

American Grand Strategy and Seapower

Michael Gerson • Alison Lawler Russell



CONFERENCE REPORT

CRM D0025988.A2/Final
November 2011

Strategic Studies is a division of CNA. This directorate conducts analyses of security policy, regional analyses, studies of political-military issues, and strategy and force assessments. CNA Strategic Studies is part of the global community of strategic studies institutes and in fact collaborates with many of them.

On the ground experience is a hallmark of our regional work. Our specialists combine in-country experience, language skills, and the use of local primary-source data to produce empirically based work. All of our analysts have advanced degrees, and virtually all have lived and worked abroad.

Similarly, our strategists and military/naval operations experts have either active duty experience or have served as field analysts with operating Navy and Marine Corps commands. They are skilled at anticipating the "problem after next" as well as determining measures of effectiveness to assess ongoing initiatives. A particular strength is bringing empirical methods to the evaluation of peace-time engagement and shaping activities.

The Strategic Studies Division's charter is global. In particular, our analysts have proven expertise in the following areas:

- The full range of Asian security issues
- The full range of Middle East related security issues, especially Iran and the Arabian Gulf
- Maritime strategy
- Insurgency and stabilization
- Future national security environment and forces
- European security issues, especially the Mediterranean littoral
- West Africa, especially the Gulf of Guinea
- Latin America
- The world's most important navies
- Deterrence, arms control, missile defense and WMD proliferation

The Strategic Studies Division is led by Dr. Eric V. Thompson, who is available at 703-824-2243 or thompsoe@cna.org. The executive assistant to the director is Ms. Rebecca Martin, at 703-824-2604.

The authors thank Loretta Ebner, Rebecca Martin, and Sarah Vogler for their administrative support during the conference, and they particularly note Loretta Ebner's aid in compiling this report. They also thank Karin Duggan for her graphics assistance, and Peter Swartz for his various contributions

Approved for distribution:

November 2011



Dr. W. Eugene Cobble, Jr.
Director, Strategic Initiatives Group

This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue.
It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

Copies of this document can be obtained through the Defense Technical Information Center at www.dtic.mil or contact CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123.

Copyright © 2011 CNA

This work was created in the performance of Federal Government Contract Number N00014-11-D-0323. Any copyright in this work is subject to the Government's Unlimited Rights license as defined in DFARS 252.227-7013 and/or DFARS 252.227-7014. The reproduction of this work for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited. Nongovernmental users may copy and distribute this document in any medium, either commercially or non-commercially, provided that this copyright notice is reproduced in all copies. Nongovernmental users may not use technical measures to obstruct or control the reading or further copying of the copies they make or distribute. Nongovernmental users may not accept compensation of any manner in exchange for copies. All other

Contents

Contents	i
Overview and recommendations.....	1
Conference agenda, premises, and questions.....	5
Conference proceedings	11
Prof. Walter A. McDougall: “History and strategies: Grand, maritime, and American”	31
Prof. John Mueller: “Embracing threatlessness: Reassessing U.S. military spending”	47
Dr. Christopher Preble: “Revisiting the flawed assumptions that guide U.S. foreign policy” ..	61
Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): “Jointness, grand strategy, and the emerging security environment: An airman’s perspective”	83
Participant biographies.....	91

Overview and recommendations

On August 4, 2011, CNA convened a conference of leading international security, foreign policy, and maritime strategy experts at the Army and Navy Club in Washington, D.C. Its purpose was to examine U.S. grand and naval strategy in light of new domestic and international dynamics, and to discuss the strategic principles that should inform the Nation and its naval services in the coming decades.¹

This report provides a record of that conference. It includes:

- The conference agenda, premises, and questions
- The conference proceedings
- Selected conference papers
- Participant biographies.

The following are some of the conference speakers' most important insights and recommendations. They are the views of individual conference speakers, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CNA; nor do they represent a consensus among conference speakers and participants.

Key insights and recommendations for U.S. naval strategy

- Forward presence will continue to be an important and unique contribution to U.S. military and foreign policy. Forward presence provides political and military decision-makers with a range of flexible and scalable options that can be tailored to a specific situation and context. Combat-credible forward presence helps assure allies of U.S. commitments and deter current and potential adversaries, and provides quick-response capabilities in a military or humanitarian crisis. In addition, it contributes to intelligence gathering, foreign military cooperation, familiarization with foreign areas, and strong ties with military and political leaders.

¹ For a related study, see Elbridge Colby, *Grand Strategy: Contending Contemporary Analyst Views and Implications for the U.S. Navy*, CNA Research Memorandum D0025423.A2/Final, November 2011.

- U.S. naval forces are one of the greatest asymmetric capabilities in the world and should be protected from budget cuts because they provide a high degree of return on investment. Regardless of what one thinks about the prospect of a future war with China, the military balance in Asia remains important. Other countries in the region constantly observe the balance of power there and factor it into their policy decisions. Consequently, in order to maintain peace and stability in the Pacific, the United States must demonstrate that it is prepared to win a war there. A favorable military balance allows the United States to pursue various non-military policy goals in the Pacific.
- A move towards equipment that is produced faster and has the expectation of a shorter service life would be tremendously beneficial for the U.S. Navy – and the U.S. military as a whole – because it could then experiment and replace equipment at a faster rate. Spiral development would be possible. The U.S. military could change software or technology every few years and produce more equipment to better suit its missions because costs would be lower. The goal would be to improve the range, diversity, and speed of replacement so that the U.S. military could change and adapt at least as fast as the opponent.
- The maritime arena is more fungible than others. Ships are more mobile than other types of military equipment and can operate equally well in different environments, which is a major strength compared to the other services.

Key insights and recommendations for U.S. grand strategy

- The United States has a vital, central, and indispensable role in maintaining and supporting the global system, which has economic order at the center. Seapower is crucial for this role because it ensures access to the world's largest markets, patrols principal trade routes, and safeguards oil from the Gulf. Through seapower and other capabilities and activities, the United States acts as the world's quasi-government, providing a specialized kind of global policing to ensure the successful functioning of the global system and reassuring allies that the military balance will not change abruptly and in an adverse way from which they cannot recover.
- The United States is more closely tied to the international economy than it has been at any other time in U.S. history, and thus has strong incentives to play a leading role in the international system. A grand strategy of isolationism is simply untenable. Yet, given current political and economic conditions, the United States should pursue a grand strategy of "restraint." Such a strategy would focus on a small number of vital security interests around the world. In Europe, the United States should give primary

security responsibilities to our NATO partners and remove most U.S. forces from the continent. In Asia, the United States should reform the U.S.-Japan alliance so that Japan takes primary responsibility for its security. In the Middle East, the United States should reduce its military presence to the lowest possible profile, and should disengage from Iraq. Regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States should maintain the lowest possible involvement in these countries consistent with counterterrorism activities.

- As part of a grand strategy of restraint, the United States should adopt a military strategy of “offshore balancing.” This is a military strategy of burden shifting, not burden sharing, as it encourages our allies and partners to take on more responsibilities. “Offshore balancing” would allow the U.S. military to concentrate its forces in a few key areas, most notably in Asia and in the Middle East, and focus on preventing the rise of a regional hegemon that could challenge U.S. power projection and undermine U.S. interests in these regions. This strategy would capitalize on U.S. strengths in air- and seapower, and would be grounded in the continued U.S. “command of the commons.”
- “Offshore balancing” is a term encompassing a wide range of recommended policies. This is evident from the literature as well as the proceedings of this conference. As applied to the deployment posture of U.S. maritime forces, the term is used by some to mean combat-credible forward presence, by others to mean maintaining surge-ready forces in the United States and its possessions, and by still others to include both of these postures and a range of options in between. Many of these “offshore options” were advocated and debated at the conference, with forward presence – as noted above – being recommended as making an important and unique contribution to U.S. military and foreign policy.
- For the United States, the greatest danger from terrorism is not the attack itself, but rather our response to it. Provoking overreaction is a key objective of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, and these overreactions cause great harm to the United States. A large military response to a terrorist attack not only is unnecessary, but also is counterproductive because it drains scarce resources – an important Al Qaeda objective.
- The United States has a poor track record of accurately predicting the future international security environment. Consequently, the United States should develop strategies and procurement policies that prize agility and flexibility. Manufacturing processes and equipment should be capable of adaptive change, and we should favor equipment that is well designed to be robust in several kinds of environments rather than equipment that is perfect for just one kind of environment.

- Effective military planning should move beyond a focus on capabilities and pay greater attention to an enemy's behavior and intent. Many current and future adversaries develop strategies for influencing U.S. willpower – especially by seeking to mire the United States in a protracted war in the belief that the United States is sensitive to combat casualties and unwilling to sustain the human costs of war – and thus the United States should consider how to affect the opponent's resolve.

Conference agenda, premises, and questions

Thursday, August 4, 2011, the Army and Navy Club, Washington, D.C.

Introduction

The nation's grand strategy may be at an inflection point. As the nation draws down from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, grapples with the effects of the economic recession, and deals with a changing strategic environment, an assessment of U.S. grand strategy, and of the role of seapower in that strategy, is especially appropriate.

American naval strategy presents a broad vision of the critical contributions of seapower to national and international security. The naval strategy, which emphasizes a worldview of increased interconnectedness and globalization, focuses on the role of naval forces in maintaining and strengthening a peaceful and prosperous global system, elevates the prevention of wars to a level co-equal with winning wars, and underscores the strategic importance of forward presence, engagement, and cooperative partnerships in fostering global prosperity, stability, and security.

CNA convened this conference of leading U.S. foreign policy, international security, and military strategy experts to examine U.S. grand and naval strategy in light of new domestic and international dynamics, and to discuss the strategic principles that should inform the nation and its naval services in the coming decades.

Conference convener

- **Mr. Michael Gerson**, Research Analyst, CNA
- **Rapporteur**
 - **Ms. Alison L. Russell**, Research Analyst, CNA

Panel one: U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century

Grand strategy involves the use of all elements of national power to serve a state's national interests. As the United States looks beyond the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is growing debate over what role it should play in the world, what should be considered "vital" U.S. national interests, and which elements of national power should be used to achieve U.S. objectives. This panel examined the range of domestic, international, economic, and military factors that shape the development and implementation of U.S. grand strategy. What is the role of a U.S. grand strategy? What should be the elements of a coherent grand strategy? Can the U.S. develop and adhere to a grand strategy? In a fiscally constrained environment, is U.S. grand strategy likely to change? Are there enduring trends in U.S. grand strategy? How might the current state of U.S. domestic politics affect grand strategy? What role does the military play in the formulation of a grand strategy?

Moderator

- **Mr. Michael Gerson**, Research Analyst, CNA

"History and Strategies: Grand, Maritime, and American"

- **Dr. Walter McDougall**, Professor of History and the Alloy-Ansin Professor of International Relations, University of Pennsylvania

"U.S. Grand Strategy and the Role of Domestic Politics"

- **Dr. Kevin Narizny**, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University

"U.S. Post-Cold War Grand Strategy: A Critique"

- **Dr. Barry Posen**, Ford International Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Panel two: The emerging security environment

The current and emerging international security environment is increasingly complex, dynamic, and uncertain are changing the global political landscape and balance of power: Many developments are changing the global landscape and balance of power: rising and reemerging powers competing for regional influence and scarce natural resources; rogue states seeking WMD and long-range ballistic missile; the growth of anti-access/area-denial capabilities; transnational terrorism; piracy; and social unrest and political revolutions. This panel examined the severity of these developments, their impact on U.S. national interests, and the potential means for addressing them. What are the major challenges facing the United States? Should some challenges receive greater priority? What role, if any, should naval forces play in addressing these threats? What kinds of naval capabilities does the United States need in order to secure its global interests?

Moderator

- **Ms. Catherine Lea**, Research Analyst, CNA

“No Major Threats”

- **Dr. John Mueller**, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University

“American Grand Strategy after the *Pax Americana*: The Case for Offshore Balancing”

- **Dr. Christopher Layne**, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University

“Failing States and Transnational Threats”

- **Dr. William McCants**, Research Analyst, CNA; former Senior Advisor for Counterterrorism, Department of State

Keynote address

- **Introductory Remarks: The Honorable Robert Murray**, President and CEO, CNA
- **Keynote speaker: The Honorable Richard Danzig**, Chairman of the Board, Center for a New American Security; Senior Fellow, CNA; 71st Secretary of the Navy

Panel three: Seapower and the “global system”

A core component of the current national strategy – and the naval strategy – is the notion that U.S. national security and prosperity are increasingly tied to the security and prosperity of other nations. The naval strategy posits the importance of a “global system” composed of interconnected networks of trade, finance, information, law, people, and governance, and contends that – in addition to the “traditional” role of winning our Nation’s wars – a central contribution of seapower to national security and prosperity is the protection of this system from a wide range of potential disruptions.

This session analyzed the nature of the “global system,” the role of the United States in its successful function, and its connection to U.S. national security. Is a “global system” worldview accurate? Is an emphasis on maintaining and protecting it valid? Is the system essential to U.S. national security? What is the role of military power, especially seapower, in defending the system?

Moderator

- **Dr. Daniel Whiteneck**, Research Analyst, CNA

“America's Global Role and Its Challenges”

- **Dr. Michael Mandelbaum**, Christian A. Herter Professor and Director, American Foreign Policy Program, SAIS

“The Trouble with Global Public Goods”

- **Dr. Christopher Preble**, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute

“Between Big Wars and Shaping/Influence”

- **Dr. James Wirtz**, Dean, School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School

Panel four: Landpower and airpower perspectives on grand strategy and the emerging security environment

Given the centrality of joint operations in U.S. military planning, discussions of seapower and grand strategy must also consider the unique perspectives of the land and air components of the military. What are the strategic priorities and objectives of landpower and airpower? What

are the service perspectives on U.S. grand strategy and the emerging security environment? From a service perspective, which strategic challenges should receive greater priority? How are the services adapting to the emerging security environment, including an austere budget horizon?

Moderator

- **Lieutenant Colonel Francis Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)**, Director, NDU Press; Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

“Landpower”

- **Major General Robert Scales, U.S. Army (Ret.)**, CEO, Colgen LP

“Jointness, Airpower, Grand Strategy, and the Emerging Security Environment”

- **Lieutenant General David Deptula, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)**, CEO and Managing Director, Mav6

Panel five: U.S. grand strategy and the role of seapower

As the United States debates its strategic objectives and priorities in a fiscally constrained environment, both U.S. grand strategy and the role of seapower are open to debate. How might U.S. grand strategy change to reflect new domestic and international realities? How well does the naval strategy reflect changes in the domestic and international environments? How should maritime force structure and procurement decisions be modified to reflect priorities in U.S. strategy? Is there a disconnect between the current naval strategy and the resources available to the naval services? What kind of fleet does the country need? What capabilities and capacities should the naval services be buying?

Moderator

- **Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher**, Distinguished Fellow, CNA; Senior Fellow, Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland; Senior Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University

Speakers

- **The Honorable Seth Cropsey**, Senior Advisor, CNA; Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; former Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy
- **Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, U.S. Navy (Ret.)**, Senior Fellow and former Director of Strategic Studies, CNA
- **Mr. Ronald O'Rourke**, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service

Concluding remarks

- **Captain Peter Swartz, U.S. Navy (Ret.)**, Senior Research Analyst, CNA

Conference proceedings

Recent developments in the domestic and international environments have generated new discussion and debate about U.S. grand strategy and about what role the United States can and should play in the world. The state of the U.S. economy, the continued drawdown of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab Spring, transnational terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the rise of China are just a few of the issues facing the United States in the second decade of the 21st century. Yet, while many agree that there are a number of challenges and opportunities in the international sphere, there is little consensus on their relative severity or urgency, or on how the United States should deal with them. Those on one end of this brewing debate advocate strong U.S. leadership, active military involvement, and a wide range of capabilities to strengthen existing alliances and meet a wide range of pressing global threats; those on the other end advocate limited U.S. involvement in international security affairs, a reduction in U.S. military engagements and commitments, and significant cuts in defense spending.

As part of this renewed interest in grand strategy, there is new discussion about the contributions of U.S. seapower to national and international security in an increasingly multipolar and fiscally constrained environment. On August 4, 2011, CNA convened a conference of leading international security, foreign policy, and maritime strategy experts to examine U.S. grand and naval strategy in light of new domestic and international dynamics, and to discuss the strategic principles that should inform the Nation and its naval services in the coming decades. The conference was organized around five panels and a keynote address. Over 180 national security and naval experts attended and participated, and the discussions were often provocative. This report highlights many of the key insights, arguments, and recommendations from the conference.

The past, present, and future of U.S. grand strategy

Grand strategy involves the use of all elements of national power to serve a state's national interests. As the United States looks beyond the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is growing debate over what role it should play in the world, what should be considered "vital" U.S. national interests, and which elements of national power should be used to achieve U.S.

objectives. The first panel examined the range of domestic, international, economic, and military factors that shape the development and implementation of U.S. grand strategy.

History and strategies – grand, maritime, and American

To set the stage for the day's discussions, Dr. Walter McDougall presented a sweeping historical overview of strategy. There have been two broad camps regarding grand strategy: seapower, as advocated by Alfred T. Mahan; and landpower, as advocated by Karl Haushofer and Halford Mackinder. Dr. McDougall argued that maritime power has had a decisive effect on international politics and war. The most successful grand strategies have all been created by seaborne empires founded by federation, such as those of the Dutch, the British, and the Americans. History demonstrates that every land-based hegemon has been defeated or contained by rival coalitions anchored by one or more maritime powers. Indeed, a central feature of the history of the rise and decline of the great powers is the substitution of one nation's maritime supremacy by another.

Dr. McDougall noted that the United States has pursued grand strategies throughout its history, and that all of them have been explicitly or primarily naval because of the United States' geographical status as a continental and island nation. Maritime power has had a special place in U.S. history, going back to the beginning of the country and enshrined in the Constitution. Article I, Section VIII of the Constitution grants Congress the power to "raise and support Armies" for no longer than two years, but allows Congress to "provide and maintain" a navy without time restrictions. The Nation's founders believed that a standing army was a threat to domestic liberty, whereas a navy, by virtue of being offshore, was a threat only to foreigners.

Dr. McDougall argued that the United States has had four sequential grand strategies, and each has been grounded in the importance of maritime power. A central policy of the early United States, as articulated by George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, was to prevent entanglement in the politics and conflicts of Europe through a policy of strict neutrality – a policy often incorrectly labeled "isolationist" – and to use the navy for coastal and commercial defense. Thus the first grand strategy was the Federalist vision promoted by Alexander Hamilton through the Constitution, Federalist Paper #11, George Washington's Farewell Address (most of which Hamilton drafted), and the naval construction program that produced the nation's first fleet of frigates. This strategy was predicated on the role of maritime forces in creating "separate spheres" between the Old World and the New World.

The second grand strategy, which held from 1880 to around 1920, was focused on enforcing the Monroe Doctrine and protecting U.S. commerce in an era of industrialism, the so-called New Imperialism, and naval arms races. This strategy was explicitly maritime, as it was based on the vision of a two-ocean, steel navy, and was developed and promoted by Secretary of the

Navy Benjamin Tracy, Naval War College founder Stephen B. Luce, Navy captain and author Alfred T. Mahan, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt.

The third strategy, created after Pearl Harbor, aimed at truly global power projection through air and sea power. It was conceived by President Franklin Roosevelt and Representative Carl Vinson, and was designed to enforce international law and punish aggression through naval blockades and air bombardment. According to this strategy, the U.S. contribution to a New World Order was to provide enforcement through sea, air, and financial power. The Cold War forced President Truman to commit ground forces to this strategy, while U.S. maritime supremacy patrolled the oceanic commons.

The fourth strategy emerged in the 1980s in response to the Soviet naval buildup. This was a new maritime strategy to defend sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and chokepoints, and maintain logistical fire support for the air-land battle plan envisioned by NATO in Europe. It was the plan for the 600-ship navy, and portions of the strategy survived as a template for post-Cold War naval planning, including *...From the Sea* and *Forward ...From the Sea*. The main elements of this strategy, according to Dr. McDougall, continue today.

The role of domestic politics in U.S. grand strategy

The next speaker, Dr. Kevin Narizny, explained how domestic politics affect the development of U.S. grand strategy. While it is obvious that domestic politics matter in U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy, the real issue, Dr. Narizny argued, is to better understand how and when they play a role.

Dr. Narizny offered four contending theories of how domestic politics influence grand strategy, as well as two predictions about future grand strategy. The first theory contends that domestic politics matter because of uncertainty. We debate grand strategy because there is uncertainty about the future threat environment – which threats will emerge and how severe they will be – and therefore there is uncertainty about which grand strategy the nation should choose. While this view is certainly correct, it does not yield much insight into how and when domestic politics matter. The second theory posits that the domestic debate over grand strategy is the result of electoral politics. Politicians debate and criticize grand strategy because they are trying to score points off their political opponents that will increase their chances of re-election. Like the first explanation, this argument contains some kernels of truth. Yet, it is ultimately an unsatisfactory explanation because it carries the dangerous – and probably incorrect – assumption that politicians and political parties do not really care about the issues.

The third theory focuses on the role of ideology. It holds that people have a core set of beliefs and choose policies and strategies that are consistent with those beliefs. For example,

someone who believes that criminals are bad people and that justice is about punishment and deterrence, is likely to advocate for more hawkish policies in the international arena. Conversely, someone who thinks that crime is the result of poverty and poor education is more likely to adopt grand strategies that inform and co-opt others through trade and multilateral actions.

The fourth theory, which Dr. Narizny argued best explains how domestic politics affect U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy, holds that geographical coalition interests are important. In the interwar period, Democrats and Republicans advocated different foreign policies consistent with their respective trade and export needs, which were determined largely by geography. The South depended on exports to Europe for its economy, and therefore voted for liberal internationalists such as Wilson and Roosevelt, who would ensure strong U.S. political and economic ties to Europe. The North, by contrast, had a manufacturing economy, because of high tariffs, and did not depend on exports. Thus, it had a weaker connection to Europe than the South had, and tended to vote for politicians who were more nationalist, unilateralist, and isolationist. Today, however, there are no major differences in economic interests between the various regions of the United States – each region is well diversified economically, and everyone is connected to, and dependent on, the international economy.

Based on the logic of the fourth explanation, Dr. Narizny provided two predictions about the future of U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy. First, in the future we should see significantly less partisanship over U.S. grand strategy than in other periods in U.S. history and less disagreement regarding U.S. foreign policy. Second, a grand strategy of isolationism is highly unlikely to emerge because the United States is more closely tied to the international economy than at any other time in U.S. history, and thus has strong incentives to maintain primacy over the international system.

A critique of current strategy and a proposal for “restraint”

Dr. Barry Posen presented a critique of U.S. grand strategy since the end of the Cold War and offered an alternative grand strategy that he called “Restraint.” In his view, there has been too much consensus in the United States for the current grand strategy of “Liberal Hegemony.” This consensus, he argued, has prevented a systematic examination of what has gone wrong in U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War and why.

Dr. Posen identified several problems that have undermined U.S. efforts in the international arena – and will continue to undermine them – unless a new grand strategy is adopted. First, there is little sense of resource scarcity. The United States has acted as if resources either do not matter or are in great, cheap, and ready supply. Second, there is a growing diffusion of power as other nations rise to great power status. The gap between the United States and

other consequential nations has been shrinking as other populous states with large literacy campaigns have opened their markets and joined the international economy. The United States, Dr. Posen argued, needs to get used to the idea that other nations will also be at the top. Third, there is the potential for more substantial balancing behavior, whereby states build up their military capabilities or form alliances to counteract the power of the United States. Dr. Posen noted that consequential states do not like other consequential states telling them what to do or operating in their regions.

Fourth, nationalism is an increasingly powerful force in the world, especially in the Middle East. Identity politics are becoming extremely important in international politics, and some countries or groups are using that energy against the United States. Finally, Dr. Posen highlighted two key challenges associated with U.S. alliance commitments. Some allies “free ride” on U.S. security, relying on the United States to expend vast resources for their security while they under-invest in defense. Other allies “reckless drive,” meaning that they have so much confidence in their alliance with the United States that they take risks that are inimical to U.S. interests and that could drag the United States into unwanted conflicts.

Despite these challenges, the United States is still very wealthy, has a diverse industrial and material base, has advanced technology, and is very secure because it has pliant neighbors, large oceans, and nuclear weapons. The challenge, therefore, is to develop and implement a grand strategy that adequately addresses the most pressing challenges and capitalizes on U.S. advantages.

To this end, Dr. Posen outlined an alternative grand strategy centered on the principle of “restraint.” Such a strategy would focus on a small number of security problems around the world. Nuclear proliferation is a central concern, but as the North Korean nuclear program demonstrates, building a nuclear weapon is not as hard as it once appeared. The United States cannot and should not seek to prevent all proliferation, but rather should work with international regimes to make proliferation a slow, managed process. If the United States cannot stop proliferation, it should at least make it as slow and orderly as possible.

