

# Warning time for U.S. Forces' Responses to Situations

A selective study

*H. H. Gaffney*

Center for  
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Studies



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
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H. H. Gaffney  
Director, Strategy and Concepts  
Center for Strategic Studies

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## Summary

The issue is whether warning times for U.S. responses to situations are so short that the U.S. must maintain forces overseas—at land bases or at sea—in order to respond in a timely manner. We judged the length of warning time crudely: from the time a situation broke on the world scene until a U.S. operation began.<sup>1</sup> As described below, “breaking on the world scene” might be an incident or attack happening out of the blue, but more often involves a precipitating incident in a local situation in which the U.S. Government did not contemplate military intervention when the situation first appeared (e.g., Lebanon).

How the U.S. government seizes the problem and begins deliberations at the NSC level is beyond the scope of this paper. A narrower, more technical definition would be from the time warning orders were sent from the President or Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, JCS, to the relevant Unified Commander. Those tend to be of a much shorter time; some cases are discussed in the annex to this paper, an extract from our 1997 study.<sup>2</sup>

The conclusion we reach from examination of a selected group of cases is that, for most of the cases in which larger forces are used, the warning times are so long—indeed, sometimes years long—that the forces the U.S. used could have been deployed from CONUS in plenty of time. Notwithstanding these long warning and preparation

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1. We had assembled the starting times of operations in the study by H. H. Gaffney, Dmitry Gorenburg, Eugene Cobble, and Daniel Whiteneck, *U.S. Naval Responses to Situations, 1970-1999* (Center for Naval Analyses, CRM D0002763.A2, December 2000) and subsequent analyses of all U.S. responses.
  2. Stephen J. Guerra, *Responses to Harm's-Way and Humanitarian Situations by Naval Forces, 1990-1996* (Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 97-100, November 1997).

times for most of the other-than-out-of-the-blue cases, the forces used often were those already present overseas. Dates for the selected cases and some observations on those cases are to be found in Table 1.

In the case of the Navy, all the responses except Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force over Kosovo were conducted by already deployed forces. A notable naval case is that of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, where a carrier was already on station in the Indian Ocean and was joined soon thereafter by another. An ARG was also in the area, although the Marines were sent into Afghanistan only two months later. For all U.S. forces in Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. Government took about a month to prepare its retaliatory plans, assemble the forces, and secure some initial bases as well as using existing bases in the Gulf area and Diego Garcia.

## The cases selected

We selected 25 cases of U.S. combat responses or shows of force for examination of the warning times entailed in each case. These cases were thought to be of considerable strategic significance at the time or involved sizable U.S. forces. We did not include responses to natural disasters, with their humanitarian implications, or non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), even though they appear to occur “out of the blue” in most cases. A convenient way of treating warning time is to divide the situations into four categories:

1. “Out of the blue,” that is, with no warning.
2. “Peaks in messes.” A situation may have arisen slowly, and persisted, and the U.S. may have been concerned with it, but not until a serious incident occurred did the U.S. feel it had to deploy forces to take direct action in the situation. It may have been that the serious incident precipitated “the CNN effect,” or it may have been the excuse an administration was looking for.
3. In the “slowly gathering” cases, there were no particular incidents of such a magnitude as to trigger a U.S. response by U.S. forces. The responses became a matter of when the U.S. found the situation so intolerable that it decided to act.
4. Those where it was the U.S.'s choice of the time to initiate some action. That is, warning time was not the problem since a situation existed beforehand and there was no precipitating attack or incident that the U.S. was responding to.

Of the 25 cases that we have examined, 9 were “out of the blue.” Of these 9 cases, 4 were most strategically significant: Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980,<sup>3</sup> Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq's massing 70,000

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3. Notwithstanding that there had been border skirmishes, especially in the mountainous Kurdish areas, before that.

troops on the Kuwait border in October 1994 in order to impress an upcoming UN vote on continuing sanctions, and 9/11. The other “out of the blue cases” were essentially terrorist cases. They include the Mayaguez incident in 1975, the mining of the Red Sea by Libya in 1984, the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985, the retaliation for Libya’s Berlin disco bombing in 1986, and the embassy bombings of 1998. These incidents seemed almost brief and unconnected until 9/11, following which the nation expects an out-of-the-blue incident at any time.

