

Making Captains of War

The Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group, 1981-1995

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Cover Photography: SSG I Fellows and staff with CNO ADM Hayward and PNWC RADM Edward Welch. Source: U.S. Navy.

Approved by:

September 2016

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ken E. Gause".

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Abstract

This information memorandum reviews the activities of the CNO's Strategic Studies Group through its early years (1981–1995). It contains the most thorough documentation done to date of the SSG during these years, having relied on archival research and dozens of interviews with former SSG officers and CNOs. This document also contains an evaluation of the SSG based on the goals established by the CNOs it reported to. A companion document to this information memorandum entitled *The Impact of the CNO's Strategic Studies Group (SSG), 1981-1995* contains a more concise review of the study's findings.

CNO Hayward created the SSG in 1981 to prepare Navy officers to think strategically as future leaders of the U.S. Navy, stimulate strategic discourse among senior Navy leadership. For the years examined in this study, the SSG achieved these goals and studied subjects that were of particular interest to the CNO.

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Executive Summary

The CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG) was conceptualized by outgoing Under Secretary of the Navy Robert J. Murray and formed in 1981 by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Thomas B. Hayward. Its purpose was to prepare potential Flag officers for three- and four-star commands, stimulate strategic discourse among the Navy leadership, and enhance the reputation of the Naval War College—or, as the SSG’s first Director, Robert J. Murray, put it, to turn “captains of ships into captains of war.” This new group had immediate impacts on the development of the 1980s’ *Maritime Strategy* and war plans. The Reagan administration came into office announcing a more aggressive stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, including a more offensive declaratory policy and a robust naval rebuilding program. Internally the Navy had been pressing for a more offensive strategy. Intelligence was penetrating deeply into Soviet intentions and practices, and opportunities to improve U.S. strategy, operational art, tactics, and plans were plentiful.

What the SSGs did

Overseen by the founding director, Robert Murray, SSG I (1981-1982) developed warfighting strategy aimed at defeating the Soviets, especially in the Norwegian Sea campaign, while avoiding nuclear escalation by either side. Their strategy employed operational art and tactics that combined the best attributes of naval, joint, and allied forces considering the geography in each theater of operations. They conducted detailed analyses and games focusing on NATO’s northern theater. Their operational art evolved into what two SSG Fellows, Captain (select) William A. Owens and Captain (select) Arthur C. Cebrowski, later named “systems-of-systems” and “Net-Centric Warfare,” respectively. SSG I also travelled extensively, engaging Washington-based and forward naval and joint staffs in intense debates and heightening awareness of naval forward strategy and operational issues. SSG II (1982-1983) built upon SSG I’s strategy, as well as its *modus operandi*, adding operational concepts and tactics for maintaining aircraft carriers forward in the eastern Mediterranean and northwest Pacific, gaining sea control, and striking Warsaw Pact forces and Soviet airfields at the outset of war.

SSG III (1983-1984), under Director Robert Wood, witnessed the invasion of Grenada and bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut during the fall of 1983. Seeking to

address additional warfighting needs, they turned to developing strategies for dealing with Soviet client states (Cuba and Libya) and developments in the Persian Gulf, in the context of both a war with the Soviets and other contingencies. They sought to use these contingencies to develop broader principles for strategies applying military, economic, and diplomatic power to achieve U.S. aims and broaden the *Maritime Strategy*. They stimulated the development of contingency plans and stirred strategic debate among naval commands. SIXTH Fleet found their contributions very helpful. SECOND Fleet strongly disagreed with their approach. These first three SSGs influenced the drafting and initial revisions of the Navy's classified *Maritime Strategy*, first briefed in the fall of 1982 and first published as a document in 1984.

As the SSG's influence on the CNO and Navy strategic and operational concepts became apparent, senior naval officers and OPNAV sought to affect their studies. This resulted in CNO James D. Watkins formally promulgating SSG objectives, tasks, and organizational relationships. He made the SSG "the Navy's focal point on framing strategic issues and the conceptualization/development of concepts for naval strategy and tactics," and firmly established that they worked only for the CNO.

The first three SSGs determined their own topics to study. However, Watkins believed it was his moral responsibility to prevent war with the Soviets. He tasked SSG IV (1984-1985) to work in conjunction with a select team from the OPNAV staff to develop strategy and plans for using naval and joint forces to deter Soviet aggression. SSG IV and their OPNAV counterparts explored deterring the Soviets both from considering the use of force and from employing armed force during a crisis. They developed naval options, contributing to the development of options involving all services that the Joint Staff adopted and the Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) subsequently employed in exercises and operations.

The next year, Watkins tasked SSG V (1985-1986) to extend deterrence beyond warfighting to the Soviets' attempts to extend their influence, and to others who would use force to challenge U.S. interests and allies. He felt that national responses to crises were reflexive: the typical response was to send aircraft carriers, whether it was appropriate or not. He intended the strategy and plans to be national, involving other agencies and branches of government, and the White House. SSG V developed methods for anticipating actions inimical to U.S. interests and evaluating naval options for deterring, preempting, or responding to such acts. They developed templates for the Navy, CINCs, and other military services and agencies to use in preparing plans. While the Joint Chiefs appreciated the SSG's concepts, Watkins retired before he could see his initiative fully implemented.

By 1986, the Navy's approach to its Maritime Strategy had matured considerably in its operations and exercises at sea, as well as in its plans and pronouncements. Captain Larry Seaquist had come down from SSG III to head up the OPNAV strategy office. He not only revised the existing strategy document but also co-drafted a

companion amphibious warfare strategy and participated in maritime strategy deliberations and implementation decisions at the very highest levels of classification. Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) John Lehman, CNO Watkins, and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) General P.X. Kelley published an unclassified but authoritative version of *The Maritime Strategy* as an addendum to the *Naval Institute Proceedings* in January 1986. CNO Carlisle A. H. Trost had the SSG VI (1986-1987) Red Team explore what the Soviets might do to counter it. SSG VI, playing Red, developed approaches for defeating the United States, and then developed counters to that “worst case” scenario. While they provided intelligence indicators for what the Soviets might do, in retrospective, Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost, perestroika, and sufficient defense initiatives pointed to the coming demise of the Soviet Union.

Trost had benefited from living, studying, and traveling overseas and dealing with early Soviet naval arms control proposals in his assignments as an Olmsted scholar and military assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of the Navy. As with Hayward, he viewed broadening the education of future Flag officers as the greatest benefit of the SSG. While primarily concerned with continuing Soviet naval modernization, he tasked SSGs VII (1987-1988) and VIII (1988-1989) with studying political-military developments in the Pacific and Mediterranean/Mideast, respectively, including Soviet arms control initiatives. Sensing the Soviet decline, U.S. allies and security partners in Asia and Europe questioned the continuing need for U.S. bases and forces in their territory. Concerned that forward naval forces would conduct the types of operations that SSG IV had recommended, Gorbachev pressed for naval arms control. SSG VII did not accept fundamental assumptions regarding the behavior of allies in war plans for the Soviets and North Koreans, fomenting debate on whether they should be assumptions or objectives. This thinking motivated the development and institution of cooperative engagement strategies and plans (now called Theater Security Cooperation plans). SSG VIII saw the need to employ alliances developed to contain the Soviets for a broader range of contingencies, principally countering terrorism, as a key driver of future naval operations.

Trost tasked SSG IX (1989-1990) to review the continuing relevance of the operational concepts underlying the *Maritime Strategy* in the light of strategic arms reductions and agreements on conventional forces in Europe. The concepts developed by SSGs I and II had remained as the foundation for war plans in the maritime theaters. In war games during the fall of 1989, SSG IX found that the canonical Warsaw Pact invasion of Europe was no longer feasible. Then the Berlin Wall fell. SSG IX recommended studying other contingencies involving U.S., Soviet, and other major power interests. Trost agreed. An Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia offered an interesting case to study, even though consideration of such a contingency was against U.S. policy of supporting Saddam Hussein as a bulwark against Iran. SSG IX wargamed the invasion in February 1990 and found that, indeed, the Red Team had to reevaluate all

decisions that the Soviets made in light of their desire to remain a great power while needing Western economic help. The SSG also identified many challenges that the Navy and United States would have in fighting a large, modern force halfway around the world with few prepositioned forces. In March 1990, the SSG's logic for studying this case was ahead of its time by several months and senior military leaders did not accept it. They considered Iran to be the enemy and Saddam Hussein to be helpful. Trost retired from CNO in early July. SSG IX's work received little notice until Hussein began deploying his forces toward the end of July. The materials from the game assisted several SSG IX Fellows in their next assignments and informed some preparations for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

When Frank B. Kelso II became CNO in 1990, he faced demands first for a peace dividend and, shortly after, for preparations for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Needing a more up-to-date value proposition for the Navy, he tasked SSG X to study the future security environment and its implications for the Navy and Marine Corps. SSG X (1990-1991) adopted a scenario-planning technique developed by Royal Dutch Shell that looked at broad economic, demographic, energy, resource, environmental, technological, and social trends out to 2010, and identified what they saw as implications for international security and the naval forces. They hoped to have the Navy adopt scenario planning as a strategic planning technique and use it much like Shell did. However, Kelso had turned to Total Quality Leadership as the Navy's approach to strategic planning.

SSG XI (1991-1992) continued SSG X's work, focusing it more specifically on trends involving allies and potential adversaries, with an emphasis on military forces. Like SSG X, they decided to focus their efforts on providing the context for developing Navy strategy and plans rather than engage in debates regarding specific future Navy platforms. Also like SSG X, they emphasized that military power needed to be integrated with other elements of national power, and employed with other like-minded nations to protect and sustain the global, inter-connected system. U.S. leadership would be a major determinant of the future. Kelso had just agreed to reduce the Navy from the Cold War target of 600 to a Base Force of 450 ships. SSG XI briefed him that continuing to do business the way that the military-industrial-congressional enterprise had done since WWII would result in the Navy having closer to 250 ships by 2012. Consumed by adjusting to evolving post-Goldwater-Nichols Act relationships within DoD, the Tailhook scandal, fallout from the Navy's investigation of the USS *Iowa* (BB-61) turret explosion, and other issues of the day, he had difficulty accepting SSG XI's analysis of the likely size of the future Navy.

SSG XII (1992-1993) continued the effort to understand what the nation and the Navy could do to sustain U.S. influence as both its military forces and its share of the world's economy diminished. Again, they looked to whole-of-government approaches and employing the kinds of institutions the United States had put in place following World War II (the United Nations (U.N.), World Bank, alliances, etc.). They

recommended actions that the CNO could promote within the Department of Defense (DoD) and at the White House, as well as policies and programs to prepare the Navy for the future. Under continuing pressure from his many other concerns, Kelso did not have the energy to pursue many of SSG XII's ideas. Some of SSG XII's ideas received a better reception at the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the White House than in the Navy.

SSG XIII (1993-1994) selected their task. The Bottom Up Review had mandated further force reductions, cutting the Navy to 400 ships, but U.N.-mandated operations increased. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Les Aspin made forward presence a criterion for force sizing, though no agreed-on intellectual foundation existed. Paralleling a study by OPNAV OP-06, SSG XIII decided to look at naval presence and influence. Their strategic studies and operational backgrounds led to innovative concepts for understanding both influence and ways to obtain more presence from fewer naval forces. The SSG's innovative concepts appeared to some to undermine OPNAV's calculations and arguments for a specific number of Navy surface ships. Admiral J. Michael Boorda relieved Kelso as CNO before SSG XIII completed their year. Boorda preferred OPNAV's work to the SSG's.

Boorda explored whether and how to change the Group. He tasked SSG XIV (1994-1995) to project trends and bound future possible national and international developments to 2005, and then give him specific recommendations as to what he should do with his remaining three years as CNO. SSG XIV presciently portrayed growing challenges from China and Russia, the emergence of Islamic terrorism, and domestic challenges, and made recommendations to position the Navy and the nation to respond. Boorda, however, viewed the work of the SSG in the 1990s as having become "too pol-mil and not enough mil-pol."

A CNO Executive Panel task force study on naval warfare innovation impressed Boorda. He implemented the CEP's recommendations and tasked the SSG with forming "concept generation teams" for revolutionary naval warfare concepts incorporating emerging technology. Beginning in 1995, the emphasis of the SSG was transformed, from preparing future three- and four-star officers and promoting strategic debate, to delivering tangible products to the CNO.

How the SSGs did it

Over this 14-year period, the CNOs personally selected the Navy officers for the Group and personally approved follow-on assignments. As with Hayward's original intention, those nominated had to be highly competitive for selection to Flag. Being "competitive" meant that they were proven leaders with solid operational backgrounds and command experience, and experts in their warfare specialties. All CNOs viewed the SSG program as a valuable way to educate upwardly mobile

officers. Though lineal numbers did affect seniority, rank usually did not matter in developing ideas within the Group. Hayward set a standard for independent thinking and encouraged the Group to promote discourse and debate, both within the Group and within the Navy.

After Hayward's tenure, the SSG continued to bring together a small group of independent-minded officers to advise the CNO on issues important to the continuing, evolving, and relevant contribution of naval forces to the U.S. national strategy. The members of SSG I set a model and a standard for subsequent SSGs in terms of:

- Their contributions to U.S. Navy strategy and operations
- Their access to and use of compartmented information
- Their access to commanders, staffs, and experts around the globe
- Their extensive study of strategy and operational art and their tasking through reading, internal discussions and debates, and discussions with those most responsible and most knowledgeable on strategy and their tasking
- Their use of war gaming (and quantitative analyses on a few occasions)
- Their subsequent assignments to influential U.S. Navy, joint, and OSD billets.

The SSG year roughly coincided with the NWC's academic year, which begins in the fall. Each Group would begin with an intensive orientation involving lectures and seminars on strategy, strategic concepts, previous SSG work, etc., provided by both NWC faculty and invited experts. As early as practical, the Group would meet with the CNO to receive his guidance directly. Trips to the Pentagon to meet the CNO would involve a week of meetings with senior military, government (including intelligence), and academic/think-tank experts in the Washington, D.C., area. During this orientation, the Group would hold frequent internal meetings to comment on what they had heard and discuss how to approach their project. In the 1980s, the CNOs had the SSGs brief their proposed approach to the Navy four-stars (CINCs) conference in order to familiarize the Navy leadership with the SSG and with the CNO tasking to them. The Group would also travel to major commands in the United States and overseas, meeting with U.S. and foreign senior military, government, and academic/think-tank experts. The Group met with the CNO every two to three months to provide updates on their progress and receive additional guidance.

Planning for the year usually involved scheduling three operational games focused on their study topic. The first game provided an orientation to gaming. The second provided an initial exploration of their concepts. The third involved the exploration of their refined concepts, involving more senior officials and academics. The character of the games changed with study topics from warfare, to contingency planning, deterrence, and path games that explored the evolution of international

security over the decades. Not all SSGs chose to use the scheduled games as part of their study.

Typical of successful, independent-thinking naval officers, each SSG was initially critical of the work conducted by previous Groups and the Pentagon. After a few months of searching for experts who could provide answers that they could turn into a briefing for the CNO, the Group would conclude that if those experts had had the answers, the CNO would have asked them, rather than the Group. The winter months became a time of intense strategic concept formulation and evaluation.

In addition to a final game, a major means for evaluating their strategic concepts was to use U.S. military, government, and foreign officials they had visited during their orientation as sounding boards (as security permitted). They would use criticism and comments they received to refine their thinking and their final briefing and report. In the 1980s, this would culminate in a briefing to the CNO, followed by a briefing to the Navy CINCs conference. Occasionally the CNO would direct the Group to brief other defense and government officials. Briefings became the principal means for conveying the SSG's work. In the 1980s, the SSG's reports were highly classified and received very limited distribution. In the 1990s, post Cold War, the studies were less sensitive and the CNO approved wide distribution of SSG reports. It was not uncommon for the CNO to move Navy officers to follow-on assignments before the end of the academic year.

Recognizing the expertise of the Fellows in fulfilling the CNO's intent, the SSG Directors served principally as mentors and to open doors for the Fellows to senior officials and academia. The CNOs and the directors defended the SSG's work as they briefed their work to Navy, military, and government leadership, with the exception of CNO Boorda at the end of this period. All but Boorda valued the strategic concepts they received from the SSG as something they would not get from either their staffs or consultants.

The value of the SSG

The SSG existed in the eyes of the CNO and at his sufferance. Each CNO had different expectations for the SSG. Hayward's intention was that the SSG Fellows would increase their strategic competence and that of the Navy's leadership through the study of strategy and warfighting and widespread dialogue. He did not expect any reports. Watkins made the SSG "the Navy's focal point on framing strategic issues and the conceptualization/development of concepts for naval strategy and tactics," and tasked them to create prototype methods and plans that he could use with the CINCs, Service Chiefs, other government agencies, and the White House. Trost thought that Hayward and Watkins had a good idea in the way that they viewed the SSG, but emphasized the Fellows' educational experience more than Watkins and

revised the SSG's objectives to focus on developing strategic concepts for him rather than the Navy. Watkins and Trost promulgated memoranda stating SSG objectives, tasks, and organizational relationships. Kelso did not do so; he left Trost's memo in effect. In 1990 congressional testimony, Kelso stated that he did not feel a need for strategy without an enemy. However, he valued the SSG as an independent source of thinking about what the nation would ask the Navy to do in the future, and as a provider of education to future Navy leaders. Boorda promulgated his own memorandum on SSG objectives, tasks, and responsibilities, with few revisions to Trost's. Like Watkins, he desired "tangible" products, rather than policy recommendations, that he could use in defending Navy force structure and designing future Navy platforms. Therefore, he transformed the group.

During interviews and a workshop, those SSG Fellows contacted for this study (46 of 129) emphasized the unique knowledge and experience that the SSG provided. Meeting the day-to-day demands of operating ships, submarines, and aircraft squadrons was required for success but had left them little time to study broader issues of strategy and theater-level operations. Though recognized experts in their warfare areas, working with other handpicked warfare specialists, including Marines, provided a much deeper appreciation of naval forces and operations. International travel and war games deepened their appreciation of joint and coalition forces and other nations' interests. Interacting with leading academics and senior government officials deepened their appreciation of ongoing strategic debates and of issues and instruments involving national, regional, and global security. Direct interaction with combatant and fleet commanders and access to the most closely held national intelligence enhanced their confidence and readiness to serve at the highest levels of command.

Over this period, the Navy selected 43 of the 88 Navy officers (49%) who served as SSG Fellows for Flag rank. Eight of these (9%) went on to serve as four-star officers:

- Two as Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Two as CNOs
- Three as combatant commanders
- One as Commander-in-Chief Naval Forces Europe/Allied Forces South
- One as Director Navy Nuclear Propulsion Programs.

Ten Fellows (11%) served as three-star officers. Three of the four women assigned served as Flags: two became three-stars and one became a two-star. The Marines promoted two of their thirty-six SSG Fellows to Flag: one served as a four-star combatant commander. One Coast Guard officer joined each Group beginning in 1991, as the recognition of naval forces roles in constabulary missions increased. The Coast Guard promoted one of these four officers to Flag. By 1995, former SSG Fellows constituted about 12% of the Navy unrestricted line officers, 22% of the 3-star admirals, and 25% of the 4-star admirals. In 2000, they peaked at 30% of the 4-star admirals. All of the officers who were interviewed valued their experience on the SSG

as having uniquely helped them as they progressed through their careers both in and beyond their military service. SSG Fellows frequently commented on how they had used what they learned and how they had implemented SSG concepts in subsequent assignments.

The SSG instilled their ideas in the people they met. Talking with others about their tasking and ideas caused the others to think more strategically. Senior officials within the Navy and beyond took the Group seriously. John B. Hattendorf, in *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986*, Newport Paper 19, provides an extensive account of the renaissance in strategic thinking across the Navy over that decade, and the SSG's role in promoting strategic dialogue.

