Assessment of CBSI Partner Nation Capabilities for Maritime Security and Law Enforcement

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with contributions by Elizabeth S. Lee and Alexander Powell
Abstract

The US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) asked CNA for independent assessments of the current maritime security and law enforcement capabilities of Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) partners. This report describes CNA’s approach and method for conducting the assessments, offers a framework for interpreting these capabilities, and presents analyses for twelve of the CBSI partner nations: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago; as well as two Caribbean cooperative security institutions: CARICOM IMPACS and the Regional Security System. These assessments are concise snapshots of partner capabilities relevant to the goals of INL CBSI as of March 2022.

This document contains the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report should not be construed as representing the official position of the Department of the Navy.

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Cover image: Veronica De Allende, during field work at Bridgetown, Barbados, Dec. 2021

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Executive Summary

The US Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) asked CNA for independent assessments of the current maritime security and law enforcement capabilities of Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) partners. This report describes CNA’s approach and method for conducting these assessments; offers a framework for presenting these capabilities; and presents assessments of two cooperative multilateral institutions, the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security and the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System, and twelve CBSI partner states: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. These assessments are concise snapshots of country capabilities relevant to the goals of INL CBSI as of March 2022. This information serves as the basis for CNA’s evaluation of all of INL’s CBSI maritime activities, programs, and investments from 2016 to 2021, found in the companion document: Evaluation of INL’s CBSI Maritime Activities and Investments 2016-2021 (CNA DRM-2022-U-032652-Final).
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Introduction

The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) is a multilateral security partnership established in 2010 among countries of the Caribbean region, including the United States. US CBSI efforts conducted by various divisions of the Department of State, including the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), aim to reduce illicit trafficking, increase citizen security, and promote crime prevention in individual partner nations (PNs) and throughout the region by supporting cooperative regional institutions. The CBSI members are Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The cooperative multilateral institutions that the CBSI supports are the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS).

As Figure 1 shows, CBSI member states are coastal or island nations with vast maritime territories, important maritime-related economic sectors such as fishing and tourism, and key maritime resources to protect. The Caribbean region lies between a major narcotics production zone and the world’s largest narcotics market, the United States; the smuggling of narcotics and other illicit goods, as well as human migrants, is common. Other maritime security challenges include illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, at-sea robbery and piracy, and natural disasters.

Caribbean nations, many of which have small populations and limited economies, struggle to face these various challenges alone. Although many have relatively institutionalized rule of law and judicial systems,1 in practice they often lack the capacity and resources to enforce laws effectively, particularly those involving complicated maritime jurisdictional or evidential issues. Despite the economic importance of maritime resources and industries, most of these nations’ governments have some degree of “sea blindness,” that is, a tendency to focus on law enforcement and public policy issues on land to the detriment of their maritime space and

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1 The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, for example, ranks governance, public security, and the rule of law in most of the CBSI nations among the top 20 to 30 percent of all Latin American and Caribbean nations, on par globally with nations such as Poland, Greece, and Malaysia. Rule of Law Index, World Justice Project, 2021, accessed May 9, 2022, https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global.
resources and to underinvest in protecting and developing these resources.\textsuperscript{2} The country
assessments illustrate this issue; many of these nations have limited capacities for surveilling
and controlling their maritime territories and investigating and prosecuting maritime crimes.
Multinational cooperative efforts, such as the CARICOM IMPACS and the RSS, and cooperation

\textsuperscript{2} Laura Burroughs et al., \textit{Stable Seas: Caribbean,} One Earth Future and I.R. Consillium, Dec. 2020, doi:
with other regional partners, including the US, are important mechanisms for collective action to address regional threats.

INL asked CNA to conduct two analyses. One is a collection of independent assessments of CBSI partners’ current maritime security and law enforcement capabilities. The other is an evaluation of the effectiveness of CBSI programs and efforts from 2016 to 2021. This document presents our assessments of CBSI partners’ capabilities, without any in-depth information about INL CBSI efforts. A companion document, *Evaluation of INL’s CBSI Maritime Activities and Investments 2016-2021* (CNA DRM-2022-U-032652-Final) presents our evaluation.³

### Country capability reports

This document assesses the maritime security and law enforcement capabilities of 12 of the CBSI PNs: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. It excludes Guyana because we were unable to conduct in-country fieldwork or to collect sufficient information otherwise to support an assessment. Included, however, are two Caribbean cooperative security institutions that INL directly or indirectly supports, the CARICOM IMPACS and the RSS.

### Framework

Each country report presents an overview of a country’s maritime security and law enforcement capabilities followed by a summary table. We organize the information by general area of capability.

The capabilities relevant to **Maritime Law Enforcement** involve a country’s maritime criminal law, the collection and management of evidence, and the ability to successfully prosecute criminal cases involving maritime activities or resources.

The capabilities relevant to **International Cooperation** include information-sharing agreements and constructs as well as indicators of interoperability, such as shiprider agreements.

Readers are encouraged to read the text of the country reports in addition to reviewing the summary tables. There are significant areas of overlap between these categories of capabilities, such as the relevance of communications to both awareness and operations. Also, some capabilities are interrelated, such as efficient at-sea interdictions involving visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) techniques and the collection and management of evidence for follow-on prosecution. The paragraphs provide additional details, explanations, and nuance about a country’s complicated spectrum of maritime security and law enforcement capabilities.

Table 1 presents the general framework for the assessments. Each country report concludes with a version of this table with specific information and ratings. The table includes the four component areas of capability and the types of indicators we examine to reach a qualitative assessment (none, low, medium, or high) of a country’s proficiency in each area. Appendix A contains an explanation of the criteria for this capability rating scale, which is meant to inform readers of a nation’s relative level of capability compared against the average of its Caribbean neighbors.

**Data sources**

The data, including qualitative and qualitative information, on which these country capability assessments are based were collected between October 2021 and March 2022. Sources included the following:

- Subject matter expert discussions with US government and military officials currently posted in the countries (particularly INL, US Coast Guard (USCG), and US Navy personnel) as well as host country nationals employed by the US government and supporting maritime security cooperation and law enforcement efforts, and materials they shared with us for the purpose of these assessments
- Subject matter expert discussions with host country government, police, military, and coast guard leaders and personnel, and information and materials they shared with us for the purpose of these assessments
• Information and reporting provided by subject matter experts active in the region and implementers of INL-funded programs in these countries, most of whom live and work in the region

• Background country information from open-source US government or commercial sources

• Country assessments conducted by CNA for previous projects in 2018 and 2019

Most information presented in the following country reports was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.

When collecting information about capabilities from individuals who work for, or with, the forces or offices that maintain those capabilities, there is clear potential for bias. CNA manages this issue by collecting specific information redundantly from different sources and sharing information selectively to validate its accuracy. When we find discrepant information that we cannot reconcile through further research or when we cannot determine the validity of one piece of information over the other, we document the discrepancy. When we encounter an item of important information that we are unable to verify or about which our confidence is low, we may still choose to present that information for consideration with a caveat about the source or its reliability.
Table 1. Example of a maritime security and law enforcement capabilities summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.(^b)</th>
<th>INL(^c)</th>
<th>DOD(^d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMAIN AWARENESS</td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>Maritime operations center with intelligence and communications fusion; interagency task force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Ship-to-shore; ship-to-ship; air-to-shore (range and performance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)</td>
<td>ISR assets such as coastal radar, maritime patrol aircraft, OPVs capable of patrolling, UAVs (frequency and range)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>Number and type (OPV, IPV, interceptor) of operable craft and operational range; proficiency of MIO units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>Preventive maintenance and repairs; status/readiness of assets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>Interagency task force, informed targeting; scanners or K9 program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Evidence handling and chain of custody; forensics lab/evidence; maritime crime investigative capabilities; criminal network/TCO intelligence analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>Capability of prosecutors trying maritime crimes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Legislative – maritime criminal laws aligned with international conventions, neighbors’ laws; Judicial – precedent and jurisprudence consistent with legislative intent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTL COOP</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Info-sharing agreements; participation in CARICOM IMPACS, RSS, OPBAT, other arrangements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Shiprider agreements; cooperative operations (patrols, HA/DR, interdictions); participation in Tradewinds exercise, other regional maritime exercises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.

Note: HA/DR = humanitarian assistance and disaster response; K9 = canine; IPV = offshore patrol vessel; MIO = maritime interception operation; OPBAT = Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos; OPV = offshore patrol vessel; TCO = transnational criminal organization; UAV = unmanned aerial vehicle.

\(^a\) This example includes ideal indicators for the category. However, the values of those indicators may not always be available. In practice, we used any directly relevant information we consider acceptably reliable and useful to understand that capability.

\(^b\) Estimates of capability rating by CNA analysts cross-referenced against other cases for standardization. Values are **NONE** (no capability), **LOW, MED**, and **HIGH** (relative to other CBSI PNs) with **N/A** if there was insufficient information to make a judgment.

\(^c\) Indicates INL assistance or cooperation has contributed to this capability.

\(^d\) Indicates US Department of Defense (DOD) assistance or cooperation has contributed to this capability.
Organization

The rest of this report presents each country’s (or institution’s) case study. We present the two institutional cases first because their activities and capabilities are relevant to many of the other cases and help the reader understand the wider regional environment. Cases follow a standard format: an introduction to the maritime security situation and the relevant organizations followed by a survey of capabilities organized along the framework presented in Table 1. Each case contains a summary list of key considerations for partner capability gaps before concluding with the summary table for that case.

For reference, we include in Appendix B definitions and examples of the three main types of vessels used by CBSI partner forces: offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), inshore patrol vessels (IPVs), and interceptor craft. Regional coast guard and maritime law enforcement units typically operate interceptor vessels, which primarily operate within territorial waters but can move quickly to chase suspected craft. Some PNs operate IPVs, which are generally larger but slower and can operate farther from shore in deeper and more difficult waters, and a few have OPVs capable of patrolling a PN’s full exclusive economic zone (EEZ; out to 200 n.mi.) over multiple days.
CARICOM IMPACS

The Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is an information-sharing and training center for regional law enforcement and customs agencies. Established in 2006 to coordinate information sharing and actions to ensure the security of the Cricket World Cup, IMPACS has been maintained by CARICOM as an ongoing tool for cooperative regional law enforcement. With a staff of just under 60 individuals and an annual budget of around USD $7 million, IMPACS maintains real-time databases on air passengers, maritime traffic, and shipborne cargo linked to INTERPOL and other international law enforcement intelligence agencies and transmits daily and monthly reports and alerts to member nations (all CARICOM members as well as Caribbean French and British territories). IMPACS has its headquarters and a Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, and a Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC) in Bridgetown, Barbados (Figure 2).

Figure 2. IMPACS headquarters and regional centers

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.

*Not all CARICOM member nations are CBSI PNs.*
IMPACS headquarters

IMPACS headquarters oversees the agency's operations, coordinates its programs, and conducts outreach and communication with member nations, donors (including the European Union (EU) and the United States government), and partners. It is the designated agency for law enforcement and security cooperation among the CARICOM nations. IMPACS headquarters staff arrange and provide analysis and advising for member nation agencies and offer training for their personnel. They do not conduct the training themselves; they coordinate with training centers such as the International Law Enforcement Agency in El Salvador, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the RSS of the Eastern Caribbean. During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic response, IMPACS headquarters hosted virtual training courses via the CBSI-Connect network. In addition, IMPACS serves as an advocate for information sharing, training, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and agreements or protocols for cooperative regional law enforcement. IMPACS leadership cooperates closely with the RSS because they have the same mission.

IMPACS also cooperates with the UNODC in codeveloping, along with member nations, a common regional maritime security strategy. A common strategy that combines security and law enforcement agencies would help coordinate nations' investments and plans to reduce redundancy and mismatching systems and improve regional security overall. The RSS is an example of a working subregional strategy and shared resource for the Eastern Caribbean microstates.

Joint Regional Communications Centre

The JRCC in Barbados operates an information-sharing process that dates to the early days of IMPACS when it was focused on potential security threats among incoming air passengers. The JRCC is equipped to receive and process information from the international Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) databases and shares pertinent information to member states on air and sea passengers as they travel through the region. Recently, IMPACS JRCC has added the Advanced Cargo Information System (ACIS), which allows targeting of high-risk cargo containers arriving at Caribbean ports, and the Advanced Targeting System Global (ATS-G), which provides rules-based targeting tools and automation to identify special interest aliens (SIAs). JRCC also uses an Israeli-developed marine traffic software service, Windward, to track commercial vessels using the Automatic Identification System (AIS), contributing to regional maritime domain awareness (MDA). The JRCC is still working to fully integrate and capitalize on these newer systems with training and support from INL advisors and relies on international assistance, particularly from INL, to
maintain these systems. These information-sharing systems, as well as a recently established link with INTERPOL and the United Kingdom Border Security Customs office, make the JRCC an important resource for regional customs and law enforcement forces.

Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre

The RIFC is IMPACs’ center for analysis on regional public security threats and trends. Its eight personnel (five of whom are on temporary duty from their national services as liaison officers) survey cross-Caribbean news on crimes and law enforcement and disseminate a daily report to member law enforcement agencies as well as monthly reports on national and regional trends. The RIFC also runs background checks on behalf of five Organisation of Eastern Caribbean (OECS) states of all individuals applying for citizenship via a citizenship by investment program. In 2021, there were 22,500 such applicants. The RIFC only shares the results of its background checks; it does not review or record any actions taken by the member state.

IMPACS is expanding RIFC analysis into the areas of cybercrime and maritime threat monitoring, information sharing, and analysis. Its building in Port of Spain has a floor allocated to the RIFC and a room where several monitors will be mounted on the wall and networked to cybercrime agencies at INTERPOL and elsewhere. From there, RIFC analysts will track threats, conduct analysis, and communicate with member nations whenever an alert is required. IMPACS will also coordinate training in cyber-related law enforcement for which the countries of the region are poorly prepared.

Maritime domain awareness

Another important initiative is the creation of a Maritime Threats Unit. As of the spring of 2022, this unit comprises two analysts with maritime security experience working at Bridgetown, Barbados, and a third at the RIFC, all tracking AIS feeds using the Windward System and investigating any unusual activity or flagged vessels of interest (VOIs) in the Caribbean. When any vessel is flagged or identified as a VOI, the RIFC collects all relevant information on the vessel and its location and shares it with affected member states via emails.

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5 The five OECS countries offering citizenship by investment programs are Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia.

6 IMPACS is currently trying to convince CARICOM member states and their partners to use a common software platform for this intelligence. The Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados currently have subscription access to Windward, whereas the Bahamas and Jamaica use the SeaVision system.
or text attachments for their awareness and action. The RIFC has recently shown its value by alerting member states of VOIs that were going unnoticed and by sharing analysis that these VOIs were masking their locations and hiding their activities. Most of these VOIs have been oil tankers delivering oil to Venezuela despite international sanctions, but others have been investigated for narcotrafficking. Over nine months in 2021, the RIFC identified and alerted member state agencies to 322 such VOIs. According to data from the RIFC’s Windward System, on March 23, 2022, 590 vessels were seen transiting Caribbean waters and transmitting AIS information. A total of 422 of those vessels bore flags for past infractions or deviations and required investigation as VOIs (although most of those are for minor infractions or mechanical issues).

The Maritime Threats Unit is designed to help the many smaller Caribbean nations establish some degree of MDA by providing intelligence about who is doing what in their waters. One drawback of the Windward System is that because AIS feeds are not required of any vessel under 100 ft in length, it provides no tracking or intelligence on the thousands of small fishing or recreational boats that routinely travel between islands. It is most useful for tracking and providing intelligence (e.g., ship type, owner, cargo, crew, previous stops, any flags for deficiency or illegal activity) on cargo ships, tankers, or cruise ships. IMPACS is looking into the possibility of gaining access (by way of its international law enforcement partners) to the cell phone tracks of individuals of special interest.

Summary

CARICOM IMPACS is a small but important institution for cooperative regional information sharing, training, and coordination for law enforcement and security. Many of the island nations neglect their maritime territories and have little means of gaining awareness of activity on their waters, but IMPACS can modestly help them do so. With a dedicated staff, resources for data collection and analysis, and access to intelligence sources such as INTERPOL and Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) feeds, IMPACS could go far to address the common problem of poor MDA across the region while sharing costs across all member states. Like the RSS, it serves as a center for training, advising, and developing common standards and protocols, reducing redundancy. It does not provide command and control (C2) nor operational or maintenance capabilities, but it enhances the intelligence, training, and advising available to all CARICOM states.
Key considerations

CARICOM IMPACS seems relatively effective for its small size and is significant both operationally, as a source for information sharing and analysis, and normatively, as a working example of the benefits of cooperation. We offer the following considerations regarding external support for the organization.

- The central challenge that IMPACS faces is the lack of assurance that member states will contribute, now and in the future, the funds, personnel, and attention that IMPACS requires to be effective. As a cooperative institution, it faces the typical collective action problem that even though all states benefit from its services, each also has the incentive to shirk its contributions. According to IMPACS leadership, two nations—Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica—cover most of the organization’s funding. Meaningful contributions from key donors and partners such as the US Department of State (e.g., using their influence with member states to encourage greater participation and contributions) would be helpful.

- Regarding the efforts to develop a Caribbean regional maritime strategy, another complicating factor is the sense that subregions such as the Eastern Caribbean, the north Caribbean (The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica), and the south Caribbean (Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname) have different security concerns, meriting different approaches and investments. In the short and medium term, supporting subregional cooperation within these groups may be more realistic than trying to wrangle Caribbean-wide initiatives, as long as subregional cooperation does not preclude wider alignment. IMPACS aspires to offer its members analytical and information-services capabilities that it cannot presently provide with its current personnel. It seeks more contributions from member state agencies but also contractors and permanent staff, particularly at the RIFC. Experienced analysts of maritime threats and problems and cybercrime are especially sought after.
Table 2. Summary of IMPACS capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>IMPACS has no ISR of its own but integrates information from other sources into items of use to member states. JRCC: Its maritime awareness relies on subscriptions to maritime intelligence software (Windward). JRCC has access to APIS, ACIS, PNR, and AIS systems for advanced warning about air and sea passengers, and cargo containers. Advanced targeting screening techniques remain nascent. Screens 40 million PAX annually. IMPACS sends information and alerts via cell phones or emails. IMPACS also supports virtual multinational training via a set of networked cameras and devices called CBSI-Connect.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>IMPACS sends information and alerts via cell phones or emails. IMPACS also supports virtual multinational training via a set of networked cameras and devices called CBSI-Connect.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/ Jurisprudence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW ENFORCE.</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>IMPACS is an information-sharing hub, feeding intelligence and analysis from several international sources into items, alerts, and reports of use to member states. JRCC integrates with all 15 CARICOM member states and British/French overseas territories; some members lack legislation to share PNR data.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Regional Security System

The Regional Security System (RSS) is a collective security and law enforcement treaty organization based in Barbados with the following member states: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (see Figure 3). As of March 2022, the RSS had moved to welcome Guyana as its newest member.\(^7\) All these nations have police forces; three of them have military forces as well (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). The RSS operates with its own Air Wing and with temporarily deployed seacraft that belong to member nations. Using these and other assets, the RSS supports member state maritime law enforcement operations, including counter-illicit trafficking. However, it also supports other missions, including humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR), search and rescue (SAR), and logistics missions, at member state request. The RSS’s annual budget of $7.5 million is funded by the seven member states, but Barbados provides the bulk of the support (40 percent; the other six members provide 10 percent each).\(^8\)

Beyond acting as a force multiplier, the RSS supports member state capacity building via a specialized center for training. The RSS Training Institute (RSSTI), located in Barbados, serves as an important source of standardized training for law enforcement, customs, and other agencies across the Eastern Caribbean. In practice, the RSS training team, which consists of seven personnel, works based on a train-the-trainer model and travels to member states to validate their basic training courses. The RSSTI partners with RSS Maritime’s training vessel fleet to offer practical instruction on outboard motor maintenance as well as basic coast guard engineer and officer training. More general courses also include, for example, leadership and command staff development, criminal investigative techniques, and maritime and border security. Specialized courses include management of investigation of serious and organized crime, money laundering investigations, and intelligence gathering and analysis. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the RSSTI has expanded its outreach to participants by using CBSI-Connect as a virtual training platform; in 2019, the RSS trained 500 to 600 participants, and in


\(^8\) Most information presented in this RSS report was collected during discussions with officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.
2020, this number increased to more than 1,250 participants across 26 different programs. Despite this growth, RSS trainers note that more practical training has suffered during the pandemic.

Figure 3. Eastern Caribbean and the RSS

Source: CNA based on Barbados Coast Guard and RSS using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.
Maritime domain awareness

The RSS contributes to member state maritime domain awareness by periodically providing air and sea intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)—although its patrols are limited in duration, range, and frequency. **RSS Maritime** uses member state–operated OPVs (from Barbados and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) to provide additional presence and sensing to member states that lack long-range patrol craft. The **RSS Air Wing** operates two organic maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs) that provide airborne detection of maritime targets and “endgame” support to surface unit interceptors from member states. Without these RSS platforms, most member states—lacking their own organic OPVs and MPAs—would remain largely sea blind and less effective at interdicting illicit maritime targets. Because of the limited availability of these assets, however, the RSS has only a limited presence throughout the extent of the Eastern Caribbean; member state EEZs alone cover more than 400,000 sq km (an area almost the size of California). For this reason, the RSS also necessarily depends on information sharing among member states and acts as a funnel for foreign intelligence (particularly advance warning of maritime tracks), most importantly counternarcotics tipping and cueing from JIATF-S in Key West.

**Integrated command and control**

**RSS Maritime Operations Center**

**RSS Maritime** plans and organizes combined operations of member forces from its headquarters at Paragon Base near the Grantley Adams International Airport on the southern end of Barbados. These operations include periodic maritime patrols by Barbadian and Vincentian OPVs (Damen Stan Patrol 4207 craft) under the Maritime Law Enforcement Concept of Operations (MLE CONOP) approved by member states in January 2021. The Barbadian OPVs, for instance, are directed by a 24/7 maritime operations center (MOC) at the Barbados Coast Guard (BCG) HMBS Pelican Base in Bridgetown. Before the pandemic, the BCG was able to support an RSS patrol once a quarter for up to a week in duration, but the frequency and duration have since decreased.

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10 Fuel capacity allows for patrols 14 days in duration, longer with coordinated resupply in foreign ports. Water and food supply are the main constraint according to BCG officers. Pandemic precautions have also been taken by scaling back patrols to reduce infection clusters.
RSS Air Wing Operations Center

The RSS Air Wing Operations Center, based at Hangar One at the Air Wing's base at Grantley Adams International Airport in Barbados, is the main nerve center for counternarcotics interdictions by most member states. The operations center is equipped with the cooperative situational information integration system (CSII) and All Partners Access Network (APAN), through which it receives maritime tracks from JIATF-S. Upon receiving an alert, the Air Wing can scramble an MPA to make visual contact and contact the nearest member state interceptor unit to coordinate an interdiction. In practice, the Air Wing, based out of Barbados, is more able to respond to targets in the nearer vicinity. Key target areas for the Air Wing operations are the maritime gaps between Guadeloupe, Dominica, Martinique, and Saint Lucia that are known for “French connection” transatlantic trafficking routes to Europe. Perhaps because of the distance, interlocutors from the more northerly RSS members of Saint Kitts and Antigua feel the Air Wing’s presence less. The RSS has access to the French airstrip in Martinique for refueling to extend range, but the arrangement is not optimal, according to Air Wing officers. The prospective addition of Guyana to the Air Wing’s area of responsibility would further stretch this high-demand, low-density asset. In addition, the Air Wing has access to Windward maritime-tracking software from the IMPACS JRCC based in Barbados, allowing it to identify registered commercial maritime traffic.

Communications

The RSS Air Wing Operations Center and MPAs have high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), and ultra high frequency (UHF) radios and Iridium satellite phones (for over the horizon (OTH) communications back to base on other satellite communications (SATCOM)-enabled units). The limited range of the RSS Air Wing antenna poses a problem, so the CBSI Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) recently visited to advise on potential upgrades. Because of their altitude advantage, RSS MPAs have a communications radius of about 30 to 40 n.mi. at sea, making them a critical enabler for surface interdictions. The RSS relies on the communications systems of member state forces to coordinate interdictions at sea with the RSS Air Wing, and these communications are mainly conducted via VHF and HF-only Motorola and Harris radio units, which are usually unencrypted and limited to an eight-n.mi. range offshore or locally at sea. These limitations are one of the reasons why RSS member states conduct interdictions only near shore.

JIATF-S notes that the RSS would need an OTH SATCOM capability for surface units to extend this range of communications out to 30 n.mi. and beyond. In addition, voice-only radio units have limited application in high-speed pursuits when engine noise and sea state drown out the audio (surface units would generally have to stop to communicate). RSS member states largely lack blue force trackers (BFTs) that allow transmission of text messages and unit coordinates,
which would allow a more seamless common operating picture for JIATF-S cueing and tipping and resolve some of these limitations. JIATF-S provided the BCG with three units in June 2021 to test the capability.

**Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**

**RSS Air Wing MPAs**

The RSS’s principal ISR platforms are the Air Wing’s two C-26 twin-propeller MPAs. The airframes were donated by the US National Guard in 1999 and have logged more than 21,000 flight hours. Both were refurbished in 2015 with INL and Canadian support. In addition to having their airframes and engines overhauled, the aircraft were equipped with a CarteNav Data Management System, maritime surveillance radar (Telephonics APS-143C Oceaneye), and forward-looking infrared (FLIR) cameras (Star Safire 380 HD), allowing surface detection and recording in daylight, in lowlight, and at night and tactical video downlink. The air and ground crew are a fully vetted unit available for 24/7 tasking. The unit supports the full range of RSS missions but most frequently supports counternarcotics operations, especially “endgame” targeting for interdiction surface units (usually member state SAFE Boats), directed by intelligence from JIATF-S or other foreign sources. During the coronavirus pandemic, one of the aircraft has been stripped of its airborne electronic sensor suite and configured for an air mobility role to transport medical and testing supplies. This reconfiguration has resulted in less availability for counternarcotics operations, as seen in the marked decline in missions and flight hours in 2020 and 2021 (see Figure 4). The Air Wing estimates that it routinely conducts 20 to 25 intelligence-driven counternarcotics missions per month in the Eastern Caribbean area of responsibility.

![Figure 4. RSS Air Wing missions and flight hours](source: CNA based on RSS Air Wing.)
Since January 2001, the Air Wing has flown more than 4,000 counternarcotics missions and prosecuted 807 maritime contacts, resulting in 207 vessel seizures and 886 arrests. In total, Air Wing–supported units have seized or disrupted 28 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, 61 MT of cannabis, and nearly USD $3 million in currency. In 2021, the Air Wing supported seizure or disruption of almost 6 MT of cocaine and 3 MT of cannabis, a dramatic increase compared to the last five years (see Figure 5).

**RSS Maritime member state OPVs**

The Barbadian and Saint Vincentian coast guard OPVs used by the RSS for combined patrols of member state EEZs are Damen Stan Patrol 4207 craft than can range out across the Eastern Caribbean and are equipped with surface detect radar and FLIR sensors. However, because they lack the vantage and speed of the RSS Air Wing MPAs, their detection range is more limited.

**Intercoastal Surveillance System**

RSS Air Wing and BCG officers both mentioned the existence of an Intercoastal Surveillance System (ICSS), a network of maritime radar installations based in Trinidad and Tobago with 24/7 monitoring of 7 repeater units in 4 RSS member states: Barbados (4), Grenada (1), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (1), and Saint Lucia (1). Most of these Israeli-made units have a limited range offshore (no more than 20 to 30 n.mi.). The RSS reports that Trinidad and Tobago does not share the ICSS common operating picture with the RSS but that the RSS is able to “see” using the Barbadian ICSS network. According to the BCG, not all the Barbadian radar units (operated by the Barbados Police Service (BPS)) are functional nor does the BPS consistently share feeds with the BCG.

**Maritime presence and operations**

As previously mentioned, RSS Maritime coordinates combined maritime operations by member state forces, both close inshore interdiction operations and routine patrols, under the MLE CONOP. Member states rely on training and support from the RSS and the CBSI TAFT in maintaining the fleets. The RSS does not play a direct role in port security, so we do not include
a section on that subject here and refer the reader to sections on port security for member states. CARICOM IMPACS JRCC also supports port security in the Eastern Caribbean.

**Patrol and interdiction**

**MLE CONOP maritime patrols**

The RSS itself owns only three training vessels (a 40-ft Sea Ark IPV and two small interceptors). RSS-coordinated operations therefore depend on member nation contributions of ships (typically the Barbadian and Vincentian OPVs). According to the MLE CONOP, the RSS aspires to use these PN vessels to provide a constant OPV presence in collective EEZs through seven-day rotations: one OPV in active “Alpha” status on patrol, operating, or in exercise; one underway or able to be underway within 2 hours (“Bravo-2”); one able to be underway within 12 hours (“Bravo-12”); and one undergoing dedicated maintenance (“Charlie”). The RSS reports conducting extended patrols four times a year. Before the pandemic, these could last up to two weeks, but they have since been limited to three to seven days.\textsuperscript{11} JIATF-S reports that routine RSS OPV deployments and contributions to “force packages” are at present still very limited in duration (lasting no more than one to two days).

**Interdiction**

The RSS reports that it can draw on a total of 54 vessels in member state fleets, mostly small interceptor boats that can operate out to only 12 n.mi. or so from shore. Most member states’ highest performing interceptors are US-donated and TAFT-supported SAFE Boats. Recently, the RSS has also coordinated larger craft patrols once or twice a year led by an OPV usually contributed by Barbados or Saint Vincent and accompanied, in member state waters, by local interceptors and, when possible, the RSS Air Wing.

**Maintenance**

The RSS docks and maintains its three training vessels at Pelican Base in Bridgetown, collocated with the Barbados Defence Force (BDF). It has limited maintenance capabilities (a single engineer) but receives technical assistance from the BCG and TAFT. The RSS has ambitions to stand up an outboard motor maintenance center of excellence through the RSSTI as well as a regional small boat maintenance logistics warehouse to facilitate streamlined logistics chains for member state security forces.

\textsuperscript{11} RSS MLE CONOP, 7.
Maritime law enforcement

The RSS does not engage in law enforcement itself; rather, it plays a key role as a force provider, multiplier, and enabler for individual member state efforts and as a cross-jurisdictional coordinator. For instance, when RSS-supported interdiction operations are successful, the seized evidence, suspects, and craft are delivered to the corresponding jurisdiction’s member state law enforcement agency for processing. The RSS’s three principal units that support member state maritime law enforcement are the digital forensics laboratory (DFL), asset recovery unit (ARU), and a recently stood-up transnational organized crime (TOC) task force, all of which are based in Barbados. These units support multidomain law enforcement efforts by member states, and, because of the archipelagic and littoral nature of the threat environment—what one US observer termed a “maritime nexus”—crime data often do not distinguish between crimes occurring on land and those occurring at sea. Multiple US implementers and PN experts commented that RSS member states tend to focus on the landward manifestations of crime arising from maritime vectors (e.g., gang violence inflamed by firearms smuggling), but RSS leadership is hopeful that lessons from the pandemic’s reduction of tourist activity will raise awareness about the region’s reliance on a “blue economy.”

Multiple US and PN observers also noted that RSS member states face endemic corruption at all levels, with individuals from member state security forces implicated in working with narcotraffickers or running other illicit networks. RSS officials and advisors have also faced intimidation and threats that have required them to be reassigned to international training courses for their temporary protection, reducing the effectiveness of some RSS-sponsored initiatives.

Investigation

Digital forensics laboratory

The RSS’s DFL specializes in exploiting digital evidence recovered at crime scenes (including interdicted vessels), especially phones and laptops, and thus strengthening prosecution cases and network intelligence against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and high-value individuals. The lab is located at the RSS Fusion Center at Paragon Base in Barbados and consists of several INL-funded workstations, a server unit, mobile phone exploitation kits, and a secure evidence repository. In terms of contributing to evidence chain of custody best practices, the DFL has camera-surveilled secure access to its evidence repository and is transitioning to a digital evidence and case management system. The DFL server houses 70 terabytes of digital evidence and other data available to support member states’ criminal intelligence analysis.
The DFL is staffed by four analysts/examiners seconded from member state police forces for periods of six months to a year. This rotation helps cross-train member states in digital forensics. The lab acts as a collective resource for RSS member states in both training member forces on digital forensics and supporting active investigations. The integration of new phone decryption capabilities in 2020 allowed the DFL to begin affecting case development. From January to October 2021, the DFL received 166 cases from four submitting countries and returned 94 of those cases (mostly related to drug matters, murder, or unnatural death) having examined 254 devices (mostly cell phones and SIM cards). No data were readily available on what percentage of these cases resulted in a successful “legal finish” or were related to maritime crime.

