This study examines the current PLA Navy leadership. It identifies the most critical navy leadership positions within the four PLA General Departments, PLA Navy Headquarters, China's military regions, and the three fleets. The study identifies commonalities shared by the entire cohort of navy leaders, as well as key characteristics possessed only by smaller groups within that cohort. It identifies common career paths and typical professional experiences shared by different types of navy leaders, and the criteria by which their careers have been evaluated. It also examines the challenges and opportunities facing China's navy leadership, including the emergence of blue-water operations, and their impact on the career advancement opportunities for China's younger generation of navy leaders. As China's maritime interests expand, naval officers are being tasked with a growing array of new and more complex missions. How China's navy handles these missions depends largely on the quality of its leadership. By providing a more nuanced and comprehensive assessment of this cohort, we hope to advance the U.S. Navy's understanding of the officers leading the PLA Navy.
Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5205.15E defines the Defense Forensic Enterprise (DFE) as "those DOD resources, assets, and processes that provide forensic science analysis linking persons, places, things, and events." The Office of the Director Defense Biometrics and Forensics (ODDBF) executes many of the Principal Staff Assistant responsibilities for Defense Forensics on behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. ODDBF tasked CNA's Center for Naval Analyses to assess the assignments and arrangements of the two Executive Agents (EA), the Secretary of the Army for non-digital forensics and Secretary of the Air Force for digital/multimedia forensics, for their effectiveness and efficiency in satisfying end user requirements. We recommend that the Secretary of the Army and Secretary of the Air Force continue in their roles as DOD EAs for forensics. We provide prioritized recommendations for each EA to improve the execution of its responsibilities. We also provide a status report of the DFE over the past 5 years. We identify important issues facing the DFE in the areas of governance, information sharing, expeditionary laboratories and exploitation analysis centers, intelligence, DNA, personnel accounting, and strategic communications.
This report describes findings from the first year of a five-year evaluation of the Florida College and Career Readiness Initiative (FCCRI) conducted by CNA, funded by a grant from the U.S. Department of Education. One goal of the report is to help Florida educators at all levels to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the FCCRI's design and implementation, as well as describe recommendations from teachers to make the initiative more effective. A second goal is to inform educators in other states and the research community about our work.
CNA's Integrated Ship Database (ISDB) brings together data on naval ships from disparate online government sources such as the Naval Vessel Register, the Military Sealift Command's Ship Inventory, USN Chief of Information's Navy Fact File, the Naval History and Heritage Command's Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, and the Maritime Administration's Naval Defense Reserve Fleet Inventory. This CNA Interactive Software product is our update with data as of September 30, 2012. It represents the 26th quarterly update of the ISDB since its inception in December 2005.
Historically, the Sunnis in Lebanon have had difficulty raising viable militias. Mainstream leaders have traditionally rejected wholesale military mobilization, preferring to pursue their community's interests through the political process. Indeed, most of the Sunni fighters in Lebanon today belong to extremist groups, which have thus far failed to garner significant public support. However, there are indications that the calculus for militia building may be changing. Since the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, the failure of the political elite to protect Sunni interests has reinforced a sense of victimization, and has created space for the growth of militant fundamentalist groups eager to claim the role of community defenders. As sectarian tensions grow, fueled by developments in Syria and Hizballah's continued role in that conflict, the Sunni population may come to perceive regional instability as an existential threat. In this case, those leaders willing to employ violence to protect Sunni interests may gain legitimacy in the eyes of the community.
