the relationship between compensation and attrition is negative. However, the magnitude of the effect appears to be quite small.

The National Guard Youth Challenge (ChalleNGe) program enrolls young high school dropouts into a system that combines classroom instruction with a quasi-military environment. Most graduates also earn a GED (or other credential) while enrolled. Furthermore, we find that the program has positive effects on those who complete it as ChalleNGe graduates who subsequently enlist in the military have much lower attrition than those who fail to complete the program before enlistment. Outcomes differ across programs; graduates of some ChalleNGe programs have attrition rates that are consistently below those of typical high school diploma graduates. However, some portion of this difference most likely stems from unobserved differences in state populations, school quality, admissions procedures, and/or program policies. To separate program differences from other unobserved differences, we recommend following up on our results in two ways. First, matching the ChalleNGe program data to Census data will allow for the inclusion of variables measuring state and local area characteristics that are now unobserved. Second, qualitative analysis of how policies relating to admission and discipline differ across programs could reveal the source of some program-level differences, and could provide an opportunity for programs to learn from each other.

In 2005, the Navy implemented changes to the Selected Reserve incentive program. The likely retention effects of these changes are not known, so we estimate the retention effect of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses to help the Navy determine the most efficient allocation of Selected Reserve Bonuses. Reenlistment bonus eligibility increases reenlistment rates and the share of Sailors who decide to obligate for at least a 6-year reenlistment contract. Thus, reenlistment bonus eligibility can be used to target personnel to reenlist and obligate for longer contracts. Receiving a reenlistment bonus does not significantly influence the decision to stay in the Selected Reserves; however, continuation rates among bonus recipients and nonrecipients are relatively high. Consequently, if the Navy is considering lump sum payments, we recommend it first be piloted to reenlistment bonuses. Targeted enlistment bonuses can be used to improve Selected Reserve continuation rates. For prior-service and non-prior-service enlistments, receiving a bonus increases the likelihood of completing the first 12 or 24 months of service. Further, the continuation rates of non-prior-service entrants who did not receive a bonus were similar to the rates of prior-service entrants, suggesting that an increase in the pool of non-prior-service accessions would not decrease overall manning levels.

This study hopes to improve the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) and to help the Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) to better understand Selected Reserve (SelRes) attrition. First, we document the legislative authorities for the payment of SelRes unit bonuses and bonus offerings across the Guard/Reserve components. This discussion draws heavily on interviews we conducted with personnel from all the Guard/Reserve components to discuss their bonus offerings and processes for determining bonus eligibility. Next, we document findings from focus groups held with Marines in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). In these groups, we discussed Marines' willingness to affiliate/reenlist with an SMCR unit and what factors were important in their decisions. The study also describes recommended changes to the current SRIP that could help improve its ability to recruit and retain Marines in SMCR units. Finally, we present our analysis of SelRes attrition and the effect of SRIP bonuses on retention.

This study is the fourth in a series of reports that collectively support a revitalized process to assess and track the portfolio of programs overseen by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASN(RDA)). The previous studies were: 1. Improving Metrics for Acquisition Management, Gary E. Christle, November 2001. (CNA Annotated Briefing D0004960.A2/Final). 2. Improving Acquisition Metrics, by Gary E. Christle, Dr. W. Brent Boning and Viki Johnson, October 2002 (CNA Annotated Briefing D0006466.A2/Final). 3. Implementing Acquisition Metrics: Portraying Program Risk for Acquisition Executives, Gary E. Christle, June 2004 (CNA Annotated Briefing D0010289.A2/Final). This report describes an improved process for assessing and overseeing the Navy portfolio of acquisition programs. The study proposes a Strategic Management System for the ASN (RDA). Proposal follows an industry model using an annual operating plan to support a balanced scorecard approach to accountability.

Despite high deployment tempo in FY05, the Marine Corps successfully met its FY05 enlisted reenlistment goals and the retention rate for officers was even higher than predicted. But as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues, there is concern as to how increasing deployment time (DEPTEMPO) will affect Marines' continuation in the Corps. This study statistically analyzes this issue. We find that high DEPTEMPO has had no negative effect on the continuation of career Marines and commissioned officers to date. In fact, we find that—for both groups—high deployment tempo and deployments to crisis areas increase their retention rates. Where DEPTEMPO has had an effect, however, is on the reenlistment of first-term Marines, particularly those without dependents, and non-deployers. Heavy DEPTEMPO more deterred Marines without dependents from reenlistment than Marines with dependents, and those with dependents averaged more deployed days. Non-deployers also had very low reenlistment rates. Unlike in FY04, however, we find that reenlistment probabilities turned up for very heavily deployed first-term Marines in FY05.

A central principle of a Continuum of Service (CoS) is the recognition that reservists differ in their willingness and ability to accept activation and deployment. Furthermore, policy-makers' experience with the All-Volunteer Force has demonstrated that people usually respond to incentives. Consequently, it is believed that changes to reservist compensation can support voluntary participation in a CoS. More specifically, correctly targeted incentives can encourage reservists to voluntarily choose levels of affiliation that meet the demand for their skills. In general, our analysis of choice-based conjoint survey data confirms these principles. The data suggest that reservists have different preferences for participation, even without changes in compensation. In addition, our survey data consistently demonstrate that reservists will respond to incentives. In other words, reservists are willing to adjust their preferences in response to changes in compensation. In principle, then, policy-makers can use compensation tools to effectively implement a CoS. Across-the-board changes in compensation, however, do not encourage participation in a CoS. Furthermore, we do not find evidence that implementing a CoS, or that increases in compensation to support a CoS, would significantly increase reserve retention. Therefore, cost-effective implementation of a CoS will rely on targeted compensation.

The Director, Deep Blue (OPNAV N3/5), asked the Center for Naval Analyses to conduct a quick turnaround analysis that examines a range of issues related to the Navy's decision to establish a riverine capability. This report examines the history of riverine warfare, identifies the services' current capabilities for riverine operations, defines maritime domain as it applies to brown-water operations, identifies where riverine operations might occur, and identifies operational and functional tasks that might be employed by a riverine force. It also examines how well the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command's (NECC's) projected capability (Riverine Group) fits across a range of military operations.

The Navy is changing the way it employs its fleet in order to have a more constantly ready, agile force. In this document, we describe our analysis of manning over the Interdeployment Training Cycle (IDTC). A common perception is that personnel levels follow a "bathtub" pattern over the deployment cycle. In particular, the number of Sailors on a ship is believed to be high during a deployment, to fall when the ship returns to homeport, to stay low in the middle of the IDTC, and then to climb again as the ship trains for its next deployment. If this were the case, it would be difficult to switch to a fleet employment model that calls for constant readiness. We construct and analyze a database that allows us to test whether this perception is true. Our database merges ship employment and personnel databases back to 1982 and provides detail by ship type, time period, and other variables.

Alternative sea manning concepts (ASMCs), such as flexible deployment concepts, optimal manning, and rotational crewing, will modify not only the ratio of operational to nonoperational billets but also the amount and nature of actual sea time associated with being in an operational billet. In this document, we first define some of the relevant ASMCs and discuss what is known about how they will affect Sailors. In particular, we focus on the effect of ASMCs on how sea-intensive Sailors' careers will be. We then look at past, current, and forecast sea/shore ratios to provide a baseline and see how this baseline compares with what we might expect under the ASMCs. Finally, we examine the extent to which the changes in Sailors' careers might affect retention and the implications for compensation.

The paper focuses on the post-9/11 relationship between deployment tempo and retention, especially on differences in responses for Marines with and with dependents. The main text describes major findings; the statistical work is found in the appendices. We found that, at least for career Marines and officers, high deployment tempo had little negative effect of reenlistment/continuation decisions. In fact, we found that officer retention increased with total days deployed or deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. On the other hand, we found that increases in deployed days lowered reenlistment rates for first-term Marines—particularly those without dependents. First-term Marines without dependents also averaged more deployed days than their counterparts with dependents. We focused mainly on retention in FY04, but we also looked at retention patterns in FY02 an FY03.

The Navy workforce consists of three distinct types of personnel, managed according to very different rules. The military manpower personnel system is widely studied and has a rich history of empirical and quantitative analysis. Contractor personnel management is by and large left to the contractors. Navy civilians have been managed according to the Federal Government civil service system, although this is about to change. This paper focuses on Navy civilian employees and how to improve the way they are managed. - A civilian strategic plan provides goals. Attaining the goals requires good leadership—first and foremost—and good people-management skills at all levels. - Improvements in the skill and efficiency of Navy civilians require changes in behavior, not just changes in rules. - DoD and the Navy have yet to focus on how to provide new incentives or change the culture of Navy civilians (or the attitudes of uniformed Navy personnel who manage civilians). - The use of trained human resource professionals in the Navy HR and Civilian Community Management (N11) offices should be encouraged. - The emphasis needs to be on performance management, rather than on performance standards and annual reviews.

The current military retirement system dates back to 1947, when Congress implemented a common 20-year system for all services and for officers and enlisted personnel alike. Over the years, critics have charged that the system is (1) excessively costly and unfair to taxpayers, (2) inefficient, (3) unfair to the vast majority of entrants who do not serve long enough to receive any benefits, and (4) inflexible and hampers force management. The purpose of this paper is to provide these groups and other interested readers with a discussion of the issues relating to the military retirement system. To set the stage for the discussion that follows, the first main section outlines what a personnel system should do. Here, the purposes of compensation and personnel policy are reviewed and certain institutional constraints that influence the structure of the military compensation system are identified. The next section highlights the structure of the current compensation system and the outcomes that result from this structure. The third main section evaluates the past criticisms of the retirement system. The fourth section discusses the retirement reform recommendations of several past commissions and identifies the broad features of a revised system.

Career paths and compensation are ideally tailored to fit the requirements of specific occupational fields and individual workers. Different skills and occupations call for different pay as well as different amounts of in-house training, career lengths, and assignment patterns. In the military, however, career paths and the structure of compensation tend to be rigid and the basic outlines have persisted since before the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force. Most analysts and policy-makers agree that the future Navy will consist of more technologically advanced platforms organized to have a more agile fleet. This fleet will call for a smaller, more experienced workforce that spends more time in operational billets. If these predictions are correct, substantial changes must occur in manpower, personnel, and training systems. It will be necessary to have more innovative career paths. In this paper, we will first show that the Navy workforce is more junior than its nonmilitary counterpart. We will then review literature that shows that this has already created problems. Next, we argue that future changes will make it even more compelling to undertake reforms needed to create a more experienced force. Then we will explore some possible reforms to create innovative career paths.

Early in the 21st century, the United States Navy launched Sea Power 21—a strategy to organize, integrate, and transform the Navy to take advantage of changing technology and to meet emerging challenges and threats. An important part of that vision is a reduced enlisted workforce of more experienced, better educated, more skilled, and higher performing people than ever before. It also means a more flexible manpower system, with significant changes in the shape of the force and in recruiting, training, and personnel policies. In support of these efforts, CNA initiated a project to address several aspects of human capital management, including innovative career paths, alternative military retirement systems, a strategy for Navy civilians, and a proposed pilot in recruiting and training. This paper describes the latter. Specifically, we propose implementing a pilot to recruit pretrained civilians, using civilian recruiters. When fully implemented, the pilot would include a significant number of Navy occupations and technical fields. This is a concept that could enhance the average skill level of junior Sailors, enabling a different kind of force structure in which fewer Sailors are in initial pipeline training and more are in the fleet as technically trained Petty Officers.

Policy-makers and analysts have consistently cited urgent needs to reform the military compensation system. In spite of this broad consensus, however, transforming this system into a set of compensation tools aligned with the Department of the Navy's (DoN's) goals and objectives will not be easy. In this memorandum, we assess the extent to which major, existing compensation tools align with these goals and principles, and recommend changes that would better align compensation with these goals. Our recommendations revolve around three themes. First, the current system is inflexible and does not maximize taxpayers? return on investment. A better-aligned system would expand use of the DoN's more flexible compensation tools. Second, the DoN does not have any tools that are explicitly designed to reward high performance. However, existing compensation tools could be modified to provide this linkage. Finally, the current system is heavily skewed toward deferred compensation such as retirement pay, retiree health care, and TRICARE for Life. The DoN should seek to remove this bias by supporting the repeal of recent enhancements to these programs or, at a minimum, by aggressively resisting any further increases. More generally, offering cafeteria-style health care and retirement benefits would improve flexibility and help maximize effectiveness.

This document offers three studies of the current geo-political climates in Greece, Italy, and Spain. These studies provide an important backdrop to a number of questions relevant to the study of U.S. Navy-host nation cooperation on AT-FP policies. They are important for understanding the larger political foundations of U.S.-host nation relations that under pin the continued presence of U.S. Navy forces in Greece, Italy, and Spain. They serve to remind that cooperative AT-FP policies can be established over the long-term based.

This paper examines an instructive set of pre-World War II military experiments to increase understanding of the process of military experimentation. The paper discusses what an experiment is, the types of models or modeling used, and the issues of technology surrogates and artificialities in answering the key question at hand.

The Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMISS) in Rome, part of the NDU equivalent of the Italian Ministry of Defense (CASD), has wanted to set up a continuing relation with CNA, following a program they had with RAND. As a pilot project, on a personal basis, Drs. Gaffney and Whiteneck responded to CeMISS's request for a study of the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran for both the Middle East and a wider sphere, particularly southern Europe. The study explores what Iran's strategic relations are at present (end-2005), and how these might change if Iran had nuclear weapons. The answer generally is that it complicates these relations and makes Iran a target for nuclear retaliation if they were ever to use such weapons. This document includes the transcript of a discussion in Rome and te briefing presented to frame the discussion. This study is also being published by CeMISS in an Italian translation.

Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) contracts provide services or sup-port where the provider is held to customer-oriented performance requirements. These contracts are not necessarily designed to save money, but rather to maintain or improve current system or platform performance in a cost constrained world. The Navy began using PBL contracts in 1999, and since then, contract managers have reported improved availability and reduced customer wait time. The Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Assessments, Deputy for Readiness (N-814) asked CNA to look at the Department of Navy's use of PBL contracts and determine whether they were pro-viding the advertised results. This study is expands on an earlier study in which CNA was asked to examine the success of PBL contracts for three programs. The objective of that study was to analyze and assess Navy PBL contracts in order to compare expected versus achieved cost savings and identify traits that characterize PBL contracts that deliver the highest return on investment.

Service members now choose between the High-3 retirement and a bonus at 15 years of service with a reduced (REDUX) retirement. Sailors? take rates for the bonus/REDUX have declined since the choice was first offered in August 2001. The paper estimates 2 models (economic model of competing interest rates and information learning curve model) to explain the choice, suggesting that the learning curve model is more plausible. Personal characteristics also play a role in these choices. We find substantially lower take rates for bonus/REDUX for female, better educated, and single Sailors without dependents and higher take rates for black Sailors, those who have more dependents, and Sailors moving from the enlisted to the officer ranks.

The Navy conducted an experiment to test a concept called Sea Swap that involves the rotation of crews on surface combatants. As part of that experiment, the Navy assessed cost savings; however, that assessment was preliminary, partial, and specific to the experiment. This study examined the broad cost implications of Sea Swap. Although we focused more on the framework for assessing costs than on estimating exact costs, we developed some estimates based on sample cases. We recognized that cost implications of Sea Swap would differ, depending on whether the program was mature (sunset) or new (sunrise). We found that significant cost savings or cost avoidance would result from implementing Sea Swap for both sunset and sunrise programs: a one-time savings of about $1.4 billion and $700 million in annual savings for a sunset program (DDG?51), and a one-time cost avoidance of roughly $14 billion and $500 million in annual cost avoidance for a sunrise program (Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)). Because the program of record for the LCS assumes Sea Swap and hence fewer ships than otherwise, the ?savings? are from avoiding costs that the Navy could have incurred under traditional crewing.

This study looked at the correlation between naval sonar operations and the mass stranding of beaked whales. It employed a statistical technique known as a "Bootstrap" to compare the frequency of beaked whale mass stranding events during periods in which naval exercise were and were not taking place in the area.

The Naval War College (NWC) through its Warfare Analysis and Research Department (WARD)-is pursuing a program of research into designing militarily relevant and scientifically valid experiments to investigate shared situational awareness (SSA) in the evolving environment of U.S. Joint command and control (C2). One aspect of this research builds on the foundation of reproducible results obtained from CNA's prior work in the field of measuring SSA in a wargaming environment. This research memorandum documents the support CNA provided to the NWC-WARD for an experiment conducted in the spring of 2002. This experiment took the form of a series of games played by teams from the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the Naval War College. The test-bed was the internet-based game SCUDHunt, developed earlier by CNA and ThoughtLink Inc. for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA). In this simple yet elegant game, players take the roles of sensor asset managers and attempt to deploy their sensors to search a small, gridded map for hidden "SCUD" launchers. Each sensor has different characteristics of coverage and reliability. To play effectively, the players must work together, sharing information and developing their shared situational awareness in order to find the SCUDs and make accurate strike recommendations.

1000 and 1050 coded billets are Unrestricted Line (URL) billets not assigned to a particular community. Thirty percent of all URL shore, non-student billets are 1000 or 1050 coded billets. The Navy needs the flexibility of 1000/1050 billets for control grade detailing. CNA has identified about 600 1000/1050 billets that do not support URL core competencies and should be realigned. The Navy needs to establish URL core competencies, and the 1000/1050 billet base is dependent on these core competencies. The current distribution of 1000/1050 billets needs to be validated annually. Lastly, the Navy needs to ensure that 1000/1050 billet assignment is based on necessary competencies, skills, as identified in the Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC), Additional Qualifying Designators (AQDs), and subspecialty codes.

The goal of this study is to provide the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel) with empirical information on loss patterns in the Selected Reserves (SelRes) since September 11, 2001. Of particular interest is how activation affected the loss behavior of SelRes members. We created a longitudinal database that follows SelRes members from September 2001 to January 2005. The database consists of records from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) merged with extracts from DMDC?s Contingency Tracking System. We use the database to compare the loss behavior of recently deactivated SelRes members with that of other SelRes members. For Reserve officers, we found that post-9/11 officer loss rates were higher than SelRes loss rates in FY 2000, a year with a low number of activations. Loss rates are higher for those who were activated but not deployed (remained in CONUS) compared with those who deployed (outside CONUS). However, SelRes officer loss rates are the lowest among the never activated. Finally, for some components, loss rates increase with the length of activation.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps asked CNA to examine the effects of current deployment tempo on retention. This study, which was sponsored by the Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, reports on the relationship between deployment tempo and reenlistment. It draws on information gathered through a series of focus groups with Marines on the east and west coasts as well as statistical analysis of deployed-day data matched with Marines? personnel records. The study recommends several measures that could be adopted to ease the stress caused by deployments, including facilitating local exchanges between heavy deployers and nondeployers, providing forward-deployed mobile education vans, considering a wartime regular reenlistment bonus, and offering BAH/BAS for outstanding first-term NCOs.

In recent years, states have substantially increased requirements for high school graduation. At the same time, the number of young people earning General Education Development (GED) certificates has increased dramatically. Both of these changes have the potential to make recruiting more difficult for DoD. In this research, we use Census data to examine how the pool of potential recruits has changed in the face of these changing education requirements. Next, we examine how the performance of Sailors and Marines has changed in response to these requirements. We find that education requirements often have nuanced effects on the civilian population helping some groups while harming others. Within the Navy and the Marine Corps, education requirements have had only muted effects to date. In general, attrition rates are not influenced by these policies, but some measures of quality (i.e., AFQT scores) are. Finally, we find that the growth of those holding alternate credentials in the Navy is not related to education requirements at all but instead is related to the recruiting environment. We expect requirements to continue to tighten in the near future.

At their 15th year of service, military personnel who are eligible and intend to serve for 20 years must choose (1) High-3 retirement plan or (2) a reduced retirement (REDUX) and $30,000 bonus at the 15th year of service. This paper is designed to help servicemembers make that decision. We describe the bonus in the second choice as an early, partial cash-out of the servicemember's retirement pension, as the member with pay back the bonus in the form of reduced retirement checks over the entire lifetime. We calculate how much the servicemember will pay back (the reduction in pension benefits) and we calculate the implied APR or interest rate for this loan. For example, an E-7 who retired in 2005 at age 38 is paying an implied interest rate of 13.1% and would see retired pay reduced by $309,460 if he or she lived to 79 years. Even if the servicemember received the bonus tax free, the repayment amount is over 10 times the amount of the loan ($30,000). If the servicemember lives to 85, the repayment amount would be $409,215.