In Europe, the United States should give primary security responsibilities, including the military command structure, to our NATO partners over an 8- to 10-year period. The United States should remove its forces from Europe while maintaining valuable base agreements with key countries. With Japan, Dr. Posen argued that the U.S.-Japan alliance should undergo fundamental reform. The current security treaty with Japan is unnatural, as it commits the United States to defend Japan while the Japanese agree to help. A reformed alliance would reverse this dynamic: Japan would take primary responsibility for defending itself and the United States would agree to help.

In the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf, the United States should reduce its military presence to the lowest possible profile, perhaps around pre-Gulf War levels. The United States should completely disengage from Iraq, and undertake a realistic assessment of what its interests in the region are, and of what it can and cannot do there, and at what cost. For example, the United States should – and can – prevent an oil empire from emerging in the region, but U.S. leaders should not believe that they can rescue a regime facing massive social change. Regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States should maintain the lowest possible involvement consistent with counter-terrorism activities. Dr. Posen argued that India, not Pakistan, is the future, and that the United States should not get between them.

The military components of a grand strategy of restraint would rely primarily on the tools of “offshore balancing.” This would focus on U.S. strengths in air- and seapower, and would be grounded in the continued U.S. “command of the commons.” A grand strategy of restraint would allow the U.S. military to concentrate its forces in a few key areas and ensure that it could effectively meet the handful of real threats to U.S. interests.

The emerging security environment

Debates over U.S. grand strategy are often animated by differing views on the range and severity of threats that the United States might face in the future. Whereas during the Cold War the United States could focus the vast majority of its efforts on one country, today the international security environment is increasingly dynamic, complex, and uncertain. The conference’s second panel presented a broad range of views on the landscape of emerging threats, and provided some recommendations that could inform a future grand strategy.

Overblown: The absence of major threats

According to Dr. John Mueller, the United States has been – and will continue to be – substantially free from threats that require a great deal of military preparedness. In his view, there are no major threats to U.S. security, and there have been none since the end of the Second World War. During the Cold War, the United States spent trillions of dollars to deter a direct military threat that did not exist, since the Soviet Union had no intention of launching an unprovoked attack on Europe or the United States.

Despite the continued absence of significant threats today, the United States is still engaged in a number of conflicts in an effort to make the world look and act the way we want. In reality, however, most modern security issues are not really military in nature; rather, they are policing and diplomatic activities that do not require substantial U.S. military involvement. While isolationism is not a viable policy, the United States does not need to use its military to solve all of the problems in the world.

Dr. Mueller argued that the absence of war among developed countries since 1945 is the greatest single development about war in history. The end of the Cold War ushered in a New World Order, and from 1989 to 2000 the United States was engaged in what Dr. Mueller called “policing wars.” There was very little domestic support for most of these ventures, however, because there was a strong U.S. public aversion to nation building, a low tolerance for casualties, and a lack of concrete political gains from success.

The terrorist attacks on 9/11 were an exogenous shock to U.S. policy, and this event made the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq possible. Dr. Mueller argued that these wars are aberrations from the broader trend of policing wars, and that the U.S. public and political leaders are moving back to the previous views – little desire for nation building, sensitivity to casualties, and few anticipated political gains – that characterized the pre-9/11 era.

U.S. grand strategy for the end of the *Pax Americana*

Dr. Christopher Layne presented an analysis of the emerging global balance of power and proposed a grand strategy of “offshore balancing” to contend with the rise of China. Dr. Layne argued that with the end of the Cold War many in the United States became fixated on the “unipolar moment,” believing that it might last indefinitely. However, if this unique moment is not already over, it soon will be, and with it the end of the Pax Americana that the United States has built since 1945. To be sure, most Americans do not like to think about the end – or at least the significant decline – of U.S. dominance in the international arena, but if the United States is to develop an effective grand strategy for the 21st century, it must deal with this reality.

Dr. Layne identified both external and internal drivers for the end of the Pax Americana. At the external level, the rise of China and other countries represents a significant shift of wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic to Asia. For countries such as China and India, this shift in the international balance of power represents a restoration of great power status, rather than a rise to a new, previously unattained position in the international system. Dr. Layne noted that China will eventually have the largest gross domestic product in the world, and thus the biggest question for the United States is not if, but when, this monumental shift will occur. Indeed, in terms of purchasing power parity, China has already overtaken the United States.

The rise of China thus represents a fundamental power transition, and this shift could undermine or threaten U.S. interests in Asia. While a peaceful rise would be best, history suggests that such events are rare. As China grows more powerful and expands its economic reach, it will want to be the hegemon in its region and develop power projection capabilities to protect its interests overseas. Since two hegemonies cannot occupy the same region at the

same time, the conditions are ripe for competition and potential conflict between China and the United States.

Internally, the United States is undergoing a self-generated relative decline brought on by chronic over-consumption, under-saving, balance of payment deficits, rising national debt, and de-industrialization. In his view, the United States is facing many significant problems over the long term that pose serious threats to U.S. power and influence around the world. Dr. Layne predicated that if another currency replaces the dollar as the reserve currency, the United States will lose its primacy in international politics.

Grand strategy, Dr. Layne argued, is intimately connected to economics and finance, and therefore the United States needs a grand strategy for an age of austerity. Such a strategy should be centered on “offshore balancing.” This strategy entails burden shifting, not burden sharing, as it gets others take on more responsibilities. Accordingly, the United States should create a strategic entente with Japan, India, and other major powers in Southeast Asia to contain China. At the same time, the United States must maintain its own capabilities as a credible backstop, and be prepared to project power ashore if the allies in the region cannot contend with an emerging threat. A strategy of offshore balancing would give preference to U.S. sea- and airpower, since this is where the United States has relative advantages, and would entail a strong U.S. presence offshore in East Asia and the Indian Ocean.

The continuing menace of terrorism and failed states

Dr. William McCants argued that while a terrorist attack can cause significant physical damage to infrastructure and economy, it is not an existential threat. For the United States, the greatest danger from terrorism is not an attack itself, but rather the U.S. reaction – or, more accurately, the over-reaction – to it. The attacks on 9/11 cost only about \$500,000 and the United States has spent nearly \$50 billion to rebuild New York and to compensate families. Yet the United States has spent vastly more to launch costly wars overseas in an effort to eliminate, or at least significantly diminish, the terrorist threat. Such overreactions cause great harm to the United States by draining resources, undermining the foundations of the state, exacerbating social tensions, and allowing for the passage of laws that undermine civil liberties.

Al Qaeda is keenly aware of all this, and in planning and conducting the attacks on 9/11 deliberately sought to put the United States on the horns of a dilemma: either the United States would have to reduce its presence in the Middle East, or it would have to commit a massive number of forces to the region. In either case, Al Qaeda calculated that it would “win”: the United States would either pull back, thereby allowing it to claim that it had defeated the United States and forced a withdrawal, or make a large-scale commitment of U.S. forces to the region, which would bleed U.S. resources, increase support for Al Qaeda’s

cause and encourage more people to join the fight against an enemy that was now even more within reach. A key Al Qaeda goal, Dr. McCants noted, is to keep provoking the United States into large-scale conflicts.

To some extent, Al Qaeda was disappointed with the U.S. reaction to 9/11 because we did not commit enough ground forces to Afghanistan. In response, Al Qaeda tried to engage Saudi Arabia in 2002 and attacked U.S. targets there in 2003, hoping to spark a guerilla war there. These attacks had the opposite effect, as they killed Arab Muslims and turned public opinion in the region against Al Qaeda. The war in Iraq, however, rekindled hopes for drawing the United States into a protracted guerilla war by providing a new place from which to attack U.S. troops.

In discussing how the United States should respond to the threat of terrorism, Dr. McCants argued that large numbers of military forces are unnecessary. Special operations forces and intelligence should suffice. Committing significant numbers of forces can be counter-productive, as it draws forces away from other missions and drains increasingly scarce resources – an important Al Qaeda objective. Dr. McCants noted that a proper response to a terrorist attack does require some element of theater, since the U.S. public will demand revenge and policymakers cannot ignore this impulse. Such theater is important because it makes citizens feel secure and shows that the government is taking concrete actions in response to an attack.

Regarding the nexus between terrorism and failed states, there is a common view that these kinds of states are dangerous because they can provide a safe haven for terrorists to plan and train for terrorist attacks. However, history suggests that weak states, rather than failed states, are better havens for terrorists planning and training because they have infrastructure and connections but lack adequate police and security forces, thereby making it easier for people to move in and out of the country. For example, al-Qaeda has favored weak, but stable Islamist states are better as safe havens when there is not an active civil war. Yet, conflicts are great opportunities for terrorists because they can practice their craft and develop new capabilities that can be later used against their enemies. Consequently, supporters of al-Qaeda are happy about the events in Libya and Yemen, and hope that Syria will follow a similar fate.

Keynote address by the Honorable Richard Danzig: The unpredictability of change

The keynote lunch speaker, the Honorable Richard Danzig, discussed the challenges of accurately predicting future trends and events, and how these difficulties affect procurement decisions. He then offered some recommendations for effective strategic planning in today's

world. Dr. Danzig noted that the modern international environment is characterized by extraordinary uncertainty and pace of change. In this kind of world, predictions about the future are a common and rational approach to dealing with uncertainty. Predictions about the future are deeply ingrained in bureaucracies, as they favor order and seek to minimize uncertainty. The Pentagon is a military bureaucracy, which means that it likes planning and dislikes unpredictability even more than most bureaucracies.

Yet, as the recent Arab Spring has forcefully demonstrated, the United States has a bad track record at predictions. Evidence from social science makes it clear that we are often wrong in our predictions. Thus, if we are planning for the future, we are building a whole system on a false premise. Dr. Danzig said it is worth asking what the system would look like if we could not foresee the future, and suggested that we need to design for that. The critical question we need to consider is: Given that we will not be able to predict what the world will be like, how will this affect concrete things such as ship design and procurement issues?

The current system is characterized by deliberate planning for requirements that focus on how equipment will fit in with the world 20 years from now. The United States spends 10 years producing the equipment to fit that vision; as a result, equipment is outdated by the time it is off the drawing board. The equipment is then in service for another 20 years. Thus, it is either in development or in use for at least 30 years after it was first envisioned. Since we have long development timeframes and develop equipment with longevity, we are doomed to a pattern of fielding outdated equipment if we continue to use the current system.

Dr. Danzig argued that we must take seriously the notion that we do not have predictive power, and must plan accordingly. While we can choose which scenarios to plan for, we must also plan to be adaptable. Since we will not imagine the right scenario every time, we must increasingly prize agility and flexibility, and view time as an important variable that we can conserve by buying more risk. In Dr. Danzig's view, manufacturing processes and equipment should be capable of adaptive change, and we should favor things that are well designed to be robust in several kinds of environments over those that are perfect for just one environment.

Seapower and the “global system”

A core component of the current national strategy – and the current naval strategy – is the notion that U.S. national security and prosperity are increasingly tied to the security and prosperity of other nations. The naval strategy posits the importance of a “global system” composed of interconnected networks of trade, finance, information, law, people, and governance. The naval strategy also contends that, in addition to the “traditional” role of winning our nation's wars, a central contribution of seapower to U.S. national security and

prosperity is the protection of this global system from a wide range of potential disruptions. The conference's third panel analyzed the nature of the "global system," the role of the United States in its successful functioning, and its connection to U.S. national security.

America's global role and its challenges

Dr. Michael Mandelbaum argued that the United States has a vital, central, and indispensable role in maintaining and supporting the global system, which has economic order at the center. Seapower is crucial for this role because it ensures access to the world's largest markets, patrols principal trade routes, and safeguards oil from the Gulf. Through seapower and other capabilities and activities, the United States acts as the world's quasi-government, providing a specialized kind of global policing to ensure the successful functioning of the global system and reassuring allies that the military balance will not change abruptly and in an adverse way from which they cannot recover.

In Dr. Mandelbaum's view, China poses the largest potential external threat to the United States and to the current global system. China is gaining wealth and military power, and thus it can afford to have more expansive political ambitions. However, there are a number of important countervailing factors and considerations that may temper the threat from China, including its low per capita income; its dependence on trade, which requires regional stability; the possibility of a proliferation race, which would not be in China's interest; a blue-water naval capability that is far behind that of the United States; an aging society and shrinking workforce; and the fact that nuclear weapons circumscribe policies and ambitions that some Chinese leaders might have. Given all of these factors, China's rise is more complicated and potentially less imminent than many realize.

Domestically, the national debt and deficit is the greatest challenge to U.S. power. Despite political preferences, spending will be cut, taxes will be raised, and entitlements will be reduced. Dr. Mandelbaum predicted that the American public and U.S. decision-makers will be less generous in funding foreign security policy in an environment where the costs of government are rising and the returns are decreasing. This down-slope in funding will occur because the United States is not truly on a war footing and the American public does not feel threatened, and because at present the military has relatively weak political allies who would lobby for continued funding at current levels.

In this financially constrained environment, the United States will have to make strategic choices. Dr. Mandelbaum suggested that the country will adjust by discontinuing the discrete military operations to which we have become accustomed in the post-Cold War era. These operations are expensive and often lead to nation-building responsibilities, which are unpopular with the American public, are difficult to conduct, and do not yield many benefits for the United States. Dr. Mandelbaum concluded by arguing that the United States must

substantially increase and expand its education programs in order to keep up in an increasingly globalized and technology-driven world. The long-term future of the United States, in his view, will ultimately be decided in the classrooms. While the fate of nations is often determined by seapower, the reverse is true for the United States in the 21st century: the fate of seapower will be determined by the nation – specifically by the strength of our education system.

The trouble with global public goods

Dr. Christopher Preble argued that a fundamental strategic shift is coming, and that such a shift is long overdue. A shift away from the current strategy of U.S.-led global governance toward a more restrained approach would make sense even in an era of abundance, and it certainly makes sense in the current environment. While some contend that a U.S. strategy of restraint would lead to a more dangerous world, Dr. Preble argued that the United States can be successful if it develops and implements a sound grand strategy.

Dr. Preble argued that the United States bears a disproportionate cost and risk in serving as a police force for the world. In his view, the majority of Americans are not interested in policing the world, as this is seen as a form of charity. In reality, the United States has maintained a vast military not primarily to protect itself, but rather because other countries are threatened. This dynamic, which amounts to a form of foreign aid, creates perverse incentives and dependencies among our allies: With the United States spending significant resources to police the global system and provide for their defense, they can divert attention and resources to other “nice to have” things such as social welfare systems and technology. This approach to U.S. security has serious deleterious strategic effects, since the allies do not have the capacity or will to help the United States in times of need. Dr. Preble also noted that this kind of U.S. grand strategy actually discourages the allies from greater participation, since many in the United States place a higher value on discouraging military buildups in other countries than on encouraging self-defense.

The end result is that under current U.S. strategy, the United States pays and the rest of the world benefits. Allies can free ride, cheap ride, or reckless drive on the security provided by the United States. Dr. Preble noted that while the United States is the leading beneficiary of the system, and thus does have an obligation and opportunity to help maintain it, the costs and risks of policing the planet and maintaining order should be paid by the many producers and consumers who are dependent on it. Consequently, Dr. Preble advocated for a move away from a grand strategy that amounts to massive foreign aid, and toward an interest-based approach to strategy that focuses on a more narrowly defined set of interests vital to the United States.

The Navy and globalization

Dr. James Wirtz noted that the U.S. Navy sees itself as an instrument of grand strategy and as playing an essential role in globalization. Indeed, the concept of globalization played a central part in the Navy's justification for the current maritime strategy, which focuses on the economic prosperity of all nations, with safe and free seas for all. The U.S. Navy has been factored into the process of globalization, and all actors assume that the Navy will provide policing and presence for the process of globalization.

Dr. Wirtz pointed out that it is difficult to know what would happen in the world if the Navy did not intervene in regional crises. In the past, relatively small crises have affected the U.S. economy. Operation Desert Storm, for example, had a \$55 billion economic impact, and the 1994 Kuwait border incident had a \$7 billion impact. Dr. Wirtz showed that the price of oil decreased after some crises because the U.S. Navy intervened, which lowered the price of oil and thereby allowed that money to be directed toward economic production. According to Dr. Wirtz, crisis response operations by the U.S. Navy have provided an \$86 billion increase in world income.

Dr. Wirtz argued that it is challenging, if not impossible, to precisely quantify the U.S. Navy's role in and contribution to the process of globalization. The Navy currently dominates the world's maritime battle space, but no one knows what the world would look like if it did not. This makes it especially difficult to predict the effects of potential changes in naval strategy and challenging to determine what the Navy's role ought to be in the future. Throughout its history, the Navy has struggled with identifying the "right size" of the fleet for maritime supremacy in conflict, crises, and disasters. The Navy is forward deployed and able to respond rapidly to events around the world, but it is difficult to know how much navy, how much dominance, and how much supremacy is enough. Given these difficulties, Dr. Wirtz predicted that this struggle to find the "right-sized" navy will continue under the emergence of new strategic and budgetary realities.

Landpower and airpower perspectives on grand strategy and the emerging security environment

The naval services are not alone in considering the consequences of an increasingly multipolar and fiscally constrained environment. The Army and the Air Force are also thinking strategically as to what their roles are, what they will be, and how they will work together in the future. Indeed, given the centrality of joint operations in U.S. military planning, discussions of seapower and grand strategy must also consider the unique perspectives of the land and air components of the military. The fourth panel featured two leading thinkers on the role of air and land power in U.S. grand strategy.

Landpower and grand strategy

According to Major General Robert Scales, U.S. Army (Ret.), the United States is at a place now where it must rethink the world after Iraq and Afghanistan. MG Scales noted that much of the day's discussion had been about policy and strategy, not war. In terms of future war, a central challenge is that we do not know who the next enemy is going to be. In an effort to answer this fundamental question, there has been a resurgence of the cottage industry of threat analysis, and people are making a lot of money by trying to figure out who the enemy will be. Yet, the United States does not have a good track record of predicting the time, place, and duration of war. The threat analysis industry – which includes what MG Scales called the “global trends school,” the “scenario development school,” the “emerging technology school,” and the “capabilities assessment school” – has failed miserably at predictions and has worked to the detriment of the nation's ground forces.

In contrast to the various “schools” of threat analysis, MG Scales advocated a focus on behavior and intent in identifying and analyzing possible future wars. In his view, every war involving the United States since the Second World War has been the result of miscalculation because we have focused too much on the enemy's military hardware and not enough on the enemy's intent. He noted that our enemies have embraced a consistent pattern of military operations and war, regardless of the level of conflict at which the war was fought. The opponent's objective has always been to dissuade the United States from intervening in their corner of the world. The enemy does not need to win, but just to avoid losing, and then stretch out the war to control the temporal side of battle – not as a means to an end, but as an end itself. The end result is that we kill a lot of them, they kill a few of us, and we tire of it first. While U.S. leaders have shifted strategic objectives over the years, our enemies' strategies have not changed much.

A focus on enemy intent would change the way the United States prepares for future wars. MG Scales said we need to focus on examining an enemy's willpower, not just its capabilities. In his view, future enemies will allow us command of air, sea, and space, and take us on where they can achieve their strategic intent at our greatest cost – in other words, they will seek to kill infantrymen. He argued that we should pay more attention to the last war when we prepare to fight the next because the past may be a better indicator of the future than we realize.

MG Scales argued that we must remember the human nature of war, and not be too distracted by technology. Technology, ships, and planes are important, but we cannot budget against behavior and intention. The acquisition process only starts working when people start dying, as in the case of the mine-resistant-ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. MG Scales noted that the U.S. weapon of choice in Afghanistan today is the M2 machine gun, which is a

1921 design. Meanwhile, Taliban fighters have the best machine gun in the world, the Soviet .50 caliber.

While the U.S. Navy talks about a Navy-Marine Corps partnership, MG Scales noted that for the last 60 years it has really been an Army-Marine Corps team. The Army and Marine Corps go to war together, and they have been driven together in the face of the enemy. They do a virtually identical task in an almost identical way. In spite of that and the plethora of predictions about the future, infantrymen will continue to face a diabolical enemy whose purpose is to kill American soldiers and Marines.

Jointness, airpower, and grand strategy

Lieutenant General David Deptula, U.S. Air Force (Ret.) argued that grand strategy requires a combination of perspectives from the air, land, and sea components, and that joint operations are central to the U.S. military today. Since the advent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, a joint approach has involved moving contingency organizations and operations from independent, de-conflicted, service-oriented approaches toward sustained interoperability. Lt Gen Deptula noted that the level of jointness since then has varied, depending on the commanders in charge and the degree to which senior leadership has encouraged it.

In the U.S. military, individual services do not fight; rather, they organize, train, and equip. Jointness means that from among our four services, a separately developed and highly specialized array of capabilities is provided through service or functional components to a joint force commander. The commander's job is to assemble a plan from this "menu" of capabilities, applying the appropriate ones for the contingency at hand. In Lt Gen Deptula's view, joint force operations create synergies because this approach capitalizes on each service's core functions. These functions require the services to give much time, effort, and focus to developing the competencies required to exploit operations in their respective domains.

When a single service attempts to achieve war-fighting independence instead of embracing interdependence, jointness unravels, war-fighting effectiveness is reduced, viable alternatives are ignored, and costly redundancies abound. Lt Gen Deptula argued that the last thing we need today, as we face a resource-constrained future, is to turn back the clock on Goldwater-Nichols. Indeed, while efforts to achieve better integration of air- and sea-based capabilities are welcome in that they keep alive the promises of a true joint approach to capitalizing on the necessary attributes each of the services provides, we really need to take the next step and move from service interoperability to service interdependence.

In discussing the role of the U.S. Air Force, Lt Gen Deptula identified four unique contributions that define the service in the context of its current objectives: gaining control of air, space, and cyberspace; holding targets at risk around the world; providing responsive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and rapidly transporting people and equipment across the globe. Both underpinning and embedded in each of these unique contributions is command and control. Given the nature of the modern security environment, Lt Gen Deptula argued that it was essential that we sustain these contributions.

U.S. grand strategy and the role of seapower

To conclude the day's discussion, the fifth panel discussed the various options for a new U.S. grand strategy and the appropriate role of seapower in those strategies. Seapower is a vital component of U.S. grand strategy and of the American ideals of economic and military security. This discussion focused on issues of commerce and economics, asymmetrical capabilities offered by naval power, and the anticipation of future security challenges based on past experiences.

Connections between seapower and prosperity

Dr. Seth Cropsey noted that the famous naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan said that seapower is the key to greatness because trade is conducted on the waterways. Dr. Cropsey noted that the overall global stability since the Second World War has convinced us that the oceans are safe – but if a competitor rendered them unsafe and unstable, the U.S. economy would suffer. He argued that it is difficult to quantify seapower's many benefits, as they lie beyond economic forecast models and create general conditions for stable commercial relations on the waterways. Yet, because many of seapower's most important contributions cannot be readily quantified and the causal mechanisms by which seapower contributes to security prosperity cannot be easily observed, Navy budgets are a ready target during times of financial pressure.

Dr. Cropsey argued that seapower is significant both in peacetime and in war. Mobile force can be deployed anywhere in the world; it is an efficient means of indirectly diverting the resources of other states; and it can shape other states in ways that fit in with our strategic interests. U.S. seapower, in his view, is a preventative force that assures allies of commitment, containment, and dissuasion, and encourages other countries to develop commercially. Ground forces, by contrast, cannot achieve these objectives in practicable or desirable ways.

Dr. Cropsey said that if U.S. security declines, conflicts will increase, not diminish. While replacing British with American seapower had little effect on the maintenance of international order, a replacement of the United States by China would have more serious consequences. From a financial perspective, if the current debt crisis leads to a reduction in

U.S. seapower, the cure for our financial woes will be short lived. Commerce provides nations with well-being, comfort, and security. In Dr. Cropsey's view, commercial supremacy is an important part of overall supremacy.

Future capability requirements

Admiral Michael McDevitt, U.S. Navy (Ret.) noted that Professor Samuel Huntington's 1954 article, "The Transoceanic Navy," articulated the essential logic of the transoceanic era: there are no more rival navies left to sink, the remaining navies are our friends, and therefore we must focus on power projection on the littorals, power projection ashore, peacetime forward naval presence, and alliances. RADM McDevitt said that these arguments, made in 1954, continue to be central elements of U.S. grand and naval strategies today.

RADM McDevitt argued that forward naval presence overseas provides presence and proximity without large ground forces, and it yields influence and provides decision-makers with a wide range of scalable options. Being proximate is a central driver of U.S. strategy, as the objectives of reassuring allies, sustaining regional stability and security, rapidly responding to threats and contingencies, maintaining the SLOCs, and deterring threats all require being relatively close to allies and to current or potential adversaries. Carrier-centered naval power is especially important because airpower is the centerpiece of the American way of war and is a key way in which the United States seeks to influence events ashore – and carriers can project a significant amount of airpower. Carriers provide the most options for the U.S. leadership to demonstrate U.S. power: by projecting power without boots on the ground; by putting boots on the ground; or by providing vital air support to ground troops. In RADM McDevitt's view, offshore options and naval forward presence will – and should – continue to be a central component of U.S. grand strategy.