As part of President Obama's commitment to help veterans successfully transition, the Marine Corps' Marine and Family Programs Division (MF) asked CNA to create a demographic profile of Marines who have a high likelihood of collecting Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX). In addition, and separate from the UCX analysis, MF asked CNA to create a demographic profile of Marines who have a high probability of using Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) benefits. In this annotated briefing, we present the characteristics of recent Marine Corps separators, UCX recipients, and MGIB recipients. Then, we predict a Marine's propensity to collect UCX in CY11-CY12 Q2, given UCX eligibility, for those who separated from the Marine Corps between CY10 Q3 and CY12 Q1. Veterans must apply for UCX within three quarters of separation. Separately, we predict a Marine's propensity to use the MGIB, given MGIB eligibility, for those who separated from the Marine Corps between CY03 and CY07. MGIB-eligible veterans have up to 10 years after separation to use their MGIB benefits. We find that Marines who have a higher probability of collecting UCX in CY11-CY12 Q2 are nonwhite, female, married, have children, are lower quality, separated during or at the end of their first terms, had a single deployment, live in states with higher unemployment rates, are less disabled, or are in combat service support or command and control occupations. We also find that Marines who that have a higher probability of using the MGIB are nonwhite, female, unmarried, have no children, are higher quality, separated during or at the end of their first or second terms, had a single deployment, live in states with higher unemployment rates, are less disabled, or are in combat arms occupations. To conclude, we present discovered inefficiencies and areas for future research.
Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011 brought about the hereditary transition of power to a third generation. Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il's youngest son, assumed the mantle of Supreme Leader. In a little over a year, he had acquired all of the titles of power, including supreme commander, first secretary of the Korean Workers' Party, and first chairman of the National Defense Commission. But this accumulation of titles does not mean that Kim has consolidated his power, a process that may take another year or two. This paper will examine the leadership dynamics surrounding Kim Jong-un's first year in power, in an attempt to piece together the picture of how decision-making and policy execution work under the new leader. It will begin with a discussion of the politics of power consolidation and the centers of power within the regime. This will be followed by a speculative discussion of how decision-making might work.
On November 12, 2013, the People's Republic of China announced the creation of a new "Nationa Security Commission." Although few details were offered, PRC official sources and commentary by senior PRC security experts provide insight into its purpose and expected achievements. This essay examines Chinese discussions of the new commission and concludes with some thoughts about key analytic issues.
The National Guard Youth Challenge (ChalleNGe) Program is a 22-week residential program (plus a 12-week nonresidential phase), serving 16- to 18-year-old high school dropouts as well as students at risk of dropping out. We focus on one ChalleNGe program, the Washington Youth Academy (WYA), and analyze the extent to which cadets' skills improve over the course of the program. We measure cognitive skills using Math, Applied Math, Reading, and Language scores from the Test of Adult Basic Education (TABE) and measure noncognitive skills based on cadets' survey responses. Both the TABE and the survey were given to cadets twice—at the beginning of the program and again at end. Our findings reveal that cadets experience improvements in both cognitive and noncognitive skills. They exit the WYA program with higher grade-level skills in all four components of the TABE. The cadets also indicated higher noncognitive abilities at the end of the WYA program than when they began. In addition, we find positive effects from the WYA's adoption of the online Khan Academy math curriculum, particularly on Applied Math test scores.
This report examines Iran's strategy in the Middle East and how it has been impacted by a variety of factors (from sanctions and sabotage aimed at undermining its nuclear program, to political turmoil and regional change associated with the Arab Spring). It argues that a confluence of pressures and regional events have proved challenging to Iran's national security and undermined its strategic efforts in the region. It examines how Iran has responded to these challenges, and discusses how its behavior in the future could be shaped by various political and regional dynamics.
In this paper, we survey the various Delayed Entry Program (DEP) practices of the services. We find that, while the services share common goals with regard to their DEPs, there are noticeable differences in policies and procedures. The deterioration of the civilian economy in the late 2000s appears to have provided an opportunity for the services to experiment with their DEP practices. One notable example is the Army's shift to Small Unit Recruiting, especially their creation of a central "Future Soldier Leader." The services could likely benefit from pooling their knowledge of their successes and failures. We also examine the effect of time in DEP on DEP and active-duty attrition. Consistent with recruiter insights, we find that longer DEP stays are related to higher DEP attrition for all services. However, longer DEP stays are also associated with lower active-duty attrition for all services, implying a tradeoff between DEP and active duty attrition. Interestingly, the services have chosen different average DEP stays, and thus different tradeoffs.