The “peaks in messes” cases we examined totaled 8. We examined the bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), the defense of the Kurds in Iraq after Desert Storm (1991), the Bosnia situation (which began in 1992), the North Korean nuclear materials problem (which arose in 1993), China threatening Taiwan (1996), the inspectors being kicked out of Iraq (1998), and the initiation of the Kosovo campaign (1999).

The “slowly gathering” cases we examined were 4, to include the Kuwaiti tanker reflagging and escort (1987), the seizure of Noriega in Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), and Haiti (1993).

Finally, there were 4 cases in which the U.S. effectively set the time and place of an action—we call it “U.S. choice.” These include the hostage rescue attempt in Iran (Desert One) of 1980, the Libyan shoot-down of 1981 during a freedom-of-navigation operation (FONOP), Desert Storm (1991), and the initiation of Southern Watch (1992).<sup>4</sup>

As a disclaimer, it should be noted that every situation that we have looked at is unique, and that they have been scattered, unconnected—except for the terrorist actions of al Qaeda. Furthermore, any of the situations in the last three categories (all except “out of the blue”) might be placed in another category—the distinctions are not that fine.

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4. Some might say that Desert Storm was a simple continuation of Desert Shield. But Desert Shield was essentially an operation to defend Saudi Arabia. Desert Storm followed a long debate as to whether force or economic sanctions were the most effective way to get Iraq out of Kuwait.



# Warning time observations

## Out of the blue cases

For the out-of-the-blue cases, the U.S. responses were swift—from the same day (Mayaguez) to just a few days. Looking at the prime cases first:

- When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, the U.S. response was mostly the providing of assistance and advisors to Saudi Arabia, mostly to ensure their air defenses were operational. These initiatives began a day after the invasion. There were also concerns about the Iranians mining the Strait of Hormuz. The war did not quickly spill over to threaten the other countries, so U.S. reinforcements were introduced gradually.
- Ten years later, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. took about a week to secure Saudi agreement to inserting U.S. forces there, after which it moved 82nd Airborne units from CONUS in to protect the receiving airfield and the Marine MPS (Maritime Prepositioning Ships) from Diego Garcia to the port in Saudi Arabia to marry up with Marine personnel flown in. An aircraft carrier had been on station in the Arabian Sea and was soon joined by one from the Mediterranean.
- Iraq mustered 70,000 soldiers on the Kuwaiti border in October 1994 in order to have an influence over a scheduled UN vote on continuing sanctions. Clouds prevented the U.S. from seeing the build-up for about a week, but upon discovery of the build-up, the U.S. responded within a day, given the presence of U.S. Air Force and Navy units on Southern Watch and a pre positioned brigade set of Army equipment.
- Finally, after 9/11, the U.S. took nearly a month (until October 7) to work up a plan and assemble the forces for the campaign in Afghanistan. Naval forces were immediately available, as

were U.S. AWACS and tankers from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf.

As for the other terrorist incidents out of the blue:

- In the Mayaguez case, in 1975, the U.S. had forces available at sea and in nearby Thailand. They were residual forces in the area following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. They responded on the same day.
- In the mining of the Red Sea by Libya in 1984, there had been an explosion on 9 July, 1984, but that a whole field had been laid was not realized until 27 July. Thereafter, the U.S. and its European allies took 19 days to assemble a minesweeping force.
- For the Achille Lauro in 1986, the hijackers had escaped to Egypt, and were then being evacuated by EgyptAir. U.S. carrier aircraft forced them down into Italy-three days after the initial hijacking. The U.S. took advantage of the presence of the two carriers in the Mediterranean.
- The U.S. retaliation to Libya's bombing of the disco in Berlin took place 4 days after the bombing-taking advantage of the presence of the two carriers in the Mediterranean, plus F-111s flying the long route out of the UK.
- The U.S. retaliation to the al Qaeda bombing of the embassies in Africa took place 13 days after the bombing. The surface combatants and SSN that fired the Tomahawks were already in the Indian Ocean.