**Asset recovery unit and financial intelligence units**

Another RSS-supported initiative is the ARU, an anti-money laundering and crime recovery proceeds advisory unit funded by an INL grant, implemented and staffed by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), and based at the RSS Fusion Center in Barbados. The ARU works with RSS member state financial intelligence units (FIUs), including law enforcement officers, financial investigators, and legal practitioners, and cooperates with several regional and international partners, including the US, the United Kingdom (UK), UNODC, the Organization of American States, OECS, CARICOM IMPACS, and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. In total, ARU-supported FIUs have contributed to the identification and seizure of nearly USD $27 million worth of criminal assets since 2015.

**Transnational organized crime task force and crime observatory**

INL has supported the RSS standup of a TOC task force in Barbados, a proof of concept that the RSS intends to first test and then—if it is successful—replicate in other member states to improve interagency cooperation in dismantling criminal networks. The unit will consist of liaisons from the BPS, the BDF, the Police Special Branch (for corruptions investigations and criminal intelligence), and the INL special investigations advisor. USAID is also supporting the launch of a regional crime observatory to improve the collection and analysis of crime trend data.

**Prosecution**

As previously mentioned, both the ARU and DFL contribute to strengthening Eastern Caribbean prosecution cases. ARU advisors have been holding regular online seminars via CBSI-Connect to foster increased mutual legal assistance among RSS member states and sharing lessons learned from recent cases and jurisprudence. In recent years, the DFL has contributed an increasing amount of quality digital evidence to generate intelligence criminal networks and strengthen prosecutorial cases by providing expert testimony in Eastern Caribbean legal cases. One silver lining of the pandemic has been that DFL examiners are now
allowed to give testimony remotely, allowing the small DFL staff to focus on investigations rather than traveling to court trials.

**Legislation and jurisprudence**

RSS member state forces’ lack of adequate legal authorities in the maritime domain (e.g., lack of laws establishing contiguous zones for law enforcement) limits the legal range of RSS interdictions more so than operational autonomy. Although RSS OPVs may be able to patrol member state EEZs and proximate high seas, member state shipriders often lack jurisdiction to make seizures or arrests there. For this reason—according to JIATF-S—the RSS partners with USCG tactical law enforcement team (TACLET) or law enforcement detachment (LEDET) shipriders to conduct interdictions.

One central effort of the RSS ARU has been supporting the passage of model civil asset forfeitures legislation, referred to as the **Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA)**, in commonwealth jurisprudence. Passage of such legislation in member states such as Barbados has allowed prosecutors and FIUs to seize criminal assets (such as land, vehicles, or vessels) used in the commission of crime through more efficient civil proceedings separate from long-running criminal cases. Recent cases involving the POCA have been upheld in Eastern Caribbean appellate courts.

**International cooperation**

The RSS is itself an institution of regional security cooperation that effectively, albeit at a modest scale, integrates and coordinates information, personnel, and assets from its seven member states into a variety of operations. It is also a conduit for coordinating member state efforts with extraregional partners with Caribbean equities and interests, especially the US (via JIATF-S), the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, and Canada, as well as other multilateral organizations such as CARICOM. The RSS also routinely supports HA/DR missions, as it did in responding to Hurricanes Irma and Maria, which struck Dominica and Antigua and Barbuda in 2017; Hurricane Dorian, which affected The Bahamas in 2017; and the La Soufrière volcanic eruption in Saint Vincent in 2021.

**Information sharing**

The RSS Regional Fusion Center (not to be confused with the IMPACS RIFC in Port of Spain), in addition to hosting the DFL, has two US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) analysts that coordinate with the US Embassy DEA attaché and two UK National Crime Agency (NCA)
analysts that can pass relevant human and signals intelligence for maritime interdictions. The Fusion Center also acts as a hub for member state information sharing that supports RSS Maritime and Air Wing operations. The Air Wing routinely generates and disseminates maritime contact reports to partners. US Embassy Bridgetown previously hosted a JIATF-S tactical analyst team (TAT), but this unit was transferred to areas of heavier illicit flows in the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.

**Interoperability**

Upon invitation, the RSS can send member state forces to support a member state in distress. This practice has included sending police forces during times of unrest or surges in crime. RSS-provided forces do not operate under any special status and must abide by all local laws. In terms of interoperability with extraregional actors, the RSS participates in JIATF-S-led counternarcotics campaigning as well as exercises such as Tradewinds.

**Tradewinds exercise**

In 2021, the RSS staff members participated in the Tradewinds exercise hosted by Guyana, although no member states were able to send assets or forces because of pandemic-related concerns. In the previous iteration of Tradewinds in 2019, the RSS and units from six of seven RSS members (excluding Saint Lucia, which was under Leahy-vetting sanction at the time) participated, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines hosted the second phase.

**Mutual legal assistance**

The RSSTI, ARU, and DFL all integrate and support member state interoperability and connect member states with assistance and intelligence from US and other foreign providers. The RSSTI has recently focused on setting common training and policing standards among member state forces to improve interoperability. The DFL regularly provides training to member states on digital forensics and sends advisors to assist with developing cases. In recent years, this support has extended to non-RSS Caribbean partners as well, such as Guyana and The Bahamas.

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12 JIATF-S officials note that US overreliance on signals intelligence in recent years has led to diminished returns and subsequent TCO improvements to communications security and electronic intelligence warfare capabilities.


Summary

As Table 3 shows, the RSS excels at its long-standing core missions: to promote and support Eastern Caribbean international cooperation for maritime security, chiefly through the sharing of information and resources for MDA. However, its ability to project presence and conduct routine operations is limited by the small number of vessels and platforms that member nations can contribute. The RSS increasingly contributes to regional law enforcement and investigative efforts as well.

Key considerations

The RSS faces several key challenges to improving its ability to build partner capacity and coordinate and align maritime security efforts of PNs.

- **MDA**: The RSS Air Wing is among its core assets and a key enabler of maritime interdictions for member states in the Eastern Caribbean. Despite refurbishment in 2015, the airframes have flown fewer and fewer hours and missions each year since, and the Air Wing faces challenges covering the full extent of member state EEZs. Although increased seizures by Air Wing–supported RSS member forces over the same period may reflect mission efficiency, INL Bridgetown should look to partner with the RSS to identify and address any potential sustainment gaps (e.g., staffing, supply chain, resourcing) if this high-value, low-density asset is to maintain a similar level of operations in support of RSS members as in previous years.

- **Maritime law enforcement**: Most RSS member states lack legal frameworks that establish jurisdiction in and beyond the contiguous zone, putting an effective legal limit on the technical range of maritime security forces’ interdiction operations.

- **DFL returns so far not evident, but promising**: Significant returns on investment for the DFL will likely not be seen for some time because cases in which the DFL contributed to a better quality evidence package are still years away from their day in court in the case backlog encountered by most member states.

- **International cooperation**: The RSS is the focal point for European and US maritime security assistance and law enforcement in the Eastern Caribbean. RSS operations depend on contributions from member states (the bulk of which are from Barbados) that will likely be constrained because of pandemic budget fallout. RSS contributions to JIATF-S force packages, including contributions of OPVs and MPAs, will need to address sustainment shortfalls.
Table 3. Summary of RSS maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMAIN</td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>Air Wing Operations Center: functional CSII/APAN (integration with JIATF-S); integration with CARICOM JRCC systems.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Ship-to-shore; ship-to-ship; air-to-ship/shore all functional between RSS and BCG (Harris radios); TAFT working on a project to upgrade Air Wing Ops Center antenna for range/reliability; RSS Air Wing has satellite over-the-horizon communications and can conduct tactical downlink of FLIR video data.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Coastal radar: Barbados has 4x coastal radars (ICSS), but these are not shared with RSS and are not operational; Air Wing: 2x C-26 MPAs (with FLIR + radar for nocturnal ops) with reduced availability; 4x OPVs for EEZ patrol with FLIR + radar but limited availability and endurance (Saint Vincent + Barbados).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>54 total member state vessels: (4x OPVs + 49x short-range interceptors); range mostly limited to 12 n.mi.; low readiness rates of most member forces limits availability; RSS Maritime owns 3x separate training vessels and provides basic training to member states.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>1x engineer for training vessels; relies on BCG maintenance facility; outboard motor/small boat center of excellence and proposed shared BCG logistics warehouse for small boats.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>RSS does not have a port security role (CARICOM JRCC provides ACIS to member states).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>DFL: able to exploit digital (phone/laptop) evidence from maritime seizures; RSS standing up regional crime observatory and TOC task force to tackle criminal network analysis and investigation; RSSTI supports investigations and training in member states.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>N/A: RSS DFL contributes to increased case package quality; actual prosecutorial capacity is rated at the sovereign jurisdiction level of each member state.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/Jurisprudence</td>
<td>N/A: actual judicial capacity and maritime legal framework only rated at the sovereign jurisdiction level of each member state.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTL COOP</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Regional Fusion Center supports info sharing among member states, the UK (NCA), and the US (DEA). Air Wing also routinely shares info with JIATF-S.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Antigua and Barbuda

At the northeast edge of the lesser Antilles (see Figure 6), Antigua and Barbuda is not a central actor in regional security or counter-illicit trafficking efforts, but it does struggle with illegal migration and smuggling of narcotics, weapons, and other illicit goods. The economy depends on tourism, much of which involves yacht and sailboat fleets in one of the islands’ several harbors. The key operations of the Royal Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force (ABDF) Coast Guard (CG)—the country’s main maritime security force—are the routine patrol of those harbors to ensure the safety and security of those commercial or civilian vessels. The ABDF’s CG patrols with two SAFE Boats once per day, unless it receives an alert. The islands’ coastlines are essentially porous to any vessel capable of crossing the 30 n.mi. from Montserrat or the 40 n.mi. from Guadeloupe or Saint Kitts and Nevis.

The smaller, sparsely inhabited sister island of Barbuda has virtually no CG presence. Crossing the 25 n.mi. from Antigua takes approximately 45 minutes. Officials with the ABDF, the national police, and state prosecutors all agree that maritime security is minimal and under-resourced by the government and that the scope and volume of illegal activities on local waters, particularly the trafficking of humans and smuggling of firearms and other goods, is unknown.

Antigua and Barbuda presents an interesting case in that the nation has received no significant INL support and no TAFT support since 2018 because of a dispute between the two governments related to debt payments. The effects on the CG are clear: inoperative communications and sensors leave the CG virtually incapable of all but the most routine constabulary duties. Still, the CG manages to operate similarly to the counterpart forces on other local islands.

In response to the government’s expressed interest in its “blue economy” of tourism and seabed minerals and ideas for a new airport and seaport on Barbuda, the ABDF is crafting a new maritime strategy. The strategy will include a new CG base on Barbuda, a second aircraft for the ABDF that can be refitted to serve for maritime patrol, new boats and ships (to include a larger coastal patrol vessel able to operate farther out to sea), coastal radars, and drones. The government is unlikely to fund the complete program. If it did, the ABDF would also need more

15 Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.
and better quality infrastructure (docks, barracks, operations centers) and trained personnel (up from the CG’s 34-person team).
Figure 6. Antigua and Barbuda, location of key assets and capabilities

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.

a  50 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

**Integrated command and control**

Antigua and Barbuda’s C2 is rudimentary and centralized within the Office of National Drug and Money Laundering Control Policy (ONDCP), a vetted unit that handles the country’s most sensitive cases, and the Office of the Police Commissioner, both in Saint John’s. When an alert is received, typically from external sources (e.g., RSS, US, UK security services), the information usually passes through the Office of the Police Commissioner. That office, in cooperation with the ONDCP if the alert involves narcotics or a highly sensitive crime, decides whether the information and resulting mission is relevant to and should be shared with the CG. According to the police commissioner and CG leadership, in most cases the police prefer to allow the suspected maritime criminal activity to reach land or a dock or port before taking action. Rarely do the police alert the CG and order an on-water interdiction. As a result, Antigua and Barbuda experiences few “maritime criminal” cases or events because the land-based police and the ONDCP control information and prefer to prosecute most cases themselves. The CG is most frequently alerted about safety and security missions (e.g., people overboard, accidents, boat troubles). According to one CG executive officer, the last time the ONDCP and the CG cooperated fully on a case was three years ago.

**Communications**

Communication among the ABDF’s headquarters and bases, including the CG base, and with CG boats is via unencrypted VHF radios (line of sight (LOS)), personal cell phones, or WhatsApp, which rely on proximate relay towers to work. As a result, CG operations rarely stray outside of this range, approximately four to six n.mi. offshore.

**Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**

Antigua and Barbuda lacks any surveillance ability aside from LOS vision from patrolling police on land or a patrol vessel. The ABDF has one plane that is out of service; when in service, it does not serve as an MPA. It has no coastal radars or ocean patrol vessels capable of wide-range ISR. It relies heavily on civilian reporting of unusual events or unknown individuals.
Maritime presence and operations

**Patrol and interdiction**

The ABDF CG fleet includes four boats, two of which are operational (SAFE Boats donated by the US around 2015). The other two, a Zodiac 970 and an old SeaArk, require major refurbishment or repairs to return to operations.

The CG operates with a force of approximately 50 personnel, 34 of them active. On any given day, several are called on to support the ABDF or police with other duties. With its two operating boats, the CG is only capable of conducting daily patrols of 4 to 8 hours within 4 n.mi. of the coast and typically focuses on safety and security among the fleets of yachts at the main marinas (a major source of the nation’s income). The second boat is left available for emergency response missions. The CG’s operations center is a room with three receivers, a duty officer, and a radio technician ready to respond to alerts.

Without targeted patrols and with patrols of short duration only during the day, the CG provides minimal presence and operational capability besides assisting civilian boat operators with emergencies. The waters and coastline of Barbuda are practically unregulated unless a citizen calls in a report, for which the CG requires a minimum of 45 minutes to arrive.

**Maintenance**

The CG seems able to maintain its SAFE Boats’ basic systems and engines and conduct preventive maintenance. But its boats did not receive the midlife upgrade that the TAFT delivered to other partners in late 2021 or early 2022 and will likely decline over time without TAFT assistance. This lack of alternative boats may help explain the risk-averse character of the CG’s operations. If one of the SAFE Boats experiences a major problem, the CG will likely be unable to repair it anytime soon.

The CG hopes to install a new fuel tank on the Zodiac. There are no clear plans to restore the Sea Ark. However, the Zodiac project and upgrades to the SAFE Boats are both delayed by providers’ refusal to sell upgraded software and other systems without US government licensing approval, which will come only when the CBSI TAFT is permitted again to assist Antigua and Barbuda. The withholding of most US assistance effectively freezes the CG’s access to upgrades and all but the most routine maintenance and repairs.

The CG has an enclosed workspace for boat repairs, but it is modest and part of a dilapidated building (that the CG hopes to replace soon). The CG has personnel trained in Mercury engine repair and maintenance, electrical systems, and welding.
Port security

A Chinese company is building a new commercial port near the cruise ship port in Deep Water Harbor. Operations at that port currently appear to be disorganized, and there is no apparent security restricting access. Civilian vehicles are allowed to drive among the containers and construction with no control. Police leadership report no working scanners (there is one, but it is out of operation) and no canine (K9) teams. Identification of containers for inspection depends on tip-offs (from international sources, human intelligence in Antigua, or someone at the port) for targeting. Police leadership and prosecutors recall that a few years ago the customs agency did seize a load of cocaine, to which they were tipped off by a port inspector who noticed an oddly loaded container, but beyond that do not know of any criminal cases coming from port control activities. CNA observed the port but did not conduct onsite discussions.

Maritime law enforcement

Investigation

According to a global source, Antigua and Barbuda has relatively effective and accountable judiciary and criminal justice systems. However, porous borders and minimal law enforcement presence on the waters translate into a minimal level of law enforcement in its maritime territory. Antigua and Barbuda police encounter episodes of illegal migration and firearms or narcotics smuggling with increasing frequency. The police special counterdrug unit, the ONDCP, investigates these. If an episode is large enough, the ONDCP, along with prosecutors, creates a case file and pursues prosecution. However, these larger drug cases very rarely (less than once per year) involve any maritime-related evidence even if they did involve maritime smuggling onto the islands.

Prosecution

Maritime criminal cases are rare, mostly involve infractions or accidents, and are generally handled by the magistrate, or lower, court. Maritime cases rise to the higher court only if they are found to involve financial crimes or high-value narcotics or other smuggling. The Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP) operates with six attorneys, most of whom have received training and some limited advisement via INL-funded programs. None of them has specific training or expertise in maritime law. None of the prosecutors could recall a single case.

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that involved an incident or seizure at sea, only cases involving seizures at ports or when boats landed ashore. Prosecutors and police struggled to recall any relevant prosecutions and recalled only one, involving a Venezuelan drug-trafficking suspect whose case is still pending after more than a decade. Several expressed the opinion that without scanners at the port or better information about the hundreds of small vessels coming to and going from the islands, there is virtually no maritime law enforcement in Antigua and Barbuda.

### Legislation and jurisprudence

The nation’s lack of maritime law enforcement is more a result of under-resourced maritime capabilities and a reliance on terrestrial law enforcement than of lack of legal framework. For example, Antigua and Barbuda’s Maritime Shipping Act is aligned with international conventions such as Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea and the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime. According to outside experts, however, the nation’s laws badly need updating to strengthen the state’s ability to prosecute complex financial crimes and organized criminal networks, which lie behind much of the human and drug trafficking that occur in local waters.17

### International cooperation

#### Information sharing

The ABDF and its CG share information informally, and frequently, with Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, and other nations of the OECS as well as with the RSS and IMPACS. This sharing is typically done informally and via person-to-person cell phone calls or texts. The RSS and CARICOM IMPACS also provide the CG commander with alerts and information about special occurrences relevant to maritime security in the region.

#### Interoperability

The CG does not interoperate with other forces because of its limited capabilities to operate within its own coastal waters. It lacks the communications and training to conduct targeted interdictions at sea. It sends personnel to the Tradewinds exercise, but only one or two because the country has been designated by the US as a high-income partner unqualified for subsidized participation. In the CG’s view, Tradewinds is less helpful than it used to be.

because it has grown to include more sophisticated forces such as the French and British and uses systems and scenarios that are beyond the reach of the local island forces’ capabilities.

**Summary**

As Table 4 shows, the ABDF and CG provide a minimal level of maritime law enforcement, chiefly routine patrols. The force has no MDA and relies on civilian or foreign tips for its intelligence. Whether the CG is capable of any maritime interdiction against a resistant target is unclear. C2 also limits the CG’s activity in that events and actions that would ordinarily be considered for maritime security response are instead handled by terrestrial forces once the target reaches the shore, sometimes without informing the CG. Law enforcement at sea and the prosecution of cases involving seaborne smuggling or trafficking are highly unusual. Yet the ABDF does participate in and support regional cooperative institutions and neighbors as well as its limited capabilities allow. The government is purported to be committed to rectifying its current maritime deficiencies with the purchase of new boats, aircraft, and coastal radars, but time will tell whether that materializes. If so, the force would need additional personnel, training, and infrastructure to make use of those assets.

**Key considerations**

Antigua and Barbuda faces many challenges to improving its maritime security and law enforcement capabilities. To be successful, it would need investments and progress in several interrelated areas.

- **MDA:** Without airborne sensors or coastal radar, Antigua and Barbuda lacks visibility over vessels and activities in its EEZ. These deficiencies can be addressed either by investing in coastal radar or aircraft (manned or unmanned) or by developing more consistent support from a multilateral partner such as the RSS.

- **Lack of a maritime-focused intelligence cell:** If the ABDF were able to see vessels in its waters, it would need to identify suspect vessels with maritime intelligence. Ideally a maritime intelligence cell could analyze the most prevalent entry or flow points of illicit maritime traffic and would have access to intelligence from the RSS, US agencies, and other international sources. Preferably this cell would operate within the CG and help direct its patrol routes.

- **Communications:** The CG badly needs upgraded or repaired Harris or other HF radio systems in order to operate farther from the shore and on longer missions and to interoperate at sea with onshore and foreign partner forces. The effects of the lack of access to CBSI TAFT are most evident in the CG’s failure to maintain those systems.
• **More boats**: Another SAFE Boat interceptor or another craft very similar to the CG’s existing vessels would boost capability. However, without intelligence to allow targeted patrols and actions, and effective communications, a few new boats would not significantly change the force’s capabilities or effective presence on the water. New craft would also stress the CG’s capacity to staff and maintain the fleet effectively. The provision of more assets should be conditional on the government’s and ABDF’s agreement to increase the size and expand the training of the CG team.

Given the significant expense, effort, and institutional restructuring that would be required of the government to make these acquisitions, we doubt that they will transpire in the coming years. However, there seems to be some agreement within the government that the nation sorely needs more effective maritime regulation. Resolution of the payments issue or at least the removal of US withholding of TAFT and other direct assistance to the ABDF would be helpful.
Table 4. Summary of Antigua and Barbuda’s maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMAIN AWARENESS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>C2 for maritime operations is disjointed, with police agencies and the Office of National Drug Control controlling information and seldom sharing it with the CG. This is one reason for the country’s general lack of maritime law enforcement.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Without TAFT assistance to repair Harris radios, the CG uses cell phones and WhatsApp or unencrypted VHF radios for communication. These systems rely on terrestrial receivers, giving the CG boats a range of 4–5 n.mi. maximum from the shoreline.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>No radars, MPAs, or other sensors. Rely on human intelligence and alerts from international sources.</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>Two of the CG’s four boats are fully mission capable. The two SAFE Boats provide daily patrols of 4–6 hours mostly to popular harbors to check on yacht/recreational fleets. Without reliable comms and alerts, the CG does not conduct interdictions at sea (the police prefer to encounter suspect vessels at shore).</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>Capable of routine maintenance and repairs of SAFE Boats, with trained technicians. But without TAFT assistance and spare parts, readiness will inevitably decline.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>The nation’s only commercial port has a scanner but mostly inspects cargo manually. When we visited, the port facilities were completely unsecured.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAW ENFORCEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Police and prosecutors described very few infrequent cases of maritime criminal investigations or prosecutions. ONDCP and police investigators are described as effective but not responsive to and specialized in maritime crime.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>Director of public prosecutors reports virtually no maritime criminal cases in recent memory. DPP office has six well-trained attorneys but none with training in maritime law. Prosecutors benefit from cooperation with a Criminal Justice Advisor.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Regulatory framework and Maritime Shipping Act align with international conventions, but enforcement is poor.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INTL COOP</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>ABDF and CG share information with neighbors and international partners (OECS, RSS) largely via interpersonal relations and via cell phones. Also receive alerts and information from RSS and IMPACS.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Interoperation limited to near zero by inshore reach of CG operations. Participate in Tradewinds but only with personnel.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
The Bahamas

The Bahamas is a critical security partner of the United States, with islands as close as 50 n.mi. to the Florida coast and a regular flow of international maritime traffic.\(^\text{18}\) The USCG cooperates routinely with the Bahamian maritime police and defense forces and reports them to be competent and professional, although undersized given the vast scale of the maritime territory they are required to regulate and control. The Bahamian forces train and retain their personnel satisfactorily and manage their budgets and resources adequately, and corruption is not reported to be a serious problem. In 2019, Hurricane Dorian took a heavy toll on their boats and facilities, and the COVID-19 pandemic has caused some diversion of personnel and funding. Still, in December 2021, the Bahamian forces and their US government partners expressed optimism that they had weathered these crises and described plans to improve capabilities in the years ahead.

The Bahamas enjoys a degree of rule of law and competent governance that few of its neighbors can match and has a comprehensive, well-structured regime for maritime law enforcement. The government has ratified virtually all the main international conventions and protocols for maritime safety and law enforcement and has adequate capabilities for prosecuting maritime crimes. Nevertheless, the effective prosecution of large-scale cases involving drug or human traffickers is resource intensive and quite rare.

Several small forces cooperate to provide Bahamian citizens and guests maritime security, including a customs authority maritime force, a port authority force, and a force for fisheries management. As Figure 7 shows, the largest and best equipped maritime security force is the Royal Bahamian Defence Force (RBDF),\(^\text{19}\) followed by the Royal Bahamian Police Force Marine Support Services Unit (RBPF-MSSU) and the Customs Department maritime enforcement unit (MEU). The RBDF has the broadest operational ambit, with open sea-

\(^{18}\) Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.

\(^{19}\) With a central mission of defending Bahamian territorial sovereignty, the RBDF cooperates closely with the US DOD as well as the USCG and other entities. Although The Bahamas falls geographically within the area of responsibility of the US Armed Forces Northern Command, its forces also benefit from some initiatives led by SOUTHCOM, such as the Tradewinds exercise series and a CBSI TAFT.
capable vessels as well as several small fast boats, and supports all missions, particularly those involving illegal immigration, smuggling, and narcotics trafficking. The RBPF-MSSU has only smaller boats, operates generally within 20 n.mi. of its posts or in riverine or shallow water areas, and focuses on narcotics interdictions missions. Both forces frequently operate with support from USCG helicopters, and US officers describe the Bahamians as proficient at interdiction tactics and VBSS operations. Although INL Bahamas does not directly support the RBDF, our capabilities assessment includes that force to provide a complete picture of overall capabilities.
Figure 7. The Bahamas, Northern Caribbean, location of key assets and capabilities

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.; see also Jane’s World Navies, Armies, and Air Forces; US Embassy Nassau; and RBDF official Facebook.

a  = 50 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

Integrated command and control

The RBDF has a maritime command center in Nassau that capably communicates across its operating locations and receives and integrates information from national and mostly international sources and partners for real-time MDA. The RBPF-MSSU also has a headquarters base in Nassau from which it communicates to its outlying units. These operational commands communicate with each other frequently and with the Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) intelligence center at the US embassy to coordinate actions.

Communications

The Bahamian maritime forces’ assets are equipped with VHF radios, which, along with a transponder system that the United States helped provide, allow HF LOS communications from the north to the south as far as Great Inagua. As backup, the US DOD recently installed satellite-based OTH communications equipment on RBDF ships, but its use is expensive and limited to high-end operations. USCG helicopters (frequently involved in at-sea interdictions) can communicate with RBDF and RBPF-MSSU vessels but only within approximately eight n.mi.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

The Bahamian maritime forces, and the Bahamian defense forces more broadly, have very little capability for airborne or radar ISR, but this situation is changing. The RBDF operates an Air Wing with two aircraft—a King Air 350 and a 208B Grand Caravan—stationed at Lynden Pindling International Airport on New Providence and a hangar facility at Ragged Island for operations in the south. Unfortunately, these airframes lack FLIR and radar sensors, limiting their ISR utility to LOS missions. In addition, these few aircraft are necessarily multirole and therefore receive tasking for SAR, airlift mobility, medical evacuation, and so forth. Because of these issues, the RBDF rarely employs the aircraft for maritime patrol or other reconnaissance.

In 2019 and 2021, the US Armed Forces Northern Command provided the RBDF with radars situated on Inagua and at New Providence as part of a maritime surveillance system (MSS).

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Two more units have been proposed for Ragged Island and Great Exuma. Still, Bahamian maritime forces remain reliant on intelligence provided by the US or other foreign partners. To improve further its ISR capabilities, the RBDF soon plans to launch a USD $17 million unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, the Bahamas National Unmanned System, with up to 55 Swift Engineering short- and medium-range UAVs; the largest will be able to operate out to 50 n.mi.

### Maritime presence and operations

#### Patrol and interdiction

Royal Bahamian Defence Force

The RBDF maintains a total force structure of close to 2,000 personnel and has plans to expand to an end strength of 3,000 after recovering from Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19. The RBDF is a primarily maritime-oriented force composed of 1,090 naval personnel and an estimated 450 infantry personnel, including a Commando Squadron (a reinforced company-sized marine infantry element), a platoon-sized special operations unit, and a military police force protection unit. The previously mentioned Air Wing consists of 50 personnel.

The RBDF operates 12 larger vessels (4 or 5 of which were fully mission capable at time of visit), including 2 60m Europatrol 250 Corvettes and 8 smaller OPVs (Damen Stan Patrol 4207s and Sea Axe 3007s). Each of the eight OPVs carries a rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) for VBSS operations. For short-range interdiction operations, the RBDF counts on a total of six SAFE Boats and Nortech interceptors (four of which were believed to be operational at time of visit). In addition, a Damen Stan landing craft allows the RBDF to conduct sealift missions between the islands as well as respond to natural disasters. The Bahamian fleet is relatively new: the Bahamas class corvettes were commissioned in 2000 but fully refitted in 2017–2018.

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Damen Stans vessels were acquired in 2013–2016, and the SAFE Boats were US donations from 2018 and 2021.25

**Royal Bahamian Police Force Marine Support Services Unit**

The RBPF-MSSU has 40 officers (16 of whom are reserves) and operates four US-donated (in 2014–2016) 40 ft SAFE Boats (410 Apostles), one each at bases in Freeport, Nassau, Exuma, and Inagua.26

Both the RBDF and the RBPF-MSSU have bases or operational locations at all the major islands and spread their forces to provide coverage throughout all regions. For years, the focus has been on improving capabilities in the south against major flows of illegal migrants and narcotics from the Windward Passage or the Dominican Republic. With a new joint base under development at Ragged Island with DOD and INL support, the next target is to improve capabilities in the north at Grand Bahamas or Great Abaco.

With only four boats with operational range up to 50 n.m.i. (a distance that would be sorely testing their fuel limits), the RBPF-MSSU tends to keep within 20 n.m.i. of shorelines. To conserve fuel and engines, it tends to keep its vessels out of the water except in the case of a potential narcotics interdiction—the focus of its efforts (although the police force does support other requirements when directed). The RBDF is more broadly capable, operating not only within 20 n.m.i. of shore but also out to 200 n.m.i. at times in operations that can be sustained for two or more days.

Even with these capabilities, the vast size of The Bahamas’ territorial waters and EEZ—more than 100,000 sq mi—presents an enormous challenge to its maritime security forces.

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**Customs Department maritime enforcement unit**

The Bahamas Customs Department also has a small MEU staffed by 15 personnel with 3 Boston Whaler interceptors (2 used and 1 confiscated). Two of these craft are located at Nassau and the other is in Freeport. Although not as well-resourced as the RBDF and RBPF-MSSU, the Customs MEU has much broader legal authority for seizures—one interlocutor called Customs MEU personnel “walking search warrants.” Despite this advantage and a prior record for seizures, the Customs force reports that maritime interdiction operations are down 50 percent since 2016. One contributing factor is that the force was not allowed to conduct boarding operations from late 2019 to early 2021 because of the pandemic, instead being relegated to an observatory role.

**Maintenance**

The RBDF has a full-service maintenance and repair facility at Coral Harbour and an adequately sized team of well-trained mechanics and specialists. In recent years, the RBDF has demonstrated its proficiency by refurbishing boats that Jamaica released as decrepit and by sustaining its considerable fleet of both small and large craft. The RBDF is capable of basic preventive maintenance and depot-level repairs, including access to dry dock facilities via local commercial providers. Readiness levels are generally good, but the lengthy postponement of US training and support because of COVID-19 has reduced this capacity somewhat. A US-provided TAFT out of SOUTHCOM supports the RBDF maintenance crew with training, advising, and engine and part donations. Relations between the RBDF, the RBPF-MSSU, and the Customs MEU are good, and RBDF mechanics provide those forces some sustainment support when necessary.

**Port security**

The Bahamas Customs Department force is responsible for port security. The total Customs force consists of 500 staff (nearly half of whom are administrative). The Customs force also has a small K9 detection unit consisting of five officers and six dogs on Nassau and two officers and three dogs at Freeport. Because The Bahamas does not have a baggage scanner, baggage must be screened by the K9 units or by hand. Container security at Freeport is driven

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27 The CBSI TAFT has recently noted that the RBDF does have a marine travel lift but it is extremely limited in capacity (unable to lift most of the RBDF’s larger patrol platforms) because of its advanced age and would require considerable investment to overhaul.

mainly by foreign intelligence agencies, such as US CBP. INL efforts to create two port control units, one at Nassau and another at Freeport, have not yet materialized.

**Maritime law enforcement**

**Investigation**

In The Bahamas, a good share of law enforcement involves the maritime domain to some degree, and maritime crimes are investigated and prosecuted in the same way as nonmaritime crimes. International observers rate The Bahamas' law enforcement, court system, and rule of law as relatively competent, transparent, and institutionalized (9th out of 32 Latin American and Caribbean nations, with the same overall score in 2021 (.61) as Greece and Croatia and not far behind the United States (.69)). Local prosecutors and maritime legal advisors report no special difficulties with the handling and prosecution of maritime crime or with the country's maritime regulatory framework.

**Prosecution**

The Bahamas has a sizable staff of about 35 national prosecutors, including several specially trained in maritime law and law enforcement. Independent sources also rate the national police force and judicial system as relatively competent. The attorney general’s (AG’s) office has five or six staff trained in maritime law but only three directly engaged in the subject matter on a day-to-day basis. Maritime prosecutions primarily focus on migration and human trafficking issues. In addition, the AG’s office acts in a legal advisory role to the RBDF, RBPF, and Customs MEU, specifically helping to build prosecution cases dealing with domestic and international maritime law. Still, major criminal cases involving maritime crimes can take several years to prosecute. No major cases of this type have occurred in more than six years.