The goal of this limited research effort was to help correct that deficiency. Dr. Numrich's plan was for the wargaming experts at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to work with the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and a group of government scientists and officials with an interest in gaming the GIG. Dr. Numrich would select and invite the members of the group. CNA would demonstrate the processes of designing a wargame to meet specific objectives by conducting a series of interactive game-design workshops with the group. Our intent was to use the workshops to develop the design concept for a simple board game to explore the use of the GIG. In effect, the workshops were to develop a conceptual design for such a game over a series of meetings. Between meetings CNA would work with the sponsor and with IDA to flesh out ideas and identify critical design decisions, and to produce real or virtual prototypes of game concepts, materials, and mechanics.

The Deputy Commander, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) invited the author to observe the first international Special Forces conference ever held, at the Tamp Conference Center in June 2005. This report contains those observations. The main observation was that, given the global war on terror, the need is for country special forces to share information and operations, rather than operate in secrecy like Special Forces have done in the past. The report includes the specific comments of the Commander of Pakistan's Special Services Group, Major General Faisal Alawi, on Pakistan operations against terrorists in Waziristan.

Congressional mandate requires DoD to review its forces, resources, and programs every 4 years. As part of this Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness requested an overview paper on how DoD can improve military manpower management. Given increasing personnel costs and budgetary pressures to control spending, cost-effective manpower management has taken on additional importance. We conclude that the military compensation package could be better aligned with what Servicemembers value. In particular, the value of the military retirement package to personnel is not commensurate with its significant cost to DoD. Furthermore, current rotation policies can significantly detract from military service; programs that allow personnel choice in their assignments would lower cost and improve the value of the overall compensation package. On the demand side, we conclude that current processes increase requirements. Rotation policies increase turnover and directly reduce performance. Furthermore, units and commands do not have visibility into the compensation or full cost of military personnel. Finally, DoD faces several constraints that result in decisions unrelated to the military mission. More discretion in using military personnel funds and relaxing the endstrength constraint would improve the cost-effectiveness of military manpower management.

Selection rates and Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) qualification standards were examined for the USMC Field Radio Operators course. Selection rates for alternative aptitude composites for assigning Marine recruits to this course were evaluated. The selection rates for the current Electronics (EL) composite of four ASVAB subtests were compared to the selection rates of other possible composite definitions by gender and racial groups. The minimum qualification standard was also examined for this course.

At last year's Navy Workforce Research and Analysis Conference, The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) announced that he would focus his efforts on developing a new human capital strategy for the Navy. In the subsequent year, much progress has been made towards this goal. This paper links presentations made at the Fifth Annual Navy Workforce Research and Analysis Conference to the five pillars and objectives of the Navy's evolving human capital strategy: Alignment to the Total Force, Competency focused, Professional and personal growth, Performance culture and Agile organizations.

This study examined the trends in the Navy's budget and prices of its platforms (ships and aircraft) to understand why the Navy cannot buy as many platforms as it used to. We found that the Navy had less to spend on procurement than before and that the Navy's platforms cost more now than before, leading to the erosion in the buying power. The major reasons for the Navy's having less funding available for procurement are: the overall budget is not high by historical standards; the R&D expenditure is at a historic high; and the Military Personnel and the Operations and Maintenance appropriations, while below the historic average, have not come down as much as endstrength and force size. The major reasons for the Navy's platforms costing more than before are: the Navy is buying a richer mix of platforms, leading to higher average cost; individual platforms are more capable than their predecessors and the additional capabilities cost more; the inflation experienced by the defense manufacturers are higher than the general inflation; the Navy is buying smaller quantities of platforms causing higher unit costs; and the defense industry consolidation may have changed the price behaviors of the remaining contractors.

CNA conducted a series of seminars with a Russian counterpart institute, The Institute for USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN), beginning with an initial visit to Russia in the fall of 1991 and ending with the last seminar in December 2003. Discussed across those years were the strategic nuclear situation and its evolution, the world situation and the two countries' roles in it, and the possibilities of cooperation between the two navies. We involved naval officers from both sides in the discussions and visited each other's naval bases. Unfortunately, the Russian navy faded away across this period as Russia was more preoccupied with creating an economy, a government, and solving other internal problems. This report summarizes the discussions across the years and puts them into a broader historical context of the evolution of Russia as a new nation-state.

This paper was prepared for a conference on proliferation networks held at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, from 29 June to 1 July 2005. The conference was sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The general proposition of the paper is that both globalization as we know it and proliferation -- particularly, nuclear proliferation, which is discussed in this paper – started in 1945 with the end of World War II. The spread of globalization, especially after the end of the Cold War in 1989, has been extensive, moving immense numbers of people out of poverty. In contrast, nuclear proliferation has been sparse, with only 8 members of the set and two others (North Korea and Iran) about to join. Proliferation is an aspect of globalization, but it is at the moment a choice of those countries opting out of globalization. The prospects of terrorists getting nuclear weapons are exceedingly remote.

CNA was part of a large Navy wide effort to examine ways to streamline T&E in order to save money. CNA's analysis showed that current Navy accounting systems are inadequate to accurately track T&E costs. This is exacerbated by the fact that T&E is funded by various funding lines. For example, one ship program was found to have funded T&E from several T&E program elements and at least one procurement program element. A better accounting system would yield better cost visibility that should yield savings. In addition, CNA found that the Navy could save money on T&E by adopting more modeling and simulation capabilities. This is especially true for ship shock trials whose costs range from $25 to $30 million per test. CNA also found that more integrated testing and better system engineering efforts could also lead to cost savings.

The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was validated against training grades for the USMC Field Radio Operators course. Alternative aptitude composites for assigning Marine recruits to this course were developed and evaluated. The current Electronics (EL) composite of four ASVAB subtests was examined for fairness as a predictor of performance for racial/ethnic minorities and women.

The goal of this study is to provide the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel) with empirical information on loss patterns in the Selected Reserves (SelRes) since September 11, 2001. Of particular interest is how activation affected the loss behavior of SelRes members. We created a longitudinal database that follows SelRes members from September 2001 to January 2005. The database consists of records from the Defense Manpower Data Center's (DMDC) Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) merged with extracts from DMDC?s Contingency Tracking System. We use the database to compare the loss behavior of recently deactivated SelRes members with that of other SelRes members. For the enlisted force, we found that post-9/11 SelRes loss rates were higher than SelRes loss rates in FY 2000, a year with a low number of activations. Loss rates are higher for those who were activated but not deployed (remained in CONUS) compared with those who deployed (outside CONUS). For some components, loss rates increase with the length of activation. We also found that those with multiple activations had loss rates similar to those with one.

To reduce shipboard manning, USN initiatives have emphasized technical changes, such as increasing the use of automation and remote sensors; using equipment, materials, and coatings that require less onboard maintenance; and making such process changes as performing more maintenance off ship. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the private sector, however, have gone beyond these types of improvements toward more fundamental changes, enabling them to achieve significantly smaller crews than the USN for nearly identical ships and missions. This study focuses on the differences between USN, foreign Navy, and MSC/commercial ship manning models and cultures, identifies the cost to the USN for many of these differences, and recommends ways to achieve substantially smaller USN crews. Specifically, the study finds that food service management policies, technical training, watchstanding practices, retirement and recruitment policies, and the amount of crewmembers' at-sea experience all affect crew size and tend to cause USN crews to be larger than civilian and/or foreign crews on similar ships. It concludes with a number of recommendations to help the USN achieve smaller crew sizes, and describes three possible pilot programs to verify them.

The Navy is in the process of establishing new Naval Enlisted Codes (NECs) for the Consolidated Automated Support System (CASS) operators. The Navy has developed personnel requirements for the initial cadre of bench operators and maintainers. However, with the introduction of new NECs, the manpower requirement for the old NECs may not be valid, and the manning requirement for the new NECs has not yet been determined. PMA-205 tasked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to develop these requirements based on current CASS maintenance data.

The U.S. military responded to international situations, including humanitarian responses, roughly 170 times in the 1970s (that's not 170 situations, but 170 responses -- some in chains for one situation), increasing that total by approximately one-third in the 1980s (to roughly 230 cases) and then again by approximately one-fifth (up to approximately 280 cases) in the 1990s. Add that altogether and you have a grand three-decade total of just under 700 responses, with roughly 40 percent of the responses occurring since the end of the Cold War. This growth represents a significant increase in response totals, but when these cases are weighted in terms of cumulative duration of response by each service, one gets the sense of a far greater increase in U.S. military operations overseas in the 1990s. However, close examination shows that most of the increases in responses are for only four situations: Somalia, Haiti, the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo), and the Gulf, mostly to do with Iraq, and that actual combat covered only 6 percent of the total days of the post-Cold War period 1989-2001.

Since the Revolutionary War, U.S. legal permanent residents have been eligible to enlist in the military. Today, about 35,000 non-citizens serve in the military and about 8,000 enlist every year. As the military continues to face recruiting challenges, an ever-growing young immigrant population could help fill future gaps. This paper examines immigration's effects on the recruitable-age population and the success of non-citizen service members in the military. We find that, controlling for other factors, 3-month attrition rates for non-citizens are 3.7 percentage points lower than for citizens. Similarly, 36-month attrition rates for non-citizen accessions are between 9 and 20 percentage points lower than those for white U.S. citizens. Since September 11, 2001, there have been several policy changes that may encourage more non-citizens to consider military service. For example, today's service members are eligible for expedited citizenship, and the military services have worked with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to streamline the citizenship application process for service members. In fact, we find that many service members attain their citizenship while serving. The military also has initiated several new programs, including opportunities for translators, which may hold particular appeal for non-citizens.

This briefing describes work we did for the Commander, Navy Installations in support of the Strategies for Support and Sustainment of Surge Requirements by Navy Shore Infrastructure Study. Specifically, it summarizes the probable surge requirements and potential infrastructure support issues resulting from implementation of the Navy's new Sea Power 21 operational vision. This new strategy and supporting operational concepts require greater flexibility in shore support options to keep the fleet assets action-capable with higher states of readiness. Since future operational needs will most likely be more fluid and less predictable, and shore support capacity relatively fixed, there will be a potentially higher possibility for these needs to overlap and result in support delays. CNI requested CNA to help address this concern by investigating the current shore infrastructure for its mission expansion capacity to support both Navy and Joint Force surge requirements worldwide and to recommend strategies of investment to determine how much, if any, additional permanent, temporary, and non-tangible infrastructure might be needed.

The Marine Corps manpower costs are 60 percent of its annual budget. The Enlisted and Officer Strength Planners must develop plans, by paygrade and month, to meet endstrength requirements in the budget execution year and 6 out-years. To develop these plans, the planners must forecast endstrength losses and gains. This study focuses on doing this accurately. Inaccuracy results in finishing either the year above the congressionally mandated endstrength target (overspending the budget) or below the endstrength target (which has operational consequences). Previously, there was no institutionalized and documented methodology for forecasting losses and no systematic attempt to improve existing techniques. New planners relied on information gleaned during overlap with their predecessors and sometimes developed their own methods (which were susceptible to errors). They had few reference tools and no capability to run loss scenarios. We first assessed the existing loss forecasting processes. Then, we made the processes more systematic. Next, we improved/added to the loss forecasting model and created reference tools. Finally, we documented the entire process in detail. We recommend creating an SSN-based file, adding a civilian planner/consultant to the endstrength team, and waiting to hard-wire models until the planners are comfortable with the modified models and their methods.

In order to investigate which duty stations and ratings are at a high risk for hearing loss, this study looked at the Defense Occupational and Environmental Health Readiness System (DOEHRS) medical hearing test records of nearly 251,000 enlisted sailors and officers over the twenty-five year period 1979 to 2004. The study found that enlisted sailors who spend most of a 24 year Navy career assigned to a Naval Surface Warship1 as opposed to being assigned to ashore duty stations or a Naval Support ship, had a much higher probability of leaving the Service with a reduction in their ability to hear. Since many individuals lose some hearing as they age, the study controlled for aging along with other factors such as gender and race to properly test if there are differences associated with ship assignments. To accomplish this task, we merged Navy medical records of hearing tests with information on each individual sailor's duty stations.

This paper examines the proposition that terrorist networks, such as Al Qaeda, are complex adaptive systems; that is, they consist of widely dispersed, autonomous cells that obey a decentralized command and control hierarchy; their operatives are adaptive and mobile; their cells are compartmentalized, structurally robust, and impervious to attack; and, though the networks are typically covert and amorphous, they can also rapidly coalesce into tightly organized local swarms. This implies that, in principle, terrorist networks are amenable to the same methodological course of study as any other complex adaptive system. In particular, fundamental insights into the behavior of terrorist networks-including an understanding of how they form, how they evolve, how they adapt, and what their innate strengths and vulnerabilities are-may be gleaned by studying the patterns that emerge from a multiagent-based simulation of their dynamics. After reviewing existing analytical and modeling tools applicable to the study of dynamic networks (including mathematical graph theory, social network modeling, complex network theory, graph visualization, and multiagent-based modeling), this paper introduces the conceptual design of a new multiagent-based toolkit, called SOTCAC (Self-Organized Terrorist-Counterterrorist Adaptive Coevolutions). SOTCAC uses autonomous, intelligent agents to represent the components of coevolving terrorist and counterterrorist networks.

This annotated briefing describes our work for the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) on the DEPTEMPO section of the Manpower and Reserve Affairs website. The CMC asked CNA to analyze the information currently on the website and to suggest what might be added. Part of the task was to recommend how the information could be displayed to clearly show stress on Marines from current and past deployments, to help determine which squadrons and battalions might be deployed in the future, and to better understand the Marine Corps' overall deployment picture.

The U.S. Naval War College (NWC) is developing an elective course on wargaming theory and practice, the first session of which will be in the fall of 2002. This course is designed to elicit ideas for the advancement of the art and science of wargaming, particularly elements of wargaming that address current operational problems. The NWC asked CNA to support their development of this course by analyzing the skills important for creating wargames, and comparing those skills to the training content of the elective course. In addition, they asked us to develop a wargame construction kit (WCK) for use in the course. This kit was intended to provide students with a baseline and framework for practical exploration of the processes of creating wargames. Our analysis of the skills associated with the creation of wargames identified six critical skills: perspective, interpretation, research, analysis, creativity, and asking questions. This report also characterizes the different levels of skills that wargame creators might possess. The Wargame Construction Kit (WCK), included in this paper, has the potential to play a useful role in the exploration of wargame concepts and how to implement them practically. The WCK was designed as an operational-level distillation.

The then-Director of Force Transformation, VADM Arthur Cebrowski, USN (Ret), asked the author of this document to provide views on future fleet architectures, as a contribution to his response to the mandate from Congress for a study on alternative future naval fleet architectures. The outline of this report was dictated to the author by Admiral Cebrowski. His alternative futures were for (1) force building, (2) force operations in "The Gap," that is, across the seam of the world, and (3) force operations in "The Core," that is, the globalized world. He also set out criteria for fleet architectures, to include relevancy, preserving options, transaction rates, learning capability, complexity at scale, entity cost, and risk management. The bottom lines were that future hulls be either light and maneuverable or trucks that could be adapted to changing needs across the years.

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) and specifically the National Intelligence Officer (NIO)for Military Issues asked CNAC to conduct a conference on the changing nature of warfare through 2020 as part of their project on Global Trends 2020. CNAC commissioned 21 papers on various aspects of the subject and convened a conference on 25-26 May 2004 at which the papers were presented and discussed. This document contains a brief summary of the conference, followed by a transcript (not verbatim) of the presentations and discussions, followed by a longer summary of the conference. See also CNAC document CIM D0010879.A1/Final of October 2004, which extends beyond the discussions of the conference to explore the wider range of evolutions of warfare toward the year 2020.

In this summary report, we will put the changing nature of warfare as discussed at the conference in to strategic context and extend its implication toward the year 2020.

Capabilities-based planning is advertised as the new approach to planning in the Department of Defense. A simple definition of such planning would be that it should be threat-less and scenario-less. Unfortunately, the new defense planning system requires that the planning be tested in what are essentially "vertical" scenarios, i.e., spikes in time, and this leads to the invention of enemies and threats to fill the scenarios. The main drawback in this is that it is hard to apply such planning to the "horizontal" scenarios the United States now faces, especially the global war on terror, which is expected to last a long time.

Targeted enlistment bonuses in the Nuclear Field have helped achieve a more level flow of accessions into training facilities. For most ratings, the accession profile is disproportionately concentrated in the summer months. This helps the Navy aggressively recruit high school seniors, but requires a large training infrastructure to accommodate the large number of recruits in the summer. This study estimates the relationship between enlistment bonuses and the ability of the Nuclear Field to level-load accessions and calculates the cost to the Navy of level-loading other ratings. Our analysis confirms that enlistment bonuses are effective in convincing Nuclear Field recruits to ship in off-peak months. If other recruits respond to pay in the same way, the Navy could level-load other ratings with a more aggressive application of targeted bonuses. In contrast, economic conditions have a small effect on the ability to level-load accessions. Using bonuses to level-load accessions requires a large pool of high school seniors. Given constraints on time in the Delayed Entry Program, success depends on the number that enter the DEP relatively late in their senior years. Second, level-loading accessions will increase attrition if the Navy increases the amount of time recruits expect to spend in the DEP.

This report evaluated the Situational Leadership II online training course used for Navy's Chief Petty Officer selectees. We identified the effect of the training on satisfaction, learning, behavior change, and leading indicators of performance improvement. Specifically, we found that participants generally liked the course and found it useful to their work. Furthermore, the study found that participants learned the course material. In addition, the CPOs applied the acquired leadership skills to the job and stated that they improved their performance in leadership areas-some general and some specific. The online course cost the same or less in a dollar-for-dollar comparison with traditional brick-and-mortar courses. Finally, analysis showed that Aviation and Information Technology ratings showed leading indicators of improvement in critical incidents specific to their fields of work. Recommendations were made for future uses of the course and on how to improve the feedback and course evaluation parts of the training.

This study answers four questions regarding the need for and feasibility of college-market recruiting for the enlisted Navy: Is it necessary for maintaining force quality? Although college enrollments are predicted to increase over the next 15 years, offsetting increases in the youth population and other trends mean that recruiting college-degree-holders will not be necessary for maintaining force quality. Can it decrease training costs? Currently, college recruits yield no training savings; they cost more per day of training and they do not bypass training at any stage. However, changes to the classification and training systems (such as those described in Sea Warrior) offer the potential for savings. Is it a means to improve force quality? College recruits do have the potential to increase force quality. In particular, 2-year-degree-holders have high AFQT scores, achieve technical ratings, and compare well on continuation measures. High school graduates with some college may also be high-quality recruits. Is it feasible? The Navy compares well with the civilian opportunities of many 2-year-degree-holders and most high school graduates with some college. Since the Navy has yet to significantly penetrate either market, increasing Navy presence in them should be feasible with existing incentives.

In leading the Navy's response to the Secretary of Defense's goal, the DASN for Safety is concerned whether the Navy is fostering a culture of safety that supports meeting safety requirements at the activity and operational levels that will, in turn, support the achievement of short term goals and sustain program success over the long-term. She asked CNA to help develop a strategy to foster a culture of safety within the Navy and Marine Corps, including the identification of ways to make a business case for safety. In this study, we focus on answering the basic question of how best to raise awareness and provide focus that supports excellence in safety Navy-wide and that generates the optimum mishap rate reduction for the funds invested.

To transform the way we fight wars we must first transform the way we think about war. One of the major elements affecting the way we think about war is wargaming. The War Gaming Department (WGD)of the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to work with them to develop some new ideas about transforming Navy wargaming as part of the Navy's ongoing efforts to transform U.S. military thinking and practice in response to the perceived changes in the global military-political-technical environment at the start of the 21st Century.