### **Peaks-in-messes cases**

- The Lebanon situation was a prolonged one, beginning in 1975, culminating in the Israeli invasion of 1982, followed by various peacekeeping efforts, especially after the Sabra-Shatila refuge camp massacres, punctuated by several NEOs or positionings for NEOs, the bombing of the U.S. embassy, and “finally” the bombing of the Marine Corps barracks. The Marines had taken up continuous station in Lebanon ten months after the Israeli invasion, and six months after that they were bombed. In this case, we say warning time was ten months

from the Israeli invasion to the deployment of U.S. forces on land in Lebanon.

- Grenada, in 1983, was a simpler case. The U.S. had been watching the island anxiously as the Soviets built an airfield, using Cuban labor, ostensibly to bring in tourists, but which the U.S. thought was to be a Soviet airbase threatening the approaches to the Panama Canal. The U.S. seized upon an incident—a Marxist coup, using the excuse of protecting and evacuating American medical students—to invade 6 days after the coup. Grenada was a convenient distance from CONUS. The U.S. had plenty of warning; the surprise was how ill-planned the invasion turned out to be.
- Protecting the Kurds in Iraq (“Provide Comfort”) occurred as a “peak in the mess” following the end of Desert Storm. Saddam attacked his own people upon the uprisings in the Kurdish and Shi’a areas of Iraq, but the U.S. had access in the north and could provide relief to at least the Kurds. The U.S. already had air access in Turkey, and could support relief efforts in Iraq on the ground from Turkey.
- Bosnia is a case where the U.S. and its NATO allies had years of warning—3.5 years in this case. We selected the day that the Bosnians declared independence (in 1992) until the air operation, Deliberate Force (in 1995), as the length of the warning time, that is, from a peak to a response, although the response awaited an incident—which turned out to be the mortaring of the market in Sarajevo. The U.S. already had forces in Europe that could be brought to bear, including a carrier in the Mediterranean.
- Kosovo was similar to Bosnia, both areas being threatened since 1987 as Milosevic began his nationalist crusade. The situation in Kosovo had been obscured by the focus on Bosnia, then flared late in 1998, with the NATO attack finally precipitated upon the breakdown of the Rambouillet talks in early 1999. The U.S. had plenty of time to assemble forces in Europe, but it is of interest that the carrier assigned, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, did not arrive until two weeks into the campaign.

The U.S. could have used the USS Enterprise, which was returning from the Gulf at the time, but chose not to break PERSTEMPO.

- Three other “peaks in mess” cases—the North Korean nuclear program, China threatening Taiwan, and U.S. retaliation for the inspectors being kicked out of Iraq—were examples of messy diplomacy, as opposed to messy conflicts.
  - In the North Korean case, they had given notice in 1993 of their intent to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to recycle spent rods from their reactor at Yong-bon. The U.S. entered negotiations in 1994 to prevent the recycling, but in the meantime contemplated attacks on the North Korean nuclear facilities. Shows of force were made, including positioning two carriers off the peninsula, and the negotiations were successful.
  - In the China-Taiwan case, there had been Chinese threats and more remote missile tests in 1995. Before the Taiwanese election of 1996 (the first to democratically elect a president), the Chinese used closer missile tests to scare the voters away from the independence candidate. But they gave notice of their missile tests, including a Notice to Mariners (NOTAM) to stay out of a dangerous area. The USS Independence battle group sailed to the area and its escorts were in place to detect the flight of the missiles. The second carrier, the USS Nimitz, which had been in the Gulf, did not arrive until two weeks later, but the mere announcement of its deployment to the area of Taiwan triggered Chinese indignation-virtual presence worked in this case.
  - As for the Iraq inspectors case (December 1998), the U.S. had already mustered a force (a second carrier in the Gulf) several months earlier to threaten Iraq (Desert Thunder), got some concessions, which in turn broke down, leading to U.S. retaliation (Desert Fox).

## Slowly gathering cases

In the slowly gathering cases, there were no particular incidents of such a magnitude as to trigger a U.S. response by U.S. forces. The responses became a matter of when the U.S. found the situation so intolerable that it decided to act.