**Legislation and jurisprudence**

The Bahamas has one of the most comprehensive sets of maritime and maritime-related laws and codes in the region and cooperates jurisdictionally with the United States and Turks and Caicos. The Bahamas has signed and ratified most of the standard international conventions and protocols for maritime safety and law enforcement (e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), International Convention for the Safety of Life at

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29 *WJP Rule of Law Index.*

30 Ibid.

31 Ralby, *Maritime Trafficking in the Caribbean*, 38.

**International cooperation**

**Information sharing**

Bahamian maritime forces regularly cooperate with their regional counterparts, most frequently via OPBAT, which supports information sharing between the United States, The Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos to conduct at-sea interdictions of illicit trafficking. The Bahamian forces also communicate often about maritime security issues with the Dominican Republic and Cuba.

**Interoperability**

The RBDF participates in US-sponsored Tradewinds exercises and finds them generally useful, especially when the scenarios and themes in the training deal with illicit trafficking and migration instead of emergency management and other issues more germane to the forces of the Southern and Eastern Caribbean. Bahamian maritime forces also participate in regional forums about maritime security affairs and cooperation. Bahamian defense units regularly train with US Marines, Navy Special Warfare, and National Guard units.\textsuperscript{33}

**Summary**

As Table 5 shows, the maritime security and law enforcement forces of The Bahamas are highly competent across most areas compared to their regional counterparts. This competence is partially because of a tradition of government attention to and investment in the nation’s maritime space and resources (less of the “sea blindness” attributed to the region’s governments, according to one subject matter expert), which ensures well-funded, professional forces. Another contributing factor is the country’s strong, routine international cooperation in information exchange and operations with the USCG and other agencies and with regional partners through OPBAT. The Bahamian forces, particularly the RBDF, train and operate routinely, including for interdictions many miles offshore. The area of lowest

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 12-15.

capability, ISR, can in part be attributed to extensive information sharing for MDA, which diminishes the need for The Bahamas to invest in its own sensors and platforms.

**Key considerations**

Taken altogether, the several maritime security and law enforcement forces of The Bahamas are relatively effective at fulfilling their collective missions. Clearly, the RBDF has the country’s most capable maritime force and seems poised to expand its capabilities to improve ISR. For reasons of US policy, INL does not provide assistance to the RBDF and instead provides modest support to the RBPF-MSSU (and very little since 2016 because of the lack of an INL program manager in country and the COVID-19 pandemic). We assess that INL clearly receives positive return from its relationship and cooperation with Bahamian forces, yet these could be improved with a more integrated vision of which force or partner is best suited to address which capability gaps of importance to INL objectives.

- **Interagency issues**: Given that the RBPF-MSSU currently has a chief mission—counternarcotics interdictions—that overlaps with that of the competent RBDF, we suggest that INL and interagency partners consider whether further investment in the MSSU as a near-shore interdiction force is the most beneficial use of INL maritime assistance. For example, INL could provide more support to the Customs Department maritime force, which has additional complementary authorities for searches and seizures. Or INL may wish to concentrate efforts on helping to improve commercial port infrastructure, port security, and cargo scanning at Freeport, Nassau, and Marsh Harbor, all items of immense importance to The Bahamas and to US security, given the centrality of Bahamian ports in regional traffic to and from the United States. The US government’s purview does not include influencing Bahamian police structure, but INL may want to suggest to the Bahamian government and force leadership that the RBPF-MSSU may be more effectively employed for missions or tasks distinct from those of the RBDF. For example, the RBPF-MSSU could be better equipped, trained, and informed to respond to environmental resource crimes such as illegal fishing or dumping and to patrol ports, harbors, and coasts for the safety and security of tourism and recreation.

- **The RBDF as a potential regional leader**: The Bahamian maritime security services are arguably the most capable and professional of the region and have strong international ties through CARICOM and, more locally, OPBAT. INL CBSI and its interagency partners may want to discuss whether The Bahamas could be more effectively leveraged as a leader of international maritime security cooperation in the Northern Caribbean. Greater information exchange, confidence, and cooperation among The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica could be
challenging but would have immediate, clear importance for regional and US homeland security. If effective, it could also serve to pull the greater Caribbean community toward higher standards of interaction and cooperation in the long run.
Table 5. Summary of The Bahamas’ maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMAIN AWARENESS</strong></td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td><strong>RBDF</strong>: MOC at RBDF HQ; VHF comms across fleet. Routine operational links with RBPF-MSSU and USCG; <strong>OPBAT</strong> operations center hosted at US Embassy Nassau.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>VHF comms capability ship-shore, ship-ship across range, with larger vessels having OTH; WhatsApp is backup; access to OTH SATCOM and for special operations; helo-boat comms good within 8 n.mi.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td><strong>RBDF</strong> (MSS): 2x new radar stations (with 2x additional projected); Air Wing: 2x multirole MPAs (only 1 operational; no FLIR/radar); OPVs not used for patrolling with limited sensors (LOS only).</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td><strong>RBDF</strong>: has 12x OPV vessels in total (only 4x FMC; including 2x 60 m corvettes) with 8x RHIBs; 6x short-range interceptors (4x FMC); capable interdictions units operate in tandem with USCG helos for target location; well-trained and with good maintenance and sustainment capabilities. <strong>RBPF-MSSU</strong>: operates 4x interceptors, focus on near-coastal (within 20 n.mi.) narcotics interdictions. <strong>Customs MEU</strong>: operates 3x interceptors.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td><strong>RBDF</strong>: has good technicians, facilities, and capability to maintain boats and sustain operations. <strong>RBPF-MSSU</strong>: uses boats sparingly, also keeps its boats well maintained. Near full readiness (50–75%).</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td><strong>Customs force</strong>: 500 (250 admin) with K9 units (no advanced scanner equipment) cover Freeport and Nassau. No interagency task force; informal info sharing.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAW ENFORCEMENT</strong></td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>SMEs report investigators and processes as satisfactory, although complex cases of maritime crime are infrequent.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>Large staff of 35 prosecutors, including maritime legal experts at AG’s office; SMEs assess prosecutors as competent, well-trained, and professional; some reports of inconsistent prosecution of maritime crime (trafficking).</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/ Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Signatory of virtually all major conventions and protocols. Robust legal framework regarding maritime activities and crime.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTL COOP</strong></td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Routine info sharing with US and partners (JIATF-S), neighbors (US and Turks &amp; Caicos) through OPBAT (operations center hosted at US Embassy Nassau). Annual conferences aim to improve interpersonal networks.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Routine interoperability with USCG helos and RBDF or RBPF on board; routine operations through OPBAT; participates in Tradewinds at own cost.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Note: FMC = fully mission capable; MOC = maritime operations center; SME = subject matter expert.
Barbados

Barbados has been a leader in maritime security and law enforcement and a proponent of greater regional cooperation in the Eastern Caribbean, a major transit zone for inbound firearms and narcotics destined for the United States and Europe. The Barbados Coast Guard (BCG) of the Barbados Defense Force (BDF) is the largest national maritime security force among the RSS member states in the Eastern Caribbean. Stationed in Bridgetown, it consists of 200 to 250 personnel and 13 vessels: 3 OPVs and 10 smaller inshore patrol and interceptor craft (see Figure 89). The BCG identifies Barbados’ primary maritime security threats as transnational organized crime (including illicit traffic in narcotics, firearms, persons, and other contraband), armed robbery and piracy, IUU fishing and other poaching, and terrorism. BDF headquarters directly controls and operates a small vetted, high-readiness BCG maritime interdiction unit, the Maritime Special Operations Unit (MSOU), that works in close partnership with the US. A few years ago, the BCG faced allegations of corruption between some officers and drug traffickers, which led to a change in leadership and ongoing precautions in operational security. The Barbados Police Service (BPS) also contributes to maritime security with a three-boat maritime unit and a coastal radar system (see Figure 8).

In addition to playing host to the RSS and its principal facilities and assets (such as the Air Wing and Training Institute) and the CARICOM IMPACS JRCC, Barbados has key leadership roles in both of these multilateral organizations. A career BDF officer is currently dual-hatted as both the acting deputy director of the JRCC and the executive director of CARICOM, and the current BDF chief of staff is also the executive director of the RSS. Furthermore, Barbadian maritime security forces are important contributors to RSS-led maritime patrols and JIATF-S-led counternarcotics campaigns in the area, alongside French, Trinidadian, and Saint Vincentian maritime forces. Still, Barbados has experienced budget and sustainment shortfalls—exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and related supply chain issues—that have limited its maritime unit readiness. Even before the pandemic, with so few capable long-range surface units, Barbados was challenged in consistently projecting presence throughout its EEZ.

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34 Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.

35 Burroughs et al., Stable Seas, 75.
The lack of a modern maritime regulatory framework also causes further limitations in addressing the present criminal threat environment at sea. In recent years, Barbados has faced mounting levels of gang violence because of increasing arrivals of illegal firearms, but political support for maritime security has often been lacking because of a preference for terrestrial approaches to addressing crime. Although Barbados benefits from INL and RSS support for digital evidence exploitation, civil asset forfeiture, and advising to police and prosecutors, poor case quality and a slow judicial process result in few examples of successful legal finishes against maritime crime and a years-long backlog of cases.

Figure 8. BCG and BPS interceptors (foreground); BCG OPVs (background)
Source: CNA based BCG and RSS, using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.

= 50 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

**Integrated command and control**

The BCG operates a 24/7 maritime operations center (MOC) with constant radio and satellite connection to RSS feeds and seagoing assets. The BCG has Harris and commercial radios for multiband HF communications between vessels and shore as well as integrated communications with the RSS Air Wing. The BCG has three US-donated BFTs used primarily on the one operational OPV and two MSOU interceptor craft, contributing to better situational awareness of operations and interoperability with JIATF-S.

**Communications**

Using military (Harris) and commercial (Motorola) multiband HF radios, the BCG can successfully maintain communications between surface units, shore headquarters and MOC, and the RSS Air Wing, although the range from land or locally at sea is estimated at no more than 8 n.m.i. These communications are only verbal and do not involve data transmission, such as unit and target coordinates, speed, and vector—vital information for an interdiction endgame.  

**Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**

The BCG’s maritime surveillance comes in part from its OPV patrols (which have radar and infrared cameras for local area detection) but more routinely from the RSS Air Wing, the JRCC (via the Windward marine traffic tracking system), and international intelligence-sharing arrangements, including those with JIATF-S. The BPS operates a network of four Israeli-made coastal radars, but these have limited range, not all the installations are operational, and the BPS does not consistently share its feeds with the BCG.

Maritime presence and operations

**Patrol and interdiction**

The BCG has a capable and modern fleet of three OPVs and interceptors, but their coverage of the EEZ and contribution to maritime security has been hindered by low levels of readiness because of logistics shortfalls. Instead, the small but vetted high-readiness MSOU is the unit of choice for interdictions. The wider force is not generally trusted with these missions because of concerns about operational security and prior cases of corruption. In total, in the

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36 Operators would have to stop their pursuit to verbally transmit these data to avoid having their audio drowned out by the sound of outboard motors and sea state in a high-speed chase.
period 2016–2021, the BCG reports seizing nearly 14 MT of marijuana and 0.4 MT of cocaine. As part of a concerning trend across the region, the BCG also reported seizing more than 20 firearms (mainly handguns) and more than 500 rounds of ammunition during the same period.

The BCG relies on the US to supplement its training program, especially for technical areas in operations and engineering as well as senior leadership development via the International Military Education and Training program. The BCG generally sends about 10 to 15 servicemembers each year to participate in US programs. Because of reductions in training opportunities from DOD in the last three years, the BCG has sacrificed junior officer and enlisted trainings in favor of long-term investments in its senior leadership education via the US Navy War College and other staff colleges. The BCG also relies on support from Jamaica’s Caribbean Military Academy and Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center and has previously received basic training and naval and command staff college opportunities from the People’s Republic of China and the EU’s Sea Cooperation Project (SEACOP).

**BCG offshore patrol**

The BCG’s three Damen Stan 4207 OPVs conduct surveillance and interdiction (using their onboard stern-gate ramp-deployed Damen MST 1000 RHIBs) for counternarcotics and fishery and environmental protection (see Figure 10). These have functional radar and FLIR cameras for local area detection of targets as well as communications equipment for land-sea-air communications with friendly units. As of December 2021, only one of the OPVs and RHIBs was fully mission capable, limiting availability not only for patrol in Barbados maritime

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37 This figure represents about four percent of the total amount of cocaine seizures made by all Eastern Caribbean partners assisted and reported by the RSS Air Wing (9.6 MT). BCG marijuana seizures are also 1.5 times the total amount reportedly seized by Eastern Caribbean partners with RSS Air Wing support (9.7 MT). The relatively large share of marijuana seizures is consistent with the northward flow of illicit marijuana cultivated in Saint Vincent on the slopes of the La Soufrière volcano.
territory but also for RSS MLE CONOP and JIATF-S deployments. JIATF-S reports that routine Barbados OPV deployments under the RSS aegis and contributions to force packages are at present still very limited in duration (no more than one to two days).

**BCG short-range interceptors**

The BCG’s interdiction assets include a flotilla of three IPVs and four Damen interceptors capable of operating within 12 n.mi. of shore (see Figure 11). This small fleet, however, suffers from low readiness; as of December 2021, none of the vessels was operational. Along with the OPVs, the small boat flotilla is tasked with general maritime law enforcement, counternarcotics surveillance, fisheries and environmental protection, and maritime safety, search, and rescue.

**BDF Maritime Special Operations Unit**

The BDF MSOU, originally stood up in 2007 to provide counterterrorism security for the Cricket World Cup hosted in Bridgetown, now has 25 personnel and 2 Zodiac Hurricane 920 interceptors that are kept at maximum readiness for high-value, high-risk maritime interdiction operations (see Figure 12). This highly capable unit has received VBSS and other training and exchanges from US Navy Seals as well as British and Israeli special forces and is responsible for virtually all the country’s intelligence-driven at-sea narcotics seizures. Because of the previously mentioned concerns with operational security and

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38 One 40-ft Sea Ark and two 40-ft Damen Stan Patrol 1204 IPVs; three Damen Stan MST 1200s and a China-donated “Endurance” interceptor craft.

39 Members of the TAFT note that these vessels are of an older generation of donated interceptors, rather than the newer and higher performance models operated by other RSS member state forces (usually SAFE Boat Defenders).
corruption in the wider force, in practice, the MSOU operates directly under the control of BDF headquarters, and other BCG small boat units are not routinely tasked with counternarcotics missions.40

**Maintenance**

Despite having a competent maintenance cadre, the BCG struggles to keep the whole fleet in full readiness because of logistics shortfalls and BDF budgetary constraints. BCG leadership is cognizant that it will not be able to operate and sustain a much larger fleet and is actively considering vessel replacements to modernize its fleet to simplify and economize its maintenance program. The BCG maintenance facility was built in 2015 and includes a large hangar equipped with workshops and stockpile along with a working 25 MT boat hoist and finger pier that can lift all but the larger OPVs out of the water for drydock repair (see Figure 13 and Figure 14).

The BCG maintenance section, with 25 technicians, is capable of both level 1 (basic/routine/preventive) and level 2 (depot) maintenance. For instance, BCG mechanics are capable of completely overhauling and refurbishing the inboard diesel engines on most of the BCG's larger craft independent of the TAFT. The TAFT currently provides only technical assistance and spare parts in support of the maintenance and readiness of the BCG's one 40-ft Sea Ark IPV and two MSOU Zodiac Hurricane fast interceptors.41 Waterjet propulsion systems for the OPV RHIBs prove temperamental (given the proliferation of seaweed in the Sargasso Sea)42 and more difficult to maintain, but

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40 BCG officers note that MSOU operators, as a rule, rarely intermingle or socialize with other BCG units, even in barracks.

41 TAFT and BCG are currently partnering to refurbish the Sea Ark and restore it to full operational use.

the BCG is otherwise quite capable in small boat maintenance, as evidenced by its partnership with the RSS to launch an outboard motor maintenance center of excellence and small boat logistics warehouse in the near future. These capabilities make the BCG a regional leader, even though in the last couple of years the BCG’s limited budget for replacement parts and consumables and reliance on a just-in-time logistics model during pandemic supply chain disruptions has depleted stocks, thereby eroding operational readiness. The BCG maintenance facility also supports the three-boat BPS maritime unit and the RSS maritime training fleet (all three services operate the same type of 40-ft Sea Ark inshore patrol and interceptor craft) (see Figure 14).

Figure 14.  BCG HMBS Pelican Base, Bridgetown, Barbados

Port security

Barbadian ports remain vulnerable to illicit activity. Barbados’ port security falls under the government-run port authority corporation and the Customs and Excise Department. Barbados’ main and only seaport (a government-run corporation) is highly insecure. Experts at Stable Seas estimate that, as of year-end 2020, 94 percent of all containers arriving in Barbados went unscanned.43 A 2021 assessment by the new INL customs enforcement advisor

43 Burroughs et al., Stable Seas, 12.
identified several key vulnerabilities, especially the lack of accountability of port customs officials. Barbados enacted its ACIS legislation in 2018 and, as part of an IMPACS JRCC pilot program in five Eastern Caribbean countries, has access to ACIS advanced cargo container targeting, but this capability is still nascent and requires further training. The EU’s SEACOP program was last active in support of Barbados’ port security and customs enforcement via the RSS in 2018.

Maritime law enforcement

Investigation

CNA was not able to directly observe the maritime evidence chain of custody between the BCG and BPS. The RSS DFL supports BPS, but it is unclear from data provided what percentage of DFL-supported cases were maritime in nature and whether support contributed to stronger cases and successful legal finishes. Furthermore, the RSS, with INL support, is piloting the standup of a TOC task force (for replication in the rest of the RSS member states) in Barbados. The unit will consist of liaisons from the BPS, the police Special Branch (which handles criminal intelligence), the BDF, and the INL special investigations advisor. Barbados also has an active FIU supported by the Financial Crimes Team—a team of Eastern Caribbean and international legal advisors supported by an INL grant to the NCSC that supports other FIUs of RSS member states but is based in Bridgetown.

Prosecution

Barbados has a relatively small maritime legal community consisting of 12 lawyers: 1 for the BCG and 11 for the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (but 3 are temporary). Of the 12, only 4 have specific training in maritime law. Until 2020, the DPP had only 5 prosecutors, so the staff has essentially doubled in only two years. The BCG is the only Caribbean coast guard service to have a sea lawyer with advanced training in maritime law. As with much of the Eastern Caribbean, serious maritime crime in Barbados corresponds to the DPP, but in practice these cases are often tried by junior police prosecutors who face off against much better trained and resourced defenders. A criminal suit can take up to five to six years to conclude.

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45 Ibid., 2, 5.


47 Ralby, Maritime Trafficking in the Caribbean, 53.
Even with the recent increase in DPP staffing, the backlog is such that cases from 2009 are still being heard in court. Therefore, the better case packages prepared with DFL evidence analysis and expert testimony are generally at the back of the queue, so any positive outcomes from investments in these capabilities will likely lag.

**Legislation and jurisprudence**

Despite some salient advances and advantages, Barbados has an anachronistic maritime legal regime. The Defense Act of Barbados effectively deputizes the BCG with police arrest authority in the maritime domain. Caribbean legal experts rate the Barbados Drug Abuse Act as significantly outdated compared to the current criminal environment, in which synthetic drugs and sophisticated trafficking in precursor chemicals are now common. Barbados lacks law establishing its contiguous zone (the 24 n.mi. offshore that provides limited powers of law enforcement under UNCLOS) and law establishing jurisdiction and prosecutorial authority beyond the territorial sea consistent with the Vienna Drug Convention. Furthermore, Barbados’ most recent National Anti-Drug Plan (2015–2020) lacked a focus on maritime illicit trafficking. These deficits limit Barbados’ ability to both plan for and conduct counter-illicit trafficking interdictions at medium range and to prosecute said cases. Barbados has an active and recently revamped civil asset forfeiture law using Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) model legislation that allows law enforcement to seize cash and other physical assets (such as boats) separate from time-consuming criminal proceedings. Data on sums of civil asset forfeitures related to maritime crime contributed to by Barbados law enforcement were not available.

**International cooperation**

**Information sharing**

With limited organic MDA and ISR capabilities of its own, Barbados is generally a net beneficiary of information sharing, principally via partnership with JIATF-S and the RSS Air Wing using CSII/APAN. Barbados also naturally benefits from signals intelligence and human intelligence sharing by DEA and UK law enforcement posted at the RSS Regional Fusion Center. Barbados has not had a JIATF-S TAT stationed at US Embassy Bridgetown for several years because of the higher demand for these limited resources in other areas of the region (the Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean).

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Interoperability

Because Barbados is a founding treaty member of the RSS and host to RSS facilities, the BCG is a frequent contributor to RSS maritime law enforcement efforts under the 2021 RSS MLE CONOP, contributing its OPVs to combined RSS rotational patrols. The BCG MOC also supports the Maritime Rescue Subregional Coordination Centre (MRSCC), subordinate to the MRSCC in Trinidad and Tobago and the MRSCC in Martinique. The BCG regularly participates in the SOUTHCOM-led Tradewinds exercise and was scheduled to host the 2021 iteration that was canceled because of pandemic conditions. Ultimately, the BCG did not send any participating forces to Guyana for Tradewinds 2021 because of pandemic-related concerns. The BCG expressed an eagerness to work more closely with the USCG in exchanges, exercises, and operations. Barbados is not a signatory of the 2003 San José Treaty. Barbados maintains shiprider agreements with both the US and the RSS.

Summary

As Table 6 shows, Barbados is generally proficient in many areas and benefits from hosting the RSS, which ensures a high level of international cooperation with neighbors and with US, European, and other partners. With good command and control, its force structure and operations are limited by logistics and resourcing challenges and concerns of corruption in the wider force. Port security and criminal investigations and prosecutions are areas in need of improvement to improve regional and national maritime public security.

Key considerations

Barbados faces several key challenges to improving its ability to conduct maritime security and law enforcement in its own maritime territory and contribute to its leadership, capacity-building, and force multiplier role in the RSS and Eastern Caribbean.

- **MDA**: ICSS coastal radars operated by BPS are of limited utility because they have limited range and are in a poor state of repair. In addition, data feeds are not shared with the BCG. Barbados’ main MDA tool is the RSS Air Wing, which, as previously noted (see Figure 4), has seen steady decline in flight hours and missions after major refurbishment in 2015, despite contributing to an increased number of successful interdictions.

- **Maritime presence and operations**: At present, the BCG is not able to keep enough OPVs in operational readiness to fully contribute to the RSS MLE CONOP for Eastern

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49 Ibid., 18.
Caribbean-wide EEZ patrols. BDF-level budget reductions and supply chain difficulties have resulted in decreased readiness of BCG surface units (except the TAFT-supported MSOU). INL Bridgetown is appropriately looking to include the MSOU in future maritime crime tabletop exercises and thereby solidify the connectivity between maritime operations and the terrestrial chain of investigation and prosecution.

- **Port security**: Customs enforcement and port container control are gaps for Barbados. INL Bridgetown is appropriately taking action to address this vulnerability with the implementation of a new customs enforcement advisor program but will likely benefit down the line from the expansions of the Container Control Programme (CCP).

- **Maritime law enforcement**: Despite an increase in DPP staff, training and expertise in maritime law are deficient, case package quality remains low, and a deep case backlog persists. Maritime crime cases are comingled with terrestrial cases in terms of both data collection and prosecution. Barbados lacks a robust and modern maritime legal framework that marries the full potential technical operation range of the BCG with legal authorities in the contiguous zone and beyond.

- **International cooperation**: Barbados is a model leader for regional cooperation in the Eastern Caribbean as a key contributor to the RSS. Contributions to JIATF-S would be improved by increased BCG force package deployments of OPVs (which will require better sustainment and self-sufficiency).
Table 6. Summary of Barbados’ maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMAIN AWARENESS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Integrated Command and Control</strong> BCG: MOC functional CSII/APAN (integration with JIATF-S); integration with CARICOM JRCC systems (including Windward) but not ICSS radars. BCG units now have 3x BFTs on loan from JIATF-S.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Communications</strong> Ship-to-shore; ship-to-ship; air-to-ship/shore all functional between BCG and RSS Air Wing using Harris HF, VHF, and UHF radios. Offshore range is likely limited.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</strong> BPS coastal radar: 4x coastal radars but these are not shared with BCG and are not fully operational; MPA: relies on RSS Air Wing: 3x OPVs for EEZ patrol with FLIR + radar but limited availability and endurance.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Patrol and Interdiction</strong> BCG: 13x total vessels: (3x OPVs + 3x IPVs + 7x short-range interceptors) at low levels of readiness due to logistics/resourcing; OPVs can range to full EEZ and international waters but with limited endurance; IPVs limited to territorial waters; interceptors up to 3 n.mi.; interdiction usually occurs in 12 n.mi. range. BDF: high-readiness, vetted MSOU unit with 25x operators and 2x interceptors performs most interdictions; BPS Maritime Unit: 3x IPVs/short-range interceptors; readiness and performance not observed.</td>
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<td><strong>Maintenance</strong> BCG: cadre of 20x engineers/mechanics with high levels of technical expertise (especially outboard motor but also diesel engine/generator overhaul) for both preventive and depot level maintenance; ability to drydock IPVs and interceptors with 25-ton travel lift; provides support to BPS and RSS.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Port Security</strong> INL customs enforcement advisor rates port security low; Barbados receives support from IMPACS JRCC using nascent ACIS cargo container targeting capability.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LAW ENFORCEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Investigation</strong> BCG/BPS: capability of transfer of maritime crime evidence not observed; receive digital evidence analysis support from RSS DFL (strong custodial evidence chain).</td>
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<td><strong>Prosecution</strong> DPP: face endemic corruption and a power/prestige imbalance vs. defense lawyers; receive case support from RSS DFL, ARU, and INL criminal justice advisor.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Legislation/Jurisprudence</strong> POCA model legislation for civil asset forfeiture upheld in recent jurisprudence; controlled substance laws in need of reform; contiguous zone law enforcement authorities not claimed; cases can take 5–6 years.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INTL COOP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Information Sharing</strong> IMPACS hosts JRCC; participates in air/sea passenger and cargo information-sharing systems (APIS/PNR/ACIS/ATS-G); receives substantial advance warning and targeting intelligence from JIATF-S; shares information with RSS.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Interoperability</strong> RSS founding treaty member; hosts RSS facilities (HQ, Air Wing, Training Institute, etc.); RSS MLE CONOP signatory and participant (no shiprider agreement), which allows for hot pursuit across EEZ boundaries without prior consent of member heads; provides 3x OPVs to RSS Maritime patrols; participates in RSS-led HA/DR missions; regularly participates in Tradewinds (was to host in 2021 but canceled because of pandemic); not a signatory to the 2003 San José Treaty; maintains shiprider agreements with the US.</td>
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Source: CNA.
Dominica

Dominica is a relatively low-income and underdeveloped Caribbean nation with an economy and infrastructure that suffered terribly from Tropical Storm Erika (2015), Hurricane Maria (2017), and the sharp decline in tourism income because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Small in population and economic activity and squeezed in the Eastern Caribbean between two French territories (see Figure 15), Dominica tends to be overlooked as a security partner. Still, it faces significant maritime threats because of its proximity (less than 25 n.m.i.) to Martinique and Guadeloupe, both relatively prosperous French territories offering lucrative prospects for the smuggling of goods and people, often Haitians attempting to gain European citizenship. The smuggling of firearms, money, alcohol, electronics, and other goods is rampant because of price disparities between Dominica and those islands. The small Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force (CDPF, 512 active personnel) and its Marine Unit (MU, 24 personnel) face local organized criminal networks who surveil the country’s only MU base and coordinate smuggling to and from French islands. In addition, experts point to an ongoing state criminal case against the former minister of fisheries to indicate that high-level corruption—although not among the rank and file of the police or MU—complicates the island’s security situation.

Maritime security is a low priority; with its one base at Roseau and its two working boats (one of its SAFE Boats had an engine problem at time of visit), the MU provides very limited presence through daily patrols. However, because the MU is integrated within the national police, it is often involved in joint operations with customs, counterdrug, or other specialized units or agencies, allowing more effective operations. It also frequently conducts operations at night. Its ability to maintain and repair its vessels, with assistance from the CBSI TAFT, is relatively good. Nevertheless, the MU is significantly under-resourced and with no MDA, its capabilities are largely limited to inshore patrolling.

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50 Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.
Figure 15. Dominica, location of key assets and capabilities

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.
* 🧭 = 100 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

Integrated command and control

The MU is one branch of the CDPF, so the structure of coordination of intelligence and joint operations is relatively simple—such coordination falls under the supervision of the chief of police. Integrated action that includes the MU as well as other agencies, such as customs or the police counternarcotics unit, is common. There is no data integration or digital support, however. Interoffice or interagency information exchange and operational coordination takes place largely in person or via cellular phones or unencrypted VHF radios, with the chief of police as the central organizer. Regular patrols are directed and managed by the MU commanding officer and the duty officer on duty, mostly via cellular phones or HF Harris radios, when those are working. The MU frequently patrols with a customs officer on board; customs agents have greater authority for boarding and inspections.

Communications

Communications is a major challenge. MU boats and the base headquarters are equipped with HF Harris radios that have a range of more than 200 n.mi., but these have operated inconsistently for many months. When the Harris radios fail, operators and base personnel use personal cell phones to communicate, with a maximum range of 8 n.mi. from shore. MU technicians purport to have found a technical work-around that fixes problems with the Harris radios and await TAFT assistance to confirm this and reestablish the use of Harris HF communications in the MU’s three boats.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

The CDPF does not have any aircraft, coastal radars, or other electronic sensors over land or sea. For intelligence and target identification, it relies on partner information sharing, for example from the RSS, a neighboring island (most frequently Martinique), or the US DEA. Its MDA is limited to whatever the MU units may spot while patrolling, visual identification from an onshore patrol, or tips from a resident or fisher.

Maritime presence and operations

Patrol and interdiction

Until recently, the MU operated two 33-ft SAFE Boats, donated by the US in 2015, and a smaller Zodiac 920. The TAFT recently conducted midlife overhauls on the SAFE Boats, but one of them has an engine problem and awaits servicing to return to the water. The MU also has two larger Sea Arks, but both require significant repairs before returning to service. The
SAFE Boats have an operating range of 40 to 50 n.m.i. (the Zodiac’s range is slightly less), but without Harris radios, operations are limited to the range of cell phone or radio communications, around 8 n.m.i. These boats patrol north or south of the base at Roseau and can cover half the island and back, if required, although they usually target key harbors, docks, and suspected smuggling sites. A typical patrol lasts four hours. MU leadership claims that both boats patrol daily during the day and at night (by radar).

The boats and teams are capable of interdictions. Police leadership reports 26 interdictions of illicit activity in 2021, all of which led to legal processing and either fines or court cases.

The base at Roseau has a recently refurbished, fully powered, and spacious wharf but suffers from proximity to a neighborhood uphill from the shoreline. Police and MU leadership claim that people in that neighborhood frequently surveil the base and its boats and communicate with partners in Dominica or in Martinique or Guadeloupe to advise them when the MU boats patrol and where they go in order to facilitate smuggling.

### Maintenance

The MU has a fully enclosed workspace for boat repairs, including special workshops for electrical and machinery work. The 24-person unit includes personnel trained in Mercury engine repair and maintenance, electrical systems, welding and hull repairs, and refrigeration, all of whom frequently receive US training. These technicians and the boat captains use the Manager Plus software program to monitor boat and engine use and to conduct regular preventive maintenance. The TAFT provides important support with acquiring spare parts and supplies and liaising with US commercial providers on licensing and technical support.

### Port security

Dominica has a single commercial port where the customs agency manually conducts cargo control and inspections. The port has one scanner, but it is often inoperative; unless the agency receives an alert from an international partner, it is very difficult for personnel to identify containers for targeted inspection. CNA did not visit the port or conduct onsite discussions.

### Maritime law enforcement

#### Investigation

MU personnel’s capability for managing an at-sea crime scene, gathering and handling evidence, and sustaining chain of custody is uncertain. By some accounts, all MU personnel are trained police officers and execute these tasks professionally. However, state prosecutors assert that, although MU personnel understand basically what they should do, in practice they
often fail to collect all available information, including coordinates at sea where events occurred and electronic or digital information (from the cell phones of crew members, for example).

**Prosecution**

Maritime criminal cases are almost always handled by Dominica’s magistrate, or lower, court, resulting in fines. State prosecutors report 14 such cases, related to illegal entry via seaports, over the last month. Maritime cases rise to the higher court only if they are found to involve financial crimes or high-value narcotics or other smuggling and then are prosecuted relatively effectively, although such cases can take two years or more. The three state prosecutors have heavy workloads. If defendants have adequate resources for good legal assistance and contacts among Dominica’s political elites, they can often get the cases thrown out or dismissed for technical reasons. An ongoing case against a former fisheries minister demonstrates the difficulty of prosecuting high-level financial crimes.