SSGs came to use a quip attributed to Aldous Huxley: "Every new idea begins as heresy and ends as superstition." The SSG had competition in framing strategic issues and the conceptualization/development of concepts for naval strategy. Just as each SSG looked skeptically at the concepts and strategies of previous SSGs and those of other institutions—OPNAV, the Joint Staff, and other commands—those institutions questioned the SSG's work. Those responsible for Navy air, submarine, and surface force development questioned any SSG concept not aligned with their rationales. Suggesting greater effectiveness through combining forces or revising Navy policies could translate into the Navy needing fewer forces, even though the SSG emphasized that there were enough challenges to keep all over-employed.

The time for SSG concepts to transition from heresy to Navy or joint common wisdom or practice varied. The Navy altered war plans within a year of SSG I's and II's briefings. Incorporating SSG tactical and operational concepts into exercises and operations required about four years. The Navy adopted the SSG IV/OPNAV deterrence strategy and operations immediately, under Admiral Watkins' oversight, and the Joint Staff followed quickly with options employing the other services. SSG VII did not develop specific approaches for cooperatively engaging with allies, but did point to the need to treat allied participation in contingency plans as an objective rather than an assumption. Flexible Deterrence Options became a planning practice about five years after SSG V's work, when Captain Mike Farmer of SSG VIII was in a position to implement the SSG's concept in the Joint Staff. Though motivated by studying future U.S.-Soviet relations, documents and findings from SSG XI's war game involving an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were in demand as events unfolded. Commander Art Cebrowski's work on SSG I evolved into Net-Centric Warfare in the 1990s and formed the basis for force transformation efforts in the early 2000s.

The work of the SSGs in the early 1990s had little direct impact on CNOs, who were struggling to adapt to the end of the Cold War. The Group's concepts closely aligned with those in *A Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Security*, published in 2007, though there is no evidence that those developing this document were aware of 1990s' SSG work. CNO Jon Greenert's year on SSG XIII (1993-1994) did affect his thinking in

publishing the update, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, and Ready*, in 2015. Many other SSG Fellows provided testimony regarding how they had implemented SSG concepts during their careers.

What the SSG could have done better

Although Hayward and Watkins intended for the SSG to enhance the reputation of the NWC, that vision faced practical difficulties. Particularly in the 1980s, the SSG's work involved highly classified information and Watkins cautioned the Group not to share their work with NWC faculty. He did not want to see information on sensitive programs openly published. The SSG began as the centerpiece of a newly created Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS). However, the Group effectively separated from the NWC at the beginning of its fifth year when the CNWS Dean no longer directed the SSG. Physically separating SSG offices from CNWS in 1989 further exacerbated the split. The SSG worked directly for the CNO at the NWC, but was not an integral part of the NWC; this limited SSG's interactions with NWC faculty and the SSG's contribution to the NWC's reputation.

During the 1990s, CNOs Kelso and Boorda felt little need for the advanced and alternative study of strategy. Maintaining a properly balanced and combat-ready Navy force structure—while downsizing—and designing Navy forces for the future consumed both, and Navy scandals and investigations distracted Kelso. The Group valued their role in briefing what they thought the CNO should hear and do. However, their studies of post-Cold War security and implications for the Navy did not resonate with the issues consuming the CNOs. This resulted in transforming the objectives and character of the SSG beginning in 1995.

Summary findings

The following is a summary of our findings:

- SSG objectives
 - The SSG succeeded in preparing officers for senior command.
 - The SSG continually engendered discourse and debate over their strategic and operational concepts. By 1986, strategic discussion among Navy Flag officers was routine, whereas few would have discussed strategy in 1981.
 - The SSG's early strategic concepts had immediate impact. Then the SSG began to address more political-military policy topics—such as sustaining the Navy's access to foreign basing; promoting coalition, interagency, and

joint capabilities; and educating Navy officers to be more effective in naval diplomacy. As it did so, it had less immediate impact, though eventually influenced Navy policies and programs. Admiral Watkins, as an active and aggressive CNO and member of the JCS before the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, was able to influence national and defense policies and plans more than subsequent CNOs during this period.

- Keys to success
 - The Honorable Robert J. Murray had three deal breakers when he approached Admiral Hayward that were key to the SSG's success. Murray wanted:
 - The CNO personally to select the Navy officers. Admiral Hayward went beyond this to direct the future assignment of SSG Fellows. Admiral Watkins codified this process.
 - A travel budget sufficient to enable the officers to draw on the intellectual resources of the Navy, other U.S. government activities, the academic world, and foreign countries, and enable widespread discussion and dissemination of SSG ideas.
 - Access to intellectual, government, and military leadership, special intelligence, and special access programs.
 - The SSG began when the Navy faced great challenges from a competent foe. Opportunities to improve naval and national warfighting policy, strategy, operational art, and tactics were plentiful.
- Though the studies performed by all the SSGs over this period broadened the Fellows' knowledge and prepared them for higher commands, those studies addressing warfighting and Watkins' strategies for deterring war had the most immediate impacts.
- Enduring contributions
 - The SSG experience significantly changed the outlook of those who participated. The Fellows employed the knowledge they had gained and implemented the concepts they had developed as they progressed through their service careers, and beyond. Their continuing service had more effect on the Navy than the briefings and reports to the CNO. The SSG experience significantly affected the thinking and actions of all the Fellows. Those who attained three- and four-star rank incorporated their SSG experience into their policies, plans, and actions.
- Director, staff, and funding

- All directors were senior civilians. The most effective directors served as mentors. Those with experience in government and academia had less difficulty adjusting to the Group than the retired ambassadors.
- The SSG staff over this period typically consisted of a director and his secretary, a program/deputy director, a secretary supporting the Fellows, and an intelligence officer. In its earliest years, an administrative officer supported the director and contractors supported the Fellows in quantitative analysis.
- The NWC provided funding for SSG activities (principally war games, travel, and invitational travel), amounting to less than \$600,000 in current dollars. The NWC provided facilities and information technology support.

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Purpose and Approach

On behalf of the Director of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies Group (SSG), Vice Admiral James Wisecup, USN (Retired), CNA conducted a study of the origins of the SSG and its activities during the period 1981-1995. The purpose of this study is to address what the SSG did and how they did it, what value they added, and what they could have done better.

The methodology used for this study involved researching and cataloging the various documents relating to the SSG, and email exchanges and interviews with former CNOs, SSG Fellows, SSG directors and staff, and others who interacted with the SSG. The study team also used published books and articles addressing the SSG and related events, and their personal knowledge of events. In February 2015, all living SSG Directors (six of seven), a large cadre of SSG Fellows from the first fourteen SSGs (1981-1995), and several former SSG and Navy staff who had interacted with the SSG during this period gathered for a workshop addressing the topics of this study, and corrected and supplemented preliminary notes. The study team updated these notes and sent them to all SSG Fellows for whom they had contact information for comment, and then incorporated their comments.

Based on its research, the study places more emphasis on SSG briefs to the CNO and other senior leaders, and game reports rather than on formal final written SSG reports. The briefs and game reports involved the interactions among the whole Group and the CNO. During the early 1980s, SSG staff or a small writing team of Fellows remaining after the departure of most of the Group typically wrote final reports, derived from briefs. The reports in the 1990s were highly classified, had limited distribution to about two dozen senior Navy officers and the CMC, and few were available. Beginning in 1991, the Group's reports became marked "For Official Use Only" received wide distribution, and were readily available.

This information memorandum serves as a record of the data that the project gathered and insights gained from those data, and as the basis for writing a research memorandum on the subject. The CNO SSG director will control distribution of this document.

Peter Swartz led the study team. A retired Navy captain, he had served on the Navy staff (OPNAV OP-06 and SECNAV Office of Program Appraisal (OPA)) preparing and promoting *The Maritime Strategy*, on the Joint Staff, and in NATO during this period. Dr. John Hanley was a consultant and principal investigator on this study. He had

served with the SSG during the period of this study, first as an analyst then as Program and Deputy Director of the SSG. His continuous involvement with all the SSGs studied gave him a unique perspective (see Appendix L). Chris Steinitz provided the objective perspective of a career CNA civilian analyst who was not directly involved in the events surrounding the SSG. Ensign Sam Oat-Judge also provided valuable research and reviews of drafts as an intern with CNA. The peer reviewer for this study was Floyd Kennedy, a senior career CNA civilian analyst with extensive experience in analyzing U.S. and Soviet Navy policy, strategy, operations and systems during the period under study.

The Perfect Storm: Fair Winds for Founding the SSG

By the mid 1970s, the U.S. Navy was ready to burst forth. It chafed at being relegated to the defensive role of protecting convoys reinforcing Europe in the event of war with the Soviets, and it was concerned as it watched the Soviet Navy grow and the U.S. Navy shrink. Admiral Hayward and the Navy leadership wanted to make a strategic difference through global forward offensive operations, a renewed interest in war games to test ideas, and intelligence that provided deep penetration and insights into Soviet plans and intentions. These factors set the stage for early success of the Strategic Studies Group (SSG).

SEA STRIKE

Army, Air Force, and Navy service cultures have been characterized as the dumb, the devious, and the defiant, respectively.¹ The mood of the Navy under Admiral Hayward was definitely defiant.

When he became Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) in 1976, Admiral Hayward was troubled by the lack of naval warfighting readiness in the Pacific and the war plan calling for swinging the Navy to the Atlantic should war with the Soviets break out in Europe.² He believed that swinging his fleet would free up Soviet forces in their Far East, and adversely affect the behavior of our other allies, the Chinese, and other nations in the Pacific region. He brought in Captain Bill Cockell, a Sovietologist, and Commander James M. Patton, who had worked for him when he was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Programs (OP-090), to

¹ Jeffrey L. McCaffrey and L. R. Jones, *Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense* (Information Age Publishing, Inc., 2004), p. 242.

² Captain James M. Patton, USN (Ret.), “Dawn of the Maritime Strategy,” *Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 2009; and Hanley interviews with Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.), Seattle, 7 October 2014, and with Captain James M. Patton, USN (Ret.), Whidbey Island, 8 October 2014.

be his war planner and assigned him to devise a plan for “prompt offensive action” against the Soviet Far East in the event of war. Captain Patton worked on the details of this plan, and identified a list of “incompatibilities” that would prevent its execution. Patton later said, “Admiral Hayward took the reduction of that list as his personal responsibility and, over time, brought it down to a manageable set. ... He insisted that every aviator in every carrier squadron be briefed on the objectives of the plan.”³ Hayward also brought in his subordinate Flag commanders, Marines, and SEALs to add their contributions. The resulting plan—which was unapproved and politically risky—was named SEA STRIKE.

As CNO, Hayward continued his emphasis on pursuing strategic concepts, based upon his offensive-minded principles, and emphasized sharing his intent with the Navy’s leadership.⁴ Working with his Executive Assistant, Captain William A. (Bill) Cockell, he developed a memorandum entitled “CNO Strategic Concepts” that embodied the extension of his thinking for the Pacific to naval operations around the world.⁵

SEA PLAN 2000

According to John B. Hattendorf,

In the mid-1970s, leaders such as Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Under Secretary James Woolsey and Admiral James L. Holloway had clearly established a general consensus within the Navy’s Washington leadership that the Service should strive for superiority at sea against the Soviets and, when examining the variety of possible wartime operations against the Soviet Navy, think in terms of forward, offensive operations as the most effective means to employ the Navy to achieve the nation’s broad defense policies. ... This changing ambience in the 1970s set the stage for a wide revival of strategic thinking within the naval officer corps.⁶

Secretary of the Navy Claytor brought Bing West, Director for Advanced Research at Newport, to see Secretary Brown, who agreed to a study of Navy power. Brown was a

³ Ibid., Patton interview.

⁴ John B. Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986*, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 38-40.

⁵ Ibid., 37-43.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 20-21.

judicious, even-handed boss. He told Claytor, Woolsey, and West that he believed they were wrong, but to “go do it.” Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Bob Komer got involved, telling West that he was “nuts,” but he did not throw up any roadblocks.

Woolsey and Claytor asked West to design a strategy for taking the offense. CNO Admiral James Holloway was all for it. West asked for some officers by name. Holloway laughed, pulled out paper from his drawer, and showed that West had asked for three on his list of about a dozen up-and-coming commanders. He gave West two: Lieutenant Commander James Stark, a surface warfare officer; and Commander W. G. (Gordy) Lange, a submariner who had recently completed his command of USS *Guitarro* (SSN 665). West also recruited Lieutenant Commander Ken McGruther, whom he had mentored on a prize-winning paper when McGruther was a student at the NWC in 1974. Once they went to the fleet, the study team was inundated with suggestions on how to attack, not defend against, the USSR. Chief among the advocates was Patton, who had done the SEA STRIKE work for Hayward.

John Lehman strongly disagreed with the Carter administration’s policy and was working for the Republican Party. Nevertheless, Lehman agreed to review the study drafts, and Harold Brown had no objections.

Lieutenant Commander Jim Stark from OPNAV OP-965 did the quantitative work on force structure, using OPNAV data. Stark’s analysis evaluated Navy force levels for forward presence and war fighting using four aircraft carriers per warfighting task group. Planning on carriers moving from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic when they could, the analysis came up with a requirement for 15 carriers. Typical configurations for task force escorts provided numbers for surface ships. Submarines and maritime patrol aircraft were assigned to area ASW and Direct Support of the carrier task forces. OP-96 analyzed what the Navy could buy using a force level model that included operating and maintenance burden rates and personnel to derive costs. The study got close to 600 ships with a 3-percent growth line in the Navy budget. The team wrote what each of the force levels investigated would allow the Navy to do in peacetime and war. Stark wrote the force level chapter. West was mostly involved in strategic analysis of why the Navy needed to be there: providing an alternative to ceding the flanks to the Soviets and abandoning allies.⁷

The team showed Secretary Brown the two conclusions: (1) any war with Russia would be global, and (2) U.S. SSNs would sink the Soviet Navy and place all Soviet nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at risk. Komer still said the team was

⁷ Hanley phone interview with Rear Admiral James R. Stark, USN (Retired), 11 August 2014.

nuts. However, Brown was a fair man. West offered to do a game with all services, and Brown said okay—but added little to the Navy budget.⁸

In June 1978, the team unveiled Sea Plan 2000 at the Current Strategy Forum in Newport⁹. Dr. Randy Jayne of the Office of Management and Budget attacked it, saying there was not sufficient money. That got a lot of press attention.

The Global War Games

This led to Bing West starting the Global War Game series in 1979.¹⁰ In the initial game, Fred Ikle played President (he would later relieve Bob Komer as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy). Ambassador Seymour Weiss, then on the CNO Executive Panel, had experience in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) political-military games, and played on the National Command Authority team. Richard Pipes from Harvard led the Orange team representing the Soviets. John Lehman, Richard Burt (*New York Times*), reporters for the *Baltimore Sun* and *Washington Post*, and two or three senators also played. Blue had 47 Navy commanders and lieutenant commanders who were at the Naval War College over the summer. Orange had 12 Navy officers. Data for the game, set in 1985, came from SEA PLAN 2000 and intelligence assessments of Soviet force levels. The war went all over the place.¹¹ West believed that the game demonstrated that the United States could not restrict a devastating war with existential consequences to one small piece of real estate, and that the war would be global.¹² This was the first game where Blue employed a strategy of attacking Soviet SSBNs.¹³ Though controversial, the strategy was in play for future thinking. Game reports suggested that the insights from the game were not analytically supportable given the limits of the game. However, Fred Ikle found the game useful for shedding light on the variables that would make one option

⁸ Ibid., West email, 5 August 2014.

⁹ For the executive summary, see John B. Hattendorf (ed.), *U.S. Naval Strategies of the 1970s* Newport Paper #30 (Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 2007).

¹⁰ For the Global War Games, see Bud Hay and Bob Gile, *Global War Game: The First Five Years*, Newport Paper #4 (Newport RI: Naval War College, 1993); and Robert H. Gile, *Global War Game: Second Series: 1984-1988*, Newport Paper # (Newport RI: Naval War College, 2004).

¹¹ Ibid., West email, 18 August 2014.

¹² Ibid., West email, 5 August 2014.

¹³ Email from Captain Ken McGruther, USN (Retired) to Hanley, 26 June 2015.

preferred, even though the game could not test the strategy. The game report recommended putting more effort into gaming.¹⁴

Global War Game '80 was a larger game and had more NWC preparation, including Army and Air Force faculty. Ambassador Weiss returned. Navy commanders (O-5s) again played the roles of regional and functional CINCs. Several Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Senate aides and staff, and senior Navy officers observed portions of the game. This year, the game ran during three weeks in July, which became the standard for future Global games. The author of a memo to the CNO concluded, "Prospects in a global war depend upon what one believes about the balance at the outset." Henry Young, a contractor playing Orange, introduced nuclear weapons at the outset of the war. Nuclear brinkmanship terminated the war in a few days.¹⁵

Bing West became Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs following the change of administrations. He again recruited Ken McGruther, this time to be his Special Assistant in the Pentagon. The Global game in 1981 was the third year of the series under the tutelage of Lieutenant Colonel Orville E. (Bud) Hay, USMC, who had been West's deputy at the Center for Advanced Research. The game involved even more preparation by the Naval War College. Up to 500 participants from all services came to the game. Intelligence experts led the Red (Soviet) team, and O-6s played the roles of CINCs. Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci came for a day, along with visits from other luminaries. The evaluators had a better opinion of this war game as an analytical tool.¹⁶

John Lehman had come to Newport for part of each Global game. To him, the idea of fighting on the defense was idiotic. He made that quite clear. Moreover, Lehman and Hayward were exchanging ideas on naval strategy. In 1980, Hayward had called West (Director of the Center for Advanced Research) and Bill Turcotte (Dean of the decision-making course) into his office and asked them to interview all Flag officers about Sea Plan 2000 and the operational level of war in general. They met with more than 100 Flag officers in six months. West estimated that 80 percent of these Flags felt that the Navy was being hemmed in and that more offense was justified, given U.S. SSN and aircraft carrier capabilities. Most Navy officers rejected the inner-German border/GIUK Gap defense mentality.¹⁷

¹⁴ John T. Hanley, Jr., *On Wargaming: A Critique of Strategic Operational Gaming*, (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms International, 1991).

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ West e-mail.

The Advanced Technology Panel

By the late 1970s, Navy efforts to develop special intelligence sources provided deep penetration of Soviet Navy thinking and practices.¹⁸ Combined with efforts to read and understand Soviet military literature, the U.S. Navy began to understand how the Soviets and the Soviet Navy planned for war.¹⁹ Key to the Soviet approach was creating defensive bastions for their newer SSBNs with their longer-range missiles by protecting them with surface naval groups and attack submarines. The implications were that the Soviet main efforts would be protecting their SSBNs and keeping U.S. naval forces beyond striking range of the Motherland, rather than sending their naval forces to interdict the Atlantic sea lanes as the Germans had done in World War II.

In November 1980, Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, Director of Navy Intelligence (DNI), chose Mr. Richard Haver, a Navy civilian analyst, to lead the effort to understand the intelligence produced by these sources.²⁰ Haver briefed the CNO that he needed a customer for this new intelligence.²¹ The CNO repurposed the Navy's Advanced Technology Panel (ATP), created in the 1970s, to become the main customer for this highly restricted intelligence.²² The ATP was "a small Group of the CNO's top 'thinkers' who were cleared primarily to review special programs, but did a lot more." Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) Admiral James Watkins led the ATP, which consisted of Vice Admiral Kinnard McKee, the Director of the Office of Naval Warfare (OP-095); Rear Admiral Carlisle Trost, Director Navy Program Planning (OP-090); Vice Admiral Nils Thunman, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare (OP-02); and the Director of the Office of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

¹⁸ Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, *The Admirals' Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War* (Annapolis; MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 84.