During the course of the Transforming Naval Wargaming project for the War Gaming Department (WGD) of the U.S. Naval War College (NWC), we (CNA and the sponsor) began an extended conversation on exactly how wargames—specifically, professional military wargames—can fail. Originally focusing on the "misuse" of wargames, the conversation expanded to include all potential failure modes for professional military wargames. We called these failure modes wargame pathologies, and at some point we decided to add a brief paper on the subject to the list of deliverables. The goal of this paper is to discuss some of the issues involved in the diagnosis and prevention of such pathologies as part of a continuing effort to advance the state of the art of wargame design.

This paper explores the influence of education credentials, attitudes, and behaviors on first-term attrition. As in the past, education credentials remain strong predictors of attrition. However, we also find that measures of attitudes and past behaviors not included in recruits' official records are strongly related to the likelihood of attrition. Examples include smoking behavior and attitude towards completing high school. We also find that enlistees with certificates of completion or attendance have substantially lower attrition than others holding alternate credentials. Finally, some characteristics (such as age) have differential effects on traditional high school diploma graduates versus those with alternate credentials. Our results suggest that, although education credential remains a consistent predictor of attrition, other factors are also extremely important. This provides the Services with the opportunity to lower overall attrition rates by screening for recruits with strong noncognitive factors.

The Navy officer personnel system allows some officers to transfer from one community to another during the course of a career. These lateral transfers often flow from the unrestricted line (URL) to RL and Staff communities within the first 5 or 6 years of service and give these communities valuable warfare experience used to support the URL. Most warfare-qualified laterals come from Surface Warfare. Surface Warfare accesses and trains more junior officers than it needs partly to support lateral transfers to RL and Staff communities. This excess of junior officers reduces the quality of training and overall readiness and increases total personnel costs. We find that reducing yearly Surface Warfare accessions from 780 to 620 and cutting laterals from the Surface community to RL and Staff communities by one-third saves $91 million per year in personnel costs. This reduces the number of warfare-qualified officers in RL/Staff communities by 448 without a large effect on overall officer seniority. A warfare-qualified RL/Staff officer would have to be worth about $200,000 more than a non-warfare qualified RL/Staff officer in the same billet for the above SWO accession cuts and consequent restrictions on laterals not to be cost-efficient.

The Conference Report of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1999 directed the establishment of a 5-year pilot program requiring the Services to treat graduates of homeschools, and graduates of the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe program who possess a GED, as Tier 1 for enlistment purposes. This interim study evaluates how these recruits compare with other recruits. Home school graduates with AFQT scores of 50 and above have 12-month attrition levels comparable to those of high school diploma graduates. While the majority of home school recruits have high AFQT scores, those with lower scores have high attrition levels. While ChalleNGe GEDs in the Navy and Air Force have very high attrition levels, those in the Army and Marine Corps have quite low attrition. In addition, we find that the number of recruits in Tiers 2 and 3 in each Service is significantly greater than that captured in DMDC files.

In the pre-1986 period, long deployments were not necessarily associated with crises, whereas the extra-long deployments from the post-1986 period were typically associated with crises. Anecdotally, Sailors identified such deployments as important and worth the extra hardships. Because of this, we expect that high PERSTEMPO in the 1990s has not been associated with lower reenlistments. This paper investigates this hypothesis. We conclude, in the post-1986 period, deployment lengths have not been a driver of reenlistment rates. However, quick turnarounds (length of time between deployments) do have negative consequences on reenlistments. Non-deployed time underway and extended periods of ship maintenance also decrease reenlistments. The longer deployments are not likely to lower reenlistments unless the missions continue for so long that the morale-boosting effect of the mission fades. If the extra-long deployments begin to appear routine, long deployments may adversely affect reenlistment rates. We suggest that the Navy monitor Sailors' quality of life and reenlistments carefully and be prepared to compensate them if retention does slip.

The Conference Report of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1999 directed the establishment of a 5-year pilot program requiring the military Services to treat graduates of homeschools, and graduates of the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe program who possess a GED, as Tier 1 for enlistment eligibility purposes. This study evaluates how these recruits compare with other recruits. Because of the substantial cost of replacing recruits who do not fulfill their enlistment obligation, attrition rates serve as our primary outcome measure; however, we also examine other measures including initial aptitude, initial paygrade, type of discharge, presence of waivers, and reason for separation. We find that both homeschooled and ChalleNGe GED recruits have much higher attrition rates than traditional high school graduates. Our findings on other measures match up with our attrition findings; homeschooled and ChalleNGe GED recruits are not strong recruits by these measures either.

The Navy has long faced shortages in certain critical shore billets. A variety of methods have been used to fill these billets, including involuntary assignments and sea duty credit for rotational purposes. However, these methods are inflexible, affect endstrength, and reduce retention. To better alleviate shortages in hard-to-fill billets, the Navy began offering Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) in three locations in June 2003. In this paper, we analyze several factors related to AIP: (1) whether access to JASS appears to be restricted for certain categories of Sailors (since Sailors can only apply for AIP using JASS); (2) differences in application rates and fill rates for AIP jobs based on job characteristics and level of AIP cap; (3) application activity for other Type 3 and Type 6 locations to determine which may make good candidates for future AIP locations; (4) a method by which application activity could be examined on a continuing basis to help determine whether AIP cap adjustments are necessary; (5) the cost-effectiveness of various lump-sum payment schemes as an alternative to the present monthly payment scheme; and (6) the overall cost-effectiveness of AIP to date.

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) recently announced that he hopes to make development of a new Navy human resource strategy the CNO project for the coming year. But developing such a strategy requires a clear and comprehensive understanding of the key factors that will serve as its foundation. This paper links presentations made at the Fourth Annual Navy Workforce Research and Analysis Conference to six key factors (people, work processes, managerial structure, information and knowledge, decision-making, and rewards) on which a human resource strategy must be built.

This document is based in part on the author's 4-year experience as an analyst at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). Part of the Lab's mission was to learn how to do military experiments, and the examples cited in this document--are selected because they are instructive in nature. The discussion of errors is meant only to improve future experimentation, and not to detract from the work of MCWL and those who served there.

The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program is the primary tool for shaping the career force. The first-term, or Zone A, SRB is key because it is the only point at which recommended and eligible Marines can be denied reenlistment in a skill area (PMOS) if their numbers would exceed requirements. In this paper, we find that SRB multiples have a large effect on reenlistment rates by occupation. Additionally, lump-sum SRBs have a larger effect on reenlistment rates than those paid in timed installments. We estimate a model that includes factors influencing the reenlistment decision separately for Zones A, B, and C. Results suggest that SRBs significantly raise reenlistment rates in all zones. Furthermore, the switch to lump-sum SRBs had fairly dramatic effects on program costs. We estimate the Marine Corps saved $8 million in Zone A and $10.4 to $25.7 million in Zone B by offering lump-sum rather than timed bonuses in FY03. We estimate predicted reenlistment rates by occupational field and bonus level and a decision model that strength planners can use to set Zone A SRB levels by PMOS. Finally, we compare the relative costs and benefits of SRBs versus lateral moves for filling boatspaces in undermanned areas.

Policy-makers have proposed replacing the current system of reservist participation with a new model, termed a Continuum of Service. This new paradigm will give reservists the ability to move seamlessly between full- and part-time status, and it relies on enhanced volunteerism by providing more options for participation. A reliance on volunteerism requires provision of adequate incentives. Before making any changes, however, it is important to understand existing manning problems and those that could arise as a result of a Continuum of Service. Therefore, this study analyzes recent data to identify existing, chronic, and potential manning challenges for each Reserve and Guard Component. Most Components have experienced recent increases in retention. This is notable because mobilizations and deployments have increased over this time period. While overall retention is high and rising, there are still certain groups with low retention. Junior enlisted personnel have very low retention, while there is strong evidence that retirement benefits heavily influence retention decisions of senior personnel. The data also provide evidence that retention varies with the strength of one's civilian earnings opportunities. Finally, it appears that many people work toward their college degrees while in the Reserves but choose to leave after finishing their education.

The Secretary of Defense has asked each of the services to achieve a 50-percent reduction in safety mishap rates over the next 5 years. Similar gains were achieved during the 1990s. However, it is unclear to what extent those improvements were the result of safety efforts or the consequence of other factors such as changes in workforce demographics. This study explores the improvement in mishap rates that occurred in the 1990s, looks at the variety of factors that explain the decline in mishap rates, and develops a sound basis for projecting possible future reductions in mishap rates.

In January, 2004, CNAC assembled three dozen U.S. and Canadian uniformed Navy, Coast Guard, and civilian experts in maritime homeland security, USCG matters, naval operations and organization, and the Unified Command Plan. The purpose of the workshop was to consider present and projected roles of the USCG, U.S. Navy, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the U.S.-Canadian Bi-National Planning Group, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Industry representatives also participated, providing insights on new surveillance and tracking technologies that enhance maritime domain awareness. This document summarizes perspectives, observations, and conclusions resulting from the workshop.

The Coast Guard has significantly restructured its enlisted workforce based on the results of the Joint Rating Review (JRR). The JRR, which concluded in July 2003, combined several enlisted ratings to establish four new ratings: Information Systems Technician (IT), Operations Specialist (OS), Electronics Technician (ET), and Boatswains Mate (BM)[1]. This process also did away with five enlisted ratings (Fire Control Technician (FT), Quartermaster (QM), Radarman (RD), Telecommunications Specialist (TC), and Telephone Technician (TT).

Drs. H. H. Gaffney and Dmitry Gorenburg traveled to Moscow 2-6 November 2003 to talk to a range of Russian strategic thinkers, plus two retired Russian officers. Their mission was to understand the political, economic, and military context in which the Russian Federation Navy was functioning today. They found that the military in general seems to be low in Russian priorities, and that the Russian Federation Navy, despite some increased activity of late, is still shrinking, perhaps to a combination of coastal force and strategic nuclear forces.

The Marine Corps has been the most successful of all the services in recruiting Hispanics. As the largest minority, Hispanic recruits will be an increasingly important market for recruiters. Hispanic youth report higher active duty propensity than non-Hispanics, although both groups cite similar reasons for joining the military. Survey data on Marine Corps recruits also show similar reasons for enlisting and similar influencers. We identify components of the Marine Corps' systematic recruiting process that seem to appeal to Hispanic recruits and their families. We visited six Marine Corps recruiting stations in areas of the country heavily populated by Hispanics as well as both recruit training depots and spoke with Hispanic recruits, training personnel, and recruiters about their experiences. The Marine Corps has benefited from Hispanics' strong enlistment behavior. We find that Hispanic recruits are more likely than others to complete bootcamp and the first term of service—even after controlling for other differences. Based on these findings, we highlight several challenges that may affect the Services' ability to recruit Hispanics in the future (e.g., high dropout rates, citizenship, and language fluency of recruits and their parents) and recommend actions that DoD can take to ensure Hispanic recruits' continued success.

The TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) asked CNA to evaluate the joint DoD/VA pilot study for mailed refill services. The pilot program addressed the ability of Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) to interface with the VA's automated Consolidated Mail Outpatient Pharmacy (CMOP) system to process refills. This program—the MTF Refill Mail Order Service (MRMS) pilot—offered DoD beneficiaries an option to receive mailed refills from the CMOP at no copay. Some additional potential benefits included freeing up MTF staff to concentrate on clinical and cognitive duties, patient safety, and customer service for beneficiaries. Based on the pilot program, MTF use of the CMOP system was technically feasible, beneficiary acceptance was high, and MTF staff were supportive of the initiative. Estimating response at 50 percent, we project that a nationwide program might send 9.35 million DoD refills to the CMOP system, at a net cost of about $8.6 million attributed to the TRICARE For Life accrual fund and $10.9 million attributed to the Defense Health Program. Costs might be covered by a combination of cutting pharmacy staff as refills shift to the CMOP, recapture from retail pharmacy and TMOP, cost-avoidance based on accrual fund reimbursement rates, or adding a CMOP copay.

The Department of Defense sponsors the Student Testing Program (STP), which provides a form of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) for use in high schools and in postsecondary schools. The test scores are used for career exploration in the schools and may also be used to enlist in the armed forces. This document describes our development of national norms for students in the 10th, 11th, and 12th grades as well as postsecondary (2-year) colleges. The norms are based on data collected as part of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97).

This study estimates the impact of increasing the active duty obligation (ADO) for graduate medical education (GME). We found that the amount by which accession requirements could decrease depends on the size of the GME program. Specifically, accession requirements and costs are less if the GME program were optimized than if it were fixed at current levels. If GME is fixed, many accessions are needed, not to fill billets, but simply to support the GME program. We find that marginal increases—1-year increases—in the GME ADO are supportable. We based this finding largely on GME program directors' perceptions and the willingness of current residents and fellows to consider and accept GME with a longer ADO. Because of the concurrent payback of the GME obligation with any prior obligation, there are many ways to structure a marginal increase in the ADO. How DoD should structure an increase depends on which specialties it wants to impact. We find that increasing the GME ADO more than marginally is not warranted because the applicant pool for accessions will not support it.

This paper discusses the extent to which a sample intended for use in norming aptitude tests must be representative of the underlying population. The work is in support of the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and its planned use of data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) as a norming sample for aptitude tests. We examined data from a previous national administration of aptitude tests to a representative sample of youth known as Profile of American Youth (PAY 80). We regressed aptitude test scores on demographics and concluded that: � A norming sample for aptitude tests must be representative of the target population with respect to age, race/ethnicity, gender, respondent's education, and mother's education. It is not necessary that the sample also be representative with respect to number of siblings in the household, degree of urbanization, or census region. Although these factors may be correlated with aptitude scores, if the other five variables are representative, then these factors need not be representative.

This analysis was conducted in support of the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and its effort to provide norms for the Student Testing Program (STP). Through the STP, free testing on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) is provided to high schools for use with students in the 10th, 11th, and 12th grades. Norms are also provided for postsecondary students in two-year colleges. The data were collected during a nationwide administration of the ASVAB as part of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). The objective of our analysis is to evaluate the suitability of the data for use in developing test norms for the STP. We examined the underlying demographics of the data and concluded that the data for students in the 10th, 11th, and 12th grades were suitable for the development of norms. This follows because the sample is representative of the target population with respect to all demographic variables known to be important correlates of test scores. The data sample for the postsecondary students was somewhat problematic but may be improved by weighting on appropriate demographic variables.

This analysis was conducted in support of the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and its project to develop aptitude test norms from a test administration done as part of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). Our analysis draws on an extensive questionnaire administered to the respondents at the conclusion of their aptitude test. We conducted a regression analysis of test scores as a function of demographics and attitudes as expressed on the questionnaire. We summarize the results as follows: � Incentive payments to persons taking the aptitude tests are essential. � Test takers tried equally hard during a lengthy 9-month testing period. Members of some demographic groups did not try as hard as others.

Food service is a commercial activity. The provision of food service on the premises of other organizations is big business. It is highly developed, worldwide, and fiercely competitive. Corporations, universities, hospitals, resorts, entertainment complexes, and other such enterprises generally find it advantageous to use the services of outside providers. It is the long-standing policy of the federal government to rely on the private sector for needed commercial services. Nonetheless, the Navy is its own food service provider. It has almost 10,000 billets for mess management specialists and fills 95 percent of them. About four times that number of people-some military, some government civilians, and some contract personnel-fill other jobs in galleys afloat and ashore.

A study of the electricity and cost savings achieved by the U.S. Navy from installing advanced electric meters in the San Diego area between 1997 and 2003. The study also examines the practicality and expected savings due to increasing the installation and use of advanced electric meters at Navy Facilities.

N81 asked CNA to examine time-to-train (TTT), timing of training, and attrition trends during initial skills training. To examine these trends, we track recruits' early career histories using the Enlisted Street-to-Fleet (ESTF) database, updated with FY01 accessions. We find that the initial training improvements that occurred since the FY97 accessions leveled off with the FY00 accessions, but then improved again with the FY01 accessions. For FY01 accessions, months to the fleet was at a 6-year low of 11 months. To provide benchmarks to monitor the progress of training initiatives, we present detailed training data for three ratings that have undergone training reevaluation and participated in training pilot programs. We also examine pre- and post-fleet A-school participation and find that most initial A-school training occurs before reaching the fleet. We find that few accessions participate in e-learning-based A-school courses but participation is increasing, particularly for 6YOs. Along with a decreased time to the fleet, a higher percentage of FY01 accessions reached the fleet than with the five previous accessions. Our preliminary findings on bootcamp attrition for the FY02 accessions suggest that the trend of declining bootcamp attrition is likely to continue.

We examined whether the class of complexity-based model(s) known as Agent-Based Models (ABMs) could be a useful decision-support tool for personnel planning and management. In using ABM, a system is modeled as a collection of autonomous, decision-making agents. ABMs are built using an object-oriented programming language. Each agent, the agent's environment, and the schedule that controls the model run are independent objects that can be matched in a variety of ways. A major strength of ABM is its ability to simulate real interactions between individuals and groups allowing for a wide variety of feedback, adaptation, and negotiation behaviors. However, ABM's results are sensitive to initial conditions, and the reliability of such results is limited to ranges of outcomes linked to ranges of input parameters. In examining a variety of ABM applications—including biological, behavioral, and organizational—we determined that ABMs have dealt with the kinds of issues important to the Navy and that, while not a perfect analogy, an ABM supply chain type of model would meet many of the Navy's personnel modeling requirements. Given the possible benefits of using an ABM, we feel that there would be value in building a prototype "proof-of-concept" ABM to test its utility.

Officer Street-to-Fleet Database: Expanding Capabilities is a follow-on study sponsored by N81. In the earlier study, the sponsor asked us to develop a database for officers that merged training files with personnel files in order to calculate time-to-train to first assignment (TTT) metrics for officer communities. The result was the beginning of the Officer Street-to-Fleet (OSTF) database. In this study, we calculated TTT metrics for pilots and NFOs by specific training pipeline, identified some areas of concern for NFO attrition, extended our TTT calculations to the large restricted line (RL) communities, and expanded the database to include officer accessions from FY 1993 to FY 2002. We found that average TTT fell for all aviation training pipelines since FY 1993 but that attrition rose slightly for most pipelines over the same period. In particular, helicopter training attrition rose substantially for the FY 1996 and FY 1997 accession cohorts. We also found that the increase in NFO attrition is related to an increase in the number of OCS accessions, historically an accession source with high attrition rates. Finally, we found recent decreases in average TTT in RL communities.

Dr. Sergey Rogov, Director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) and his colleagues from Moscow met with Mr. Robert Murray, President of CNAC, and others from CNAC and the Washington area. The subject of the mini-seminar was the changed strategic situation following the U.S. conquest and occupation of Iraq in early 2003. The fact that the U.S. would be preoccupied with Iraq for some time to come was noted, but the Russians believed that the opportunities for U.S.-Russian collaboration remained open.

Dr. Nosov provides a concise summary of the pressures that Russia has faced from the east and the south, while reaching out toward Europe-which was in large part "the West" until the post-World War II period and the Cold War. Russians agonize more about their relations with the West and about their own identity than we in "the West" do about whether Russia somehow belongs in the West. After all, Russia never had a nation-state of its own until the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has now had only 12 years to sort out an economy and a political system, while being bogged down in Chechnya.

This study estimates the impact of increasing the active duty obligation (ADO) for the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (AFHPSP). We found that the amount by which accession requirements could decrease depends on the size of the graduate medical education (GME) program. Specifically, accession requirements and costs are less if the GME program were optimized than if it were fixed at current levels. If GME is fixed, many AFHPSP accessions are needed, not to fill billets, but simply to support the GME program. We find that increasing the ADO from 4 to 5 years for 4 years of subsidization is supportable. We based this finding on (1) recruiters' perception that they could still meet the recruiting mission with a 5-year ADO, (2) the willingness of current AFHPSP students to consider and accept AFHPSP with a 5-year ADO, (3) the downward pressure on the medical billet file, and (4) the Services' success in meeting recruiting goals that vary substantially from year to year. We find that increasing the AFHPSP ADO beyond 5 years is not warranted because it is not supportable from a recruiting standpoint and most AFHPSP students didn't express a willingness to accept an obligation beyond 5 years.