**Legislation and jurisprudence**

Dominica’s regulatory framework related to maritime crime and regulations is considered patchwork, with different acts related to illegal entry or immigration, human trafficking, fisheries, narcotics, firearms, and the smuggling of other goods. These laws allow prosecution, but often definitions are vague and the application of the laws can be complicated if defendants have adequate legal assistance. Penalties are often too weak to deter illegal activity; a state prosecutor recounted a case in which a human trafficker was caught and penalized three times over the course of four years and each time his boat was returned to him. There is no overall maritime regulatory act to streamline and clarify law enforcement and maritime-related cases. According to outside experts, the nation's laws badly need updating to strengthen the state’s ability to prosecute complex financial crimes and organized criminal networks, which lie behind much of the human and drug trafficking that occurs in local waters.

**International cooperation**

**Information sharing**

The CDPF, through the office of the police commissioner, often shares information and coordinates actions with French (via the MRSCC at Martinique) or Dutch (Sint Maarten) police and maritime forces. The CDPF also receives information from the RSS and IMPACS or directly from other islands' police when required. These communications typically occur via personal cell phones to the commissioner of police.
Interoperability

The MU units share information and coordinate their counter-smuggling or interdiction operations with French forces operating out of Martinique or Guadeloupe once every two weeks on average. They have also supported RSS tasking when Harris radios are working. The MU sends personnel to the regional Tradewinds exercise.

Summary

As Table 7 shows, Dominica’s police and its MU conduct a minimal level of maritime law enforcement, chiefly routine patrols. The MU seems to maintain its few assets adequately, with TAFT support, and to operate at a high tempo given its small size and limited resources. The MU purports to conduct interdictions and seizures out at sea and to coordinate actions with neighboring islands, which, if true, would be impressive. But the commitments of the police and the government to maritime law enforcement and security are questionable, and the government’s regulatory framework and prosecution office lag those of other Eastern Caribbean islands. The integration of the MU within the CDPF facilitates joint interagency action but also situates the unit within a tightly centralized police force beneath the police commissioner. The CDPF’s command and control and operations, including those of the MU, are directed largely from the police commissioner’s cell phone.

Key considerations

Dominica clearly faces significant challenges in regulating and protecting its maritime territory, particularly from smuggling networks. Given the very small size and documented deficiencies of the MU, it is not clear that the government or police force prioritize addressing those challenges compared to addressing developmental and terrestrial security needs. Also, we find the centralization of information and power in the office and person of the chief of police concerning amid allegations of endemic, high-level corruption. We offer the following considerations:

- **Sea blindness**: The MU is surprisingly active and competent (at maintenance and patrolling) given its meager resources and lack of institutional support (from the broader CDPF). It has several deficiencies, in resources, training, personnel, boats, and access to intelligence. As the Dominican government or CDPF seems less than

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51 The CNA team was unable to verify or observe these claims, and, given that other similarly equipped coast guard and police forces in the region are incapable of long-range interdiction operations, we doubt the Dominican MU conducts these operations regularly, if at all.
dedicated to addressing these deficiencies, we suggest that INL direct its assistance elsewhere, perhaps to improving capabilities for the investigation and prosecution of financial crimes and sensitive, complex crimes.

- **Desire for a larger vessel:** The MU and the chief of police express a desire for more boats and in particular for a larger boat capable of staying at sea for two or three days to allow disruption of the mostly nighttime smuggling between Dominica and neighboring islands. Although sensible from a strategic perspective, we doubt the MU's capability to equip, staff, maintain, and operate such a vessel without more personnel and resources. On the other hand, the MU's request for such a boost in capability may be interpreted as evidence that it can indeed operate its current small fleet near to its maximum capabilities.
Table 7. Summary of Dominica’s maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domains Awareness</td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>CDPF-MU: integrates interagency cooperation via the commissioner’s office. MU regular operations (patrols) managed by MU HQ, but police HQ frequently coordinates joint interagency operations. Customs, drug office, and other offices frequently join as shipriders on MU boats. Rudimentary C2 centralized under police commissioner.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>MU struggles to maintain and use Harris radios consistently. When radios are not working, communication is via cell phones with max range of 8 n.mi.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>No radars, MPAs, or other sensors. Rely on human intelligence and alerts from international sources.</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence &amp; Operations</td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>CDPF-MU: 1x SAFE Boat interceptor and 1x Zodiac 920 that are fully mission capable. 1x SAFE Boat interceptor requires minor engine servicing; 24 total PAX with which it patrols routinely (on both daylight and nocturnal missions); MU’s base at Rouseau is surveilled by local community. SAFE Boats capable of operating out to 100+ n.mi. and supporting RSS interdictions, Zodias 50 n.m.i. — doubtful given lack of comms. Chief of police claims that MU conducted 26 successful interceptions at sea in 2021 that led to seizures and court actions.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>Capable of routine maintenance and repairs of SAFE Boats and Zodiac. Technicians trained in electrical system repairs, welding, refrigeration; frequently receive training and support from US TAFT. Decent, covered workspace. Use Manager Plus to monitor regular preventive maintenance.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>The nation’s only commercial port has a scanner, but mostly inspects cargo manually. The customs agency is considered relatively good.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Mixed accounts. Some say MU—as with all trained police units—are adequate at evidence collection and frequently support prosecutions with testimony. Others assert that MU needs more training in technical crime scene management, evidence collection, and witness handling; cases sometimes fail because of insufficient maritime evidence collection.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>DPP reported 14 cases related to illegal entry in last month, all handled by magistrate court. DPP office has 3 attorneys, none with training in maritime law. Focus is largely on financial crimes, which often have some maritime component. DPP benefits from support from international partners, especially the RSS DFL and INL Justice Advisor.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Maritime legal framework addresses illegal entry/migration, fisheries, narcotics smuggling, and human trafficking. However, prosecutors view them as insufficiently strict and vaguely defined. No overall maritime act to clarify jurisdictions and authorities, and maritime registry (of vessels) held in US, difficult to access when required. Mention of executive/political-level corruption: recent case against fisheries minister.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl Coop</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Police and MU share information and coordinate actions with French and Dutch (Saint Martin) island and other international partners (RSS), largely via interpersonal relations and cell phones.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Frequently interoperate with French forces from Martinique or Guadeloupe every 2 weeks or so. Also participate in Tradewinds, but only with personnel. Can interoperate with RSS when Harris radios working.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a key US partner in the central Caribbean because of its close commercial ties under the CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement), strong economy, and relative political stability. The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern part of the island of Hispaniola, and relations with its western neighbor Haiti are historically contentious. The porous border region is rife with migrant smuggling and other illicit activities. To control the migrant influx, in February 2022 the Dominican government stationed troops along the shared border and began the construction of a border wall. These terrestrial security issues bleed into the maritime domain. The Dominican Republic is a key transit country for cocaine moving from South America through the Caribbean, ultimately destined for North America and Europe. Cocaine exits the country via the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico, but also via commercial port traffic.

The Dominican Republic’s Navy (Armada de la República Dominicana, ARD) is the country’s principal maritime security force and the chief law enforcement authority in the maritime domain. The ARD is one of the largest naval forces in the Caribbean, with 11,220 active personnel, including auxiliary and support personnel. The Dominican Republic’s Armed Forces do not have joint doctrine, which is required for effective MDA and counterthreat operations involving maritime and land interdiction operations. Figure 16 shows a map of ARD’s principal bases and assets.

The ARD has overlapping missions focusing on border and citizen security and support to the DNCD (Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas, National Drug Control Directorate). The ARD

52 Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.


is challenged by lack of funding for fleet sustainment and tactical communications and lack of organic ISR assets.

The ARD’s primary responsibility is maintaining the Dominican Republic’s maritime territorial integrity and sovereignty; however, it has significantly increased counternarcotics operations in recent years.

The country’s relatively weak judicial system has been ineffective in tackling most corruption. Although officials in the Dominican executive and judiciary have been suspended from their functions during the present administration because of anticorruption investigations, there have been no convictions in these cases to date, and in fact, the judiciary routinely dismissed high-level corruption cases.


Figure 16. Dominican Republic, key assets and capabilities

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.

* 🚢 = 100 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

**Integrated command and control**

The Dominican Republic has a network of joint and interagency-staffed operation centers that can integrate open-source, organic, and US-shared maritime and aerial intelligence and can track and communicate with US assets and a limited number of ARD surface units. Communication with the latter is almost nonexistent beyond 15 n.mi., negating effective real-time command and control in much of the Dominican EEZ. The Dominican Republic can also remotely monitor video feeds at its major seaports and AIS transponders for commercial traffic on a 24/7 basis. Long-range detection of maritime tracks is sourced almost entirely through JIATF-S intelligence feeds rather than organic sources.

The Dominican Republic has a three relatively sophisticated joint and interagency command and control hubs: (1) the DNCD, which operates two specialized operations and intelligence fusion centers: the Joint Intelligence and Cooperation Center (*Centro de Investigación y Cooperación Conjunta*, CICC) and the Joint Operations and Interdictions Control Center (*Control de Operaciones Conjuntas e Interdicciones*, COCI); (2) the Air-Sea-Land Intelligence Analysis Center (*Centro de Investigación y Análisis Aero-Naval y Terrestre*, CIAN); and (3) the ARD’s MOC, which operates out of its M3 Operations division.

**Joint Operations and Interdictions Control Center (COCI)**

The COCI acts as command and control center for coordinating joint and interagency DNCD, ARD, Dominican Air Force (*Fuerza Aérea de República Dominicana*, FARD), and Task Force Lanza multidomain operations. The COCI situation room has a multipanel wall screen for display of CSII/APAN (JIATF-S common operating picture and chat) and air radar feeds in addition to a communications hub (see Figure 17). The CSII feed from JIATF-S is used primarily for tracking both friendly aircraft and aerial tracks (whereas the ARD MOC focuses on maritime tracks), including US MPAs that support ARD maritime interdiction operations. DNCD also hosts two US DEA agents at the COCI for direct passing of intelligence. US intelligence not passed through CSII data feeds and APAN chat is passed directly to the interagency Task Force Lanza’s ARD and DNCD direct action units (covered in the patrol and interdiction section) usually via Signal—a free encrypted messaging mobile app.
Air-Sea-Land Intelligence Analysis Center (CIAN)

The CIAN fusion center focuses on surveilling for illicit activity at the major airports and seaports and monitoring commercial maritime traffic. CIAN therefore also plays a vital role in supporting the Specialized Port Security Corps (Cuerpo Especializado de Seguridad Portuaria, CESEP) and the country's four UNODC-CCP–backed Port Control Units (PCUs). The situation room, shown in Figure 18, has three full walls of multiscreen displays and is staffed by 15 personnel divided into 3 teams of 5 (1 supervising officer and 4 analysts), with each team assigned to either air, land, or maritime domain activity. CIAN monitors video feeds from closed-circuit television (CCTV) security cameras installed at Caucedo and Haina seaports as well as Las America and Punta Cana international airports. In addition, CIAN is equipped with APIS/PNR for air and sea passenger tracking and recognition. CIAN was previously using MarineTraffic.com to monitor AIS signals of all commercial maritime traffic in its maritime domain but adopted SeaVision as of November 2021 with INL UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) support.
ARD M3 Maritime Operations Center (MOC)

The ARD MOC is located at the M3 Operations headquarters building at the 27 de Febrero Naval Base in Santo Domingo (see Figure 19). It consists of a situation room with displays for CSII/APAN and SeaVision (implemented with UNODC-GMCP support in October 2021) and a small communications center (with both L3 Harris radios and Motorola radios for communicating with ARD surface units and US government assets). JIATF-S recently donated 20 Shout NANO BFT transmitters for deployment on the ARD’s main interdiction units for situational awareness for JIATF-S and the ARD using CSII. As a result of a Support to Interdictions and Prosecutions (SIP) advisor assessment conducted June 29, 2021, INL is supporting the ARD with a renovation upgrade of the MOC that will bring it in

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58 The situational awareness rendered by BFTs is significant not only for effective command and control but also for discipline and accountability. BFTs help address concerns of corruption in the wider force by giving commander officers visibility of unit locations to ensure missions are being performed as directed.

closer alignment with the DNCD CICC fusion centers. At present, the ARD operates the MOC with a rotating 24/7 watch that is highly centralized and that—in the eyes of a US observer—has limited operational flexibility and initiative. Also, in the past, staffing the center with motivated personnel has been difficult because MOC billets pay less than field command billets, creating a potential vulnerability.

**Communications**

ARD surface units have good direct communications capabilities with surface units (ship to shore) out to around 15 n.mi, and with some encryption if necessary. OTH SATCOM is available to some assets but is conditional and expensive. The ARD has radio repeater towers onshore at strategic points around the island to support communication. Both US implementers and ARD officers concur that the lack of a modern long-range tactical communications network is the main obstacle to improved interdiction operations. A UNODC-GMCP MOC assessment recommends at least three additional powered sites to extend coverage.

US observers note that communications security discipline is relatively low—beyond using encrypted Harris radios for secure communications with surface units at sea, MOC officers rely on WhatsApp/Signal secure messaging apps and mobile phones to send and receive intelligence from US entities such as the USCG Liaison Officer (CGLO) stationed in Santo Domingo. This comes after years of investment in Harris radios and annual refresher training by L3, which have proven insufficient in generating a self-training capability for ARD forces or in resolving known Harris unit vulnerabilities in the maritime environment.

**Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**

The ARD and FARD have limited organic ISR platforms such that the Dominican Republic is largely reliant on JIATF-S ISR assets for targeting and detection of inbound maritime and aerial tracks. Coupled with the aforementioned communications deficiencies

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61 The ARD reports having a rotating 24/7 watch with seven noncommissioned officers and six enlisted personnel. The command structure is centralized in the MOC director, meaning that coordination and sharing decisions are not entrusted to these lower echelon watch standers as they would be in a US MOC. This structure creates a single point of failure.

62 As a result of the communications assessment previously mentioned, Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) plans to assist the Dominican armed forces in upgrading their tactical communications network, including a $6.7 million phase one system upgrade to be completed in 2022 that will include replacing existing repeaters and adding more.

that impair ARD surface units’ ability to relay intelligence back to shore-based C2, this lack of ISR extremely limits the ARD’s independent ability to generate a common operating picture of even part of its maritime territory. The ARD also operates a large intelligence section that focuses on gathering human intelligence in the high-risk transit zones to the south and east, but this unit operates largely in isolation of the ARD’s traditional surface units.

**Dominican Air Force (FARD)**

The FARD lacks purpose-built MPA airframes with radar, camera, and night vision with airborne electronic sensor operators to support the full spectrum of ARD maritime operations. To fill this gap, in 2014 FARD purchased a TECNAM aircraft from Italy, and the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) has been assisting with modifications to the airframe to install the sensor equipment required for the dedicated MPA role in support of ARD operations. Unfortunately, the modification program has been dogged with problems and delays for years and, as of February 2022, the aircraft had not been delivered.

**Dominican Navy (ARD)**

The ARD’s principal surface assets, coast guard vessels such as the recently donated near coastal patrol vessel (NCPV) GC-102 Betelgeuse or the older ex-USCG GC-112 Altair, are fitted with FLIR cameras and radar, but these have a more limited range than airborne platforms.

## Maritime presence and operations

### Patrol and interdiction

Although the Dominican Republic has a relatively large navy—both in terms of personnel and vessels—only a very small fraction of the force is trained and sustained in readiness for effective patrol and interdiction at range throughout the EEZ. The Lanza special interdiction unit task force is the only unit capable of consistently generating a partial presence offshore and reliably conducting long-range VBSS interdictions in the high-transit south and east zones. Flotilla squadron interceptor units can reliably conduct short-range interdictions and patrol in territorial waters as well as coordinate land-based interdictions in the littorals with mobile coastal infantry. Even this high-readiness Lanza unit is often diverted from long-range maritime interdiction to terrestrial tasking.

**Dominican Navy (ARD)**

The ARD—on paper—has a total force in excess of 11,000 (officers and enlisted), including auxiliary and support personnel. The ARD’s active ready force is likely much smaller and
diverted to many terrestrial missions. This force includes a battalion-sized Naval Infantry unit (Infantes Navales or marines) tasked with securing naval installations and the Dominican Republic’s extensive coastline. More US support is now focused on the development of the Amphibious Commandos (Comandos Anfibios), a platoon-sized special operations force (SOF) drawn from Naval Infantry selectees. The ARD M3 Operations section—which specifically manages ARD’s surface fleet units—consists of 500 personnel.

This large force structure has implications for resourcing other capabilities. Surprising for a maritime and insular nation, the navy’s budget is relatively small compared to the rest of Dominican Republic’s defense budget—only 15 percent of the total $579 million, or about $88 million—but this amount still dwarfs the budget of other Caribbean forces. ARD’s large force structure has a heavy carrying cost: more than 80 percent of the ARD’s 2021 and 2022 budgets went toward fixed personnel costs (salaries, pensions, rations, etc.). This budget structure leaves little in the way of capital investments in naval infrastructure and new fleet acquisitions, which are predominantly US donations or made via special nonrecurring presidential budgets.

In addition, although the ARD has recently become more self-sufficient in basic training for the wider force, it struggles to organically provide advanced training and develop specialists necessary for sustaining and conducting maritime operations. One reason for this is that the recruitment pool suffers from low levels of literacy and numeracy. After years of relying on Colombian advisors from the US-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation

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64 Dominican Navy personnel serve in terrestrial auxiliary and constabulary responsibilities (such as being seconded to serve in the DNCD). Low pay for both enlisted and commissioned personnel also incentivizes routine absenteeism—to pursue income from secondary employment. Patronage-style corruption (the purchase of promotions or cover for absenteeism) is also endemic.

65 Likely understrength, not more than 1,000 personnel.

66 The Naval Infantry are equipped with US-supplied JEEPs for littoral mobility and are often deployed to interdict and ambush narcotrafficking vessels as they come ashore.

67 SIP Program Assessment 2020-2021, SBU, 3.


70 With the ARD contributing $4.25 million Dominican funds in a 50/50 split with the US.
(USCAP) program, the ARD now offers its own basic training to both sailors (at Las Calderas) and naval infantry (at Boca Chica). ARD officers report conducting more preprogrammed and less on-the-job training with more deliberate leverage of US-provided training opportunities such as USCAP and USCG Mobile Training Teams (MTT) courses. Although the wider force is benefiting from these improvements, certain advanced, specialized areas such as SAR and VBSS training lack standardization and organic processes for individual qualifications absent US training.

**ARD Flota (surface fleet)**

ARD M3 Operations organizes its surface forces into two components: (1) the Flota, or fleet, composed of larger coastal and near coastal patrol vessels; and (2) the Flotilla, composed of smaller, faster, and shorter range interceptor craft. The Flota consists of three larger OPVs (ex-USCG Balsam and White Sumac buoy tenders that were first launched in 1942); 11 IPVs (guardacosteras), including Point class vessels (ex-USCG vessels that originally date from the Vietnam War era) and cutters of various commercial make; and several auxiliary craft, including a schoolhouse sailboat, SAR support craft, and landing craft.

Because of the age and low readiness of the fleet, the Flota’s endurance and performance at long range beyond territorial waters is limited, so the ARD has been looking at options to decommission these obsolete vessels and modernize the fleet. The Flota’s most recent addition, an 87-ft Defiant class NCPV, was a 2020 US donation and the first newly constructed patrol craft the ARD had acquired in decades (see Figure 20). The vessel has been a high performer in the hands of ARD’s Task Force Lanza special interdictions unit despite initial—and likely long-term—difficulties integrating and sustaining this more sophisticated vessel. As of February 2022, ARD had plans to purchase a second NCPV and requested three ex-USCG Marine Protector class vessels (87 ft) through the excess defense articles (EDA) program.

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71 Building off their improved organic basic training program, the ARD now proactively sets the demand signal for a more advanced and specialized training pipeline to develop its future force structure. An example of increased absorption of advanced training is that the ARD now hosts the USCG MTT Boarding Officer Course three times annually when it was previously held at most once a year.

72 **SIP Assessment of Maritime Operations Center.**

73 Made by Metal Shark Boats based on the proven Damen Stan Patrol 2606 model.
ARD Flotilla (short-range interceptors)

The ARD’s workhorses for interdictions are the Flotilla’s interceptors. By 2022, the Flotilla consisted of 18 interceptors, including 15 Boston Whalers donated by the US—1 or 2 every year—since 2009. Many of these vessels include the more modern 35- and 38-ft version with triple-mounted Mercury outboard motors of the latest iteration, but some of the oldest are near the end of their lifecycle and will either need to be refurbished or replaced. Flotilla interceptors are generally for short-range interdiction operations in territorial waters or longer range three-pronged operations in conjunction with Flota cutters and any available MPA assets.

Comandos Anfibios and Task Force Lanza

Growing the previously mentioned Comandos Anfibios maritime SOF unit has been a focus of US support in recent years. This trend toward US support of small high-readiness, vetted SOF unit interdictions reflects a shift in security assistance strategy. Previously, investments were spread thinly across the entire ARD force—which is vulnerable to corruption—and saw minimal gains in capability. Originally stood up in 2015, the Comandos have expanded to 60 personnel in 2022. This high-readiness unit has trained with US Navy Seals in VBSS operations and more recently with the Green Berets in mountain warfare. Although originally focused on maritime interception operations (MIOs) (they are responsible for the majority of successful ARD seizures), the unit has increasingly been tasked with direct action operations

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74 The Comandos have been seeking more terrain cross-training as they have been increasingly tasked with taking down drug-trafficking organization safe houses in the country’s mountainous interior.
in the country's rugged interior and in urban environments in support of high-profile internal security and law enforcement missions. The Comandos contribute 36 fully vetted personnel (up from 14 when originally established). The Comandos operators make use of sophisticated equipment donated by the US, including for nighttime operations, and deploy using the most capable Boston Whaler interceptors and two dedicated cutters (the GC-102 *Betelguese* NCPV and GC-112 *Altair*) in the south and east zones but have also practiced deploying on pre-positioned equipment from other outposts under their *Quimera* (“Chimera”) operational concept. Along with the DNCD’s Tactical Reaction Unit (*Unidad Reacción Táctica*, URT), the Comandos Anfibios are the only units capable of reliably interdicting suspect vessels at long range beyond territorial waters. Both units support the joint interagency Task Force Lanza that focuses exclusively on drug interdiction missions.

**Operational outcomes**

The two most important ARD missions are counternarcotics and counter-illicit migration, but the service also performs counter-IUU fishing and SAR operations. Since the Abinader Administration assumed office on August 16, 2020, the ARD reports having conducted more than 4,500 maritime patrol missions, including 2,428 routine deterrence patrols and 785 counternarcotics missions (Figure 21). As a result of those counternarcotics missions, 725 vessels were inspected with 216 detained, along with 267 persons suspected of drug trafficking. Of 245 patrols targeting irregular migration, 62 vessels were inspected and 31 detained, along with 1,179 suspects.

The ARD reported seizing 15 MT of cocaine in the same period, including almost 11 MT in 2021 alone; 60 percent of all interdictions were land operations. This issue reflects the reality of ARD’s posture: as a destination for drugs country with limited long-range assets and tactical

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75 In the Dominican Republic, political change involves almost-universal turnover in senior-level leadership. Data are not readily available for prior periods.
communications, it needs to adopt a defense-in-depth strategy. Littoral and beach ambush operations are more practical.

**Maintenance**

Given the size of the ARD in terms of its fleet and personnel, the force operates with fairly small but experienced cadres of maintenance personnel for both of its surface fleets, the Flota and the Flotilla. The maintenance cadre of both units constitutes less than 1 percent of the total ARD force. Thanks to long-standing US support and training, both teams have the technical expertise to conduct most of the level 1 (basic, routine/preventive) and level 2 (depot level, advanced troubleshooting, engine overhauls, etc.) maintenance on their current inventory of vessels. The ARD has been challenged, however, by the introduction of newer, more sophisticated vessels such as the Metal Shark Defiant 87-ft NCPV and will likely encounter headwinds integrating additional units.

The ARD is generally constrained by limited willingness or capacity to fully fund its preventive maintenance plan as well as a slow highly centralized acquisitions process, which even routine purchases are subject to. Although the ARD benefits from access to domestic shipyards with favorable arrangements for drydocking and routine out-of-water hull inspection, this budget shortfall means that routine maintenance is perpetually in backlog and repairs are casualty-driven only. Even for the relatively advanced and sophisticated Flotilla sustainment team, lack of direct access to visits by the CBSI TAFT and funding for parts during the early part of the pandemic revealed shortfalls in the ARD’s ability to independently source needed replacement parts in country.

**ARD Directorate of Naval Construction, Repair, and Maintenance (Flota)**

Maintenance of the larger offshore, inshore, and auxiliary craft of the ARD Flota is managed by the Directorate of Naval Construction, Repair, and Maintenance (Dirección de Construcciones, Reparaciones, y Mantenimiento Naval, DNCRM). The directorate has a preventive maintenance service plan for the Flota; however, the plan is not fully funded by ARD’s service chief. As such, the ARD Flota is kept in a perpetual state of low readiness. The directorate has 16 assigned specialist personnel (not including supervising officers), including 6 welders and 10 diesel engine mechanics. The Flota Maintenance Directorate also has access to electrical and electronics technicians at M6 Communications Directorate. These specialists are assigned to three task-driven mobile maintenance teams that operate from Las Calderas and Santo Domingo conducting field repairs (ad hoc/not preventive maintenance). Each patrol vessel has a chief engineer on the crew (most of whom have trained at NAVSCIATTS).

“We take it one day at a time, just trying to keep the vessels maintained.”—ARD official
responsible for daily maintenance and reporting.\textsuperscript{76} There is no dedicated warehouse for Flota parts—consumables are requested directly through the M4 Logistics section.

Although senior engineers and technicians are quite adept at maintaining the EDA USCG vessels and other older vessels, integrating the modern and relatively sophisticated NCPV has been a challenge.\textsuperscript{77} ARD engineers are used to improvising solutions and bypassing systems on older vessels, whose quality manufacturing and simple designs are much more forgiving. The integrated and highly computerized systems of the NCPV do not allow such direct override exploits. Furthermore, according to ARD officers, the vessel has proven to be 3 times as expensive to maintain as the ARD’s other cutters.\textsuperscript{78} Modernizing the ARD’s Flota maintenance program will be key to recapitalizing and expanding the fleet sustainably. Although the proposed new EDA USCG additions to the fleet are not nearly as advanced as the NCPV, they are still much more sophisticated than existing units in the Flota.

In terms of depot- and shipyard-level maintenance, whereas the Flota’s DNCRM largely works through mobile repair teams, the ARD benefits from access to and partnership with domestic CIRAMAR shipyards colocated at one of its principal bases at Las Calderas in the southwest. Since August 2020, all 14 major surface units have been in drydock (a record amount for a 1.5-year period because of opening after a pandemic backlog) for routine hull inspections.\textsuperscript{79} Access to this resource does not necessarily guarantee the implementation of a routine maintenance program for the larger patrol craft. The Flota maintenance staff has projected costs for all required and scheduled maintenance on each vessel;\textsuperscript{80} however, the ARD service chief staff (Comandancia General) routinely does not assign funds to cover all the annual maintenance

\textsuperscript{76} Recently, only about two personnel have attended international maintenance training (one at NAVSCIATTS and one in Colombia). The ARD relies on two main maintenance training facilities: the Naval Basic School at Calderas and INFOTEP (Instituto Nacional de Formación Técnico Professional, or National Institute of Technical and Vocational Training). INFOTEP is a government-run and private industry-supported technical institute that provides mobile trainings courses for electronics, diesel, electrical.

\textsuperscript{77} The GC-102 Betelguise, although based on a proven Damen Stan Patrol 2606 design, was the first in its class for the manufacturer, Metal Shark Boats. Its entry into the ARD Flota has been an unfortunate baptism by fire for the ARD, dogged by design and manufacturing flaws, an allision incident on the delivery journey, and subsequent poor-quality warranty support and client relations.

\textsuperscript{78} According to US implementers, the ARD has thus far only committed to allocating RD $15,000 (USD $264) per month to maintain the vessel, even after the warranty expired. This amount hardly covers the materials needed for basic routine oil and filter changes.

\textsuperscript{79} Normally these occur at least once every two years.

\textsuperscript{80} The preventive maintenance plan appears to be a paper- and Excel-based system. The ARD Flota does not currently use an integrated maintenance and logistics management software at the fleet level like the Flotilla (which uses Manager Plus). The only Flota vessel to use Manager Plus (implemented as of late 2021) is the NCPV, because it is a CBSI TAFT-supported vessel.
requirements. Maintenance is therefore ad hoc and casualty-based, precluding the implementation of a long-term preventive maintenance plan.

**ARD M4 – Logistics Directorate**

The ARD operates a fairly large logistics enterprise for the entire force, but the system is capacity constrained by the previously mentioned absence of key parts stock (unfunded preventive maintenance plan), a slow acquisition process, and a limited domestic vendor base—all of which contribute to considerable delays in sustaining the fleet in readiness. M4 handles all the logistics functions for the Flota (the Flotilla handles all its logistics functions internally). The 15-person staff runs M4’s three principal warehouses (all centrally located in Santo Domingo) as well as its administrative functions (located at 27 de Febrero Naval Base), such as requisitions.

ARD M4 officers report carrying a one-year stock of basic consumables for the Flota (paint, oil, filters, etc.). Because of cost, most major parts are not kept in stock and must be ordered through the major local dealers, such as AutoMarina. Often these dealers do not have stock of specialized parts (particularly for the discontinued USCG vessels that make up the bulk of the fleet) and must order them from the manufacturer (elongating the supply chain).

Acquisitions are conducted through an all-paper system of approvals (that must go through the ARD service chief) that are subsequently submitted to the M4 Requisitions Office. Once purchased, acquisitions are logged in an Excel-based inventory tracking system. From start to finish, the acquisitions process can take anywhere from two to three months from order issuance to delivery, even for small or simple purchases. This system is required by law for transparency purposes but does not allow for rapid acquisitions of items needed to address casualties and sustain operations.

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81 This issue presents one of the arguments for modernizing the fleet with commercially available security vessels (like the NCPV): access to readily available replacement parts.

82 M4 and the Flota have yet to adopt a fully integrated inventory and maintenance management system like the Flotilla, but the TAFT is helping the NCPV experiment with Manager Plus at the unit level.
**ARD Flotilla**

The Flotilla performs preventive maintenance and depot-level repairs for the ARD’s squadron of 15 US-donated Boston Whaler interceptors. Its competence shows in consistently high rates of readiness (12 of the 15 interceptors were fully mission capable at the time of our visit). In contrast to the Flota maintenance section, which makes use of mobile repair teams, the Flotilla operates from a centralized location at Las Dragas, San Souci (Figure 22) at the mouth of the Rio Ozama. The Flotilla is staffed by 22 personnel, including specialists across four departments: outboard motor (4 specialists), fiberglass (3), logistics (3), and transportation (2). Mechanics conduct regular preventive maintenance, including scheduled outboard motor tune-ups every 300 operating hours. Each Flotilla interceptor visits the Dragas facility at least once a year for routine hull inspection and maintenance in addition to familiarization training for the new vessel commanders, chief engineers, and their crews.

The TAFT helped the Flotilla successfully implement Manager Plus—an inventory and maintenance management software program—four years ago and recently assisted the Flotilla with the transition to the new cloud-based version (Manager Plus Lightning). The TAFT continues to support unit training and program adoption. The Flotilla can source most of the replacement engines and parts it needs for the commercially available Boston Whalers through local vendor *AutoMarina*, but the acquisitions process is similarly long.

In the last two years, the ARD has expanded docking infrastructure at the Dragas site. Although the piers still lack water and power shore connections, this dock greatly expands the Flotilla’s homeport space for staging operations and organizing training and sustainment activities. In addition, the Flotilla transportation is responsible for a logistics motor pool of 10 US-donated F-450 super-duty trucks and several boat and fuel trailers. A recent restoration project of fuel

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83 The Flotilla’s main facility consists of a hangar structure composed of six stacked converted shipping containers that form two covered maintenance bays, air-conditioned office space, barracks, and four Conex boxes functioning as the Flotilla’s parts and consumables stockpile. The office has three dedicated computer terminals for logistics (inventory) and maintenance.

84 Parts for the Flotilla’s discontinued older models are somewhat more difficult to acquire.
trailers has increased outstation refueling capabilities and reduced wear on the motor pool, which delivers fuel to forward outposts throughout the country.