¹⁹ Peter M. Swartz, *Understanding an Adversary's Strategic and Operational Calculus: A Case Study—U.S. Views on Soviet Navy Strategy and Operations toward the End of the Cold War*, DOP2013U003646 Final (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, January 2013); Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968), Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy*, pp. 24-29.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Ford and Rosenberg. See also RADM Tom Brooks, USN (Ret) and CAPT Bill Manthorpe, USN (Ret), "Setting the Record Straight: A Critical Review of Fall from Glory," *Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly* (April 1996).

²¹ Hanley and Swartz interview with Admiral William O. Studeman, U.S. Navy (Retired) and Dr. Alf L. Andreassen, CNO Executive Panel Conference Room, 26 November 2014.

²² *Ibid.*, Hattendorf, pp. 32-33.

(OP-098).²³ A group of Navy captains serving under these officers formed a “breakfast club” to regularly review the intelligence and develop strategy for acting on that intelligence.²⁴ Admiral McKee also created a team of line officers, led by the chief civilian scientist at OP-095, Dr. Alfred Andreassen, to assess the implications of Haver’s analysis and needed Navy warfare capabilities.²⁵

By late 1980 and early 1981, the available intelligence began confirm these general conclusions on Soviet Navy plans.²⁶ However, several admirals attending the Navy CINCs conference in August 1981 did not accept the intelligence and its implications.²⁷ Within a year, with further efforts of the ATP and contributions by the SSG, the Navy leadership came to believe the intelligence and had a strategy for countering the Soviet Navy’s approach.

The offensive mindset, the gaming, and, in particular, the intelligence provided an atmosphere for a group of talented officers to come together and have immediate impacts on Navy strategy and operational art, just as a change in administrations brought in new national civilian leadership, including Ronald Reagan and John Lehman, with a bent toward taking on the Soviets, especially at sea.

²³ Admiral William N. Small, U.S. Navy (Retired), “Oral History.” Interviewed by David F. Winkler, Naval Historical Foundation, 1997, p. 56.

²⁴ Email from Captain Larry Seaquist, USN (Retired) to Hanley, 9 October 2014.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Ford and Rosenberg, p. 86.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Hattendorf.

²⁷ The CNO convened semiannual Navy CINC conferences attended by the CNO, VCNO, Navy Unified and Specified CINCs, Navy component commanders (Fleet CINCs), and OP-06/090/095, with other senior Flags attending sessions, depending on the topics of discussion.

In the Beginning: Creation and the SSG under Admiral Hayward (1980 – 1982)

Following the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980, the Honorable Robert J. Murray submitted his resignation as Under Secretary of the Navy. Murray needed a job.²⁸

During the 1970s, Murray had been a Special Assistant to SECDEF James R. Schlesinger. Schlesinger directed him to look into what to do with the Army post-Vietnam and to come up with a strategy for Europe that relied more on conventional weapons than nuclear forces. Senator Mansfield was forwarding a plan to remove 100,000 troops from Europe. The Army was in bad shape. Murray went to General Mike Davidson, Commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, for his ideas on strategy. Davidson told him that he did not have time to think about fighting Soviets. He said that he was the mayor of a troubled urban city concerned with “druggies, race riots, and fraggings.”²⁹ The barracks that Murray visited were decrepit, and it was not safe for officers to go into the enlisted barracks after dark. The prepositioned overseas materiel, which reinforcing units from the United States were to use, were configured in unit sets (POMCUS) and not maintained. Which units were to fall in on what equipment was not specified.

To Murray, one bright spot was General David C. Jones, Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe. He had been studying the Soviets/Warsaw Pact operations, capabilities, and tactics in detail, and developing operational concepts to defeat them. Secretaries of Defense Eliot Richardson and Schlesinger supported these efforts. REFORGER exercises, with specific units assigned to specific POMCUS, and clear lines of command were established during this period. The All-Volunteer Force

²⁸ Hanley, Steinitz, Oat-Judge, & Davids interview with Hon. Robert J. Murray, Center for Naval Analyses, 5 August 2014; and Hanley and Swartz interview with Hon. Robert J. Murray, Center for Naval Analyses, 29 August 2014.

²⁹ *Fraggings* refers to troops killing their fellow soldiers and officers. Fraggings of officers has occurred in all services.

was just beginning. Murray became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to oversee these efforts. The Marine Corps adopted a zero tolerance approach and began throwing out troublemakers. As the Corps scaled down and began reforming, the Army soon followed.

From this experience, Murray learned that the Army thought in broad terms, sent its officers to schools for professional education, and emphasized staff work. When Murray became the Under Secretary of the Navy in 1980, his Military Assistant, Captain Norm Moser, arranged for a group of young officers to get together with Murray and discuss Navy issues. From these meetings, Murray came to appreciate that Navy officers had “little time to think large thoughts.” The Marines had a bit more. Navy aviators and submariners did not have time in their careers to attend the NWC. Navy officers did not see a year at the college as a way to advance one’s career. According to Murray, “The general consensus in the Navy about the NWC in the early 70s was, ‘It’s nice to be selected for it, but too bad you have to waste a year of your professional life actually going there.’”³⁰ Murray found that Navy officers thought either tactically, or in broad strategic terms, but had little concept of the operational art that connected the two. Strategy was “just words” with little direct connection to operations. The Marines were closer to the fleet and less independent of the Navy than they are today. The Marines also thought more jointly. Murray, borrowing an apt phrase from Winston Churchill, asserted the necessity for turning “captains of ships into captains of war.”

The President of the Naval War College (NWC), Rear Admiral Edward F. Welch, Jr., had been a mentor to Murray and encouraged him to come to the college. Murray formed an idea for the creation of a Center for Naval Warfare at the college “to serve as a focal point, stimulus, and major source of strategic thinking, ... drawing on the intellectual resources of the Navy, other U.S. government activities, the academic world, and foreign countries to promote an enduring renaissance in naval strategic thought.” This center would be staffed principally by a group of six to eight active-duty Navy and Marine Corps officers in the grades O-5 and O-6, normally serving a term of one year, with additional civilian and retired military support. It was “anticipated that the Center will attract the best strategic minds in naval uniform, and that successful Service on its staff will be viewed as an achievement of high

³⁰ That had started to change somewhat, starting in 1972-73 as NWC President Rear Admiral Stan Turner turned it into a respected institute of higher learning within the Navy. He also created the Center for Advanced Research there, and recruited West and Turcotte to head two of the three new departments (Strategy and Defense Management, respectively). His doing so “tilled the soil,” so to speak, to make it a logical home for the CNWS and SSG. If he had not done so, the SSG either would not have been put there or would not have been respected. Ibid., McGruther email, 26 June 2015.

distinction by selection boards and assignment personnel.”³¹ The center would “maintain active contact with, and promote an exchange of views, with other portions of the office of the CNO concerned with strategy and the strategy-tactics interface, ... [and] will interact as well with Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the fleet commanders in chief, numbered fleet commanders, and other U.S. government agencies concerned with strategic and politico-military affairs.”³²

Murray took his idea into CNO Hayward, cold. His deal breakers for the job were that the CNO and CMC had to pick the officers, that he had to have a sufficiently robust travel budget, and that the group needed to have access not only to high levels of U.S. and foreign military, government agencies, and academia, but also to sensitive intelligence and Navy special access programs. Hayward responded very positively.

Only on taking command of SEVENTH Fleet had Admiral Hayward become “aware that it was not until the three-star level that a senior officer was faced with having to make strategic decisions. As a ship’s commanding officer, one did not have the necessary knowledge, and in most other positions one did not have the time to prepare oneself. This insight gave Hayward the determination to do all that he could to encourage strategic thinking.”³³ Admiral Hayward viewed the Center for Naval Warfare as an opportunity to provide personally selected officers that he believed likely to be future leaders of the Navy “to get the experience before they sat in the chair.”³⁴

Creation of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies and the SSG

Though John Lehman became SECNAV in February 1981, Murray remained Under Secretary of the Navy through September 1981 when Congress finally confirmed James F. Goodrich. Even so, encouraged by Lehman and Hayward, Murray moved to

³¹ Draft white paper, “The Center for Naval Warfare at the Naval War College.” Unsigned and undated. Following that came a memo—Under Secretary of the Navy, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Personnel, Subj: Center for Naval Warfare, May 1, 1981—with minor revisions.

³² Draft white paper, “The Center for Naval Warfare at the Naval War College.”

³³ “The Center for Naval Warfare at the Naval War College;” Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy*, p. 17.

³⁴ “The Center for Naval Warfare at the Naval War College;” interviews with Admiral Hayward and Captain Patton. The quote is from Captain Patton.

Newport in June 1981 and turned his focus to establishing the Center for Naval Warfare and the SSG.³⁵ To provide more resources to the officers forming the SSG and provide a core for research activities, Rear Admiral Welch also assigned several entities to Murray as the Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS): the Center for Advanced Research (a program to enable select students to conduct focused research in lieu of one of the NWC academic trimester courses); the Center for War Gaming; and the Naval War College Press, under editor Frank Uhlig.³⁶ In addition to gaming support, Murray wanted the Center for War Gaming for its naval intelligence detachment, which would allow the SSG to stay abreast of developments in the Soviet Navy and of U.S. Navy assessments of the Soviet Navy. Lieutenant Colonel Bud Hay, USMC, who oversaw the high-profile annual Global War Games and related studies, was also a member of the CNWS staff. Having Murray in charge of all these activities reduced Rear Admiral Welch's need for direct oversight, allowing him to concentrate on the teaching mission of the college.³⁷

In addition to the staff that came with these activities, Murray assembled a small staff to help with the SSG. The staff included Commander Ken McGruther, USN, who had been involved in Sea Plan 2000 and was working for West in the Pentagon, and Commander James J. Hinds, USN (administrative officer). Professor Tom Etzold from the College offered his services to the start-up.³⁸

³⁵ Interview with Admiral Hayward; Hanley and Swartz interview with Robert J. Murray.

³⁶ McGruther email 26 June 2015. According to McGruther: "Turner's actions to heighten the credibility of the Naval War College enabled Murray to cobble together the CAR and War Gaming Center under one roof that worked nicely in mutual support of the SSG. (Remember that by the mid 1980s, the focus of CAR became to work out detailed studies of various aspects of the more conceptual SSG thinking. Viz: "The Air Battle for the Southern Region [in NATO's Southern Flank]" which included participants such as then-CDR Mike McConnell [future Director of the National Security Agency and Director of National Intelligence]. So CAR, as a subsidiary and consumer of SSG thoughts also became a breeding ground for future naval and national leaders."

³⁷ McGruther email 26 June 2015.

³⁸ McGruther email 26 June 2015. According to McGruther: "While Tom Etzold was not a charter member of Murray's brain trust upon arrival in Newport, he soon volunteered, was 'vetted' by Murray, Hay and myself, and came aboard at about the time the SSG members began arriving in September."

SSG I (1981-1982)

Focus: The Norwegian Sea campaign and a global forward Maritime Strategy

Hayward did not believe that he could rely on the usual personnel selection approaches to provide the officers that he had in mind for the SSG. Rather than going to the Bureau of Personnel, he turned to the Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations responsible for plans and policy (OP-06), naval warfare (OP-095), Navy programs (OP-090), and the platform “barons”—naval air (OP-05), submarines (OP-02), and surface ships (OP-03)—for nominations and used his own knowledge of officers with high potential to advance.³⁹ He selected the Fellows himself. The submariners were particularly obstinate and told him that a year at the NWC would ruin the career of a front-runner. Former Oxford University U.S. Navy Fellow Commander William A. (Bill) Owens had impressed Hayward as having the right kind of intellect when Owens had worked for him at the Secretary of the Navy’s Office of Program Appraisal. Therefore, he selected Owens. The submariners were not happy. The CMC agreed to select the officers, but left it to the Marines’ personnel system.⁴⁰ The Marines assigned officers who were already at Newport as Naval War College students to SSG I, which became their practice for most SSGs.

In August 1981, the first group of what became known as SSG Fellows assembled in Newport, RI. The group consisted of:

- Lieutenant Colonel Richard (Bull) P. Bland, USMC (aviation)
- Commander Arthur K. (Art) Cebrowski, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain Franklin D. (Frank) Julian, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain Stuart D. (Stu) Landersman, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain Rene W. (Sam) Leeds, USN (carrier aviation)
- Commander William (Bill) Owens, USN (submarine warfare)
- Colonel Joseph D. (Joe) Ruane, USMC (ground)
- Captain Daniel J. (Dan) Wolkenstorfer, USN (maritime patrol aviation).

³⁹ Hanley interview with Hayward.

⁴⁰ Interview with Murray.

Creating a program for the SSG “was a Lewis and Clark moment.”⁴¹ Hayward provided no guidance for running the Group, but left all details to Murray. The Group began with an intense orientation schedule of readings, lectures, and discussions about topics important to the Navy.⁴² Since the original idea was to publish papers,⁴³ each officer chose a topic on which to write.⁴⁴ While Murray was keen on operational art, McGruther was pushing for concentration on clarifying the warfighting strategy.⁴⁵ Landersman was the senior Navy officer, but rank played little role in Group decisions.

SSG I established an orientation agenda that included presentations and intensive internal discussions at the Naval War College; travel to Washington to meet with the CNO, senior leaders in the Pentagon, other government officials, and prominent defense thinkers; and other domestic and foreign travel to meet with senior commanders, their staffs, government officials, and think tanks.⁴⁶

During the week of 19 October 1981, the Group had its first meeting with Hayward, and met with senior members of the OPNAV staff and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQ USMC).⁴⁷ As related by Hattendorf:

Admiral Hayward told the Group that there was a lack of strategic thinking even at the fleet commander level. Hayward told them that he wanted the Strategic Studies Group to fill the void and to convince the leadership of the armed forces that the Navy is thinking, and that the Naval War College is the place for that thinking.⁴⁸

The orientation also included war games to familiarize the Group with both wargaming as a research technique and the issues involved in their study. During the week of 26 October, the SSG held a seminar war game.⁴⁹ They conducted another war

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Attachment to Memorandum for Distribution (SSG & Staff), From: Ken McGruther, Subj: SSG Retreat on 28 June, 22 June 1982.

⁴³ Ibid. Draft white paper.

⁴⁴ Ibid. SSG Retreat memo.

⁴⁵ Email from Ken McGruther, 15 September 2014.

⁴⁶ SSG I records contain few details of these trips or meetings other than the Retreat memo.

⁴⁷ Hattendorf, pp. 47-49, and Retreat memo.

⁴⁸ Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy*, p. 47.

⁴⁹ Sam Leeds' memorandum on the game. Sam calls this game #1, but the McGruther retreat memo refers to this as game #2.

game in November.⁵⁰ By November, the chemistry in the Group was beginning to gel.⁵¹

Studying and gaming existing war plans played a key role in the SSG exploring and developing their concepts. From their war game in October 1981, Leeds noted, “The war plans are, in most cases, a time-phased deployment of assets and not a strategic [strategy] or concept of operations. They have an additional complication since in many instances they are complicated and confused by programming objectives and shortfalls recognized by various CINCs and OPNAV. All too often the plans become a list of things that could be or operations that could be undertaken instead of an overall strategy.”⁵² He also noted that participation from CINCPAC and OP-06 enhanced the success of the SSG game. Well-placed representatives from fleet commands, OPNAV, and the intelligence community were key participants in SSG war games. Though the SSG had identified shortfalls in the U.S. strategy, they “had not yet ascertained how the Navy could make a strategic difference.”⁵³ Ruane summarized, “There is no strategy except to execute the plans and lose!”⁵⁴

In November, the SSG met with Captain William H. J. (Bill) Manthorpe, USN, from OP-009J to discuss Soviet naval strategy. “By December 1981, The Advanced Technology Panel had fully developed an interpretation of Soviet intentions, which cast serious doubts on the conventional U.S. strategy based on Soviet attack of Western sea lines of communication. The new interpretation stressed the importance of the United States being able to defeat the missions of the Soviet Navy.”⁵⁵ It happened that the ATP was looking to explore the implications of their new intelligence in games at the NWC, and believed that the SSG was exactly the right group of officers to work with as they were developing their strategy and operational concepts.⁵⁶ Admiral William N. (Bill) Small, who had relieved Admiral Watkins as VCNO and leader of the ATP, decided to open the new intelligence to the SSG with the understanding that they would develop a game to explore its implications.⁵⁷

⁵⁰ Ibid., Hattendorf, p. 53.

⁵¹ Ibid., McGruther email, 14 September 2014.

⁵² Ibid., Leeds memo on SSG wargame #1.

⁵³ Ibid., Hattendorf, p. 54.

⁵⁴ Ibid., McGruther email, 26 June 2015.

⁵⁵ Ibid., Hattendorf, p. 33.

⁵⁶ Ibid., Studeman and Andreassen interview.

⁵⁷ “There is a remarkable and, I think, understated, reversal of course in that the ‘new intelligence’ was ‘not well-received’ at the Aug 1981 CINCs Conference, and yet only 4 months later ADM Small heading the ATP opened it to the SSG anyway, which development provided

In November and December 1981, the Group also visited major military command headquarters, government officials, and think tanks in Europe and Asia.⁵⁸ Visits to commands helped them understand the war plans and official policies and gain confidence in interacting with senior officers. Visits to organizations such as Oxford Analytica and the International Institute for Strategic Studies gave them insights to a broader strategic discourse. In December, they met with SECNAV Lehman.⁵⁹

In January 1982, Rich Haver from OP-009J briefed the Group on the ATP's sensitive intelligence that he had recently briefed to President Reagan. The Group shifted their emphasis from writing individual and team papers to doing analyses and otherwise preparing for a game in April using this intelligence.⁶⁰ Working with the ATP, Owens and Cebrowski began espousing concepts for changing the Soviet correlation of nuclear and conventional forces to control escalation and promote war termination. Wolkenstorfer and Owens had developed a combined arms ASW concept for gaining sea control, quickly destroying Soviet SSBNs, and opening avenues for strategic strikes on the Soviet Union. Cebrowski studied and analyzed combining NATO and U.S. land- and sea-based airpower to control northern Norway and limit Soviet Naval Air lines of approach to allied aircraft carriers. Instead of writing individual papers, the Fellows focused their efforts on the details for implementing these strategic and operational concepts.⁶¹

In February, Owens and Wolkenstorfer brought in Navy Reserve Lieutenant Commanders John T. Hanley, Jr., and Robert D. Smith to conduct analyses during their two weeks of annual training. Following that two-week period, Murray and Owens asked Hanley to continue with the Group as an analyst under contract. Hanley remained, conducting detailed analysis of the campaign at sea in NATO's northern region and preparing materials for the war game.

In early April, Murray briefed Hayward on the Group's initial findings and thinking.⁶² The SSG had studied the war plans for NATO's Northern, Central, and Southern theaters, for Southwest Asia, and for the Pacific in their war games and visits to the

the lynchpin to the SSG I's development of the conceptual approach to what became the Maritime Strategy." Ibid., McGruther email, 26 June 2015.

⁵⁸ Ibid., Retreat memo.

⁵⁹ Ibid., Hattendorf.

⁶⁰ Email from Ken McGruther, 14 September 2014, and Hanley phone interview with Admiral William A. Owens (Retired), 20 December 2014.

⁶¹ Landersman did complete a monograph entitled "Principals of Naval Warfare" that he had committed to write at the beginning of the year. The monograph was never published.