- The first case selected was the reflagging and escorting of Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf, in 1987. U.S. surface combatants had been in the Gulf (actually, as MidEastFor, since the 1940s), but especially after Iraq attacked Iran in 1980. There had been numerous incidents, including the attack on the USS Stark. It was not until after the Kuwaitis requested escorts and it looked like the job might even go to the Soviets that the U.S. decided to take on the escorting task itself (Earnest Will). In short, there was much warning, but the forces used were already in the Gulf.
- The second case was the seizure of Noriega in Panama in 1989. He had become a thorn in the U.S. side across the 1980s, had been indicted for his involvement in drug traffic in 1987, numerous diplomatic attempts were made to persuade him to go into exile, but then President Bush was determined to seize him and try him. The U.S. chose the date. The operation was facilitated by the presence of U.S. bases in Panama.
- In Somalia, the country had descended into anarchy after the ouster of the old President, Siad Barré, in January 1991. It was not until December 1992 that the U.S. and other countries decided to intervene to protect the movement of relief supplies. In short, the warning time was nearly two years. The U.S. had a carrier and ARG in the Indian Ocean, and doubled them with reinforcements from the U.S. for the operation.
- Finally, there was Haiti. President Aristide had been exiled in September 1991, but the U.S. decided to intervene in force to restore him to office only in September 1994—three years later. The U.S. took a year to plan the operation. Haiti was accessible from CONUS.<sup>5</sup>

## Responses at a time of U.S. choice

- The first case examined here was Desert One in 1980, to rescue the hostages in Iran. The U.S. got to choose the time. It was connected with U.S. politics. The Nimitz was in the Arabian Sea, and offered a conveniently present platform. Other equipment was deployed into the area for the operation.
- Another case was that of a Freedom of Navigation (FON) operation in the Gulf of Sidra, meant to provoke the Libyans. In 1981, the Libyans did just that, sending two SU-17s out to intercept U.S. F-14s. They lost.
- In a way, Desert Storm was also initiated at a time of U.S. choice, once the forces had been assembled (after the election of November 1992), a UN vote had been lined up, and after the U.S. Congress had voted its approval. There was not a precipitating incident, except for the original Iraqi invasion of Kuwait six months before.
- The final case in this category was the initiation of Southern Watch, the air patrols over Iraq. While Desert Storm had ended in March 1991, our records show that Southern Watch was only initiated in August 1992, when the Iraqi government renewed its persecution of Shi'ites in the south.

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5. The Russian military was envious of the time the U.S. had to plan the operation-Yeltsin sent them into Chechnya with no time for preparation, that is, with practically no warning, and their operation was a disaster.

## Conclusions

The country that attacks out of the blue is Iraq. That's what they did in 1980, and again in 1990. They did not take the opportunity in 2000, but they had done a sudden massing in 1994 as a political gesture. Now the U.S. has much surveillance over Iraq, and Iraqi forces are much reduced, but we must always remember clouds had masked Iraqi actions from overhead surveillance in both 1980 and 1994. The U.S. has kept practically continuous naval presence, including carriers, in the Gulf since Desert Storm, plus maintaining the Air Force in Gulf states and in Turkey. Two brigade sets have been prepositioned, in Kuwait and Qatar, and the Army periodically exercises to those sets. The case for continuous presence in the Gulf has thus been well-established.

The other out-of-the-blue cases have been terrorist incidents, though we would not preclude other kinds of cases arising, particularly in Korea.

- South Korea is a place in which the U.S. should sustain its trip-wire force, along with the ROK forces, which constitute the overwhelming bulk of the defense.
- As for terrorist incidents, while the U.S. has responded in the past with forces already in the area (the Med and Gulf), it is not clear that the speed of the response would act as a prior deterrent, as opposed to some kind of large, devastating response, if the targets can be found. In short, terrorist incidents spark retaliation, and the U.S. can pick the time, place, and size of that retaliation.

As for the other categories of situations (note that we avoid the use of the word "crisis"), the situations have taken a long time to develop, the U.S. Government may agonize about them in private, or discussions may take place in the press, but it seems to take an egregious incident to finally precipitate U.S. intervention.

What we have not undertaken in this review is a study of when the appropriate Unified Commanders might have been given warning orders to plan operations. They may have been given a long time to plan—a year in the case of Haiti, or, in the NATO organization, successive plans for intervention in Bosnia (the first having been a plan for the extraction of UNPROFOR troops)—or the government's decision might have come “out of the blue” as far as military planners are concerned, notwithstanding that the Chairman, JCS, and the Vice Chairman are deeply involved in an administration's deliberations.