In discussing the future demand signal for naval assets and capabilities, RADM McDevitt argued that a good way to think about the future is to look at recent history. Examining and characterizing the military events of the last 20 years provides a good vision for the security environment over the next 20 years. Thus, RADM McDevitt argued that most combatant commanders will maintain a demand signal similar to the one they have had for the past decade or longer. The U.S. Central Command will lessen some demand for sea-based airpower, but its requirements to keep SLOCs open, deter a nuclear-capable Iran, reassure Gulf Cooperation Council countries, maintain afloat ballistic missile defense, and conduct sea-based counter-terrorism operations in the Indian Ocean littoral will continue. The uncertainties are linked to the possibility that Iraq or Pakistan could become failed states, and whether this kind of situation would create a demand signal for more forward naval presence.

Europe Command and Africa Command's demand signals could increase because the Arab Spring changed the security situation in the Mediterranean littoral, particularly in Libya, Egypt, and Syria. Israel's security situation could change for the worse, and might lead to a demand for increased U.S. naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, Russia could change its posture, which might create a demand signal for U.S. warships to be present in the Eastern Mediterranean for long periods of time.

RADM McDevitt argued that the U.S. Pacific Command's current demand is likely to remain the same. Relations between China and Taiwan are as good as ever and trending in the right direction. USPACOM will maintain its deterrence mission in the region, and since North Korea is becoming a direct threat to the United States, there may be a demand for more sea-based ballistic missile defense. However, China's growing anti-access/area denial capabilities may trigger different needs. RADM McDevitt argued that the United States must keep pace with China, and this may involve a redistribution of U.S. naval assets from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, though it will not necessarily require buying more equipment.

Asymmetry of U.S. naval forces

Mr. Ronald O'Rourke presented a series of arguments that he believed might be offered by those who see naval forces as being important tools of U.S. policy. For example, he argued that such naval supporters might assert that a key element of U.S. national strategy is to prevent a hegemon from rising in the Eurasian hemisphere, which is home to most of the world's resources and people. In fact, preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon is the primary reason for buying and maintaining long-range capabilities. Mr. O'Rourke argued that those naval supporters could claim that we are designed for something unique – we are the only country whose military is designed to move to another hemisphere and conduct operations there. While some foreign analysts and commentators frequently note that the U.S. Navy is significantly larger than other navies, Mr. O'Rourke pointed out that supporters of naval forces might say that the other navies are in the other hemisphere and so they don't need to travel as far to project power. Mr. O'Rourke argued that naval supporters might also claim that perhaps the size differential means that allies invest too little, not that the United States invests too much, in naval power.

Two-thirds of the world is water, much of which is international waters. As a result, a significant part of the world's surface is a potential space for maneuver and projection of interests. Mr. O'Rourke continued his arguments that he believed naval supporters might make by noting that U.S. naval forces are one of the greatest asymmetrical capabilities in the world and should be protected because they are an investment that provides a lot of payoff for world leaders. While a future conflict with China may be unlikely, Mr. O'Rourke argued that naval supporters might point out that this does not mean that the military balance in the

Pacific is not important. An argument might be presented that in order to maintain peace and stability in the Pacific, the United States must demonstrate that we are prepared to win a war there. Mr. O'Rourke noted that other countries constantly observe that balance of power in the region and factor it into decisions regarding policy vis-à-vis the United States and other countries. Consequently, supporters of U.S. naval forces might argue that a favorable military balance allows us to pursue various non-military policy goals in the Pacific and in general.

In concluding his arguments that he believed supporters of naval forces might make, Mr. O'Rourke stressed the continued importance of forward naval presence in U.S. grand and naval strategies. Forward presence provides many important benefits, including intelligence gathering, foreign military cooperation, and familiarization with foreign areas, strengthened ties with military leaders, improved interoperability, and the rapid execution of humanitarian relief and disaster response operations. In addition, presence helps limit regional conflict and control escalation. Mr. O'Rourke presented the argument that forward-deployed naval forces provide operational and diplomatic benefits that other forces cannot provide, including the ability to operate without a "permission slip" from other countries. Mr. O'Rourke noted that as access to overseas bases becomes more limited in the future, modular, flexible U.S. naval forces will be at a premium.

Conclusion

The current economic situation and domestic political climate in the United States has forced a new debate about America's role in the world, and the likely decrease in the U.S. defense budget will require the U.S. military to make tough choices in the coming years. As a global power with global interests, the United States must examine closely which interests it can and should pursue, which ones it cannot and should not pursue, and what cost its choices will incur. The United States must pay particular attention to its role as the world's leading maritime power, a role that has given it important political and military advantages over the past seven decades. This conference sought to bring a wide range of perspectives to the table in order to contribute to what is likely to be an important and challenging debate.

Prof. Walter A. McDougall: “History and strategies: Grand, maritime, and American”

Of sea-captains young or old, and the mates, and of all intrepid sailors,
Of the few, very choice, taciturn, whom fate can never surprise nor death dismay.
Pick'd sparingly without noise by thee old ocean, chosen by thee,
Thou sea that pickest and cullest the race in time, and unitest nations,
Suckled by thee, old husky nurse, embodying thee,
Indomitable, untamed as thee.

—Walt Whitman, “A Song for all Seas, all Ships”

A classic treatise on grand strategy specifically addressed the geopolitics of the Pacific Rim in the aftermath of the First World War. Its cautionary conclusion warned that great powers drawn to compete for commerce and empire in the vast vacuum of the North Pacific invariably overreached. Bids for hegemony by Spain and Portugal, then Britain and Russia, had already been thwarted and the likelihood in the 20th century was that Japan would be tempted to overreach, followed, perhaps, by the United States. The author of that prescient analysis was none other than Karl Haushofer, whose reputation is that of a leading proponent of *continental* geopolitics fixated on the quest for hegemony over the Heartland of Eurasia, which his English counterpart Halford Mackinder dubbed the “World Island.”

Haushofer’s first career as an artillery officer climaxed in 1908-10 when he served as an attaché in Japan and even met the Meiji emperor. The seven-sided scramble for imperial concessions in the Far East transfixed him, even after he left active duty, earned a doctorate, and began a second career focused on Germany’s geopolitics. Haushofer’s very first book, in fact, was an analysis of the geography driving Japanese expansion, and his second book was on the grand geopolitics of the Pacific. Moreover, in his land-power studies to follow, he never imagined that a single empire could impose a hegemony on the World Island. Rather, he suggested that Germany seek an alliance with Russia to control the heartland and alliances with Italy and Japan to secure its *maritime flanks*.¹

¹ Karl Haushofer, *Das Japanische Reich in seiner geographischen Entwicklung* (Vienna: L.W. Seidel, 1921) and *Geopolitik des pazifischen Ozeans* (Berlin-Grunewald: Kurt Vowinckel, 1924). His literal warning was that all nations who overreached in the Pacific were sure to experience “*fühlbare, sichtbare Strafe*”

Haushofer's closet navalism proves how ubiquitous was the sway of the American Naval War College professor A. T. Mahan. His book *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* "went viral" after 1890 and helped persuade the leaders of almost all the great powers to join the global race for blue-water navies, global markets, and colonies. But the very fact that the Mahanian thesis about the decisiveness of sea power stoked a nearly universal navalism really testifies to the *folly and pride* of the leaders in those Great Powers that lacked the endowments Mahan identified as the bases of sea power. They included: "I. Geographical Position. II. Physical Conformation, including, as connected therewith, natural productions and climate. III. Extent of Territory. IV. Number of Population. V. Character of the People. VI. Character of the Government, including therein the national institutions."² To the extent that a nation scored high in those categories (and Mahan's America certainly did), it might confidently venture forth on the high seas. Yet a nation, no matter how large, populous, rich, or industrial, that lacked one or more of these features – for instance, access to open seas from defensible ports – must content itself with a maritime strategy limited to coastal defense. That pride-wounding caveat was lost on Russia, Italy, and Germany, among others.

In retrospect, it has been argued that Mahan's theories were oversimplified and accepted all too uncritically. His analysis of 18th-century British economics and strategy was essentially correct, but analogizing them to late 19th-century America was not. His fixation on command of the seas through decisive fleet engagements ignored many other important maritime roles. In retrospect, the best theorist of the era (and one whose works even the Naval War College would teach in the 1920s) was Sir Julian Corbett, precisely because he stressed maritime, not just naval power, by de-emphasizing big battleship determinism and stressing the roles of blockades, amphibious operations, logistics, and army-navy combined arms.³ Navies have always been about "jointness" as we call it today, which is why, as Hugh Strachan observed, an almost unconscious distinction is drawn between strategy and naval or maritime strategy. The

– tangible, visible punishment, like a whipping (p. 234). Haushofer returned to the study of maritime power with a vengeance in *Weltmeere und Weltmächte* (Berlin: Zeitgeschichte Verlag, 1937). I discovered these earlier maritime works by Haushofer while researching Walter A. McDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise. A History of the North Pacific From Magellan to MacArthur* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).

² T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1957 [1980]), p. 25.

³ Clark G. Reynolds, *Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires* (New York: William Morrow, 1974), pp. 402-15; Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University, 1976), pp. 444-77. In addition to *Influence* see Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power: Present and Future* (Boston: Little, Brown 1897) and *The Problem of Asia and its Effect on International Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1900). Julian Corbett's masterpiece was *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London: Longman's, Green, 1911).

former is usually restricted to land warfare in the manner of Clausewitz and leans down toward operations, while the latter embraces land, air, and sea and thus stretches up toward grand strategy.⁴

The era of nearly universal naval and colonial competition spelled crisis for the world's long-standing naval, colonial, financial, and commercial leader. Throughout the many decades when Britannia ruled the waves, her Admiralty boasted of a Two-Power Standard (the Royal Navy should exceed the next two largest navies combined) and her Foreign Office boasted of Splendid Isolation. But the rise of many competitors rendered those luxuries unsustainable. Especially vexing were the Franco-Russian Alliance (1894), Germany's High Sea Fleet program (1897), and the appearance of America's Two-Ocean, Blue-Ocean Navy (1898) and Russian and Japanese fleets in Northeast Asia (1901). No longer able to enjoy command of the seas everywhere at once, the British hedged against potential rivals by concluding an alliance with Japan (1902) and ententes with the United States (1901), France (1904), and Russia (1907). In retrospect, Britain's maritime hegemony was bound to end sooner or later as other nations industrialized (just as America's post-World War II hegemony had to erode over time). When at last "normal" competitive times returned and several peer competitors arose in various global theaters, the British sought partners to help police the seas (just as the U.S. Navy seeks partners today).

Yet Wilhelmine Germany stubbornly raced, even after H.M.S. *Dreadnought* raised the stakes after 1906. Admiral Tirpitz assured the Kaiser that the German fleet did not need to equal, much less defeat, Britain's North Sea fleet, because once it reached a critical mass the British would gladly make imperial concessions rather than risk all in a war. That "I dare you" strategy of extortion inspired a classic exchange of memoranda in the Foreign Office which diplomatic histories (most recently Henry Kissinger's *On China*) invariably cite in order to illustrate the conundrums posed when a suddenly rising power challenges an established one.

⁴ Hugh Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," *Survival* (Autumn 2005), p. 37, cited by Timothy D. Hoyt, "The United States and Maritime Strategy: A Parochial View from the U.S. Naval War College," *Orbis* 51:4 (2007): 577-84.

On New Years' Day 1907, Eyre Crowe, a brilliant newcomer to the Foreign Office, penned the following minute on a Foreign Office document reviewing European affairs.⁵

Second only to the ideal of independence, nations have always cherished the right of free intercourse and trade, in the world's markets, and in proportion as England champions the principle of the largest measure of general freedom of commerce, she undoubtedly strengthens her hold on the interested friendship of other nations, at least to the extent of making them feel less apprehensive of naval supremacy in the hands of a free trade England than they would in the face of a predominant protectionist Power. This is an aspect of the free trade question which is apt to be overlooked. *It has been well said that every country, if it had the option, would, of course, prefer itself to hold the power of supremacy at sea, but that, this choice being excluded, it would rather see England hold that power than any other State* [italics added].

That passage is justly famous and felicitous, at least to Anglo-Americans. We believe in a liberal, open world order, hence other nations can trust us to exercise a benevolent hegemony. But to stop there and conclude that Crowe was a hawk vis-à-vis Germany ignores the dilemma posed by a rising new power's intentions. Indeed, Crowe continued with an either/or:

Either Germany is definitely aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime ascendancy, threatening the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the existence of England; Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ambition, and thinking for the present merely of using her legitimate position and influence as one of the leading Powers in the council of nations, is seeking to promote her foreign commerce, spread the benefits of German culture, extend the scope of her national energies, and create fresh German interests all over the world wherever and whenever a peaceful opportunity offers, leaving it to an uncertain future to decide whether the occurrence of great changes in the world may not someday assign to Germany a larger share of direct political action over regions not now a part of her dominions, without that violation of the established rights of other countries which would be involved in any such action under existing political conditions. In either case Germany would clearly be wise to build as powerful a navy as she can afford [italics added].

Thus, Germany's naval program might be a weapon designed to overthrow the world order or a tool to help her forge a larger (responsible) stake in that order. But Sir Thomas Sanderson, a brilliant veteran just retired from Whitehall, responded to Crowe with a sigh.

⁵ From the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*. For a complete on-line text see http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Memorandum_on_the_Present_State_of_British_Relations_with_France_and_Germany.

He bade him (and by extension his chief, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Gray) to see world politics from Germany's point of view:

It has sometimes seemed to me that to a foreigner reading our press the British Empire must appear in the light of some huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream.

In short, Sanderson argued that Britain's empire and its maritime lifelines could be secured better through accommodation of a rising peer competitor than by arrogant outrage and dogged defense of the status quo. The parallels to the United States and China today are obvious. But in retrospect what ought to surprise historians about the Crowe-Sanderson exchange is that both took German naval ambition for granted. That is, neither one concluded that since Germany was functionally land-locked it was either foolish or malign for the Kaiser to challenge Britain's maritime supremacy. Indeed, the Kaiser's High Seas Fleet really weakened Germany by turning Britain and all her new friends into enemies and thus imperiling even Germany's supremacy on land. One can only surmise that Crowe and Sanderson, being British, took for granted the delicious appeal of sea power and were not surprised Germans wanted some, too. But you can't argue with geography. The Germans could not get away with pursuing world power in the same manner as the British, just as the Japanese could not get away with claiming a "Monroe Doctrine" in the same as the Americans. That was because geography allowed the U.S. to arrogate to itself the Caribbean without stepping on any gouty fingers and toes, whereas geography ensured that any similar claims by Japan in the northwest Pacific were bound to elicit screams from Russia, China, Britain, or the United States.

One need not be a geographical determinist to conclude from the historical narrative of the modern era, at least, that every bid for hegemony by a terrestrial empire was doomed. From the Holy Roman Empire of Ferdinand II, and to the France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, to the Germany of the Kaiser and Hitler, to the Russia of the tsars and commissars, all such bids were defeated by rival coalitions orchestrated and supported by one or more maritime powers. Indeed, the Duke of Wellington himself confessed, "If anyone wishes to know the history of this [Napoleonic] war, I will tell them it is our maritime superiority [which] gives me the power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so."⁶

By contrast, those nations that pursued the most successful grand strategies, that garnered global power and pelf, and *pari passu* advanced human rights, international law, commerce, science, and culture, have been self-contained, self-governing, mostly Protestant federations

⁶ Wellington cited by Clark G. Reynolds, *Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires* (New York: William Morrow, 1974), 276.

including the Netherlands' *United Provinces*, which served as a model for the British Isles' *United Kingdom*, whose union of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland for the pursuit of power abroad served as a model for the 13 American colonies' *United States*. Indeed, the integral story of modern history is not so much the struggle between hegemony and balance of power, or between land power and sea power, but between the reigning maritime supremacy and its successor. Mahan's history made that explicit for the 17th century by pushing the wars of religion and Bourbon France into the background while concentrating on the Anglo-Dutch wars for control of the seas. A similar focus on the 20th century might stress America's swift supplanting of British power for which the hot and cold wars against the dictatorships were the occasions.

Equally instructive is a study of the Great Powers that tried and failed to compete on the high seas. Russia built many fleets from Peter the Great to Admiral Gorshkov, and every one ended up rotting, rusting, or sunk in battle. A nearly land-locked or chokepoint-constrained empire, no matter how big and rich, just cannot aspire to being a first-rank blue-water navy. France, by contrast, was bigger and richer than Britain and almost as oceanic as Britain throughout modern history, yet the French repeatedly squandered their assets by trying to be dominant on land and on sea simultaneously. They invariably lost out in both theaters. Imperial Germany was as bottled up as Russia, since the British could plug the North Sea; yet the Kaiser bought Admiral Tirpitz's theory that once a German High Seas Fleet reached a critical mass, the British would not risk a war and instead would grant Germany global concessions. That strategy of threat and extortion only ensured the encirclement of Germany by a hostile alliance. But sea powers can also make mortal blunders. Japan enjoyed regional naval supremacy – indeed, a sort of Japanese Monroe Doctrine – from 1904 to 1937. But rather than seeing insular Japan as the Asian mirror of Britain and privileging naval power, the Mikado saw Japan as the Asian mirror of Germany and privileged the army. Hence, Japan exhausted itself in a suicidal bid for a mainland empire. One might even say that the British, too, lost their maritime supremacy by engaging in two exhausting world wars on land. One might even wonder whether the United States is in danger of squandering its supremacy through a series of discretionary land wars in Asia.

The purpose of this long preface is to sketch in the elaborate backdrop to our contemporary tensions over the rise of Chinese offshore military ambitions and so render more plausible short assertions regarding some of the questions addressed in this CNA conference. First, all truly grand and successful strategies have been essentially (if not exclusively) maritime. Second, no nation's rise to world power has been more swift and complete than that of the United States. Third, therefore, America's rise must have reflected one or more maritime strategies; hence, the United States must ipso facto be able to do grand strategy. Of course, we can introduce lots of complications regarding definitions, parameters, and operational features of grand strategy, not to mention how consistent, codified, or even how conscious a

grand strategy must be. For a lengthy discussion of the question “Can America Do Grand Strategy?” see my essay published in *Orbis*.⁷

Americans’ bias toward maritime strategy is in fact over-determined. The geographical location, expanse, topography, and resources of North America make it the *real* World Island and thus by far the best suited to nurture a maritime supremacy. Indeed, the United States ranks first or close to it in all six of Mahan’s fundamentals for sea power. But the fact that the United States is history’s largest and most successful thalassocracy (Greek for “rule by the sea”) is attributable to cultural traits inherited from Great Britain as well as innate material and spatial endowments. Thus did the classic naval historian Clark Reynolds define the *purpose* of thalassocracy as “control of the sea lanes and islands by one state to insure its economic prosperity and thus its political integrity?” But the manner of control, commerce, and polity most conducive to maritime supremacy just happen to foster more independent (he calls it “national privacy”), liberal, entrepreneurial, individualistic, representative, curious, diverse, cosmopolitan, and creative people and institutions than do rigidly hierarchical extractive land empires. (“Isn’t it funny,” he cites John Marin as saying, “that Dictators *never never never* live by the sea?”) Moreover, navies cannot occupy or plunder provinces in the manner of armies and so pose little threat to civil liberties. Navies are expensive and take a long time to build, but can quickly decay or be lost; hence they tend to be conservative. Yet they venture forth on a chessboard claiming 71 percent of the earth’s surface and serving as highway to all civilizations of mankind, hence navies tend to be cosmopolitan. Thus, whereas armies and their historians tend toward a narrow, national perspective, naval historians tend to be universal in their perspective, stressing and generally (if guardedly) optimistic about the progress that seafaring peoples have bestowed upon civilization.⁸

⁷ See Walter A. McDougall, “Can America Do Strategic Strategy?” *Orbis* 54:2 (2010): 165-84.

⁸ Reynolds, *Command of the Sea*, esp. 1-16, and *History and the Sea: Essays on Maritime Strategies* (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1989); “thalassocracy” and “control of the sea lanes,” 20; “national privacy,” 6; “Isn’t it funny,” 21. Reynolds knows he is bucking the conventional wisdom about “the American way of war” and its emphasis on mass, materiel, and attrition dating back at least to U.S. Grant. But he insists that the big land wars have been the exceptions, not the rule, in American history. Stressing national history and land warfare, scholars such as Russell F. Weigley have falsely concluded that “the history of usable combat may be at last reaching its end” in the nuclear era, whereas it only made the world safe for more limited war. He believed that American strategic history also suffered from a serious and closely related shortcoming until quite recently, namely the subordination of the Navy’s doctrinal history to the Army’s (and Air Force’s). Not until 1956 did any survey of American military doctrines offer a balanced treatment of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. That was Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New York: Putnam, 1956), although Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (Princeton, 1939) was “something of a turning buoy to a new course.”

America's true policy, as George Washington and Alexander Hamilton phrased it, was to preserve the incomparable blessing of her insulation from Europe's broils through a foreign policy of neutrality and a naval strategy of coastal and commercial defense. So long as Americans did not throw away their geographical advantages, their natural growth born of liberty and prosperity would surely make them in time a continental empire greater than any in history. But the original U.S. strategy was also maritime for reasons of political culture. Consider Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. It grants to Congress the power "to raise and support Armies," but adds that "no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." It also grants to Congress the power "to provide and maintain a Navy" – period, no restrictions. That very conscious distinction derived from the knowledge that a standing army poses a potential threat to the liberties of people at home whereas a navy is by definition offshore and a threat only to foreigners.

Hence, the John Adams administration and Congress created a cabinet-rank Department of the Navy (1798), whereas Washington had founded a Department of *War* rather than Army on the assumption that there would be no sizeable army except during war! That dispensation reflected the experience of the English Civil War, during which both Crown and Parliament fielded armies to wrest political power from each other. So it was, in the wake of that conflict, that King Charles II christened Britain's *maritime* forces the Royal Navy with the blessing of Parliament, whereas no monarch dared speak of a Royal *Army*, because it was understood that the British army belong to Parliament.⁹

Those distinctions are now lost on us, first because American armies never have threatened civil supremacy, and second because the Cold War arms race obliged the United States to go on a war-footing even in peacetime. But in our early national era it was understood that all the United States needed for a long-term grand strategy was a respected naval force plus militias, because its strategy was maritime.¹⁰

The first grand strategy was the Federalist vision promoted by Hamilton through the Constitution, Federalist Paper #11, Washington's Farewell Address (most of which he drafted), and the naval construction program that produced our nation's first fleet of sturdy

⁹ England's sea power dates from Henry VIII, who informally referred to his personally financed warships as the Navy Royal. Charles II flipped the words, made them official, and applied them to all government-owned and -conscripted ships. For a survey of war powers in American history, see Walter A. McDougall, "The Constitutional History of U.S. Foreign Policy: 222 Years in the Twilight Zone" at: <http://www.fpri.org/pubs/2010/McDougall.ConstitutionalHistoryUSForeignPolicy.pdf>.

¹⁰ The following descriptions of U.S. grand/maritime strategies owe much to the lectures of Karl F. Walling. See his article, "A Backward Look at Some Forward-Thinking Maritime Strategists," *Joint Force Quarterly* 50: 3 (2008): 130-39.

frigates.¹¹ President John Adams employed them to good account in the quasi-war against the French Republic, and Jefferson against the Barbary corsairs. Indeed, what made this grand strategy permanent was the fact that it outlasted the Federalist era and won over Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Andrew Jackson (who, against all expectations, proved to be a naval enthusiast).

The four great traditions of 19th-century U.S. diplomacy, which I described in my book *Promised Land, Crusader State*, all depended upon and in turn supported the maritime strategy of “separate spheres” between the Old World and New first expressed in Tom Paine’s *Common Sense* and made explicit in the Monroe Doctrine, drafted by John Quincy Adams. Those principles included Exceptionalism, which meant civil and religious Liberty, Independence, and Unity *at home* so as to unleash the creative powers of the people to grow the nation; next, Unilateralism or Neutralism which was anything but Isolationism, because Washington’s maritime strategy insisted that the United States would seek friendship and commerce with all nations while shunning alliances except in emergencies; then, the American System of post-colonial republics envisioned in the Monroe Doctrine; and finally the fruit of it all: Expansionism, or a Manifest Destiny that no power on earth could prevent (at least after the Louisiana Purchase held up) except the American people themselves. Hence the greatest crisis of our first grand strategy was the Civil War, in which the Union was saved and Europe narrowly kept from intervening, by General Scott’s Anaconda Plan, a maritime strategy for victory based on coastal and riverine blockades to strangle the Confederacy.