Navy leadership is concerned that reduced levels of organizational level (O-level) maintenance personnel experience and outside technical assistance may be lowering aircraft readiness. This study examined annual maintenance factors data for 13 squadron types and 145 squadrons (both fixed-wing and rotary) for the past nine years. We determined that aircraft availability has dropped by 5.8 points to a current maintenance support rate (MSR) of 60.6.
As part of its Maritime Asia project, CNA's Center for Naval Analyses conducted a joint workshop on maritime security issues in East Asia with the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) Study Group from Yonsei University in Seoul. The purpose of this workshop was to explore the commonalities and contrasts between the U.S. and Korean perspectives on the most pressing security issues in the East Asian maritime domain. Participants in this Maritime Asia workshop discussed a broad range of East Asian maritime security topics and, among these, identified flashpoints that could result in open hostilities in the region. This report examines South Korean security issues related to the maritime domain, East China Sea disputes, and the prospects for international legal mechanisms to resolve maritime disputes in East Asia.
This paper describes a panel discussion CNA/CHS held on China's most recent defense white paper, released in April 2013. It presents the main observations that emerged from this discussion.
This study addresses two research questions: What are the links between illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and piracy in Somalia? What role does the maritime sector play in emerging transnational threats such as drug trafficking, the illegal arms trade, and human smuggling in Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania?
Insights into an adversary's strategic and operational calculus can be gained by examining similar cases. One such case is the evolution in the U.S. understanding of the Soviet Union's strategic and operational calculus regarding the wartime employment of its navy during the last two decades of the Cold War. This paper analyzes, as a case study, the Reagan administration's Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, which was principally aimed at the Soviet Union. It then applies insights from that case study to a contemporary potential adversary -- 21st century Iran -- as an example. This analysis will help national security decision-makers and their staffs become aware of the range of methods that can be used to understand an adversary's strategic and operational calculus; and the uses to which such an understanding can be put.
This paper examines the calculus behind North Korea's decisions to conduct provocations and its capability to carry them out. The paper explores how the North Korean regime balances the risks of escalation with potential benefits to be gained by provocation. It also considers the impact of South Korea's "Proactive Deterrence Strategy" on Pyongyang's risk calculus. Finally, it examines the events of March–April 2013 for indications of change in how North Korea views the issue of escalation and whether it has changed its risk calculus in the Kim Jong-un era.
This paper examines Iranian operational-level military decision-making from the perspective of historical case studies. Specifically, it analyzes the various factors and processes that influenced Iranian military commanders during four major operations of the Iran-Iraq War and what these operations might tell us about current-day military decision-making. Although a significant period of time has elapsed since the war, most of Iran's senior military leaders participated in the conflict, which constituted a defining moment in the history of the Islamic Republic. It is also the only example of a major state-on-state conflict in the post-revolutionary period. Iran's military academies and training centers have devoted a great deal of attention to studying the war, in part to derive operationally useful lessons for the present. Thus, despite the passage of time, the war remains relevant to understanding the mindset of today's military leaders in Iran.
Traditionally, the Navy has set sailors' initial contract lengths to ensure a return on investment (ROI) from sailors' training. The current mix of 4-, 5=, and 6-year Navy enlistment contracts is partially a result of the ROI framework. However, this approach is not necessarily aligned with the sea-shore flow. We find that many sailors finish their end of active obligated service (EAOS) before they complete their first prescribed sea tour (PST), which follows training. Because these sailors tend to complete their tours at much lower rates, we recommend that the Navy align PST and EAOS by increasing sailors' initial obligation, which would increase sea tour completion rates. The "T+X" pilot—a program launched in 2011 that proposes enlistment contract lengths be based on the length of training (T) plus the length of the initial operational tour (X)—is already doing this. Preliminary data show that lengthening obligations for T+X sailors has not affected recruit composition or early attrition rates. Based on these findings, we present simplified estimates of cost savings, which range from $7.35 million to $11.67 million per year, depending on economic conditions. Finally, we discuss the shortcomings of the data on enlistment incentives and explain how that prevents us from precisely identifying the cost of increased commitment from recruits. We also suggest ideas for future pilot programs, including several randomized experiments, which would help fill the current data gaps.