The late 1980's and 1990's were a period of intensive reform within American public education. However, in terms of verified student outcomes, there is little evidence that most of these reforms had the desired impact. Examining military personnel data, which is a highly detailed source of information on recent high school graduate's performance, we find that the quality of Navy recruits improved during the 1990's. However, we don't find evidence that this improvement was the result of school reform. Specifically, recruits from states that enacted reform do no better on our performance measures than recruits from non-reform states, even after controlling for baseline performance. In some cases, recruits from "reform" states perform at lower levels than those from non-reform states. Reforms seem to affect non-degree graduates differently (often more negatively) than they affect high school graduates. The increase in quality of Navy recruits appears to be due to selective recruiting and/or a general increase in achievement, rather than to any specific school reform(s).

The primary tasking for this project was to develop a choice-based conjoint (CBC) model of Sailors' preferences for reenlistment incentives and quality-of-service factors to learn more about how compensation-based reenlistment incentives compare with non-compensation factors in influencing reenlistment decisions. In response to this tasking, we designed the Navy Survey on Reenlistment and Quality of Service (NSRQOS), and sent it to approximately 9,000 first-term Sailors. The survey results indicate that, even with several measures of pay included in the survey, non-pay factors play a substantial role in guiding Sailors' reenlistment intentions. The secondary tasking was to demonstrate how CBC survey data and models can be used to analyze personnel issues. Based on a review of the relevant literature, we concluded that CBC surveys are most appropriate for short-term applications in which the decisions of interest are made on the basis of competitive differences between a few well-known attributes. Therefore, the best Navy personnel applications of the CBC methodology would be analyses of proposed policies that entail well-defined trade-offs between a few characteristics. Furthermore, use of CBC results should focus on the relative effects of different characteristics; results should not focus on absolute changes in predicted reenlistment rates or program participation rates.

Department of Defense asked CNA to evaluate 16 competitions in this category. We were to identify why the services and Defense agencies decided to conduct large competitions, how they conducted the competitions, and whether these strategies were successful. We were also asked to determine the savings that are expected and the costs of conducting the competitions, and to identify economies of scale, the small business opportunities, the implementation times, and the ease of competitions. As a point of comparison, we were also asked to examine several multi-site, single-function competitions.

The Deputy Chief BUMED, Resource Management/Comptroller, asked CNA to examine the delivery of primary care to beneficiaries at a selected set of Navy clinics. We examined six primary care clinics and two family practice clinics within naval hospitals engaged in the graduate medical education of interns and residents. We explored several issues, including understanding clinic management practices, developing measures of productivity and costs associated with clinic visits, and the implications of other influences, such as the incentives on managing demand associated with the managed care support contracts. We found that the sites were generally productive, whether the unit of measure was based simply on the number of encounters with the provider or the complexity of the service provided to the beneficiary. We found that the average costs of the services varied across the clinics and were higher than the costs of primary care services to many of the same beneficiaries when obtained in civilian health care facilities. We also offered several recommendations based on our analysis, including improving the accuracy of the staffing data and developing reliable cost measures to allow comparisons of DOD and civilian costs.

The Navy began offering a new pay, Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP), in June 2003 to encourage sailors to volunteer for and remain in difficult-to-fill billets. Sailors may bid on AIP-eligible billets during the detailing process. If selected, they then receive AIP monthly for the duration of their tours. To evaluate AIP's design and implementation, we modeled simplified bidding systems, reviewed auction design materials, and discussed the Navy's assignment system and potential bidding systems with auction experts and Navy personnel. We highlight, in this annotated briefing, our concern that gaming may occur; we also identify several options to mitigate it. Encouraging competition is among the most promising strategies to minimize gaming. Other mechanisms, such as encouraging early bidding, are also worth further investigation. In sum, we believe AIP offers the Navy a potentially effective distribution tool, but it is likely that the AIP system will require adaptations as it evolves. We urge the Navy to increase sailors' awareness and understanding of AIP but to implement AIP gradually and allow flexibility in the decision rules. The Navy can then assess the pilot's success and can test, model, and implement strategies to increase AIP's long term cost-efficiency.

CNA has been analyzing the retention implications of the post-9/11 period. This annotated briefing summarizes our findings and some ways to mitigate adverse effects, should they occur. Data from Desert Shield/ Desert Storm (DS/DS) show that attrition dropped during the conflict, particularly for ships deployed to the region, and then spiked following DS/DS. A previous CNA statistical analysis indicates that reenlistment rates dropped for sailors who experienced extra-long deployments before the Navy formalized its PERSTEMPO limits in 1986. Anecdotally, long deployments before 1986 were more routine in nature and not necessarily morale-boosting. Based on this analysis, we estimate that sailors may require between $220 and $345 per month to offset the retention effects of long deployments if PERSTEMPO rules continue to be broken. To offset any retention repercussions, we recommended two pays: Sea Pay Plus and a restructuring of the High Deployment Per Diem (or ITEMPO pay). Sea Pay Plus would compensate sailors for extra-long deployments. Our recommended restructuring of ITEMPO would compensate sailors for extra-long deployments and excessive cumulative time away. We recommend that the Navy (1) use Sea Pay Plus should retention drop in the near term, and (2) push for a legislative revision of the ITEMPO pay.

We review the effects of open-bid procurement auctions on prices in the Department of Defense. Theoretically, an open-bid auction should result in better prices for the auctioneer (relative to a sealed-bid auction) whenever: (1) the true cost of a contract is unknown, (2) each bidder has some noisy signal about this cost, and (3) these signals are affiliated (roughly, statistically correlated) with each other and the true cost. Using purchase data from the Defense Supply Center Columbus, we determine that open-bid auctions lowered prices by 4.4% on average. We review the results of Navy and Army auctions, which report savings of 20% or over. These higher savings may result from differences in the types of goods being purchased (DSCC auctions are typically for smaller, repeat purchases, while Navy auctions especially are often larger and for items infrequently purchased) or from differences in the baseline (Navy and Army auction savings are based on the Independent Government Estimate, DSCC savings are based on purchase price comparisons). We review what types of items are suitable for auction. We conclude that items that can be fully described (including non-commodity unique items) are very good candidates.

We review several innovative commercial and Navy acquisition practices introduced mainly during the 1990s. The first group of practices is associated with greater supplier involvement over the product lifecycle (such as maintenance of retail stock, third-party logistics, bundling of maintenance with equipment, leasing, and purchasing equipment services rather than the equipment). A second group of practices entails changes in the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship (such as partnering and long-term contracting, allocating intellectual property rights, and greater reliance on incentives). For each acquisition practice, we document examples of its application in both commercial and Navy contexts. We conclude that the first group of practices would be more likely to benefit the Navy if the Navy's purchases constitute a small share of the total market for the good or service. The benefits from the second group of practices, on the other hand, can be derived even when the Navy is a large buyer relative to the total market. These latter practices could be applied more widely.

This report is a technical supplement to the report, Military Transformation as a Competitive Systemic Process: The Case of Japan and the United States Between the World Wars, by William D. O'Neil (CRM D0008616.A1, June 2003). It surveys available data on the economic resources of Japan and the United States in the period between the world wars and their allocation to defense purposes. Various comparative measures are derived. In general terms, the economy of the United States was roughly seven times as large as that of Japan. However, because Japan devoted a much greater proportion of its national product to defense, the amount it spent on defense between the wars was roughly equivalent to that of the U.S.

To facilitate true military transformation, the naval research community must work more closely than ever with leadership so that it can inform, shape, and support this systemic change. To this end, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) hosted the Third Annual Navy Workforce Research and Analysis Conference on March 31 and April 1, 2003. The conference brought together Navy's leadership and the research communities to discuss how to better integrate today's research and development (R&D) efforts with leadership's evolving manpower, personnel, and training vision. This document relates the conference presentations and discussions to aspects of the CNP's FY03 guidance and the Navy's R&D priorities—including efforts to shape the force, better establish manpower requirements, design Sailor-centric systems, leverage new technology, manage careers more effectively, provide service members with a positive Navy experience, and create a seamless military team.

This paper discusses the U.S. Navy's aggressive campaign in the Aegean Sea against Greek pirates who interfered with American shipping during the third decade of the nineteenth century. This campaign was not a particularly important one in the overall history of the U.S. navy, nor did it strongly influence subsequent Greek-American naval relations. Those relations - outlined in the paper - have been largely amicable and even quite close at times, especially following the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Independence for Ottoman Turkey, and of the republic in North America that had itself won its independence less than a century earlier.

Specific individual military transformations achieve full significance only in the context of the broader processes of multiple interrelated transformations taking place in competition with those of one or more opponents. This study examines one historical case of broad systemic competitive processes to clarify the underlying dynamics: Japan and the United States between the two world wars. The armed forces of both nations envisioned significant risk of war between them and sought, with varying focus and vigor, to prepare. These efforts are contrasted in operational concept, doctrine, and technology. Japanese forces achieved a very high level of excellence in tactical execution, a level that American forces did not initially match in many areas. Moreover, Japan entered the war with materiel that was in many areas equal if not superior to that of the U.S. in both quantity and quality. But the effort the U.S. had put into capabilities for planning and executing higher-level operations frequently enabled its forces to pit strength against weakness, resulting in far faster erosion of Japan's defenses than the Japanese had anticipated. Thus American transformation efforts brought advantages beyond those of simple weight of forces.

This study analyzes the relationships between military crisis response operations, political stability and economic stability. The study uses a combination of case studies and cross-country regression analysis to examine whether different regions of the world or countries at different levels of economic development react in different ways to military crisis response operations. We found several differences, depending on the length of the operation. Short operations have a positive effect on political stability for several months after completion of the operation, particularly in Africa and low-income countries, though they do not appear to affect economic stability. Longer operations can affect both political and economic stability over the long term, but the extent of the effect is unclear. This analysis provides quantitative evidence that crisis response operations do affect future political and economic stability. Given the nature of the data, it is difficult to know the exact magnitude of these effects, but it appears that there is some kind of linkage between crisis response operations and political and economic stability.

This study analyzes the relationships between military crisis response operations, political stability and economic stability. The study uses a combination of case studies and cross-country regression analysis to examine whether different regions of the world or countries at different levels of economic development react in different ways to military crisis response operations. We found several differences, depending on the length of the operation. Short operations have a positive effect on political stability for several months after completion of the operation, particularly in Africa and low-income countries, though they do not appear to affect economic stability. Longer operations can affect both political and economic stability over the long term, but the extent of the effect is unclear. This analysis provides quantitative evidence that crisis response operations do affect future political and economic stability. Given the nature of the data, it is difficult to know the exact magnitude of these effects, but it appears that there is some kind of linkage between crisis response operations and political and economic stability.

This is the report of the 16th CNAC-ISKRAN seminar held on 10 December 2002 at CNAC. The seminar was part of a series that dates back to 1991. The agenda covered US-Russia relations, Russia-NATO relations, the situation in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea areas, and convergence of US and Russian interests in the Middle East, particularly on Iraq. Also discussed at the seminar was the current situation with regard to strategic nuclear forces and treaties.

This study analyzes the relationships between military crisis response operations, political stability and economic stability. The study uses a combination of case studies and cross-country regression analysis to examine whether different regions of the world or countries at different levels of economic development react in different ways to military crisis response operations. We found several differences, depending on the length of the operation. Short operations have a positive effect on political stability for several months after completion of the operation, particularly in Africa and low-income countries, though they do not appear to affect economic stability. Longer operations can affect both political and economic stability over the long term, but the extent of the effect is unclear. This analysis provides quantitative evidence that crisis response operations do affect future political and economic stability. Given the nature of the data, it is difficult to know the exact magnitude of these effects, but it appears that there is some kind of linkage between crisis response operations and political and economic stability.

Each year, the Department of the Navy (DoN) pays about $245 million in workers' compensation benefits under the FECA program. CNA first looked at DoN workers' compensation costs 3 years ago. At that time, we identified two DoN programs as particularly effective. Our analysis suggested that millions in savings might be possible from broader application of their practices. Since then, little has changed. Worse, we see indications that overall program effectiveness is declining. Our new study, confirms this decline. The expected lifetime cost of each DoN claim is now 50 percent higher than in 1999. The new CNA study uses an actuarial approach to compare DoN programs. CNA identifies the best 20 percent of DoN programs and estimates that savings of $145 million over five years are possible if DoN as a whole matches the success of these programs. CNA recommends: (a) the establishment of specialized claims centers to support management of older claims and (b) more focused high-level DoN attention to the performance of local FECA programs.

This paper was the basis for remarks by the author at the Army War College's Annual Conference on the American Way of War, 9-10 April 2003. An "American Way of War" emerged after the end of the Cold War, in successive combat experiences. We at the CNA Corporation examined the eight main cases of combat from 1989 through 2002 to discern its characteristics. The U.S. has now successfully undertaken a ninth combat case-Operation Iraqi Freedom-in which the characteristics have generally been confirmed, but with some new twists. War-fighting is, of course, the core of what U.S. forces do. Around that core, we speak of some larger strategic functions, like deterrence, presence, interaction with allies, and, of course, preparing for the future, currently referred to as transformation. The paper discusses the effects on the strategic environment of the American Way of War."

We computed life-cycle costs for physicians, dentists, and other selected health care professions. Specifically, we computed the cost to access them, train them to be fully qualified duty special-ists, and maintain them in staff utilization tours. We computed the cost per year of practice (YOP) as a fully trained specialist with emphasis on the cost per YOP at the completion of the initial active duty obligation and at the expected YOP. We found that training costs are substan-tial—8 to 49 percent over compensation costs for physicians depending on specialty and acces-sion source. Given these life-cycle costs, we've developed a model to determine the optimal mix of acces-sions to fill future billet requirements. The optimum depends crucially on the model's con-straints, which include the required experience profile, in-house training requirements, and ac-cession constraints. The results indicate that the required experience profile affects the optimum for physicians more than any other constraint, whereas in-house training requirements are the biggest driver in the dentist model. Looking at the impact of pay on the optimum, we found that accession bonuses are modestly cost-effective for some specialties and that targeted special pay increases are more cost-effective than across-the-board increases.

The last half of the 1990s was a difficult period for military recruiting. To improve its ability to meet the recruiting mission, the Navy greatly expanded the use of enlistment incentives. However, the level and distribution of incentives were based on relatively little research, and what research did exist failed to account for such phenomena as the low unemployment rates during the late 1990s. As a consequence, we were tasked to investigate one aspect of incentives�the effects of changes in Enlistment Bonuses on enlistments in ratings with similar recruit qualifications. Our research into the levels of bonuses offered, their relationship to other monetary incentives within and across ratings, and the interaction of these offers with shipping goals led us to conclude that an accurate estimate of the effect of individual incentives on rating choice is not possible using historical data only. We cannot determine whether the existence of a relationship between enlistments and incentives is the direct result of incentives or stems from a constellation of factors that simultaneously determine rating and ship date selection. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the options offered depend on a complicated process that takes into account goals, rating, and ship date priorities.

When Congress initiated Enlistment Bonuses (EBs) in the early 1980s, it required the Department of Defense to conduct experiments on how these incentives affect recruiting. More recently, the only policy guidance for those who set enlistment incentives has come from analyses based on nonexperimental data. These analyses have employed widely recognized statistical estimators and, in many instances, have produced findings that seem both plausible and precise. Unfortunately, the statistical estimators used in these works have significant potential for bias when they are applied to nonexperimental data. This analysis describes several of the estimation problems that arise from using nonexperimental data to analyze the effects of enlistment incentives, discusses some of the econometric tools that researchers have used in their attempts to overcome these problems, and indicates the shortcomings of these tools. It also argues that the potential for estimation bias in these works is so severe that the Services should view the results from the recent analyses as inconclusive. Finally, the study proposes two experiments the Navy could undertake that would reveal important information about enlistment incentives, that would be low cost, and that would not hamper the Service's ability to meet its accession goals.

While enlistment bonuses (EBs) have traditionally been used to affect accession decisions, it seems likely that offering a recruit a bonus that is payable at the end of training could also reduce attrition. This study attempts to assess the relationship between the size of the enlistment bonus offered a recruit and the likelihood that the recruit attrites—holding all else constant. Following recent studies of enlistment incentives, we employed non-experimental data (data generated from the administration of the EB program) to explore this relationship. Using this type of data creates an empirical challenge because both the size of enlistment bonuses and attrition behavior are likely to be substantially affected by unobserved variables. While there are various empirical techniques to control for the effects of unobserved variables under specific circumstances, we find that these methods have only limited applicability to the current analysis—that is, they can only control for some of the effects of omitted variables. Among our empirical findings, we find limited evidence that enlistment bonuses reduce attrition. While we believe that these statistical results are not substantial enough to guide policy, we suggest that they are sufficiently compelling to justify the Navy pursuing experiments on the issue.

This monograph examines the statistical methods that have been used to estimate the learning-rate parameter in learning curves, as well as the methods used to calibrate cost-estimating relationships (CERs). We argue that some widely-used methods, such as lot-midpoint iteration, do not have either a strong mathematical or statistical justification. The properties of other, general-purpose methods, such as non-linear least squares and iteratively reweighted least squares, are well established in the statistics literature. These latter methods can be applied to learning curve and CER estimation, and possess stronger properties than the heuristic methods traditionally applied by cost analysts.

This briefing examines the relationship between pre-Service smoking behavior and first-year attrition. We report four main findings: 1) Recruits who reported that they smoked before enlisting had significantly higher RTC- and 12-month attrition rates than those who did not. 2) Attrition differences between pre-Service smokers and nonsmokers did not disappear after boot camp, which indicates that the RTC ban on smoking was not the primary factor contributing to higher attrition rates for recruits who smoked before enlisting. 3) Attrition differences by pre-Service smoking behavior were comparable to or greater than differences in attrition by tier category and by waiver status. 4) There was no interaction effect between educational tier group and pre-Service smoking. However, higher pre-Service smoking rates for Tier II/III recruits increased their average attrition relative to Tier I recruits. Based on these findings we recommended that the following questions might be addressed in future research: What is the true link between attrition and pre- and post-enlistment smoking behavior? Do attrition differences by pre-Service smoking behavior vary by season? Why is the smoking rate for the Navy sample twice that of the national average?

The Navy finished FY02 above planned endstrength because of higher than anticipated retention. Despite cuts in the FY03 accession goal, there are concerns that the Navy might continue to be above planned strength. At the same time, there is a concern that additional cuts in accessions would leave the Navy with long-term manning problems. Therefore, this study examines the Navy's steady-state, non-prior-service accession requirements to see if further cuts would result in a cohort that is too severely undersized. We estimate a range of requirements using FY01 and FY00 retention, but incorporate recent improvements in first-term attrition, likely changes in economic conditions, and future changes in advancement opportunities. We estimate a range of non-prior-service accession requirements of 42,300-46,000; this implies a total steady-state accession requirement of 45,000-48,700. (U) If steady-state requirements are at the lower end of this range, current conditions do support a temporary cut in accessions. Cutting accessions carries some risk, however; if requirements are closer to the upper end of our estimates, the current first-term cohort is appropriately sized. It is imperative, therefore, that the Navy carefully monitor the retention of any undersized cohorts and be committed to protecting retention with reenlistment incentives.

This paper is intended for the Major or Lt Commander newly given a military experimentation assignment. It describes the nature of military experiments, what they do, why they are needed, and how they are conducted. Hypotheses, accuracy, realism, fidelity, truth and cheating are discussed, along with characteristics of successful experimentation and obstacles to effective experimentation. The paper also addresses data collection, reconstruction, analysis, and report writing, and supplies a general military-experimentation template.

Written in the wake of the "9-11" terrorist attacks, this short paper lays out and draws conclusions from the long history of U.S. Navy involvement in what are now called "homeland defense" operations. Topics covered in the survey include: The submersibles and gunboats of the Revolution and the War of 1812; the creation (and subsequent reorientation forward) of a Home Squadron in 1840s; the innovative naval homeland defense systems of the Confederate Navy during the Civil War; the role of inshore U.S. Navy monitors during and after the Civil War; the massive failure of American homeland defense at Pearl Harbor in 1941; offshore antisubmarine warfare during both world wars; and Cold War U.S. Navy continental air defense and coastal underwater surveillance efforts. Analysis of the historical record shows that U.S. Navy forward offensive deployments have almost always taken precedence over homeland defense efforts; that naval systems and organizations originally developed for homeland defense usually migrate to other roles; and that naval homeland defense operations have almost always been embedded in larger joint, inter-agency and total force efforts, usually involving the U.S. Coast Guard. (A shorter version of this paper was published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings May 2003 edition).