**Port security**

Because of its central location in the Caribbean and its significant ports and other infrastructure, the Dominican Republic is a major hub for maritime commerce in the region; it has the most port container traffic among CBSI countries. Its main port at Caucedo—east of Santo Domingo—is a major transshipment hub, meaning that exports from across the Caribbean and beyond are reloaded onto larger container ships for reshipment to North America and Europe. Caucedo is the Dominican Republic’s most modern and automated port and accounts for roughly two-thirds of all Dominican port container traffic, as shown in Figure 23. Caucedo is also the only Dominican port certified by the US Container Security Initiative.\(^85\) Secondary ports include Haina (east of Santo Domingo) and Salcedo and Puerto Plata on the northern coast.\(^86\) Overall, the Dominican Republic is an attractive target for drug-trafficking organizations looking to piggyback off the ample logistics infrastructure. Dominican and US officials we spoke with estimate that nearly 90 percent of the drugs that enter the Dominican Republic exit via cargo containers, especially through Caucedo. Because of a 2020–2021 expansion project by owner DP World, the Caucedo Port has nearly doubled in capacity to 2.5 million annual twenty-foot equivalent units.\(^87\)

Relative to the rest of the CBSI PNs, the Dominican Republic has fairly sophisticated port security—especially at Caucedo. CESEP, a joint interagency task force, can receive and consistently act on network intelligence for successful targeting of high-risk containers and leverage some advanced scanner and other contraband detection techniques and equipment.

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\(^85\) *INCSR 2022 Volume I*, 111.

\(^86\) The Haina port is significant for Dominican Americans because—since the 1980s—they have been able to make duty-free remittances in goods back to family members on the island. Transnational criminal organizations have unfortunately exploited this vector to increasingly smuggle in firearms and marijuana (still illegal in the Dominican Republic): in 2021 there were nine separate firearms seizures alone.

at Caucedo, one of the four principal ports. As a result, CESEP seized 7 to 8 MT of cocaine in 2021, and by February 2022 had already seized 3 MT.\textsuperscript{88}

These relatively successful outcomes have been driven by Ministry of Defense investments in CESEP, the in-country presence of the Caribbean UNODC CCP program advisor, the early standup of two PCUs in 2014, and cooperation with port owners. CESEP operates in all 14 major ports with both a military and civilian security component, with the largest detail located at Caucedo. The military component consists of army and navy personnel that partner with port owners to provide physical security, patrols, inspection enforcement, and military intelligence. Component civilian agencies include DNCD and the customs directorate (Dirección General de Aduanas).\textsuperscript{89}

In terms of detection capabilities, the DNCD provides special K9 units for high-risk container inspections, four URT divers for underwater hull inspections (for detecting “parasite” packages of drugs), and the CIAN camera surveillance system. DP World has invested in a truck x-ray scanner (see Figure 24) staffed by a 24/7 team of 16 certified imaging analysts that scan every container passing through Caucedo, but none of the other ports benefit from a high-capacity scanner. The PCUs—each staffed by two military intelligence, two DNCD, and two customs agents (six total)—are located at Caucedo and Haina (both established in 2014) in the south and Salcedo and Puerto Plata in the north (as of early 2022). The Caucedo and Haina PCUs thus benefit from nearly a decade of

\textsuperscript{88} Despite these relatively large seizures, efforts are likely capacity constrained, given that hundreds of metric tons of cocaine are estimated to exit Caucedo each year.

\textsuperscript{89} At Caucedo the CESEP detail is led by a Dominican Army general and partners with DP World’s private security contingent (30 officers that largely staff the entrance gate inspections). The military component consists of 100 personnel, including 30 officers of the ARD’s harbor master section (Capitanía de los Puertos), and the rest seconded from the other services. The DNCD contributes a complement of 25 agents. The military conducts five ground-mobile patrols of the wharfside complex and two aquatic patrols of the main channel daily. At present, physical security includes the following features: barbed wire/chain-link perimeter fences, multilayer security inspection at gate entrances, fixed-lane truck scanners for radioactive material and x-ray inspection, 200 CCTV cameras monitored by CIAN, and a sequestered physical container inspection zone ramp.
experience leveraging technology and their contacts in the CCP PCU global network intelligence to target high-risk containers for inspection. In addition to being capacity constrained by increased port traffic volume, PCU targeting is hampered by the increasingly sophisticated concealment techniques used by drug traffickers that exploit port process vulnerabilities. None of the Dominican PCUs is currently equipped with the tools and technology—such as fiberscopes, density meters, and other portable scanners—to easily detect these types of exploits.

**Maritime law enforcement**

**Investigation**

Up until fairly recently, the ARD—the chief law enforcement authority at sea—had only fairly rudimentary capacity for maritime crime scene investigation, evidence collection and exploitation, and case package development. This area has therefore been the subject of a CBSI INL intervention via the establishment of the SIP program in 2019 staffed by a USCG investigative service special agent. SIP assessments found that only ARD vessel patrol officers (as opposed to enlisted personnel) were trained in post-boarding evidence collection and crime scene management. Vessel search techniques, space clearing, and crew detention procedures were also lacking.

To address this gap, the SIP advisor has been actively working with the ARD to advance the drafting and implementation of the ARD Maritime Operations Manual. This manual will allow for SOPs during maritime interdictions and will improve case package documentation. The goal is for the manual to become the ARD’s maritime operations doctrine. During our in-country visit, ARD officers mentioned the importance and usefulness of this manual in filling a gap on establishing and implementing specific maritime policies and case package procedures in support of successful prosecutions.

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90 In addition to inspection of automatically targeted high-risk containers, all domestic export containers are randomly selected for physical inspection.  
91 For instance, CESEP Caucedo recently discovered thin layers of cocaine concealed at the bottom of refrigerated containers filled with plantains and pineapples (refrigerated containers are subject to fewer searches because of expedited processing to avoid spoilage of produce). Timber exports from Suriname were also discovered to have cocaine hidden in thin layers between boards.  
92 Modeled on the one in Panama, established in 2015.  
94 With the support of subject matter experts from the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies.
Another key finding of SIP assessments was that the ARD, the only agency with authority and jurisdiction to conduct a maritime interdiction, did not have any drug detection tools or intrusive search equipment. In our own analysis of ARD’s maritime seizure data, we found a major gap in the number of vessels and suspects suspected of narcotrafficking that were stopped and inspected but not detained (70 percent of vessels and 80 percent of suspects, see Figure 25). This finding suggests that either original targeting intelligence is highly inaccurate or boarding teams are unable to detect concealed drugs when they are present. In November 2021, the SIP program, with funds from INL, provided the Dominican authorities with 10 Ion Scanners (8 units for the ARD and 2 for DNCD) and provided subsequent training in their employment to fill the drug detection gap. Future examiners should look at the vessel seizure data to determine whether inspection-to-seizure rates have improved based on this intervention.

Scientific substance detection plays a critical role in the Dominican legal system. By law, ARD officers are required to deliver suspects and suspected controlled substances into DNCD custody in port within 48 hours, allowing a *Procuraduría General de la República* (PGR) attorney to file a case to the Public Ministry. All evidence, including seized controlled substances, is submitted to the PGR National Institute of Forensics (*Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses*) to confirm substance weight and type. The lab is the only authorized agency that can provide evidence of illegal drugs that is permissible in court.\(^95\)

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95 *SIP Program Assessment 2020-2021*, SBU, 3.
Prosecution

Compared to other CBSI partners, the Dominican Republic has a sprawling judicial system that provides fairly efficient rates of prosecution, but it has only a limited focus on maritime crime. As of December 31, 2021, the Dominican Republic has a total of 1,203 prosecutors (625 female and 578 male) at national court level. Untrained assistant clerks and deputy clerks also prosecute cases at lower level courts with the direction of national court-level prosecutors. The PGR only has maritime legal experts in its Office for Illegal Immigration and Human Trafficking (Tráfico Ilícito de Migrantes y Trata de Personas). There is no such specialized office focused on maritime drug interdictions, but offices on money laundering and arms trafficking exist. For migration infractions, the PGR tends to focus on prosecuting vessel captains or migrant organizers rather than migrants themselves (although these persons are expeditiously repatriated when possible).

The PGR is fairly efficient at processing criminal cases to sentencing, as shown in Figure 26. According to the Dominican judiciary, for the period 2014–2021, more than 17,000 cases are still outstanding, nearly 6,000 of which are related to drugs and controlled substances (34 percent) and only 77 of which are related to migration infractions. In the same period, however, the Dominican judiciary successfully sentenced nearly 70,000 total cases, including more than 20,000 drug and controlled substance cases (29 percent) and only 112 migration cases. Therefore, only 22 percent of the drug and controlled substance cases opened in 2014–2021 remain outstanding. Unfortunately, the Dominican judiciary does not disaggregate reported infraction statistics by location (i.e., maritime, ports of entry, or terrestrial), so we were unable to assess the relative rate of sentencing for maritime cases. Anecdotally, US contacts in the ARD, DNCD, and PGR report that some cases can take longer than a year to resolve (hence the backlog). The PGR does employ a case management information system called Justicia 2.0; however, data from the system typically lag the judiciary’s data, and it is not

Figure 26. PGR cases sentenced vs. outstanding

Source: CNA based on Dominican judiciary.

96 Directorate of Analysis and Public Policy [Dirección de Análisis y Políticas Públicas], Criminal Jurisdiction: First Offense Cases Outstanding for Public Prosecution and Public Prosecution upon Private Complaint by Filing Year, by Province [Jurisdicción Penal: Primera Instancia - Relación De Casos De Activos De Acción Pública Y Pública A Instancia Privada, Por Año De Entrada, Según Provincia], Excel spreadsheet, Judiciary of the Dominican Republic [Poder Judicial, República Dominicana], Apr. 21, 2022.
a joint enterprise platform that spans the ARD, DNCD, and PGR (US implementers have been looking into a potential solution).

## Legislation and jurisprudence

The Dominican Republic stands out from most of the rest of the anglophone Caribbean because its civil legal system is based in its colonial Spanish legal heritage (rather than on British Commonwealth precedent), making it most similar to Suriname. The Dominican Republic also has a National Maritime Authority (La Autoridad Nacional de Asuntos Marítimos), established in 2007, that works to harmonize government efforts in the maritime sector by promoting and executing a National Maritime Strategy. Although the Dominican maritime legal infrastructure is largely in concert with international conventions, it has several gaps, including with respect to the rapidly evolving world of controlled substances and clarifying the ARD’s legal reach at sea.

### Maritime law enforcement authorities

The Dominican Republic has several laws on the books establishing its maritime territory and legal authority therein but with key authority gaps for interdiction and law enforcement. The Maritime Areas Law, which dates to 2007, establishes maritime zones, including territorial waters, a contiguous zone (article 13), and an EEZ (article 14), consistent with UNCLOS. This law includes adopting conventions on enforcing customs, financial, immigration, and sanitation laws between 12 and 24 n.m.i. and conferral of rights to use of the EEZ. The Drugs and Controlled Substances Law, dating from 1988, does equate all internal, archipelagic, and territorial waters as “national territory,” but neither this law nor the Maritime Areas Law specifically confers maritime trafficking (drug or otherwise) enforcement or express interdiction jurisdiction or authority consistent with the Vienna Drug Convention.

As previously noted, acting as the primary maritime law enforcement entity, the ARD regularly

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conducts operations, including drug trafficking interdictions, beyond the Dominican Republic’s territorial waters (with the already-established caveat that its C2 is much degraded beyond 15 to 30 n.mi.) but lacks specific extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction.

**Drug trafficking laws**

Maritime legal experts comment that the Dominican Republic’s Drugs and Controlled Substances Law is quite comprehensive in its proscriptive list of substances (which includes precursor chemicals). One substance definition that has not aged well is the definition of marijuana, which addresses only the original *Cannabis Sativa L.* species/cultivar but does not address genetically modified variants.\(^\text{101}\) Trafficking of substances is treated more harshly than possession, with a minimum fine of RD $250,000 (more than current USD $4,500) and a 5- to 20-year prison sentence if convicted.\(^\text{102}\) Even so, ARD officers estimate wholesale cocaine prices at $2,000/kg in the Dominican Republic and closer to $50,000 to $80,000/kg in Puerto Rico and the continental United States, meaning payoffs for offenders more than offset pecuniary penalty risks, even with small loads.

**International cooperation**

**Information sharing**

The Dominican Republic has established information-sharing agreements that it routinely exercises with its major maritime partners, the US and Colombia. The Dominican Republic plays host to the permanent presence of multiple US law enforcement liaisons focused on the maritime domain. With respect to immediate maritime neighbors, the ARD has exercised increased contact with the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), and the Bahamas is set to revive its long-standing information-sharing memorandum of understanding (MOU) thanks to UNODC-GMCP outreach.

The ARD’s closest partners for information sharing are the US—via the JIATF-S TAT stationed at US embassy Santo Domingo—and Colombia’s Center for Investigation and Analysis of Maritime Narcotrafficking (*Centro de Investigación y Análisis Narcotráfico Marítimo*, CIMCON). The ARD maintains liaison officers at both JIATF-S Key West and CIMCON in Cartagena, Colombia. Because of the shared maritime boundary with the US in the Mona Passage, US coordination with the ARD and PGR on irregular maritime migration (both of Haitians and Dominicans) is a central focus. For this reason, both a USCG Attaché (COGATT) and Liaison

\(^{101}\) Ralby, *Maritime Trafficking in the Caribbean*, 72.

\(^{102}\) Ibid., 70.
Officer (CGLO) are stationed at US Embassy Santo Domingo. The San Juan, Puerto Rico Coast Guard Command Center (District 7) is in regular contact with the ARD MOC, which acts as a hub for information sharing. The CGLO regularly works with the ARD M2 and M3 to coordinate ongoing SAR, counternarcotics, and migrant interdiction missions—handling two to three events daily (likely amounting to more than 1,000 unique case events each year). USCG officers note that communication and coordination has improved in recent years, with the ARD more frequently initiating contact with the CGLO to coordinate jurisdiction and response.

The Dominican Republic is linguistically, culturally, and politically more closely tied to South and Central American and other Spanish-speaking countries on the southwest end of the Caribbean Basin than to its nearby insular anglophone neighbors, which is reflected in its involvement in multinational operations and information sharing. ARD officers we spoke with reported rarely working with Eastern Caribbean partners in the RSS or the Bahamas to the north.

The one notable exception is Jamaica, with which the Dominican Republic has increasingly cooperated over the past year via a UNODC-GMCP-sponsored MOC-to-MOC initiative and the Caribbean Forum on Maritime Crime. The JDF and ARD MOC staffs now meet monthly and conducted three in-person exchanges over the course of 2021—and these talks now include relevant air domain components from the JDF Air Wing and Dominican FARD. The two forces also reportedly share subject matter expertise in other key areas.

**Interoperability**

As with information-sharing, Dominican forces routinely cooperate operationally the most with its more distant but most important partners in the US and Colombia, including regular embarkation of ship-riders (especially with the US). Cooperation with closer maritime partners like the Jamaica JDF has also increased in recent years. The ARD is a regular participant and host to internationally led exercises and operations such as Tradewinds, Orion, and French-led Dunas.

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103 The Dominican Republic also has strong interservice ties with Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras, and Guatemala, often brought together by US-led security assistance and cooperation. For instance, the ARD participates in an NCPV community of interest with other countries receiving vessels from that program of record. This community exists via informal network contacts groups on WhatsApp.

104 One program implementer noted that the Dominican Republic’s willingness to engage with its anglophone neighbors may arise from its desire to garner goodwill in the maritime security domain as it grapples with the accusations from neighbors of IUU fishing violations committed by Dominican fishers.

105 US implementers report that the JDF would like to emulate the ARD’s TAFT-supported small boat maintenance program and that the Dominican Republic, in turn, would like to learn from the JDF Air Wing’s more advanced MPA program.
The ARD’s strongest interoperability ties are with the US. The Dominican Republic is the only CBSI partner that is signatory to the San José Treaty, and the ARD regularly makes regular use of ship-rider agreements with the US maritime services. At a tactical level, ARD units can communicate with US MPAs when in the vicinity of a target for interdiction endgame support. As previously mentioned, these US assets act as a communications relay back to ARD HQ to help generate a common-operating picture (if but a delayed one). The ARD routinely participates in the US-sponsored Tradewinds exercise (hosted Phase I in 2019) and has previously hosted the Dunas amphibious exercise at Las Calderas (2019).

The Dominican Republic also works closely with Colombia, from whom it receives military (including navy, marine, and coastguard) advisors via the USCAP. The ARD also regularly participates in Operation Orion, a series of multilateral counternarcotic campaigns led and orchestrated by the Colombian Navy’s CIMCON apparatus.

ARD interoperability is also increasing with local Central Caribbean partners. Dominican and Jamaican maritime forces have drafted an MOU for cooperative maritime and aerial SAR. Tangible results of this cooperation, include a recent successful combined response to a SAR case to rescue Dominican nationals stranded at sea, in which the two forces contacted each other using and official line (vice WhatsApp). The Bahamas is set to join the MOC-to-MOC initiative and revitalize its older MOU with the Dominican Republic.

Summary

As Table 8 shows, the maritime security and law enforcement forces of the Dominican Republic are relatively competent across most areas compared to their regional counterparts and have the political will to improve. However, there are gaps to be addressed.

Key considerations

The Dominican Republic faces several challenges to improving its maritime security and law enforcement capabilities. To be successful, it would need investments and progress in several interrelated areas.

- **MDA**: The Dominican Republic has fairly sophisticated networked nerve centers for monitoring maritime threats and responding with security forces, especially in the

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106 “Tradewinds 2019.”

107 The document is currently awaiting the signature of the Jamaican Attorney General and recommendation to the Cabinet for adoption and approval Draft Memorandum of Understanding on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue between Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, UNODC-GMCP Caribbean, (2021).
areas of port security and licit maritime traffic. However, the Dominican Republic is lacking in organic sensing capabilities (MPAs and radars) and tactical communications for supporting operations beyond territorial waters. Addressing these two issues will help the Dominican Republic become less reliant on JIATF-S intelligence and force packages and more of a contributor in the central Caribbean.

- **Maritime presence and operations:** The ARD has a well-run short-range interceptor program in the Flotilla, but it remains operationally reliant on constant supervision and support from the TAFT. Similarly, although the Flota benefits from access to an organic drydock and shipyard and a small but well-trained cadre of mobile repair teams, the ARD surface fleet preventive maintenance program routinely goes unfunded. This lack of sustainment resourcing is a poor foundation for ARD and US OSC ambitions to “refleet”—modernize and recapitalize the fleet—as demonstrated by difficulties integrating the new NCPV. Even prospective EDA donations such as USCG Marine Protector class cutters will be more advanced than the ARD is currently accustomed to. These sustainment deficits will continue to impose an upper limit on the ARD's ability to consistently project maritime presence and interdiction cordons further offshore toward threat vector sources (even if communications problems are resolved).

- **Port security:** Although the CCP is well established in the Dominican Republic with four PCUs and a resident UNODC program advisor for the Caribbean, increased traffic at the Caucedo Port will need to be met by increased security resources and technology and better targeting as traffickers continue to devise innovations to exploit high-throughput vulnerabilities.

- **Investigation:** As the chief maritime law enforcement authority, the ARD lacks SOPs for investigating maritime crime scenes and developing case packages to drive prosecutions to successful legal finish.

- **Maritime legal authority:** The ARD lacks specific jurisdiction to successfully try maritime interdiction cases that occur beyond the contiguous zone. Upgrades to communications and operations range will need to be accompanied by reforms to “legal range.”

- **International cooperation:** The US already has a strong and willing partner in the Dominican Republic. Helping the ARD address its communications and sustainment deficits will result in more meaningful contributions to JIATF-S counternarcotics and USCG-led counter-illicit migration efforts. INL programs have helped Dominican forces begin to establish better ties with local anglophone maritime neighbors, especially Jamaica. Further support is likely needed to achieve similar results with the Bahamas.

- **Information sharing:** US-Dominican information sharing in the maritime domain is funneled through a single relationship (the ARD's liaison officer and the CGLO at the
US Embassy). Frequent rotation of the ARD personnel makes maintaining a persistent and stable coordinating relationship difficult.
### Table 8. Summary of the Dominican Republic’s maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMAIN AWARENESS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>DNCD: CIIC COCI: integration w/ JIATF-S air assets and air/sea tracks vs CISSI/APAN (directs TF Lanza interdictions) CIAN: port traffic intelligence fusion cell (200 CCTVs at Caucedo and SeaVision (as of Nov. 2021)) ARD M2 MOC has CISSI/APAN and SeaVision (as of Nov. 2021) and a communications center with JIATF-S loafer BFTs; close coordination with CGLO and JIATF-S/TAT. Lacks ability to direct assets beyond territorial waters.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>ARD: limited range of terrestrial repeaters, means ARD surface units lose contact with MOC after 15 n.mi.; ARD surface units able to coordinate locally with USG provided air assets.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>ARD: 2x A-29 Tucanos with transferable FLIR; 1x TECNAM MPA (not in service); reliance on JIATF-S detection/targeting and MPA support for interdiction endgame. ARD M2 Intelligence: 270 personnel focused on terrestrial and inshore human intelligence on drug trafficking organizations and migrant networks.</td>
<td>MED</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>ARD Flota: 11x IPvS, but only some have range, sensors, and performance suitable for MIOs ARD Flotilla: 15x US-donated Boston Whaler Interceptors (dating from 2009–2021) TF Lanza: Comandos Anfibios + DNCD URT SOF Units for VBSS interdictions and land seizures.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>ARD Flota: 15x specialists assigned to mobile task-organized mobile repair teams (welding, diesel engine, and comms/electronics); preventive maintenance is unfunded for most vessels; shipyard at Las Calderas Naval Base with drydock/lift capability; ARD Flotilla: 22x specialists supported by CBSI TAFT at las Dragas San Souci.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>CESEP: joint interagency task force for port security (DNCD, Customs, and Military); access to URT divers and DNCD K9 units for special inspections. CCP-PCUs: 4x PCUs at Caucedo, Haina, Puerto Plata, and Manzanillo; PCUs have strong network with other regional PCUs (e.g., Guyana and Panama); truck X-ray and portable scanners</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LAW ENFORCEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>ARD: has a newly drafted INL-supported operations manual that addresses maritime crime scenes and handling case packages, but it is not yet fully implemented. 10x portable IonScanner for drug detection at sea. PGR: lab for testing controlled substances</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>PGR: 1,203 prosecutors; maritime legal experts for migration/human-trafficking only; 17,000+ cases outstanding (2014–2021); including ~6,000 controlled substance and 77 migrant cases (not disaggregated by maritime cases).</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation/ Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Maritime legal framework: contiguous zones and EEZ established consistent with UNCLOS; ARD maritime law enforcement authority in international waters not defined. Drug &amp; Controlled Substances: fairly comprehensive list, but light penalties for traffickers.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTL COOP</strong></td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Participates in Colombian Navy’s CIMCON apparatus and JIATF-S; largely dependent on US intelligence for interdictions; regular (daily) communication with US CGLO; increasing level of information sharing with Jamaica via MOC-to-MOC initiative; limited info sharing with other anglophone Eastern Caribbean nations.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Numerous passing exchanges with JIATF-S force packages (USCG/US Navy air and surface assets); US Shiprider Agreement + San José Treaty signatory; high degree of cooperation with USCG District 7/PR via CGLO/COGATT US Embassy Santo Domingo to handle mixed loads of irregular migration and narcotrafficking in Mona Passage.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Grenada

Grenada and the United States cooperate routinely to address a variety of security issues including narcotics, smuggling, and other forms of transnational criminal activity.\(^{108}\) Located south of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in the Windward Islands chain in the Eastern Caribbean, Grenada is nicknamed the Spice Island though it is in fact more economically dependent on tourism. The global COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing drop in international travel dealt a considerable blow to Grenada’s economy.

Grenada’s position as the southernmost Windward Islands nation exposes it to trafficking in drugs, weapons, and people from Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and Colombia. Grenada functions as a transshipment point for trafficking in weapons, narcotics, and other illicit cargo between South America and Western European markets. Grenada has increasingly seen illicit weapons shipments emanating from the US as well. Grenada has no standing army, navy, or air force. Security is provided instead by the Royal Grenada Police Force (RGPF), which includes the **RGPF Coast Guard (CG)**, as well as other forces such as the Drug Squad, Immigrations, and Prosecutions Departments. The RGPF CG currently consists of 46 personnel and is based at True Blue, on Grenada’s main island.

Although Grenada faces maritime security challenges, the CG is small and has relatively few assets (Figure 28). The fleet consists of four vessels: two SAFE Boats, one RHIB 920, and one Sea Ark. One of these vessels was down for maintenance during CNA’s visit. None of these vessels is capable of long operations at sea. CG operations are thus mostly limited to 30 n.mi. offshore. Because the CG is integrated within the national police, operations often involve other departments, such as the Drug Squad. The Customs Department also has one vessel, but it is rarely used.

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\(^{108}\) Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.
Figure 27. Grenada, location of key assets and capabilities

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.

\( \text{a} \) = 50 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

**Integrated command and control**

The CG is one branch of the RGPF, so the coordination structure of intelligence and operations is relatively simple—such coordination falls under the supervision of the chief of police. Operations often include participation by other entities, such as the Drug Squad and the Customs Department, as appropriate. Whether the chief of police or another representative from the RGPF exercises C2 over CG operations or whether operational C2 is delegated to the commander of the CG is unclear. Regular patrols are directed and managed by the CG commanding officer, mostly via Harris radios (when operational) or over VHF communications channels. C2 past 30 n.mi. offshore becomes difficult because of technological issues.

**Communications**

Communications is a major challenge for the CG. The CG relies on VHF as well as Harris radios. However, both have issues. The Harris radios experience issues related to their antennas and blind spots. The CG lacks a repeater for VHF, meaning many blind spots where communications are not possible over VHF exist as well. These challenges affect both ship-ship communications as well as ship-shore communications.

**Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**

The CG used to rely on information provided by a fixed radar station located at police headquarters in Grenada's capital, Saint George. This station was neither owned nor operated by the CG unit but rather by the broader police force. However, the radar system has not been working for some time because of a maintenance issue. The radar system is based on an Israeli coastal surveillance system, which adds to challenges in maintaining and repairing the system.

In addition to the currently nonoperational radar system, Grenada relies on ISR provided through its long-standing membership in the RSS. Grenada can request aerial support from the single air asset operated by the RSS (based in Barbados). According to subject matter experts in Grenada, this process apparently works smoothly and the country can normally get support when needed.
Maritime presence and operations

**Patrol and interdiction**

The CG operates two SAFE Boats, one RHIB 920, and one Sea Ark, all provided by the United States. Until recently, the CG also operated another vessel (a 106-ft Defender class) which it procured on its own. However, this vessel has since been decommissioned because it aged out of the fleet. The TAFT recently conducted midlife overhauls on the SAFE Boats. CG operations typically extend 30 n.mi. offshore; any farther and communications back to base are lost. Although most of the fleet is based at True Blue, the CG recently started basing one vessel to the north, around the small Grenadian island of Carriacou, in response to the evolving threat picture.

CG operations include routine patrols, security operations during cruise ship visits and other events, interdictions, SAR (e.g., for lost fishers), and protection of natural resources. The CG estimates that it spends approximately 25 hours per week underway conducting all types of operations and operates 3 to 4 patrols per week (indicating that most patrols last between 3 and 4 hours, assuming roughly 10 hours per week are spent on other missions).

In terms of frequency, the CG estimates that it conducts around two interdictions of illicit goods per month, although this number can fluctuate. In one recent high-profile example often cited, CG forces successfully executed a high-speed chase targeting bank robbers trying to escape by boat. When conducting interdictions, the CG routinely brings a member of the Drug Squad. All CG personnel are police officers as well and thus have the power to arrest.

**Maintenance**

The status of maintenance seems to be relatively good in Grenada. The CG has its own fully enclosed workshop and seems capable of performing basic routine maintenance on its vessels. The CG claims to adhere to a maintenance schedule (e.g., checking engines every week). It also claims that, for the most part, it can handle unexpected problems when they arise. That said, representatives from the police force acknowledge that maintenance is an issue, specifically the sourcing of spare parts that are not produced on the island. Many parts are sourced from Mexico, and the CG has run into issues with language barriers as well as delays because of COVID-19. The TAFT visits Grenada regularly and helps with maintenance challenges that arise. The TAFT recently installed the new Manager Plus software program to monitor boat and engine use and to conduct regular preventive maintenance, and the CG uses this system.
Port security poses significant challenges in Grenada. The country lacks scanners, so containers must be inspected by hand by the port police, another department that falls under the RGPF. Given the volume of trade, examining everything coming into the country is impossible. Furthermore, in addition to regulated trade, a robust informal network of trade occurs between Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago. Most of this trade is legal, and it is an important part of the economy; disruption and onerous delays would impose significant costs on the small-scale traders who ply the waters between the two countries. For this and other reasons—including corruption, according to local sources—this less-than formal trade receives only perfunctory police scrutiny. As a result, criminals can slip a gun or a small amount of drugs into a shipment relatively easily. Yet Grenada does not want to impose formal restrictions upon this trade because of its vitality to the local economy.

Maritime law enforcement

Investigation

The capability of CG personnel at managing an at-sea crime scene, gathering and handling evidence, and sustaining chain of custody is uncertain. CG personnel can place individuals under arrest. CNA did not have the opportunity to determine how proficient CG personnel are in their investigative abilities.

Prosecution

Most maritime criminal cases are handled by Grenada’s magistrate, or lower, court. Grenada has six magistrates: three based in Saint George (one for traffic offenses alone), one handling the western part of the country, one handling the eastern part, and one that supports both western and eastern depending on requirements. Magistrates are generally overworked given the vast number of cases pending (CNA was told anecdotally that magistrates have around 30 to 40 matters going on at any given time). This overwork translates to cases taking much longer than they should and the courts maximizing the use of bail to free up space in prison. Cases can take anywhere from months to many years to even be
heard. Although police officials are generally satisfied with the level of cooperation between the CG and the prosecutors, capacity challenges often result in criminals being fined rather than serving serious jail time. Maritime cases rise to the higher court only if they are especially serious or involve high-value narcotics or other smuggling, usually with regional consequences. When they do, cases can take very long to work their way through the justice system because there are only four public prosecutors.

These frequent delays also affect the CG because of their impacts on asset seizure. During the asset forfeiture process (which, in tandem with case processing, can take a very long time), the CG is responsible for storing the seized vessels. This results in a massive buildup of vessels at the CG facility (Figure 29).

Legislation and jurisprudence

By all accounts, legislation and jurisprudence in Grenada are adequate. The relevant laws are in place to enable prosecution of maritime crime, and the justice system is set up in a way that is consistent with other countries in the region.

International cooperation

Information sharing

The CG shares information via the RSS construct, although this process is not always consistent. For example, Barbados carried out a recent interdiction operation in Grenada's waters without informing the RGPF.

The police Drug Squad reportedly maintains a good relationship with the US DEA as well as SOUTHCOM. Grenadian police officials also noted a desire to work more closely with regional countries on information sharing pertaining to goods coming into and out of countries because they lack scanners at port facilities.

Interoperability

Grenada has been a long-time participant in the Tradewinds multinational exercise program. A shiprider agreement between the United States and Grenada, signed in 1996, has lapsed for reasons that CNA was unable to determine.

Summary

As Table 9 shows, the RGPF, through its CG unit, conducts maritime operations ranging from routine patrols to interdictions to basic rescue missions. The fleet is small, but the force seems
mostly capable of fleet maintenance except when major mechanical issues arise. Sourcing spare parts is a critical challenge affecting readiness. The CG interacts most frequently with other RSS countries and the United States (through the TAFT) and has select engagements with the British and French. Information sharing occurs, although it could be improved through more exercising and standardized communications means. Although Grenada has a legal system in place, capacity challenges hamper its effectiveness and can result in maritime criminals being let off too easily.

Key considerations

The RGPF suffers from the deficiencies typical of the small Eastern Caribbean island nations. An improvement in its overall capabilities, from communications to operations to maritime case development, would require attention to numerous areas:

- **MDA:** Without radars or MPAs, the country is blind at sea. CBSI may consider how best to address this issue, either with more local assets or more resources and cooperation with multinational agencies such as the RSS.

- **Port security:** Grenada is in urgent need of greater port security. Scanners, although clearly necessary, are not sufficient; more attention needs to be devoted to tackling corruption and encouraging greater efforts to enforce customs laws.

- **Overtaxed courts and prosecutors:** Grenadian public officials are aware that their legal system is overburdened. Support and assistance from countries that share Grenada's legal traditions and practices (including members of the Commonwealth) could make significant contributions to strengthening prosecutors and the judiciary.