Although many sailors still join the Navy with a 4-year enlistment contract, longer contracts have become more common. Especially before the recent recession, the Navy offered enlistment bonuses to sailors who agreed to an additional year of obligation. Because 4-year contracts often expire before a sailor completes an initial sea tour, lengthening first-term contracts offers the potential to improve alignment and thus increase the number of completed sea tours among this group. We examine data on applicants and enlistees from 2003 forward. We split our data into two periods based on civilian conditions. Although we do not model the detailing process explicitly, our reduced-form models suggest that applicants are relatively insensitive to obligation length; regardless of civilian conditions, the availability of longer/shorter terms has little explanatory power over the decision to enlist. Consistent with this, we find that obligation length has little relationship to first-term attrition. These findings, coupled with the relatively modest cost of increasing obligations through initial bonuses, suggest that gains from increasing initial obligations to align with sea tours could be considerable. However, a well-designed pilot program will allow the Navy to make a more accurate assessment of the benefits and costs of increasing contract length.
This is the sixth and final report associated with an 18-month study to explore the security situation that the U.S. faces as it disengages from major ground combat in Afghanistan and evolves toward more of an off-shore strategy.
As part of its Maritime Asia project, CNA conducted the third workshop in this series. The workshop focused on Japan's territorial disputes, which Japan has with all of its near neighbors. Two in particular have assumed a higher profile over the past year. The nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea by Tokyo has turned into a serious crisis, while the dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets between Japan and South Korea has derailed the bilateral security progress that Japan and South Korea made in early 2012. At a time when all of the concerned powers have experienced a leadership transition, there is indeed both opportunity and danger for Japan in its territorial disputes. This conference report explores the security implications for Japan of its unresolved territorial disputes and the implications of those disputes for the U.S.-Japan alliance.
The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) asked CNA to analyze how the improvised explosive device (IED) threat will develop in the 2015-2020 timeframe. Although IEDs were used extensively in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the trajectory of the IED threat over the next seven years is uncertain. To address this question, we assessed: 1. The IED threat to deployed forces; 2. The IED threat to the U.S. homeland; 3. Innovations that could enhance the effectiveness of IEDs; and 4. Emergent threats that could develop into a favored asymmetric tactic. The analyses of these issues will inform upcoming decisions about the counter-IED capabilities that the United States will need to maintain.
On the morning of January 17, 2012, a new Tuareg group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, began of a full-fledged assault that expelled the Malian government from the north of the country and created an opening for Islamist extremists in the region. To stem the southward advance of militants, the French military intervened. On March 22, 2013, CNA's Center for Strategic Studies convened a small group discussion to identify Tuareg aspirations and examine post-conflict political dynamics in Mali. The meeting brought together noted academics, journalists, and experts from the United States and abroad.
Large-scale events provide local governments with a number of valuable opportunities, including increasing revenue, revitalizing a city, and providing an increased sense of community. With these benefits comes greater responsibility for local law enforcement to ensure the public's safety. When law enforcement executives are tasked with managing a large event, they can maximize their efforts by learning from other agencies and adopting proven practices. Too often, however, past lessons learned are not documented in a clear and concise manner. To address this information gap, the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance worked in partnership with CNA to develop this Planning Primer. This Planning Primer synthesizes salient best practices pertaining to security planning for a large-scale event, specifically pre-event planning, core event operations, and post-event activities. The Planning Primer includes detailed information on 18 core operational areas that law enforcement executives can give to lead law enforcement planners as supplemental guidance. This guidance can be used as a foundation for coordinating area-specific operational plans and can be modified to accommodate event security requirements and existing protocols. Furthermore, supplementing each operational area presented in the Planning Primer are actionable templates, checklists, and key considerations designed to facilitate the planning process (see Appendix A: Planning Toolkit).