When military planning begins and an operation is scheduled, it appears from the cases reviewed that it is forces present around the world—either in the immediate general area or the next region—that are used for the operation. The bigger the operation the more forces from CONUS will be used. In short, the U.S. has gotten used to keeping forces out around the world, even after the end of the Cold War: the 100,000 permanently stationed in both Europe and in Northeast Asia, and the continued regular deployment of U.S. naval forces. The carrier homeported in Japan and its escorts have been of particular utility, e.g., for the shows of force off Taiwan or Korea, and for deployment to the Gulf.

The biggest change has been the Southwest Asia area (Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean), especially after Desert Storm and the continued operations to contain Iraq (with the side benefit of containing Iran as well). The bases there have hardly the permanent, treaty status of those in Europe or Northeast Asia, but they haven't been closed and more are being opened up in Central Asia. It was the posture created in the Gulf area upon and after Desert Storm that facilitated the operation in Afghanistan.



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TABLE 1. WARNING TIME FOR MAJOR U.S. OPERATIONS

	Situation	Characteristics	First broke on world scene	Major incident	Initial U.S. response
1	Mayaguez Incident	Out of blue	12-May-75	12-May-75	12-May-75
2	Iraq invades Iran	Out of Blue	21-Sep-80	21-Sep-80	23-Sep-80
3	Red Sea Mines	Out of Blue	9 Jul 84 First explosion	27 Jul 84 Extent recognized	15 Aug 84 Start demining ops
4	Achille Lauro Hijack	Out of blue	07-Oct-85	07-Oct-85	10-Oct-85
5	Retaliate on Libya	Out of blue	05 Apr 86 Berlin disco bombing	05-Apr-86	09-Apr-86
6	Iraq invades Kuwait	Out of blue	01-Aug-90	01-Aug-90	07-Aug-90
7	Saddam build-up on border	out of blue	06-Oct-94	06-Oct-94	07-Oct-94
8	Embassy bombings in Africa	Out of blue	07-Aug-98	07-Aug-98	20-Aug-98
9	Retaliation for 9/11	Out of blue	11-Sep-01	11-Sep-01	07-Oct-01
10	Lebanon-MC Barracks bombed	Peak in mess	6 June 82 Israeli invasion	23 Oct 83 MC barracks bombed	22-Apr-83
11	Grenada	Peak in mess	14-Oct-83	14-Oct-83	20-Oct-83
12	US aids, defends Kurds	Peak in mess	26-Mar-91	3 Apr 91 Confirmation of CW use	06-Apr-91
13	Bosnia strikes	Peak in mess	03 Mar 92 Bosnian independence	28 Aug 95 Market mortar attack	29 Aug 95 Deliberate Strike
14	North Korean Nukes	Peak in mess	12 Mar 93 w/drawal from NPT	19 Mar 94 Breakdown of negotiations	1 June 94 (show force)
15	China threatens Taiwan	Peak in mess	23 Feb 96 Warning of missile tests	8 Mar 96 Missile tests	01-Mar-96
16	Inspectors kicked out of Iraq	Peak in mess	09 Dec 98 inspections blocked	09-Dec-98	16 Dec 98 Desert Fox
17	Bombing over Kosovo	Peak in mess	15 Jan 99 Racak massacre	19 Mar 99 Collapse of Rambouillet second round of talks	23-Mar-99
18	Kuwait tanker escort	Slowly gathering	28 Mar 84 First recorded attack	27-Jun-87	24-Jul-87
19	Panama-Noriega	Slowly gathering	11 Jun 86 NYT report of Noriega drug trafficking	04 Feb 88 Indictment of Noriega	17-Dec-89
20	Somalia--UNOSOM I	Slowly gathering	26 Jan 91 Siad Barré ousted	25 Nov 92 UN SYG report on failure of UN policy	09-Dec-92
21	Haiti	Slowly gathering	30 Sep 91 Aristide ousted	11 Oct 93 Harlan County incident	19-Sep-94
22	Iran hostages--Desert One	US choice	16-Jan-79	04-Nov-79	24-Apr-80
23	Libyan Shootdown (2SU-17)	US choice	18-Aug-81	19 Aug 81 Shootdown	18 Aug 81 (began FON)
24	U.S. invades Kuwait	US choice	01-Aug-90		17-Jan-91
25	Southern Watch over Iraq	US Choice	31 Jan 92 First reports on repression of Shia	11 Aug 92 UN report on systematic abuses	19-Aug-92