The Commander of Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) asked CNA to determine what type of compensation would target any existing or impending shortfalls in Seabee retention and manning. Currently, the Seabee community receives no sea pay and little deployment-related pay. This annotated briefing presents analysis of data from the Seabee Quality-of-Service Compensation Survey, which collected data on enlisted Seabees' preferences for aspects of sea duty assignments. Our results suggest that sea duty deployments are the most arduous characteristic of a sea tour, and that most of the perceived benefit from a decrease in sea tour length or a shorter deployment rotation cycle is from corresponding decreases in deployed time. To address the perceived hardship of sea tour deployments, we estimate monthly compensations that are larger, or more expensive, than estimates calculated in a companion paper: "Can Do" No More? An Assessment of Seabee Compensation, May 2002 (CNA Research Memorandum D0005212.A2). This suggests that a monthly pay of about $200 during a sea tour is a first step in addressing Seabee dissatisfaction and manning and retention shortfalls.

The Navy plans to rely on a new pay, Assignment Incentive Pay or AIP, to encourage sailors to volunteer for and remain in difficult-to-fill billets. To gain insight into its potential usefulness in keeping sailors in billets, we investigate the effect of sea pay--the Navy's primary distribution tool--on the willingness of sailors to remain or extend on sea duty. We conducted regression analyses quantifying the link between sailors' behavior and the sea pay they receive. Our best estimates indicate that an additional $50 per month in sea pay increases sailors' completing a year of an obligated sea tour up to 2.5 percentage points. Extensions are even more responsive to sea pay. In total, $50 more per month translates into 1,425 work-years of sea duty annually. At a cost of $31,600 per work year generated, using sea pay compares favorably to increasing endstrength. If an AIP of $50 per month had similar effects, our best estimate is that the Navy might receive a modest 300 additional work-years in the hardest-to-fill CONUS shore billets. Again, however, this is just one benefit to AIP. The combined benefits of getting sailors to volunteer for duty and keeping them there longer make AIP worth pursuing.

The Navy has long faced difficulties in manning certain billets. To alleviate its problems, it has used a patchwork of assignment incentives. Then, if all else fails, the Navy orders sailors involuntarily into hard-to-fill billets. In this study, we consider the costs of the current system and determine how the Navy might encourage sailors to volunteer for hard-to-fill billets cost-efficiently. We find that an incentive pay for hard-to-fill billets (such as Assignment Incentive Pay) is a promising way of moving the Navy toward a more voluntary, efficient assignment system if designed as a flexible, market-based pay. For overseas shore billets that currently use sea-duty credit as an incentive, AIP will almost certainly be cost-effective. The cost of getting volunteers for OCONUS billets would probably be below $25 million annually using an efficiently designed AIP. Sea duty credit is at least three times more costly. AIP, however, may not be cost-effective for CONUS shore billets. Our best estimate is that sailors may volunteer for traditionally difficult-to-fill billets for an AIP of about $125 per month on average-about the same cost as the savings generated from AIP. For these billets, great care must be taken in designing a cost-effective bonus.

The purpose of this pamphlet is to assemble articles and writings that may be relevant to understanding the implications of the policies stated by Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access � From the Sea and Memorandum of Understanding: Navy/Marine Corps TAC AIR Integration. These two papers forms the basis for adjusting the missions, organizations, and equipment of the Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces for future contingences and combat. While some adjustment will come in the form of new equipment, the greater part will be in new ways to think about how the various elements of naval forces work together in common purpose with the Amy and Air Force to achieve national objectives.

As part of the Navy's Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture (M&P IWAR), N81 asked CNA to examine trends in the training of recruits before their first fleet assignments. In the past few years, the Navy enlisted approximately 48,000 sailors each year. The Navy's system of training and delivering these recruits to operational billets must be an efficient one. The flow of Sailors into the fleet depends on the number of Sailors who continue through boot camp and training, and the length of time it takes. Policy-makers are concerned with attrition during initial training and the length of training pipelines. To examine these trends, we tracked recruits' early career histories using the Street-to-Fleet database. This report updates 1999 and 2001 CNA analysis, adding recent accessions and providing more evidence on the impact of Navy training reengineering. We also present more detailed training data for the Information Systems Technician (IT) and Mess Management System (MS) ratings, and present participation trends in temporary duty assignment.

Because the Navy must order personnel into hard-to-fill billets, negative impacts on manning can result. Consequently, the Navy is considering ways to restructure the assignment system including the implementation of an Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP). The Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel (N1B) asked the CNA Corporation to analyze the attractiveness of alternative incentives meant to persuade Sailors to volunteer for historically hard-to-fill billets. To do so, we developed and administered the Assignment Incentive Survey. Against the backdrop of upcoming AIP implementation, the most important findings from the analysis are those that relate to the effects of special pay on Sailors' assignment preferences. At the most fundamental level, we find that pay is an effective way to sway people's assignment decisions, which indicates that AIP is likely to work. For example, a monthly special pay of between $60 and $900 would make an assignment to Japan attractive. The amount of money that will make a hard-to-fill attractive differs depending on Sailors' dependent status and current assignment location. For example, Sailors without spouses or children have less of a home-basing preference, so these Sailors will most likely be the first to fill hard-to-fill billets with AIP attached.

The central question this report addresses is: What are some likely interventions that Navy Medicine can take in building the infrastructure of ambulatory primary care and mental health in Navy medical treatment facilities (MTFs) to optimally allocate, integrate, organize, and use the human, physical, and technical resources directly or indirectly available to it to achieve the capacity, accessibility, effectiveness, satisfaction, and efficiency performance goals of optimization, within the context of and constraints set by its external environment? Based on our work with Navy Medicine's primary care and mental health advisory boards over the past two years, the report discusses background conceptual issues to optimization, introduces a series of ten potential interventions that we recommend Navy Medicine consider implementing, and then identifies a number of barriers to and critical success factors that bear on implementing them. We see optimization as a system property, and Navy Medicine as a complex system requiring optimization interventions that (a) organize and integrate clinical care and care protocols within and across multiple system levels and interrelated clinical specialties, (b) incorporate clinical leadership, technological advances, and behavioral approaches, and (c) are evidence based.

To increased understanding of the process of military experimentation, this CNA occasional paper examines some of these experiments; today, the technologies need no introduction, and the Second World War provides hindsight through which the experiments and their findings can be viewed. The efforts described here have been chosen as an instructive set, not an exhaustive one. This being a work of analysis, rather than history, secondary sources--as well as primary sources in the form of some participants' memoirs--have been used freely.

This report investigates the future force structure of the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) based on current peacetime presence requirements. The sponsor (N42) was interested in finding what changes in the force structure will be needed due to: the retirement of legacy ships and the commissioning of new ships; new assumptions based on maintenance and transit between theaters; and post-September 11, 2001 combatant requirements.

U.S. shipbuilding has been examined repeatedly in recent years with general agreement about the major findings. From the shipbuilders' perspective the major problem is that too few large ships are being ordered and built; and from the perspective of buyers the major problem is that large U.S. built ships cost too much. This paper traces the recent history of world commercial shipbuilding to help understand the current condition and explain its roots and development. It shows that the current situation is not a new problem. It developed over many decades, and U.S. shipbuilders have not been competitive with the world-class builders of commercial ships for many years. It is also important to realize that the shipbuilding industries in many European nations have experienced and now face problems very much like those facing the United States. The summary starts about 60 years ago and focuses on four major historical events that had major impact on shipbuilding - World War II, the Suez crisis in 1956, the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 and the end of the Cold War in 1989.

This report describes the development of CNA's Officer Street-to-Fleet (OSTF) database and reports changes in time-to-train for the aviation, surface warfare, submarine, and supply corps communities. OSTF is a longitudinal database designed for use in descriptive, statistical and evaluative studies of Navy training. It combines the Defense Manpower Data Center's Officer Master Files with extracts from the Navy Integrated Training Resources Administration System (NITRAS). The result is a complete account of officers' training histories from accession to first operational assignment. OSTF includes all officers who started training between October 1992 and September 2001. For each officer, it reports courses taken, start and end dates of each course, course outcomes, and time-to-train prior to first assignment. It also covers officer characteristics such as race, gender and accession source and records career events such as pipeline completion, attrition, and lateral transfer. In general, there has been a decline in average TTT to first assignment for successive accession cohorts throughout the 1990s for officers who complete training. Where possible, we break down average TTT into average time under instruction (UI), time not under instruction (NUI), and stash time. Changes in average NUI and stash time over the period have been mixed.

Although the initial burst of reformist energy that followed Soeharto's fall in 1998 has largely dissipated, the long-term prognosis for Indonesia remains basically positive. Expectations for democratic reform should be kept modest for the foreseeable future. President Megawati Sukarnoputri's opponents in the 2004 elections do not have strong political bases, and she appears likely to win re-election, but will probably govern with a shaky coalition. Political and government institutions, the judicial system, the police, and political parties are weak, and will gain strength only slowly. Parliament is unable to deal with more than a fraction of the legislation before it. The armed forces are not likely to take over, but will exercise considerable influence despite their formal removal from politics. Islamic-agenda political parties are divided: they may win up to 20% of the vote, but are not likely to coalesce around a single leader. The resilience of the Indonesian people is likely to prevent popular anger at government's failings from exploding.

Indonesia's ability to deal with separatist pressures in Aceh and Papua is limited by weaknesses of leadership, vision, and institutional development. Even so, Indonesia is not likely to disintegrate. Policy toward separatist movements lacks coherence and consistency. Neither the insurgents nor the government appear able to achieve their goals through military action. Stalemate could lead to a quagmire for government troops, particularly in Aceh. Both the independence movement and the armed forces in that province have been responsible for a level of violence that compares with the worst periods in the 1990s. The government under President Megawati appears to be heading toward a renewed effort at a military solution, although talks with the insurgents continue. The separatist movement in Papua is weaker and poorly armed. Papuan leaders have united in a "Presidium" with which the government could negotiate, although the murder of a Papuan leader in November 2001-reportedly by army elements-has undercut the political track. Effective implementations of special autonomy laws for both regions could, over time, result in willing continuation of these territories as parts of Indonesia. The United States has only a limited ability to foster solutions in Aceh and Papua.

Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, has experienced an unprecedented Islamic resurgence since the 1980s, as more Indonesians displayed their piety publicly and became more religiously observant. The predominant disposition among Muslims remained moderate and tolerant, committed to a pluralist government and to democracy. Beginning in the 1990s, however, former President Soeharto courted extremist Muslim groups to protect his power base. After his fall in 1998, hardline Islamists, including paramilitary militias, gained a level of influence far greater than their numbers would warrant, and today represent a serious challenge to the stability of Indonesia and to U.S. interests. They are not likely to gain power through elections, but will be able to influence some government policies and actions. Among the extremists, a relatively small number of Muslims, many of Yemeni ancestry, are prime candidates for al Qaeda links. U.S. assistance in critical areas, including media skills and outreach, to the two mainstream Islamic mass organizations can help the moderate mainstream regain its voice and influence.

This white paper analyzes and draws conclusions about Department of Defense (DOD) support for homeland security (HLS) and homeland defense (HLD) in general, and maritime homeland defense (MHLD) specifically. It was requested by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA) as part of that office's comprehensive review of the reserve component (RC) as directed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). OASD/RA's original question was, "What is the appropriate mix of forces between the active component (AC) and the RC to accomplish the MHLD mission?" However, initial research quickly revealed that as yet there are no official definitions of HLS, HLD, or MHLD, no definitions of service MHLD roles and missions, and no official organizational structure in which to manage the HLS missions and forces. These issues are being considered in ongoing discussions about the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (NORCOM). Until official decisions are made, there is no way to determine the appropriate AC/RC force mix. Those limitations notwithstanding, this paper presents a general overview of the HLS and HLD missions, and provides a framework and a methodology for determining the appropriate AC/RC mix in the MHLD mission area when key decisions are reached.

In preparation for the transition to a new Administration in January 2001, CNAC conducted workshops with informed citizens in four U.S. cities: New York, Chicago, Atlanta, and San Francisco, with the last one conducted in December 2000. This report summarizes the views of those workshops participants. They were especially concerned that the United States stay active in the day-to-day world, and were less interested in transformation of U.S. forces for the future or in national missile defense. While circumstances have not permitted us to return for more discussions in these cities after 9/11/2001, we have nonetheless annotated this report to extrapolate their views to the post-9/11 situation. We believe that they would have fully supported the global war on terror, in close coordination with our allies around the world.

The latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) tasked the Department of Defense to perform a Comprehensive Review of Active/Reserve Force Mix, organization, priority missions, and associated resources. To support the review, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Reserve Affairs, Manpower and Personnel) asked CNA to identify and develop examples of concepts that could improve capabilities and/or alleviate high-demand/low-density constraints in the Navy and Marine Corps. The concepts could be ones that the Navy is already experimenting with-as long as they highlight the contributions that the Reserves can potentially make to overall capabilities. This report describes seven concepts for using reservists and reserve units to extend the capabilities of the Navy; one also applies to the Marine Corps. The seven concepts are (1) augmenting selected carrier flight deck and ordnance ratings, (2) augmenting carrier aviation intermediate maintenance within the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD), (3) using reservists to increase ship's time in areas of operations (AORs), (4) staffing ships during nondeployed periods, (5) having the reserve EA-6B squadron train with Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), (6) moving workload off ships, and (7) filling emerging skill niches. The report discusses each concept's feasibility and the need for further research.

This study draws the connections from globalization to the U.S. Navy. "Globalization" is the description these days of the world system and its process of evolution, taking account of the attacks on 9/11/2001. The study draws attention to the gap between the core countries involved in globalization (a core that may expand) and those countries that are having difficulty integrating into the globalization system. The gap is particularly acute in the Middle East and South and Central Asia. The U.S. Navy plays an important role in joint forces in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and many of its improvements are appropriate to possible conflicts there. Its second role is contributing to stability in East Asia, and its tertiary role is visiting and exercising with allied navies. It is the best and biggest ocean-going navy in the world, and will remain so for the indefinite future. Altogether, though, these circumstances provide little guidance for the size and configuration of the U.S. Navy.

This paper investigated the effects on continuation of serving in a "hard-to-fill" billet, serving in a preferred billet, and homebasing for both initial enlistees and career sailors. Using a location based definition of hard-to-fill billets, we found that Jacksonville was the most preferred location while Lemoore was the least preferred. For careerists, continuation in "good" locations was 1.2 percentage points higher than in "bad" locations. We didn't find any location effect for initial enlistees. The results show that those serving in a preferred billet had continuation rates that were 2.1 and 0.8 percentage points higher for initial enlistees and careerists, respectively. As for homebasing, we found that career sailors with children who homebase have a continuation rate that is 1.4 percentage points higher than those all other careerists. For initial enlistees with children, we found no effect on continuation.

This paper is a historical analysis of the U.S. Marine Corps' new concept for amphibious warfare, operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS). The paper examines the history of amphibious warfare from 1941 to the present in order to provide a general assessment of the relationship between OMFTS and historical reality. The major argument of this paper is that the stated premises underlying the OMFTS warfighting concept, while largely sound, are incomplete. OMFTS neglects important historical constraints and demands on amphibious warfare. Consequently, OMFTS should be refined into a more realistic and pragmatic concept.

In this first application of the SkillsNET process to the Navy, Sailors described their job tasks; each task was then linked to skills and abilities. Next, Sailors grouped the tasks into clusters, identified the required tools and knowledge, and rated the mission criticality of each task. The SkillsNET method identified 200 more tasks than the Occupational Standards for the information technology area. This is significant because the standards are a primary basis for developing training content and advancement exams. Additionally, we found that A-Schools do not cover many mission-critical tasks. There is a significant overlap in the tasks performed by Sailors in three separate ratings, which implies a significant potential for consolidating training related to the overlapping tasks. We found that work performed does not always reflect the competencies for which a reenlistment bonus was paid. Sailors who do network administration but do not receive a bonus are more likely than the bonus recipients to plan to leave the Navy. Finally, advancement exams often fail to cover the critical tasks. The study recommends enhancing the occupational standards with a more comprehensive process that captures the competencies and identifies the mission criticality of the tasks.

In this project, we examined how U.S. maritime forces--the Navy and the Marine Corps--relate to globalization.

In January 1999, the Navy contracted out a portion of its enlisted Medical Laboratory Technician (MLT) training to Thomas Nelson Community College (TNCC) in Hampton, VA. This marked the beginning of a 2-year MLT training pilot study (ending August 2001). CNA was tasked to evaluate the TNCC MLT pilot across six broad areas: quality of graduates, production of graduates, cost, student satisfaction, maintaining military bearing among students, and end-user satisfaction. For each area, we compared outcomes from the TNCC pilot with outcomes of a selected control, or comparison, group (particular Navy in-house training programs). Our findings show that the TNCC program produced high-quality graduates at a lower per-graduate cost when compared with the in-house MLT training program. In addition, the TNCC program accomplished this while continuing to be at least as successful as the in-house programs with regard to attrition rates, and many aspects of student satisfaction, military bearing, and the satisfaction of MTF lab supervisors working with the program's graduates. This annotated briefing documents the results of our evaluation analysis, with specific discussion of the evaluation plan, methodology, data, and results for each of the six measures of success.

The issue is whether warning times for U.S. responses to situations are so short that the U.S. must maintain forces overseas -at land bases or at sea-in order to respond in a timely manner. We judged the length of warning time crudely: from the time a situation broke on the world scene until a U.S. operation began. As described herein, "breaking on the world scene" might be an incident or attack happening out of the blue ; but more often involves a precipitating incident in a local situation in which the U.S. government did not contemplate military intervention when the situation first appeared (e.g., Lebanon). How the U.S. government seizes the problem and begins deliberations at the NSC level is beyond the scope of this paper. A narrower, more technical definition would be from the time warning orders were sent from the President or Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, JCS, to the relevant Unified Commander. Those tend to be of a much shorter time; some cases are discussed in the annex to this paper, and extract from our 1997 study.

This report examines the potential political impact on naval planning and operations in the region of a second stage NATO enlargement plan that would include the Baltic states. It examines the costs and benefits of such a decision for U.S. military activities in the region. It also analyzes the impact of such a decision on relations with the Russian Federation and address measures the U.S. Navy could take to reduce tension with Russia over this issue. Finally, it assesses the lessons learned from previous NATO enlargement in the Baltic region.

In recent years, the Seabee community-the Navy's 'construction force'-has become concerned about its ability to retain skilled enlisted personnel. It fears that the Seabees' expanded mission, hectic deployment schedule, and harsh work environments have created retention and manning difficulties, which will worsen due to recent sea pay increases for seagoing personnel. In response to these concerns, NAVFAC asked CNA to assess whether an additional Seabee compensation is warranted and, if so, to recommend appropriate pay delivery vehicles. For mid- and senior-grades, the Seabee sea retention and manning environments are generally similar to or worse than those experienced by similarly skilled shipboard personnel. Yet recent sea pay enhancements are designed to address fleet recruiting, retention, and manning problems. As such, they will provide a "fix" for the problems facing the shipboard groups, but will not improve Seabee conditions since Seabees do not receive sea pays during sea tours. Providing the Seabees with a pay comparable in size to sea pay enhancement would cost $2.9 to $4.3 million annually, depending on whether it targets manning shortfalls or is equally distributed. The most promising near-term compensation vehicles for this pay would be an increase in the meals or incidental expenses portion of per diem for Seabees, whereas a long-term fix might require the implementation of a distribution incentive pay with targeted Selective Reenlistment Bonus.

An understanding of the relationship between changes in compensation and changes in reenlistment behavior is crucial to shaping the force. A common measure of this relationship is the pay elasticity of reenlistment, the percentage change in reenlistment associated with a 1-percent increase in pay. The literature on Navy enlisted personnel has produced widely varying estimates of this relationship; with changes in both analytic approach and in the Sailors being studied, the reasons for these differences are unclear. Our analysis suggests that most of the variation in these estimates can be explained by the use of different analytic models. Different specifications yield different estimates that span the range found in previous research. Because each specification uses the same data, these different estimates reflect differences in the degree to which these models attribute differences to pay, not differences in the behavior of enlisted personnel. In contrast, there is little variation in the pay elasticity over time; the only significant changes occur during the drawdown. We choose a preferred specification by examining its ability to accurately predict reenlistment behavior. For both in-sample and out-of-sample predictions of reenlistment, our baseline model, with a pay elasticity of 1.5, provides the best fit of the data.