The Bay of Bengal is now unique in that it was the first time that the newly constituted International Law of the Sea Tribunal (ITLOS) in Hamburg adjudicated a comprehensive maritime boundary dispute between the overlapping continental and maritime zone claims of Bangladesh and Myanmar. There were serious economic and political consequences for both states in the event of an adverse decision;2 yet, both states consented to the jurisdiction of the ITLOS to decide their overlapping maritime boundaries. The big question surrounding this decision is whether this case is just another judicial decree or something special. We will also examine whether there are things in this decision that policy makers can build upon to help resolve other maritime disputes. In my view, this decision was both positive and precedent setting - both as a matter of international law and policy and because it helped assure the continuing viability of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
The CNA China Studies Division is pleased to make available an in-house translation of an article written by Lieutenant General Qi Jianguo of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Given General Qi's official portfolio (foreign relations and intelligence), it warrants the attention of outside readers interested in how a senior Chinese military official views important regional and global security issues, China's own security situation, and especially the United States. Although LTG Qi's analysis may not represent an official PRC position, it is possibly the most detailed public assessment of the rebalancing policy made to date by a senior PRC military official.
This document provides biographic information on key Chinese military officers, including PLA General Staff Deputy Chief Lt. General Qi Jianguo, PLA Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli, and important PLA Navy South Sea Fleet officers.
The Indian Ocean is growing as an area of strategic interest to U.S. policymakers. In fact, the National Security Council is undertaking a review of U.S. interests and force posture implications in the Indian Ocean. In an era of decreasing defense budgets, however, the United States must be judicious in applying limited resources to build partnerships with countries in this vast region. Given that the United States seeks to work with India to promote regional stability, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) asked CNA to investigate the potential for the U.S. Navy and the Indian Navy to coordinate on the provision of security assistance and capacity-building in the Indian Ocean as a form of security burden-sharing. To do this, we first conducted a systematic analysis of both U.S. and Indian security cooperation with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. We then surveyed official and expert perspectives in all five countries on the possibility of coordinated U.S. and Indian security cooperation in the IO. Finally, we developed recommendations in pursuit of this goal. Functional areas such as counterpiracy, CT, HA/DR, and maritime domain awareness were briefly assessed as areas of coordination, while Seychelles and Mauritius were also examined in a secondary tier of analysis.
On the afternoon of October 6, 1973, on Yom Kippur the armies of Egypt and Syria launched major assaults against Israeli positions along the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights. It has long been rumored that in this desperate context Israel alerted or somehow manipulated its nuclear forces – perhaps in order to "blackmail" the United States into providing greater support, or to deter further Arab assault. If true, this would constitute one of the very few serious nuclear "threats" of the nuclear era. In light of the continued and perhaps growing salience of nuclear weapons – and thus also their political "uses"– in the hands of U.S. adversaries as well as allies and partners, this episode has enduring relevance. Together with other examples drawn from crises and conflicts, it helps elucidate how nuclear weapons can affect and influence the course of politics and war. This study is the first of this kind on this incident and represents the results of almost a year of extensive research in U.S. Government archives and in the open literature, numerous interviews with participants and scholars, and the convocation of an experts' workshop.
The military has two different systems for paying housing allowances—the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) system used in the 50 states and the Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA) system used abroad. Currently, servicemembers in the U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) receive OHA. Congress is considering switching the allowance system in the U.S. territories from OHA to BAH. The allowance systems are very different. OHA, for the most part, is a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement for actual housing expenses. BAH, essentially, is a compensation payment in lieu of providing on-base housing for servicemembers; with BAH, there are no restrictions on how the servicemember actually spends the income. This study evaluates both systems and their applicability to the territories. For Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, it estimates future BAH rates, short-term transition costs from OHA to BAH, and long-term cost comparisons between OHA and BAH. The study also estimates effects on the quality of life for servicemembers and effects on local housing markets.
This report addresses the major security issues associated with the South China Sea.