TABLE 1. WARNING TIME FOR MAJOR U.S. OPERATIONS

	Situation	Time from initiation to U.S. response	Response depend on presence?	Strategic Significance
1	Mayaguez Incident	Same day	Forces in area--at sea, Thailand (AF)	Exaggerated, post Vietnam
2	Iraq invades Iran	2 days	Had to deploy survey/advisors first	Very strategic--oil
3	Red Sea Mines	19 days		Odd incident--not repeated
4	Achille Lauro Hijack	3 days	Carrier air tracked hijackers to Italy	Terrorism as strategic?
5	Retaliate on Libya	4 days		Libya again--terrorism
6	Iraq invades Kuwait	7 days	Deployed 82nd Abn and MPS	Very strategic--sovereignty & oil
7	Saddam build-up on border	One day	Carrier, ARG in Gulf; prepo bde	Contain Iraq
8	Embassy bombings in Africa	13 days	US choice when to retaliate; SCs in IO	Terrorism gone global
9	Retaliation for 9/11	One month to assemble force	CV, ARG in area; lots of bases; rest deployed	Terrorism as the global threat
10	Lebanon-MC Barracks bombed	MC in PKO 10 months after invasion	U.S. took time to react; NEOs earlier	Lebanon not strategic
11	Grenada	6 days	Within a few days of U.S.	Exaggerated--fear of Soviet base off Panama
12	US aids, defends Kurds	3 days	Provide Comfort---US base in Turkey	Contain Iraq
13	Bosnia strikes	4 years	18-day Deliberate Force; lots of time	Humanitarian; stabilize Europe
14	North Korean Nukes	2.5 months after breakdown of negotiations	US forces in Korea & Japan	Critical for non-proliferation
15	China threatens Taiwan	6 days	China sends warnings on test; Indy on station by time of test, Nimitz two weeks later	China-US strategic confrontation over Taiwan
16	Inspectors kicked out of Iraq	One week	Desert Fox--CV and SCs in PG	Critical--stop proliferation
17	Bombing over Kosovo	Force in place 17 Feb 99 --one month ahead of initiation of campaign	Forces in Europe; time to deploy; forces in place earlier, but stood down after first Rambouillet Agreement; TR two weeks into campaign	Humanitarian; stabilize Europe
18	Kuwait tanker escort	About a month	U.S. escorts had been around	Very strategic--oil
19	Panama-Noriega	Nearly two years after indictment	US bases in Panama facilitated	Not strategic, unless Noriega-Castro connection
20	Somalia--UNOSOM I	Nearly two years	ARG, CV avail. In IO; doubled them	Humanitarian; wasn't Bosnia
21	Haiti	3 years (incidents along way)	Haiti close to U.S.	None--keep boat people home
22	Iran hostages--Desert One	7 months	Nimitz routine deployment	Political--Carter had to do something
23	Libyan Shootdown (2SU-17)	20 days	Used carriers present in Med	Is Libya strategic? A rogue and real pest...
24	U.S. invades Kuwait	Nearly six months to assemble force	Long build-up--got bases in Saudi	Very strategic--sovereignty
25	Southern Watch over Iraq	1 year and 7 months	Bases in Saudi; keep CV in Gulf	Contain Iraq

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# Appendix A

## An analysis of warning time from CRM 97-100

Warning time, or time available for planning of responses, is defined in this Appendix as the amount of time between the first order relating to an operation and the execution order for that operation. CNA researched this "paper trail" of orders from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the regional CINCs. The findings were declassified and released to CNA by the Joint Staff.

We were able to find data covering only 21 of the 40 harm's-way responses, and some orders may be missing from the reconstructed "paper trail." The table on the next page indicates the earliest order CNA located for each of the operations we were able to track. The table on the next page indicates order type, date time groups (DTGs) for the first order and the execution order (EXORD), and the amount of time between the two. Warning time is divided into four categories: none, less than 1 week, 1 to 3 weeks, and more than 3 weeks.

Of the 21 responses for which CNA tracked the orders, 14 occurred with less than 1 week available for planning time. Some operations, mostly the larger one, had substantial time for planning. This was the case, for example, for Deny Flight in Bosnia and United Shield in Somalia.