⁶² Ibid., email from Ken McGruther, 15 September 2014.

major command headquarters. They concluded that the separate theater plans did not provide a coherent strategy for fighting the Soviets, who did have a coordinated approach across their theaters of military operation.⁶³ Murray did not have an opportunity to complete the briefing before the CNO ran out of time. The CNO and assembled Flag officers reacted negatively to Murray's brief.⁶⁴ The result was that McGruther returned to Washington the following week to provide the rest of the brief to Hayward's Executive Assistant. This restored the CNO's confidence in the SSG. The lesson for Bob Murray was to have SSG Fellows brief rather than him. The subsequent SSG Directors followed this practice.

During the period of 19–30 April, the SSG conducted Seminar War Game #4 with the ATP working Group.⁶⁵ On 30 April and 1 May 1982, VCNO Small visited CNWS with all of the ATP Flag officers to debrief and discuss how to use the results of the war game.⁶⁶ This game cemented the SSG's strategic and operational concepts among the Navy leadership and resulted in a number of actions for OPNAV to take in order to exploit the new intelligence.⁶⁷

The SSG conducted a retreat on 28 June to review and critique their year. The year culminated with SSG I Fellows playing their concepts during the period of 26 July–13 August 1982 as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and theater commanders in Global War Game '82.⁶⁸ The game served to further test the SSG concepts and share them widely.⁶⁹

This template of orientation—meeting with the most responsible and most knowledgeable people on the subject under study (including major military commands, U.S. and foreign government officials, and academics), reading, researching, analyzing, iterating concepts, exploring the concepts in war games, holding incessant internal Group discussions, and reporting results to senior commanders—set the pattern for the subsequent SSGs through 1995.

⁶³ Ibid., Leeds memo on SSG wargame #1, and McGruther email, 15 September 2014.

⁶⁴ Ibid., Murray interview 5 August 2014, and McGruther email, 15 September 2014.

⁶⁵ Three-ring binder with materials from Seminar War Game #4.

⁶⁶ NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NOTE 5050, From: President, Naval War College, Subj: Visit of Admiral William N. Small, U.S. Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations to Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College; 30 April–1 May 1982.

⁶⁷ Ibid., Studeman and Andreassen interview.

⁶⁸ McGruther and Hay designed and orchestrated Global War Game 82. McGruther email, 26 June 2015.

⁶⁹ McGruther email, 26 June; Hanley, *On Wargaming*, p. 302.

The main features of SSG I's strategic and operational concepts are well documented.⁷⁰ The strategic concept was to attack the Soviets' strategy and change the nuclear correlation of forces quickly, reducing incentives for either side to escalate quickly, and increasing incentives for war termination favorable to the United States and its allies. Operational concepts featured combined arms ASW that would limit the number of Soviet submarines that could get to the Atlantic Ocean, and free U.S. SSNs to sink Soviet SSBNs and naval air defenses. This in turn would allow U.S. maritime patrol air to operate further forward, increasing both U.S. submarine survivability and Soviet SSBN loss rates, and eliminate the Soviet Navy's contribution to the strategic air defenses. Linking AWACS and submarines via Link 11 provided targeting of Soviet surface action groups to support forward sea and air control. Naval air would reinforce northern Norway, adding night and all-weather capabilities that only they could contribute. This would provide air control that would cause Soviet Naval Air longer transits and allow U.S. carriers to come farther north with prudent risk. Using Marine Tactical Air Operations Centers (TAOCs) supported command and control for the air battle. Only the Marine TAOC brought together the NATO Air-Ground Defense Environment and Navy Link-4 and Link-11 to provide a more comprehensive operational air picture than could be achieved otherwise.

These concepts undergirded what became *The Maritime Strategy* and revised war plans. The command and control concepts evolved into Net-Centric Warfare. Though SSG I Fellows did not recall studying Hayward's "CNO Strategic Concepts,"⁷¹ they adopted Hayward's offensive-minded approach, emphasis on detailed campaign planning down to the tactics and logistics to ensure that the strategy was executable, and emphasis on widely sharing strategic concepts to engender a dialogue among Navy admirals.⁷²

To promote strategic discourse, the main mechanism for sharing SSG concepts was through briefings rather than publications. Owens and Cebrowski became the principal briefers. They briefed 162 Flag officers, by their count. The more senior officers of the Group, on the threshold of Flag selection, were happy to have the

⁷⁰ Ibid., Hattendorf, pp.54-57; Robert J. Murray, "The U.S. Maritime Strategy," in *Proceedings of a Symposium on the High North*, edited by Ingemar Dorfer, The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment, Stockholm, 28-29, 1987, pp. 17-21; John T. Hanley, Jr., "Creating the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Implications for Today," *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2014).

⁷¹ Statement by Admiral William A. Owens, U.S. Navy (Retired) and Captain Rene W. Leeds, U.S. Navy (Retired) at SSG Workshop, 20 February 2015.

⁷² McGruther recalls studying the CNO Strategic Concepts and remembers the SSG having it in the back of their minds. Ibid., McGruther email, 26 June 2015.

junior members present the Group’s controversial ideas.⁷³ Though the basic ideas that the SSG promoted reflected the Navy ethos of offensive operations, many Flag officers thought the SSG concepts too radical. Articulating them was controversial.⁷⁴ Platform “barons” thought that ideas for winning with current naval force structure and alternative uses of their platforms would undermine their rationales for future programs. Documents from SSG I’s retreat characterized “two- to three-star officers defending their rice bowls” among the long-term threats to the strategy.⁷⁵ Even the submariners initially objected to the heavy emphasis on going after Soviet SSBNs.⁷⁶ On the other hand, VCNO Small believed that “OPNAV was planning and programming forces which were increasingly irrelevant to evolving enemy intentions, capabilities and priorities. As we learned in the JCS tank, this was not unique to the Navy, and the Chairman tried to force ATP-like thinking on the other Services.”⁷⁷

Hayward was non-directive, and did not care much about having a paper. He was interested in giving officers the experience of thinking strategically. He never gave “rudder orders,” or attempted to micromanage. The Group wanted to contribute beyond the briefings.⁷⁸ Following the departure of SSG I, Murray had Hanley turn the briefings into a classified draft report for his review. Due to the relationship of the report to sensitive intelligence and revised war plans, the distribution of the report was initially limited to the top two dozen Flag officers in the Navy and the CMC.

Having selected the Group members, Hayward took a hand in their follow-on assignments. Wolkensdorfer had been selected for Flag—the first from the Naval War College in a long time—and went to command. He then was assigned to take over the ASW Division in OP-095 on the Navy staff. OP-095 was the newly created Naval Warfare directorate on the OPNAV staff, headed up by Vice Admiral Lee Baggett. Owens became Baggett’s executive assistant. Leeds had left the Group early to replace the Chief of Staff (COS) at SIXTH Fleet.⁷⁹ Cebrowski went to command a carrier air wing, and was then reassigned to OP-095’s Electronic Warfare division (OP-956). Julian remained at CNWS as Murray’s Deputy. This set the pattern for SSG

⁷³ Comment by. Owens at SSG Workshop, 20 February 2015.

⁷⁴ Admiral William A. Owens, *High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 3.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Retreat notebook.

⁷⁶ Email from Rear Admiral Jerry Holland, U.S. Navy (Retired), to Peter M. Swartz, 1 March 2009.

⁷⁷ Admiral William N. Small, U.S. Navy (Retired), letter to Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN (Retired), 2 October 1998

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Murray interview, 29 August 2014.

⁷⁹ Hanley interview with Captain Rene (Sam) Leeds, U.S. Navy (Retired), 12 January 2015.

Fellows: they went to a command, to senior fleet staff positions, or to the OPNAV staff—especially the newly transformed OP-095, the Naval Warfare directorate—to help implement the naval warfare concepts that they had developed while in the Group.

The Maturing of the SSG under Admiral Watkins (1982 – 1986)

Context for SSG studies, 1982-1986

Admiral James D. Watkins relieved Admiral Hayward as CNO on 30 June 1982.

Both Watkins and President Reagan had concerns over Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as the basis for nuclear deterrence. In May 1982, President Reagan proposed changing the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) to Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). In May 1983, he announced his intention to pursue a Strategic Defense Initiative proposed by Watkins. The Navy was gaining confidence in its maritime strategy.

The Soviet Union shot down a South Korean civilian airliner in September 1983, and NATO was preparing to deploy Pershing II intermediate-range and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe in November. Relations were tense. A NATO nuclear weapons command post exercise in November 1983 prompted the leadership of the Soviet Union to fear that the maneuvers were a cover for a nuclear surprise attack by the United States. This triggered a series of unparalleled Soviet military responses. According to the *Washington Post*, “Yuri Andropov, the KGB chief who later became Soviet leader, was a major source of the anxiety in Moscow about a surprise nuclear attack. In 1981, Andropov declared to a major KGB conference that the Reagan administration was actively preparing for war and that a nuclear first strike was possible.”⁸⁰

Though the Soviets remained the dominant security concern, U.S. naval forces were increasingly involved in other events: the 1983 bombings in Beirut, the invasion of Grenada, and the hostage rescues in the 1984 Hezbollah hijacking of a TWA flight and the 1985 PLO seizure of the cruise ship *Achille Lauro*. The U.S. Navy also became involved in escorting tankers during the Iran-Iraq war, which began in 1980 and expanded into a tanker war in 1984.

⁸⁰ David E. Hoffman, “In 1983 ‘war scare,’ Soviet leadership feared nuclear surprise attack by U.S.,” *The Washington Post*, 24 October 2015.

Tensions with Qaddafi in Libya over the hijacking of a TWA airliner in Beirut in July 1985 and bombing attacks at U.S. and Israeli airline counters at Rome and Vienna in December of that year led to Operations ATTAIN DOCUMENT to test freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Sidra. The first two operations, in January and February 1986, occurred without incident. The third, in March, resulted in surface-to-air missile attacks against U.S. forces and counter attacks against Libyan air defenses and surface ships. In April 1986, Libyan agents attacked the “La Belle” nightclub, a popular spot for U.S. service members in Berlin, killing three people and injuring 229 others. After coordinating with European and Arab partners, President Reagan ordered Operation ELDORADO CANYON, a strike against Qaddafi, on 15 April 1986.

In 1985, Senator Barry Goldwater and Congressman Bill Nichols, with the help of Senator Sam Nunn, were making headway on a DoD reorganization act to fix operational and acquisition problems allegedly caused by inter-service rivalry that had manifested most recently in the aborted Iranian hostage rescue operation in 1980 and the 1983 invasion of Grenada.

In 1986, the Iran contra affair caused a scandal when it became known that senior administration officials had secretly facilitated the sale of arms to Iran, which was the subject of a congressional arms embargo. They hoped that the arms sales would secure the release of several U.S. hostages and provide money to fund the Contras in Nicaragua. Under the Boland Amendment, Congress had prohibited further funding of the Contras. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, USMC, had orchestrated this plan from his position on the NSC staff. The scandal resulted in the retirement of Vice Admiral John Poindexter, USN, who was the National Security Advisor to the President, and the removal from the NSC staff of not only Oliver North but also many other naval officers. This scandal would ultimately affect the CNO as he worked to implement the national strategy approach developed by SSG V.

Meanwhile, from August to October 1982, at the direction of the VCNO, Admiral Bill Small, the Navy was developing its own classified statement on the utility of U.S. naval forces during peacetime, crises, and war. Styled *The Maritime Strategy*, OPNAV (OP-603) drafted it with inputs from other elements, especially the SSG. SSG staff member CDR Ken McGruther, an OP-603 alumnus, fed insights gleaned from the SSG’s discussions and activities to OP-603 lead action officer LCDR Stan Weeks. The brief would be updated and codified into a document in 1984, and the document itself would be updated in 1985. In January 1986, an unclassified version would be published.

SSG II (1982-1983)

Focus: The Mediterranean and Pacific campaigns in a global forward Maritime Strategy

Admiral Hayward selected the Navy officers for SSG II in the spring of 1982. The Group had the following members:

- Colonel Myrl W. Allinder, USMC (aviation)
- Captain Edwin K. (Ed) Anderson, USN (maritime patrol aviation)
- Captain Clarence E. (Skip) Armstrong, Jr., USN (carrier aviation)⁸¹
- Captain Ralph E. Beedle, USN (submarine warfare)
- Colonel Theodore L. (Ted) Gatchel, USMC (ground)
- Captain Joseph (Jay) Hurlburt, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain John H. Maurer USN, (submarine warfare)
- Commander Michael A. (Mike) McDevitt, USN (surface warfare).

Armstrong, the senior member on SSG II, had arrived at Newport early and could spend some time with SSG I and participate in the 1982 Global War Game. He had some concerns about the viability of some of SSG I's concepts and was committed to having the Fellows on SSG II write their own report rather than leaving it to the staff.⁸²

The program for the year was similar to that for SSG I. The Group traveled to Washington for orientation meetings, as SSG I had done, and met with the CNO on 17 August.⁸³ Admiral Watkins' direction to the Group was, "Tell me how to fight the Soviets, and don't tell me to buy another thing."⁸⁴

⁸¹ Armstrong met Hayward while in command of USS *Forrestal* (CV 59) when the CNO flew out to visit his old command. Armstrong arranged for Hayward to fly himself on and off the *Forrestal* in an S-3, which greatly enhanced the CNO's visit. Hanley phone interview with Skip Armstrong, 17 December 2014.

⁸² Ibid., Armstrong interview.

⁸³ Ibid., Hattendorf, p. 57.

⁸⁴ Hanley interview with Colonel Ted Gatchel, USMC (Retired) Naval War College, 18 September 2014.

The Fellows on SSG II adopted tenets of forward offensive operations and decided that they would form two teams to conduct the kind of detailed analysis of operations in NATO's southern region and in the Pacific that SSG I had done for NATO's northern region.⁸⁵ The plan for October was to organize team responsibilities, review war plans, develop trip plans, prepare questions and a database, and provide research topics for the Center for Advanced Research.⁸⁶ The Group prepared a briefing on their plans and prepared to participate in the 28 October Navy CINCs conference. As SSG I had done, they would also visit military headquarters, government agencies, and think tanks. They would go to Europe in November and to the Pacific in December.⁸⁷

Navy CINCs conference in Newport, October 1982

On 28 October 1982, Watkins convened the first Navy CINCs conference of his tenure as CNO in Newport.⁸⁸ He moved the conference from the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, to the NWC to signal his support for enhancing its reputation. SSG I members had departed for their next assignments and SSG II had convened for their year of study and had met with the CNO. At the meeting of SSG II members with the CNO on 17 August 1982, Watkins had asked Murray to prepare a memorandum and a briefing of the SSG I's ideas for the CINCs conference. McGruther briefed the memorandum at the conference, providing the broader conceptual umbrella, and Owens and Cebrowski were invited back to provide their presentation on the more specific operational concepts underlying the strategy.⁸⁹ The CINCs amended and approved the memorandum.⁹⁰ The schedule allowed 45 minutes at the end of the day

⁸⁵ Hanley, SSG I Fellows, and other SSG staff suggested topics that SSG II might pursue. Memorandum from J. Hanley, to Strategic Studies Group, Subj: Topics for Further Study, 23 August 1982, and *Ibid.*, Retreat notebook.

⁸⁶ MEMORANDUM FOR MURRAY, Subj: SSG Concept of Operations for 1982-83, 6 October 1982

⁸⁷ As with SSG I, SSG II's records did not include details of their orientation period.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Hattendorf, pp. 57-58.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, McGruther email, 26 June 2015.

⁹⁰ "The key comment that I recall was in a personal note from Bill Small to me while I was still on the podium after I had briefed and there had ensued much extended discussion among Watkins and the CINCs (Small remaining silent) about how to "fix" the brief and the ideas it contained. His note said: 'Ken, Change it. BUT DON'T CHANGE IT VERY MUCH. Bill.' (Caps and underlining were his). I'll never forget it, and showed it to Murray, Hay, and I think Art and Bill and they agreed and that was my marching orders. I re-briefed it the next morning, with about 12% changed, and everyone said, 'Great job! That's it' without very much discussion at all.

for the briefs. The briefs went on for hours as the CINCs discussed the merits of the operational concepts. War plans in the Atlantic soon changed to incorporate the SSG's operational concepts.

The OPNAV *Maritime Strategy* briefing, drafted in OP-603 with inputs from the SSG through CDR McGruther, was also briefed at the Conference and engendered discussion. "Not by accident," it dovetailed with the SSG brief.

SSG II

The SSG II Fellows learned from each other, and from interactions with foreign counterparts.⁹¹

SSG II played SSG Seminar War Game #5 during the week of 13-17 January 1983, and #6 in the week of 11-15 April 1983.⁹² The Navy frequently maintained a carrier battle group in the eastern Mediterranean to respond to turmoil in the Levant and had a carrier stationed in Japan. Keeping carriers forward in the eastern Mediterranean and northern Pacific at the outset of war entailed significant risks. To mitigate these risks, SSG II noticed some research done by the Center for Advanced Research on radar shadowing and developed "haven" tactics for stationing ships near land features that would prevent Soviet naval aircraft from targeting them. By using these tactics, the carriers could work with Marines and allied air forces in the eastern Mediterranean and northern Pacific to conduct attacks on Soviet forces and bases on

Showing not only that Small was spot on, but that it took a bit of acclimatizing to embrace new concepts." Ibid., McGruther email 26 June 2015.

⁹¹ During a visit to the shared U.S. and Japanese P-3 base at Misawa, Anderson, who had been stationed there, knew many of the Japanese. When visiting a Japanese P-3, he said that the Japanese P-3s differed from the U.S. P-3s in two ways. One was that the nameplates were in both Japanese and English. The second was that everything worked. When U.S. planes came from maintenance, the crews would have a hundred gripes. Once he found a gum wrapper in a fuel filter. If that happened in Japan, someone back at the factory would commit suicide. Part of the visit was an evening at a Geisha house. One of the Japanese officers was one of the last serving naval aviators from WWII. A Geisha sat between each U.S. and Japanese officer and served each formally. After dinner, the Geisha played traditional music, and then departed. The Japanese officers brought in a boom box and sang to German-sounding music. When asked, they told the Americans that it was the song of the Japanese fighter pilots at Rabaul. Gatchel mentioned that the Marines had pilots at Rabaul, but declined to say that they "kicked ass." Seeing the spirit of the Japanese officers changed Gatchel's impression of the Japanese. Despite being a self-defense force, they were ready to fight. Ibid., Gatchel interview.

⁹² Records are contained in SSG II war game files. Numbered SSG games were supported by the Center for Wargaming, while others were arranged by the SSG and staff.

the same time lines as NATO forces were engaging Soviet forces in central and northern Europe.

SSG II employed Marine air and a TAOC in Greece and northern Japan, as SSG I had done in northern Norway. Marine air contributed to defending the allied ground forces, providing outer air defenses for the carrier battle groups, and providing forward airfields to extend the range of the carrier-based air as needed. Placing a Marine Expeditionary Force in the “Thracian seam” between Turkish and Greek forces would alleviate the continuing grievances between these two NATO allies to keep them focused on the Warsaw Pact, rather than each other. Since the Marines in northern Japan did not expect to face a Soviet amphibious assault at the outset of war, Allinder developed schemes for immediate air attacks on Soviet Naval Air (SNA) bases to reduce the threat to the carriers.

Protected in havens and with an outer screen of NATO air forces, the SSG Mediterranean team developed concepts for defeating the Soviet “battle of the first salvo,” rapidly destroying the Soviet Navy deployed in the Mediterranean and key bridges used to support the Warsaw Pact advance, and striking SNA bases in the southern Soviet Union. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Fought, USAF, a student at the Center for Advanced Research and former B-52 pilot, helped SSG II gain access to Air Force plans for penetrating Soviet air defenses. Due to the large number of possible targets and limited number of strike sorties, SSG II began efforts to identify “targets that count.”⁹³ Underlying these operational concepts was a strong desire not to allow the Soviets to gain the initiative, and not to abandon our eastern Mediterranean allies and cede sea control east of Malta in a time of rising tensions.⁹⁴

The Pacific team also developed plans for using combined arms ASW to establish sea control and attack Soviet SSBN bastions in the Sea of Okhotsk as SSG I had done in the Norwegian, Greenland, and Barents Seas.