The Navy determines the number of sailors it needs on board ships through a complex and demanding process. To those not directly involved, it is a black box. This study describes the Navy's methods and compares them to practices used by private-sector firms. It identifies assumptions that drive the number of people needed, or "manpower requirements," and quantifies the impact of those assumptions on billets and costs. The study concludes that the Navy's manpower requirements process is thorough, accountable, and meets the Navy's stated goals. However, it does not adequately consider manning alternatives. In setting requirements, the Navy takes technology as given and uses decades-old assumptions about work hours, labor productivity, and the paygrade mix of the crew. Such assumptions, which are "hard-wired" into the Navy's requirements computation model, are costly and merit revalidation. Other problems include limited cost incentives and a lack of performance metrics with which to assess different manning configurations. The study recommends that the Navy (a) make the costs (and benefits) of requirements more visible (b) shift the focus from workload validation toward innovation and improvement; and (c) charge an agent or organization with identifying avenues for manpower savings, through methodological, technological, or organizational changes.

The Military Health System (MHS) must execute twin missions. The primary mission of the MHS and the three Service medical departments is force health protection. This readiness mission involves providing medical support in combat and other military operations and maintaining the day-to-day health of about 1.5 million men and women who serve in the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The second mission is to provide a health care benefit to nearly 6.6 million other people who are eligible to use the MHS. Because the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a single force to meet the sometimes disparate missions, it must cultivate a workforce that is dedicated to caring for patients, committed to continuous improvement in performance and productivity, and competent in both wartime and peacetime. This challenge is particularly difficult because uniformed health care professionals are costly to access and train, and they have skills that are in demand in the private sector. Congressional awareness of this mandate and competition from the private sector for qualified health care professionals resulted in the following committee language in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001: "The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a review and to report to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the adequacy of special pays and bonuses for medical corps officers and other health care professionals. The committee directs this review because of the level of competition within the economy for health care professionals and the potential devaluation of current special pays and bonuses, which could have a significant impact on recruiting and retention of health care professionals." As a result of this language, the TRICARE Management Agency (TMA) asked CNA to conduct to address the concerns voiced by Congress. This research memorandum describes the results of phases II and III of this study, adequacy of special pays and bonuses for medical officers and selected other health care professionals.

The military services, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Congress have all expressed concern about the shortages of spare parts for aviation units and about the workarounds, including the cannibalization of parts, that are required to achieve readiness goals. In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework that should help decision-makers understand why cannibalizations occur; what factors influence cannibalization rates; and, given the interaction of those factors, how to predict cannibalization rates. We start with a description of the theoretical model and then provide a numerical example. Next, we examine several policy implications and offer some suggestions for future research. Upon request, we will provide a spreadsheet calculator that will allow users in the Navy and Air Force to derive simulation results using their own parametric values.

In February 1999, in response to increasing recruiting difficulties, the Secretary of the Navy raised the cap on non-high-school-diploma graduates (NHSDGs) from 5 percent to 10 percent of enlisted accessions. Because of concern about the effect that such an increase could have on attrition, Navy Recruiting Command changed the screening tool used to determine NHSDG eligibility. The High Performance Predictor Profile (HP3) replaced the Compensatory Screening Model (CSM) in February 1999. In August 2001, CNA documented the effectiveness of HP3 for the period from February 1999 through FY00. In this publication, we continue the analysis through FY01. In summary, we find no evidence that the HP3 screen has improved the survival of NHSDGs through 12 months of service. Although the absolute survival of NHSDGs has improved through Recruit Training Camp (RTC), 180 days, and 12 months since the implementation of the HP3 screen, the increase in survival of HSDGs through the same milestones is at least proportionally as large. In fact, the increase in survival through 12 months is relatively larger for HSDGs than for NHSDGs. Therefore we conclude that the HP3 and CSM screens are comparable in their ability to screen out high-risk NHSDG recruits.

There is a perceived need for a single metric that represents the operational mechanical and electrical (M&E) readiness of ships. Such a number could be useful in maintenance planning, programming, and execution; in evaluating whether the fleet is ready for contingency; and in spotting systematic readiness deficiencies and making associated resource decisions. One effort to develop such a metric is the Ship Material Condition Metrics (SMCM) initiative developed at the Naval Warfare Assessment Station (NWAS) at Corona, California. As a pilot project, the formulas for the metric have been applied to the evaluation of the USS Lake Champlain (CG-57). OpNav N81 asked CNA to evaluate the way the metric was constructed. The NWAS model aims to roll up "readiness" evaluations of small pieces of equipment into a single number for the entire ship M&E. We assessed the model on two levels. In the first, we evaluated the NWAS model parameters and model structure for a significant subset of the ship systems. As a result of our investigations, we can suggest modifications to the formulas which should permit better handling of redundant systems and should better represent the criticality of particular subsystems. In the other part of our evaluation, we took a step back and critically reviewed the fundamental structure of the calculations, formulas, and numerical scales. Our aim was to evaluate whether the SMCM methodologies would give measures that are meaningful, consistent, and useful.

The Director, Medical Resources, Plans, and Policy (N-931) asked CNA to analyze potential alternatives for Navy Medicine's future deployable medical platforms, focusing on the 2015-2025 time frame. Specifically, N-931 directed CNA to: 1. Analyze future operating environments 2. Analyze the medical capabilities required by those environments 3. Describe and analyze generic potential platforms that will supply those capabilities 4. Analyze the requirement-setting process and funding cycle, to draw recommendations for Navy Medicine's actions. Future operating environments could require Navy Medicine to support a wide variety of missions, including homeland security, operational maneuver from the sea, and managing the consequences of biological and chemical attacks. Our analyses show that there will be a continuing need for both land-based and sea-based medical platforms because no single platform is optimal in all circumstances. Among sea-based platforms, we found that variants or conversions of amphibious ships would be strong candidates for many future missions. Maritime Pre-positioning Force Future (MPF(F)) ships should also be considered among potential future medical platforms for echelon II care. Variants of today's fleet hospital could serve Navy Medicine's needs for future land-based options. Navy Medicine needs to begin the process of developing mission needs statements soon because the requirement setting, funding, and procurement processes take many years.

CNAC and its Russian counterpart, ISKRAN, held their 15th seminar here at CNAC on 7 December 2001. This is a report of that seminar. The report is also based on other discussions the Russian visitors had in the Washington area, including with Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Vice Admiral Keating, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations. The CNAC program dates back to the fall of 1990, when we invited Andrey Kokoshin, among others, to the CNAC Annual Conference, to the fall of 1991, when a CNAC group took its first trip to Moscow, and the spring of 1992, when the first CNAC-ISKRAN seminar was held, here in Washington. The discussions focused on new opportunities for Russian American relations and for NATO-Russian cooperation following September 11, following President Putin's initiative to support the United States on September 24, and following the Bush-Putin summit meeting in November ("the Crawford Summit"). These discussions stood in some contrast to the discussions we held in Moscow in July 2001. Then there was an almost complete obsession among our Russian interlocutors, with the impending demise of the ABM treaty, and with it, as they said, the end of strategic stability. There was also a discussion during the seminar on whether the last decade had seen a great deal of progress in the improvement of U.S.-Russian relations or was a time of wasted opportunities during which the chances for a real Russian-American partnership, especially in matters of security, were squandered.

CNA performed the Navy Specialty Physician Study at the request of the Navy Surgeon General. The objective of the study was to further explore retention of Navy physicians, by identifying and tracking critical indicators of Navy physician retention, to provide BUMED information for improving personnel policy business practices. Years of practice in specialty, percent board certified, number of residents and fellows, and demographics are some of the critical indicators we tracked by specialty. In recognition of the typical career path of Navy physicians, our retention analysis considered matriculation and attrition rates. We found that the matriculation rate of newly trained specialists has improved since FY 1987. We believe this is a result of the April 1988 active duty GME obligation policy change. To provide policy-makers some context and comparison for our findings, we explored some of the physician recruitment and retention strategies being used in the civilian sector. This information will help policy-makers better understand the Navy's competitive position when it competes for physicians.

The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO), asked CNA for help. This new command, the Navy component command to U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), established in February 2000, had a staff cobbled together from various existing commands, which it in part replace, and no official manning review was involved in its inception. The focus of our study was on this question: Is NAVSO organized and staffed to do its job? To answer this question we had to understand NAVSO's job, organization (with a focus on its relationships in the administrative/Navy chain of control), and staff. As background to these efforts, we needed to look at the history of Navy component commands in the SOUTHCOM AOR. This work produced insights into the genesis of NAVSO and the form it took.

Over the past several years, the military has faced mounting recruiting, reenlistment, and manning difficulties. One perceived reason for these difficulties is increased competition for skilled personnel from the private sector, particularly through its incentive pay and benefit offerings. Although the recent softening of the economy may help to ease some of these competitive pressures, other less cyclical trends -such as a smaller high-school graduate recruiting pool and lower propensity to enlist in the military-persist. These trends suggest that a careful survey of the private-sector incentive pay and benefits landscape is needed. In this paper, we compare and contrast the incentive pay and benefit offerings of large, private-sector firms to those of the military. In doing so, we assess whether these offerings differ significantly in their provision, scope, or structure. We also consider whether these offerings have played a role in the military's recent recruiting, reenlistment, and manning difficulties. Finally, we describe the offerings of several private-sector companies that are likely to compete with the military for skilled personnel. We find significant differences in military and private-sector incentive pay and benefit provision of incentive-based pay, health care and retirement benefits, education and training services, child care, workforce flexibility measures, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)/other quality-of-life programs. In most cases, military benefits are broader in scope, differ in structure, and involve less choice than those offered by the private-sector. Taken together, these trends suggest several recommendations that could help the military in its recruiting, retention, and manning efforts.

The Ninth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC)is reviewing ways to structure military compensation to improve military recruiting, retention and manning. Retirement pay is a significant component of the current compensation package, and there is concern that the structure of these benefits is not competitive with that offered by the private sector. The current military retirement system is a defined benefit program, with some limited ability to participate in a thrift savings plan (TSP). In contrast, the private sector increasingly uses defined contribution plans, which give the employee an opportunity to manage at least part of the retirement plan benefits. Expansion of the TSP component of military retirement benefits would potentially increase the attractiveness of military compensation. Given the sheer size of the military, however, several concerns have been raised about the implications of such a dramatic shift in compensation. At least four major questions have been asked-questions surrounding the level of service member participation, potential effects on total saving, implications for federal tax revenues, and the administrative costs associated with such a program. In light of these concerns, this research memorandum summarizes both the theoretical and empirical literature devoted to these issues. The evidence suggests that participation and contribution rates are strongly related to the size of matching contributions made by the employer. In addition, surveys show that military personnel would increase participation in TSP if the government were willing to make matching contributions. Given the financial risk associated with these plans relative to insured, defined benefit plans, there is also evidence that financial education (preferably provided by the emplyer) increases employee saving and improves contribution allocation.

The Ninth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) is reviewing the role of the military compensation system in past recruiting, manning, and retention shortfalls in search of ways to better structure compensation to mitigate these problems in the future. A synopsis of sea pay is presented in this paper. First, the purpose of sea pay and how it has changed through the Navy's history is addressed: who has been eligible for sea pay and the size of sea pay relative to basic pay and to manpower expenditures. Secondly, sea pay as it has been used in the recent past is described including: the sea pay table; incentives; and, survey and actual behavioral data. Thirdly, reforms to sea pay currently being implemented are detailed, along with the Navy's objectives and options. Finally, the implications for a new servicewide deployment pay are considered.

The 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) is seeking ways to better structure military compensation to alleviate current recruiting, manning, and retention shortfalls. Structured correctly, basic pay and special pays should provide incentives to stay in the military, to gain experience and skills valuable to the services, and to move into critical skill areas or jobs where they are most needed. No existing pays fully answer the need to provide incentives to take on jobs that require serving alone, away from home. For this reason, the 9th QRMC is considering the creation of a new pay that would compensate service members for the hardships associated with deployments. The difficulty in creating such a pay, however, is establishing consistent definitions and measures of many of the key concepts related to time away from home. Relevant issues include: identifying the goals of any new deployment pay and the hardships for which people should be compensated; defining deployments and time away; and developing a deployment pay structure. Taken together or separately, these definitional and conceptual issues must be considered when determining the structure or use of a new pay and how it would relate to existing military pays. In a companion paper, we examine in detail the largest "away" pay, sea pay. Here we summarize that paper's conclusions regarding sea pay and examine several of the other special and incentive pays that historically have been used to compensate people for hardships associated with deployments. We then examine the availability of these pays to date and assess the adequacy of these pays in meeting the military's goals. Finally, we conclude by outlining policy options and recommending compensation changes that would better align existing pays with any newly created pays and with the military's primary goals and objectives.

Are the most senior enlisted service members adequately compensated? Given the varying levels of responsibility assigned to them, is the compensation sufficient to ensure that we retain the talent we require? Because these senior enlisted personnel are more apt to be retirement-eligible, are the best retiring too early? Are there sufficient incentives to induce the most competitive to remain in service? Service members in grade E-9 usually fall into two categories: the technical or duty expert of a certain occupational field; or the senior enlisted advisor to the commanding officer of a given unit, usually a unit with its own organizational colors. In discussing these issues, this paper starts with a short history of non-commissioned officers, concentrating on the most senior grade. Then we'll present a current overview of the E-9s in each of the services and describe what we see as the challenges facing the E-9 community today. We'll turn then to the current experience distribution of E-9s, promotion timings, and the pattern of retirements. Finally, we'll return to the question of incentives for E-9 retention and a proposal for an E-10grade.

In August 2000, PREST (Policy Research in Engineering, Science & Technology), a research institute of the University of Manchester, was asked by CNA to undertake a study of the participation of ten leading US defense contractors in the European defense market. PREST was also asked to profile two leading European defense contractors-BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce-and analyze their participation in the US defense market. For each US company, the report describes and analyses the company's participation in the European defense market in terms of its current and potential future foreign military sales and its defense-related strategic alliances, joint ventures, and acquisitions/divestments involving European firms. The report also shows that the participation of US companies in the European defense market has evolved over the last fifty years from predominantly government-led arrangements driven by Cold War concerns about Western European military capabilities toward increasingly industry-led relationships driven by commercial concerns about market access. The report also profiles BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce participation in the US defense market in the same way. Looking to the future, the report makes clear that companies in the newly consolidated European defense industry and their US counterparts will face significant and on-going business pressures to expand their international activities, and transatlantic relationships are likely to be an important dimension of their strategies.

This survey represents a survey of enlisted retention models and findings. It includes discussion of: the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model; panel prohibit models; conditional logit models; multinomial logit models; reverse causation between bonuses and the reenlistment rate; joint models of attrition and retention; elasticity computation; elasticity estimates; estimation of discount rates; and, effects of variables other than pay.

CNA was tasked by N81 as part of the Integrated Warfare Architectures (IWARS) program to examine and assess the process that determines the wartime medical manpower requirement. We examined the processes for staffing the Navy's hospital ships (T-AHs), fleet hospitals (FHs), and the OCONUS military medical treatment facility (MTF) augment. We also examined how the medical manpower requirements for the fleet and Fleet Marine Force (FMF) are determined.

After the Soviet Union was dissolved, the new Russian Federation faced an agenda calling for fundamental transformation. There were five major challenges for Russia, among them to conduct military reform. Today, while there is finally a blueprint for military reform, there is still no coherent and integrated government military reform strategy in sight, no balancing of stated commitments and available resources. Fundamental military reform will for some time likely remain hostage to a growing pyramid of foreign and domestic debt and a strained internal situation. The Russian state is hampered by poor tax collection; high turnover of prime ministers, cabinet members, and presidential advisors; and continuing competition between the military and non-Ministry of Defense (MOD) security forces for scarce resources and power. This paper discusses the failed military reforms of Boris Yeltsin; the Sergeyev reforms, the Kvashnin alternatives; economic limitations; the military-industrial complex; Russia's reliance on strategic nuclear forces; politics and the military under Putin; reform under Putin; and, civilian control and the Ministry of Defense.

In November 2000, CNA convened a conference of over 200 national security professionals to assist incoming DOD leadership with budget, personnel, and policy issues. Through panels and discussions, participants considered a number of issues, including the role of the military, the perceptions of a personnel and morale crisis, the pros and cons of a sea-based component of national missile defense, how to strike the right balance between fostering intellectual competition among the services and ensuring they can work together in real-world operations, the degree to which "transformation" driven by technology should govern our thinking, and the appropriate priorities for the Defense Department during the coming year. This document summarizes the insights gained.

This annotated briefing reports the results of a study for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD/HA) and the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) on the Optimization Plan of the Military Health System (MHS). The plan is designed to make the MHS more efficient as well as to increase the overall health of DOD beneficiaries. Our main goal is to determine the link between optimization and several measures of system efficiency. We explore how greater efficiency can increase system capacity so that current workload that is going to the managed care support contractors (MCSCs) can come back into the MTFs). This "recapture" of CHAMPUS workload is the main focus of this study. We examine recapture in several ways: by the military's medical treatment facilities (MTFs) providing more of the inpatient (IP) workload (the overnight stays that go "downtown") and more of the outpatient (OP) visits that today might go to civilian providers. Some of the workload may be part of the Prime network of civilian providers that the MCSCs have set up for DOD beneficiaries, but the majority is for non-network services for which DOD ultimately pays. For both IP and OP workload, we examine whether MTF physicians can provide more of these services and compare the "complexity" of the work with that provided by civilian providers. Lastly, we examine the demand for services, by measuring the demand rates of DOD beneficiaries and how well that demand is managed by local MTFs.

The goal of the Repatriated Prisoners of War (RPOW) program and the Center for Prisoner of War Studies is to evaluate the former prisoners and their experiences—both in captivity and through repatriation and reintegration into society—and to apply the lessons learned to help others in the future. Using a health assessment survey, CNA collected data on the general health status of prisoners of the Vietnam War after repatriation. We then developed a database tool for archiving and analyzing relationships in the data. This manual provides a guide for the use of the survey database.

The goal of the Repatriated Prisoners of War (RPOW) program and the Center for Prisoner of War Studies is to evaluate the former prisoners and their experience to learn how to help others from future conflicts. CNA was asked to do a descriptive study of the general health status of prisoners of the Vietnam War, nearly 25 years after their repatriation. We have shown that the RPOWs are now in poorer health than those in the control group and a group of like-aged retired military personnel.

As part of the CNA's support to the Robert E. Mitchell Center for Prisoner of War Studies at the Naval Operational Medicine Institute (NOMI), CNA is examining Repatriated Prisoners of War (RPOW) data sources that currently reside at the Mitchell Center. Thirty-four tapes were created with data on Vietnam-era RPOWs. There has been no attempt to make these data available to researchers, or to document the status of the data stored on the tapes. NOMI and the Mitchell Center have asked us to examine all of these data sources to see if they contain information that could be made available to both internal and external researchers exploring the effects of long-term captivity.

This briefing begins with an overview of how this study began. It then outlines the three specific areas that CNA was asked to study and presents the findings for each of these tasks. First, we would examine administrative costs that are associated with the managed care support contracts. Our second task was to examine several commercial performance standards to be used as benchmarks in our analysis of the military health care system. Finally, we were to examine Region 11 utilization and cost.

The purpose of this study is to review the realism and sustainability of estimated savings under the competitive sourcing program and examine whether the expected level of savings can be achieved and maintained over the long run without affecting the quality of services provided. To look at these cost and performance issues, CNA examined 16 competitions completed between 1988 and 1996. For the 16 competitions included in our analysis, we collected actual costs and all available performance information from the time of competition through FY 1999. We calculated the expected level of savings for each competition (based on the difference between the pre-competition costs and the winning bid) and compared these savings estimates with the post-competition costs.