The second American maritime strategy, which was initially devised to reinforce the nation’s original grand strategy under new circumstances, flourished from roughly 1880 to some point in the aftermath of the Great War, around 1920. It was anchored, literally and figuratively, on the vision of a two-ocean, blue-water, steel, coal- and then oil-fired navy, whose missions were to enforce the Monroe Doctrine and shelter America’s growing foreign trade during the dangerous heyday of industrialism, the so-called New Imperialism, and naval arms races. This grand strategy was, needless to say, explicitly and overwhelmingly maritime, as it was conceived and promoted by Secretary of Navy Benjamin Tracy, Naval War College founder Stephen B. Luce, Navy captain and author A. T. Mahan, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt. The Republican Party was midwife to the new strategy, but

¹¹ Although I don’t believe I used the term “grand strategy,” the fact that the mutually supportive, internally consistent American foreign policy traditions bequeathed by the great statesmen of the early republic amounted to a grand strategy is self-evident in Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter With the World Since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997). I certainly describe them as such in a lecture and essay produced last year for the Temple University/ Foreign Policy Research Institute Consortium on Grand Strategy. See McDougall, “Can America Do Grand Strategy?” 165-84.

Progressives in both parties nurtured it – not least Woodrow Wilson, who pledged to build a United States navy “second to none.” The Great White Fleet, Panama Canal, overseas naval bases and colonies, and first big military-industrial complex were themselves only the naval expression of a self-conscious grand strategy for the United States that included promotion of exports, assimilation of immigrants, regulation of interstate and overseas commerce, national standards, public education, and big government mediation between big business and labor. These were the Progressive Era’s responses to the novel challenges of globalization, industrialization, urbanization, imperialism, and navalism.¹²

The third American grand strategy emerged during World War II and mutated into its final form during the early Cold War. It was a strategy aimed at global – truly global – power projection but not – repeat not – territorial occupations in Europe or Asia. It was conceived by that “former naval person” Franklin Roosevelt and his congressional paladin Carl Vinson. FDR imagined a postwar United Nations keeping the peace but really being run by his Four Policemen, each with its own “beat” or implicit sphere of influence. He also imagined a truly global and open economic system bankrolled and managed by the United States. America’s modes of enforcement in this New World Order were to be sea, air, and financial power, which is why Roosevelt spoke at Yalta of pulling American troops home from Europe within eighteen months of a German surrender. Instead, the Truman administration sharply reinforced U.S. ground forces in Europe and Asia in response to the Berlin Blockade and Korean War. But President Eisenhower devised a Cold War Containment strategy “for the long haul” by stressing nuclear deterrence plus air and naval supremacy. And, just as FDR had envisioned, that maritime supremacy based on sea and air power also patrolled the global commons in the interest of an open and prosperous economy.

The fourth American maritime strategy (but still within the grand strategy of Containment) was the 1980s response to the rapid Soviet naval buildup dramatized in the early Tom Clancy novels. But it really ought to be dated to 1969, when the Nixon Administration began the long withdrawal of American ground forces from South Vietnam. In a speech at the very apt location of the island of Guam (following the splashdown of the Apollo 11 astronauts), the president proclaimed the Nixon Doctrine to the effect that henceforth the United States would assist peoples threatened by aggression with all manner of military and economic

¹² On Progressive Imperialism, see McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, chapter 5. On the rise of the new steel blue-water navy see inter alia the recent works by Henry J. Hendrix, *Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century* (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 2009); Kurt Hackemer, *The U.S. Navy and the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex, 1847-1883* (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 2001); and Mark R. Shulman, *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882-1893* (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1995); as well as the classics Richard D. Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy 1898-1914* (Princeton University, 1973), and Robert Greenhalgh Albion, *Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947* (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1980).

support except ground combat units. “Asian boys must fight Asian wars,” he said. The doctrine was made explicit and operational in the post-Vietnam era by the ancillary doctrine promulgated by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and elaborated on by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, which specified stringent conditions under which U.S. ground forces should or should not be deployed in combat.

Taken together these doctrines signaled a very strong bias toward an offshore balancing strategy that came to define America’s posture during the third and last stage of the Cold War. Its most perfect expression was *The Maritime Strategy*, catalyzed in 1981 by Ronald Reagan’s Navy Secretary John Lehman. In it, America found her way partially back to Washington’s “true policy” or at least what Washington’s rule implied in an era of global Cold War and nuclear deterrence. The U.S. Navy was tasked not only with defending the whole world’s sea lanes and chokepoints against any Red Navy breakout, securing the U.S. Navy’s submarine-based portion of the nuclear triad, and guaranteeing logistical and fire support for the AirLand Battle operations plan in case of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war in Europe, but also with protecting and reinforcing allies and partners on the Western alliances’ flanks, in northern and southern Europe and in the Far East, and holding at risk things the Soviets held dear on their own Eurasian flanks and adjacent watery bastions, including their own strategic nuclear submarines.. All that added up to the ambitious goal of a 600-ship navy. It was never achieved, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, but *The Maritime Strategy* survived as a template for post-Cold War planning.¹³

The first efforts at such, including the 1992 “White Paper” . . . *From the Sea*, and the 1994 strategic concept *Forward...From the Sea* often seemed even to informed outside observers to be tentative and sterile, due to the defense budget cuts and general complacency following the 1991 Gulf War. Thus, American strategy appeared most adrift during the very years when the United States enjoyed maximal freedom of action.¹⁴ The Global War on Terror after 2001

¹³ See John B. Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004); and John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008).

¹⁴ See John B. Hattendorf, ed., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006). I remember well the fruitless debates of those years because I was editing *Orbis* at the time and wondering, with Harvey Sicherman, how long the United States could get away with such drift. A good snapshot of the mood of those years is Norman Friedman, *Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests* (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), because it was published just prior to the September 11 attacks. He introduced his subject with three postulates (1-4): First, “At the dawn of the twenty-first century the U.S. Navy is the foremost instrument of U.S. military diplomacy.” Next, “Since basing and aerial rights cannot be taken for granted [lessons of the 1990s], Navies are the only truly sovereign military instruments.” Finally, and for the ages, “About four centuries ago, Francis Bacon wrote that ‘he that commandeth the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.’” Friedman concluded that maintaining its

brought a host of new distractions born of protracted counter-insurgency warfare that violated American grand strategic doctrine and conjured more budgetary woes, born, this time, of profligacy rather than penury.

By mid-decade, visionary officers – most prominently Admiral Mike Mullen – seized the initiative to educate the Pentagon, politicians, pundits, and public about the new or magnified maritime challenges in the 21st century and measures to meet them. At the International Seapower Symposium in September 2005, Admiral Mullen floated the bold idea of a “Thousand Ship Navy,” to be deployed by an alliance of nations devoted to securing the global commons, not only from state aggression but also from piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, illegal immigration, terrorism, and transport of WMD.¹⁵ Then, in October 2007 the Marine Corps and Coast Guard joined the Navy in sponsoring *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (CS 21) similar in some respects to 1980s plan, but focused on today’s geography, enemies, and weaponry.¹⁶ Like the Lehman conception, the *Cooperative Strategy* must be “forward, global, allied, and joint...must also fit the nation’s grand strategy, must be multilateral, must be effective in peacetime and limited wars, must be affordable, and must be *public*.” The latter is a subtle point. If the purpose of a strategy is to deter and keep the peace, not surprise but publicity is mandatory.¹⁷

Finally, the rise of China, a potential peer competitor in the western Pacific, has inspired an elaborate and sophisticated operational concept called “Air-Sea Battle.” To date, the most public expression of the concept is *Air-Sea Battle: A Point of Departure*, itself echoing the U.S. Army’s “AirLand Battle” plan of the 1980s. Drafted not by the government but by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), the document’s scenarios assume that China seeks the capability and may someday reveal the intention to deny the U.S. Navy access

superior seapower was the top priority of post-Cold War America and its first line of defense because a “deployed fleet tends to keep problems at arm’s length.”

¹⁵ The concepts of global commons, strategic restraint, and offshore balancing have been popularized and eloquently defended by Barry R. Posen. See the brief summary of them in Posen, “Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy,” *Orbis*, 51:4 (Fall 2007): 561-67. His cutting conclusion rightly insists that the worst way to “spread democracy” is to attempt to do by force and label it “Made in U.S.A.” In the same issue, on pages 569-75, Geoffrey Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World,” describes the tension in recent maritime strategy between the ongoing requirements of international competition born of the modern “Westphalian state system” (in which the oceans are *res nullius* belonging to no one), and the requirements of international consensus born of postmodern globalization (in which the oceans are a global commons belonging to all).

¹⁶ A particularly pithy yet thorough comparison of the maritime strategies of the 1980s and 2000s is James Kurth, “The New Maritime Strategy: Confronting Peer Competitors, Rogue States, and Transnational Insurgents,” *Orbis* 51: 4 (2007): 585-600.

¹⁷ Norman Friedman, *The US Maritime Strategy* (London: Jane’s Publishing, 1988), 3-4.

to air and sea out to the first island chain off the Chinese coast and perhaps even the second chain. The CSBA document urges the Navy and Air Force to collaborate on the planning and execution needed to ensure that U.S. and allied forces can deny China the ability to deny access to its seas (what James Kurth coded as D and D2 and the document codes as A2/AD). But the CSBA authors insist repeatedly that the *purpose* of the “Air-Sea Battle Point of Departure” is not to coerce or provoke or win a war against China, but simply to deter aggressive behavior and “sustain a stable, favorable, conventional military balance throughout the Western Pacific region.”¹⁸

Can the United States devise and execute wise grand strategy in the present era of geopolitical flux and financial constraint? The answer is a highly conditional Yes – *if* the factions within each armed service can make common cause, *if* the services as a whole can rally behind a grand strategy, *if* the Joint Chiefs can market the strategy to the administration and Congress that will take office in 2013, and *if* the economy and public opinion can support any new strategic initiatives during an era of penury.¹⁹

From my perspective on world history and American political culture, the New Maritime Cooperative Strategy and the Air-Sea Battle operational concept meets the nation’s needs perfectly and should be especially appealing in the wake of the Iraqi and Afghan ordeals. But not even a vigorous and intelligent maritime strategy can be assured of success. In past conflicts the United States prevailed thanks to its strategic depth, productive power, and capacity to adapt in the fog of war, not because its prewar strategy proved right. War Plan Black never was executed. World War I at sea had no use for the Great White Fleet. Likewise, World War II turned on carriers, submarines, and strategic bombing rather than battleship battle line actions, while the enemy targeted by the 1980s *Maritime Strategy* just imploded. All one can do today is make educated guesses about the threat matrix of the next 20 years, or the future intentions of the Chinese regime (or, for that matter, its very survival), while the complex alliance diplomacy on which the Cooperative Strategy would depend, injects an additional range of (if you’ll pardon the expression) Unknown Unknowns into the equation.²⁰

¹⁸ The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, *Air-Sea Battle: A Point of Departure* (Washington D.C.: May 2010): <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/>.

On the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), see Bernard D. Cole, *The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-first Century* and Toski Yoshihara, *Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 2010).

¹⁹ Kurth’s article “The New Maritime Strategy” is especially shrewd in its analysis of inter- and intra-service rivalries and preferences with regard to enemies, roles, and mission.

²⁰ Donald Rumsfeld re-popularized the phrase in *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (New York: Sentinel, 2011), but I became familiar with the concept way back in the 1980s while researching the space

Still, it is far better to think about future strategic contingencies than not to think about them. As Ike famously said, “In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable”; and “failing to plan is planning to fail.”

In conclusion, I would just add that knowledge of – and respect for – the history of maritime rivalries and geopolitical realities should put us on guard against the natural impulse to over-promise or obfuscate in our efforts to “sell” strategies and weapons systems. A seemingly innocent case in point is the stated purpose of Air-Sea Battle Point of Departure, which is not roll-back or containment or a war-winning strategy or even the defense of Taiwan or an other specific asset, but simply a way to minimize Beijing’s incentives to achieve its goals through aggression and thus “to sustain a favorable, conventional military balance throughout the Western Pacific.” As a sales pitch I like it. As a diplomatic demarche I like it. But as a grand strategic plan it begs every important question. To spend the next 20 years racing to devise countermeasures sufficient to deny the Chinese ambition to deny us access to seas out to some unspecified limit (first island chain, second island chain?) is not a formula for stability, but a formula for the sort of perpetual competition for technical and diplomatic advantage that increases the chance of miscalculations and the incentive for preventive strikes. We must not forget the wisdom of Basil Liddell-Hart that the object of military strategy “is a better state of peace, even if only from your own point of view.”²¹

Thus, while the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* and its possible Air-Sea Battle corollary may prove to be of critical value in some future operational contingency, its grand strategic value must not be to punish or even deter bad Chinese behavior, but to encourage good Chinese behavior within *some* portion of its coastal seas to which they are denying – or soon will be certain to deny – others access. What is more, to tell the Chinese in words or deeds that external powers either will not or cannot permit them to have any power projection beyond their coast is to reprise Opium War-style imperialism of the sort they have been patiently frantic to end! In sum, the ultimate goal of the *Cooperative Strategy* and Air-Sea Battle should be stand-off enforcement of a diplomatic accord under which China agrees to police the seas and protect legitimate shipping within some designated “zone of control” in return for which the *Cooperative Strategy* partners agree to police the seas and protect Chinese shipping beyond the zone.

program. Variables and problems that will have to be overcome in a project but as yet have not even been identified are simply a vexing fact of life for scientists, engineers, and systems analysts engaged in research and development – and not least for aerospace engineers, who were the topic of my book back then. See Walter A. McDougall...*the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York; Basic Books, 1985), 439.

²¹ Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), 338.

I risk being keelhaunched for this, I know, but my rationale in supporting the proposed maritime strategy and naval build-up is to push the status-quo powers and rising power, not toward confrontation, but toward accommodation of the sort pursued by the 1921-22 Washington Naval Conference. Of course, the three great multilateral treaties produced by that conference failed in the end to stabilize East Asia, cap naval armaments, or tame a rising Japanese Empire. But that failure was not the result of flawed ends or means. Rather, the arms control, non-aggression, and Open Door pacts were killed by China's anarchy and xenophobia, America's insouciance toward Japan's needs, Japan's vulnerability to military rule, and everyone's collapse during the Great Depression into autarky and either militarism or isolationism. None of that history, sobering as it is, precludes the design today of a multilateral Asian/Pacific treaty regime rendered durable through realistic sanctions for violation and mutual interest in compliance.

On the contrary, a new "Washington Conference system" would be much stronger in our era precisely because no single power enjoys the regional naval hegemony that Japan did in the interwar years, and no power has an interest in sacrificing globalization for conquest. Finally, what's the alternative to seeking a *modus vivendi* with China: straining to prolong in perpetuity the artificial post-1945 status of the Pacific Ocean as an American lake? To do that would only invite, sooner or later, the "*fühlbare, sichtbare Strafe*" (tangible, visible punishment) that Haushofer warned awaits all nations that overreach in the Pacific.

Should Americans accommodate China's blue-water aspirations? Accept a Chinese "zone of control" that U.S. and allied forces dare not contest except *in extremis*? Abandon long-standing friends in Northeast Asia to some sort of tributary status vis-a-vis Beijing? Hints that a positive answer to those questions may even be up for discussion elicit accusations of "appeasement" and invocations of Munich.²² The implication is that to imagine a Chinese sphere of influence out to the first island chain (and therefore inevitably half way to the second island chain) is to consign South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines (with the Spratly Islands), and perhaps even Okinawa, to some kind of Finlandization. But the question of just how much *American* maritime dominance is enough and therefore just where to draw a new "Dean Acheson defense perimeter" line through the seas of *China's* oceanic "near abroad"

²² For instance, June Teufel Dreyer, "Why Taiwan Matters," Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Note (July 2011) at <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201107.dreyer.taiwan.html>, summarized her testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that critiqued such articles as Bruce Gilley, "Not so Dire Straits. How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits US Security," *Foreign Affairs* 89:1 (2010): 44-60, and Charles Glaser, "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," *Foreign Affairs* 90:2 (2011): 80-91. But see also James R. Holmes, "America's 'Munich Moment'?" (<http://the-diplomat.com/2011/07/17/america-s-munich-moment/>) rebutted the claim by Senator James Webb (R-VA) that the U.S. is "approaching a Munich moment with China."

will be addressed, like it or not, sooner or later. The challenge for Sino-American diplomacy is to figure out how to raise those questions voluntarily, in an atmosphere of conciliation rather than crisis, and in a regional rather than bilateral forum. Would accommodation of any sort feed the appetite of the authoritarian, nationalistic Beijing regime such that it would grab for control over more blue water in East and South China seas? The historical record strongly suggests that Chinese dynasties, even when strong, tend not to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. But we need not look to history, culture, or economic ties to keep the peace in the Pacific so long as the (still far superior) U.S. Navy and its friends along the first island chain, plus the Indian Navy and its friends beyond the Straits of Malacca, are on station to keep China honest.

In short: speak softly and carry a big stick. That way, the Chinese are the ones obliged to prove that they can be responsible stakeholders. That way, the Chinese are obliged to make the strategic choice of what kind of neighborhood they wish to inhabit.

In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea: there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to stay afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and enemy; and the seamanship consists of using the resources of a traditional manner of behaviour in order to make a friend of every hostile occasion.

—Michael Oakeshott, *The Voice of Liberal Learning*

Prof. John Mueller: “Embracing threatlessness: Reassessing U.S. military spending”

All sorts of notions and propositions are churned out, and often presented for consideration with the prefatory works: “It is conceivable that...” Such words establish their own truth, for the fact that someone has conceived of whatever proposition follows is enough to establish that it is conceivable. Whether it is worth a second thought, however, is another matter. It should undergo a good deal of thought before one begins to spend much money on it.

—Bernard Brodie, 1978

After examining an important U.S. Defense Department policy document, Benjamin Friedman observes that rather than estimating the varying likelihood of potential national security threats and coming up with recommendations on that basis, it “contends simply that ‘managing risk’ compels the United States to prepare for all of them,” and concludes that we should “retain the weapons and forces we have, with a few tweaks).”¹

A sensible defense policy should, in contrast, not focus on and evaluate the threats that plausibly exist, but it should design its force structure in accordance with their disparate likelihoods. In the process it should keep in mind Bernard Brodie’s admonition about what might be called “conceivablism” and about what he dubbed at the same time “worst case fantasies.”²

I attempt to carry out – or at least to sketch – such an exercise here.³ On evaluation, it seems the United States lives in an environment that is substantially free from threats that require a great deal of military preparedness. Although the United States will need to maintain some military forces to work its way out of the 9/11-induced wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, an examination of problems that lurk in current conditions and on the horizon suggests that the country may well be substantially exaggerating the urgency of the threat environment. In

¹ Benjamin H. Friedman, “The Terrible ‘Ifs’,” *Regulation*, Winter 2008: 35.

² Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” *International Security*, Spring 1978: 68, 83.

³ On this approach, see also Christopher J. Fettweis, *Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010).

consequence, it appears to be over-spending to confront real or imagined threats – if “conceivable” ones – that may be of only very limited significance and likelihood.

Major war

A sensible place to begin the consideration is with an examination of the prospects for a major war like World War II.

Although there is no physical reason why such a war cannot recur, it has become fairly commonplace to regard such wars as obsolescent, if not completely obsolete.⁴ Leading or developed countries continue to have disputes, but, reversing the course of several millennia, none seems likely seriously to envision war as a sensible method for resolving any of these disputes.

Europe, once the most warlike of continents, has taken the lead in this. It was on May 15, 1984, that the major countries of the developed world had managed to remain at peace with each other for the longest continuous stretch since the days of the Roman Empire.⁵ That rather amazing record has now been further extended, and today one has to go back more than two millennia to find a longer period in which the Rhine remained uncrossed by armies with hostile intent.⁶

“All historians agree,” observed Leo Tolstoy in *War and Peace* in 1869, “that states express their conflicts in wars and that as a direct result of greater or lesser success in war the political strength of states and nations increases or decreases.”⁷ Whatever historians may currently think, it certainly appears that this notion has become substantially obsolete. Prestige now

⁴ For an early examination of this proposition, see John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Free Press, 1989; reprinted and updated edition, edupublisher.com, 2009). See also Fettweis, *Dangerous Times*.

⁵ Paul Schroeder, “Does Murphy’s Law Apply to History?” *Wilson Quarterly*, New Year’s 1985: 88. The previous record, he notes, was chalked up during the period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the effective beginning of the Crimean War in 1854. The period between the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914 – marred by a major war in Asia between Russia and Japan in 1904 – was an even longer era of peace among major European countries. That record was broken on November 8, 1988. On some of these issues, see also Evan Luard, *War in International Society* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 395-99; and James J. Sheehan, *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008).

⁶ Bradford de Long, “Let Us Give Thanks (Wacht am Rhein Department), November 12, 2004, www.j-bradford-delong.net/movable_type/2004-2_archives/000536.html.

⁷ (New York: Norton, 1966), 1145.

comes from other factors, such as making economic progress and putting on a good Olympics.

The Cold War did supply a set of crises and peripheral wars that engaged leading countries from time to time, and it was commonly envisioned that doom would inevitably emerge from the rivalry. Thus, political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau in 1979 said: “In my opinion the world is moving ineluctably towards a third world war – a strategic nuclear war. I do not believe that anything can be done to prevent it. The international system is simply too unstable to survive for long.”⁸ At about the same time, John Hackett penned his distinctly non-prescient book *The Third World War: August 1985*.⁹ Such anxieties obviously proved to be over-wrought, but to the degree that they were correctly focused on a potential cause of major war, that specific impetus no longer exists.

World War III, then, continues to be the greatest nonevent in human history, and that happy condition seems very likely to continue. There have been wars throughout history, of course, but the remarkable absence of the species’ worst expression for two-thirds of a century (and counting) strongly suggests that realities may have changed, and perhaps permanently. Accordingly it may be time to consider that spending a lot of money preparing for a “conceivable” eventuality – or fantasy – that is of ever-receding likelihood is a highly questionable undertaking.

The challenge of a rising power

In a globalized economy, it is actually better for the United States if China (or Japan or Brazil or India or Russia or anybody else) becomes more prosperous – for one thing, they can now buy our stuff (including our debt). However, eschewing such commonplace economic logic, there has been a notable tendency to envision threat in China’s rapidly increasing prosperity on the grounds that at least some countries that have lots of money will necessarily invest a considerable amount of it in military hardware and that this will cause them consequently to come to feel impelled to target the United States or to carry out undesirable military adventures somewhere.

This fashionable conceivablist line of thought has a recent precedent. Japan’s impressive economic rise in the late 1980s led to similar alarmed breast-beating, culminating in another

⁸ Quoted, Francis Anthony Boyle, *World Politics and International Law* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985), 73.

⁹ (New York: Macmillan, 1979).

decidedly non-prescient book, *The Coming War With Japan*, published in 1991.¹⁰ Applying the same questionable thought processes to China, the alarmed are given little pause by the fact that China has built far fewer nuclear weapons than it easily could have, and they continue essentially to maintain that it would be better for the United States if China, and presumably the rest of the world, were to continue to wallow in poverty.

China's oft-stated desire to incorporate (or re-incorporate) Taiwan into its territory and its apparent design on other offshore areas do create problems – ones that world leaders elsewhere should sensibly keep their eyes on, and ones that could “conceivably” lead to an armed conflict to which American military forces might appear relevant. But it is also conceivable, and far more likely, that the whole problem will be worked out over the course of time without armed conflict. The Chinese strongly stress that their perspective on this issue is very long term and that they have a historic sense of patience. Indeed, if China eventually becomes a true democracy, Taiwan might even join up voluntarily or, failing that, some sort of legalistic face-saving agreement might eventually be worked out. Above all, China is increasing becoming a trading state, in Richard Rosecrance's phrase.¹¹ Its integration into the world economy and its increasing dependence on it for economic development and for the consequent acquiescent contentment of the Chinese people is likely to keep the country reasonable. Armed conflict over the issue would be extremely – even overwhelmingly – costly to the country, and, in particular, to the regime in charge, and Chinese leaders seem to realize this.

In the meantime there is a danger of making the issue into a threat by treating it as such – by refusing to consider the unlikelihood of a worst-case scenario as well as the consequences of fantasizing about it, and by engaging in endless metaphysical talk about “balancing” as if it had some coherent corollary in physical fact. In this respect, special consideration should be given to the observation that, as one scholar puts it, “although China looks like a powerhouse from the outside, to its leaders it looks fragile, poor, and overwhelmed by internal problems.” Provocative “balancing” talk, especially if military showmanship accompanies it, has the potential to be wildly counter-productive, and special heed should be paid to the warning that “historically, rising powers cause war not necessarily because they are innately belligerent, but because the reigning powers mishandle those who challenge the status quo.”¹²

¹⁰ George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, *The Coming War with Japan* (New York: St Martin's, 1991). On this issue, see also John Mueller, *Overblown* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 109-111.

¹¹ *The Rise of the Trading State: Conquest and Commerce in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

¹² Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 255, 261.

Policing wars

One possible use of American military forces in the future would be to send them into countries to depose regimes that, out of either incompetence or viciousness, are harming their own people, or to stop civil wars and to set up competent governments. Most international law authorities agree that, if such actions are mandated by the Security Council of the United Nations, they are legal and acceptable.¹³

In the aftermath of the Cold War, a number of such actions have been carried out by individual developed countries or by coalitions of them in such places as Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

It is highly unlikely, however, that these ventures are the wave of the future and will justify the maintenance of much military force. As it happens, there is little stomach for such operations. There are at least three problems.