More work remains to be done to fully understand the warning-time implications of the harm's-way situations that have arisen in the 1990s. The situation in Iraq requires continual vigilance, because Saddam Hussein can act on a moment's notice. On a superficial basis, however, we can group the situations according to how they arose and characterize the U.S. Government decisions to respond to them. We group them as follows:

- The sudden, out-of-the-blue situations tended to be associated only with Iraq and with those events that trigger the need for NEOs. Iraq attacked out of the blue in 1990 (as it had attacked Iran in 1980), and built up forces on the Kuwaiti border quite quickly in October 1994.
- Some of the situations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, however, built up slowly over time to the point that they became intolerable. In such cases, the U.S. decisions to intervene were at times of our own choosing, following long periods of decision-making by the U.S. Government. There were minor actions by U.S. forces in each of those situations before the main intervention.
- There were considerable warnings before the successive crises over the North Korean nuclear program required precautionary actions. This was also the case before the Taiwan Straits situation, as tensions and PRC signals grew before the Taiwanese elections in 1996.
- A number of actions were taken entirely at times of our own choosing -TLAM and air strikes against Iraq, for example.

In summary, opportunities for deliberate planning before undertaking responses seem ample in the 1990s, but particular incidents may occur in situations in which we are already engaged in some manner, requiring quick responses by U.S. forces already on the scene.

Table 2. Contingency operations: time between first order and execute order

Operation	Order Type; DTG of first order	EXORD DTG	Time of Planning
Bosnia: Decisive Endeavor	ALORD 041805ZNov95	021425ZDec95	>3wks
Bosnia: Deny Flight	SACEUR planning 301700ZDec92	092256ZArpr93	>3wks
CAR: Quick Response	none found	301835ZApr96 <sup>a</sup>	0
Haiti: Support Democracy	PLANODR 061354ZMay94	201555ZMay94	1-3 Week
Haiti: Uphold Democracy	ALORD 081115ZSep94	190803ZSep94	1-3 Week
Haiti: Sea Signal	CINC OpOrder 151715ZDec92	161650ZJan93	>3 Wks
Iraq: Desert Shield	none	020602ZAug90 <sup>c</sup>	0
Iraq: cruise missile strikes	none	270100ZJune93	0
Iraq: Desert Strike	DEPLOYORD 310155ZAug96	022150ZSep96	<1 Week
Iraq: MIO	ALORD 111700ZAug90	162310ZAug90	<1 Week
Iraq: Provide Comfort	CINC OpOrder 062043ZApr91	070044ZApr91	<1 Week
Iraq: Southern Watch	CINC OpOrder 201300ZAug92	261633ZAug92	<1 Week
Iraq: Vigilant Sentinel	none	171226ZAug95 <sup>d</sup>	0
Iraq: Vigilant Warrior	DEPLOYORD 081410ZOct94	100130ZAug94	<1 Week
Liberia: Assured Response	ALORD 070233ZApr96	092255ZApr96	<1 Week
N. Korea: reactor talks	none	122326ZApr95 <sup>e</sup>	0
Rwanda: Distant Runner	WARNORD 072331ZApr94	091310ZApr94	<1 Week
Somalia: Impressive Lift	WARNORD 20 November 1992	17 Feb 1993 <sup>f</sup>	>3 weeks
Somalia: Restore Hope	WARNORD 011335ZDec92	5 December <sup>g</sup>	>1 week
Somalia: United Shield	WARNORD 152218ZAug94	051626ZJan95	>3 weeks
Somalia: Ranger incident	CINC report for forces 5 Oct 93	072125ZOct93 <sup>h</sup>	>1 week

- a. Modification to execution order for NEO Assured Response in Liberia, which detached forces to C Quick Response.
- b. For enforcement of enhanced sanctions passed by UNSCR of 6 May 1994. Enforcement operation earlier sanctions began in October 1993.
- c. DEPLOYORD.
- d. DEPLOYORD.
- e. DEPLOYORD that ordered a carrier battle group to a 5-day tether from Cheju-Do, and a 9-day Cheju-Do for an ARG with embarked MEU (SOC).
- f. Order's date-time groups were unavailable for this operation.
- g. Date-time group unavailable. First forces arrived 9 December.
- h. DEPLOYORD.