In FY 98, the Navy failed to meet its enlisted recruiting goal by 7,000 recruits, or 12 percent. Early in FY99, it appeared that the recruiting difficulties would continue. All of the military services were facing a tight recruiting market because of such factors as low unemployment, a decreased propensity of youth to enlist, and increasing college enrollments. The Secretary of the Navy responded in February 1999 by increasing the cap on the recruitment of non-high school diploma graduates (NHSDGs) from 5 to 10 percent of enlisted accessions. Although NHSDGs are less costly to recruit than high-school-diploma graduates (HSDGs), both in terms of recruiter time and in marketing, the military services limit the number of NHSDG recruits because they have much higher attrition than high school graduates. Because the Navy was concerned about how the increased numbers of NHSDGs would affect overall recruit survival, it initiated the following two programs: Navy recruiting modified the Compensatory Screening Model (CSM), the screen used to determine NHSG eligibility-the new screen, called the High Performance Predictor Profile (HP3), was implemented with new contacts during February 1999; and the Commander, Navy Education and Training (CNET) developed a 1-week course for NHSDG recruits called Academic Capacity Enhancement (ACE), which began in March 1999, discontinued during the summer surge, and returned as a fully revised course in October 1999. Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) asked CNA to analyze (a) the survival of NHSDGs under these two new policies and (b) the overall cost-effectiveness of the policy to increase the cap on NHSDG accessions. This annotated briefing presents our findings.

The purpose of this research memorandum is to report and comment on the findings of an analysis of Navy Medicine Primary Care (NMPC) to members of the Primary Care Product Line (PCPL) Advisory Board (the Board) and to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED). This report is part of the support that CNA is providing to the product line. It analyzes Ambulatory Data System (ADS) records of visits made to Navy Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs) during FY 2000, as well as data from two Department of Defense (DOD) surveys that provide information on the satisfaction of users of NMPC. Its intent is to provide empirical information as background to the Board's and BUMED's optimization activities. In this report, we describe what NMPC is, based on what primary care providers (PCPs) do in Navy MTF primary care (PC) settings, and identify how and to what extent the content and nature of NMPC varies by provider and setting. This approaches NMPC from the supply side - what care is provided by whom, and where. Its focus is not on how much care is provided (e.g., number of visits) but rather on the nature and distribution of that care (e.g., percentage of visits by clinical content and provider type).

When the Navy's downsizing ended in the 1990s, undermanning in the fleet became evident. By the end of the decade, fewer than 90 percent of the enlisted billets were filled. Problems with recruiting, distributing, and retaining sailors all contributed to the undermanning difficulties. In response, the Navy fought to reverse the trend by instituting initiatives to alleviate attrition. As part of the Navy's efforts to increase manning through reduced attrition, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel (N1B) asked CNA to analyze the causes of fleet attrition-that is, early separations among sailors who make it to a full-duty billet, both on shore and at sea. Because most fleet attrition occurs soon after arrival in the fleet, we focused on first term attrition. First, we studied the patterns of fleet attrition losses in the Navy. Then we investigated the causes of attrition and how those factors changed in the 1990s. We conducted an analysis of yearly cohort attrition for first-term sailors on both sea and shore duty. Then, restricting our analysis to sailors on surface ships, we explored how the deployment cycle influences attrition. Finally, because attrition is costly, we explored strategies aimed at reducing it and keeping it low.

CNAC has had a program of seminars with its Russian counterparts since 1991. We have discussed a range of issues, from strategic nuclear matters to naval cooperation. For the seminar we are planning in Russia in the summer or fall of 2001, one of the prime agenda items will be the long-term future of the relation of Russia to European security (assuming the United States has a long-term future relation in Europe as well). As part of our preparations for the seminar, we organized a workshop to discuss the issues of Russia and European security. It was held at CNA on 13 April 2001. The format of the workshop involved five speakers, each addressing one of five scenarios chosen to raise a full range of issues. The scenarios, described in this paper, are: 1) NATO expansion to Russia's borders; 2) bringing Russia into NATO; 3) Russia and Europe gradually converging in matters of security; 4) Europe creates a security infrastructure separate from U.S. and from Russia; and 5) drift in European security arrangements.

Since the onset of the volunteer military almost 30 years ago (1973), the American full-time workforce has become more diverse, and the active-duty military reflects that diversity. This paper considers comparisons of full-time, military-age (18 to 44 years) civilian workers and active-duty military personnel in 1970 and 2000. In that 30-year period, percentages of civilian workers changed from 89 to 70 percent white, from 10 to 12 percent black, and from 1 to 18 percent other racial categories. The percentage of women in the civilian workforce rose from 29 to 41 percent. Percentage differences in the active-duty military population between 1970 and 2000 are comparable: from 83 to 65 percent white, from 11 to 20 percent black, and from 6 to 14 percent other racial/ethnic backgrounds. The percentage of women in the military increased from 2 to 15 percent. This research memorandum begins with a discussion of this increased diversity with the Gates Commission and the beginning of the all-volunteer force, and of how representative of society the all-volunteer force is today.

The Navy expects to enlist about 55,000 sailors each year in the near future, and faces the challenge of training and delivering these recruits to operational billets. Accordingly, policy-makers wish to monitor the fraction of recruits who complete training, as well as the time it takes them to reach the fleet. In this report, we track sailors "from street to fleet, " analyzing factors that influence attrition from the Navy during the period of initial skills training. A companion report describes street-to-fleet trends and focuses on the time it takes recruits to reach the fleet. The Director, Assessment Division (N81) requested this study as part of the Navy's Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture (IWAR). The IWAR is a planning vehicle that uses analyses to shape long-range goals and policies. This study examines prefleet attrition from the Navy; it does not investigate losses from the fleet, attrition from specific courses, or transitions between training programs. CNA conducted a regression analysis to define patterns in attrition as they relate to gender, rating, and training time.

In 1997, in a joint effort, the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Department of Defense (DOD)collected aptitude test data from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery )ASVAB) on a nationally representative sample of youth. The tests were administered as part of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). A subset of data pertaining to youth 18 to 23 years of age is referred to as the Profile of American Youth (PAY 97). In 1999 CNA conducted an initial analysis of PAY 97 test scores. We concluded that the data sample was missing a large number of persons likely to deplete both the upper and lower levels of aptitude distributions. We further concluded that the loss would bias resulting norms unless corrected. We recommended weighting the data by race, gender, age, respondent's education, and a proxy for social economic status in an effort to correct the bias. The data were subsequently weighted by NORC. This report describes the follow-on analysis that we conducted on PAY 97 test scores. This work was funded by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) provides consulting, research, and education services to a wide range of military and some civilian medical facilities. However, the Defense Health Program must subsidize AFIP's activities with an annual budget of roughly $55 million. As part of its Revolution in Business Affairs, the Department of Defense is striving to increase efficiency by making its various activities as self-sufficient as possible. The CNA Corporation was asked to evaluate whether AFIP has the potential to become a self-sufficient organization. We also looked at a range of alternative organizational structures that might be used to run AFIP and offer some insight into the effectiveness of those structures. We believe that AFIP could exist as a fee-for-service activity, but would require significant organizational restructuring.

This work was done as part of a larger study conducted for N814. The purpose of the larger study was to examine the link between mission performance and readiness drivers using data from CVN-71's combat operations during Operation Allied Force (OAF). In this part of the project, we looked specifically at material readiness of the embarked airwing (CVW-8). Our original intent was to estimate the parameters for a complete Markov model of aircraft material condition. We were unable to implement a complete realization of this model because of problems that included missing data and resource constraints. However, we were able to make substantial progress on two components of the process, and present these results.

The purpose of this paper is to describe ambulatory mental health care in Navy clinics We examined outpatient mental health visits in terms of absolute numbers, focusing on patient characteristics, clinic characteristics, and visit characteristics. We use absolute numbers instead of rates because Navy Medicine does not know definitively for how many beneficiaries it is responsible for providing care. This research provides the membership of Navy Medicine's Mental Health Executive Board with a picture of recent military beneficiary use of mental health services at Navy clinics. This analysis is for use by the Mental Health Executive Board to inform its decisions regarding the Navy's provision of mental and behavioral health services.

As part of the Navy's Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture (M&P IWAR), N81 asked CNA to examine trends in the training recruits receive before their first fleet assignments. The Navy expects to enlist approximately 55,000 sailors each year in the near future. The Navy's system of training and delivering these recruits to operational billets must be an efficient one. The flow of sailors into the fleet depends on two things: the number of sailors who get there and the amount of time it takes. Accordingly, policy-makers are concerned with both the attrition of recruits during the period of initial training and the lengths of the training pipelines themselves. To examine these trends, we tracked recruits' early career histories from "street-to-fleet." This report updates a 1999 CNA analysis, adding recent accessions and reflecting training reengineering that the Navy has undertaken since then. We also examine initial skills training in more detail, looking at all contract lengths (2-, 3- and 5Yos, as well as 4- and 6YOs) and at ratings.

The FY 2000 Evaluation of the TRICARE Program was performed jointly by the CNA Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs). The objectives of the evaluation were to assess (1) the effectiveness of the TRICARE program in improving beneficiaries' access to health care, (2) the impact of TRICARE on the quality of health care received by Military Health System (MHS) beneficiaries, and (3) the effect of TRICARE on health care costs to both the government and MHS beneficiaries. This document represents the Center for Naval Analyses' contribution of the Evaluation of the TRICARE Program, FY 2000 Report to Congress. The full report also included IDA's evaluation of the costs to the government and beneficiaries. The TRICARE evaluation project is an ongoing effort that provides an annual report to the Congress as the program matures.

At the beginning of the new century, the Navy is undergoing a series of major changes in the way it fights. Changes in the force structure have altered the demand on personnel. New technologies are revolutionizing Navy platforms and concepts of operations. Business practices have shifted some work previously done by military personnel to civilians in both the civil service and the private sector. Organizational changes for all the armed forces, first initiated with the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, have placed increasing control in the hands of the joint arena. This paper explores how and why an efficient military might include an increasing proportion of senior officers over time. The argument rests on four main pillars: force structure; technology; outsourcing; and joint, interagency, and international coordination.

Sea manning shortfalls have plagued the Navy over the latter part of the 1990s-with E4-E9 sea manning dropping below 90 percent for much of that time. The Navy considered two general solutions: ordering sailors to sea for longer or offering incentives for sailors to volunteer for additional sea duty. Although the assignment to sea duty is involuntary, the length sailors actually serve reflects both their sea duty obligation and their willingness to serve at sea. As we will document here, many sailors do not complete their sea tours, so lengthening sea tours may not be an effective way to improve manning. A recent CNA study used survey data to predict how sailors would respond if the Navy were to restructure sea pay, which is the Navy's primary distribution tool. In this annotated briefing, we look at historical data on the average time sailors spend at sea and relate them to changes in sea pay. Survey and anecdotal evidence exist, but little direct evidence links sea pay and time spent at sea. These data provide additional empirical evidence on sailors' response to sea duty incentives and the groundwork for a more detailed study in the future. In addition, as the Navy reforms sea pay, it will need to monitor the system and change sea pay rates when necessary. The measures we present here may provide a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the reform.

This report documents a series of briefings on Marine Corps personnel selection and classification issues presented at a workshop held March 28 and 29 2001. Separate briefings (combined in this report) covered the following issues: review of validation systems; validation of ASVAB for selection and classification of officers and enlisted personnel; validation of the experimental Assembling Objects subtest; and performance criteria.

On January 2, 2001, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vernon Clark visited the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to hear a series of briefings on contemporary issues of interest to the Navy. Research Staff members of the Workforce, Education and Training (WET) Team presented three of these briefings on Recruiting Issues, Navy Enlisted Education Policy, and the Quality and Quantity of Attrition. During this session, Admiral Clark received a copy of a paper on Compensation Strategy. Shortly thereafter, he requested a follow-up briefing on this issue. This document provides annotation of these four briefings.

The level and composition of military pay is crucial to the success of the all-volunteer force (AVF). Most analyses of the "adequacy" of military compensation focus on comparability with earnings offered in civilian labor markets, but an effective compensation system needs to address other goals as well. An important goal is that military pay be sufficient to meet the basic needs of all personnel. This research memorandum focuses on the standard of living that the military compensation system provides its enlisted personnel and their families. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) reviewed the common methods, both objective and subjective, used to measure standard of living in the literature. We then used these different concepts to evaluate the standard of living of enlisted personnel. Our results suggest that relatively few enlisted personnel have incomes below the poverty lines.

The Marine Corps has committed considerable resources to the development of the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW). This Oracle-based system allows Marine Corps analysts to look at the force historically and to do very detailed analysis of what it looks like today. A shortfall of the TFDW is that it cannot answer such "street-to-fleet" questions as: what enlisted recruit characteristics are associated with successful adaptation to the Marine Corps; and, what officer characteristics are associated with retention? The purpose of this Street-to-Fleet study was to identify the best historical data that could be found and to build accession-based files, for Marine Corps commissioned officer and enlisted personnel, organized by fiscal year of entry into the Marine Corps. In this volume of the final report, the Marine Corps attrition reasons (MCAR) and Marine Corps attrition interactive database (MCAID) databases for the enlisted personnel are described along with the procedures developed for updating them.

This research memorandum documents the Marine Corps Commissioned Officer Accession Career (MCCOAC) file, an events-based file that combines information from several data sources to describe the street-to-fleet process. It explains the method of compilation, and presents some initial analyses. The appendix describes the MCCOAC file format.

The purpose of N81's M&P IWAR (Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture) 2000 is to examine the alignment of the Navy's operational capabilities and requirements. The examination focuses on four areas: civilian staffing, medical manpower, reserves, and retention. This study supported that effort by addressing the medical manpower issue. Our specific tasks were: provide a comprehensive profile of all operational medical personnel assets by Navy fleet and Fleet Marine Force (FMF) organizational structure; identify capabilities provided by each medical unit by platform or related organizational entity; identify the medical manpower requirement determination process for both the Navy fleets and FMFs; assess the requirement determination process, examine differences and inconsistencies within and between Navy fleets and FMFs; and, identify opportunities to achieve balance and consistency in the distribution of medical manpower resources.

The Military Health System (MHS) is charged with maintaining a healthy active duty force, attending to the sick and wounded in time of conflict, and successfully competing for and treating patients within the peacetime benefit mission. The military must attract and retain high-quality health care professionals. These issues are particularly important for military health care professionals because they are costly to access and train, and they have skills that are readily interchangeable to the private sector. The Department of Defense (DOD) is competing against private sector employees who are offering accession bonuses, flexible work schedules, portable retirement plans, continuing educational opportunities, employee-tailored benefits, and competitive salaries. The TRICARE Management Agency (TMA) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to conduct a study to examine appropriate compensation, special pays and bonuses for military health care professionals. Our analysis showed that the current military-civilian health professional pay gap varies widely-from 3 to 63 percent, depending on specialty and years in service.

The Military Health System (MHS) is charged with maintaining a healthy active duty force, attending to the sick and wounded in time of conflict, and successfully competing for and treating patients within peacetime benefit mission. The military must attract and retain high-quality health care professionals. These issues are particularly important for military health care professionals because they are costly to access and train, and they have skills that are readily interchangeable to the private sector. The TRICARE Management Agency (TMA) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to study appropriate compensation, special pays, and bonuses for military health care professionals. CNA conducted a comparative analysis of current compensation (cash and benefits) between Army and Air Force physicians and private-sector physicians. Our analysis shows that the current military-civilian physician pay gap varies widely depending on specialty and years in service.

As the longest economic expansion in history continues, the competition between the private sector and the military for able personnel intensifies. This competition has prompted renewed interest in the benefit and incentive pay programs that large, private-sector firms offer. As part of the Navy's FY 2000 Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture (IWAR), the Director of the Assessment Division (N81) has asked CNA to examine the provision of various benefit and incentive pay programs in the civilian sector. Of particular interest is the provision of such programs among large, private-sector firms that are considered strong competition in the market for skilled labor. This annotated briefing provides some context for the discussion by describing the current recruiting and retention difficulties of both the military and large, private-sector firms, and explains our choice of research methodology for assessing benefit and incentive programs currently offered to workers in large, private-sector firms.

The Navy plans to recruit more than 55,000 youth into its active enlisted force each year for the foreseeable future. However, decision-makers fear that recruiting difficulties will continue and that this goal-recently revised downward from 58,000-is not feasible. The Integrated Warfare Architectures (IWARs) are a part of the Navy's annual planning process. This year's Manpower and Personnel IWAR focuses on increasing retention and the appeal of naval service. As part of this effort, N813 asked CNA to describe and evaluate alternative retention available to the Navy.

This research memorandum compares different military and civilian organizations and examines different ways the services can organize to exchange information. Our goal is to better understand how forces are organized for air, land, and sea combat, and how the unique organizations that have grown up in each environment can work together in a joint operation, We do this by examining service and joint organizations, and how military forces and civilian organizations currently reassemble to work across organizational boundaries. The purpose of this memorandum is to examine other ways in which the Navy could "plug into" service and joint command and control organizations, without the Navy losing the fundamental character of the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept.

Quality of life (QOL) satisfaction surveys are one of many tools the Navy can use to target resources toward increased retention. The effectiveness of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus and other monetary rewards is well documented. Despite the potential retention value of surveys, less is known about their effectiveness. The focus of this year's Manpower and Personnel IWAR is on increasing retention and the appeal of naval service. As part of this effort, N813 asked CNA to look at a specific set of tools for recruiting and retention: surveys. In this annotated briefing, we assess the way the Navy keeps track of members' attitudes about Navy quality of life and quality of service.

The Virtual Naval Hospital (VNH) is a digital medical library administered over the Internet by the Electronic Differential Multimedia Laboratory, University of Iowa College of Medicine in collaboration with the U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED). A CD-ROM version of the VNH is also distributed to Navy health care providers. Its purpose is to deliver authoritative medical information to point-of-care medical providers to help take better care of patients. Evaluations of the VNH to date have focused on information needs of medical providers and readership of the World Wide Web (WWW) site. No analysis of VNH utilization patterns, derived benefits, or media preferences has been done. The goal of this evaluation is to provide an analysis of the VNH that can be used to document lessons learned, and planning for future services that might be offered.

In today's world of downsizing and shrinking budgets, the Department of the Navy (DON) continues to seek more efficient and effective ways to support the operational forces. The past decade has seen the end of the Cold War and a rise in the number of crisis response actions. With its ability to project forward presence, the DON has become a strong element in today's diplomacy. It is apparent that as the missions of the naval services evolve, the infrastructure that supports the operational forces must evolve as well. This infrastructure must be as flexible, responsive, and adaptable as the forces it supports. In response to this situation, in late 1997, the Secretary of the Navy directed the Under Secretary of the Navy to begin work on a strategic business plan for the DON. Such a plan required the participation of not only the leadership in the Secretariat, but the Navy and Marine Corps as well. This paper documents the DON's strategic planning efforts, reviews the processes and products that have been created to enable strategic planning, and provide recommendations and lessons learned.

Navy Medicine has identified mental and behavioral health as one of the major product line areas for which it wants to develop a strategy for providing these specialty services. To inform this strategy development process, we provide a review of the mental health care delivery models that dominate the U.S. health care delivery system, assess where the Navy stands in comparison to current delivery trends, and outline salient issues regarding potential changes that the Navy should consider as part of its managed care evolution. This report focuses on three types of delivery models: contractual, functional and educational.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is interested in exploring key factors that affect how teams, particularly distributed teams, develop what is called shared situational awareness (SSA) in an operational environment. The DARPA Program Manager for the Wargaming Asymmetric Environment program asked CNA to address these issues, with subcontracting support from ThoughtLink Incorporated. The focus of the project was to demonstrate how wargaming could be used as a testbed for conducting experiments to explore these key factors in team SSA. The approach centers on the use of a simplified, though not quite abstract, game that allows us to tailor its design and mode of play to focus on the specific research items of interest. In the case of SSA, we designed the game so that the bulk of the operational task faced by the players lies precisely in building a shared picture -their SSA-of their operating area. This approach removes much of the potential confounding between SSA and game-playing skill, a problem that can be associated with measuring a team's performance in a game primarily by measuring its success in performing a specific operational game task (such as winning the game). This paper summarizes our survey of SA and SSA research, and describes the game we used as our testbed, and outlines our experiment and its results. We conclude by discussing what we learned and speculating on where our research could lead.