The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship is a minimally manned platform that requires a large amount of sustainment support from shore commands. The Navy leadership is concerned that the commands that provide support to LCS achieve economies of scope and scale such that efficiencies are realized. This study examines the tasks, organizational structure, and business processes of these commands to see what changes could be made to be more efficient in providing sustainment services to LCS.
At their 15th year of service, military personnel who are eligible and intend to serve for 20 years must choose either: (1) High-3 retirement plan or (2) A reduced retirement (REDUX) and a $30,000 bonus paid at the 15th year of service. This paper is designed to help servicemembers make that decision. We describe the REDUX/bonus option as an early, partial cash-out of the servicemember's retirement pension that the member pays back in the form of reduced retirement checks over his or her entire lifetime. We calculate how much the servicemember will "pay back" (the reduction in pension benefits) and we calculate the implied APR or interest rate for this loan. For example, an E-7 who retires at age 38 with 20 years of service is paying an implicit interest rate of 14.9 percent and would see his or her retired pay reduced by $387,714 if he or she lived to 79 years. Even if the servicemember received the bonus tax free, the repayment amount is almost 13 times the amount of the loan ($30,000). If this servicemember lives to 85, the repayment amount would be $512,694. For virtually all servicemembers, choosing REDUX/bonus is a bad (and costly) decision.
Past CNA studies have found that a sizable share of sea tours are incomplete and that average sea duty served falls short of sailors' Prescribed Sea Tours (PSTs). In this study, we examine more recent data on sea tour incompletions (STIs) and analyze what's driving STIs. Focusing on men, we find that not all sea tours are being completed, most notably sea tours with 60-month PSTs. However, we find that average sea duty served approximately equals PSTs (when we exclude STIs due to enlisted Navy losses). When it comes to the drivers of STIs, we find that a majority of STIs are due to enlisted Navy losses. Among non-loss STIs, the largest group are those that cannot be explained by reasons that we are able to identify in our data. In summary, STIs are less problematic than previously thought. For those who remain in the enlisted Navy, sailors are staying at sea for the length of their PSTs, on average. But, the Navy is still losing sea duty in the form of STIs and losses to the enlisted Navy. We urge the Navy to add PSTs to the enlisted personnel files so that STIs may be more readily tracked.
At their 15th year of service, military personnel who are eligible and intend to serve for 20 years must choose either: (1) High-3 retirement plan or (2) A reduced retirement (REDUX) and a $30,000 bonus paid at the 15th year of service. This briefing is designed to help servicemembers make that decision. We describe the REDUX/bonus option as an early, partial cash-out of the servicemember's retirement pension that the member pays back in the form of reduced retirement checks over his or her entire lifetime. We calculate how much the servicemember will "pay back" (the reduction in pension benefits) and we calculate the implied APR or interest rate for this loan. For example, an E-7 who retires at age 38 with 20 years of service is paying an implicit interest rate of 14.9 percent and would see his or her retired pay reduced by $387,714 if he or she lived to 79 years. Even if the servicemember received the bonus tax free, the repayment amount is almost 13 times the amount of the loan ($30,000). If this servicemember lives to 85, the repayment amount would be $512,694. For virtually all servicemembers, choosing REDUX/bonus is a bad (and costly) decision.
This report looks at the larger factors that drive cooperation and competition among Syria's Sunni Arab rebel groups. It investigates the question: Why have Syria's rebel groups failed to unify? The report examines how goals and resources could be affecting rebel alliance building in Syria. We first identify the major segments of the Sunni Arab rebellion and discuss their key goals. We then discuss how rebel groups have acquired resources through the external support of foreign states and wealthy private donors. We then analyze how divergent goals and resource levels appear to have influenced rebel alliance building and the rebellion thus far. Finally, we discuss what the current trends in alliance building could mean for the future of the Syrian civil war and its aftermath.