First, there is a low tolerance for casualties in such applications of military force: a loss of a couple of dozen soldiers in chaotic fire-fights in Somalia in 1993 led the mighty United States to withdraw, particularly when polls found that 60 percent of the American public agreed with the extreme contention that “nothing the US could accomplish in Somalia is worth the death of even one more US soldier.”¹⁴

Second, the experience with policing wars has been accompanied by an increasing aversion to the costs and difficulties of what is often called “nation-building.”

Third, there is little or no political gain from success in such ventures. If George H. W. Bush failed to receive a lasting boost from the American public for the way he applied the U.S. military at remarkably low cost to drive Saddam Hussein’s Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, it is exceedingly difficult to imagine an operation that could do so.

These considerations have been driven into the highest relief by the exceedingly messy and costly wars the United States has waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. Any aversion to casualties and, certainly, to the costs and responsibilities of nation-building have been immeasurably heightened by this experience.

Many people in the American military envision these kinds of missions to be the future face of war, and counter-insurgency, willfully forgotten after the Vietnam War disaster, has re-

¹³ Christine Gray, “From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force against Iraq,” *European Journal of International Law* 13(1) 2002: 3-7. See also John Mueller, *The Remnants of War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).

¹⁴ John Mueller, *War and Ideas: Selected Essays* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 177.


entered the military classroom. However, it is much more likely that these ventures will be the last of their type. World War II inspired a World War syndrome, and none has taken place since. The Korean War inspired a Korea syndrome (on both sides), and none has taken place since. Vietnam famously inspired a Vietnam syndrome, and none has since taken place for the United States (though the USSR stumbled into its own version in Afghanistan). Somalia inspired a Somalia syndrome and any subsequent intervention by developed countries in local conflict in the remainder of the 20th century was kept highly limited – to assistance and maybe to some bombing from high altitudes or, in the case of genocide in Rwanda in 1994, simply to distant hand wringing. The disasters in Iraq and Afghanistan, though receiving much more support at first than earlier ones because they seemed to involve direct national interests, are highly likely to lead to an effective Iraq/Afghan syndrome built on a clear and overwhelming dictum, “Let’s not do that again.”¹⁵

The growth of this syndrome shows up clearly in public opinion data. Since 1945, a key poll question about engagement in foreign affairs has been posed periodically: “Do you think it would be best for the future of this country if we took an active part in world affairs, or if we stayed out of world affairs?” After the 1999 policing war in Kosovo, Americans became less keen on intervention – an interesting reaction, since the military action there had been something of a success at least in its own terms – as those choosing the “stay out” option rose to near all-time high of 34 percent. Right after 9/11, the figure dropped to a low of 14 percent, and after a brief rise, declined again to 14 percent at the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003. Since that time, however, the “stay out” option has become considerably more popular. By 2006, the last time the question was asked, fully 38 percent embraced the sentiment – the highest ever registered. This does not necessarily mean that old-fashioned isolationism is emerging: the United States is unlikely to withdraw from participation in the global economy, disengage from international political organizations, or cease to be a citizen of the world community. However, stung by the Iraq and Afghanistan miseries and deeply concerned about the extensive debt they generated, the public is likely to remain exceedingly hostile to anything that looks like a repeat performance.

The palpable reluctance of the developed world to get militarily involved in Liberia and Darfur in 2003 is also indicative of the process. So is the impressive unwillingness to use military force in the various risings of the Arab Spring in 2011 when military efforts were restricted to delicate tinkering around the edges and to the lobbying of munitions from a safe distance – and then only in one instance, that of Libya.

¹⁵ Mueller, *War and Ideas*, 217-19; John Mueller, “The Iraq Syndrome Revisited: U.S. Intervention, From Kosovo to Libya,” *foreignaffairs.com*, March 28, 2011.

Actually, the problems that policing wars were designed to handle may be resolving themselves. In the last couple of decades, there has been a marked decline in the number of venal tyrannies and, as figure 1 suggests, in civil wars.



Insofar as policing military forces might be useful, the most promising possibility seems likely to be in the construction of a viable international force through the United Nations.¹⁶ Among the advantages is that participants would be international civil servants/volunteers, not representatives of any specific country – thus, their deaths in action would stir only indirect concern in their home countries. Among the key questions, however, are whether developed countries will be willing to pay for such an enterprise, whether the international organization can put together a truly capable military force, and whether the Security Council can be counted on to manage, fund, and deploy it effectively.¹⁷

¹⁶ As suggested, for example, long ago in Brian Urquhart, “For a UN Volunteer Military Force,” *New York Review of Books*, June 10, 1993: 3-4.

¹⁷ On the other hand, there seems to have been considerable success in peacekeeping (as opposed to peace-making). Thus, people in Africa and elsewhere seem to have become fed up with the civil warfare they have suffered in recent decades in which small numbers of thugs, often drunken or drugged, have been able to pulverize effective society through their predatory criminal antics, some-

Rogue states

Over the course of the last several decades, the United States has variously sensed threat from small countries led by people it found to be decidedly unpleasant. These rogue states (as they came to be called in the 1990s) were led by such devils de jour as Nasser, Sukarno, Castro, Qaddafi, Khomeini, Kim Il-Sung, and Saddam Hussein, all of whom have since faded into history's dustbin.

Today, such alarmed focus is directed at teetering Iran, and at North Korea, the most pathetic state on the planet. Except in worst-case fantasies, however, neither country presents a threat of direct military aggression – Iran, in fact, has eschewed the practice for several centuries. Nonetheless, it might make some sense to maintain a capacity to institute containment and deterrence efforts carried out in formal or informal coalition with concerned neighboring countries – and there are quite a few of these in each case. However, neither country is militarily impressive and the military requirements for effective containment are far from monumental and do not necessarily need large forces-in-being.

Moreover, the Iraq syndrome seems already to be having its effect in this area. Despite nearly continuous concern about Iranian nuclear developments, proposals to use military force to undercut this progress have been persistently undercut.

The Gulf War of 1991 is an example of military force being successfully applied to deal with a rogue venture – the conquest by Saddam Hussein's Iraq of neighboring Kuwait. This experience does not necessarily justify the maintenance of substantial military forces, however. First, Iraq's invasion was rare to the point of being unique: it has been the only case since World War II in which one UN country has invaded another with the intention of incorporating it into its own territory. As such, the experience seems to be much more of an aberration than a harbinger. Second, in a case such as that, countries do not need to have a large force-in-being because there is plenty of time to build a force should other measures to persuade the attacker to withdraw, such as economic sanctions and diplomatic forays, fail. And third, it certainly appears that Iraq's pathetic forces – lacking strategy, tactics, leadership, and morale – needed the large force thrown at them in 1991 to decide to withdraw.¹⁸

times sustaining them for decades. In consequence of this disgust, there has been a strong willingness to accept and make effective use of outside aid and to establish effective (if hardly perfect) governments, a process that Virginia Page Fortna, among others, has interestingly explored: *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

¹⁸ On this issue, see John Mueller, "The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War," *Security Studies*, Autumn 1995: 77-117.

Proliferation

The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been far slower than has been commonly predicted over the decades, primarily because the weapons do not generally convey much advantage to their possessor.¹⁹ Nonetheless, an aversion to nuclear proliferation continues to impel alarmed concern and was a chief motivator of the Iraq War, which essentially was an anti-proliferation war.

The war proved to be a necessary cause of the deaths of more people than perished at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined, and the subsequent and consequent Iraq syndrome strongly suggests there will be little incentive to apply military force to prevent, or to deal with, further putative proliferation. As noted, the continuing lack of enthusiasm to apply force to North Korea and Iran suggests the validity of this observation.

It seems overwhelmingly apparent that history is on the side of democratic, capitalist South Korea while the North is a bizarre, sometimes almost comical, relic (or caricature) of a bygone and increasingly forgotten era. There is no need to take risks or act impetuously to hurry this historical process along. All that seems likely to be required in this case, as with the devils du jour of the Cold War era, is judicious, watchful, and wary patience.

Much the same seems to hold for Iran. At the outset of the Iraq War in 2003, some neo-Conservatives suggested sending it and an other regimes in the area a two-worded note: "You're next." As noted, in the wake of the Iraq experience, that sort of thing isn't heard any more; nor are the once-common, and urgent, calls for bombing Iranian nuclear facilities. Any efforts to slow nuclear developments in Iran or elsewhere are likely to be non-military.

Terrorism

Any threat presented by international terrorism has been massively inflated in the retelling. The chief demon group, al-Qaeda, consists of perhaps 100 to 200 people who, judging from information obtained in Osama bin Laden's stronghold when he was murdered in May 2011, are primarily occupied by dodging drone missile attacks and complaining about the lack of funds.²⁰ Other terrorist groups around the world may be able to do intermittent mischief, but nothing that is sustained or focused enough to recommend the application of military force. In all, extremist Islamist terrorism claims some 200 to 400 lives yearly worldwide outside of

¹⁹ John Mueller, *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), chs. 7-8.

²⁰ Greg Miller, "Bin Laden Documents Reveal Strain, Struggle in al-Qaida," *Washington Post*, July 1, 2011.

war zones, about the same as the number of people who drown in bathtubs in the United States.²¹

It seems increasingly likely that the reaction to the terrorism attacks of September 11, 2001, was massively disproportionate to the real threat al-Qaeda has ever actually presented. An analogy might illustrate. In November 1963, a miserable, ridiculous little man with grandiose visions of his own importance, managed, heavily because of luck, to murder the President of the United States. Stunned by the event, many have maintained that such a monumental event could not be caused by such a trivial man – the proportions seemed all out of whack. In September 2001, a miserable, ridiculous, tiny group of men – a fringe group of a fringe group – with grandiose visions of its own importance managed, heavily because of luck, to pull off by far the most destructive terrorist act in history. As with Oswald, there has been a general reluctance to maintain that such a monumental event could have been pulled off by a trivial group, and there has consequently been a massive tendency to inflate the group's importance and effectiveness.²²

At the preposterous extreme, the remnants of the tiny group have even been held to present a threat that is “existential.” Rare indeed have been such observations as those from Glenn Carle, a 23-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency, where he was deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats: “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are.” Al-Qaeda “has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist organization,” and although it has threatened attacks, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.”²³

The main, and essentially only, military efforts to deal with terrorism were the ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both of these were quite disproportionate to the supposed danger presented. More to the point for present purposes, however, the military approach has been substantially discredited by the costly and extended wars that evolved from American intervention. That is, to the degree that terrorism requires a response, it is one that calls for

²¹ For an extended discussion, see John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, *Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Costs, and Benefits of Homeland Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 2.

²² For rare, perhaps unique, questionings of this tendency in the early years after 9/11, see John Mueller, “Harbinger or Aberration?” *National Interest*, Fall 2002: 45-50; and Russell Seitz, “Weaker Than We Think,” *American Conservative*, December 6, 2004. See also Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

²³ Glenn L. Carle, “Overstating Our Fears,” *Washington Post*, July 13, 2008. See also Fawaz Gerges, *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

policing and intelligence work and perhaps for occasional focused strikes conducted by small units far more than it calls for large military operations.²⁴

Policing the “global commons”

Particularly in an age of globalization and expanding world trade, many, especially in the Navy, argue that a strong military force is needed to police what is portentously labeled the “global commons.” However, there seems to be no credible consequential threat, beyond those to worldwide shipping. There have been a few attacks by pirates off Somalia, exacting costs in the hundreds of millions of dollars a year from a multi-billion dollar industry which, surely, has the capacity to defend itself from such nuisances – perhaps by the application on decks of broken glass, a severe complication for barefoot predators. In the unlikely event that the problem should become severe, it would not need forces-in-being; it could be dealt with by newly formulated forces designed for the specific purpose.

Non-issues

In addition to these considerations, conceivablists have variously and imaginatively come up with a string of other potential problems that, in my view, justify little concern or, as Brodie would put it, even “a second thought.” And, in particular, they scarcely justify massive expenditures to keep a military force-in-being.

There is, for example, great concern about an impending invasion by cybergeeks. For the most part, however, such ventures are essentially forms of crime or vandalism, and do not require military preparations.

The country’s dependence on oil imports from the Middle East has been an issue for the better part of a half-century now. The rhetoric and political posturing surrounding it will likely continue for the rest of eternity, barring a large technological breakthrough such as fusion power. However, unless the country plans to invade other countries in order to seize their oil, the need for a military force-in-being to deal with this problem is far from obvious. Any oil disruptions are likely to be handled by the market: if supply diminishes, price

²⁴ President Barack Obama, in agreement with many, urged in a speech on April 11, 2010, that “the single biggest threat to U.S. security, both short term, medium term and long term, would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon.” This concern may well be overwrought: see Mueller, *Atomic Obsession*, chs. 12-15. However, insofar as it is valid, efforts to deal with it mainly require policing and intelligence, as well as international cooperation on locking up and cataloging fissile material and on sting operations to disrupt illicit nuclear markets.

increases, and people buy less. Not much fun, but much more likely than imperial invasion, especially after Iraq.

The Palestine/Israel dispute may or may not be resolved by the end of the millennium, but the value of maintaining large American military forces seems to be irrelevant to that resolution. Americans might eventually be part of a force to help police a peace settlement, but, if so, they can be recruited if the need ever becomes evident.

Many people are greatly concerned about the potential for, and the consequences of, global warming. Yet, the need to maintain a military force to deal with this problem is scarcely evident, although the shut-down of all military vehicles on land, in the air, and on the sea might reduce warming vapors somewhat.

The country certainly faces major economic problems – as does the world – but the military is of little importance here, though large cuts in military budgets would temper the budget problem some.

There are many other issues that are frequently, if questionably, promoted as national security threats – AIDS in Africa, for example, or “complexity.” The value of military forces-in-being scarcely seems relevant to any of these.

Hedges

On the chance that there is some occasional misjudgment in the screedery arrayed above, it may be sensible to judiciously keep some military on line and viable to cover such “conceivable” contingencies that might actually come into being and require a military response. There is justifiable concern about defending friends and allies. But Europe scarcely faces threats, while Taiwan and South Korea seem largely capable of taking care of themselves, as does Israel which is mainly concerned with threats that are sub-state anyway. Accordingly, the maintenance of some small rapid-response forces and of a small number of nuclear weapons may be prudent, and the ability rebuild should be maintained. It seems to me, however, that to spend half a trillion dollars yearly to cover unlikely fantasies borders on – indeed, considerably o’ersteps – the profligacy line.

My observations are neither pacifistic nor isolationist. The argument is that large military forces are not needed in the current or likely future threat environment, not that they are inherently evil or that there are no conditions under which they should be instituted or deployed. In addition, there is no suggestion that the United States should withdraw from being a major and important world citizen. The generally desirable processes of increasing economic inter-connectivity and of globalization make that essentially impossible anyway.

There would of course be risk in very substantially reducing the military, but there is risk as well in keeping it going in its current massiveness. Any unforeseen dangers in cuts must be balanced against the sizable gains made possible by forgoing the substantial financial outlay required to service conceivable, or worst-case fantasy, contingencies. After all, had the country (like Costa Rica) had no military in 1965, it could not have gone into the Vietnam fiasco and the lives of 55,000 mostly young Americans would not have been taken from them. Had it had no military in 2003, it would never have ventured into the Iraq fiasco and several thousand Americans (and a hundred thousand Iraqis) would still be alive. This grim consideration should be brought up whenever conceivable fantasize.

Dr. Christopher Preble: “Revisiting the flawed assumptions that guide U.S. foreign policy”

As the United States grapples with an urgent fiscal crisis, persistent budget deficits, mounting debt, and a stagnant economy, a familiar cast of characters have sallied forth to decry proposed cuts in the military’s budget.

The chief worry is that such cuts will create a hollow force – too few planes, ships, and personnel, chasing too many missions – and increased risk for all Americans. This is a valid concern. If military spending eventually comes down, it will be a grave disservice to our men and women in uniform to saddle them with the same roles, or larger ones, while providing them with fewer resources.

For a time, military spending advocates hoped to fend this off by focusing their attention solely on maintaining or increasing the Pentagon’s budget. They believed that they could insulate the military from the nation’s fiscal woes, and they succeeded, for a time, extracting steadily increasing budgets for national defense even after the financial collapse of 2008.¹

As more and more people directed their attention to the nation’s looming deficits, however, these military spending advocates faced new challenges. Those who appealed to mostly right-of-center audiences were loathe to call for tax increases to pay for rising military costs, or for the wars that they championed. Instead, they believed that they could achieve the necessary deficit reduction solely by cutting domestic spending.

Belatedly, they are beginning to focus on the other side of the hollow force equation: the breadth and depth of the Pentagon’s task list. They argue against a review of the purpose of U.S. military power. They claim that attempts to reframe the nation’s global commitments, and restrain Washington’s interventionist impulses, would pose an intolerable risk to U.S. national security – and to global security. The United States, they assert, cannot afford to

¹ In inflation-adjusted dollars, total spending on national defense grew from in \$548.1 billion in 2008, to \$669.5 billion in 2011. See table 6.1 – Composition of Federal Outlays: 1940-2016, *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2012, Historical Tables*, 138.

alter its global posture, or reform its alliance relationships.² Few are willing to concede that our military power is expensive; they claim, instead, that the costs are modest by historical standards, and that the costs and risks associated with a change at this particular time are simply too great to contemplate. There are few credible alternatives to American hegemony, they explain, and all are unpalatable. According to AEI's Tom Donnelly, if the United States retreated from its role as superpower, the end result would be less security for all. "The only thing worse than Americans running the world is someone else running the world."³ The Council on Foreign Relations' Max Boot agrees. "A world in which America is not the leading military power," Boot told the House Armed Services Committee, "would be a brutal, Hobbesian place in which aggressors rule and the rule of law is trampled on."⁴

But Donnelly and Boot can be counted among a relatively small and shrinking pool of pundits and scholars who are determined to fend off cuts in the Pentagon's budget, and equally determined to retain a hegemonic foreign policy. On the other side of the debate are several former die-hard defenders of U.S. foreign policy and military spending who have begun to have second thoughts. Fearing that public concern over rampant federal spending and burdensome debt will starve the military of resources at a time when its obligations already exceed its capacity to meet them, some have called for a comprehensive review of roles and missions. In April 2011, President Obama directed the Pentagon to conduct such a review, and since that time a number of outside analysts have endorsed the notion that the U.S. military might have to make some "hard choices" in the near future.⁵ Meanwhile, some taxpayer advocates have pressed for cuts in the Pentagon's budget as part of a plan to reduce federal debt and deficits. These groups expect the military and policymakers to realign their

² See, for example, Bill Kristol, Arthur Brooks, and Ed Feulner, "Peace Doesn't Keep Itself," *Wall Street Journal*, October 4, 2011; and Robert Kagan, "The Price of Power," *Weekly Standard* 16, no. 18, January 24, 2011.

³ Quoted in Tara McKelvey, "Pentagon's Worst Nightmare," *The Daily Beast*, August 3, 2011, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/08/03/pentagon-braces-for-steep-defense-budget-cuts-after-debt-deal.html>.

⁴ Max Boot, "Indefensible Budget Cuts," testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, *The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten Years after 9/11*, <http://www.cfr.org/defense-policy-and-budget/indefensible-budget-cuts/p25843>.

⁵ John T. Bennett, "Obama Orders 'Fundamental Review' of Defense Missions; Calls for \$400B in Cuts," *The Hill*, April 13, 2011, <http://thehill.com/news-by-subject/defense-homeland-security/155855-obama-orders-fundamental-review-of-defense-missions-400b-in>. See also, LTG David W. Barno, USA (Ret.), Nora Bensahel, and Travis Sharp, "Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity," Center for a New American Security, October 2011; and Daniel Goure, "A Review of Roles and Missions Could Reveal Opportunities to Reduce Defense Spending," Lexington Institute Early Warning Blog, September 8, 2011, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/a-review-of-roles-and-missions-could-reveal-opportunities-to-reduce-defense-spending?a=1&c=1171>.

strategic goals and plans rather than to count on new revenues to make up the difference.⁶ Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute put the matter succinctly: “At some point, we Americans need to face up to the reality of our economic circumstances,” Thompson wrote at the *National Journal’s* National Security Experts Blog. “We can’t afford to keep policing a world in which many of our trading partners are growing faster and our military methods are contributing to national bankruptcy.”⁷

Austerity ahead: Will retrenchment follow?

Resistance to any type of strategic retrenchment on the part of the United States remains strong, however. Fearing “the dangers of American retreat,” *Financial Times* columnist Philip Stephens predicted that the economic burdens and general fatigue afflicting the United States would prompt new skepticism toward the activism that has characterized U.S. foreign policy for decades. Stephens anticipates that America “is about to take a big step back” but he worries about what that portends for the future. “The uncomfortable irony is that friends and allies will probably find Washington’s absence just as troubling as they once saw its overweening presence...Strangely enough, some of Washington’s rivals may also find a weaker U.S. less congenial than the hegemon of a few years ago.”⁸

Such statements essentially echo Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan’s claim from 1996 that “most of the world’s major powers welcome U.S. global involvement and prefer America’s benevolent hegemony to the alternatives.” Indeed, they continued, “the principal concern of America’s allies these days is not that it will be too dominant but that it will withdraw.”⁹

That latter point has never been tested. For the most part, American taxpayers, and especially American troops, have borne the burdens of “benevolent hegemony,” while U.S. allies – with a few exceptions – have been content to focus their attention on other pursuits.

⁶ See, for example, “Conservative Leaders Call on Congress to Consider Defense Spending Cuts,” November 30, 2010, <http://www.atr.org/conservative-leaders-call-congress-consider-defense-a5674>; and *Toward Common Ground: Bridging the Political Divide with Deficit Reduction Recommendations for the Super Committee*, a joint report by U.S. PIRG and the National Taxpayers Union, September 2011, http://www.ntu.org/news-and-issues/budget-spending/uspig_toward_common_ground.pdf.

⁷ Loren Thompson, “Illtimed and Wrong-headed,” *National Journal* National Security Experts Blog, August 3, 2010, <http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/08/us-military-power-preeminence.php#1610944>.

⁸ Philip Stephens, “The Dangers of American Retreat,” *Financial Times*, September 8, 2011.

⁹ William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4, July-August 1996: 21-23, 26.

These burdens might seem modest to some, but they are not, especially when compared with that spent by most other developed countries today. For example, the average American – every man, woman and child – spends two and a half times as much as the British or the French on national security, five times as much as the Germans, and seven and a half times as much as the average Japanese.

In the context of the current debate over spending, debt, and deficits, therefore, it should not surprise anyone that many Americans are now asking why they should accept cuts in domestic spending, and be saddled with more military spending, and perhaps higher taxes, so that U.S. allies can continue to spend more on their domestic priorities and cut defense spending.

Still, it is, at best, premature to declare that the fiscal situation requires a change in U.S. foreign policy. The United States *could* afford the current approach. Austerity is a good auditor, but the fiscal situation does not require cuts in military spending, per se. The question is what Americans are willing to give up in order to continue to be the world's policeman. Early indications suggested that they were unwilling to give up anything; more recent polls show modest support for tax increases, but more support for spending cuts – just not necessarily to the programs that an individual likes.¹⁰ Either way, the military will be competing for funding with other domestic priorities in the coming years, and the funding pool is unlikely to grow.

But a review of the rationales for the U.S. global posture is warranted independent of the public mood. Indeed, such a review was warranted long before the onset of the nation's current fiscal distress. For nearly two decades, the United States has maintained a dominant military posture, one that is consistent with America's self-appointed role as the undisputed power in every region of the globe. Many in Washington believe that the United States must act as the lynchpin of the international order, and that its global economic interests require the forward deployment of the U.S. military to the four corners of the globe. Some believe that the United States has an obligation to spread the blessings of liberty to people denied basic human rights.

President Obama, in his cover letter to his national security strategy, declared that “we will maintain the military superiority that has secured our country, and underpinned global security, for decades.” In case that wasn't clear enough, the first page of the *National Security*

¹⁰ See, for example, Mark Murray, “NBC/WSJ Poll: Voters Deficit-Worried but Wary of Cuts,” MSNBC, March 2, 2011, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41876558/ns/politics/t/nbcwsj-poll-voters-deficit-worried-wary-cuts/>; and Jeffrey M. Jones, “On Deficit, Americans Prefer Spending Cuts; Open to Tax Hikes,” Gallup, July 13, 2011, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/148472/deficit-americans-prefer-spending-cuts-open-tax-hikes.aspx>.

Strategy affirms, “Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security.”¹¹

Most in the U.S. foreign policy community believe this to be true, and they can countenance no alternative for the future. But a strategic shift is in the offing. In an era of fiscal austerity, U.S. foreign policy is likely to become more modest.