SSG II developed these concepts to allow U.S. and allied forces to simultaneously attack Soviets from the maritime theaters around the globe, preventing the Soviets from shifting forces between theaters, as they had done in World War II in their successful defense of Moscow, while rapidly changing the Soviet correlation of forces that they used to calculate the likelihood of success. The strategy aimed to relieve pressure on the Central Front in Europe and discourage escalation to the use of nuclear weapons by either side.

⁹³ This began a series of Navy efforts under that rubric that eventually led to the Joint Warfare Analysis Center and came into play during Operation DESERT STORM and selecting targets to strike in the Balkans in the 1990s.

⁹⁴ Email from Armstrong to Hanley, 23 August 2015.

When being briefed on SSG concepts at the end of the April war game, one surface warfare rear admiral objected that carriers could not launch planes from anchor. Armstrong replied that he had done so on *Forrestal*. “To have credibility, you need that kind of expertise.”⁹⁵

During that period, SSG II also played in a game with officers from NATO Allied Forces Southern Region—principally NATO members bordering the Mediterranean. Given national sensitivities, the allied participants were hesitant to play their actual war plans. To account for this approach, the American officers played allied roles in separate rooms. The Americans would say things like, “At D+1 the Greeks have only 7 days of 155mm ammo, so they cannot stop the Soviet advance.” The Greek officer would come back with the real numbers—several times that amount—which they did not want the Turks to know. Admiral William Crowe, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) and NATO Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), stated that he learned more about Turk and Greek logistics from that game than he ever could have known otherwise.⁹⁶

During 4-7 May, SSG II participated in the first CNWS May Conference, entitled “After Containment and Détente: Evolving Strategy for the Soviet Union.” Murray initiated the conference to enhance the reputation of the NWC. He brought top academic experts from the United States, Europe, and Japan together with the SSG and Naval War College faculty to address the subject.

In the spring, the SSG briefed their results to fleet commanders, OPNAV, and the Navy CINCs conference.⁹⁷ Flag officers routinely objected to SSG concepts and findings. Again, the “barons” in charge of aircraft, ships, and submarines objected to SSG ideas that might undermine arguments for their priority programs.⁹⁸ With some advice and encouragement from the SSG staff, SSG II wrote its own report. Like those of SSG I, the distribution was limited to top leadership of the Navy and CMC.⁹⁹

Over the year, the Group had also assembled a set of “pretty good rules.” Some of the most popular were:

⁹⁵ Ibid., Gatchel interview, and Hanley interview with Mike McDevitt, CNA, 5 August 2014

⁹⁶ Ibid., Gatchel interview and McGruther email, 26 June 2015.

⁹⁷ Ibid., for account of briefing Commander SIXTH Fleet off of Beirut.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Cited in Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy*; and Strategic Studies Group, *Fighting Forward and Winning: A Concept for Employing Maritime Forces to Exploit Soviet Weaknesses in a Global Confrontation* (Center for Naval Warfare Studies: The Newport Papers, n.d.).

- #2. Never argue with an idiot. The people watching may not be able to tell the difference.
- #4. Observe everything; admire nothing!
- #5. Never resist the opportunity to keep your mouth shut!
- #11. It's anatomically difficult to hit someone in the nose while you are wringing your hands over his capability.

Thanks to the efforts of Gatchel in assembling these rules, SSG II was the only Group offered payment for its work, as the *Reader's Digest* offered to publish this set of rules.¹⁰⁰

While some received orders, several in the Group remained at Newport to play their concepts in the 1983 Global War Game.

In April 1983, Watkins sent a memo to OP-01 stating that he intended to become personally involved in assignment of officers to the SSG and in their follow-on assignments.¹⁰¹ Anderson and Armstrong were selected for Flag rank while on the Group. Armstrong went to OP-095 as OP-953, in charge of Navy tactical development and evaluation. Anderson went to the Joint Staff and then to command. McDevitt went to OP-095 as Deputy to Rear Admiral Bobby Bell, OP-950 in charge of integrating Navy warfare assessments. Many officers still considered assignment to the SSG as risky. Beedle, concerned that assignment as Executive Assistant to OP-06 would jeopardize his chances of making Flag in the submarine community, chose to resign and became an executive at the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations.¹⁰²

Like those of SSG I, SSG II's games and analyses directly affected war plans, this time in the Mediterranean and Pacific.

The Johnston study

During SSG II, Bob Murray requested Doug Johnston, Executive Director of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government Executive Program on National and International

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., Gatchel Interview.

¹⁰¹ Memorandum for OP-01, from Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Strategic Studies Group Detailing, 20 April, 1983. The memo was occasioned by his EA, CAPT Dave Jeremiah, learning that BUPERS intended to order Mike McDevitt to that command, not to a job involving ideas about naval warfare, operations, strategy, or tactics. (McDevitt interview with Swartz, 4 Dec 2015.)

¹⁰² Ibid., McDevitt interview.

Security and a Navy Reserve captain, to study relations between CNWS and NWC and provide his findings during his two-week annual training. The findings addressed institutional jealousies and recommended arrangements to address them. A major finding was that the NWC faculty, particularly in the Naval Operations Department, felt that they were not getting enough from the SSG.¹⁰³ Johnson proposed solutions, such as SSG lectures, to improve the two-way flow of information. Coming as Murray departed, the proposed solutions were never implemented. The SSG was at, but not of, the NWC.

SSG III (1983-1984)

Focus: National and Navy strategies to counter Cuba, Libya, and Persian Gulf contingencies, as part of the Maritime Strategy

The SSG experienced significant leadership and staff changes over the summer of 1983. Bob Murray had accepted a job at Harvard. Commander Ken McGruther went to command. Rear Admiral Jim Service had relieved Rear Admiral Ed Welch as President of the College. Admiral Service recommended Dr. Robert S. (Bob) Wood, then Chairman of the Strategy Department, to be the next SSG Director. While on leave over the summer, Wood received calls first from Watkins, then from Secretary John Lehman, offering him the job.¹⁰⁴ Lehman had a direct hand in many senior Navy personnel affairs, often to the consternation of the CNO. Professor Jim Kurth also came in to help arrange visits and advise the Group. Captain Frank Julian remained Deputy to the Dean of CNWS/Director SSG; Commander Jim Hinds remained as administrative officer. John Hanley remained as an analyst with the Group.

Wood had initially come to the NWC as a visiting lecturer from the University of Virginia. Following his lecture, he was asked to come as a visiting professor, and then asked to chair the Strategy Department. He was comfortable addressing strategy in international relations and political science, but had no experience in translating strategy into action, as he knew the CNO expected the SSG to do. He decided to run the SSG as Bob Murray had.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Letter to Robert J. Murray, From Douglas M. Johnston, Jr., May 20, 1983.

¹⁰⁴ Hanley interview with Dr. Robert S. Wood, Naval War College, 24 August 2014.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

In September 1983, Wood sent a letter to Watkins expressing his concern about the ability of the SSG to respond directly to tasking he was receiving from fleet commands, OP-06 and OP-095.¹⁰⁶ This resulted in the CNO promulgating the first official memorandum establishing SSG objectives, tasks, and organizational relationships.¹⁰⁷ The stated objective of the Group was to be “the Navy’s focal point on framing strategic issues and the conceptualization/development of concepts for naval strategy and tactics.” The SSG tasks were:

- To evaluate current strategy
- To link U.S. naval strategy to national, joint, and alliance concerns
- To provide study and analysis for expanding understanding of combined arms in naval warfare¹⁰⁸
- To establish a strategic context in which to shape naval forces and frame decisions about technology, force mix, programming and training
- To foster thought and discussions about U.S. naval strategy.

This memo established that only the CNO tasked the SSG, that the CNO would personally assign officers to the SSG, and that following their service on SSG the Fellows would serve in OP-06 or OP-095 “and will in all cases have CNO approval.” The CNO included the essence of this memo into his Flag officers’ newsletter.¹⁰⁹ This memo protected the Director of the SSG and the President, NWC, from others who sought to influence the work of the Group.¹¹⁰

At about this time, RADM Ron Marryott (OP-60) was in Newport to brief the second version of the OP-603-drafted Maritime Strategy to the CNO and several former

¹⁰⁶ Letter from Robert S. Wood to Admiral Watkins, 7 September 1983.

¹⁰⁷ Memo from CNO to President, Naval War College and Director SSG, Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG) Objectives, Tasks and Organizational Relationship, Ser 00/3U300345, 12 September 1983.

¹⁰⁸ Owens and Wolkensdorfer in SSG I adopted the term “combined arms ASW” as describing the use of submarines, air, and surface ASW forces in a task force, rather than independently. This became a central element of naval operational art, and was thus included in future SSG tasks. They adopted the term from the Army’s use in applying combined infantry, artillery, and tank formations. This term creates some confusion with “combined” operations referring to multinational forces; the context is needed in order to clarify the meaning.

¹⁰⁹ Input for Flag officers’ newsletter, 9/83.

¹¹⁰ See for example, Memo from Director, Naval Warfare (OP-095), To: President of the Naval War College, Subj: Gaming of Critical Deployments during Crisis and Transition Periods, Ser 095/4U339137, 1 May 1984. This memo requests that the SSG game timely MAB deployments in critical areas during the transition to war. This request was not consistent with SSG III’s focus, but was addressed as part of a broader PHIBSTRAT effort.

CNOs. SSG I alumnus Captain Bill Owens and SSG II alumni Commodore Skip Armstrong and Captain Jay Hurlburt also participated in the discussion, continuing the SSG's influence on the strategy's development.¹¹¹ Larry Seaquist arrived early enough to play on the Red team in Global War Game '83, which helped set him up for his year on the SSG and future assignments.¹¹²

SSG III included the following members:

- Colonel Edward V. (Ed) Bodalato, USMC (aviation)
- Colonel William A. (Andy) Hesser, USMC (ground)
- Captain Andrew C.A. (Andy) Jampoler, USN (maritime patrol aviation)
- Captain Larry R. Marsh, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain Richard L. (Dick) Martin, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain Frederick M. (Mike) Pestorius, USN (submarine warfare)
- Commander Gordon G. Riggle, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain Larry R. Seaquist, USN (surface warfare).

The Navy officers in this Group were remarkable for all having graduate degrees. Mike Pestorius and Dick Martin held Ph.D.s. Watkins had not provided any tasking for the Group. As before, the SSG staff and others suggested approaches for identifying SSG tasking to focus the research earlier in the year.¹¹³ Through internal discussions and orientation briefings and meetings, SSG III began by pushing down the path of SSGs I & II, looking at problems of fighting the Soviets.¹¹⁴ During September, the Group suggested alternative topics around which to organize their study.¹¹⁵ An area of concern was what Soviet "client states" or "surrogates" such as

¹¹¹ Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986* (Newport Paper #19 (Newport RI: Naval War College, 2004), p. 79. For a brief period in 1982 and 1983, O-7 flag officers received the title of Commodore Admiral or Commodore.

¹¹² Hanley interview with Captain Larry Seaquist, USN (Retired), Gig Harbor, WA, 7 October, 2014. Seaquist had also had a previous tour as a Navy Federal Executive Fellow (FEF) at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

¹¹³ Memorandum from J. Hanley to Dr. Etzold, Subj: Improving the Efficiency of the SSG, 24 Feb 83.

¹¹⁴ Like those of SSGs I and II, SSG III's records do not document their early briefings and meetings at the Naval War College, or their travel to Washington and Harvard in August and September.

¹¹⁵ Memorandum for the SSG, Subj: 83-84 Work Program Proposal, signed by Andrew C.A. Jampoler, 16 September 1983, and Memorandum for SSG, From: F.M. Pestorius, Subj: SSG III Study Strawman, 26 September 1983.

Cuba and Libya might do in the event of war with the Soviets.¹¹⁶ The Group started with the problem of Cuba. At their meeting with Watkins on 14 October, Wood suggested that the national command authorities might ask the Navy to strike Qaddafi and to ask the fleet to enter the Persian Gulf because of the Iran/Iraq war. Watkins was not sympathetic, but said to “go do it.” He cautioned against mal-deploying the fleet for a fight with the Soviets.¹¹⁷

Wood noted that travel was a key to the SSG pursuing their project.¹¹⁸ SSG III was visiting Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces Atlantic (CINCLANT) headquarters on 25 October 1983, just two days after the bombings of the Marine barracks and other facilities in Beirut. As they waited to meet with the commander, Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, staff scurried in and out of the admiral’s office. After about an hour, Bob said to one officer, “If I didn’t know better, I would think you were fighting a war.” The officer went out. Shortly after, the admiral’s executive assistant came out and led the SSG into the operations center where they watched the invasion of Grenada.¹¹⁹

The Group decided to study Cuba in the context of a war with the Soviets, and Libya and the Persian Gulf as places where naval forces were likely to be employed both in stand-alone crises and in war with the Soviets. They formed three teams to study Cuba, Libya, and the Persian Gulf. The study objective was to prevent crises, influence crisis outcomes, and prevail in general war.¹²⁰

In early November, the Group visited commands and civilian institutes in Europe.¹²¹ Later, when SSG III visited Saudi Arabia, the Saudis did not want them talking to oil

¹¹⁶ The early OP-603 *Maritime Strategy* brief had a chart of states that could cause problems when fighting the Soviets.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Wood interview.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ Naval War College Memorandum, Subj: Strategic Studies Group III, signed by R.S. Wood, Director Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 17 October 1983.

¹²¹ SSG III Trip Reports Folder. The following SSG fall orientation trip was typical:

- 31 Oct–4 Nov, London/Oxford England: Meetings at CINCUSNAVEUR with Deputy CINC Vice Admiral Staser Holcomb/staff and Fleet Marine Forces Europe (FMF EUR), discussing contingency plans, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford Analytica
- 4–8 Nov, Stuttgart, Germany: Meetings with European Command (EUCOM) staff
- 8–10 Nov, Naples/Gaeta, Italy: Flew on P-3. Meetings with Commander Task Forces 67 & 69, meeting with Admiral Small (CINCUSNAVEUR/CINCSOUTH) and NATO staff, COMSIXTHFLT staff (including COS Sam Leeds from SSG I).

executives about threats to the region. Group members had to use a subterfuge of having individual representatives meet them sequentially at a house of one of the executives.¹²² In addition, most of the Group was involved in a mid-air collision when they went up in a tanker to observe an AWACS refueling. Andy Jampoler handed out parachutes for the emergency landing, not telling anyone that they were one short and he did not take one, which no one knew until after they landed safely. This incident resulted in the Group not being welcome in the newly established U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) for a while.¹²³

Building on their visits around Washington, D.C., during their orientation and study of national decision-making, SSG III conducted its first game 16-17 November 1983.¹²⁴ This game addressed decision-making at the level of the NSC, escalation and intentions, the roles that various actors were likely to play, and international law in three Southwest Asia scenarios: an internal threat to petroleum production facilities, an external regional threat (Iran), and the transition from crisis management to general war in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.¹²⁵

The Group's access under Bob Wood was as it had been with Bob Murray. They returned to Harvard and Washington, D.C., the week of 9 January to discuss their thinking with knowledgeable people. Meetings included those with:

- The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- *Newsweek* magazine
- The Joint Staff
- Larry Korb (Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics)
- The National Military Command Center (NMCC)
- The Navy Command Center
- *Congressional Quarterly*
- The National Security Council (NSC) staff
- Dr. Jim Roche, Northrop Corporation (also Captain, USN (Retired), former Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Director, and future Secretary of the Air Force)

¹²² *Ibid.*, Wood interview.

¹²³ Phone interviews with Captain Andrew C. A. Jampoler, USN (Retired), 19 June 2014, and Rear Admiral Larry R. Marsh, USN (Retired), 8 March 2015.

¹²⁴ Memorandum, From: COL Hesser, To: SSG Fellows, Subj: SSG Crisis Game, 16-17 Nov '83; Lessons Learned, 18 November 1983.

¹²⁵ Moderators included Anton W. Deporte; Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, Royal Marines (Retired); Don Daniel; Bing West; Bob Murray; and Thomas M. DeFrank.

- The Department of State
- The National Security Agency (NSA)
- SRA International Incorporated
- Major General Colin Powell, USA (Military Assistant to SECDEF).¹²⁶

Pestorius noted that a meeting with Representative Newt Gingrich was “particularly memorable.”¹²⁷

The Group conducted SSG Game 7 during 30 January–3 February 1984.¹²⁸ The objective of the game was to explore and test concepts developed by the SSG for each of their regions and to draw out common elements of the National Command Authority (NCA) crisis decision-making process. The intent was to raise questions and help focus on key issues to study during the remainder of the year. This game involved an NCA/Washington Agency team and three regional teams addressing simultaneous scenarios: a Cuban crisis coincidental with a buildup of tensions in Europe preparatory to a NATO/Warsaw Pact war; a crisis involving Libya and Libya’s role in a NATO/Warsaw Pact war; and situations in the Persian Gulf. It included participants from the OPNAV, Intelligence Community, the Unified CINCs and their Navy component commands, Army and Air Force European component commands, the Department of State, and Harvard University.¹²⁹

The Cuba team (Pestorius and Hesser) attended a Caribbean Basin Symposium at the Armed Forces Staff College on 18-19 January 1984, and visited military commands in the Caribbean on 7–13 February 1984. During these trips, the team learned that command relationships were murky and most of the staffs had not thought about the problem of Cuba and the area’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in a European war.¹³⁰ The SSG visits stimulated the initiation of planning at those commands.

¹²⁶ Memorandum for Distribution, Subj: Schedule (etc.) for week of 9 January, 5 January 1984.

¹²⁷ Email from Mike Pestorius to Hanley, 24 June 2015.

¹²⁸ SSG III Game 7 folder.

¹²⁹ CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Navy Operational Intelligence Center (NOIC), Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT), CINCUSNAVEUR, U.S. Army Central Command (USARCENT) from Europe, U.S. Air Forces in Central Europe (USCENTAF), Commander-in-Chief U.S. Forces Pacific (CINCPAC), Commander U.S. Forces in the Caribbean (COMUSFORCARIB), COMSIXTHFLT, OP-603, Department of State, USMC HQ, CINCLANT, aircraft squadron VA-35, and Harvard University.

¹³⁰ Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Trip Report, 15 February 1984, signed by Pestorius and Hesser.

The Group provided an update on their progress to Watkins during a trip to Washington on 9-10 February. Then Seaquist, working in Libya, visited COMSIXTHFLT and CINCUSNAVEUR staffs to get their impressions of SSG III's concepts under development. He noted that both staffs, because of players returning from the SSG's game and his visit, "were clearly moving into synch with SSG thinking," and that both staffs were looking forward to participating in next SSG game. Dealing with Lebanon occupied the COMSIXTHFLT staff and they were pleased that SSG was helping get a handle on what might be their next problem. Both staffs welcomed the return of the Libya team the second week in March to discuss "full findings and analysis."¹³¹

Over the year, the Group traded internal point papers on their appreciation of the issues and topics requiring further investigation, meeting frequently to discuss these ideas as the previous Groups had done.¹³²

The Group held SSG Game 8 during 9-13 April 1984.¹³³ The game's objectives were to:

- Reexamine/extend Southwest Asia strategies.
- Reexamine/extend Cuba strategies.
- Explore and test a number of SSG general/crisis management strategies/techniques.
- Discuss and refine crisis management ideas.
- Stimulate SSG thinking about the elements of a general crisis-related strategy.