As CNA concludes the celebration of our 70th year, we reflect on the pivotal roles our analysts have played—and continue to play—in supporting our military and government leaders in their important work at home and abroad. From World War II to the war in Afghanistan, from homeland security to education, on site in locations across the country and around the world, CNA analysts have always been, and remain, out in front when it counts, delivering analytical excellence. This diverse research agenda is carried out by a world-class staff of professionals that includes statisticians, political scientists, economists, chemists, physicists, engineers, and many more disciplines. To honor those efforts, we've expanded this 2012 Year in Review to include highlights from our past that stand as milestones of our 70-year history and that are the foundation of our work today.
On February 21, 2013, CNA's Center for Strategic Studies convened a group of Middle East experts with academic and U.S. government backgrounds for a dialogue on the future prospects for Syria and possible policy options for the United States. The discussion was structured to focus on four key aspects of the conflict: Future of regime elites and the minority question; the changing role of regional states and external influence; jihadist networks in Syria and their implications for terrorism; and options for U.S. policy and involvement.
The U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) worked in partnership with CNA to provide technical assistance and support to local law enforcement security operations prior to and during the 2012 national conventions. The primary goal of the technical assistance was to develop an after-action report (AAR) that documents key findings of the overall security planning and operations. CNA analysts deployed to Tampa, Florida to support the Tampa Police Department's (TPD) public safety and security operations for the 2012 Republican National Convention (RNC) from Sunday, August 26 through Friday, August 31, 2012.
The U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) worked in partnership with the CNA Corporation to provide technical assistance and support to local law enforcement security operations prior to and during the 2012 national conventions. The primary goal of the technical assis-tance was to develop an after-action report (AAR) that documents key findings of the overall security planning and operations. CNA analysts deployed to Charlotte, North Carolina to support the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department's (CMPD) public safety and security operations for the 2012 Democratic National Convention (DNC) from Sunday, September 2 through Thursday, September 6, 2012.
This report addresses the major security issues associated with the Sea of Japan.
In this study, we assess what costing methodologies are most appropriate for the AC/RC force mix allocation process and consider whether there are well-defined best practices for identifying the roles and missions to which the active and reserve components should be employed. We demonstrate that there are shortcomings in the way costs are currently accounted for by the services and that, as a result, there is significantly greater scope than is generally believed for the cost-effective use of the RC in support of operational deployments. We recommend that any comparison of AC and RC costs should not consider the strategic and operational capabilities in isolation, but should simultaneously consider units' strategic and operational roles. Our analysis also discusses the cost elements that should be considered in the AC/RC force mix allocation process. We suggest that identifying the full set of capabilities in which the RC can support recurring deployments of units should involve community-by-community analyses of alternatives that focus on changes in resources, activities, and missions that would result from a reallocation of structure. We show that the need for detailed assessment becomes increasingly important as planners consider using components in never-before-used ways.
This study is an investigation into nonproductive time focuses on two issues in the Navy's Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (MPT&E) supply chain. Our objectives were (1) to develop a tool to assist PERS4 in the transition to billet-based distribution (BBD) of personnel and (2) to analyze ways to optimize efficiency in the MPT&E supply chain with respect to the amount of time sailors spend awaiting instruction and/or orders. To fulfill the first objective, we developed a tool, the EDPROJ Redux that projects the number of sailors available for distribution each month across an 18-month time horizon, thus supporting the transition to BBD. To fulfill the second objective, we used a simulation model, based on the push-pull supply chain strategy, to analyze the non-productive time between A-school and C-school. We find that the presence of some number of nonproductive sailors between these stages of training is necessary for supply efficiency and flexibility; however, there are many more students awaiting instruction (in C-school) than there are students awaiting orders (from the fleet).
CNA's Integrated Ship Database (ISDB) brings together data on naval ships from disparate online government sources such as the Naval Vessel Register, the Military Sealift Command's Ship Inventory, USN Chief of Information's Navy Fact File, the Naval History and Heritage Command's Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, and the Maritime Administration's Naval Defense Reserve Fleet Inventory. This CNA Interactive Software product is our update with data as of June 30, 2012. It represents the 26th quarterly update of the ISDB since its inception in December 2005.