Some lament that such a shift might be necessary; others will stubbornly insist that it is not. Many are convinced that a world in which the United States scales back on its efforts to provide the supposed global public good of security will be a far less happy one. The Washington consensus explains that the United States has chosen to do for people in other countries what their governments could do for them because Americans can more efficiently provide these services, and because the diminution or withdrawal of U.S. military power in certain key regions would precipitate renewed security competition that could eventually lead to full-scale conflict. Because such conflict would serve neither the interests of the people in those regions nor those of Americans living very far away, it is still better that the United States continue to perform these services, even if the costs are mounting.

The defenders and critics of the status quo come to very different conclusions about what grand strategy makes sense for the United States because they have very different theories about how the world works. They disagree about the sources of international order and disorder, great power competition, and war. They hold different ideas about what guides the behavior of nation-states and governments, what conditions foster peace, and what factors are most instrumental to facilitating international commerce.

Ultimately, then, a discussion of current U.S. foreign policy, and of the appropriate policy of the future, is waged in the realm of competing counterfactuals. If the U.S. military is smaller and less active, the hegemonists believe that the world will – or is very likely to – descend into “chaos.” This was one of Charles Krauthammer’s central claims in his seminal article, “The Unipolar Moment,” and it has been repeated countless times since.¹² The skeptics of U.S. unipolarity disagree.¹³

¹¹ President Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

¹² Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1990/1991): 23-33. In addition, see the writings of Michael Mandelbaum, Bill Kristol, Robert Kagan, Fred Kagan, Max Boot, Gary Schmitt, Tom Donnelly, Mackenzie Eaglen, and other contributors to *Defending Defense*, <http://www.defensestudies.org/defendingdefense/>.

¹³ See, for example, Christopher Preble, *The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Harvey M.

But are these predictions about “a world without America”¹⁴ – an outrageous idea in its own right – accurate? They are built on two related arguments. The first is that the international economic order might come crashing down without the omnipresent U.S. military threatening random pirates or fraudulent operators. The second is that other countries are incapable of defending themselves or their interests, and are therefore unable to deal with local or regional threats before they become global ones. This paper will explore these two claims, and, in the process, scrutinize U.S. policies aimed at addressing them.

The high cost of our current strategy is one of the reasons why such a review makes sense. But it isn’t the only one or even the most important one. This paper argues that, indeed, a strategic shift would be appropriate even in an era of budget surpluses, and is especially appropriate as large-scale operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are brought to a close over the next few years. Going forward, the United States should shape its military to match a more modest strategy. If Washington makes significant reductions in the overall military budget, especially by reducing the size of the conventional ground forces, it cannot so easily absolve itself of the need to prioritize when, and whether, to deploy those troops abroad. The governing presumption, therefore, should be that it will not. Americans should be particularly anxious to avoid costly and counterproductive nation-building missions in weak and failing states. More generally, by carefully defining U.S. vital security interests, Washington can reduce the occasions in which the U.S. military is expected to play a vital or even central role, while making it necessary for other countries to step forward and assume responsibility for their own security.

A question of costs, and of who pays

The advocates of the current U.S. foreign policy contend that its costs are relatively modest – especially when compared to military expenditures during the Cold War or World War II, for example – and believe that the alternative world that would emerge under a more restrained grand strategy is considerably more frightening than the one we know today. But this anticipated post-American world would have to be considerably more frightening, both dire and likely, to justify the additional \$250 to \$400 billion in U.S. military spending annually

Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, Eugene Gholz, and Daryl G. Press, “Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty,” *World Affairs*, Fall 2009: 84-94; Barry R. Posen, “The Case for Restraint,” *American Interest* 3, no. 2 (November-December 2007): 6-17; Gordon Adams and Matthew Leatherman, “A Leaner and Meaner Defense: How to Cut the Pentagon’s Budget While Improving Its Performance,” *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 1 (January/February 2011): 139-152; and Richard Betts, “A Disciplined Defense,” *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 6 (November/December 2007): 67-80.

¹⁴ Peter Brookes, “A World without America,” *Real Clear Politics*, July 4, 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/07/a_world_without_america.html.

that cannot be directly attributed to U.S. national security – in other words, that share of the DoD budget that is dedicated chiefly to global governance missions and not to the physical security of the United States and protection of U.S. vital interests.

If the world were as frightening as the hegemonists imagine, it might be logical to conclude that such expenditures are wise. But the United States is enormously secure, by any objective measure – in spite of its many overseas military adventures, not because of them. Americans enjoy a measure of safety from traditional military threats that their ancestors would have envied, and that their allies and adversaries do envy. The costs of its hegemonic grand strategy are, in fact, quite large relative to this threat environment, and yet Washington's strategic goals still outstrip the resources that the public is willing to apply to achieve them.¹⁵

And what of other countries? The U.S. government's approach to the use of force, and its commitment to a grandiose vision of America's purpose in the world, has created an entire class of dependents and client states who shirk their most fundamental obligations – namely, to provide for the defense of their own people. A competing vision for U.S. grand strategy would expect and increasingly demand that other states take primary responsibility for their own security, and for securing their vital strategic interests, chiefly in their respective regions.

The defenders of the status quo either don't want other countries to do so or don't believe that they will. The solution in either case is U.S. global hegemony, or, in Michael Mandelbaum's formulation, global governance. "The United States furnishes services to other countries," explains Mandelbaum in *The Case for Goliath*, "the same services, as it happens, that governments provide within sovereign states to the people they govern."¹⁶

The United States lacks any formal authority to provide these so-called public goods. There has been no global plebiscite conferring such powers upon Washington. Nor does the U.S. Constitution stipulate that the U.S. government must perform this role – it speaks only of the common defense of "We the People of the United States." Nor have Americans been asked if they want it to do so. Indeed, polls show that a majority of Americans aren't interested in playing this role.¹⁷ This shouldn't come as much of a surprise. As Mandelbaum admits, "To

¹⁵ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010); Stuart J. Kaufman, "Too Cheap To Rule: Political and Fiscal Sources of the Coming American Retrenchment," *The Telegram* 7 (October 2011); the FPRI-Temple University Consortium on Grand Strategy, <http://www.fpri.org/telegram/201110.kaufman.fiscalrestraints.pdf>.

¹⁶ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the 21st Century* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), pp. xvi, 7.

¹⁷ For example, a Rasmussen poll of likely voters taken in early 2011 asked, "Should the U.S. military strategy be to focus narrowly on defending the United States and U.S. interests, or should the U.S. military strategy seek to maintain worldwide stability and peace?" Of the respondents, 55 percent

make sacrifices largely for the benefit of others counts as charity, and for Americans, as for other people, charity begins at home.”¹⁸

The United States maintains a vast military not so much because Americans are threatened, per se, as out of the fear that others might be threatened, be denied access to global markets, or be cut off from the benefits of democracy and liberal governance. The U.S. military serves as a global constabulary, deterring would-be miscreants, and punishing those who don’t abide by the rules. Such threats to the global order are rare, and almost always localized, but the U.S. military presence supposedly helps to ensure that they don’t spiral into regional or global threats.

But to the extent that the threats are quite modest, and the international system relatively benign, the global U.S. presence is not an insurance policy so much as a form of foreign aid. U.S. taxpayers derive some benefits from being the world’s policeman, but most of the benefits are enjoyed by those not living in the United States. And just as direct financial assistance creates perverse incentives that often impede economic development and create dependency, so does Washington’s promise to defend other countries that can and should defend themselves.

Indeed America’s wealthy, well-governed allies, have diverted their attention – and their resources – to other, nice-to-have, things: short work weeks, long vacations, shiny mass transit systems, and generous health and welfare benefits.

Many of the advocates of current U.S. foreign policy deem this a feature, not a bug, of the current international order. Most Americans aren’t so sure, however. A growing number believe that this approach to global security, which has the U.S. government doing for all citizens what it is formally obligated only to do for its own, unfairly saddles U.S. taxpayers, and U.S. troops, with burdens that should be borne by others.

Explaining the under-provision of global security goods

Less apparent to the general public are the serious strategic defects of the present course. Because U.S. security guarantees to wealthy allies have caused them to under-provide for their own defense, they also have less capacity to help the United States in its time of need

agreed with the former, and just 34 percent wished to be the world’s policeman. See Christopher Preble, “New Rasmussen Poll Finds Modest Support for Restraint,” *Cato@Liberty*, February 4, 2011. Other polls have shown even less support for the U.S. military’s hegemonic posture. See “U.S. Role in the World,” *WorldPublicOpinion.org*, http://www.americans-world.org/digest/overview/us_role/hegemonic_role.cfm#top.

¹⁸ Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath*, 223.

either now, in Afghanistan, for example, or in the future, in a contest with, say, China or a resurgent Russia.

Those who want the U.S. government to be the provider of global public goods contend that Americans are more inclined to assume global responsibilities, a function of American exceptionalism combined with a pervasive culture of weakness among our allies. Although the defenders of the status quo concede that it would be nice if our allies would do more, they counter that it would be irresponsible to base our strategy on the assumption that they will. On the contrary, they simply assume that most other countries will not do so in the future, because most have not in the past. Focusing chiefly on Europe in his book, *Of Paradise and Power*, Robert Kagan doubts that others “can change course and assume a larger role on the world stage.” He states that “the political will to demand more power for Europe appears to be lacking, for the very good reason that Europe does not see a mission for itself that requires power.”¹⁹

Kagan at least appreciates the extent to which U.S. strategy has discouraged Europeans from doing so. “If Americans are unhappy about this state of affairs, they should recall that today’s Europe...is very much the product of American foreign policy.”²⁰

Many countries do not see a need for power of their own. The United States’ possession of great power, and its decision to expand this power as others grow weaker, has contributed to a steady expansion of concepts of security, and ever-rising costs, within the United States, and uncertainty elsewhere in the system, especially as the gap between U.S. strategic ends and available means grows wider.

This was predictable, and predicted. When Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser first considered the public goods theory within an international context, they observed that such goods were quite rare, and would not operate in the same way as in domestic settings.²¹ The problem with so-called global public goods is that they are neither global goods nor public goods.

¹⁹ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003), 68.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 70.

²¹ Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 48, no. 3 (August 1966): 266-79; and idem, “Collective Goods, Comparative Advantage and Alliance Efficiency,” in *Issues in Defense Economics*, ed. Ronald McKean (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1967), 25-48.

By definition, public goods have two characteristics. First, once provided, their benefits cannot be denied to those for whom the original provision was not intended. Economists refer to this as “nonexcludability.” The other crucial feature of public goods, nonrivalrous consumption, holds that the value of the good is not diminished as additional consumers partake of it.

Consider how this works, in practice, in the context of a collective security alliance. To the extent that the allocation of assets to defend one ally necessarily diminishes the amount that can be used by another ally, the good is therefore rivalrous. Further, decisions about how the assets are distributed are likely to be affected by a host of considerations that, on the whole, would make that benefit excludable, and therefore not a pure public good. Even when an alliance operates properly, and advances its core objective, it is a collective good for alliance members, but a club good, generally, because its benefits are presumed to be excludable.

Much of U.S. foreign policy that is organized around the notion that the provision of security for the planet is, in fact, a public good, elides these concerns. If challenged, the defenders of the current system implicitly concede that U.S. policies might not meet the textbook definition of a public good, but they counter that the practical effect of these policies is that of “gifts because these countries neither request nor pay for them.” Americans spend hundreds of billions of dollars every year providing security so that others do not have to. It isn’t pure altruism. “The United States intends what it does in the world to further its own interests, above all the overriding interest in remaining secure,” Michael Mandelbaum explains, “But other countries do derive benefits from those policies.”²²

Moving beyond a discrete scholarly understanding of public goods, the advocates of U.S. global hegemony often argue that because the United States is the leading beneficiary of the international economic system, Americans have both a special obligation and a unique interest in maintaining that order.²³ Americans have performed this service, the policy’s defenders claim, because the costs of doing so are small, and are largely incidental to actions that we take mostly for our own benefit. Our situation is analogous to that of an “owner of a large, expensive, lavishly-furnished mansion surrounded by more modest homes,”

²² Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath*, 218.

²³ This is a variation on traditional hegemonic stability theory, which holds that a stable international economic order must be policed by a single hegemonic power. See, especially, Charles P. Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (June 1981): 242-54; Robert Gilpin, “Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective,” *Economic Issues and National Security*, ed. Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 19-66; and Stephen Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” *World Politics* 28 (April 1976): 317-47.

Mandelbaum explains in *The Case for Goliath*. If that owner chooses to pay for security guards to patrol the street, “their presence will serve to protect the neighboring houses as well, even though their owners contribute nothing to the cost of the guards.”²⁴

But the merits of the current situation in which the average American “pays and the rest of the world . . . benefits without having to pay”²⁵ are more apparent than real. Take the case of the wealthy landowner whose purchase of security services for his home ostensibly benefits his neighbors. After all, no one in the neighborhood benefits if the occupants of smaller houses discontinue their home-monitoring services, leave their homes and cars unlocked, and advertise the fact that their property is unlocked and unguarded. Likewise, this country’s creation of a global public good as a side-effect of its providing for its own security is less advantageous for the United States than the advocates of benevolent global hegemony posit. This tendency of the weak to free ride on the strong, and to grow still weaker in the process, is a recurrent condition predicted by the economic theory of alliances.²⁶ But basic common sense teaches this as well: individuals are generally not inclined to pay for things that others are willing to buy for them.

Those who celebrate the United States’ role as the world’s policeman do not dispute the free-rider problem, per se, but most are convinced that other countries simply won’t defend themselves or their interests. Instead, other countries, it is claimed, will be content to let security challenges grow and fester on their borders, or within them, and that the United States – and the U.S. alone – simply must perform the role of global sheriff. According to Robert Kagan, Americans should “be more worried about a conflagration on the Asian subcontinent or in the Middle East or in Russia than the Europeans, who live so much closer,” because the harm from other countries’ failure to act will inevitably threaten U.S. security. “Americans know that when international crises erupt, whether in the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir, they are likely to be the first to become involved.”²⁷

²⁴ Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath*, 8-9. Richard N. Cooper uses the same analogy in a comment on the Olson-Zeckhauser thesis. See Richard N. Cooper, Comment on “Collective Goods, Comparative Advantage and Alliance Efficiency,” in McKean, *Issues in Defense Economics*, 55.

²⁵ Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath*, 10.

²⁶ In addition to Olson and Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” see especially John R. Oneal, “Testing the Theory of Collective Action: NATO Defense Burdens, 1950-1984,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 3 (September 1990): 426-48; and idem, “The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO,” *International Organization* 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 379-402. For a useful overview of the literature, see Todd Sandler, “The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no. 3 (September 1993): 446-483.

²⁷ Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 35.

Other advocates of U.S. hegemony attach a higher value to discouraging other countries from sharing in the burdens than to encouraging them to do so. They assume that others might be more likely to try to defend themselves if the United States were to adopt a less costly military posture and focus its efforts toward its own defense. Although most Americans would welcome such a move, the hegemonists fear it. For example, Mandelbaum predicts that if the U.S. military presence in Europe and East Asia were withdrawn, “the countries in both regions would feel less confident that no threat to their security would appear. They would, in all likelihood, take steps to compensate for the absence of these forces.” And one of the steps that these countries might take, Mandelbaum darkly warns, is the fateful decision to acquire nuclear weapons.²⁸

But it is curious that advocates of U.S. hegemony celebrate the extent to which a large U.S. nuclear arsenal, and Washington’s professed willingness to use this arsenal to defend others, advances a collective interest – namely, the slowing of the spread of nuclear weapons.²⁹ It is especially puzzling given that, as a practical matter, U.S. counter-proliferation policies have stimulated proliferation among potential adversaries, and stifled it among allies.

The U.S. military as defender of trade and promoter of democracy: Essential, irrelevant, or counterproductive?

Of all the public goods rationales offered in defense of U.S. global dominance, none is more important than the presumption that the U.S. military must ensure access to the world’s resources – especially that most important resource, oil, from that most volatile region, the Persian Gulf – and the more general assertion that the U.S. military serves as the de facto guarantor of global trade. This claim flows from the belief that the relatively open international trading system requires a single dominant power to set the rules and punish rule breakers. According to the historian Niall Ferguson, the British Empire played the leading role in the spread of free markets and democracy in the 19th century, and the United States performs a similar function today.³⁰ Others agree. In Charles Krauthammer’s

²⁸ Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath*, 40.

²⁹ Robert Art notes the “deep fear that, if the United States were to withdraw its nuclear umbrella, regional powers would, one after another, seek nuclear weapons.” Robert Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 164. Robert Kagan is more ambivalent, noting that a multipolar world with several regional powers in possession of nuclear weapons “could make wars between them less likely, or it could make them more catastrophic.” Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Knopf, 2008), 94.

³⁰ Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 186.

words, “If the United States were to shed its unique superpower role, its economy would be gravely wounded.” He continues:

Insecure sea lanes, impoverished training partners, exorbitant oil prices, explosive regional instability are only the more obvious risks of an American abdication...The cost of ensuring an open and safe world for American commerce...is hardly exorbitant.³¹

But there is scant evidence for the claim that international commerce requires a single hegemon, or that the American military must perform this role.³² The threats to global trade today are quite limited. The percentage of shipments protected by military means, let alone U.S. naval vessels, is tiny. And even when political instability does disrupt trade, it has only a minimal economic impact in the United States.³³ By linking markets, globalization provides supply alternatives for the goods we consume, including oil. If political upheaval disrupts supply in one location, suppliers elsewhere will take the orders. Prices may increase, but markets adjust. That makes American consumers less dependent on any particular supply source, undermining the claim that the U.S. government needs to use force to prevent unrest in supplier nations or secure trade routes.³⁴

Ensuring that oil flows on the global marketplace, for example, is in the interest primarily of oil producers. Many have little else of value to sell, and some, especially the Gulf Arab states, often rely on generous public spending fueled by oil revenues to tamp down domestic

³¹ Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” 27.

³² This is not to say that it is impossible that a rival state might try to disrupt U.S. trade during a conflict. That possibility, however, does not require policing all shipping now, as opposed to protecting threatened shipments at the time.

³³ Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, “The Effects of Wars on Neutral Countries: Why It Doesn’t Pay to Preserve the Peace,” *Security Studies* 10, no. 4 (Summer 2001): 1-57. Oil price shocks may be an exception. For that view, see James D. Hamilton, “Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08,” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (Spring 2009): 215-284. Other economists, however, argue that the U.S. economy is far less vulnerable to sudden increases in oil prices than it used to be. See, for example, Olivier J. Blanchard and Jordi Gali, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Price Shocks: Why Are the 2000s so Different from the 1970s?” MIT Department of Economics Working Paper no. 07-21, August 2007; and Paul Edelstein and Lutz Killian, “Retail Energy Prices and Consumer Expenditures,” Center for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. DP6255, April 2007. Even if the U.S. economy is vulnerable to political instability that causes oil price spikes, it does not follow that military deployments, as opposed to reserve stocks, are an efficacious way to mitigate the problem. For this view, see Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, “Energy Alarmism: The Myths that Make Americans Worry about Oil,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 589, April 2007.

³⁴ Sapolsky et al., “Restraining Order,” 88-89.

dissent. It is they, the suppliers, not consumers, who are dependent upon oil reaching the global market.

Because Americans and other net consumers can shift to alternative suppliers in the short term, or adapt their consumption patterns over the medium and long terms, the costs and risks of maintaining order in oil-producing regions should primarily be borne by the people who would be most harmed by a major disruption: the oil producers. Precisely the same logic could be applied to any product or resource. It makes no sense for Americans to bear a disproportionate share of the costs and risks of policing the planet when we are merely one of many beneficiaries of the interconnected global economy.

Are there still other reasons why the U.S. government might adopt a more expansive definition of “the common defense” than that of safeguarding U.S. security? Notwithstanding the U.S. government’s costly and counterproductive attempts to deliver democracy to Iraqis and Afghans within the past decade, some people still argue that the cause of individual liberty and human rights needs a champion, and that the United States is, and should be, that champion. People living under a tyrant’s heel deserve to be liberated. The power of the U.S. military might convince petty despots to step down, or, failing that, the sharp end of American military power might deliver them to a prison, or the gallows.

If Americans can be convinced that the success of democracy in distant lands is essential to their own safety and security, and to that of their family and friends, they will from time to time go along with Washington’s adventurousness, and pay for Washington’s wars of liberation. But eventually the public realizes that such missions are often irrelevant to U.S. security, or, worse, have actually undermined it (though that certainly wasn’t the intention).

Democracy is best promoted by example, not by force. The United States should build a society worth emulating, and demonstrate that a responsive government that respects the rights of its citizens is also best able to provide for their needs. The calls for the U.S. government to serve as the armed vindicator for democracy ignore the vital role played by private citizens and non-governmental organizations in advancing that same goal by peaceful means. Today, hundreds of NGOs, representing hundreds of thousands of supporters, promote political reform, human rights and core principles of good governance, individual liberty, and free markets. These champions for human rights do not perform their work at the behest of the U.S. government. They do not operate under the covering fire of American armaments. And they have succeeded spectacularly well. One of the best things that government policy can do to facilitate their good works is to stay out of the way.

Curing our geostrategic hypochondria

To review: the advocates of our present course either doubt that other countries will protect themselves from harm, necessitating costly U.S. interventions in the future, or they believe that other countries will defend themselves, requiring the United States to prevent security competition from spiraling into a full-scale war. Neither scenario is certain, but the costs of preventing either head-in-the-sand timidity or aggressive security competition are borne almost exclusively by Americans. The belief that the international economic order might come crashing down without the omnipresent U.S. military patrolling the land, sea, air, and space creates demand for a global presence. A different grand strategy would build on the more plausible assumption that the international economic order is far too complex, and the scale of transactions far too great, to be policed by a single superpower, no matter how large and intrusive that superpower's military might be. Democracy and human rights are worthwhile goals, but U.S. foreign military interventions have an uneven track record of delivering either, and several recent attempts have been expensive and counterproductive blunders. A more circumscribed view of U.S. power, building around very different assumptions about U.S. interests and the way the world works, would require U.S. policymakers to separate and prioritize urgent concerns from less urgent or irrelevant ones, and focus on devolving many current military obligations to other countries. And it could save U.S. taxpayers a lot of money.³⁵

But the fear factor is at work. The conceptions of national interest foisted on the American people, and the rationales and justifications put forward for military action to safeguard our supposedly tenuous security, are based on the proposition that the world is sitting atop a combustible log pile, that every incipient conflict can become the spark that engulfs the planet, and that the United States is the only country with a bucket of water to extinguish the spark before it ignites a flame.³⁶ Believing that every simmering ethnic and sectarian conflict is likely to bloom into full-scale war, Washington contemplates sending the U.S. military into the middle of these squabbles. Believing that demographic trends will precipitate a pell-mell scramble for scarce resources, and that these scrambles are likely to turn violent, U.S.

³⁵ For an assessment of the savings that could be derived from such a strategy, see Christopher Preble and Benjamin H. Friedman, "Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 667, September 21, 2011.

³⁶ This logic is consistent with one of Jack Snyder's central "myths of empire": The best defense is a good offense. This conceit includes overconfidence in offensive action, and a strong preference for preventing falling dominoes by stopping the first one from toppling over. See Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 4, 22-24.

policymakers offer to preserve a peaceful global economic order. Seeing every tin-pot tyrant with a megaphone as the next Adolf Hitler, someone in Washington makes plans to whack them before they realize their wicked ambitions. According to Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order.”³⁷

That wasn’t true when they wrote it in 1996, and it isn’t true today. The erroneous belief that the United States is the only country on the planet with the wisdom, foresight, and capacity to propel the planet toward the future, and the related notion that we alone are capable of preventing the world from descending into total, bloody chaos, have saddled the American people with an unnecessarily costly and risky foreign policy, and have imposed a nearly endless list of missions on a U.S. military that is straining under the burdens of near-constant conflict.

Most of the things that the fear mongers tell us to fret about are, in fact, overblown. Unrest in distant lands does not lead inevitably to regional disorder. Regional crises do not portend global instability. And instability, writ large, is not by itself particularly threatening. Failed states and civil wars, for example, rarely represent security threats to the United States. Such conditions, however, often represent security threats to other states, usually nearby states, that should be expected to deal with most such crises long before they engulf a particular region, let alone consume the planet. In fact, there is little reason to believe that the world will descend down the path to chaos, pestilence, and war, if the United States adopts a restrained foreign policy focused on preserving its national security and advancing its vital interests. That is because there are other governments in other countries, pursuing similar policies aimed at preserving their security, and regional – much less global – chaos is hardly in their interests.

To read much of what passes for serious discussion in foreign policy circles today, one might conclude that the United States isn’t simply the world’s indispensable nation, but rather the world’s only nation, or at least the only nation with the sense and the foresight to even have a foreign policy in the first place. For a time, when the resources at our disposal seemed limitless, many Americans were likewise captivated by dreams of fashioning a new global order. Today, we have become less confident in our ability to do all that – but we are still driven by false fears. We believe that we can be secure only if others are secure, that insecurity anywhere poses a threat to Americans everywhere. If someone on the other side of the planet sneezes, the United States is supposedly in danger of catching pneumonia. The putative cure is preventive war. Such geostrategic “hypochondria” has gotten us into much

³⁷ Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 23.

trouble over the years.³⁸ We would be wise to take measure of our relative health and vitality, and not confuse a head cold with cancer.