This game was similar to Game 7 with an NCA team and three regional teams working simultaneously. The specific objectives of the NCA/Washington Agencies team were to:¹³⁴

- Continue the efforts of the previous SSG crisis management war game to structure and conduct the game play of the NCA/Washington Agencies, in order to expose the issues and decisions involved in crisis management.
- Expose the processes and knowledge involved in strategic thinking, in order to devise a formal approach to developing strategies.

¹³¹ Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Trip Report, Strategic Studies Group, European Liaison Division, 16 February 1984, signed by Larry Seaquist.

¹³² SSG III Planning Folder.

¹³³ SSG III Game 8 folder.

¹³⁴ NCA/Washington Agencies' Portion of the General Crisis Management (CM) Game, Enclosure (7).

- Expose the fundamental objectives, relations, and forces that crisis management actions attempt to influence, in order to represent them in a more graphic form.

In April, the SSG briefed the Navy CINC's conference in Annapolis. Some participants did not agree with the SSG's abbreviated presentation of the three theaters. In particular, Vice Admiral Lyons (OP-06 and former COMSECONDFLT) disagreed with SSG III's concepts for using diplomatic measures and controlling the Florida Strait with forces reserved for homeland defense to allow reinforcements to flow to Europe from the Gulf of Mexico, rather than "neutralizing" Cuba. Neutralizing Cuba would have required more munitions than were available to SECONDFLT and would have delayed forces flowing forward. Pestorius observed, outside the meeting, "The various war plans failed to have any cooperation or overlap. Many plans assumed the use of forces and capabilities that they did not own."¹³⁵ Wood responded in a letter to Watkins that the SSG was grappling with how to conceive and manage crises and contingencies generally.¹³⁶ They chose these theaters because they not only related to the forward maritime strategy, but also because they provided relevant areas from which they could draw and analyze issues, and served as illustrations of the several points the Group was developing.

The Group participated in the CNWS May Conference, which had become an annual event. It also briefed the CNO Executive Panel (CEP) on 24 May 1984 to get their response.¹³⁷

The SSG presented its final brief to the CNO on 19 June 1984. In a follow-up letter, to Watkins, Wood provided responses to tasks assigned at this briefing and a section of the brief on general problems in the management of crises that they did not have time to brief.¹³⁸ Enclosures included a draft CNO memorandum for the Libyan theater and a draft letter to CINCLANT from the CNO accompanied by SSG work on Cuba. The letter promised a draft CNO memorandum for Southwest Asia providing a general perspective within which the role of naval forces in the Gulf could be evaluated and related to non-maritime forces. It also noted that the Group was preparing a briefing for the Secretary of State on the need to develop inter-agency contingency planning, using the Cuban and Libyan cases as examples. It also suggested possible tasks for SSG IV.

¹³⁵ Ibid., Pestorius email.

¹³⁶ Robert S. Wood letter to Admiral Watkins, 30 April 1984.

¹³⁷ The CEP was, and is, a group of retired senior government and civilian executives and thought leaders selected by the CNO to advise him on topics of interest to him.

¹³⁸ Robert S. Wood letter to Admiral Watkins, 21 June 1984.

Admiral Watkins appreciated the work in the end, tying it to his theme of “violent peace.”¹³⁹

The officers from SSG III departed over the period 1 July–1 August 1984.¹⁴⁰ On 6 November 1984, the NWC President, Rear Admiral Service, forwarded the original SSG III report to the CNO for his review, recommending 28 copies for distribution.¹⁴¹ On 12 March 1985, Wood forwarded the final report to 21 recipients, the numbered fleet commanders holding the lowest rank.¹⁴² Wood characterized the SSG as developing and testing concepts related to the forward maritime strategy, noting that the assistance of the staffs of those receiving the document had been invaluable in directing and shaping these efforts. He noted that SSG III concentrated on the use of maritime forces in outlying regions in crisis and war, and that they had already received the Group’s recommendations in briefings and CNO messages.

The report provided the studies and analyses underlying the recommendations. Later that year, Captain Jampoler published an unclassified article in the *Naval War College Review* distilling many of the issues raised by the first three SSGs.¹⁴³

Over the year, Seaquist had worked on his own ideas for “Maritime Architecture Project Development,” described as “a proposal “to ‘build’ an architecture of naval warfighting functions with the objective of bridging the gaps between the *Maritime Strategy* and actual fleet operations (on the fleet CINC side) and naval program development (on the OPNAV side).”¹⁴⁴ In August 1984 he also completed “The Strategic Diamond Ring: A Strawman Description of the Field of Naval Strategy,” relating strategies to institutional functions “by which naval staffs build, maintain,

¹³⁹ Ibid., Wood interview. The “violent peace” theme will reappear in Watkins’ promulgation of an unclassified version of *The Maritime Strategy* in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* special January 1986 supplement.

¹⁴⁰ SSG IV Orientation Folder.

¹⁴¹ Letter from RADM Jim Service [PNWC] to Admiral Watkins, 6 Nov 1984. Cited in Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy*, and Strategic Studies Group, *The Use of Maritime Forces in Outlying Regions in Crisis and War* (Newport: Center for Naval Warfare Studies: The Newport Papers, ca.1984.)

¹⁴² MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION, Subj: Final Report of Strategic Studies Group III, signed by Robert S. Wood, 12 March 1985.

¹⁴³ CAPT Andrew Jampoler, “A Central role for Naval Forces . . . to Support the Land Battle,” *Naval War College Review* (Nov-Dec 1984), 4-12.

¹⁴⁴ Memorandum for Dr. Wood, Director, CNWS/SSG, Via: CAPT Martin, Sr. Fellow, SSG, Subj: Maritime Architecture Project Development, 23 January 1984, signed Larry Seaquist.

and use the strategies,” and “Expanding the Forward Maritime Strategy: A catalog of tasks for naval strategists.” This work built upon a paper that he had written in April 1984, “Using the Maritime Strategy: An Analysis Proposal.”¹⁴⁵ Seaquist’s work on relating strategy to fleet operations and Navy program development was to serve him well in future assignments.

The efforts of SSG III were very successful in stimulating debate among the Navy leadership, particularly with Vice Admiral Lyons (former COMSECONDFLT, later OP-06). SIXTH Fleet adopted some of their concepts, and they stimulated planning at other commands in the Caribbean. Their efforts to address interagency strategy and decision-making at the NSC proved a valuable experience for them, but had no impact on national processes. However, it did set a precedent with Watkins on the role of the SSG in addressing broader national strategies and plans. They also contributed to the secret Maritime Strategy document being conceptualized and briefed by OPNAV (OP-603).

Though he preferred officers not going to command to have assignments in OPNAV, CNO approved Jampoler to be Executive Assistant to CINCPACFLT.¹⁴⁶ Marsh relieved Owens as Executive Assistant to OP-095, continuing the policy of stocking the Navy’s Warfare Directorate with SSG alumni. Seaquist went to be OP-603 (Head Strategic Concepts Branch), continuing development of *The Maritime Strategy*, and working with Badalato and other Marines on PHIBSTRAT—a strategy to help Watkins think through the use of Marines.¹⁴⁷ Pestorius went on to be commanding officer of the Naval Ocean Systems Center, relieving Captain Jim Patton (Admiral Hayward’s planner), to give him a major command before the FY-87 Flag Board.¹⁴⁸

However, Martin decided to retire and teach at Carnegie Mellon University. He had used his Ph.D. to develop computer scheduling when in command of USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN 70) and had developed computerized program schedules with detailed tasks for SSG III.¹⁴⁹ Riggle also decided to retire, and take a position with Senator Cohen on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee. These retirements caused a review of SSG assignment policy, resulting in an agreement for subsequent

¹⁴⁵ Seaquist Strategy Papers Folder.

¹⁴⁶ Chief of Naval Operations letter to Bob Wood, 17 May 1984.

¹⁴⁷ This was the first post-SSG assignment to an OPNAV “strategy” vice “warfare” billet.

¹⁴⁸ Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, via: Director, Naval Warfare (OP-095) and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Strategic Studies Group Detailing, 30 April 1984.

¹⁴⁹ For example, see Task net plans, 6 Month Overview, Created 27Oct83 in SSG III files.

Groups to remain on active duty for two years following completion of SSG assignments.¹⁵⁰

SSG IV (1984-1985)

Focus: A strategy to deter war

The selection of SSG IV began with a letter from Rear Admiral Service, President of NWC, to CNO Watkins in February 1984, offering strong nominees for the Group.¹⁵¹ The CNO did not respond with a letter, but took personal control over the SSG selection.¹⁵² In March, Watkins sent a memo to the Deputy CNOs (OP-02, 03, 05, 06, and 095) requesting officers “for this prestigious Group.”¹⁵³ In it he stated, “This Group is a critical and stabilizing part of our efforts to revitalize the Naval War College as a crucible for strategic and tactical thinking. Those we choose for the Strategic Studies Group must be our finest commanders and captains—those most likely to make Flag.” On 30 March, the Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence, provided a list of 17 officers for consideration, via the VCNO, Admiral Ronald J. Hays.¹⁵⁴ The VCNO requested that the CNO add one name to the list.¹⁵⁵

Wood passed on a request to CNO that he had received from the CMC General P.X. Kelley, to add a combat support officer to the Group to represent all Marine communities. Though Watkins thought that not all Marine communities needed representation, just as not all Navy communities had officers on the Group, SSG IV was the first to have three Marines.¹⁵⁶ In 1984, Leeds returned from SIXTH Fleet to CNWS as Wood’s Deputy. Julian went on to command the USS *Lasalle* (LPD 3).

¹⁵⁰ Memo from Executive Assistant to the DCNO (Manpower, Personnel and Training), for CNMPC, Subj: Agreement to Remain on Active Duty – Strategic Studies Group, signed Captain J.M. Boorda.

¹⁵¹ Letter to Admiral Watkins from Rear Admiral James E. Service, 27 February 1984.

¹⁵² Letter from President of the Naval War College, to Admiral Watkins, 15 February 1984.

¹⁵³ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Memorandum for the Distribution List, Subj: Nominees for Strategic Studies Group IV, Ser 00/4U300104, 1 March 1984.

¹⁵⁴ Bureau of Naval Personnel Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, via: Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Strategic Studies Group IV, 30 March 1984.

¹⁵⁵ Handwritten memo from Vice Chief of Naval Operations to CNO, 4 April 1984.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Wood letter, 30 April 1984.

Watkins selected six officers:

- Captain Jesse J. Hernandez, USN (maritime patrol aviation)
- Captain James R. (Jim) Lynch, USN (submarine warfare)
- Commander Thomas E. (Tom) Murphy, USN (SEAL)
- Captain George O'Brien, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain Will Rogers III, USN (surface warfare)
- Commander Harold P. (Hal) Sexton, USN (surface warfare).¹⁵⁷

Tom Murphy had a Ph.D. in addition to having commanded SEAL Team SIX.

The Marine communities were represented by Marine colonels Robert A. (Rob) Browning (aviation and ground), Lawrence R. (Larry) Medlin (aviation), and Edward J. Lloyd (combat support).

As the senior member of the Group, Jesse Hernandez kept detailed records of much of the Group's schedule (Appendix A). The Group arrived in July and August 1984 and began their orientation the week of 13 August. During their meeting on 16 August, Rear Admiral Service made it very clear that he understood that the Group worked directly for the CNO and that the CNO was very protective of this point.¹⁵⁸ He related a problem that SSG III was having: bringing the CINC's staffs onboard with their ideas, but not bringing the CINCs themselves, and then running into resistance at the Navy CINCs conference. He encouraged them to pre-brief the CINCs themselves and co-opt the opposition. He said that they had an ample travel budget to go where they needed, but not to "gold plate it"—e.g., have two to three people per rental car. He pointed to both "envy & xenophobia" out there, up to the CINC level, and encouraged them to "be aware and be sensitive."

While continuing its orientation reading and lectures at the NWC, the Group began its planning sessions on 30 August. The week of 12 September, they began orientation meetings in D.C. with a schedule similar to those of previous groups, and had their first meeting with the CNO to discuss tasking on 14 September.

Unlike previous years, the CNO knew what he wanted SSG IV to do.¹⁵⁹ He had given the tasking to Wood before their meeting. Watkins believed that present plans

¹⁵⁷ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Personnel, Subj: Strategic Studies Group IV, undated. Commander Byron L. Duff was on the original selection memo and replaced by George O'Brien. Office of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations Executive Assistant memo to OP-01A, Subj: Strategic Studies Group IV, 5 May 1984.

¹⁵⁸ SSG Orientation Plan folder: Memorandum on briefing by RADM Service on 16 August 1984.

¹⁵⁹ A care of nuclear war, launched by the Soviets, had occurred the previous November.

concentrated on warfighting and placed too little emphasis on deterrence. In his view, the national objective was to avoid war. He wanted SSG IV to work at a strategy to get the politicians off top dead center and “start to develop a deterrence strategy.” There were no cohesive plans for deterrence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did nothing but respond to crises, using force as deterrence with no thought-out options. He cautioned the SSG not to be involved in the details of execution or try to build the plans for the CINCs, but to influence the CINCs in building their plans. He told them that in the spring, the JCS would sponsor a deterrence game. He told them to use the Maritime Strategy as baseline. He noted that the ongoing PHIBSTRAT effort was a separate issue that OP-090 would be addressing. He expressed his desire to get key civilians involved in the spring game so that “we” can get the President away from the nuclear strategy and start working towards a strategy of deterrence.

Watkins envisioned running worldwide exercises for deterrence, annual exercises done on short notice—about 20 days. He told the Group to look to running a deterrence exercise in 1985 using 1985 forces. He asked the Group, to consider running a game in the spring wherein Cuba would be neutralized. He wondered about the State Department’s plan, and was still worried about Cuba following the work of SSG III. He said that we should take early action during the buildup phase of a crisis to protect our flanks. We must not allow the Soviets an opportunity for early massive build-up as a pre-war move. For example, he cautioned, don’t let them move into the airfields in Libya. We must prevent this sort of move.

The CNO went on to discuss some contingencies, which caused some confusion among SSG. The Group felt that his concepts were difficult to implement. He reiterated that in crises we send the military and no one knows what the mission is. He told the SSG not to focus only on the Navy and the Marines; early deployment for deterrence must include the other services. He also told them that “we must drill at early moves for deterrence and readiness rather than provocation.” He stated that recommendations for new forces or hardware would be all right. He told them to brief him in about one month using the same brief that they would give at the fall Navy CINCs conference. Watkins also noted that with this administration early decisions were possible, and reiterated that “we must get the top senior civilians and Congress to play in the spring game.” He wanted a public affairs strategy as part of the deterrence strategy, exercising the newly formed correspondence teams in deterrence exercises.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ Jim Lynch notebook: Memorandum for the Record, CNO Tasking Session, 14 September 1984.

When Watkins became CNO, he realized that he had not thought enough about nuclear issues.¹⁶¹ During his turnover, he spent about 8 hours with Captain Linton Brooks (OP-65B), and his boss Rear Admiral Jerry Holland (OP-65). Watkins had certain people to whom he turned for different subjects. Brooks became his go-to person on all subjects nuclear. However, Brooks did not have the CNO's ear on broader strategic issues. Being a devout Catholic, the prospect of nuclear war and his possible role in it deeply troubled Watkins. This led to his involvement in promoting the Strategic Defense Initiative. Watkins became deeply concerned with the morality of Mutually Assured Destruction and the position of the Catholic bishops against it.¹⁶² At his request, Wood, a Mormon bishop, counseled Watkins that the French bishops endorsed Mutually Assured Destruction, which alleviated some of Watkins' concerns.

SSG IV continued their orientation, picked up the pace of their planning, and made another trip to Washington, D.C., the week of 17 September for intelligence briefings and initial meetings with State Department, congressional staff, and the NSC staff. They organized into groups for addressing Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific areas and began making distinctions between general deterrence, deterrence in the present environment, deterrence on the brink of crisis, and deterrence on the brink of war.¹⁶³ On 3 October, they assigned teams to explore classes of deterrence measures.¹⁶⁴

On 12 October, the Group briefed the CNO on their approach, characterizing the SSG IV study of maritime deterrence as a subset of the national deterrence strategy. The proposed objective was "to develop a maritime strategy of deterrence as the cornerstone of a national deterrence strategy that would contribute to preventing the Soviet Union from political and/or military actions detrimental to the vital interests of the U.S. and its allies and to avoid direct conflict with the Soviets." The CNO told them to focus left of war, saying, "If we get to limited war we've lost." Watkins stated the need to focus on the State Department and Defense Department interface, believing that the State Department would eventually be the key player. He also expressed his concern over giving the CINC in Europe (CINCEUR) nuclear release authority, stating that "we can't leave global deterrence up to a CINC."¹⁶⁵ He

¹⁶¹ Hanley interview with Ambassador Linton Brooks (Retired), McLean, VA, 4 August 2014.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, Wood interview.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, Lynch notebook: "Some Definitions, or An effort to speak the same language!" 2 Oct 1984.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, SSG IV Groups, 3 Oct 1984.

¹⁶⁵ At that time, General Bernard Rogers (NATO SACEUR and USCINCEUR) was on record as having to use tactical nuclear weapons to stop a Warsaw Pact invasion.

emphasized that deterrence had to be linked to exercises. He told them to address Unified Command Plan issues through “warfighting structure command and control.”¹⁶⁶ Then they discussed a list of criteria to consider in studying deterrent measures: understanding the status quo, potential for increase in activity, etc.¹⁶⁷

Along with the SSG, Watkins had tasked the ATP with plans for managing Soviet perceptions and deterrence. At that time Rear Admiral Bobby Bell, OP-950, was running the ATP effort. Captain McDevitt (SSG II) was his Deputy. Bill Manthorpe was now a Navy civilian and was doing the bulk of the work on this effort, along with Rich Haver and then Commodore Bill Studeman. The CNO also told them to coordinate with the Army and Air Force, and ensure that they incorporated Rear Admiral Bell’s project. This would be the second time that the SSG worked closely with the ATP.

The Group adjusted their brief based upon the CNO’s comments and presented it to the Navy CINCs on 23 October. They then went to Europe to discuss their interests with major commands and think tanks.

Four SSG IV officers eligible for major command screening in November 1984 were concerned that follow-on assignment to OPNAV might restrict their command opportunities. In October 1984 Wood asked the CNO to broaden the follow-on assignment of SSG officers beyond OP-06 and OP-095 and include assignment to senior positions on fleet staffs and command. He noted, “Your belief [is] that the SSG officers are themselves a most important ‘strategy product.’”¹⁶⁸ OP-095 endorsed the request. This actually had been the practice all along. The CNO replied that there should be no cause for concern that the SSG would be assigned in a timely fashion to key billets, stating, “A review of data from the first three Groups shows this specialized, individual detailing attention to be working well.”¹⁶⁹ Watkins also supported having one former SSG officer serving as Dr. Wood’s Deputy, when possible.

¹⁶⁶ The Unified Command Plan is a document that the President uses to assign responsibilities to the combatant commanders.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Lynch notebook.

¹⁶⁸ Robert S. Wood letter to Admiral Watkins, 26 October 1984 with OP-095 endorsement.

¹⁶⁹ Chief of Naval Operations letter to Dr. Wood, 9 January 1985.

The Group participated in the Naval War College Media conference to glean ideas relevant in planning deterrence actions, and then played their first seminar war game on 19-20 November, in preparation for a game in Washington on 26-27 November.¹⁷⁰

The CNO had arranged for the Navy Chief of Chaplains to host a conference at the Naval War College on 9-11 December 1984 for a discussion on concepts for the legitimate use of force in different faiths. Members of the Group attended this conference in order to inform their concepts for appropriate deterrence actions.