- **Registering ship engines:** Parenthetically, Grenadian officials suggested an ostensibly low-cost measure for enhancing maritime security and domain awareness, namely developing a method for registering ship engines—a critical component in any maritime-related criminal enterprise—to create a log of when a given engine was produced. Such a log could help with chain of custody when dealing with seized vessels and would likely have to be developed either directly by or in coordination with industry.
Table 9. Summary of Grenada’s maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domain Awareness</strong></td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>Integration with the RGPF facilitates interagency cooperation under the commissioner’s office. MU regular operations (patrols) managed by the CG. Representatives from the Drug Squad frequently join as shipriders on CG vessels.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>CG struggles to maintain and use Harris radios consistently. VHF comms also have issues, creating blind spots.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)</td>
<td>No functional radar, MPAs, or other sensors. Rely on human intelligence and alerts from international sources.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presence &amp; Operations</strong></td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>CG has 4 vessels: 2x SAFE Boats, 1x Zociac Hurricane 920 RHIB, and 1x Sea Ark, and is staffed at 46 personnel. Most vessels are stationed at True Blue, with 1x SAFE Boat interceptor stationed in the north near Carriacou. The CG spends approx. 25 hrs./wk. underway, conducting routine patrol (e.g. security for cruise ships) as well as interdictions and humanitarian assistance missions when required. The CG’s small fleet and communications challenges, however, limit operational range to no more than 30 n.mi. offshore.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>Decent; capable of routine maintenance and repairs of SAFE Boats, RHIB, and Sea Ark. Use Manager Plus to monitor regular preventive maintenance. However, more serious problems require outside assistance. CG often struggles to get spare parts, which are not produced in Grenada.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>The nation lacks scanners and thus must inspect cargo manually. Robust informal trade network further complicates matters.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Law Enforcement</strong></td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Unknown.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>DPP office has 4 public prosecutors, too few given the number of cases at any given point. At the magistrate level (where most maritime cases end up), courts are overworked, resulting in long backlogs. Defendants often receive fines to help ameliorate overcrowding in prison. Cases can take years to work their way through the justice system.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/Jurisprudence</td>
<td>There is no overall maritime act to clarify jurisdictions and authorities and no maritime registry (of vessels). There appears to be no clear distinction or threshold between magistrate cases and high court cases. That said, officials did not mention legislation being a limiting factor.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTL COOP</strong></td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>RGPF and CG share information and coordinate actions via the RSS construct. Although information sharing happens in accordance with signed agreements, it is not always ideal. Sharing information outside RSS can be difficult, although Grenada maintains ties with the DEA and SOUTHCOM.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>A long-time TRADEWINDS participant; a shiprider agreement with the US has lapsed.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Jamaica

Jamaica is an important maritime security partner of the United States. The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) Coast Guard (JDFCG) is considered professional, has improved its capabilities in recent years, and is on track to continue that trajectory. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the government of Jamaica invested its own funds in maritime security assets and intended to continue to grow the JDFCG’s forces, expand its fleet, and acquire MDA and communications platforms. Notionally, these plans are still on the table, but they have been slowed, if not outright halted, by the government’s decision to respond to the COVID-19 crisis by investing in health and human services over the past two years. The JDF capital investment budget has been cut by more than 70 percent. The Jamaican government currently prioritizes anti-gang investments over expensive maritime security procurements.

Rule of law is a challenge in Jamaica. Outside the JDF, there are significant concerns about corruption among the other maritime security elements. Most regional experts indicated that the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) Marine Division (JCFMD) is corrupt, and some also expressed concerns about the Customs Agency Contraband Enforcement Team (CET). Maritime crimes are generally prosecuted in the same way as cases on land; for example, narcotics and weapons trafficking offenses are prosecuted under the same laws (regardless of whether the offense occurs at sea or on land) in the parish courts or the supreme court. Although there was no suggestion of impropriety within the judicial system, rule of law is impeded by significant case backlogs and staffing shortages in all areas of prosecution and adjudication. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is in the process of establishing a maritime crimes unit to focus on cases of human smuggling/trafficking, IUU fishing, and other violations of maritime law.

The JDFCG is the largest and best equipped maritime security force, and its operations are supported by an MPA operated by the JDF Air Wing (JDFAW). The JDFCG operates OPVs with 100 n.mi. range and coastal interceptors that it pushes beyond manufacturer ratings. Jamaica’s Pedro Cays, some 50 n.mi. from the main island, provides an expansive EEZ to Jamaica’s south. However, the JDFCG primarily uses its OPVs for presence missions, and most maritime interdictions occur in Jamaica’s territorial waters. The JCFMD operates interceptors and

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109 Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.
smaller boats for harbor and riverine patrols. There are limited cocaine flows to Jamaica. Maritime interdiction priorities for both the JDFCG and the JCFMD are the “guns for ganja” trade that fuels the country’s high murder rate. In addition to the CET, Jamaica has a small (four full-time personnel) vetted PCU.

Unlike in some other Caribbean countries (e.g., The Bahamas), INL directly supports both the maritime police and coast guard (part of the defense establishment) in Jamaica. Both the JDF and JCF fall under the government of Jamaica’s Ministry of National Security, meaning both security agencies are represented by the same cabinet member in budget discussions.
Figure 29. Jamaica, location of key assets and capabilities

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.

* = 50 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

**Integrated command and control**

In 2018, the JDF integrated its maritime, air, intelligence, special activities, and cyber units into a Maritime, Air and Cyber Command (MACC), headquartered at the Up Park Camp JDF headquarters in Kingston. A maritime-air operations center (MAOC), established in 2020, provides the JDF a common operating picture of the maritime environment and communications with JDFCG and JDFAW assets. The MAOC receives and integrates information from the Military Intelligence Unit (MIU) and the JIATF-S for real-time MDA. The MACC is in the process of installing JIATF-S-provided BFTs on its vessels. During operations, the MPA provides oversight of the operating area for surface assets. The JCFMD headquarters is in Kingston Harbour, adjacent to the Customs Agency. The JCFMD uses an Amber system (similar to GPS-based automobile theft detection\(^\text{110}\)) to track its vessels, but the maritime police force does not have a good picture of its littoral or riverine operating environment.

**Communications**

Communications is a challenge for the Jamaican maritime forces, and actual capability does not match the capability of the assets on paper. JDFCG assets mostly communicate LOS, with some HF radios capable of OTH communications. Technically, JDFCG interceptors can communicate directly with the JDFAW MPA, but there have been challenges with all assets and the MAOC sharing a frequency. The JDFCG has some Harris HF radios, but generally personnel on different vessels communicate with each other, and ship-to-shore, using WhatsApp. There has been some discussion about the MACC acquiring an Aeronet communications system to connect the MAOC and its maritime and air assets. The JDFCG has also asked the US security cooperation office about acquiring satellite telephones. Both US and Jamaican interlocutors noted the importance of improved training on the communications assets the JDF already has instead of acquiring new—and potentially equally complicated—systems. Meanwhile, the JCFMD has no radios. If the vessel is not in cell phone range, it is not possible to communicate with the asset.

**Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**

In 2018, the JDFAW acquired a Textron Beechcraft King Air 350 WR with a sensor package. This asset is regularly referred to as a “game changer” for the JDFCG because the MPA

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can pick up and track a suspect vessel and communicate its coordinates to JDFCG assets in the area. Jamaica still plans to acquire two additional MPAs, but the limited flight hours of one aircraft means that the MPA is rarely deployed for MDA patrols that develop intelligence for the MAOC; instead, it is overwhelmingly deployed to support intelligence-based operations.

JDFCG operations are driven by intelligence from the MIU and JIATF-S. Jamaica does not currently deploy maritime radar. In the past, the government recognized the need for better MDA and launched a Maritime Domain Awareness Capability initiative. In 2019, as part of that initiative, the JDF began to procure seven French Coast Watcher 100 radar systems. Whether Jamaica has acquired all seven land-based maritime radars is unclear, but even though some of this purchase may be (and may remain) unfulfilled, the MACC is moving forward with bringing systems online in the near term. The Coast Watchers will have a separate operations center, but the JDF plans to integrate that radar data into the MAOC common operating picture. Once operational, the MACC will also share this radar feed with JIATF-S.

Jamaica’s coverage of its territorial waters is incomplete. Despite JDFCG and JCFMD stations around the island, there are nearly 150 “unofficial” ports on Jamaica’s shorelines that are well known to the local fishers involved in smuggling contraband to and from the island.

Maritime presence and operations

Patrol and interdiction

The JDFCG maintains a total force structure of 300 personnel, two-thirds of whom are based out of the force’s 1st District. This number represents a doubling of JDFCG personnel over recent years but is far short of the force’s stated goal of 500 personnel per district. The JDFCG formally launched its 2nd District in November 2021, which provides better command and control across the country’s maritime space but also cut the number of personnel reporting to HMJS Cagway. Both districts have a small headquarters staff, and no staff are permanently

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111 In a Feb. 16, 2022, conversation, US Embassy personnel were unfamiliar with this Jamaican initiative.


assigned to the JDFCG’s disparate small boat stations: personnel rotate to these locations for two-week spans. The JDFCG is on a trajectory of growing and improving its personnel, including operating its own officer candidate school, but this process will necessarily take time and the current force is relatively underexperienced. The maritime force does not have the capacity to berth all its recruits, who instead go through a year of infantry training at Up Park Camp before joining the coast guard. The Kingston-based Caribbean Military Academy’s Caribbean Military Maritime Training Center (CMMTC) provides training to JDFCG recruits and foreign maritime forces, but the CMMTC does not have its own vessels for lessons. Most JDFCG training is on the job.

The JDFCG operates four OPVs, all acquired since 2017 with national funds. The JDFCG traded in three of its older OPVs and acquired two new Damen Stan Patrol 4207s in 2017. The JDFCG commissioned HMJS Nanny of The Maroons, a Damen Fast Crew Supply (FCS) Vessel 5009, in July 2020. A third Damen Stan Patrol 4207 was commissioned into service in December 2021. Typically, one OPV is based at Discovery Bay and another at Port Royal; there is a weekly patrol from the latter to Pedro Cays. The JDFCG has open orders with Damen for a fourth Stan Patrol 4207 and a second FCS 5009. For short-range interdiction operations, the JDFCG operates five 37-ft Boston Whalers and five 38-ft SAFE Boats (all ten were US supplied). The JDFCG’s fleet is relatively new—all its operational interceptors were delivered between 2015 and 2019. However, the Boston Whalers are not appropriate for Jamaica’s waters (although the force does deploy them), and the OPVs are too slow to catch maritime smugglers, leaving the five SAFE Boats as the workhorses of JDFCG interdiction operations. The JDFCG operates its vessels every day. CNA was told that the force conducts 200-hour preventive maintenance on its SAFE Boats every two weeks, suggesting long operational hours. According to one US interlocutor, this timeline seems excessive but is

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116 "HMJS Alexander Bustamante Added To JDF’s Fleet.”


118 The JDFCG also has a US-supplied 40-ft SeaArk patrol vessel, but it is a decade older than the rest of the fleet and no one mentioned this craft’s use during CNA’s field visit.
entirely possible if the JDFCG is short on vessels and overextending those that are mission capable.

With these limited resources, the JCFCG tends not to use its interceptors for patrol missions but instead conducts maritime interdiction operations following JIATF-S cues and MIU targeting intelligence. The coast guard has relative success in disrupting the guns for ganja trade, but it is far more likely to recover marijuana leaving the country than weapons entering for several reasons. One is that it is easier for the JDF and JCF to interdict launch operations. Another is that JDFCG personnel lack training and appropriate weapons for noncompliant boardings. A third is that smugglers aboard interdicted vessels likely dump their contraband before allowing the JDF to board—packages of marijuana float and are recovered on the surface, but guns sink.

**Jamaica Constabulary Force Marine Division**

The JCFMD has 183 active duty personnel, with about 170 stationed around Jamaica at any given time. Its Kingston Harbour headquarters is one of the more active stations given the resources on hand and activity around the harbor and ports, but the JCFMD has stations in nearly every parish, including a site in Pedro Cays where personnel camp out for a week at a time.

The JCFMD operates 10 US-donated (in 2015) Boston Whalers as its main patrol vessels. For patrols in coves and rivers, the police operate canoes and 17-ft craft. The JCFMD supposedly conducts routine patrols of Jamaica’s harbors and rivers, including three- to four-hour patrols around Kingston Harbour. Twenty-one of the JCFMD’s Boston Whalers and small craft are always operational, with at least one boat located at each station. The force presents itself as a hardworking but under-resourced maritime security unit “treated like a bad stepchild.” There is consensus in Kingston that this treatment is deserved. The reputation of the JCFMD is marred by allegations of corruption and incompetence spanning from taking payoffs from narcotics smugglers to the theft of one of the INL-supplied Boston Whalers from a station in Westmoreland Parish not long after it was donated to the force. The JCFMD, for its part, claims to actively interdict marijuana smuggling: for example, on the Black River before shipments from the center of the country can get out to sea.

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119 As noted in the above section, these vessels do not operate well in Jamaica’s waters.

**Maintenance**

All JDFCG maintenance is done at 1st District headquarters at HMJS Cagway (Port Royal), although the force deploys at least one engineer to each station for small fixes. The coast guard maintenance team had the skills to do most maintenance itself, but the JDFCG recently released senior maintainers, has struggled to incentivize mid-level personnel to stay, and has a slow recruitment pipeline for new maintainers. The HMJS Cagway maintenance shop is a “skeleton of its former self,” with 4 to 5 junior members. In one recent month, the force lost nine personnel whose contracts were up and who decided they could make 2 to 4 times a JDF salary in the private sector.

The JDFCG depends on CBSI-TAFT for assistance with getting parts, which has been especially difficult given the supply chain challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic. The JDFCG outsources specialized hull welding to civilian maintenance specialists in Jamaica because the force determined that sustaining this specialized skill in house did not make sense. Repairs to its OPVs are still covered by the manufacturer, and Damen has an in-country representative who regularly supports these vessels. The JDFCG’s FCS 5009 has been at Damen’s repair facility in Cuba for 10 months, and the force determined that it will send the OPVs to Damen Shiprepair Curaçao in future.

The JCFMD does its own maintenance at an INL-funded facility inaugurated in 2016. The engines of its Boston Whalers need to be overhauled regularly, and the JCFMD is rebuilding six of them now (it has completed four). COVID-19 supply chain issues also make it difficult for the JCFMD to get parts for its boats. The marine police maintenance budget is also not enough to sustain the JCFMD’s vessels.

**Port security**

The Jamaica Customs Agency CET is responsible for port security. There are 27 CET personnel, whose responsibility is stopping contraband from being imported and exported at Jamaica’s two ports in Kingston, Kingston Wharves Limited and Kingston Freeport Terminal Limited (KFTL), and one in Montego Bay. At KFTL, 90 to 95 percent of containers are transshipped through Jamaica, and responsibility for halting transshipped contraband falls to the vetted PCU, led by a CET member with one team member from the port authority and two from the JCF. The PCU is short three staff and is supported by two reserve CET personnel.\(^{121}\) Another PCU in Montego Bay is essentially defunct, with no full-time staff. The PCU is capable of physically searching five containers a day, but it typically receives tips on suspect cargo through the UNODC CCP network. However, its reported seizures are low: one to three cases

\(^{121}\) It is unclear whether both reserve members are fully vetted.
of contraband a year from 2018 to mid-2021, according to official reporting. The CNA team was told that the main contraband that the PCU finds is not drugs or guns but intellectual property violations, and the unit seizes three to nine shipments of fake shoes, clothes, and other consumer products a year. The larger CET is capable of significantly more seizures, and Jamaica has better intelligence and port security technology than other central Caribbean CBSI countries (The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic). However, corruption in the force is assumed. US personnel have turned to working with the JCF and JDF to guard and inspect suspect containers. As with the PCU, the small amount of narcotics and firearms found in containers does not reflect the known level of trafficking of these contraband. Said one interlocutor, “By pure accident, you should stumble onto more than one [shipment of firearms] a year.”

**Maritime law enforcement**

**Investigation**

In Jamaica, IUU fishing and other EEZ violations are considered maritime crimes, but maritime narcotics and arms trafficking are investigated and prosecuted in the same way as nonmaritime crimes. International observers rate Jamaica’s law enforcement, court system, and rule of law as reasonably competent, transparent, and institutionalized (12th out of 32 Latin American and Caribbean nations, with an overall score in 2021 (.57) above the regional average and on par with the global average (.56)). Jamaican prosecutors report that both the JDFCG and JCFMD are competent at collecting and handling evidence. The chain of custody of suspects and seizures goes through the JDFCG to the JCFMD to the JCF investigations unit to prosecutors, who decide to prosecute the case based on the evidence collected. In FY 2021, 789 Jamaicans were charged for narcotics and precursor crimes and 2,515 were charged for weapons trafficking.

Increased interactions among the JDFCF, JCFMD, and the DPP have resulted in some discussions regarding appropriate evidence collection during interdictions. The JCFMD has also taken some parish prosecutors out on patrols to introduce them to the environment.

**Prosecution**

Jamaica has 54 prosecutors in the DPP, who prosecute at the national court level, and 2 to 4 prosecutors per parish at the parish court level, in which assistant clerks and deputy

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122 *WJP Rule of Law Index.*

123 Charges in total, not just for maritime-based crimes.
clerks without formal legal training also prosecute cases under the direction of prosecutors. Until recently, maritime cases (i.e., EEZ violations and illegal immigration) were randomly assigned to DPP prosecutors; the office is presently establishing a four-person maritime crimes unit. Narcotics and firearms cases will still be randomly assigned. Crimes committed in the territorial waters off a parish may be tried in that parish’s court. There are no specialized maritime prosecutors at the parish level, but the DPP has sent specialists to assist complex parish-level prosecutions. Jamaica’s judicial system is understaffed in all areas, and there are major case backlogs. The case management system is informal, meaning that maritime crimes with international links are likely to be prioritized; however, there is an effort now to formalize case classification and prioritization to address the backlog. In US FY 2021, Jamaica’s conviction rate for drug trafficking cases was 37.82 percent and for weapons trafficking cases was just 4.52 percent. The reasons for these low conviction rates are unclear, and, given the backlog of cases, it is unclear in what years charges were brought for the cases that Jamaican courts adjudicated in FY 2021. CNA has only one year of data, so we are unable to say whether these conviction rates have changed over the period of evaluation.

**Legislation and jurisprudence**

Jamaica has a comprehensive collection of maritime and maritime-related laws that direct cases into the appropriate court systems. For example, the Supreme Court (the national-level system) will see violations of the Fisheries Act, the EEZ Act, and the Trade Act. Firearms cases are also brought before the Supreme Court, per the Firearms Act. On the other hand, the Dangerous Drugs Act directs that narcotics crimes—including maritime narcotics smuggling—be brought before a parish court. For parish court–level crimes at sea, the Parish Crime Act specifies that these cases be tried before the Kingston Parish Court, whereas, as mentioned above, crimes in territorial waters may be tried in the parish ashore. Offenses are tried based on the potential for the most successful prosecution avenue. Jamaica has ratified all the standard international conventions and protocols for maritime safety and law enforcement (e.g., UNCLOS, International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, United Nations Vienna Drug Convention, and International Convention on Search and Rescue). Jamaica is not a signatory to the 2003 Treaty of San Jose.

**International cooperation**

**Information sharing**

The JDFCG is developing a closer bilateral relationship with the Dominican Republic’s maritime forces. Jamaica’s closest and most consistent partner for maritime information sharing is the Cayman Islands, with which it shares the same vectors for monitoring trafficking.
Jamaica and the United States also exchange information regarding maritime trafficking. The government’s willingness to sign an MOU to share its radar feed with JIATF-S suggests that the country is a partner in developing regional MDA.

**Interoperability**

The JDFCG participates in US-sponsored Tradewinds. It also conducts occasional passing and communications exercises with USCG vessels, which the JDF views as very beneficial. Jamaica has shiprider agreements with the US, the Netherlands, Colombia, and Cuba (the latter two are rarely used). When the JDFCG was less capable, USCG TACLET personnel rode on Jamaican vessels with more frequency, but there has not been a US shiprider on an JDFCG vessel in some time. Jamaica has not conducted bilateral exercises with the Dominican Republic, but there was a recent exchange between national MOCs and another is scheduled. As part of this growing relationship, the two central Caribbean nations are close to completing a shiprider agreement.

**Summary**

As Table 10 shows, the maritime security and law enforcement forces of Jamaica are moderately competent across most areas, compared to their regional counterparts, and have the political will to improve.

**Key considerations**

- **Capacity**: The JDFCG currently lacks the personnel, vessels, and equipment for increased patrols and maritime interdictions. Dedicated training craft or simulators for the CMMTC would help build skills among recruits.

- **Small patrol craft**: Even with the larger force that the JDFCG is slowly building, the coast guard requires more SAFE Boat interceptors to patrol its territorial waters. INL and its US government partners should consider procuring more SAFE Boats for Jamaica and urge the JDF to invest national funds on small craft instead of additional OPVs.

- **Overburdened judiciary**: Jamaica’s judicial system is understaffed and overburdened. Both the Supreme Court and parish courts require assistance in addressing judicial backlogs. Support for ongoing efforts to prioritize cases could be especially helpful. It would also be beneficial for the INL Section in Kingston to monitor and report adjudication length and conviction rates of narcotics and arms trafficking cases to track the outcome of US assistance.
• **Boosted ISR:** Strong cooperation with JIATF-S in recent years has improved Jamaica’s intelligence-driven maritime operations. The MPA has been a “gamechanger” for maritime ISR, but Jamaica needs more aircraft to take advantage of this capability and COVID-19 spending has disrupted planned security budgets.

• **New sensors integration:** MDA is the area of lowest capability, but the JDF maritime common operating picture may be improved in 2022 if the MACC integrates maritime radar and BFT data. The MACC would benefit from MOC exercises, and the US government should encourage and sponsor the growing bilateral MOC-MOC exchanges and exercises between Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.

• **Corruption:** The JCFMD is stuck: the force needs training and equipment to prove its competence, but the US government and even Jamaican entities are wary of wasting resources on a seemingly corrupt force.
Table 10. Summary of Jamaica’s maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMAIN AWARENESS</strong></td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>JDF: MOC at MACC HQ, not synced to JDFCG district HQs; radio challenges among MOC, vessels, and MPA; deploying BFT. JCF: Tracks vessels but limited communications from HQ to deployed craft.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>JDF: VHF comms capability ship-shore, ship-ship across range, with OPVs having OTH, but WhatsApp is preferred comm method; exploring Aeronet, but untrained at comms they currently have (Harris HF radios). JCF: Comms via mobile phones, comms lost outside range.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>JDF: 1x ISR MPA, frequently not mission capable; too few patrol vessels to conduct ISR patrols; coastal radar planned to come online in 2022 (coverage unclear).</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>JDF: 4x OPVs in total (1x not mission capable); 10x interceptors (2x not mission capable); MIO units operate in tandem with MPA for target location; well-trained in vessel ops but not VBSS; challenged maintenance and sustainment capabilities. JCF: Patrol in harbors, coves, and rivers with 10x interceptors (unclear how many are fully mission capable) and smaller craft. Limited will for interdiction operations (maritime police viewed as corrupt).</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>JDF: Recent loss of senior technicians deteriorated maintenance capability; limited sustainment budget. JCF: Conducts maintenance, including engine overhauls, at INL-funded facility; over 20 craft operational.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>Customs force: 27 enforcement personnel, plus a vetted unit of 4 full-time personnel. No interagency task force; good info sharing among units; very low seizures of imported and transshipped contraband.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAW ENFORCEMENT</strong></td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>JDF and JCF considered competent at gathering and handling evidence. Complex cases of maritime crime are infrequent: 2x in recent memory.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>DPP: 54 prosecutors in office of DPP and 2–4 prosecutors per parish; DPP establishing maritime crimes unit; major case backlogs because of staffing shortages across judicial sector. Maritime interdictions tried in same way as nonmaritime trafficking crime.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Signatory of all major conventions and protocols. Robust legal framework regarding maritime activities and crime.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTL COOP</strong></td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Robust info sharing with US and partners (JIATF-S) and Cayman Islands. Developing bilateral relations with Dominican Republic at a quick pace. Proposed coastal radar to feed to JIATF-S.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Occasional interoperability exercises with USCG and JDF; shiprider agreements used infrequently; recent MOC-MOC exchanges with Dominican Republic; participates in Tradewinds.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Kitts and Nevis is a relatively small nation (population 54,000) with a small **Royal Saint Kitts and Nevis Police Force** (RSKNPF, 400 personnel), **Saint Kitts and Nevis Defence Force** (SKNDF, 300 personnel, including reservists), and **Saint Kitts and Nevis Coast Guard** (SKNCG, 32 personnel), which is part of the defense force. Similar to its island neighbors, the country focuses its police and defense efforts on on-land threats. With only three boats and limited communications, the CG is only capable of conducting routine patrols and near-shore inspections (Figure 31).\(^{124}\) Sea blindness is apparent in a pattern of government neglect of maritime resources, territory, or policies compared to on-land issues. The SKNDF is chiefly a land force and allocates few resources to its CG. Law enforcement at sea is infrequent, and high court cases involving seaborne smuggling or trafficking are virtually unheard of, despite rising awareness of serious problems from the sea, including firearms smuggling, narcotics smuggling, and the trafficking of humans (often headed to Dominica or on to a French territory). Without radars, sensors, or any kind of maritime intelligence, SKNDF and CG officers and personnel admit that they have little idea what is coming into their waters or onto their porous shores. The CG does have a new fully wired and comfortable operating and training center and barracks, and its leaders express optimism that the SKNDF is beginning to dedicate more resources to improving maritime security.

\(^{124}\) Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.
Figure 30. Saint Kitts and Nevis, location of key assets and capabilities

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.

a = 50 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

**Integrated command and control**

The division between the RSKNPF police force and the SKNDF, with the CG a subordinate unit, isolates the CG from the country’s central operational offices, such as police intelligence and counterdrug operations. The commissioner of police describes the CG as a patrol unit used to guard harbors and tourist yacht fleets and to conduct safety and rescue operations. C2 is centered on the police commissioner, with the defence force supporting the police by providing personnel and supporting operations when requested. Officials describe operational cooperation as good, in part because the community is so small that pulling together a joint operation with different police units, the CG, and customs (for example) is a matter of a few cellular calls among contacts. There is also a biweekly national security meeting that includes the executive officers of the police force, defence force, CG, customs, fisheries, emergency management, and other agencies. The CG C2 is rudimentary: a commanding officer overseeing a duty officer managing the radio and phone traffic.

**Communications**

The police and defence forces transmit informational and operational communications via cell phones, WhatsApp, or unencrypted VHF radios. The CG fleet has HF Harris radios, but they have not been operational for some time. Without them, the boats have a maximum communications range of 8 n.mi. using VHF radios or WhatsApp and stay close to the shore.

**Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**

With no radars, aircraft, or sensors, the SKNDF lacks any maritime surveillance ability aside from LOS vision from patrolling police on land or a patrol vessel. They rely on civilian reporting of unusual events or unknown individuals operating at sea.

**Maritime presence and operations**

**Patrol and interdiction**

The CG operates two SAFE Boats and one Zodiac, all of which are fully mission capable as of March 2022. It also possesses a working Boston Whaler boat on loan from the Ministry of Fisheries, but it is out of the water and unused. An old Sea Ark could be restored and used with much effort, but the CG has no plans to do so. With 21 personnel trained and available to serve on boat crews (out of 35 total personnel), the CG conducts two SAFE Boat patrols daily, one to the north of the island and the other to the south and on to Nevis, from its single base beside the Deep Water Port outside of Basseterre. The CG claims that its SAFE Boats can operate out
to 100 n.mi. and its Zodiac out to 50 n.mi., but they lose communications much closer in, so the defence force and the CG keep them close to shore. CNA observed a patrol ranging less than 3 n.mi. from the coast and believes that the SKNCG operates most frequently within its communications range. Without MDA and with limited communications, the CG does not conduct at-sea targeted interdictions.

**Maintenance**

The CG’s maintenance capability appears impressive, with four of its five boats operational (although CNA observed only two of the boats—the SAFE Boats—in operation). Many of its 35 personnel are described as trained technicians, including 8 who are competent at engine repair and maintenance, 2 welders who can conduct aluminum hull repairs, and 5 electricians. The CG has two logistics officers that work with the RSKNDF and the TAFT to acquire needed parts and supplies. The CG uses Manager Plus to monitor regular preventive maintenance, and the TAFT provides spare parts and upgrades as well as liaison support with US service providers.

**Port security**

Police and defence force officials describe port security as minimal both at the largely unregulated, smaller ports of entry for recreational vessels and at Deep Water Port, the country’s one commercial port. Deep Water Port operates a scanner, but it is frequently out of service and difficult to operate effectively. The nation’s customs agency, with around 80 personnel, has a presence at the port and a K9 unit. Once a year or so it finds illegal cargo at Deep Water Port, mostly when it receives an alert from an international source, such as IMPACS. Much of the smuggling is conducted via beaches or small docks around the islands.

**Maritime law enforcement**

**Investigation**

The RSKNPF typically treats all cases as on-land, regular police cases, even if they involve at-sea violations or illegality. Because most maritime criminal cases involve minor violations of fishing or boating regulations, virtually all are resolved in magistrate courts with police prosecutors and end with small fines. According to experts and prosecutors, CG personnel and police have little or no training in maritime crime scene handling or evidence collection and often do not even impound boats or seize phones or records.
Prosecution

Maritime cases rise to the higher court for prosecution only if they are found to involve financial crimes or high-value narcotics or other smuggling. Prosecutors struggled to recall a single recent maritime-related case. The Saint Kitts and Nevis Directorate of Public Prosecutors (DPP) includes five attorneys, none with maritime law training. Case development and prosecutions take years, and prosecutors have a heavy workload. The DPP receives some international assistance and advising, but they report that they hardly ever face cases requiring international cooperation. Fundamentally the system is adequate. The World Justice Project ranks Saint Kitts and Nevis at 32 out of 139 countries globally in its exercise of criminal justice.125

Legislation and jurisprudence

Like its neighbor island nations, Saint Kitts and Nevis has several maritime-related laws and statutes that were written to align with international conventions, such as the Fugitive Law and Asset Recovery Law, but these are rarely exercised in the maritime context. The government’s overarching Maritime Act dates from 1984 and is considered out of date and lacking basic features critical to law enforcement against organized crime, such as witness handling and protection and definitions of conspiracy crimes,126 which greatly complicates its ability to prosecute these crimes effectively.

International cooperation

Information sharing

The CG and police receive and share information via PN groupings such as the OECS, RSS, and IMPACS and through interpersonal networks built up over years of meetings and conferences. CG and police leadership report receiving daily and weekly communications about targets or cases of interest in the region.

Interoperability

Saint Kitts and Nevis is relatively far from Barbados and many of the other islands of the Eastern Caribbean. In part because of this distance and in part because its forces seldom engage in maritime security, it has few opportunities to cooperate with partners beyond sharing information via cell phone calls. CG personnel participate in the Tradewinds exercise.

125 WJP Rule of Law Index.
126 Ralby, Maritime Trafficking in the Caribbean, 101-102.
but only with personnel, no assets. When the Harris radios are operating, the CG is willing to support RSS operations, but this has not occurred for several years.

**Summary**

As Table 11 shows, the SKNDF and SKNCG provide a minimal level of maritime law enforcement, chiefly routine patrols. The force has no MDA and relies on civilian or foreign tips for its intelligence. C2 is an issue because events and actions that would ordinarily be considered for maritime security response are instead handled by terrestrial forces once the target reaches the shore, sometimes without informing the CG. Despite the islands’ porous borders, the government and defence force seem satisfied with an unregulated maritime domain and with trying to address the seaborne trafficking of people, firearms, drugs, and other goods once they are ashore. Maritime law, case law, and prosecutors are largely irrelevant because cases involving maritime crimes and maritime law are rarely prosecuted.

**Key considerations**

Saint Kitts and Nevis faces many challenges to improving its maritime security and law enforcement capabilities. To be successful, it would need investments and progress in several interrelated areas:

- **MDA**: The government and security forces need to address their lack of MDA by acquiring coastal radar, an MPA (expensive to staff and maintain), or UAVs. Alternatively, CBSI and partners may consider the feasibility of expanding RSS capabilities or other multilateral initiatives to share the cost of increased ISR capabilities not just in Saint Kitts and Nevis but across the Eastern Caribbean. Because Saint Kitts and Nevis is the northernmost of the OECS and RSS member states, the RSS Air Wing requires the most time and effort to provide services there.

- **Sea blindness**: A significant increase in funding for maritime security and law enforcement capabilities would require a change in the mindset of police and defence leadership that maritime security—the deterrence and disruption of illegal activity conducted in the maritime domain, before they reach a shore—is an important component of public security and requires a capable, active CG or maritime police force. INL and US government partners should consider ways of delivering that message.

- **Intelligence for targeted patrols**: The CG would be far more effective if it conducted targeted patrols or interdictions of suspicious activity, not random patrolling. These activities would require a maritime intelligence cell that can analyze the most
prevalent entry or flow points of illicit maritime traffic and that has access to intelligence from the RSS, US agencies, and other international sources. Ideally, this cell would operate within the CG and help direct its patrol routes.