In November 2000, CNA convened a conference of over 200 national security professionals to assist incoming DOD leadership with budget, personnel, and policy issues. This document is an excerpt from the conference sessions. Through panels and discussions, participants considered a number of issues, including the role of the military, the perceptions of a personnel and morale crisis, the pros and cons of a sea-based component of national missile defense, how to strike the right balance between fostering intellectual competition among the services and ensuring they can work together in real-world operations, the degree to which "transformation" driven by technology should govern our thinking, and the appropriate priorities for the Defense Department during the coming year.

In November 2000, CNA convened a conference of over 200 national security professionals to assist incoming DOD leadership with budget, personnel, and policy issues. This document is an excerpt from the conference sessions. Through panels and discussions, participants considered a number of issues, including the role of the military, the perceptions of a personnel and morale crisis, the pros and cons of a sea-based component of national missile defense, how to strike the right balance between fostering intellectual competition among the services and ensuring they can work together in real-world operations, the degree to which "transformation" driven by technology should govern our thinking, and the appropriate priorities for the Defense Department during the coming year.

In November 2000, CNA convened a conference of over 200 national security professionals to assist incoming DOD leadership with budget, personnel, and policy issues. This document is an excerpt from the conference sessions. Through panels and discussions, participants considered a number of issues, including the role of the military, the perceptions of a personnel and morale crisis, the pros and cons of a sea-based component of national missile defense, how to strike the right balance between fostering intellectual competition among the services and ensuring they can work together in real-world operations, the degree to which "transformation" driven by technology should govern our thinking, and the appropriate priorities for the Defense Department during the coming year.

In November 2000, CNA convened a conference of over 200 national security professionals to assist incoming DOD leadership with budget, personnel, and policy issues. This document is an excerpt from the conference sessions. Through panels and discussions, participants considered a number of issues, including the role of the military, the perceptions of a personnel and morale crisis, the pros and cons of a sea-based component of national missile defense, how to strike the right balance between fostering intellectual competition among the services and ensuring they can work together in real-world operations, the degree to which "transformation" driven by technology should govern our thinking, and the appropriate priorities for the Defense Department during the coming year.

In November 2000, CNA convened a conference of over 200 national security professionals to assist incoming DOD leadership with budget, personnel, and policy issues. This document is an excerpt from the conference sessions. Through panels and discussions, participants considered a number of issues, including the role of the military, the perceptions of a personnel and morale crisis, the pros and cons of a sea-based component of national missile defense, how to strike the right balance between fostering intellectual competition among the services and ensuring they can work together in real-world operations, the degree to which "transformation" driven by technology should govern our thinking, and the appropriate priorities for the Defense Department during the coming year.

In November 2000, CNA convened a conference of over 200 national security professionals to assist incoming DOD leadership with budget, personnel, and policy issues. This document is an excerpt from the conference sessions. Through panels and discussions, participants considered a number of issues, including the role of the military, the perceptions of a personnel and morale crisis, the pros and cons of a sea-based component of national missile defense, how to strike the right balance between fostering intellectual competition among the services and ensuring they can work together in real-world operations, the degree to which "transformation" driven by technology should govern our thinking, and the appropriate priorities for the Defense Department during the coming year.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is interested in exploring key factors that affect how teams, particularly distributed teams, develop what is called shared situational awareness in an operational environment. The DARPA Program Manager for the Wargaming Asymmetric Environment program asked CNA to address these issues, with subcontracting support from ThoughtLink Incorporated. The focus of the project was to demonstrate how wargaming could be used as a testbed for conducting experiments to explore these key factors in shared situational awareness. The concept of "shared situational awareness" which underlies some recent ideas about the organization of military staffs, is elusive and ill-defined, and does not lend itself easily to traditional scientific evaluation. Nevertheless, this paper composes a systematic definition and develops objective approaches to studying the process by which "shared situational awareness" (SSA) arises.

As the military health system (MHS) evolves to meet the managed care environment of the peacetime benefit mission, Navy Medicine in particular, and DOD in general, must continue to concern themselves with three principles: (1) Navy Medicine will attract and access quality individuals; (2) the medical department will retain the best of the people accessed; and (3) the best people will want to remain in the military because of the challenge, training, professional ism, and overall environment of Navy Medicine. DOD implemented TRICARE to maximize the quality of healthcare while minimizing the cost of that care. To meet this goal, military medicine must continue to attract and retain quality personnel under this changing work environment. Given these challenges and concerns, the Navy Surgeon General asked CNA to evaluate physicians' job satisfaction within the existing climate to determine whether major problems exist that adversely affect relation of specialists. We have examined Navy physician retention and compensation patterns over the past decade, and find that there has been a decline in retention for the majority of specialists, but the cause and extent of the decline are difficult to quantify. We have attempted to identify the main drivers behind this decline, including compensation, work environment, and promotion opportunity. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, there has been no decline in promotion opportunity] however, we do find that the military- pay gap has been widened by 4 to 24 percent for most specialties during the 1990s.

The purpose of this research memorandum is to attempt to correlate existing individual exercise training data that reflect warfighting proficiency to training effort expended. Our tasking was to use existing fleet data sources. Previous CNA studies have concentrated proficiency to training resources, but this effort required unique and extensive data collection and did not always reflect existing data sources. Our goal was to identify a similar connection based on existing fleet data sources. We analyzed unit training for three types of platforms for three mission areas: multi-crew support aircraft (P-3Cs) and their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission; surface combatants and their naval surface fire support (NSFS) mission; and tactical aircraft (F/A-18s) and their strike warfare (STW) mission.

Dr. Harold Brown is the sixth person to be presented with the Paul H. Nitze Award. In this paper he offers a broad overview of U.S. national security objectives and required military capabilities beginning with the Cold War and suggest policies to deal with security and political trends during the next 50 years such as the prospect of an adversarial alliance among rising and resurgent powers; outside military intervention in response to internal tyranny, ethnic conflicts, or other human rights issues; challenges to nation-states presented by supranational agencies and supranational currencies; and, economic globalization and technological advances.

Evidence suggests that the quality of aviation accessions has been falling. Decision-makers question whether the decline is the result of the active duty service obligations (ADSOs) required of aviators. In a way, these lengthy obligations compensate for the expense of training new aviators to replace those who depart. Traditionally, the aviation community has been able to attract the most promising students, turning away many each year. Is the growing difference between aviation ADSOs and those required in other communities leading the best students to forgo aviation? This annotated briefing discusses CNA's analysis of these issues as requested by N13.

This research memorandum is a product of the USMC Ground Combat Study, which analyzes the size and organization of small infantry units. Our goal is to use this analysis of historical changes in squad size and organization to provide the Marine Corps with an assessment of the future relevance of these units. This report explores the factors behind the emergence of squads, and how and why they have changed in size and organization with time. We believe that understanding the drivers of these changes will allow us to analyze, with some confidence, the kind of impact the complex future warfighting environments that the Marine Corps may face are bound to have on its current 13-man squad. The methodology used in this report is both historical, in that it looks back into the past; and extrapolative, in that it looks forward briefly into the future as well.

In the USMC Ground Combat Study we are focused on small unit (squad and fire team) size and organization. Our goal is to use an analysis of historical changes in squads together with an analytic tool to provide the Marine Corps with an assessment of the relevance of these units on the future battlefield. Using CNA-initiated funding, we plan to demonstrate the utility of analyses in one of the USMC's core warfighting areas. We also plan for this study to be the first in our program of research into ground combat and, at a more general level, MAGTF operations.

Navy medicine has identified mental health as one of the major product areas in which it wants to develop a business strategy that supports the effective and efficient provision of these services to the military health system's beneficiaries. To develop this strategy, the Navy Bureau of Medicine has established a mental health product line executive panel. Its members include both medical and non-medical Navy and Marine Corps personnel, reflecting the Navy's diverse mental/behavioral health resources. Among the many tasks facing the panel is establishing a comprehensive baseline understanding of mental/behavioral health care services as they currently exist in the Navy and Marine Corps communities. Our purpose in this document is to provide an overview of the regional TRICARE mental health care delivery systems and to identify issues requiring further investigation, thought, and analysis during the course of the executive panel's proceedings. This annotated briefing represents the first in a series of research documents that we will be preparing for the working group during the next several months.

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel (N1B) requested that CNA analyze the Navy's compensation system in view of current recruiting and manning shortfalls and anticipated future changes in the Navy's workforce. This study will help the Navy implement an effective, market-based compensation system that will give it the ability to attract, retain, and motivate a high-quality workforce in a competitive, dynamic labor market. The intent is to take a strategic look at Navy compensation policy and practices. The starting point is to consider what the Navy wants to accomplish with its compensation system. What goals, in terms of managing human resources, can be met through compensation policies and practices? We consider human resources management system approaches, as well as approaches suggested by economics literature, and arrive at a succinct set of strategic goals.

One of the biggest issues of concern to military personnel is the military "pay gap". Many are troubled by the possibility that the level of military pay has declined significantly relative to that of civilian wages. A common concern is that a civilian-military wage differential will quickly lead to retention and recruiting problems for the military. Furthermore, many in the Navy believe that the differentials are more prevalent in some ratings than in others-specifically, that the highly technical ratings are having the largest retention and recruiting problems as a result of relatively high civilian pay. Given these concerns, the objective of this study is to examine the correlation between manning shortfalls in various Navy enlisted ratings and the relative earnings of enlisted personnel in these occupations. We also examine differences in military compensation from one rating to another and compare these differentials with those in the civilian sector. In addition, we examine the relationship between military compensation and the propensity to reenlist, using our mew measure of occupation-specific relative military compensation. This analysis yields estimates of the responsiveness of reenlistment rates to changes in relative pay, which can be used to estimate the change in compensation necessary to achieve manning level targets on a rating-by-rating basis.

Early in FY00, the U.S. Army asked each of the other services to consider joining it in proposing, through the Unified Legislative and Budgeting (ULB) process, legislation that would change the military's personnel target from an end-strength goal to a goal based on average strength, calculated across the fiscal year. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel (N1) asked CNA to evaluate the average-strength scheme to help the U.S. Navy formulate its response to the Army. We provided the N1 staff an earlier draft of this report that raised concerns about the scheme (as this final version of the report continues to do). The Navy shared the draft report with the Army, which decided not to continue pursuing the proposal.

In June 1999, the Navy's Five Year Development Plan included roughly 80,000 civilian positions as part of its "competitive sourcing initiative." As a result of competitive sourcing, half or more of the positions involved with commercial activities (Navy activities that are similar to activities in industry) could be removed from the civil service roles either because of outsourcing or internal efficiencies. Because the competitions were planned for the most part, as isolated actions, the broader consequences of these competitions for the overall civil service workforce were not fully understood. For this reason, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N1B) asked CNA to develop some guidelines that would help decision-makers plan for the consequences of the Navy's competitive sourcing initiative. Specifically, the request was to (a) establish a baseline of the current and past civil service workforce, and project changes that could result from the competitive sourcing initiative; (b) benchmark the Navy system and its projected shape with other civil service systems; (c) examine alternative approaches for dealing with the evolution; and (d) develop proposals, if needed, that would help the Navy adjust to the evolving size and shape of the civil service workforce.

In this choice-based conjoint (CBC) study, CNRC tasked CNA to explore three questions: which attributes of an enlistment package do potential recruits consider most important; what are the tradeoffs among various elements of a possible enlistment package; and, what elements of an enlistment package are most likely to help the Navy in its efforts to expand beyond its traditional recruiting base? The relationship between enlistment propensity and recruitment incentives was analyzed. The data show that respondents with different enlistment propensities have different preferences for the various incentives in the survey. The results of this study indicate that CNRC must investigate ways, most specifically by focusing on college-related incentives such as the Navy College Fund (NCF) and college credit for Navy training, to make serving in the Navy competitive with the alternative path of attending college and seeking employment in the private sector after having spent some time in college.

The Navy Surgeon General has asked CNA to evaluate physicians' job satisfaction and retention within the existing climate to determine if major issues exist. The scope of the study was expanded to include a comparative analysis of compensation for Navy physicians continuing a military career versus leaving for a private-sector track. We find that a substantial current compensation gap exists between military and private-sector physicians, particularly at the end of the 7-year career point, and the disparity in total compensation varies widely by medical specialty. Our finds show, however, that as Navy physicians accrue more military service, it becomes more lucrative for them to complete 20 years, retire, and then pursue a private career. This information memorandum documents the results of these compensation comparisons.

Military activity on the island of Vieques has recently become a contentious political issue, putting its future as a naval training facility in doubt. To prepare for the possibility that pre-deployment training will have to be conducted elsewhere in the future, the Secretary of the Navy tasked CNA to examine alternatives to Vieques that that could be made available within approximately five years. The analytical approach is basically a three-step process: 1) analyze the training operations that are endangered by the potential loss of Vieques to determine what range attributes would be required to conduct those operations elsewhere; 2) survey existing and potential ranges to determine what range attributes could be made available (this step includes a survey of alternative training technologies, e.g. simulation, to determine what role they can play; and 3) compare the required range attributes from step one with the available range attributes from step two to identify the most promising Vieques alternatives. The specific methodologies for conducting these steps are also described.

The military health care system has two missions. The first is the readiness mission to provide care for U.S. forces who become sick or injured during military engagements. The second is the peacetime mission, which includes maintaining the health of U.S. military personnel and supporting the provision of the military health care benefit to active duty dependents, retirees and their dependents, and survivors. This paper focuses on the legislative and regulatory evolution of this second mission and the costs associated with program change.

This briefing on attrition was presented to the Navy Human Resources Board of Directors in June 2000. While one of its purposes was to raise the awareness level of the attrition problem among the Navy's senior leadership, we concentrated on how the Navy can change its system so that the attrition issue is raised in importance at lower levels in the command structure, even when the senior leadership is focused on other issues. We organized our suggestions/recommendations into two categories: improving accountability within the system and incentives.

The TRICARE program is designed to provide for the health care needs of those on active duty, their family members, and retirees and their family members. TRICARE is a complicated health care system with several different parts. One key component is Prime, the managed care portion of the Defense Health Plan (DHP). One must enroll in Prime in order to receive care under it; however, other options for receiving care do not require enrollment. This study responds to tasking from the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Personnel and Readiness concerning the feasibility of an enrollment system for the DHP. Under Prime, enrollment is a requirement for receiving care. In a limited sense, enrollment is not only possible but currently under way. We believe, however, that the more important question and one posed under the tasking is whether universal enrollment is feasible. As we'll show, Prime pertains to a relatively important and growing part of the beneficiary population that relies on military treatment facilities (MTF)-military clinics and hospitals-for health care. The other user of the MTFs rely on space-available care. These people don't have to enroll to use military healthcare providers or facilities; they use the NTFs for care when there is sufficient capacity.

In February 1999 CINCUSNAVEUR asked CNA to analyze prospective trends and developments in the Black Sea region over the next five years in light of U.S. interests and objectives, assess the contribution that Navy engagement programs can make to achieving them, and make specific recommendations for future Navy planning and engagement activities. This report, an important building block in the project, contains profiles of the six Black Sea littoral nations, Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria, with specific attention to U.S. national objectives. In the case of the newly independent states and countries that were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact, we look in detail at the prospects for domestic political stability, economic development, and regional relations, and how Navy engagement programs can support U.S. goals. The Russian profile concentrates on that country's Black Sea perspective. We look at Turkey, a key U.S. ally, in terms of its special responsibilities in the Black Sea, as well as its regional interests. The study team used information available through December 1999 in preparing these profiles.

The Navy is considering outsourcing some ship functions to civilians. This report focus directly on the issues related to the outsourcing of service functions aboard deploying ships and examines practical issues that arise in integrating civilians into a military working environment on board the ship. Our main interest in this effort is to get an accurate sense of the fleet's issues and concerns, particularly the sailors who will have to work with civilians, should the Navy decide to outsource. This research memorandum identifies the main issues and discusses their effect on the compatibility of a mixed crew of active duty personnel and civilians.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is working with the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to develop for its Medicare-eligible beneficiaries a cost-effective alternative for delivering access to quality care. This alternative, commonly called TRICARE Senior Prime, will give Medicare-eligible beneficiaries the opportunity to enroll in Prime with primary care managers (PCMs) at military treatment facilities (MTFs). TRICARE Senior Prime enrollees will have the same priority access to MTF as military retirees and retiree family members currently enrolled in Prime. At present, this program is in the demonstration phase. DOD should be concerned that many managed care plans have either withdrawn from the Medicare-Choice program entirely or reduced their service areas in the last several years as the Medicare-Choice plan has been phased in. The purpose of this report is to determine what factors have played a part in these withdrawals and how this could affect the viability of the TRICARE Senior Prime program.

To better understand the utility of AOEs in peacetime, we wanted to learn how much business they do as CVBG station ships and who their customers are during forward deployment. To that end, in 1996 we asked the Navy to have deploying AOEs record their underway replenishment (UNREP) data and send it to CNA. We supplemented those data with similar AOE and substitute CVBG station ship data. This report documents the UNREP activity of the AOEs (and substitute CVBG station ships) when they are deployed. (It doesn't reflect the total logistics support Navy combatants receive from all sources.)

CNA was tasked by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to examine the DOD health care benefit. The basic idea is to examine what exactly the benefit provides and compare it to what other employers provide-especially the federal government through its health care plan and private employers through their plans. Our approach was to compare the benefits offered under the Defense Health Plan (DHP) to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) both from the point of view of the employer, who cares what it will cost and how attractive it will be relative to what other employers provide, and to the employee, who then places a "value" on the benefits provided. The cost of the program to DOD is examined with some simple comparisons of total cost and cost per user. The main focus, however, was to compare not only the health care benefit provided to active duty personnel, but all of the benefits provided with what the federal government and private employers provide to their workers. It's not just the absolute level of one specific benefit that matters, but how the total compensation that includes all benefits compared with what's offered elsewhere.

We report on a few publications that present quantitative conclusions on the impact of aging platforms on maintenance and operating costs. This literature review, though far from exhaustive, is meant to convey the idea that this topic has been examined before, and that work in this area is continuing. Some exploratory analysis of two data sets that were created for this purpose is presented. Both use the individual aircraft as the unit of Observation. One is organized around individual sorties in a particular month; the other contains summary maintenance labor data and is organized by aircraft, by month, for a 10-year period. Both provide additional evidence that maintenance effort raises with aircraft age.

Over the next ten years, implementation of the Navy's Helicopter Master Plan will reduce the Navy's helicopter force from its current seven types of aircraft to just two, the SH-60R and the CH-60S. At the same time, other Navy forces will be undergoing significant "mission-shedding," with many of the shed missions being assumed by the helicopter force. In light of these changes, the Navy is reexamining its helicopter force size and organization. N88 asked CNA to study future helicopter force requirements. At the same time, COMSECONDFLT has been studying future helicopter force organization. CNA's work has been coordinated with that of Second Fleet. This "requirements analysis" examines the effects of the coming changes in helicopter missions and capabilities on the need for helicopters in the battlegroup and other operational units. It examines the size and disposition of the helicopter force in approximately 2010, after the breakdown to the SH-60R and CH-60S has been completed.

This annotated briefing documents the analysis conducted under task 2 of the N7-sponsored Navy fleet training migration study. In the analysis, we reviewed the training development process for a set of acquisitions, identified major crosscutting training issues for these acquisitions, address some training management oversight and support questions, and probed to see if mechanisms exist to assess the cumulative impact of training decisions on the fleet. We believe this project was well placed and timed since there are a number of factors (addressed in this report) that are changing the acquisition process and increasing the importance of training in it.

The Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery asked CNA to examine several alternative pharmacy plans that would extend prescription coverage to the DOD 65+ Medicare-eligible population. The specific pharmacy plans examined fall under three general categories. After paying an enrollment fee, beneficiaries may receive prescriptions (1) through mail order, (2) at the military treatment facility (MTF) or mail order, or (3) at retail pharmacies or through mail order. This research memorandum describes these options and the costs to DOD for each.

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Institute for USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) held the eleventh in a series of seminars in December of 1998. Topics included contemporary international situation as perceived by both countries, strategic stability under contemporary conditions, and Russian problems with the Far East and Central Asia. Discussions were held in Moscow on relations between the American and Russian Navies, Russian foreign policy and defense reform, arms control and Russian arms sales. A list of seminar participants is also included in this report.