In January, the SSG began detailed planning for a war game with the ATP, recognizing that the burden of proof was on the SSG to show that a specific behavior or action (measure) would have the desired deterrent effect.¹⁷¹ On 4-8 February they visited commands in the Pacific to gather information and get reactions to their ideas.

The SSG designed the March game with the ATP to test both SSG and ATP concepts. According to Wood, it

...Not only will game a crisis but will attempt to game a steady state with the Soviets—in that we will test deterrence measures both in a period of relative stability with the Soviets and a period of growing crisis. At the same time, we intend to stop the play periodically and re-play initiatives in order to see how they might develop in comparison to earlier moves.¹⁷²

Bob Blackwill headed the Red team, comprising intelligence officers from CIA, DIA, the Army and Air Force who had no knowledge of the SSG's topic.¹⁷³ They were not told that this was a deterrence game, but came expecting a war. The Blue team was composed of SSG members along with officers from OPNAV and selected members from key fleet and joint staffs. Captain O'Riordan, Royal Navy, participated in the game as the First Sea Lord's personal representative. The ATP had been deterrence options. Many focused on a period of crisis leading to war. Commodore Studeman and Haver were present to help play emerging deterrent ideas. While the SSG explored "crisis" deterrence, they put their weight on "structural" deterrence, using exercises and demonstrations well before a crisis occurred.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., Lynch notebook: Memorandum for the SSG, From: Lynch, Subj: Media Conference Notes, 20 November 1984.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., Lynch notebook: From: J.J. Hernandez, To: SSG, Dr. Wood, Dr. Kurth, LCDR Simeral, Mr. Hanley, Subj: 3 January Deterrence Measures Inputs.

¹⁷² Wood letter, 4 February 1985.

¹⁷³ SSG IV Games folder: SSG Game 4-2 Presentation of Results.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., Wood interview, and SSG Game 4-2 Presentation of Results.

In March, the CNO's office discussed the approaching JCS CINC's game and selling the Navy's combined strategy for deterrent options. There was some worry about the Red Team missing signals in the games and about the Soviets doing the same in the real world. The CNO's Executive Assistant, Commodore Michael Boorda, suggested using direct contact with the CINC's rather than working through the Joint Staff "to tell them what we are doing and what we intend in words they could not misunderstand." CNO wrote, "Sit on this until after CINC war game—we have time. A leak would do severe damage now to CINC's who have here to fore been relatively passive."¹⁷⁵ This led to the JCS war game on 15-19 April with both SSG and ATP participation.

The CNO had the Navy CINC's play a game at their NWC conference later in April. Admiral McDonald (CINCLANT) found it "invaluable to have the opportunity to listen to the unconstrained dialogue between the Chiefs as you dealt with the unfolding situations and I heartily agree with your recommendation that we strengthen all of these games with a 'real' Red Team—something I know you have espoused in our Navy games and which we are working on to incorporate when possible."¹⁷⁶

From the end of April through May, SSG IV briefed their work on deterrence options widely. On 29 April, the USMC officers briefed Marine Corps on elements of the plan in Norfolk, VA. On 3 May, members of SSG IV briefed at CNA.

On 14-16 May, CNWS sponsored an SSG reunion in conjunction with the annual May Conference, bringing back Admiral Hayward (Retired) and all SSG Fellows who could attend, including those newly selected for SSG V. The conference and reunion brought together "1) academics and analysts who have seriously thought about issues of national security, 2) senior officials from throughout the Federal Government, and 3) naval and other officers who have been intimately connected with the development of the Maritime Strategy." According to Wood, the SSG members participated in the seminars and had a "substantial impact on the thinking of the participants. Perhaps the most significant representative comment that I received was, 'I came here expecting a snow job but instead participated in the most significant strategic discussion in my career. The Navy must be very confident to be able to generate such important discussion.'"¹⁷⁷ On the side, SSG IV briefed the details of their work to those who had the clearances and need to know.

¹⁷⁵ Memorandum for CNO from Executive Assistant, 26 March 1985.

¹⁷⁶ Letter from Admiral W.L. McDonald, Commander in Chief Atlantic and Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, 30 April 1985.

¹⁷⁷ Letter from Robert S. Wood to Admiral Watkins, 22 May 1985.

On 17 May 1985, SSG IV briefed the CEP. On 22 May, they briefed the President NWC, Rear Admiral Service, and on 24 May briefed the CNO and SECNAV Lehman. Lehman asked Wood to remain following the brief. He told Wood that the SSG was doing good work, but that the answer was always “600 ships.”¹⁷⁸

On 17 June 1985, the SSG briefed the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse. He responded with a letter to Admiral Watkins applauding and supporting the “robust and thoughtful approach to the balance between provocation and increased deterrent posture,” and thanked the CNO for involving his staff in the SSG war game.¹⁷⁹

The International Seapower Symposium was held 21 October 1985 at the NWC, and attended by free-world navies. Watkins presented his thoughts on deterrence and gaming, emphasizing his strong belief in deterrence, using bilateral rather than full NATO cooperation where appropriate, and the value that he placed on war games. He invited the foreign navy chiefs to participate in gaming at the NWC (Appendix B).¹⁸⁰ Also at this event, Watkins announced that he would publish an unclassified version of *The Maritime Strategy*.

As in previous years, SSG IV wrote a report—classified Top Secret—with very limited distribution to top Navy leadership and the CMC.¹⁸¹ Their work contributed directly to the creation of the Navy options for deterring the Soviets. The JCS expanded this approach to their own collection of deterrence options for all of the services. The Navy soon began executing some of these.¹⁸²

Following their year on the SSG, Hal Sexton became Executive Assistant to OP-06. Tom Murphy became Deputy Director of the CEP (OP-00K). Jim Lynch went to command USS *Simon Lake* (AS 33). Jesse Hernandez relieved Mike McDevitt (SSG II) as OP-950B. George O’Brien went into the nuclear carrier commanding officer pipeline on his way to USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN 70).¹⁸³ The Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral William Lawrence, proposed that Will Rogers go to the Assistant Chief of Staff for

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., Wood interview.

¹⁷⁹ Letter from Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse to Admiral James D. Watkins, No. 1300/10, 19 June 1985.

¹⁸⁰ Remarks by Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, International Seapower Symposium, Newport RI, 21 October 1985, “Alliance Maritime Power and Deterrence of War.”

¹⁸¹ Cited in Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy*, and Strategic Studies Group, *Global Maritime Elements of U.S. National Deterrence Strategy* (Center for Naval Warfare Studies: The Newport Papers, n.d.)

¹⁸² Ibid., Seaquist interview, 7 October 2014.

¹⁸³ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Personnel, Subj: Strategic Studies Group Detailing, Ser 00/5U300114, 27 March 1985.

Operations and Plans at Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURFPAC) for family concerns.¹⁸⁴ OP-095 penned on the memo that Captain Rogers should go to OP-090, having served in OP-96, citing that his family concern was that his wife wanted to return to San Diego and that he already had a tour on the COMNAVSURFPAC staff “for me.” The VCNO agreed. On the memo detailing SSG V, CNO commented to OP-01 (Chief of Naval Personnel), “I assume the SSG members are all advised when they are selected to this unique Group that follow-on tours will be IAW [in accordance with] my policy.”¹⁸⁵ Captain Rogers would later take command of USS *Vincennes* (CG-49), in April 1987.

Hernandez passed down an extensive set of notes to Captain Leighton W. Smith, the senior member of SSG V. These notes covered lessons on travel, comments on SSG staff, discussion of fitness reports, early tasks, NWC events to monitor, and report writing.¹⁸⁶

SSG V (1985-1986)

Focus: Peacetime uses of the Navy in an era of “violent peace”

In 1985, Wood reorganized CNWS, establishing the Strategy and Campaign Department led by Professor Don Daniel and changing the War Gaming Center to a department. He told the CNO, “Both of these departments will now provide a more focused foundation for the work undertaken by the SSG, both in terms of ‘spade work’ for the SSG and pursuing follow-up studies.” The NWC faculty and CNWS staff also formed Fleet Teams to work with each of the numbered fleets. Wood requested that Captain Tom Murphy remain to assist in implementing the reorganization of CNWS.¹⁸⁷ The CNO agreed with CNWS reorganization plans and endorsed retaining one (underlining original) post-SSG officer to serve on CNWS staff. He could not

¹⁸⁴ Bureau of Naval Personnel Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, via: Director, Naval Warfare (OP-095) and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Strategic Studies Group Detailing, 14 March 1985.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, CNO memo, 27 March 1985

¹⁸⁶ He noted, “Hanley usually writes, and helps prepare final briefs, but we did this year.” SSG V admin folder: pass down notes from CAPT Hernandez to CAPT Smith, 16 July.

¹⁸⁷ Robert S. Wood letter to Admiral Watkins, 4 February 1985.

support Captain Murphy because Leeds was not scheduled to leave until the summer of 1986.¹⁸⁸

Along with CNWS, the SSG underwent significant changes in 1985. Concerned over the growth of CNWS and the potential for turning the SSG into just another think tank, Wood recommended bringing in a director for the SSG separate from the CNWS Dean.¹⁸⁹ With an endorsement to the CNO from Admiral McDonald (CINCLANT),¹⁹⁰ Ambassador Marshall Bremont—whose pro-Navy diplomacy as U.S. Ambassador to Iceland had caught the eye of SECNAV John Lehman—became Director of the SSG in September. In spite of Wood’s intentions to maintain close relations between CNWS and the SSG, separating the organizations led to separate agendas and less CNWS support to the SSG. Also in September, John Hanley returned to government service as the Program Director for the Group.¹⁹¹ Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott took over as President, NWC on 8 August 1985, having presided over the promulgation of *The Maritime Strategy* as OPNAV OP-60.

Watkins began the SSG V selection process in January 1985 with a memo requesting four candidates each from OP-02, 03, 05, 06, 090, and 095, emphasizing the SSG’S role in providing “valuable strategic and tactical concepts, and stimulating our discussions and thinking in these vital areas.”¹⁹² He again requested those most likely to make Flag.

The CNO selected, in order of seniority:

- Captain Leighton W. (Snuffy) Smith, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain Arnold R. (Robin) Battaglini, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain John B. (Bat) Laplante, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain Philip A. (Phil) Boyer, III, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain Irve C. (Chuck) Lemoyne, USN (SEAL)
- Commander Dennis J. Carroll, USN (carrier aviation).

¹⁸⁸ Chief of Naval Operations letter to Dr. Robert S. Wood, 13 March 1985.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Wood interview.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, McDonald letter, 30 April 1985.

¹⁹¹ Bob Wood had offered him the position in 1983, but it took two years to approve and fund the billet. Hanley had taken over much of the scheduling and advising for the Group as CNWS consumed more of Dr. Wood’s time. Hanley was also beginning his third year of studies towards his Ph.D. in operations research and management science at Yale, on a half-time basis, with Bob Wood’s strong support.

¹⁹² Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for Distribution, Subj: Nominees for Strategic Studies Group V, Ser 00/5U300041, 29 January 1985.

OP-095 had recommended Captains Smith and Laplante and Commander Carroll.¹⁹³ Marine colonels Stephen E. (Steve) Lindblom (ground), Bertie D. (Don) Lynch (combat support), and Thomas A. (Tom) Bowditch (aviation) rounded out the Group.

Using results from the May Conference, Wood had suggested topic options for SSG V. These included examining the logistic and campaign implications of work done by the previous Groups; exploring how to include the Maritime Strategy in a national forward strategy including other services and allies; looking at war termination; and looking at developing trends and examining views of the nature of the threat beyond that contained in National Intelligence Estimates.¹⁹⁴ Watkins responded that there were more pressing issues than time for the SSG to examine them.¹⁹⁵ He continued:

However, there is one aspect of maritime strategy development which I consider extremely urgent.

As I mentioned during our last meeting, I think World War III is already underway. Considering all the possible aspects of maritime power, I believe next year's SSG should focus on the early, low violence end of the spectrum rather than the later, high violence end. We need to understand better how to use the Navy in the war which is in progress. Deterrence of global war is one aspect, and SSG IV has examined this well. Now we need to consider the more general topic of how to employ the Navy in opposing Soviet expansion and supporting U.S. national interests worldwide.

There are several reasons for selecting this focus for next year's effort:

It is relevant to what the Navy actually does on a day to day basis. Intuitively, which superpower triumphs is probably as much dependent on the Navy's success in the third world as on how many tanks there are in Germany, but we have not looked at the subject in detail.

It is the best use of the SSG's operational expertise. Next year is an especially good time to undertake this project since Ambassador

¹⁹³ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Personnel, Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG) V, Ser 00/5U300120, 1 April 1985.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Wood letter, 22 May 1985.

¹⁹⁵ Letter from Admiral Watkins to Robert S. Wood, 17 June 1985.

Bremont will bring direct, first hand understanding of the utility to the foreign policy establishment of the peacetime use of the Navy.

It is unlikely to be examined elsewhere. In contrast, with the general acceptance of the broad outlines of the Maritime Strategy, refinement of that strategy will continue no matter what the SSG does.

In view of the foregoing, I think SSG V should concentrate on the peacetime use of the Navy. The focus should not primarily be on deterrence of global war—which SSG IV had already examined—but rather on using the Navy to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives generally. This would expand and build on the work of SSG IV and include both those actions of the Navy primarily aimed at Soviet expansion and those directed at other nations or surrogates. Such an examination should be intellectually challenging for the SSG and the results should be exceptionally useful.

SSG V began its orientation on 8 August 1985. Ambassador Bremont began his orientation upon his arrival on 9 September. By this time the template for SSG orientation had become well established (Appendix C provides SSG V's and Ambassador Bremont's orientation schedules). With Ambassador Bremont as Director, and given the nature of the tasking, the SSG spent a bit more time at the State Department than it had during previous Washington, D.C., visits. The SSG staff provided the schedule up to 23 September, then turned it over to the Group to revise and arrange.¹⁹⁶

SSG V first met with the CNO on 23 September. The CNO began by expressing his concern that the Soviets were outflanking NATO and the West, reiterating his point that World War III was going on now and his belief that the Soviets were winning. He discussed events in Libya, Syria, Persian Gulf, Korea, Nicaragua, and the Philippines, and said that he wanted peacetime options rather than looking at them in the context of global war. He envisioned that a possible outcome of study would be improvements to Defense Guidance, transmitted from CNO to Chairman of the Joint Staff (CJCS), and from SECNAV to SECDEF. He stressed that the strategy must support national policy. He said that they could not go to CINCs seeking ideas. He said, "Once we know what we are doing, tell the CINCs, not their staffs. Discuss the project with the CINCs in October."

He was not looking for new missions to justify the 600-ship navy; rather, he thought the study should be bound by current resources and operational security concerns. He was looking for imaginative schemes, stating that "we [the Navy] are reactive,

¹⁹⁶ SSG V Schedules folder: SSG V Orientation Schedule, 2nd Revision, 8/6/85.

used as a force of convenience, and to show presence without real reason.” He encouraged the SSG to be more aggressive in order to balance Soviet and Soviet surrogate victories, stating that the Soviets do it better. He told the Group that Ambassador Brement would be helpful with area sensitivities, and not to frighten the CINCs. He told them not to get wrapped up in NWC “pet projects,” that they were not members of NWC. He wanted an independent solution. He emphasized that the Group was answerable only to him and Ambassador Brement.

He needed options to blunt Soviet actions, “discredit them in world public opinion,” and influence other nations’ thinking that United States is a responsible country, but also tough. He was looking for area-specific strategies rather than larger ones, noting that others were working countering drugs and terrorism. He said that their work might end up affecting changes in national policy. The Peoples Republic of China and India were beyond the SSG’s scope; others were working those areas. He cautioned them to have nothing to do with what OP-65 was doing with the Strategic Defense Initiative. He wanted military operations. He tasked the SSG to give him an update a week before they were to present their thinking to the Navy CINCs conference.¹⁹⁷

Admiral Watkins was again looking for a national strategy; again well to the left of war, and this time going beyond the Soviets to broader U.S. foreign policy interests.

The Group returned to the CNO on 16 October. Besides the CNO, the others present were Commodore Boorda (his Executive Assistant), Captain Michael B. Hughes (OP-00K/CEP Director), and the SSG were present. The SSG presented an alternative objective statement to calm some nerves about what the SSG was doing, and a five-phase study approach: project definition, research, developing naval force options matrices, gaming, and product development.

The CNO thought that the revised objective statement was a good idea as long as it still accomplished his objectives. He recognized that the Navy could be accused of stepping out of its box, noting that sensitivities were very critical here. He thought that the Special Forces should be better integrated into peacetime operations supporting national policy objectives, as they were too geared for global war. He selected three areas for study: the eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf/North Arabian Sea, and the western Pacific. He questioned the SSG’s ability to research into national objectives at the State Department without raising hackles at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Ambassador Brement assured him that the SSG could see the right people.

¹⁹⁷ SSG V Meetings with CNO/CEP/CNE Folder.

The CNO noted that the Group might find that the national policy process did not exist. He noted that once National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) were written they fell apart. For example, CIA and military plans for Nicaragua were executed independently, and that the economic and diplomatic efforts never happened. He stressed that the strategy needed public relations campaigns, congressional involvement, and “many things.” The JCS wasn’t involved. CNO could not fix it. There were no mechanisms to ensure the NSDD was carried out. He thought that George Schultz, Secretary of State, was doing a “super” job of trying to make order from chaos. He emphasized the need for political, military, economic, and diplomatic efforts to run together and coordinate. He wanted the Group to look at the use of military forces in peacetime as a cohesive part of a national structure. He noted that the United States was not ready to respond if Libya attacked Tunisia. He was not prepared to tell CINCEUR what to do, but wanted to influence CIA, JCS, OSD, and the National Command Authorities. He told the Group to be careful about charging into sensitive areas.¹⁹⁸

He wanted a product by May so that he could be involved himself before being relieved as CNO. He wanted to brief CJCS, then SECDEF, maybe the President. Regarding Naval Force Option Packages proposed by the SSG, he told them to be alert for opportunities for Army/Air Force and think combined arms. He told them not to flesh out the joint insertions, but to show requirements. He instructed them to create a joint perception in the brief, recognizing challenges of deploying Army and Air Forces. Regarding SSG V’s proposed Phase III Matrix Development, he questioned Iranian, Philippine, and Libyan relations with Soviets. He directed the Group to take the phrase “Soviets/surrogates” out of brief and go with “Actions unacceptable to U.S.” He commented that Phase IV Gaming looked good. For Phase V Product Development, he told them to have the CEP murder board the brief in April, and not to show the product to Unified CINCs until he liked it and the JCS was briefed on it. He told the Group that they could go to Navy CINCs to vet Navy options. The proposed milestones and schedule looked good. He told them to plan to brief to JCS in late May, go to the SECDEF concurrently, and wrap up by 1 June.¹⁹⁹

CNO’s objective was a new way of doing business between key agencies. He believed that the United States must develop a new approach for dealing with crises that might lead to superpower conflict. He wanted a strategy for deploying forces in harmony rather than along individual timelines; he advocated a proactive stance—planning/thinking ahead—rather than reactive use of force. He asked what the State Department plan of action and milestones was. He told them to look at the SDI program as an example of how to coordinate across agencies (President on TV,

¹⁹⁸ SSG V Meetings with CNO/CEP/CNE Folder.

¹⁹⁹ SSG V Meetings with CNO/CEP/CNE Folder.

Schultz statements, U.N. releases, etc.) and compare that to the interagency's confusion over contemporary Nicaragua policy. He reiterated that the proposed objective was fine as it was, but that it was a subset of a new way of doing business for crisis control in peacetime. The proposed unacceptable actions matrix looked good. He said that the CNO and SSG must never get too far ahead of national policy, but that all could be laid out ahead of time so that the Navy would be ready to respond strategically when things happen, rather than simply react ad hoc. This would put teeth in U.S. national policy.²⁰⁰

This was the period when Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, USMC, used his position on the National Security Council (NSC) staff to use money from the sale of arms to some Iranians for the return of U.S. hostages to arm Contras in Nicaragua, ostensibly because the U.S. government was unable to coordinate interagency actions.