- **Communications:** The CG badly needs upgraded or repaired Harris or other HF radio systems in order to operate farther from the shore and on longer missions and to interoperate at sea with onshore and foreign partner forces.

- **Prosecutorial capacity:** An improved CG, trained in maritime crime scene management and evidence collection or with police on board who can perform these tasks, will create a need for laws and prosecutors better prepared for maritime-related criminal cases. A more proactive and targeted maritime security effort will likely lead to organized criminal networks, for which the current regulatory framework is poorly prepared.
Table 11. Summary of Saint Kitts and Nevis’ maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMA</td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>Police control information and flow, often bypass CG and handle “maritime” cases if/when boats reach shore. No coordinated patrols. CG OPs limited to inshore and on-land patrols coordinated by a duty officer via cell phone or unencrypted VHF communications.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Via cell phones or WhatsApp with max range of 8 n.mi. Harris radios not working at present (working with Harris and TAFT to fix them); use them when possible for 300+ n.mi. range. Communicate with police via VHF radio.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>No radars, MPAs, or other sensors. Rely on human intelligence and alerts from international sources. Aspire to receive coastal radar network.</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>2 working SAFE Boats and 1 working Zodiac. 35 total PAX; 21 available for OPs. Boston Whaler available but unused. 2 patrols daily, 1 north and 1 south, for spotting illegal activity among yachts and on beaches and for emergency assistance. Maintain capacity to respond to alerts. SAFE Boats capable of operating out to 100+ n.mi., Zodiacs 50 n.mi., but doubtful they do without comms. Doing much with little, but without MDA or intel, random patrols yield few results. Do not report any targeted at-sea interdictions.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>4/5 boats mission capable, 3 in water. Have 8 PAX who can repair engines, 2 welders (hull repairs), 5 electricians, 2 logistics officers. Use Manager Plus to monitor regular preventive maintenance. TAFT provides spare parts and upgrades, advising, and liaison with companies.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>No interagency task force, 1 scanner (status uncertain).</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Reported as adequate, but only 2 “maritime” cases prosecuted in recent memory (a narcotics seizure and an illegal entry/human trafficking case). Maritime cases investigated and prosecuted as on-land, regular police cases. Most maritime crime involves fishers or boat infractions that are resolved in magistrate courts with small fines.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>DPP has 5 attorneys, none with maritime law training. Prosecute crimes effectively but with heavy workload. Receive little international support but can share information and reach out when necessary.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTL COOP</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>CG and police receive information and share information via OECS, RSS, IMPACS, and interpersonal networks. Daily/weekly communications about targets or cases of interest.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Participate in Tradewinds, but only with personnel unless exercise is in East Caribbean. Can interoperate with RSS when Harris radios working, but this seldom occurs. Shiprider agreements with US and RSS, seldom practiced.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Saint Lucia

Saint Lucia and the United States are share an interest in combating drug trafficking and other international crime. Toward this end, the countries have concluded a maritime law enforcement agreement and several other bilateral treaties (e.g., regarding mutual legal assistance and law enforcement). Saint Lucia is a very small nation in the Eastern Caribbean’s Windward Islands archipelago that lies between Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the French overseas department of Martinique. Heavily reliant on tourism, Saint Lucia’s economy dropped drastically because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of international travel.

Saint Lucia functions as a transshipment point for traffickers moving guns, narcotics, and other illicit cargo from South America through the Caribbean Sea to mainland Europe. The country’s proximity to Martinique—which, given its status as a French overseas department, makes it part of France itself—helps make Saint Lucia an important waystation for criminal actors supplying the European market. In the words of one Lucian official, “Once you’re in Martinique, you’re in the EU.”

Killings by Saint Lucian police in 2011 led to a 10-year suspension of US foreign assistance. This aid cutoff resulted in an attrition of skills among Saint Lucia’s police force. However, as of 2020, many restrictions have been lifted and Saint Lucia is once again able to receive US assistance.

Saint Lucia has no regular military force and relies instead on the police to carry out security-related functions. In the maritime realm, these are the responsibility of the Marine Unit, a component of the Royal Saint Lucia Police Force (RSLPF). The Marine Unit currently consists of 54 personnel and is based in Castries, the country’s capital (Figure 32). The Marine Unit fleet

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127 Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.

consists of six vessels: two SAFE Boats, two Brunswicks, one Sea Ark, and one Mako. All vessels in the fleet were provided by the United States. Because of earlier restrictions on US assistance and delays from COVID-19, the SAFE Boats have not yet undergone the midlife refits that TAFT has completed for other Eastern Caribbean nations.
Figure 31. Saint Lucia, location of key assets and capabilities

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.
* 50 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

Integrated command and control

Currently, the Marine Unit is a branch of the RSLPF. As such, the structure of coordination of intelligence and operations is relatively simple; such coordination occurs under the supervision of the commissioner of police. Whether the commissioner of police or another representative from the RSLPF exercises C2 over the Marine Unit’s operations or whether operational C2 is delegated to the commander of the Marine Unit is unclear. However, Saint Lucia is in the midst of creating a new border control organization, which will bring together the Marine Unit and the Immigration and Customs departments. The legislation is being finalized by the attorney general, although when it will become law is unclear. Regular patrols are directed and managed by the Marine Unit commanding officer, mostly via satellite phones (when operational) or cell phones. The Marine Unit also runs a MOC located at its headquarters in Castries, which it staffs 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

Communications

Communications is a major challenge for the Marine Unit. Although it has access to VHF communications channels, they are frequently nonfunctional; hence, Marine Unit personnel resort to relying heavily on cell phones. This practice is less than ideal because cell phone range is limited to 15 n.mi. from the coast. When working with the Drug Squad, the Marine Unit uses police band radios (range unknown). At one time, the Marine Unit used satellite phones, but according to local sources, infrequent use led to a lapse in its subscription with the provider.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

Saint Lucia has radar capabilities, but they are currently severely limited. There are two radar sites on the island, one in the north and one in the south; the former is operational on only a part-time basis, whereas the latter is completely nonfunctioning. The Marine Unit does not handle maintenance for the radar systems, so it cannot fix the systems itself. As a result of this shortfall, the unit relies on a higher operational tempo of regular patrols and human intelligence. For example, the Marine Unit has found local fishers who are willing to report when they see suspicious activity.

In addition to its own intelligence, Saint Lucia relies on ISR provided through the RSS construct. Like the other RSS countries, Saint Lucia can request aerial support from the single air asset operated by the RSS (based in Barbados). The Marine Unit will often try to use this intelligence to get more specific information about developing threats. However, Lucian officials noted challenges with regard to optimizing use of the asset given capacity challenges.
Maritime presence and operations

**Patrol and interdiction**

The primary missions of the Marine Unit are supplying port security, providing SAR, fighting drug trafficking and other criminal activities, protecting the country’s territorial waters from illegal fishing, and delivering HA/DR. To carry out routine patrols and interdictions, the Marine Unit operates two SAFE Boats, two Brunswick vessels, one Sea Ark (Figure 33), and one Mako. All were provided by the United States. Because of the recently lifted restrictions on US assistance, TAFT has not yet been able to complete the midlife overhauls of the SAFE Boats that it has undertaken in other Eastern Caribbean nations.

**Maintenance**

The Marine Unit appears to be capable of conducting or providing for the conduct of basic maintenance. During the years that US assistance was restricted, Saint Lucia had no choice but to facilitate its own repairs. During the previous administration, the then prime minister procured new Mercury engines for Marine Unit SAFE Boats, demonstrating some ability to finance repairs and refurbishments. However, the Marine Unit likely lost capability during the cessation of US assistance. During a recent visit from TAFT (the first since the lifting of restrictions), TAFT personnel installed the new Manager Plus software program to monitor boat and engine use and to conduct regular preventive maintenance.

**Port security**

Port security is a significant challenge in Saint Lucia. The country lacks scanners, so inspections of containers must be completed by hand. Given the volume of trade, examining everything coming into the country is impossible. Saint Lucia also has robust informal trading networks, primarily with Martinique. Most of this trade is legal and provides a way for locals to trade goods across borders. However, criminals can easily slip a gun or a small amount of drugs into a shipment. Furthermore, Saint Lucia also benefits from something referred to as the "barrel program," in which the Lucian diaspora community donates goods to Saint Lucia around Christmas. However, this program provides another avenue for trafficking illegal...
goods. Some customs officials are suspected of being corrupt and enabling the traffic of illegal goods.

**Maritime law enforcement**

**Investigation**

CNA was unable to determine how proficient Marine Unit personnel are in their investigative abilities (managing an at-sea crime scene, gathering and handling evidence, and sustaining chain of custody). Marine Unit personnel can place individuals under arrest. Whether the proposed creation of the Border Control department will facilitate better investigative processes through the collocation of the Marine Unit with Customs and Immigration remains to be seen.

**Prosecution**

Similar to other Eastern Caribbean nations, Saint Lucia has a two-tiered justice system: a lower magistrate level and a high court. Although processes are in place to enable prosecutions, capacity is a major challenge, as in other Eastern Caribbean nations. There is a large backlog of court cases, resulting in the number of people on remand outnumbering the number serving prison sentences. There are some examples of individuals on remand for up to 10 years. This backlog can lead to what some Lucians perceive as “slaps on the wrist,” such as light sentences and minimal fines.

The asset forfeiture process in Saint Lucia is slow and inefficient. Officials estimate that after court proceedings have been completed, the government will end up forfeiting only 1 out of 10 seized vessels involved in maritime crimes. According to police officials, this results in the same vessels being used to commit maritime crimes repeatedly. Both police officers and the DPP mentioned that a streamlined asset forfeiture process is needed, which would allow the Marine Unit to sell off (or repurpose for its own use) seized vessels more quickly.129

**Legislation and jurisprudence**

Saint Lucia has legislation specific to crimes in the maritime domain. According to Lucian officials, the Maritime Areas Act is satisfactory to enable enforcement of the law. Furthermore, Saint Lucia has recently worked with UNODC to change existing legislation on

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129 The World Justice Project ranked Saint Lucia in the middle of its criminal justice index, above Suriname and Jamaica but below The Bahamas and Saint Kitts and Nevis. *WJP Rule of Law Index.*
arms possession to better differentiate trafficking from possession. The proper legal framework appears to be in place.

**International cooperation**

**Information sharing**

The RSLPF and the Marine Unit share information both via the RSS construct and outside it. Lucian officials have relationships with the Eastern Caribbean nations at the police commissioner level. For example, the RSLPF works closely with the gendarmerie in Martinique. If an issue rises above the commissioner level, it goes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to facilitate cooperation and information sharing.

**Interoperability**

The RSLPF works with other countries via the RSS construct by providing assets as well as relying on the assets of others. When natural disasters occur in the area, the RSLPF maintains a team on standby to deploy with the RSS. Furthermore, in cases in which Saint Lucia cannot address a maritime issue on its own, it will work with another country that can (e.g., Saint Vincent with its longer range OPV). That said, the processes by which the Marine Unit works with others and their effectiveness is unclear.

**Summary**

As Table 12 shows, the RSLPF, through the Marine Unit, conducts maritime operations ranging from routine patrols to interdictions to basic rescue missions. But the force lacks sufficient ISR; its vessels are aging; and senior, experienced personnel are retiring. Moreover, the asset forfeiture process needs reform, and the courts are overwhelmed with cases.

**Key considerations**

- **ISR**: Saint Lucia’s lack of effective coastal radar coverage renders the country partially blind (or at the very least, myopic) in terms of understanding the maritime threat environment. Improving this capability requires significant investments in equipment and training that are likely beyond the country’s resources and political will.
- **Port security**: Customs officials take a desultory approach (whether through understaffing, corruption, the desire to protect economically important trade, or some combination of these factors) when dealing with less-than-formal interisland trade. Insecurity at the port is a particularly thorny problem involving a lack of equipment,
understaffing, corruption, and other factors. But as with other Eastern Caribbean countries, customs duty is a significant source of revenue for the government, so a financial incentive exists for Saint Lucian officials to recognize the problem of lack of port security. Meeting this challenge should be a priority for the United States.

- **Additional vessels**: Like US security partners the world over, Saint Lucians seek more equipment—in Saint Lucia’s case, an 87-ft decommissioned USCG vessel, perhaps under the EDA program. But although the Marine Unit has demonstrated some maintenance and repair capabilities, whether the force would be able to sustain a vessel of this size and type is unclear. SAFE Boats, whose maintenance can be supported by TAFT, are a better option.

- **Training**: Marine Unit officials also expressed a strong desire to increase the number of training opportunities for Marine Unit personnel. These training opportunities, which were halted because of Leahy vetting issues, are critical for both building the skills of the force and improving morale and bolstering an appreciation for Saint Lucia’s relationship with the United States.
Table 12. Summary of Saint Lucia’s maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMAIN AWARENESS</td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>Integration with the RSVGPF facilitates interagency cooperation under the commissioner’s office. Proposal of new Border Control organization may facilitate streamlined C2 among relevant departments, although gained/lost efficiency yet to be determined.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Marine Unit struggles with technology challenges. Satellite phone system is currently nonoperational. VHF communications channels experience issues. Use of cell phones is prevalent, but service is lost 15 n.mi. offshore.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Saint Lucia has a partially operating radar capability, enabling limited intelligence. The Marine Unit has attempted to compensate by developing human intelligence sources, including fishers.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>This capability was not possible to determine, but, given the small size of the Marine Unit fleet and its communications challenges and other shortfalls, it is likely low.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>The cessation of US assistance necessitated organic maintenance for the Marine Unit fleet. Marine Unit has a decent covered workspace. Marine Unit recently provided with Manager Plus to monitor regular preventive maintenance. However, more serious problems require outside assistance.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>Saint Lucia lacks functional scanners at port facilities, a situation made worse by the high levels of informal trade that occur. Furthermore, there are suspicions of corrupt port official activity.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Unknown.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>Saint Lucia suffers from similar capacity challenges as other Eastern Caribbean nations. A large backlog of cases leads to delays and often to minimal sentencing for all but the most serious offenders. Delays result in criminals getting their vessels back only to commit more maritime crimes.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Existing legislation seems to be generally sufficient for addressing crimes committed in the maritime domain. Furthermore, Saint Lucia has received support on strengthening legislation to focus on illicit trafficking.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTL COOP</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>RSLPF shares information inside and outside the RSS construct. It has developed a close relationship with Martinique’s police force, the Gendarmerie nacionale.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>RSLPF has a standby force to assist in RSS operations for natural disasters. Alternatively, Saint Lucia relies on support from others when its assets are insufficient (if an operation needs a larger vessel). Exact level of interoperability unknown but likely low.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.

*a Note: RSVGPF = Royal Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force."
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

The United States and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) are partners in countering narcotics and combating other local, regional, and transnational threats. SVG is a small country in the Windward Islands chain that lies between Grenada to the south and Saint Lucia to the north. The country’s gross domestic product is among the lowest in the region. SVG, heavily reliant on international visitors, has suffered economically since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The eruption of the Soufrière volcano on the country’s main island in April 2021 created additional economic and social disruptions.

SVG serves as a logistical stepping-stone for criminal actors moving their products (most importantly, firearms and narcotics) to markets outside the region, particularly Western Europe. SVG does not have a standing military and relies instead on The Royal Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force (RSVGPF) and its maritime force, the RSVGPF Coast Guard (CG), to counter criminal and other security threats.

The CG currently consists of 104 personnel and is headquartered at the SVG Ship Calliaqua Base on Saint Vincent, the main island, and has two satellite bases on the islands of Canouan and Bequia in the Grenadines (Figure 33). The CG is relatively large compared to the CGs of other Eastern Caribbean nations. The fleet consists of eight vessels: three SAFE Boats, one RHIB 920, one Sea Ark, one 40m Damen OPV, and two small boats for SAR missions. Several vessels were down for maintenance during CNA’s visit. The range of the Damen vessel (1800 n.mi.) enables offshore CG operations.

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130 Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.
Figure 33. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, location of key assets and capabilities

ROYAL SAINT VINCENT and the GRENADINES POLICE FORCE (RSVGPF)
RSVGPF Coast Guard Unit
SVG Ship Calliaqua Base, Saint Vincent

104 PAX

| 1x 40 mm Damen | 1x Sea Ark | 3x SAFE Boats

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.

* = 50 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

Integrated command and control

The CG is a branch of the RSVGPF and so falls under the authority of the commissioner of police. Whether the commissioner himself exercises C2 over CG operations or whether operational C2 is delegated to the commander of the CG is unclear. Regular patrols are directed and managed by the CG commanding officer, mostly via Harris radios (when operational) or cell phones. The CG also operates a MOC at its headquarters in Calliaqua, which it staffs 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. A second MOC on the island of Canouan also reportedly operates 24/7.

Communications

Communications is a major challenge for the CG. Although the CG has access to VHF communications channels as well as Harris radios, both have issues that limit their effectiveness. The CG has only one operational radio bay station. Furthermore, the geography of the country (with its many valleys) can limit VHF use. These challenges affect both ship-ship communications as well as ship-shore communications. As a result of these challenges, cell phones are prevalent as a means of communication.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

The CG used to rely on information provided by a fixed radar station located at the SVG CG base in Calliaqua. However, the radar system has not been working for some time because of a maintenance issue. The radar system is based on an Israeli coastal surveillance system but was funded by Trinidad and Tobago as part of an ICSS initiative. Maintenance issues must be handled by Trinidad and Tobago, whereas updates to the system must be done by Israel. These shared responsibilities have resulted in delays to keeping the system operational, as evidenced by the system’s current nonoperational status.

In addition to the currently nonoperational radar system, SVG relies on ISR provided through the RSS construct. Like the other RSS countries, SVG can request aerial support from the single air asset operated by the RSS (based in Barbados).


132 Some countries in the region use OPVs for ISR purposes; CNA could not determine whether the SVG CG does so.
Maritime presence and operations

Patrol and interdiction

The CG operates three SAFE Boats, one RHIB 920, one Sea Ark, one 40m Damen OPV (Figure 35), and two humanitarian assistance craft. The SAFE Boats, RHIB, and Sea Ark were provided by the United States. SVG procured the 40m Damen vessel on its own, and Japan provided the two humanitarian assistance boats. TAFT recently conducted midlife overhauls on the SAFE Boats. During our visit, the RHIB was down for maintenance, and one of the SAFE Boats was nonoperational because of cracks in the keel.

Figure 34. SVG Coast Guard Damen OPV

Source: CNA.

CG missions and operations include routine patrols, interdictions, humanitarian assistance, marine environment and natural resource protection, and port security, which is conducted in accordance with the International Ship and Port Facility code. The CG estimates that it spends a minimum of 40 hours per week underway conducting all types of operations. A normal patrol might last between 4 and 6 hours. A member of the Drug Squad will sometimes accompany the CG on operations.

Maintenance

The CG appears to be capable of conducting or providing for the conduct of basic maintenance. The SVG government finances the maintenance budget for the CG fleet, and the CG has its own fully enclosed workshop. The CG claims that, for the most part, it can handle
maintenance issues when unexpected problems arise. For instance, the CG asked TAFT for permission to weld keel cracks in its SAFE Boats because TAFT was taking a long time to facilitate the repairs and the CG knew it could do it itself for a lower cost. That said, police representatives acknowledge that there are still maintenance issues, specifically sourcing spare parts that are not produced on the island. TAFT recently installed the new Manager Plus software program, which the CG uses to monitor boat and engine use and help ensure regular preventive maintenance.

**Port security**

CNA did not have the opportunity to examine port security in any depth.

**Maritime law enforcement**

**Investigation**

The capability of CG personnel at managing an at-sea crime scene, gathering and handling evidence, and sustaining chain of custody is uncertain. CG personnel can place individuals under arrest. However, how proficient CG personnel are in their investigative abilities is unknown.\(^{133}\)

**Prosecution**

Similar to other Eastern Caribbean nations, SVG has a two-tiered justice system comprising a lower magistrate level and a high court. Most maritime criminal cases are handled at the magistrate level. Although we were told that magistrates should be able to handle the workload given appropriate time management, cases can still take a very long time to work through the system. Although police officials are generally satisfied with the level of cooperation between the CG and the prosecutors, they admit that there is always room for improvement. At the high court level, prosecutors are so busy that they cannot specialize in different aspects of the law. The goal is to complete due process on all cases within 3 to 5 years, but this goal is not always achieved. Having enough capacity in all levels and duties of the courts remains a significant challenge.

\(^{133}\) That said, the World Justice Project’s rankings of the criminal justice systems in 128 countries places SVG relatively high, both regionally and globally, just below Barbados and above Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. *WJP Rule of Law Index.*
Legislation and jurisprudence

By all accounts, legislation and jurisprudence in SVG are acceptable. The relevant laws are in place to enable prosecution of maritime crime, and the justice system is set up in a way that is consistent with other countries in the region. However, there is no specific maritime act, and there may not be clear distinction between cases that can be heard at the magistrate level and cases that require the high court.

International cooperation

Information sharing

The RSVGPF and its CG share information via the RSS construct. According to officials, information sharing is excellent but occurs mostly through informal means such as WhatsApp and cell phones. These informal processes are strengthened by interpersonal relationships, often developed through engagements and training involving CG officials from different countries, including law enforcement training sponsored by RSS and SOUTHCOM.

Interoperability

The CG’s level of interoperability is unknown, although it is likely quite limited. We were told that the force conducts joint operations with other countries, although this happens mostly spontaneously. Apparently, the coast guard’s Damen vessel has been used to support RSS operations in the past. However, the processes by which the CG works with others and their effectiveness is unclear.

Summary

As Table 13 shows, the RSVGPF CG conducts maritime operations ranging from routine patrols to interdictions to basic rescue missions. The CG fleet is larger than that of some Eastern Caribbean neighbors, and with the addition of one OPV, the CG says it can conduct operations up to 180 n.mi. offshore. Maintenance capability seems adequate, although sourcing spare parts is a challenge. The CG interacts most frequently with other RSS countries and the US (through TAFT). Information sharing occurs mostly via informal means such as WhatsApp.

Key considerations

- **MDA**: Vincentian officials hope to acquire a UAV to enhance their ISR capabilities, which may be a relatively cost-effective way to reduce the country’s apparent lack of MDA.
• **Criminal justice training**: Greater attention should be given to helping SVG develop more capacity, including specialists in maritime crime, to carry out prosecutions and reduce the backlog of criminal cases.
Table 13. Summary of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines’ maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>INLDOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMAIN AWARENESS</td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>CG integration with the RSVGPF facilitates interagency cooperation under the police commissioner’s office. CG operations (patrols) are managed by the CG. Drug Squad representatives frequently join as shipriders on CG vessels. CG operates a 24/7 MOC.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>CG struggles to maintain and use Harris radios consistently. VHF comms also have issues, creating blind spots. Heavy use of cell phones and WhatsApp.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>No functional radar, MPAs, or other sensors. Rely on human intelligence and alerts from international sources (such as through the RSS construct).</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>CG has 8 vessels: 3x SAFE Boats, 1x RHIB 920, 1x Sea Ark, 1x Damen OPV, 2x small humanitarian craft, and is staffed at 104 personnel. The CG spends approximately 40 hours per week underway, conducting routine operations (patrols, security for cruise ships, etc.) as well as interdictions and humanitarian assistance missions when required.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>Capable of routine maintenance and repairs of SAFE Boats, RHIB, and Sea Ark. Decent covered workspace. Uses Manager Plus to monitor regular preventive maintenance. However, more serious problems require outside assistance. CG often struggles to get spare parts, which are not produced in SVG.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>Unknown.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Unknown.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>DPP office has 4 public prosecutors, too few given the number of cases at any given point. At the magistrate level (where most maritime cases end up), courts are overworked, resulting in long backlogs. Defendants often receive fines to help ameliorate overcrowding in prison. Cases can take years to work their way through the justice system.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/ Jurisprudence</td>
<td>There is no overall maritime act to clarify jurisdictions and authorities, nor is there a maritime registry (of vessels). No clear distinction or threshold between magistrate cases and high court cases. That said, officials did not mention legislation being a limiting factor.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTL COOP</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>RSVGPF and CG share information and coordinate actions via the RSS construct. Information sharing is often informal in nature via WhatsApp and through personal relationships developed in training engagements. SVG also maintains ties with the DEA and SOUTHCOM.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>SVG conducts joint operations through the RSS construct, although mostly spontaneously. Apparently, the Damen OPV has been used for RSS missions. However, little evidence of true interoperability.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
The governments of the United States and Suriname have strengthened and deepened their ties in recent years, most notably in combating transnational crime. Although often seen as one of the Caribbean countries, the Republic of Suriname has no coastline on the Caribbean and is positioned between Guyana and French Guiana along the Atlantic Ocean on South America’s northeast corner. It is physically remote from the other Caribbean countries considered in this evaluation and until recently was politically isolated as well. A colony of the Netherlands until 1975, Suriname is the continent’s only Dutch-speaking country and is among South America’s smallest nations in terms of both land area and population. The country is rich in natural resources, including gold, fish, and timber, and there is growing foreign investment in offshore oil field development on the Guyana Shelf.

However, the country faces serious challenges, including endemic corruption, weak institutional development, and a commodity boom-bust cycle. The illegal extraction of gold has introduced considerable amounts of mercury, cyanide, and other poisons into the environment. Moreover, maritime security is under threat, particularly with respect to IUU fishing and, to a lesser extent, human trafficking. Finally, Suriname’s porous borders contribute to its role as a transshipment point for narcotics moving from other South American countries, including Colombia.

Suriname has three primary maritime security forces that report to three different ministries: the Coast Guard (under the Ministry of the Interior), the Navy (under the Ministry of Defense), and a police maritime unit (part of the Korps Politie Suriname, Suriname’s police corps, under the Ministry of Justice and Police). In addition, the quasi-public Maritime Authority of Suriname (MAS) has several security-related functions, including port security, and personnel

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137 The Korps Politie Suriname has other units specializing in threats that can have a maritime security dimension (e.g., financial crime, human trafficking, drug smuggling). See also INTERPOL, “Suriname,” INTERPOL, undated, accessed Apr. 18, 2022, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Member-countries/Americas/SURINAME.
with police powers to ensure compliance with maritime regulations. The coast guard appears to be the largest and most well-resourced of the three primary security forces.\(^{138}\)

The roles, missions, and functions of the three primary maritime security forces are overlapping. The coast guard’s responsibilities include maintaining security and safety on surface waters, underwater, and in the airspace over water out to the farthest reaches of the EEZ, 200 n.m.i. from the coast. The navy is nominally in charge of border security and riverine operations. Finally, the maritime police unit is also tasked with patrolling rivers and coastal waters and supporting the coast guard when vessels are interdicted.

During the past five years, INL support to Suriname has been limited and has focused largely on non-materiel assistance, for example, funding to support the UNODC CCP in Suriname, assistance to Surinamese prosecutors through the International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador, and $600,000 in funding to underwrite anti–money laundering activities. That said, INL has in the past provided equipment to maritime security forces. In 2017, INL bought two aluminum-hulled boats for the police maritime unit on the condition that officers received training, developed SOPs, and learned maintenance skills—all of which Suriname failed to do. INL provided no further aid, and the boats were left to decay. The US Embassy in Paramaribo remains skeptical about the purpose and utility of the police maritime unit—indeed, the embassy’s relationship with the police continues to be challenging. Although the coast guard is under the Ministry of the Interior, a legacy arrangement allows the embassy’s Military Liaison Office to provide training support. To date, such assistance has been minimal.

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\(^{138}\) Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.
Figure 35. Suriname, location of key assets and capabilities

Source: CNA using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.

a  = 50 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

**Integrated command and control**

CNA was unable to develop a clear picture of C2 arrangements within and between the country’s maritime security forces, but at least some level of cooperation appears to exist. For example, Surinamese officials said that a body called the Directorate of National Security (Directoraat van de Nationale Veiligheid) provides information to the maritime security forces on training opportunities offered by CARICOM, UNODC, and other organizations.

**Communications**

The coast guard has HF, VHF, and UHF radios, although none work consistently, for reasons unknown to the service. Crews use cell phones to communicate near shore; in deeper waters, they have to rely on satellite phones, which are extremely expensive to use. Whatever the location of vessels on patrol, ship-to-shore communications are impossible. The navy uses VHF radios and cell phones for communications (whether ship-to-shore communications are possible is unknown). The capabilities of the police maritime unit are unknown, but, given its small size and apparently minimal resources, the unit’s capabilities seem unlikely to be superior to those of the coast guard.

**Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**

The coast guard lacks ISR, including coastal radar, although it does hope to acquire drones to conduct maritime aerial surveillance. Colombia, Guyana, and France provide intelligence support, although the extent of that assistance could not be determined. The ISR capabilities of the navy and the police maritime unit could not be determined, but because they are principally riverine forces, their ISR is likely to rely much more on human intelligence from the community or on-land police intelligence.

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140 One coast guard officer said this was not in fact the case and that it was possible to use the MAS as a "bridge" for ship-to-shore communications; this capability was not confirmed during CNA’s visit.
Maritime presence and operations

Patrol and interdiction

The coast guard has three vessels, two of which are currently operational (Figure 36). There are 118 personnel total, 30 of whom can conduct operations. The remit of the coast guard extends out to 200 n.mi., although US embassy officials are skeptical that it can patrol beyond 50 to 60 n.mi. According to the coast guard, the service conducts two-night, three-day patrols in coastal waters near Guyana, where IUU fishing is a widespread threat. A senior Surinamese official said that the coast guard checks every fishing vessel it encounters to ensure that it is properly licensed and obeying maritime regulations. The coast guard provided no data on interdictions beyond pointing out that its last narcotics seizure at sea was in 2016. According to the navy, the service conducts regular but not daily patrols on the river (see Figure borders with Guyana and French Guiana. According to one Surinamese official, the maritime police unit can patrol on rivers and close to shore but is unable to operate offshore.

Maintenance

The coast guard says that it has technicians on staff who can monitor engine performance and conduct some routine maintenance and minor repairs and who are trained on electrical systems. For drydock and other major repairs, the service depends on a contracted shipyard. The companies that provide the coast guard with its vessels are said to give good support, including upfront payments.

Port security

According to a senior US official, the MAS is a highly professional organization. However, responsibility for container-related security rests with the customs service. The CCP has been in Suriname since 2012, when the country created a joint task force of security agencies at the port in Paramaribo. Customs has made some drug seizures—including 4.5 tons of cocaine in
the past 10 years. Tensions exist between the joint task force and the customs service, whose officers reportedly resist being “second guessed.” Scanners remain an issue, according to US embassy officials, who say that the port’s first large scanner (apparently donated by China) was incorrectly installed and failed to operate properly. A new operational scanner is reportedly at the port, but US officials remain skeptical that it works.

Maritime law enforcement

Investigation

When the coast guard seizes a vessel suspected of involvement in a criminal offense, the service calls in the maritime police, who in turn draw on the Special Crimes Unit, which works with the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to build a case. The maritime police and the Special Crimes Unit are reportedly competent in dealing with witnesses and evidence, although maritime crime scenes are very rare, likely partially due to the relatively limited presence of maritime security vessels at sea.

Prosecution

Less serious maritime-related crimes, such as small-scale IUU fishing, are typically treated as misdemeanors and punished with fines. Many who wind up in court are first-time offenders. Discussions with US government and Surinamese officials suggest that the country lacks judicial and prosecutorial capacity. For example, none of the three prosecutors who are assigned to the “maritime desk” at the DPP have received special training in maritime crime. Moreover, there is a notable backlog of criminal cases, and detention centers operated by the police are overcrowded.

Legislation and jurisprudence

According to the US embassy, Suriname’s criminal code includes all the necessary provisions for prosecuting crimes committed in the country’s waters. Suriname is also party to

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several international agreements. For example, the country ratified UNCLOS in 1998 and since then has on several occasions been in arbitration with Guyana over maritime border issues—an increasingly sensitive subject because of hydrocarbon potential in the Guyana-Suriname Basin.\textsuperscript{143}

**International cooperation**

**Information sharing**

The election of a new government in 2020, and a belief that the country had put behind the violent and chaotic era of former president Dési Bouterse (inter alia, convicted of murder in 2019), has created new opportunities for international engagement. In the realm of security, such opportunities include a MOU between Suriname and Guyana and a rewritten and expanded MOU with the French. A long-standing MOU with SOUTHCOM allows personnel exchanges and joint training. Suriname has also seconded personnel to the RIFC, a subagency of CARICOM IMPACS in Port of Spain and has participated in the Tradewinds exercises.

**Interoperability**

Suriname seems to have few international cooperation activities ongoing with Caribbean island countries, although Suriname’s participation in activities such as Tradewinds may lead to enhanced interoperability with its friends and partners. The Surinamese maritime forces’ international engagement is meager except on its bordering rivers. This lack of engagement makes sense considering that aside from its neighbor Guyana, Suriname’s next-closest CBSI partner is Trinidad and Tobago, 500 n.mi. distant.