Burden sharing in deed, not just in word

In the end, none of the stated public goods rationales for having the U.S. military act as a global police force withstand scrutiny without resorting to dystopian counterfactuals. Unrest and chaos in distant lands is not particularly threatening. The U.S. need not maintain a dominant military posture in all regions of the globe in order to prevent bad things from happening. Trade flows largely in spite of, not because of, the U.S. military. So, too, do democracy and human rights; though the path is uneven, and there are setbacks, to be sure, the trajectory is clearly moving in a positive direction. Rather than maintaining a global military presence and discouraging other countries from defending themselves and their interests, U.S. policymakers should strive for a more equitable distribution of the costs and risks among the many beneficiaries of global security and order. We should begin by moving away from a conception of foreign policy as foreign aid, away from the belief that the U.S. military presence is a gift to the world, and embrace instead an interests-based approach to security.

This would be a gradual process, one that should begin with an attempt to transform our various overseas commitments into more equitable alliances, with a goal of stimulating greater self-reliance worldwide. Though it is true that few countries currently have military forces capable of influencing events far outside their spheres of influence, all countries have forces for self-defense. In the absence of the threat posed by a would-be global hegemon such as the Soviet Union, other countries should be expected to act as first responders against all manner of threats in their respective regions.

Going forward, it simply isn't realistic to expect Americans to continue to bear the burdens of global governance indefinitely, a point that Mandelbaum grudgingly admitted in the closing pages of *The Case for Goliath*. For Americans, he explained, our own national interests "have priority." This "does not bespeak unusual financial stinginess or moral callousness: Americans approach the world much as other people do.... For the American public, foreign policy, like charity, begins at home." For that reason, above all others, Mandelbaum predicted that "the American role in the world may depend in part on Americans not scrutinizing it too closely."³⁹

³⁸ I expropriated this term from my colleague Ted Galen Carpenter. See his *Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2008), 6.

³⁹ Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath*, 172-3, 224.

But while it might have been unrealistic to expect the American people to remain completely ignorant of the true purpose of U.S. foreign policy, or to embrace a foreign policy that required them to remain so, it was also a mistake to believe that other countries would accede to America's role as the undisputed provider of public goods.⁴⁰ They haven't yet volunteered to fill the void left behind by the United States, in part because they don't believe that we're leaving. Despite the fact that the Obama administration has shown some faint interest in sharing the burdens of policing the world with others, its reluctance to significantly reduce U.S. military spending signals an expectation that the foreign policy status quo will hold.

The administration's rhetoric merely buttresses this sense. Recall a line from the *National Security Strategy*: "There should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security." Taking their cue, U.S. allies have proved understandably disinterested in spending more on their militaries, and many have planned additional cuts.

U.S. leaders – from Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, to Bob Gates, and now Leon Panetta – can talk about burden sharing until they're blue in the face. In order to make burden sharing a reality, the United States must adopt a new grand strategy of restraint. We should be more reticent to intervene militarily when our own vital interests are not at stake. And we should shape our military to reflect the fact that we expect to be less involved militarily over the next two decades than we have been in the last two.

Conclusion

The belief that the United States must provide global public goods has unfairly burdened Americans with unnecessary costs, and should have been abandoned long ago. The fiscal crisis, though a long time building, is exerting serious downward pressure on U.S. military spending, and this, in turn, is prompting discussion of competing grand strategies.

Such a discussion must consider ends, ways, and means. Policymakers must identify a few essential, achievable goals. For too long, the U.S. policymakers have confused what they want from the military, which is global primacy or hegemony, with what the country needs, which is safety. Given that our geography, wealth, and nuclear weapons provide us with an enviable degree of safety, a better strategy would husband our resources, focus the military on a few core missions, and call on other countries to take responsibility for their own defense. Global military primacy is a game not worth the candle.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 111.

⁴¹ Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 52-67.

For years, some international relations scholars have stressed that the world would resist the emergence of a single global superpower.⁴² The fact that we've managed to sustain our "unipolar moment" for nearly 20 years does not mean that an alternate path might not have delivered a comparable level of security at far less cost and risk. Even many who celebrate our hegemony admit that their approach is costly. They also admit that it cannot last forever. It was they, not their intellectual opponents, after all, who called it a "unipolar *moment*."⁴³

The wisest course, therefore, is to adopt policies that will allow us to extricate ourselves from regional squabbles, while maintaining the ability to prevent a genuine threat to the United States from forming. This paper has tried to set forth just some of the many reasons for doing this. The strongest reason of all might be that our current strategy doesn't align with the wishes of the American people. As the costs of our foreign adventures mount, and as the benefits remain elusive, Americans may push with increasing assertiveness for the United States to climb down from its perch as the world's sheriff.

For now, no clear consensus on an alternative foreign policy has emerged. Polls show that Americans are opposed to using the U.S. military to promote democracy abroad.⁴⁴ Similar majorities believe that the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have not been worth the benefits.⁴⁵ There is now precious little enthusiasm for launching new military missions – the Libya war being a case in point – and considerable skepticism that the United States must solve all the world's problems, or even that these problems require solving.⁴⁶

If the trends are moving away from a strategy of primacy, away from the United States as indispensable nation, and away from Uncle Sam as global sheriff, where might a new consensus on foreign policy end up? It is possible that it will coalesce around a strategy that is less dependent on the exercise of U.S. military power and more on other aspects of U.S.

⁴² See, for example, Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5-51.

⁴³ Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," 24 (emphasis added).

⁴⁴ Respondents in a Pew Research Center poll ranked "promote democracy abroad" as the lowest priority for U.S. foreign policy among 10 goals listed, with just 13 percent saying it should be the top priority. "Views of Middle East Unchanged by Recent Events," Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, June 10, 2011, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2020/poll-american-attitudes-foreign-policy-middle-east-israel-palestine-obama> (accessed October 5, 2011).

⁴⁵ Scott Wilson and Jon Cohen, "Poll: Nearly Two-Thirds of Americans Say Afghan War Isn't Worth Fighting," *Washington Post*, March 15, 2011.

⁴⁶ Forty-six percent of respondents in a Pew Research poll taken in May 2011 agreed that the United States should "mind its own business internationally," a slight decline from a poll taken in 2009, but still high by historic standards. In December 2002, by comparison, just 30 percent of respondents expressed this sentiment. See "Views of Middle East Unchanged by Recent Events."

influence – including our vibrant culture, and our extensive economic engagement with the world. Another very different consensus could also coalesce, however, and move the country – and possibly the world – in a sad and ugly direction.

Surveying the high costs and dubious benefits of our frequent interventions over the past two decades, many Americans are now asking themselves, “What’s the point?” Why provide these so-called global public goods if we will be resented and reviled – and occasionally targeted – for having made the effort? When Americans tell pollsters that we should “mind our own business,” they are rejecting the global public goods argument in its entirety.

The defenders of the status quo like to describe such sentiments as isolationist, a gross oversimplification that has the additional object of unfairly tarring the advocates of an alternative foreign policy – *any* alternative – with an obnoxious slur.⁴⁷

But while it is wrong to cast anyone who questions the direction of U.S. foreign policy as an opponent of global engagement, there is an ugly streak to the United States’ turn inward. It appears in the form of anti-immigrant sentiment and hostility to free trade. The policies that flow from these misguided feelings include plans to build high walls to keep unskilled workers out, and calls for mass deportations to expel those already here.

For the most part, Americans want to remain actively engaged in the world without having to be in charge of it. We tire of being held responsible for everything bad that happens, and always on the hook to pick up the costs. The public has grown even more skeptical of U.S. current foreign policies when the primary benefit that they are supposed to deliver, namely greater security, fails to materialize. If “global engagement” is defined as a forward-deployed military, operating in dozens of countries, and if the costs of this military remain very high, we should expect the public to object. Some will demand that the U.S. government change course. But if Washington refuses to do so, or simply tinkers around the margins while largely ignoring public sentiment, we should not be surprised if many Americans choose to throw the good engagement out with the bad, opting for genuine isolationism, with all of its nasty connotations.

That would be tragic. It would also be dangerous. If Americans reject the peaceful coexistence, trade, and voluntary person-to-person contact that has been the touchstone of

⁴⁷ Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, “For U.S. Interventionists, ‘Isolationism’ Is Just a Dirty Word,” *World Politics Review*, June 22, 2011.

U.S. foreign policy since the nation's founding, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world will only grow worse wider, with negative ramifications for U.S. security for many years to come.

Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): “Jointness, grand strategy, and the emerging security environment: An airman’s perspective”

Thanks to CNA for the opportunity to participate today. The introduction to our segment speaks to the centrality of joint operations in the U.S. military – and that accordingly, discussions of sea power and grand strategy need to also consider the perspectives of the land and air components. I couldn’t agree more. So before I address the questions regarding airpower, I want to take a couple of minutes to speak to an area that’s very pertinent to the subject area today, but little discussed nowadays.

Since the advent of Goldwater-Nichols, a joint approach has been to move contingency organizations and operations from independent, de-conflicted, service-oriented approaches, to sustained interoperability. How well the U.S. military has done that, where we are today, and where we ought be heading, could and should be the subject of a conference all its own, but suffice it to say that the degree of jointness exhibited since 1986 has ebbed and flowed based on the commanders in charge, and the degree – or lack thereof – to which the senior-most U.S. military leadership has encouraged joint organization and execution.

The way America fights essentially boils down to this: individual services do not fight – they organize, train, and equip. It’s the combatant commands that fight under the unifying vision of a joint force commander. Jointness means that among our four services, a separately developed and highly specialized array of capabilities are provided through service or functional components to a joint force commander – his or her job is to assemble a plan from among this “menu” of capabilities, applying the appropriate ones for the contingency at hand.

Jointness does not mean that four separate services deploy to a fight and simply align under a single commander. Nor does jointness mean that everybody necessarily gets an equal share of the action. The reason that joint force operations create synergies is because this approach capitalizes on each service’s core functions – functions that require much time, effort, and focus to develop the competencies required to exploit operations in their respective domains.

When a single service attempts to achieve war-fighting independence instead of embracing interdependence, jointness unravels; war-fighting effectiveness is reduced; viable alternatives are ignored, and costly redundancies abound. The last thing we need today as we face a resource-constrained future is to turn back the clock on Goldwater-Nichols. Considering this perspective, it's laudatory that the Air Force and Department of the Navy are committed to pursuing a new operational concept optimizing U.S. power-projection capabilities. As stated in an important RAND Corporation study, "*The familiar missions of deterring and defeating aggression through large-scale power-projection operations have not diminished in importance. In fact, these missions are, in many ways, becoming more challenging.*"¹

Accordingly, one would hope to see mutual support for the new long-range ISR/strike aircraft because of how it will enable naval operations in anti-access environments. The memorandum of agreement between the Air Force and the Navy on working BAMS (the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance aircraft) and Global Hawk interoperability is another example of partnership that should become the norm, not the exception, as we move forward.

Sea control isn't accomplished just with ships anymore, and air control isn't carried out just with aircraft. The air and maritime domains are seamlessly interconnected, and we owe it to America to be more integrated as two military departments. Efforts to achieve better integration of air and sea-based capabilities are a welcome step in keeping alive the promises of a true joint approach to capitalizing on the necessary attributes that each of the services provides. We really need to take the next step, however – the move from service interoperability to service interdependence.

I'll say more on the appropriateness of that aspiration when I address the issue of the austere budgets ahead, but my point is that it's time our security architectures move forward to better integrate functions and capabilities across service lines while simultaneously eliminating unneeded redundancies, yet retaining the separateness of the functions of the services that is really the linchpin of jointness.

¹ Andrew R. Hoehn, Adam Grissom, David A. Ochmanek, David A. Shlapak, and Alan J. Vick, *A New Division of Labor: Meeting America's Security Challenges Beyond Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2007), p. xiv.

So, on to the first question.

What's the airman's perspective on U.S. grand strategy and the emerging security environment?

The United States has not had a clear, well-defined grand strategy since 1989. Since the Berlin Wall collapsed, our strategy has been a reaction to various threats such as failed states, rogue regimes, Islamic radicalism, and nuclear proliferation. There are however, two enduring tenets from our National Security Strategies over the years that will continue to form the basis of any future U.S. grand strategy: (1) we need to maintain sufficient forces and capabilities to engage forward around the world in order to encourage peace and stability; and (2) in the event that we do need to fight, we will do so away from U.S. territory in a fashion that puts the other combatants' value structures at risk.

In the Air Force's recently released vector on its vision, it states that the interplay of three major trends will characterize the future security environment – violent extremism, shifting regional balances of power, and the proliferation of advanced technologies.

It's difficult to distill a clear grand strategy from these different trends. Moreover, any grand strategy must adhere to political and economic realities: for example Americans are unlikely to lavish the Department of Defense (DoD) with funding for manpower-intensive operations, or undisciplined expenditures on new technology, or anything else not clearly linked to vital U.S. interests.

So given the enduring tenets of past National Security Strategies, the diverse multiple trends characterizing the security environment, and the reality that resources available for security are becoming more constrained, perhaps the best we can do is accept that in the broadest sense a grand strategy of "Strategic Agility" may be appropriate.

Our challenge is that the Nation has many interests...but only a select set are fundamentally vital in nature. I suggest that among those are: stemming nuclear proliferation; managing the rise of near-peer competitors; ensuring access to key resources; maintaining strategic alliances; protecting open access to the global commons; and, defending the homeland.

America's grand strategy and fundamental global interests should be mutually aligned. In looking to a future of how to do that, one idea gaining attention is the notion of *offshore balancing*, and it may play a key role as a subset of "Strategic Agility."

Essentially, offshore balancing means that the U.S. influences – or *balances* against adversaries – without relying on a big deployed footprint. Instead, it uses forces from *offshore*, whether located in the United States, based with trusted allies, provided by the Department of the

Navy and/or Air Force and/or Army, or all of the above. It's not isolationism. Rather, it permits American intervention, but favors using indirect methods in conjunction with allies and proxies to compel and/or deter adversaries.

Indeed, offshore balancing may become an element of "Strategic Agility" of necessity due to economic realities and a diminished appetite for manpower-intensive nation-building adventures.

What, then, is the role of the Air Force in an American grand strategy? What are the strategic priorities and objectives of airpower?

Airpower shapes, deters, and dissuades so that we can attain fundamental national interests while minimizing the need for combat operations. When combat *is* necessary, aerospace capabilities yield a variety of strategic, operational, and tactical effects that provide asymmetric advantages by projecting power while minimizing liabilities and vulnerabilities.

Our Nation has three services with air *arms* – the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Those air arms exist to facilitate their parent services' core functions – their mastery of operations on the ground, at sea, or in a littoral environment.

The Nation has only *one* Air Force, whose reason for being is to exploit the advantages of operating in the third dimension of air and space in order to directly secure our objectives. It possesses the speed, range, flexibility, lethality, and persistence to respond to events anywhere, anytime with tremendous agility.

Airpower is particularly well suited for offshore balancing and a strategy of "Strategic Agility." Fundamentally, it provides our civilian leaders options and influence, *if* it is understood as more than simply a substitute for its military predecessors, and *if* connected directly to desired strategic end-states.

Regardless of how America's future grand strategy is characterized, the strategic narrative of the Air Force is to provide *global initiative*. For over 20 years the Air Force has codified its strategic objectives as providing Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power. The global initiative enabled by these tenets emphasizes not only the agility of airpower capabilities, but also the flexibility that such capabilities provide to civilian leaders.

Essentially, the Air Force is a capabilities-based force. This actuality makes it the Nation's strategic hedge regarding future challenge – this is a highly desirable characteristic considering that we are horrible predictors of future conflict.

What does this narrative mean for the strategic priorities of airpower? Airpower can achieve political effects through a spectrum of means: deterrence, long-range strike, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or ISR, humanitarian relief, partnership building, special operations, and a variety of rapid-response non-kinetic actions such as airlift, information operations, cyber effects, and economic development.

Its future efficacy will be viewed through a triple lens of operational effectiveness, cost-effectiveness or value, and efficiency. Fiscal challenges will mandate a re-evaluation of airpower in all its forms and the combined effects they can achieve.

The air-sea integration concept – also known as AirSea Battle – is an excellent example, since it re-conceptualizes how airpower and sea power can integrate in a cost-effective yet strategically relevant manner. Thus, achieving synergies with the Navy should be a major strategic priority.

From an Air Force perspective, which strategic challenges should receive greater priority?

Four unique contributions define the Air Force in the context of its objectives: gaining control of air, space, and cyberspace; holding targets at risk around the world; providing responsive ISR; and rapidly transporting people and equipment across the globe. Underpinning and embedded in each of these unique contributions is command and control.

The nature of the modern security environment demands that we focus on sustaining these contributions. However, the Air Force faces challenges in maintaining these capabilities on three fronts – economic, technological, and cultural.

Economic pressures are going to critically affect the Air Force's ability to sustain its contributions. The Air Force is operating a geriatric force that is becoming more so every day. It has bombers and tankers over 50 years old, and fighters and helicopters over 30. For comparison purposes, the average age in the U.S. airline fleet is 10 years – and airliners don't pull six or more times the force of gravity on a daily basis as our fighters do.

Across the future years' defense program, the Air Force is averaging buying 118 aircraft per year. That equates to a replacement rate of 48 years. If you remove those aircraft that aren't replacing present systems, the average is about 65 aircraft per years, or an 87-year replacement rate.

Without adequate funding, we are destined to go down one of three paths: we get smaller, we get weaker, or we get smaller and weaker.

Closely coupled to economic challenges are technological changes. These include potential adversaries' growing access to asymmetric weapons as well as the promise of new technology, such as increasingly autonomous, stealthy, and persistent aircraft (many remotely piloted); directed-energy weapons; anti-satellite capability; and cyber wizardry.

All these issues – potential adversaries, economic concerns, and technological change – interrelate with what is perhaps the biggest challenge faced by not just the Air Force, but our entire National Security establishment: institutional change.

Our establishment will suffer if its internal organizations fail to adapt to new, disruptive innovations and concepts of operation. New technology – and old technology applied in new ways – blurs traditional roles, yet people tend to cling to their traditional mental model of how things should be. An example is non-traditional ISR.

One of our significant challenges is how we will satisfy the growing demand for ISR in a future of constrained defense resources. One way is to capitalize on the sensor capabilities inherent in our modern aircraft. However, traditional nomenclature and thought constrain the understanding of capability in this regard.

For example, fifth-generation aircraft are termed “fighters,” but technologically those F-22s and 35s are not just “fighters” – they’re F-, A-, B-, E-, EA-, RC, AWACS-22s and 35s. They’re flying sensors that allow us to conduct information age warfare inside adversary battle space whenever we desire.

Another example is the expenditure of vast sums of money to acquire more motion video and single-dimension intelligence using older technology and concepts when newer technologies and innovative techniques are available. The DoD recently made a decision to buy 15 more orbits of MQ-9 Reapers at a cost of 4.5 billion dollars and about 3,000 manpower billets – when wide-area airborne surveillance systems and automatically cross-cued intelligence sensors on platforms that can stay airborne five to seven days can provide dramatically more and better capability at a fraction of the cost, and without anywhere near the number of additional personnel required by older, conventional remotely piloted aircraft.

In the face of disruptive innovation and cultural change, the military can maintain the status quo, or it can embrace and exploit change. I suggest that the latter is preferred. One way to get a handle on institutional change is to grow personnel who are widely read, widely educated, open-minded innovators who realize how much they don’t know. George Marshall once stated, “The hardest thing I’ve ever done in my life is learning how to learn.” Yet, we must do so.

A challenge of the future is educating the National Security community to understand the potential of airpower, especially in the gale of creative destruction wrought by technological change.

So how is the Air Force adapting to the emerging security environment, including an austere budget horizon?

Former Secretary Gates said, “The defense budget, however large it may be, is not the cause of the country’s fiscal woes. However as a matter of simple arithmetic and political reality, the Department of Defense must be at least part of the solution.” Part of that solution must be articulation by the Nation’s Defense leadership that the *first* responsibility of government is the security of its people. Defense leaders need to remind the public and Congress that before we start cutting, we need to establish priorities.

I suggest that there is no better starting point for those priorities than our Constitution. The preamble stipulates that it was established to “provide for the common defense, [and then to] promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” Note that it does not say “provide for the general welfare”; it does explicitly say “provide for the common defense.” It’s time to get our priorities straight. Providing for the common defense is U.S. government’s *number one job*. Watching the debates over the deficit recently has provided ample evidence that too many people in leadership positions who should understand this, in fact do not.

Like all the services, the Air Force will play a role in the solution to austere Defense budgets, but hopefully not by retrenching or continuing business as usual on a reduced scale – that approach would reflect a failure of imagination at best, and a dereliction of duty at worst. The Air Force will have to make difficult choices to balance near-term operational readiness with longer-term needs, and fit all of that into a more affordable package. The bottom line however, is that when you’re broke, fundamental interests are what count – everything else is a liability. That demands much clarity regarding goals and desired outcomes. A budget-driven roles and missions debate is underway – whether one calls it that or not – but a thoughtful conversation regarding national interests and strategy has yet to occur. This conference is a bright start to that dialog.

I believe it’s in the Nation’s interest to secure national objectives through deterrence, dissuasion, and regional shaping – in other words, peace through strength. To do so requires sufficient numbers of forces, systems, and capabilities to win 99 to 1, not 51 to 49. Having the capability to win 99 to 1 is what creates deterrence. A 51-to-49 force based on “just good enough” capability is one guaranteed to encourage adventurism and create conflict vice preventing it. When combat operations *are* necessary, we must employ forces capable of

securing our country's objectives in an efficient and effective manner – projecting focused and intelligent power, and *minimizing* liabilities and vulnerabilities.

These points don't just apply to the Air Force; each of the services has a contribution to make. If we want to retain our role as the world's sole superpower, we need to have the strongest army, navy, marine corps, and air force in the world. That said, I will close by reminding you that *the only thing more expensive than a first-rate Air Force, is a second-rate Air Force.*

Participant biographies

Seth Cropsey

Dr. Seth Cropsey served as Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy in 1984, and as such was responsible for maritime strategy, strategic education, defense reorganization, and special operations capabilities. During the administration of George H. W. Bush, Dr. Cropsey was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. His work in the government continued as the first department chairman and distinguished professor at the George W. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, where he lectured on national security planning, post-Cold War U.S./NATO strategy, and the mechanisms that characterize strategic planning in democratic states. During his tenure at the Marshall Center, Dr. Cropsey worked with the governments of several new NATO members to develop their own national security planning processes.

In 2005, following his service in the U.S. Senate-confirmed position as Director of International Broadcasting for the U.S. government, Dr. Cropsey returned to writing, analyzing, and speaking on U.S. strategy. He is currently a Senior Adviser for maritime strategy at CNA and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. Cropsey continues to publish articles on foreign policy, national security, and U.S. defense planning. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Cluj in Romania in July 2011.

Richard Danzig

The Honorable Richard Danzig is the Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Center for a New American Security. He is also a member of the Defense Policy Board and a Director of the RAND Corporation and a member of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, and serves as a Senior Advisor at CNA and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His primary activity is as a consultant to the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security on terrorism.

From the spring of 2007 through the presidential election of 2008, Dr. Danzig was a senior advisor to Senator Barack Obama on national security issues. Dr. Danzig served as the 71st Secretary of the Navy from November 1998 to January 2001. He was the Under Secretary of the Navy from 1993 to 1997.

Dr. Danzig was born in New York City in 1944. He received a B.A. from Reed College, a J.D. from Yale Law School, and Bachelor of Philosophy and Doctor of Philosophy degrees from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. Upon his graduation from Yale, Dr. Danzig served as a law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Byron White. Between 1972 and 1977, Dr. Danzig was an Assistant and then Associate Professor of Law at Stanford University, a Prize Fellow of the Harvard Society of Fellows, and a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow. During this period, he wrote a book on contract law and articles on constitutional history, contracts, criminal procedure, and law and literature. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Danzig served in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, first as a Deputy Assistant Secretary and then as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics. In these roles, he contributed particularly to the development of the department's ability to mobilize manpower and materiel for deployment abroad. In 1981, he was awarded the Defense Distinguished Public Service Award. He received that same honor – the highest Department of Defense civilian award – twice more in 1997 and 2001 for his work with the Navy and Marine Corps.

Between 1981 and 1993, Dr. Danzig was a partner in the law firm of Latham and Watkins. Resident in Washington, his unusually broad legal practice encompassed white-collar crime defense work, civil litigation, and corporate work, including heading the firm's Japan practice. During this time he co-authored a book on national service, taught contracts at Georgetown University Law School, and was a Director of the National Semiconductor Corporation, a Trustee of Reed College, and litigation director and then vice chair of the International Human Rights Group. In 1991, he was awarded that organization's Tony Friedrich Memorial Award as pro-bono human rights lawyer of the year. Dr. Danzig and his wife, Andrea, reside in Washington, DC, where Mrs. Danzig has an active practice as a psychotherapist. They have two adult children, David and Lisa.

David Deptula

As Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Mav6, General Deptula oversees all aspects of the company's organization, strategy, operations, and output. A highly decorated military leader, he transitioned from the U.S. Air Force in 2010 as a lieutenant general after more than 34 years of distinguished service. A world-recognized pioneer in conceptualizing, planning, and executing national security operations from humanitarian relief to major combat operations, he has also served on two congressional commissions outlining America's defense posture.

General Deptula has twice been a Joint Task Force Commander. He was the principal attack planner for the Desert Storm air campaign; orchestrated air operations over Iraq in 1998-99 and Afghanistan in 2001; and was the Joint Force Air Component Commander for the South Asia tsunami relief effort. As the first U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), he transformed the U.S. Air Force's ISR and remotely piloted aircraft enterprises, setting a standard emulated by services and nations around the world. He has logged more than 3,000 flying hours (400 in combat), to include multiple command assignments in the F-15. He is a senior scholar at the U.S. Air Force Academy, sits on the boards of a variety of public and private institutions and think-tanks, is a prolific author, and is a sought-after commentator around the world as a thought leader on defense, strategy, and ISR.

Michael Gerson

Mr. Michael S. Gerson is a research analyst in the Strategic Studies Division at CNA, where he serves as a lead analyst and project director for studies on nuclear and conventional deterrence, nuclear strategy, arms control, missile defense, and WMD proliferation. Since joining CNA in 2006, he has regularly provided research and analysis on deterrence and nuclear issues to the U.S. Navy, and in 2007 he participated in the conceptual development of the maritime strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. In 2009 he served as a staff member on the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and, in that capacity, was a lead author of a study on international perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy and posture.

Mr. Gerson has lectured on deterrence and nuclear issues at the John Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, George Washington University, New York University, and Moscow State University. He has given talks at various think tanks and institutions, including the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Stanford University's Hoover Institution, the New America Foundation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the NATO Defense College (Rome), and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow). He has published articles on the history of U.S. nuclear strategy, nuclear and conventional deterrence theory, U.S. nuclear policy, and contemporary deterrence challenges. He also serves as co-chair of the Next Generation Working Group on U.S.-Russia Arms Control. He is a graduate of the University of Texas and the University of Chicago.

Frank Hoffman

LtCol Frank G. Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired) is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University,

where he also serves as the Director of NDU Press. Prior to this recent appointment, he served in the Department of the Navy as Deputy Director of the Office of Program Appraisal from August 2009 to June 2011. Before this senior executive position, he had been a research fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) in Quantico, VA, since 2001. He was also a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, PA.

His military career includes 24 years as a Marine infantry officer, and several tours at Headquarters Marine Corps and the Pentagon. He has served on the staff of two congressional commissions including: the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Services, and the U.S. National Security Commission/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission). He also served on three Defense Science Boards, including the 2004 Defense Science Board for Post-Conflict Stability Operations. He retired from the Marine Corps Reserve in 2001 as a lieutenant colonel.

He is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School, 1978) and George Mason University. He graduated from the Naval War College with highest distinction in 1995. He is a frequent contributor to professional military and foreign policy journals, having published over 200 articles and essays, and is the author of a book, *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War* (Praeger 1996), and numerous book chapters. His awards and decorations include the Department of the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the DON Superior Civilian Service Medal, a DOD Civilian Excellence Award, the Navy Commendation Medal (gold star in lieu of second award), and the Navy Achievement Medal.

Catherine McArdle Kelleher

Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher is College Park Professor at the University of Maryland and also serves as a Senior Fellow at the Watson Institute at Brown University and Research Professor Emeritus at the U.S. Naval War College. She is a member of the Naval Studies Board of the National Academies of Sciences, and a Distinguished Fellow at CNA. In the Clinton Administration, she served as the Personal Representative of the Secretary of Defense in Europe and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia. Professor Kelleher's other governmental experience includes a staff position on the National Security Council during the Carter Administration and a series of consulting assignments under Republican and Democratic administrations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Department of the Army. She was a professor of military strategy at the National War College and editor of the *Naval War College Review*.

Professor Kelleher has had a wide range of academic involvement in the field of national security studies. She has taught at Columbia University, the University of Illinois-Chicago, the University of Michigan, and the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, and was founding Director of the Center for International Security Studies (CISSM) at the University of Maryland, as well as a professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland. She has been a research fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, and a Kistiakowsky fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and has received individual research grants from NATO, the Council on Foreign Relations, the German Marshall Fund, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Ford Foundation. She is the author of more than 70 books, monographs, and articles, and has served on many international research boards, including those of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as well as the present Carnegie Commission for a Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI).

Professor Kelleher received an A.B. and a D.Litt. from Mt. Holyoke College, and a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She is the recipient of the Medal for Distinguished Public Service of the Department of Defense, the Director's Medal from the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Cross of Honor in Gold of the Federal Armed Forces of Germany. In 2004, she was awarded the Manfred Woerner Medal by the German Ministry of Defense for her contributions to peace and security in Europe, and in 2009, she received the Hubert H. Humphrey Award for Scholarship and Public Service from the American Political Science Association.

Christopher Layne

Dr. Christopher Layne is a professor and holds the Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University's George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. He is the author of *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Cornell University Press, 2006) and (with Bradley A. Thayer) *American Empire: A Debate* (Routledge, 2006). He is currently working on his next book, to be published by Yale University Press, entitled *After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana*.

His articles have appeared in such peer-reviewed journals as *International Security*, *Security Studies*, *International History Review*, *International Politics*, *Review of International Studies*, and the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. He also comments frequently on American foreign policy for such publications as the *National Interest*, *the Atlantic*, *The New Republic*, *Foreign Policy*, *the Nation*, *World Policy Journal*, and the *American Conservative* (of which he is a contributing editor). He has published numerous opinion articles in newspapers such as the *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Financial Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *the Australian*,

Chicago Tribune, and the *Boston Globe*. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and an Intelligence Community (IC) Associate. Professor Layne received a B.A. from the University of Southern California, a J.D. from the University of Southern California Law Center, an L.L.M. from the University of Virginia School of Law, and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.

Catherine Lea

Catherine K. Lea is a research analyst in CNA's Strategic Initiatives Group. Ms. Lea's work focuses on Navy operations in East and South Asia as well as U.S. Navy strategy. She is the CNA scientific analyst to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director of International Engagement (OPNAV N52). Her recent work includes studies on Navy alternative futures, future Navy deployment patterns and force packages, U.S. Navy-Indian Navy partnership, Marine Corps basing in Asia, and U.S. Navy operations in an anti-access environment.

Ms. Lea returned to CNA headquarters in September 2009 from Yokohama, Japan, where she conducted analyses of mine warfare command and control, particularly in the East Asia region. From 2001 to 2006, Ms. Lea served as a CNA field representative to U.S. Navy commands in Norfolk, Virginia: United States Fleet Forces (USFF) from 2003 to 2006, and Amphibious Group Two (PHIBGRU-2) from 2001 to 2003. Prior to her field work, Ms. Lea conducted political-military analyses as a member of the International Affairs Group (IAG) at CNA headquarters from 1997 to 2001. While in IAG, her work covered a wide range of international security issues, including U.S. Navy interoperability with selected allied navies, U.S. Marine Corps basing options in East Asia, U.S. Navy Theater Ballistic Missile Defense in Asia, and the management of U.S. Navy engagement with foreign navies. She holds an A.B. in political science and economics from the University of California, Berkeley, and an M.A. in national security studies from Georgetown University.

Michael Mandelbaum

Dr. Michael Mandelbaum is the Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C., and is the director of the American Foreign Policy Program there. He has also held teaching posts at Harvard and Columbia universities, and at the United States Naval Academy. He serves on the board of advisors of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a Washington-based organization sponsoring research and public discussion on American policy toward the Middle East.

Professor Mandelbaum is the author or co-author of numerous articles and of 12 books: *The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era* (PublicAffairs, 2010); *Democracy's Good Name: The Rise and Risks of the World's Most Popular Form of Government* (Public Affairs, 2007); *The Case For Goliath: How America Acts As The World's Government in the Twenty-first Century* (PublicAffairs, 2006); *The Meaning of Sports: Why Americans Watch Baseball, Football and Basketball and What They See When They Do* (PublicAffairs 2004); *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century* (PublicAffairs, 2002); *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (Priority, 1996); *The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Cambridge University Press, 1988); *The Global Rivals* (I.B. Tauris and Co., 1988, co-author); *Reagan and Gorbachev* (Knopf, 1987, co-author); *The Nuclear Future* (Cornell University Press, 1983); *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima* (Cambridge University Press, 1981); and *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976* (Cambridge University Press, 1979). He is also the editor of 12 books. A graduate of Yale College, Professor Mandelbaum received an M.A. at King's College, Cambridge University, and a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard University.

Dr. William McCants

William McCants is an analyst in the International Affairs Group (IAG) at CNA, where he focuses on studies of al-Qaeda, terrorism, and Middle Eastern politics. He is also an adjunct faculty member at the Johns Hopkins University Krieger School of Arts and Sciences. From 2009 to 2011, Dr. McCants served as the Senior Advisor for Countering Violent Extremism in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department. Prior to that, he was the program manager of the Minerva Initiative in OSD-Policy; an analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses and SAIC; and a fellow at West Point's Combating Terrorism Center.

Dr. McCants is the founder of Jihadica.com, a group blog that explains the global jihadi movement. The blog has been featured on the cover of the *New York Times* and rated by Technorati.com as one of the top 100 blogs on global politics. *Wired* magazine recently described it as "the gold standard in militant studies." Dr. McCants is the editor of the *Militant Ideology Atlas* and the author of an article in *Foreign Affairs* on al-Qaeda. In 2005, he translated an Arabic book written by an al-Qaeda strategist. His book, *Founding Gods, Inventing Nations: Conquest and Culture Myths from Antiquity to Islam*, will be published by Princeton University Press in fall 2011. He received a Ph.D. in Near Eastern studies from Princeton University.

Michael McDevitt

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, US Navy (Ret.) is a Senior Fellow associated with the CNA Strategic Studies Division, which he led for 13 years before stepping down in 2011. CNA Strategic Studies conducts research and analyses that focus on strategy, political-military issues, and regional security studies.

Rear Admiral McDevitt held four at-sea commands during his Navy career, including command of an aircraft carrier battle group. He was the Director of the East Asia Policy office for the Secretary of Defense during the George H.W. Bush Administration. He also served for two years as the Director for Strategy, War Plans and Policy (J-5) for U.S. CINCPAC. Rear Admiral McDevitt concluded his 34-year active-duty career as the Commandant of the National War College in Washington, DC. He is an active participant in conferences and workshops on security issues in East Asia, and has had a number of papers published in edited volumes on this subject. His most recent research focus has been the maritime dimension of China's national strategy. Rear Admiral McDevitt received a B.A. in U.S. history from the University of Southern California and an M.A. in American diplomatic history from Georgetown University. He is also a graduate of the National War College in Washington, D.C.

Walter McDougall

Dr. Walter A. McDougall is a professor of history and the Alloy-Ansin Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania. A graduate of Amherst College and a Vietnam veteran, he received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1974 and taught at the University of California, Berkeley, for 13 years. He then came to Penn to direct its International Relations Program, which now has 350 majors.

Professor McDougall teaches U.S., European, and Asia/Pacific diplomatic history and is the author of many books, most recently *Freedom Just Around the Corner: A New American History, 1585-1828* (HarperCollins, 2004) and *Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era, 1829-1877* (HarperCollins, 2008). His other recent books include *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter With the World Since 1776* (Houghton Mifflin, 1997) and *Let the Sea Make a Noise: A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur* (Basic Books, 1993). In 1986, Professor McDougall won the Pulitzer Prize for *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age*. He is also a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia and editor of *Orbis*, its journal of world affairs.

John Mueller

Dr. John Mueller holds the Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, and is professor of political science at Ohio State University. Professor Mueller is the author of several award-winning and critically acclaimed books on international relations, U.S. foreign policy, and international security, including: *War and Ideas* (Routledge, 2011), *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda* (Oxford, 2010); *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them* (Free Press, 2006); *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (John Wiley and Sons, 1973); *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (Basic Books, 1989); *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War* (University of Chicago Press, 1994); *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics* (Longman, 1997); *Capitalism, Democracy, and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery* (Princeton University Press, 1999); and *The Remnants of War* (Cornell University Press, 2004), which was awarded the Leggold Prize for the best book on international relations in 2004. He has also published numerous articles in leading policy, academic, and popular journals, as well as in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. His most recent book, co-authored with Mark Stewart, is *Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Costs, and Benefits of Homeland Security* (Oxford, 2011).

Before coming to Ohio State in 2000, Mueller was on the faculty at the University of Rochester for many years. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, has been a John Simon Guggenheim Fellow, and has received grants from the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities. He has also received several teaching prizes, and in 2009 received the International Studies Association's Susan Strange Award that "recognizes a person whose singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency in the international studies community." In 2010, he received Ohio State University's Distinguished Scholar Award. He was also selected for the *Playboy* Honor Roll of 20 Professors Who Are Reinventing the Classroom in the October 2010 issue of the magazine. Professor Mueller did his undergraduate work at the University of Chicago and earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in political science at UCLA.

Robert Murray

The Honorable Robert J. Murray is President and CEO of CNA, a non-profit research and analysis organization devoted to independent and objective analysis of public issues. Before coming to CNA, Mr. Murray was a teacher: first at the Naval War College in Newport, RI, where he was the Dean and Director of the College's Advanced Research Center and creator/director of the Strategic Studies Group; and then, from 1983 to 1990, at the John F.

Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where he was a faculty member and director of the school's national security program.

Mr. Murray served in government in various capacities before his stint at teaching. He was appointed by President Jimmy Carter and confirmed by the Senate as Under Secretary of the Navy. He previously held an appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), and, in that position, he participated in the Camp David negotiations that resulted in the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Earlier, Mr. Murray was the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, first under Elliot Richardson and then under James Schlesinger. Following this assignment, he was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). In these two assignments, Murray was particularly involved in the redesign and implementation of a new NATO strategy, the transition of the armed forces following Vietnam, and the implementation of the All-Volunteer Force. Mr. Murray had several prior assignments in the Defense and State Departments, and he served in the U.S. Marine Corps before entering civilian government service.

Mr. Murray is a graduate of Suffolk College (1961) and Harvard University (1967). He is a Principal of the Council for Excellence in Government, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Fellow of the National Institute for Public Affairs, a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration.

Kevin Narizny

Dr. Kevin Narizny is currently an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University. He received a B.A. from Drew University and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the Department of Politics at Princeton University. Before coming to Lehigh, Dr. Narizny was a lecturer at the University of Chicago's Committee on International Relations.

Dr. Narizny has also held postdoctoral fellowships at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. His research and teaching interests include international order, state formation, democratization, political economy, and international relations theory. His book, *The Political Economy of Grand Strategy*, was published by Cornell University Press in 2007. It examines how the sectoral interests behind partisan coalitions determine governments' approach to foreign policy, and it features case studies of the United States and Great Britain between 1865 and 1941. Dr. Narizny is currently at work on a second book, *The Capitalist Path to Democracy*, which shows how economic elites in early modern England and Costa Rica constructed democratic institutions as a means to protect themselves from rent-seeking states. He is also

in the early stages of research on a project about the role of Anglo-American hegemony in the global spread of democracy.

Ronald O'Rourke

Since 1984, Mr. Ron O'Rourke has worked as a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. He has written numerous reports for Congress on various issues relating to the U.S. Navy. He regularly briefs members of Congress and congressional staffers, and has testified before congressional committees on several occasions. In 1996, Mr. O'Rourke received a Distinguished Service Award from the Library of Congress for his service to Congress on naval issues. Mr. O'Rourke is the author of several journal articles on naval issues, and is a past winner of the U.S. Naval Institute's Arleigh Burke essay contest. He has given presentations on Navy-related issues to a variety of audiences in government, industry, and academia.

Mr. O'Rourke is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the Johns Hopkins University, from which he received a B.A. in international studies, and a valedictorian graduate of the university's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he received an M.A. in the same field.

Barry Posen

Dr. Barry R. Posen is the Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program. He serves on the Executive Committee of Seminar XXI, an educational program for senior military officers, government officials, and business executives in the national security policy community. He has written two books: *Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks* (Cornell University Press, 1992); and *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Cornell University Press, 1986), which won two awards – the American Political Science Association's Woodrow Wilson Foundation Book Award, and the Ohio State University's Edward J. Furniss Jr. Book Award. He is also the author of numerous articles, including “The Case for Restraint,” *The American Interest* (November/December 2007); “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security* (Summer 2003); “The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics,” *International Security* (Winter 2001/02); and “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security* (Winter, 1996/97).

Dr. Posen has been a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow; Rockefeller Foundation International Affairs Fellow; Guest Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Woodrow Wilson Center Fellow; Smithsonian Institution Fellow;

Transatlantic Fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States; and, most recently, Visiting Fellow at the John Sloan Dickey Center at Dartmouth College. Dr. Posen's current research interests include U.S. national security policy, the security policy of the European Union, the organization and employment of military force, great power intervention into civil conflicts, and innovation in the U.S. Army, 1970 to 1980. He received a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.

Christopher Preble

Dr. Christopher A. Preble is the Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. He is the author of three books: *The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous and Less Free* (Cornell University Press, 2009), which documents the enormous costs of America's military power, and proposes a new grand strategy to advance U.S. security; and *John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), which explores the political economy of military spending during the 1950s and early 1960s. Dr. Preble is also the lead author of *Exiting Iraq: How the U.S. Must End the Occupation and Renew the War against Al Qaeda* (Cato Institute, 2004); and he co-edited, with Jim Harper and Benjamin Friedman, *Terrorizing Ourselves: Why U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Is Failing and How to Fix It* (Cato Institute, 2010).

In addition to his books, Dr. Preble has published over 150 articles in major publications, including *USA Today*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Financial Times*, *National Review*, *The National Interest*, *Harvard International Review*, and *Foreign Policy*. He is a frequent guest on television and radio. Before joining Cato in February 2003, he taught history at St. Cloud State University and Temple University. Dr. Preble was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, and served onboard USS *Ticonderoga* (CG-47) from 1990 to 1993. He received a Ph.D. in history from Temple University.

Alison L. Russell

Alison Russell is a research analyst at CNA. She specializes in global naval engagement strategy and Middle East political-military activities. She has directed and participated in studies on topics that include maritime security cooperation, partner capacity building efforts, international support for global fleet stations, U.S. Navy-U.S. Coast Guard integration for theater security cooperation goals, and military partnerships with non-governmental organizations during humanitarian and civic assistance missions. She has conducted operational analyses in support of military exercises and wargames. In addition, Ms. Russell has traveled throughout the Middle East and worked with U.S. and regional military leaders.

She has conducted several assessments of the political, social, and economic environments in the region. Her work has addressed the force structure development of the Iraqi Navy and Gulf Cooperation Council states' maritime forces.

Ms. Russell is currently a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Her dissertation focuses on developing a theory for cyber blockades. She holds an M.A. in international relations from American University and a B.A. in political science and French language and literature from Boston College. She has lived abroad in France, Morocco, and Syria.

Robert Scales

Major General Robert Scales, U.S. Army (Retired) is one of America's best known and most respected authorities on land warfare. He is currently President of Colgen, LP, a consulting firm specializing in issues relating to landpower, wargaming, and strategic leadership. Prior to joining the private sector, Dr. Scales served over 30 years in the U.S. Army. He commanded two units in Vietnam, winning the Silver Star for action during the battles around Dong Ap Bia (Hamburger Hill) during the summer of 1969. Subsequently, he served in command and staff positions in the United States, Germany, and Korea, and ended his military career as Commandant of the United States Army War College. In 1995 he created the Army After Next program, which was the Army's first attempt to build a strategic gaming and operational concept for future land warfare. He has written and lectured on warfare to academic, government, military and business groups in the United States, Australia, Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and South America.

He is the author of two books on military history: *Certain Victory*, the official account of the Army in the Gulf War, and *Firepower in Limited War*, a history of the evolution of firepower doctrine since the end of the Korean War. In addition, he is an authority on contemporary and future warfare. Concepts and ideas contained in his writings and studies have significantly influenced the course of contemporary modernization and reform within the military. He has written two books on the theory of warfare: *Future Warfare*, a strategic anthology on America's wars to come, and *Yellow Smoke: the Future of Land Warfare for America's Military*. He was the only serving officer to have written books subsequently selected for inclusion in the official reading lists of three services: *Certain Victory* for the Army, *Firepower* for the Marine Corps, and *Yellow Smoke* for the Navy. Congressman Ike Skelton included *Yellow Smoke* in his National Security Book List, which was sponsored by the National Defense University. His latest work, *The Iraq War: a Military History* (Harvard University Press, 2005), written with Williamson Murray, has been reviewed very favorably by the *New York Times*, *The Atlantic*, and *Foreign Affairs*.

He is a frequent consultant with the senior leadership of every service in the Department of Defense as well as many allied militaries. He is a senior military analyst for the BBC, National Public Radio, and Fox News Network. He has appeared as a commentator on the History Channel, the Discovery Channel, PBS, TLC, and Star Television. His commentary is carried frequently on all major television outlets in the People's Republic of China. He has written for and been frequently quoted in the *New York Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Times*, *Time Magazine*, *Newsweek*, *Roll Call*, and virtually every service defense periodical and media network on issues relating to military history and defense policy. He is a graduate of West Point and earned a Ph.D. in history from Duke University.

Peter Swartz

Captain Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy (Retired) has been an analyst and manager at CNA since 1993. He has served as a research team leader and directed or contributed significantly to studies for the U.S. Navy and other agencies on maritime strategy and related issue areas, especially applying naval strategic and operational history to enhance the situational awareness and perspective of decision-makers regarding current and future problems. He also serves as an advisor to the U.S. Navy flag officer directing the Strategy and Policy Division (N51) of the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Before joining CNA, he was a career officer in the U.S. Navy. He was Special Assistant to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell during the first Gulf War, and Director of Defense Operations at the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels during the Warsaw Pact collapse. Throughout the early and mid 1980s, he was a principal author of and spokesman for the Reagan Administration's "Maritime Strategy," serving for part of that time on the staff of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. As a junior officer, he served two tours in Vietnam as an advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, and also taught naval counterinsurgency (COIN). He is the author of numerous journal articles, and is the co-editor, with Dr. John Hattendorf, of *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s* (2008). He holds a B.A. with honors in international relations from Brown University, an M.A. in international affairs from the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and an M.Phil. in political science from Columbia University.

Daniel Whiteneck

Dr. Daniel Whiteneck is a research analyst on the Operational Policy Team at CNA. He joined CNA in 1999 as a member of the Center for Strategic Studies. He has directed projects ranging from "The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?" to studies on the use of naval forces in shaping and influence operations, naval coalition operations, and

maritime security operations, including counterpiracy and counterproliferation. He deployed twice with carrier strike groups for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF), and was the CNA field representative to Commander 6th Fleet/Commander Joint Command Lisbon, as well as to the J5 at U.S. Strategic Command. He served three tours in the Pentagon on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) as CNA scientific analyst to N51, N31, and DEEP BLUE.

Dr. Whiteneck earned his Ph.D. from the University of Washington and has taught U.S. foreign policy and international relations at the University of Washington, the University of Colorado, and the U.S. Air Force Academy.

James Wirtz

Dr. James J. Wirtz is the Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies and a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. Dean Wirtz is the author of *The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War* (Cornell University Press, 1991, 1994); co-editor with T.V. Paul and Richard Harknett of *The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order* (Michigan University Press, 1998, 2000); co-editor with Peter Lavoy and Scott Sagan of *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers will use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons* (Cornell University Press, 2000); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of *Rockets' Red Glare: National Missile Defense and the Future of World Politics* (Westview, 2001); co-editor with Roy Godson of *Strategic Denial and Deception* (Transaction Publishers, 2002); co-editor with Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, and John Baylis of *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (Oxford University Press, 2007); co-editor with Loch Johnson of *Intelligence: Windows Into a Hidden World* (Roxberry, 2004); co-editor with T.V. Paul and Michelle Fortmann of *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford, 2004); co-editor with Jeffrey A. Larsen of *Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. Nuclear Doctrine* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); co-editor with Loch Johnson of *Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of Spies* (Oxford 2007); co-editor with James Russell of *Globalization and WMD Proliferation: Terrorism, Transnational Networks and International Security* (Routledge, 2007); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of *Stability from the Sea: Naval Roles in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations* (Routledge, 2009); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of *Arms Control and Cooperative Security* (Lynne Rienner, 2009); and co-editor with T.V. Paul and Patrick Morgan of *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age* (University of Chicago Press, 2009).

His work on intelligence, deterrence, the Vietnam War, and military innovation and strategy has been published in numerous academic and policy journals. A native of New Jersey, Professor Wirtz earned a B.A. and M.A. from the University of Delaware, and a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. He teaches courses on nuclear strategy,

international relations theory, and intelligence. He is currently working on a monograph entitled *Theory of Surprise*.