**Summary**

As shown in Table 14, Suriname’s three maritime security services and its criminal justice system face challenges. Like many other countries in this evaluation, communications and ISR remain poor, marine patrolling is limited, and port security is problematic. On a brighter note, the election of 2020 seems to have contributed to an improved international climate for Suriname and increased the potential for enhanced cooperation with friends and partners inside and outside the region. By all accounts, Suriname’s borders are porous. Given the

country’s role as a transshipment point for drugs and other illegal material and the widespread IUU fishing along the Atlantic coast, tightening up controls is an obvious priority. Unfortunately, little is known about the country’s ability to patrol its rivers (which serve as borders with Guyana to the north and French Guiana to the south) or indeed its coastal waters.

**Key considerations**

During CNA’s site visit, several issues arose that are worth further consideration by INL:

- **Prosecutorial capacity**: Although Suriname’s criminal code appears adequate, the DPP lacks prosecutors who are specialists in maritime crime, which reflects a broader lack of prosecutorial capacity and a judicial system that is overwhelmed with cases.

- **Port security**: As with many other countries we evaluated, port security is lacking, despite earlier assistance by UNODC. This shortfall likely reflects a combination of lack of technological skills, poor training, staffing shortages, and corruption.

- **MDA**: Poor ISR and communications across the region are enduring challenges, and Suriname is no exception. Enhanced information and intelligence sharing with other countries could help overcome these shortfalls, as could the use of aerial drones for maritime surveillance.

- **Riverine environment**: Rivers define the borders between Suriname and its two neighbors on the so-called Wild Coast of South America—a unique topographical feature among the countries considered in this evaluation. Yet to what degree Suriname can police these waterways is unclear. Illegal gold mining in and around major rivers appears to be widespread, and it seems safe to assume that other criminal activity takes place in these interior waters. Developing a more complete picture of the riverine environment is a logical next step in any effort to enhance Suriname’s maritime security.

- **Resource limitations**: Perhaps unsurprisingly, the priorities of the US and Suriname differ—the former focuses heavily on combating the trade in narcotics, whereas the latter places Venezuelan encroachment on its resources (as well as a potential invasion) and IUU fishing at the top of its security agenda. These priorities overlap, of course, but a relatively poor country like Suriname will unlikely be able to devote significant resources to maritime security, which is very expensive. That said, this situation could change if hydrocarbon extraction leads to large increases in government revenues and a sense that protecting offshore operations requires more robust measures to promote security in the maritime domain.
Table 14. Summary of Suriname’s maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMAIN AWARENESS</strong></td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>CNA was unable to develop a clear picture of C2 arrangements within and between the country’s maritime security forces. But at least some level of cooperation appears to exist.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>CG has HF, VHF, and UHF radios, although none work consistently. Crews use mobile phones to communicate near shore; in deeper waters, they rely on satellite phones. Ship-to-shore communications are impossible.</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>CG lacks ISR, including coastal radar. Countries in the region provide intelligence support, although the extent of that assistance is unknown. The ISR capabilities of the police maritime unit and the navy are unknown.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **PRESENCE & OPERATIONS**   | Patrol and Interdiction                  | 3x total patrol vessels (1x 32 m patrol vessel + 2x 24m patrol vessels)—only 2 vessels currently operational. Personnel total: 118; 88 administrative, 30 operational.  
CG patrol range supposedly 200 n.mi. but 50–60 n.mi. is more likely.  
Two-night, three-day patrols in coastal waters near Guyana. Regular navy patrols on river border with French Guyana and French Guiana. Maritime police able to patrol on rivers and near shore but not offshore. | MED  | ●   |     |
|                             | Maintenance                              | CG has some capability to conduct maintenance and minor repairs. Major repairs are conducted by a contracted shipyard.                                                                                     | MED  | -   | ●   |
|                             | Port Security                            | MAS is described as “highly professional.” There is a large scanner at the port (which replaced an improperly installed Chinese-made device) but US officials remain skeptical that it works. | MED  | -   | -   |
| **LAW ENFORCEMENT**         | Investigation                            | The maritime police and Special Crimes Unit are reportedly competent in handling witnesses and evidence.                                                                                                   | MED  | -   | -   |
|                             | Prosecution                              | Relatively minor crimes are typically treated as misdemeanors and are punished with fines. Many who wind up in court are first-time offenders. The DPP has no specialists in maritime crime, although it does have three prosecutors assigned to the maritime desk. | MED  | ●   |     |
|                             | Legislation/Jurisprudence                | Suriname’s criminal code has all the provisions required for prosecuting maritime-related offenses.                                                                                                           | MED  | ●   |     |
| **INTL COOP**               | Information Sharing                      | MOUs with Guyana, France, and the US suggest that there is a foundation, and perhaps a framework, for information sharing, although the extent and nature of such sharing could not be determined. | LOW  | -   | -   |
|                             | Interoperability                          | No direct evidence, although Suriname’s participation in Tradewinds may lead to enhanced interoperability.                                                                                              | LOW  | -   | ●   |

Source: CNA.
Trinidad and Tobago

Trinidad and Tobago is the southernmost of the lesser Antilles, situated between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, and is a dual-island nation only 8 miles off the coast of Venezuela with Guyana 140 miles to the southeast. The country is prosperous—its per capita gross domestic product is among the highest in the region—with an economy dominated by energy production and downstream industrial use. However, it faces considerable public debt, increasing gang violence, and corruption among police officers and customs officials.

Trinidad and Tobago also serves as an entrepôt and regional hub for trafficking in drugs (notably cocaine from Colombia and Venezuela destined for the European and North American markets), persons (particularly Chinese and Venezuelan nationals seeking local employment), firearms and ammunition (including high-powered weapons, primarily from the United States), and contraband, as well as IUU fishing.

Trinidad and Tobago has three maritime security forces: (1) the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard (TTCG), (2) the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Marine Unit (TTPS-MU), and the Customs & Excise Marine Interdiction Unit (C&E-MIU) (Figure 38). The TTCG is the largest and best equipped of these forces, with several offshore-capable larger vessels, but its role in supporting or executing law enforcement actions is controversial. These forces have overlapping (and some say competing) roles and missions with respect to border and maritime security, counterdrug operations, smuggling, and other criminal activities offshore. The C&E-MIU has the broadest law enforcement authorities and adequate capabilities for inshore patrolling and port inspections. The newly formed TTPS-MU is purported to have chiefly a riverine patrol mission, but its only boat is not well designed for that environment.

During the past five years, INL has provided little to no support to these forces, although the coast guard does receive assistance through the US Embassy’s Military Liaison Office. According to US and local sources, INL remains skeptical about the purpose and utility of the TTPS-MU.

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144 Most information presented in this country report was collected during discussions with PN officials and experts and US officials during our data collection visits. To preserve the anonymity of our sources, we do not cite the individuals or specific conversations. When the source of an item of information is not provided in a footnote, the reader can assume it is from one of these subject matter expert interactions.

145 Trinidad and Tobago, unlike other countries discussed in this report, does not participate in SOUTHCOM’S CBSI TAFT, which aims to improve maintenance and operational readiness among select maritime forces.
Figure 37. Trinidad and Tobago, location of key assets and capabilities

Source: CNA based on IISS Military Balance, using Mapbox OpenStreet Map base.

* = 50 PAX. See rest of country chapter for further details on other icons.
Maritime domain awareness

Integrated command and control

The TTCG purports to have a good maritime operational picture from the nation’s network of radars. It monitors the information and feed and alerts a multiagency National Fusion Operations Center when it perceives cause for a maritime engagement action. With approval from the agency, the TTCG then deploys its forces or those of the C&E-MIU or the TTPF-MU, depending on the nature of the threat. The C&E-MIU says that it has good working relationships with other maritime security agencies. But it is worth noting that the TTPF and TTCG are riven by significant intraservice and interservice rivalries. Coordination is said to take place through informal and personal contacts as much as through institutional channels.

Some Trinidadian police and government officials expressed concern that the TTCG, as the dominant and most active maritime force, is not well trained or designed for constabulary missions and desire a greater role for maritime police in operations. They point to incidents of suspects and witnesses receiving harsh treatment by TTCG personnel and to a February 2002 incident when TTCG personnel opened fire on a boat carrying Venezuelan migrants, severely wounding a woman and killing her nine-month-old baby.

Communications

The TTCG reports that its Harris radios are operational, as are its VHF systems. Whether the TTCG is forced to use mobile phones for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications could not be independently confirmed. The C&E-MIU uses unencrypted VHF radios, Motorola Astro radios and, most frequently, mobile phones. What equipment the TPSS-MU uses is unknown.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

The coast guard operates an island-wide network of coastal radars that are said to provide excellent coverage of the islands’ EEZ (although no specific range was given because of the sensitivity of the information). The radars are described as a “national asset,” and all the information is shared with the multi-ministry National Fusion Operations Center.

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Maritime presence and operations

**Patrol and interdiction**

Trinidad and Tobago's largest fleet is that of the TTCG, with two Austal Cape class 58-m OPVs, four Speyside class OPVs (Damen Stan Patrol 5009 OPVs), two Point Lisas class fuel supply craft (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009), and eight IPVs (six Scarlet Ibis class (Austal 30m) and two Gaspar Grande class), as well as dozens of small interceptor boats (see Figure 39).

It also has an 82-m long-range patrol vessel donated by China that is not fully capable and used only for training purposes. According to the TTCG, the two largest ships can operate for up to two weeks at sea, allowing patrols and operations across the islands' EEZ. The Damen OPVs can operate for up to seven days and out to 100 n.mi. (not confirmed independently). The two 50-m fuel/logistics vessels are capable of long-range (not specified) seven-day operations in support of the other ships. Some but not all TTCG vessels can operate at night with lights and radar (also not confirmed independently). The TTCG operates at five bases, three on Trinidad and two on Tobago.

The C&E-MIU, with its two smaller SAFE Boats and two Boston Whalers (Figure 40), claims to conduct two- to six-hour patrols two to three times a day, although one senior C&E-MIU officer said patrols were carried out only once every 24 hours. The TTPS-MU has only one fully mission capable craft. Although the service claims that it can patrol for two to five hours, night or day, given the lack of radar and spotlights, nighttime operation seems unlikely. Moreover, although the TTPS-MU

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is meant to conduct riverine patrols, it does not do so because its one boat is “inappropriate” for river operations.

**Maintenance**

The TTCG would not provide any information on maintenance and readiness, although it did say that there was a dedicated maintenance facility at Staubles Bay. Indeed, the service treated as “close hold” relatively mundane data about personnel, patrol times, and training. The TTPS-MU can conduct basic maintenance, including fiberglass-hull repairs and receives assistance from the TTCG crew. For its part, the C&E-MIU has a maintenance facility at Point Fortin, although the extent of its capabilities is unknown. None of the forces expressed that maintenance or logistics of their vessels are a problem.

**Port security**

As with other nations in the regions, customs is an important source of revenue for the government of Trinidad and Tobago. Security at ports in all its dimensions should be a national priority. However, according to various sources, corruption is consistently a problem despite efforts by UNODC (among others) to combat it. Customs officers are said to routinely accept bribes. Container scanners are often broken or employed only intermittently, as are CCTV systems. Such shortfalls encourage and enable corrupt practices.

**Maritime law enforcement**

**Investigation**

The TTCG sometimes mishandles evidence and suspects, which has compromised eventual prosecutions. Police are undertrained in maritime crime and are reluctant to use electronic surveillance, despite having the legal authority to do so, and no SOPs exist for handling confidential informants. Moreover, forensics (both physical and digital) and indeed the investigative process overall are highly time consuming, and these delays contribute to the drawn-out nature of court proceedings. Analysis by the World Justice Project assigns Trinidad and Tobago a relatively low score for criminal justice in general.¹⁴⁹

**Prosecution**

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has a staff of 44 prosecutors, none of whom specializes in maritime crime. The system is plagued by delays, a shortage of financial resources and personnel, and what one legal official terms “a culture of adjournment and lack

¹⁴⁹ *WJP Rule of Law Index.*
of urgency.” Coordination among agencies is lacking; in the judgment of the office of the DPP, the TTPS and TTCG deeply distrust each other and often refuse to share important information.

### Legislation and jurisprudence

Trinidad and Tobago, according to the DPP, has adequate maritime legislation, but much of it is not used or applied, which presents challenges because serious cases of crime that sometimes occurs on the water, such as human trafficking, are on the rise. According to a regional analysis report, the country has the strongest counterdrug laws and countersmuggling laws in the region. Its regulatory framework includes numerous specific acts or laws addressing maritime violations.150

### International cooperation

#### Information sharing

Trinidad and Tobago is an active participant in CARICOM IMPACS, contributing staff from the TTPF, TTCG, and Strategic Services Agency. The TTCG has bilateral informal shiprider arrangements with Guyana. The TTPS also has a robust engagement with INTERPOL. The coast guard provides training to other countries in the region, has hosted a regional UNODC training conference, and participates in Tradewinds.

#### Interoperability

No direct evidence of interoperability with foreign forces was discovered, and TTCG and TTPF-MIU officers did not describe any cooperation with neighbor forces beyond information exchange. The coast guard regularly participates in Tradewinds, however, so we can assume at least a minimal ability for communication and coordination.

### Summary

As shown in Table 15, despite its impressive coast guard fleet, Trinidad and Tobago's three maritime security services and its criminal justice system face challenges. First and foremost, the prosperous nation’s propinquity to Venezuelan coastline to the south and west leads to a constant flow of illicit goods and migrants, occasionally involving organized crime. The TTCG, a defense force, has the most substantial resources, including an impressive collection of vessels. However, questions about patrols and other operations, maintenance,

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communications, and ISR remain unanswered. Corruption is reported to be a serious issue at the ports, and interagency tensions and distrust seem to undermine national maritime law enforcement efforts. Finally, the criminal justice system is plagued by resource shortages and other shortfalls, which contribute to the very protracted nature of investigations and court proceedings.

**Key considerations**

The following considerations describe clear deficiencies and areas of concern in Trinidad and Tobago’s maritime security and law enforcement efforts:

- **Interagency issues:** Trinidad and Tobago has serious interagency issues in terms of its maritime security and law enforcement forces. The TTCG is clearly dominant. The recently created TTPS-MU has an undefined mission, meager resources, and an uncertain future within a national police force undergoing changes in leadership. In CNA’s view, INL investments have better prospects of success in other areas, especially port security and training for the TTCG and TTPS-MU in SOPs for VBSS and evidence seizure and management.

- **Potential to be a leader in the region:** The TTCG seems willing and able to engage with Guyana, potentially with Suriname, and with other neighbor forces to provide joint training and dialogue. We share the concerns of others in Trinidad and Tobago about the professionalism and competence of TTCG staff, but a training and exchange program that incorporates trainers and experts from other Caribbean nations with competent coast guard forces (e.g., Panama, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Barbados) could give a boost to Trinidad and Tobago’s maritime forces as well as support lagging forces like those of Guyana and Suriname.

- **Prosecutorial deficiency:** Given the country’s struggle against corruption, INL’s and the country team’s training and advising for the DPP and support for prosecutors in sensitive, complex cases are well-conceived. As in many of the CBSI partners, capabilities for investigating and building complex, internationally scoped cases against financial crimes or trafficking networks are sorely needed.
### Table 15. Summary of Trinidad and Tobago’s maritime security and law enforcement capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Capability Type</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMAIN AWARENESS</strong></td>
<td>Integrated Command and Control</td>
<td>CG provides intel through a National Fusion Operations Center staffed by representatives from the country’s security institutions and designed to ensure integrated security practices. CG manages an OP center and directs the C&amp;E-MIU and the TTPF-MU in MIOs. These agencies have significant intra- and interservice rivalries that are personal as much as institutional.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>CG uses Harris radios and VHF radios. C&amp;E-MIU uses unencrypted VHF radios, Motorola Astro radios and mobile phones. TPSS-MU uses mobile phones.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>CG operates radars across virtually all maritime territory and monitors AIS feeds. It shares relevant information with C&amp;E-MIU and TTPS-MU.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td>Patrol and Interdiction</td>
<td>CG claims that its fleet of 6 ocean and coastal patrol craft are capable of multiday at-sea OPs with fuel resupply (2 ships), but we could not verify how often such OPs occur. Some CG boats can operate at night with lights and radar. Interdictions and at-sea seizures estimated at 10/year. C&amp;E-MIU and TTPS-MU conduct short daytime patrols. TTPS-MU’s boats are not appropriate for river OPs, their intended mission.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>CG has dedicated maintenance facilities, but CNA unable to verify conditions or competence. Four fully mission capable patrol vessels indicate satisfactory maintenance. Have access to contracted support from Damen and other providers. C&amp;E-MIU reports difficulties maintaining older Mercury engines. TTPS-MU receives maintenance support from CG.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Security</td>
<td>Port security operates scanners and CCTV, but anecdotal evidence suggests significant problems using the equipment consistently and effectively. Allegations of corruption.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAW ENFORCEMENT</strong></td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Competent generally but undertrained for maritime criminal evidence collection. Maritime criminal cases not common but occur. As defense force, CG sometimes mishandles evidence and suspects, complicating cases. TTPS-MU better trained but seldom involved until boat and evidence are onshore.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>DPP has a staff of 44 prosecutors, none of whom specializes in maritime crime. Prosecutors have huge backlog and workload, and system is famous for its slowness. Few maritime-related cases are prosecuted.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation/Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Relatively comprehensive and robust maritime laws, strongest countertrafficking laws in region. But enforcement is lacking.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTL COOP</strong></td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago participates actively in IMPACS, and the CG and police share information with Guyana and other partners, when appropriate. The TTPS has a robust engagement with INTERPOL.</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>CG has informal shiprider arrangement with Guyana, formal agreement with US. Participates in the Tradewinds exercise but not in actual operations in recent years. The CG provides training to other countries in the region; has hosted a regional UNODC training conference.</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Conclusion

This survey of the capabilities, and capability gaps, for maritime security and law enforcement of 12 of the CBSI PNs and 2 regional security constructs as of spring 2022 is meant as a companion document to our evaluation of INL’s CBSI maritime activities and investments.¹⁵¹ That evaluation analyzes the data on capabilities and integrates it into considerations regarding CBSI outcomes and challenges such as addressing sea blindness in several of the PNs, poor MDA, and corruption, particularly in regional commercial ports. Luckily, the Caribbean region has a relatively strong and long-standing commitment to regional data sharing and cooperation, including through the CARICOM and OECS frameworks.

We hope that this assessment of capabilities, along with that evaluation of INL CBSI efforts, contributes to the achievement of US objectives in the region and the strengthening of maritime security and safety and governance across the Caribbean.

¹⁵¹ Espach et al., *Evaluation of INL CBSI Maritime*, CUI.
Appendix A: Capability Rating Criteria

Table 16 explains CNA’s scale for rating estimated partner maritime security and law enforcement capabilities. The purpose is to clarify and standardize our simplified none, low, medium, and high ratings of capabilities by defining those categories with clear, demonstrable indicators. Even so, these indicators cannot capture well the variance that occurs within cases, such as temporary changes in policy or asset availability or the effects of weather or other external factors. These ratings are meant only as estimates of general capabilities at the time of our data collection (December 2021 to March 2022) for purposes of comparison across cases.
Table 16. Maritime security capabilities ratings descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Rtg.</th>
<th>Rating Description (Indicators)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>DOMAIN AWARENESS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>AWARENESS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong> Staffed and operational MOC with integration of intelligence and communications and ability to track and communicate with major surface and air units (blue and green forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MED</strong> Has a MOC but with limited operations or intelligence fusion and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>LOW</strong> Has a rudimentary MOC that often lacks key elements: staff, connectivity, and communications with operating units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>COMMS</strong> Communications Ship-to-shore; ship-to-ship; air-to-ship/shore (range and performance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong> Able to reliably communicate between MOC, air units, and surface units (with blue and green forces) throughout EEZ; uses encryption and OTH communications and can transmit data such as coordinates and video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MED</strong> Able to intermittently communicate between MOC, air units, and surface units in territorial waters (12 n.mi.) and at close range in blue water; lacks encryption and relies on voice-only radio communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>LOW</strong> Unable to reliably communicate between air and surface units even close to land; frequently uses cell phones or WhatsApp or equivalent for operational communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ISR</strong> Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ISR assets such as coastal radar, MPAs, OPVs capable of patrolling, UAVs (frequency and range)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong> Has ISR platforms (MPAs, UAVs) with sensors able to regularly detect and track targets throughout much of its EEZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MED</strong> Has ISR platforms with sensors, but these have limited range or performance beyond territorial waters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>LOW</strong> Few ISR platforms or platforms that are not fully capable; limited to LOS spotting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESENCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PRESENCE &amp; OPERATIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Patrol and Interdiction</strong> Number and type (OPV, IPV, interceptor) of operable craft and operational range; proficiency of MIO units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong> Able to project a regular presence throughout much of the EEZ and perform long-range interdictions and VBSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MED</strong> Able to project an intermittent presence in the EEZ; able to conduct short-range interdictions (in territorial waters or just beyond)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>LOW</strong> Able to conduct harbor patrol and other limited coastal patrols; low readiness for interdictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Maintenance</strong> Preventive maintenance and repairs; status/readiness of assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong> Routinely conducts level 1 &amp; 2 maintenance for most of its vessels (including drydock) independently or with minimal external support; fleet operations are sustained with satisfactory levels of readiness (&gt;50% FMC for major operational assets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MED</strong> Able to conduct level 1 and up to level 2 maintenance for its smaller vessels with some support; fleet is in moderate levels of readiness (&gt;25% FMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>LOW</strong> Able to conduct some basic maintenance and repairs (level 1) on its own but largely relies on external support; low readiness (&lt;25% FMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PORTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Port Security</strong> Interagency task force, informed targeting; scanners or K9 program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong> Receives and acts consistently on intelligence for successful targeting; can reliably detect contraband using scanners or K9 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MED</strong> Receives and acts inconsistently on intelligence; can conduct searches with K9 units or scanners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>LOW</strong> Lack of port screening for contraband; ports remain vulnerable; customs enforcement activity is low or lacks accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Rtg.</td>
<td>Rating Description (Indicators)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INVESTIGATE</strong></td>
<td><strong>INVESTIGATE</strong></td>
<td>Investigation Evidence handling and chain of custody; forensics lab/evidence; maritime crime investigative capabilities; criminal network/TCO intelligence analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Effective chain of custody for evidence seized in maritime crime and investigative process; able to exploit evidence to strengthen cases that contribute to legal finishes; evidence analysis yields new intelligence for operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Tenuous chain of custody for evidence seized in maritime crime and limited investigative process; limited ability to exploit evidence to strengthen cases and generate intelligence that contributes to legal finishes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Evidence collected for maritime crime and investigative process, but chain of custody often incomplete; legal processing and prosecutions often suffer from lack of reliable evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROSECUTE</strong></td>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>Capability of prosecutors trying maritime crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Has maritime legal experts capable of successfully prosecuting maritime cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Has prosecutors able to build maritime criminal cases that can result in effective legal finishes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Few prosecutors and little or no maritime legal training; maritime criminal cases seldom prosecuted successfully</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEGAL</strong></td>
<td>Legislation/Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Maritime criminal laws aligned with international conventions, neighbors’ laws; precedent and jurisprudence consistent with legislative intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Has maritime legal experts in government and judiciary; has maritime legal authorities established throughout the EEZ and contiguous zone; laws effectively address present criminal threat environment (drugs, firearms, civil asset forfeiture, etc.); support/ratification of international maritime conventions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Has some legal authorities established in the EEZ; some laws address present criminal threat environment (drugs, firearms, etc.); support for some international maritime conventions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Minimal legal authorities beyond territorial waters; maritime regulatory framework in need of modernization; inconsistent participation in/recognition of international maritime conventions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INFO</strong></td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Info-sharing agreements; participation in CARICOM IMPACS, RSS, OPBAT, other arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Established info-sharing agreements with major maritime neighbors that are routinely exercised; hosts bilateral/minilateral/regional liaisons or other info-sharing centers (e.g., OPBAT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Established info-sharing agreements with maritime neighbors that are exercised frequently</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Limited, few info-sharing arrangements; info sharing not common or institutionalized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTEROP</strong></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Participation in shiprider agreements; cooperative operations (patrols, HA/DR, interdictions) and exercises (e.g., Tradewinds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Cooperates operationally with neighbors, regularly embarks shipriders on its own and partner vessels; hosts or takes a lead role in combined operations, campaigns, and exercises with limited support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Shares operational information; sometimes embarks shipriders on its own and partner vessels; contributes to combined operations and campaigns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Does not embark shipriders or share operational information; rarely participates in combined operations or exercises</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Note: FMC = fully mission capable.
Appendix B: Vessel Typology

Table 17 shows the typology we used to categorize vessels used by PN forces. Regional coast guard and maritime law enforcement units typically operate interceptor vessels, which primarily operate within territorial waters but can move quickly to chase suspected craft. Some PNs operate IPVs, which are larger and slower but can patrol into EEZs, and fewer have OPVs capable of patrolling a PN’s full EEZ over multiple days. For each type we also include examples of some of the more common vessels employed across the region. The CBSI TAFT generally supports maritime forces only with their smaller interceptor craft below 50 ft in length, but there are some notable exceptions (namely the Dominican Metal Shark Boats Defiant 87-ft NCPV).

Table 17. Vessel typology, descriptions, and examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel Type</th>
<th>Abbrv.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>TAFT Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offshore patrol vessel</td>
<td>OPV</td>
<td>Vessels longer than 100 ft capable of extended (multiday) operations throughout the EEZ and into international waters (beyond 200 n.mi.). Has full crew services (galley, heads, berths, etc.) and inboard engines and powerplant. Metal hull.</td>
<td>Damen Stan Patrol 4207 (Jamaica, Barbados, Bahamas) and Sea Axe 3007 (Bahamas); Vosper Europatrol 250 Corvettes (Bahamas)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inshore patrol vessel</td>
<td>IPV</td>
<td>Vessels between 40 and 100 ft in length capable of somewhat extended operations (mission duration in excess of 24 hours) throughout territorial waters and partially into the EEZ. Has closed cabin, crew services, and inboard engines and powerplant. Metal hull.</td>
<td>Damen Stan Patrol 2606/Metal Shark Defiant 87’ NCPV (Dominican Republic); Sea Ark Dauntless 40-48’ (Bahamas, Eastern Caribbean, Suriname)</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interceptors</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Vessels (usually) less than 40 ft in length capable of limited operations (mission duration less than 24 hours) beyond territorial waters (12 n.mi.); usually (but not always) fitted with 2–3 high-HP outboard motors and capable of pursuit speeds in excess of 30 n.mi. when in top condition. May or may not have a closed cabin. Metal, fiberglass, or other rigid inflatable hull.</td>
<td>SAFE Boats Defender class 25’-38’ (Eastern Caribbean); Boston Whaler 32-37’ (Dominican Republic); Zodiac Hurricane 920 (Eastern Caribbean); Metal Shark Defiant 29-38’ (Guyana); Nor-Tech 43’ (Bahamas)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
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# Abbreviations

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABDF CG</td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACIS</td>
<td>Advanced Cargo Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>attorney general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Automatic Identification System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APAN</td>
<td>All Partners Access Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APIS</td>
<td>Advanced Passenger Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARD</td>
<td><em>Armada de la República Dominicana</em>, Dominican Republic Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARU</td>
<td>asset recovery unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS-G</td>
<td>Advanced Targeting System Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCG</td>
<td>Barbados Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Barbados Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFT</td>
<td>blue force tracker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Barbados Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;E-MIU</td>
<td>Customs &amp; Excise Marine Interdiction Unit (Trinidad and Tobago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>US Customs and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSI</td>
<td>Caribbean Basin Security Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Container Control Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>closed-circuit television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDPF</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESEEP</td>
<td><em>Cuerpo Especializado de Seguridad Portuaria</em>, Specialized Port Security Corps (Dominican Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CET</td>
<td>Customs Agency Contraband Enforcement Team (Jamaica)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGLO</td>
<td>US Coast Guard Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAN</td>
<td><em>Centro de Investigación y Análisis Aero-Naval y Terrestre</em>, Air-Sea-Land Intelligence Analysis Center (Dominican Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICC</td>
<td><em>Centro de Investigación y Cooperación Conjunta</em>, Joint Intelligence and Cooperation Center (Dominican Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMCON</td>
<td><em>Centro de Investigación y Análisis Narcotráfico Marítimo</em>, Center for Investigation and Analysis of Maritime Narcotrafficking (Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMMTC</td>
<td>Caribbean Military Maritime Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCI</td>
<td><em>Control de Operaciones Conjuntas e Interdicciones</em>, Joint Operations and Interdictions Control Center (Dominican Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COGATT</td>
<td>US Coast Guard Attaché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSII</td>
<td>cooperative situational information integration system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG</td>
<td>Commander Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>US Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFL</td>
<td>digital forensics laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNCD</td>
<td>Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas, National Drug Control Directorate (Dominican Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNCRM</td>
<td>Dirección de Construcciones, Reparaciones, y Mantenimiento Naval, Directorate of Naval Construction, Repair, and Maintenance (Dominican Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>US Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Director of Public Prosecutions, Directorate of Public Prosecutors/Prosecution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>excess defense articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>exclusive economic zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARD</td>
<td>Fuerza Aérea de República Dominicana, Dominican Republic Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Fast Crew Supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIU</td>
<td>financial intelligence unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLIR</td>
<td>forward-looking infrared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMCP</td>
<td>Global Maritime Crime Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA/DR</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance and disaster response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HF</td>
<td>high frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICSS</td>
<td>Intercoastal Surveillance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPACS</td>
<td>Implementation Agency for Crime and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>US Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPV</td>
<td>inshore patrol vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS/R</td>
<td>Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUU</td>
<td>illegal, unreported, and unregulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCF</td>
<td>Jamaica Constabulary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCFMD</td>
<td>Jamaica Constabulary Force Marine Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDF</td>
<td>Jamaica Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDFAW</td>
<td>Jamaica Defence Force Air Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDFCG</td>
<td>Jamaica Defence Force Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATF-S</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force-South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRCC</td>
<td>Joint Regional Communications Centre (CARICOM IMPACS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-E</td>
<td>Joint Task Force-East</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
K9  canine
KFTL  Kingston Freeport Terminal Limited
LEDET  law enforcement detachment
LOS  line of sight
MACC  Maritime, Air and Cyber Command (Jamaica)
MAOC  maritime-air operations center
MAS  Maritime Authority of Suriname
MDA  maritime domain awareness
MEU  maritime enforcement unit
MIO  maritime interception operation
MIU  Military Intelligence Unit (Jamaica)
MLE CONOP  maritime law enforcement concept of operations
MOC  maritime operations center
MOU  memorandum of understanding
MPA  maritime patrol aircraft
MRSCC  Maritime Rescue Subregional Coordination Centre
MSOU  maritime special operations unit
MSS  maritime surveillance system
MT  metric ton
MTT  Mobile Training Teams
MU  Marine Unit (Dominica)
NCA  UK National Crime Agency
NCPV  near coastal patrol vessel
NCSC  National Center for State Courts
OECS  Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
ONDCP  Office of National Drug and Money Laundering Control Policy (Antigua and Barbuda)
OPBAT  Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos
OPV  offshore patrol vessel
OTH  over the horizon
PCU  Port Control Unit
PGR  Procuraduría General de la República, Attorney General (Dominican Republic)
PN  partner nation
PNR  Passenger Name Record
POCA  Proceeds of Crime Act
RBDF  Royal Bahamian Defence Force
RBPF-MSSU  Royal Bahamian Police Force Marine Support Services Unit
RGPF  Royal Grenada Police Force
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RGPF CG</td>
<td>Royal Grenada Police Force Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhib</td>
<td>rigid-hull inflatable boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIFC</td>
<td>Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSKNPF</td>
<td>Royal Saint Kitts and Nevis Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSLPF</td>
<td>Royal Saint Lucia Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Regional Security System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSTTI</td>
<td>Regional Security System Training Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSVGPF</td>
<td>Royal Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>satellite communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEACOP</td>
<td>Sea Cooperation Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>special interest alien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIP</td>
<td>Support to Interdictions and Prosecutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKNCG</td>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKNDF</td>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>US Armed Forces Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVG</td>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACLET</td>
<td>tactical law enforcement team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAFT</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Field Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAT</td>
<td>tactical analyst team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCO</td>
<td>transnational criminal organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>transnational organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTG</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTPS-MU</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Marine Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultra high frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URT</td>
<td>Unidad Reacción Táctica, Tactical Reaction Unit (Dominican Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCAP</td>
<td>US-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>US Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBSS</td>
<td>visit, board, search, and seizure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>very high frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOI</td>
<td>vessel of interest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Dominican Republic Section 333 (S.333) Communications Site Survey CUI, REL to USA. Naval Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWAR) PEO C4I PMW 740 Nov. 11, 2021.


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