Ambassador Bremont designated Smith as the Group's briefer, against Smith's wishes.²⁰¹ Smith briefed the Navy CINCs conference on 24 October 1985.²⁰² The CNO introduced the SSG as working in the area of "peacetime crisis control," toward the development of a political structure with applicable military underpinnings, noting that the political structure will be the most difficult part of the strategy. The CINCs made no comments during the brief. The CNO then stated his intentions to present the completed briefing to the service Chiefs, SECDEF, and maybe Secretary of State George Schultz, before it goes to Unified CINCs for review, and made many comments similar to those he made to the SSG. Vice Admiral Edward H. Martin (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare) questioned why the Group was not looking at Central America. The CNO defended the choice of areas. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf (Deputy CNO for Surface Warfare) concurred with the choice of areas. Admiral Ace Lyons (now CINCPACFLT) mentioned that strike plans existed for Libya, and asked what would be different. The CNO repeated that he was looking for a broader set of military options.

As with previous Groups, SSG V organized into teams for the regions under study while working together to create a common methodology. They conducted a small, one-day game with 10 people on 22 November as a rehearsal for the game they were to play 25-27 November. The approach was similar to the games conducted by SSGs III and IV with separate teams addressing different regions simultaneously.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Hanley interview with Admiral Leighton Smith, USN (Retired), Pinehurst, NC, 17 November 2014. On this issue and others relating to SSG V, see Paul Stillwell (interviewer), "The Reminiscences of Admiral Leighton W. Smith, U.S. Navy Retired" (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2010), pp. 478, 489-502.

²⁰² Ibid.

In January 1986, Admiral Watkins published an unclassified version of *The Maritime Strategy*, drafted in OP-00K. In it he presented his views on U.S. Navy peacetime operations and wartime preparation in an era of “violent peace.”

The SSG ran their own ideas past OP-00K and the CEP on 13 February. The initial discussion involved semantics, then transitioned to whether responding with aircraft carriers was sufficient and bureaucratic arrangements for implementing the strategy as the CEP warmed up to the subject.²⁰³ The CEP declared the SSG’s ideas for gaming at the national level unrealistic, but otherwise did not offer specific changes to the presentation.

Following this meeting, the Group met with Admiral Bill Small, who had recently relinquished command of CINCUSNAVEUR. He offered that the Navy driving national policy was a touchy subject. The Group needed to be careful about saying that the military was the means to the end and that national strategy was based on military capability, noting that the Navy had a tendency to be seen a little bit too aggressive in the geopolitical arena. He made several comments on needing better guidance from the NSC and thought it would be good to have a force option book for CNO to use with the JCS. Every quarter General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), submitted plans to challenge Libyan claims to the Gulf of Sidra. Each time the NSC turned it down. Small suggested keeping the ideas in the chain of command rather than at the national level, while recognizing that the chain of command was unwieldy. He also suggested that the SSG be further to the left on the violence spectrum, and consider exercises rather than focus on more direct actions.²⁰⁴

SSG V conducted a second game the end of February 1986. The second game provided greater validation for their ideas than the Group anticipated.²⁰⁵

On 26 March, Rear Admiral Armstrong (SSG II), then OP-953, sent a memo to Rear Admiral Boorda, Executive Assistant to the CNO, suggesting options to present to the fleet CINCs on how to implement the SSG V regional strategy plan. He suggested that the organization responsible for developing and maintaining regional strategies work directly for the National Security Advisor, Vice Admiral John Poindexter, USN. He recommended getting Admiral William Crowe, USN (CJCS) on board as soon as possible, leaving it up to Crowe when to give the brief to SECDEF Weinberger. Then brief key NSC staffers, using Admiral Poindexter and Captain Rod McDaniel, USN (on

²⁰³ SSG V meetings with CNO/CEP/CINCs folder: SSG Brief to CNO Executive Panel (CEP), 13 February 1986.

²⁰⁴ SSG V Meetings with CNO/CEP/CINCs folder: Session with ADM Small at CNA (typed and handwritten comments).

²⁰⁵ Notes in SSG V Report Working Papers 3,” three-ring binder.

the NSC staff) as the conduit. He recommended tightening the SSG presentation, then having Poindexter (or his designee) brief the President and Cabinet. He said that the briefer should be prepared to handle “rice bowl” [roles and authorities] issues. If the President approved, the SSG should brief the strategy to applicable departments and agencies. He noted that the Unified CINCs must be players and this would be an excellent topic for August JCS/CINCs conference. He then went on to suggest details of the implementation.²⁰⁶

This was a time when some referred to the NSC as the “Naval Security Council” because of the National Security Advisor being an admiral and the large number of naval officers serving on the staff. The CNO often had a friendly ear from the President and staff at the White House.

On 3 April, the SSG briefed the Navy CINCs conference in Annapolis. The CINCs discussed using the Packard Commission as a way to lead into the SSG’s strategy. They suggested putting ideas on the value and shortcomings of the NSC back into the brief. The CNO reiterated, “Global War with the Soviets is not my first order of business. The war that is underway is.” He talked about thinking through national objectives at every level of government, and how the strategy might cause Congress to think it through—i.e., be a participant rather than an aftermath haranguer. He discussed an effort in Pacific Command where the Chiefs of Mission and the Unified CINC would get together for area planning, and suggested that it was a weakness in the SSG’s brief.²⁰⁷ The CINCs discussed approaches for improving the brief: he addressed how to keep the planning up to speed, emphasized that lines of responsibility remain unchanged, and walked through a scenario to demonstrate the approach. The CNO requested that the Navy CINCs take one more turn on the brief in April so he could take it to CJCS in May after reviewing it one more time. The CINCs talked about examples of other service leads (e.g., the Army providing security for the 1988 Olympics in Korea) and whether the SSG strategies should be illustrative or literal. The CNO said to give up pride of authorship and let the JCS run with it.²⁰⁸

In looking back, Vice Admiral Bat Laplante USN (Retired) offered:

Our experience was that the “CNO” part of CNO SSG was deadly serious. It was known to be his, personally, as were the Fellows. The

²⁰⁶ Memorandum from Skip Armstrong, OP-953, for RADM Boorda, Subj: Strategy for Implementing Integrated Regional Strategy Planning, 26 March 1986.

²⁰⁷ This was the beginning of PACOM’s Cooperative Engagement, which led to Theater Engagement Plans that transitioned to Theater Security Cooperation Plans.

²⁰⁸ SSG V Meetings with CNO/CEP/CINCs folder: Tom [Bowditch], CINCs Conference, Annapolis, MD, 3 April 86.

tasking was known to have come from him, not his staff. It was known that he expected us to engage with principals, not staff. It was known that attempts—even by the four-star community—to influence our work in any way at all would produce unpleasant telephone calls at the four-star level. And they did. My conclusion was that Jim Watkins was using the SSG as a way to influence his four-star community.²⁰⁹

On 8 April, SSG V ran their ideas past SSG founding director Bob Murray to tighten up their brief. After hearing their presentation, Murray suggested that they explain early to JCS where they were working in the peacetime spectrum. They also should heed the warning about the Chief’s sensitivity to giving secrets to meddling civilians. They had not met yet with regional Unified CINCs, but recognized their concerns over who did regional military planning. There was a lot of discussion on how to highlight the elements considered (such as aid and sanctions) and how to clarify the example.²¹⁰

A small SSG contingent had a much more difficult meeting on 14 April with Admiral Moreau, CINCUSNAVEUR, in Naples, Italy. He was disappointed that he could not talk to the whole SSG. He congratulated the SSG on their thinking, and then stated that all of the SSG’s recommendations were being done at the national level, but not through formally written products, due to the fear of leaks. Moreau had had extensive White House and strategy and policy experience, and was a former OP-06 (presiding over the development of *The Maritime Strategy*) and former Assistant to the Chairman. He stated that regional strategies were not required at the national level. He saw the SSG concept as a valuable staff tool for working with the Joint Staff. He felt that the naval force options book would give the CNO a lead, and said that the Navy should think about these things and game them. He then stated that the purpose of the SSG was to give officers with strong operational experience a strategic background, and added, “SSG is not to produce great insights but great people.” His bottom lines were that the pitch was okay, with the exception of statements regarding what was not being done; that the concept had some value as an OPNAV/JCS staff tool, but would add nothing nationally; that the CINCs were too busy to get into this; and that the SSG should be more humble.²¹¹

Following visits to Navy CINCs, SSG V presented their revised brief to the CNO on 5 May. In attendance were Rear Admiral Boorda (CNO Executive Assistant), Rear

²⁰⁹ Email to Hanley from Vice Admiral Bat LaPlante, USN (Retired), 20 September 2014.

²¹⁰ SSG V Meetings with CNO/CEP/CINCs folder: Notes from listening to Bob Murray, 4/8/86.

²¹¹ SSG V Meetings with CNO/CEP/CINCs folder: Battaglini, LaPlante, Lindblom, Memorandum for the Record, Subj: SSG CINCUSNAVEUR Brief, 14 April 1986.

Admiral Butcher (OP-06B), Captain Mike Hughes (OP-00K), and Commander Michael “O.B.” O’Brien (OP-603 staff). The CNO disagreed with Admiral Moreau that an informal process was sufficient and did not want to soften this part of the brief too much. The SSG had changed information flow diagrams to align with comments from Admirals Lyons (CINCPACFLT) and Trost (CINCLANTFLT), and Vice Admiral Schoultz (Deputy CINCUSNAVEUR). The CNO cautioned not to let this appear as a Navy sales pitch. They discussed the joint aspects and role of regional commanders in providing input to the national processes. The CNO called for creating regional teams at national level, while limiting full-time bureaucracies, and directed the preparation of an approach for phasing in teams. He told the SSG to get with OP-06 to tailor the brief for the Joint Chiefs. The CNO emphasized that we should be spending our time [in the tank] on how to avoid global war, stating that the JCS was not working on a deterrent strategy for the “grey zone.” They discussed the way to create a “winning” brief. The CNO balked at briefing the NWC, saying that he did not want “gurus” up there to get hold of this and then read about it in the Naval Institute *Proceedings*. The CNO said he would prepare the JCS brief with one person from the SSG and would brief CJCS and the service operations deputies before the tank session with the Joint Chiefs. The CNO then reviewed the changes he wanted made to the brief for his review on 12/13 May: focus on one option, work on lead-ins, and insert a peacetime-to-war spectrum slide up front.²¹²

The tank session with the Joint Chiefs occurred on 13 May 1986. Though Smith tried to get the whole Group into the briefing, only he was allowed to attend.²¹³ Watkins introduced the session. He began by stating that he felt the Chiefs had a significant void in “our” planning process. He cited improvements in deliberate planning and in crisis action planning “as witnessed by Grenada, the *Achille Lauro* operation, and both ATTAIN DOCUMENT and ELDORADO CANYON.” However, he felt that:²¹⁴

We need to look a lot more closely at the pre-conflict stage before the situation develops the violent peace as we often call it, and identify ahead of time better selection of measured approaches to hot areas. We must be able quickly to define international acts as acceptable or unacceptable. We must develop a mechanism which better identifies all the players in addition to the military and the coordination procedures required to ensure that first step taken in a conflict scenario is really taken because all other avenues have been tested and found wanting. This first step must also have been thought out

²¹²SSG V Meetings with CNO/CEP/CINCs folder: SSG Brief to CNO, 5 May 86, 1515.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, Admiral Smith interview.

²¹⁴ SSG Brief, A16988-09, 13 May 1986.

and practiced. Although a cook book approach for pre-planned responses is not desirable, I believe we can better develop an approach to these responses, both regionally where the “unacceptable act” has occurred and globally to ensure the best and most flexible use of all our assets; political, economic as well as military. With this in mind, I chartered the Strategic Studies Group, working at the Naval War College, to attack this problem. I asked them to develop an approach which would enhance the cooperation of military and non-military in defining the objectives, goals and checkmarks along the way that are needed for proper precursor planning, a mechanism that will allow us to be more active than reactive.

He then turned the floor over to Smith to present the brief.

Smith presented the briefing, calling for articulated policy objectives and pre-crisis planning for effective crisis deterrence. The approach called for national regional strategies coordinating military, political, economic, diplomatic, and public diplomacy efforts. He then presented the SSG methodology of anticipating unacceptable acts and taking both proactive steps to induce desired behavior, and preparations to respond more effectively to preempt acts on warning or react after the fact. The brief then went into organizational roles and relationships for creating the strategies, centered on national-level working groups, and did call for national-level gaming by the working groups and the NSC. He then used the SSG work on North Korea to illustrate the concepts, including their approach for assessing physical and political risk. He closed the brief by recommending that the process start now.²¹⁵

The SSG had prepared a book of unacceptable acts and naval force options matrices, identifying options and assessing the military and political risks associated with each. In the discussion following the brief, General Paul X. Kelley (CMC) cautioned against providing such options books to the NSC, fearing that some “lieutenant colonel over there” would select a military option without consulting the Joint Chiefs.²¹⁶ (Ironically, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, USMC, was serving on the NSC at the time.)

Watkins retired from his position as CNO before he could see his ideas, as expressed in the SSG’s work, come to fruition.

²¹⁵ SSG V briefing to JCS, copy of text and slides.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Admiral Smith (retired) interview.

On 30 January 1986, Vice Admiral Donald Jones (OP-06) sent recommendations for SSG V follow-on assignments to Admiral James R. Hogg, the new Director of Naval Warfare (OP-095) in his “capacity as CNO’s agent for assigning SSG members,” recommending Phil Boyer and Chuck LeMoyné for positions in OP-06.²¹⁷ On 10 March, Vice Admiral Dudley L. Carlson (Chief of Naval Personnel) proposed follow-on assignments via OP-095 and the VCNO. OP-095 and the CNO concurred with the proposed assignments. Anticipating the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, the CNO penned on the memo, “All these are potential candidates after one year in OPNAV to migrate to key slots opening in the JCS.”²¹⁸

Smith was promoted to Flag rank while on the SSG and relieved Armstrong (SSG II) as OP-953. Battaglini went to OP-955, the OPNAV Anti-Air Warfare Division. Laplante was selected for major command afloat and went on to command USS *Coronado* (LPD 11) (he had already had an OP-095 tour, as the head of the Amphibious Warfare Division). Boyer relieved Captain Tom Daly as OP-603, Head Strategic Concepts Branch, and would later be assigned to the Joint Staff J-5. Daly had relieved Seaquist (SSG III) shortly before and was waiting assignment as new SECNAV Jim Webb’s Military Assistant.²¹⁹ Lemoyne headed the Navy Security Team, OP-06D. Carroll became Head Aviation Warfare Analyst, OPNAV Program Resource Appraisal Division.

Laplante and the SSG staff completed SSG V’s report. The report addressed:

- The era of Violent Peace and the need for strategies to get out in front of these challenges
- U.S. regional objectives to address the Persian Gulf, eastern Mediterranean, and western Pacific derived from NSDDs, Defense Guidance, and State Department, and other official documents
- Naval force options and matrices assessing risks
- Shortfalls in the national decision-making processes.²²⁰

Like the previous year’s reports, the final report was Top Secret and distributed to only the most senior Navy leadership and the CMC. SSG Director Marshall Brement

²¹⁷ Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations), Memorandum for Director of Naval Warfare, Subj: Follow-on Assignment of SSG Members, 1000, 60/6U408708, 30 January 1986.

²¹⁸ Bureau of Naval Personnel Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, via: Director of Naval Warfare (OP-095) and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Strategic Studies Group Detailing, 10 March 1986.

²¹⁹ Email from Captain Phil Boyer, USN (Retired) to Hanley, 2 July 2015.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, SSG V Report Working Papers 3,” three-ring binder.

later published an article in the *Naval War College Review* recapping (at the unclassified level) some of the SSG's findings, as well as his own views on the Iran-Contra Affair and other topics.²²¹

SSG V's topic again lent itself to vigorous discussions of naval and national strategy among the Navy leadership. The experience of thinking through options using all services and other agencies of government, and interacting with the State Department and senior levels of government, served SSG V Fellows well as they progressed in their careers.

SSG V's work became a topic of interest the following fall, after Admiral Carl Trost had relieved Watkins as CNO.²²² National Security Study Directive (NSSD) 5-86 directed a study on Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Trost asked Captain Anthony Maness (OP-00K) whether the work of SSG V would be of any use. Captain Maness found that the SSG work would be "directly relevant to at least two specific taskings of the NSSD." He went on to note that OP-603 had the action for OPNAV and that Captain Phil Boyer, a member of SSG V, was the OP-603 branch head.²²³ Admiral Trost penned "good" on the memo and added a cover note: "Would it be useful to make comment on LIC and USN studies in Posture Statement? In any case, need backup for hearings."

²²¹ Marshall Brement, "Civilian-Military Relations in the Context of National Security Policymaking," *Naval War College Review* (Winter 1988), 27-32.

²²² CNO Executive Panel Memorandum for Admiral Trost, Subj: SSG V Relevance to NSSD on Low Intensity Conflict, OP-00K/fb, Ser 757, 3 Dec 86.

²²³ Phil Boyer does not recall working this task. Conversation during SSG Workshop, 20 February 2015.

The SSG under Admiral Trost: Validating the Maritime Strategy (1986 – 1990)

Context for SSG studies, 1986-1990

Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost relieved Watkins as CNO in July 1986. When serving as OP-090 under CNOs Hayward and Watkins, Trost thought that Hayward had a pretty good idea in creating the SSG and that the SSG contributed to Hayward's thoughts. He also saw how Watkins used the SSG as a "validator" of the Maritime Strategy. He believed the SSG provided a "valuable thought process for pointing us," and a "good way of broadly educating and developing talented officers." The SSG helped Watkins explore the "what ifs" in a changing world to keep the Maritime Strategy current.²²⁴

He saw that the SSG's advantage was in that current policies and strategy did not constrain it. Its greatest value was in growth of the officers assigned. The Navy used the SSG to develop a cadre of officers who had had access and experience.

He spent a lot of time selecting the Group, a cadre of people that had a lot of potential for growth in Navy leadership. He said, "I played a one-man selection board." He got many inputs from others, but he personally made the final assignment decisions. He took the time, and took his responsibility in choosing the SSG members very seriously. The SSG was "important, warranted my attention, and was productive." He was happy with the way it operated under Hayward and Watkins and did not consider changing it significantly: "The Navy needs to think broadly about itself and its mission, and the SSG helps it do it."²²⁵

Trost favored mini-staffs (such as the SSG), and used OP-00K that way. He saw OPNAV as coming up too often with lowest common denominator products. He needed people to think. Trost tasked OP-00K to act as the OPNAV point of contact

²²⁴ Hanley, Swartz, and Captain Jo Dee Jacob, USN (Retired), interview with Admiral Carlisle A. Trost, Annapolis, MD, 19 February 2015.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*

with the SSG, saying, “In that capacity, establish a complete file of past SSG products and maintain that file for ready access. As a continuing function, monitor the work of the SSG, integrate that work with other long range planning efforts, and initiate a formal tasking follow-up mechanism to ensure that the value of that work is not lost upon the departure of each Group.”²²⁶

Following that memo, Trost updated Watkins’ memo on the objectives, tasks, and organizational relationships for the SSG.²²⁷ The substance of the updated memo was essentially the same as the original one, but emphasized the SSG as developing concepts for the CNO and identified OP-00K as CNO’s central point of contact, rather than OP-095 and OP-06.

In January 1986, shortly before Trost took over as CNO, Watkins and CMC General Kelley had published the *Maritime Strategy* addendum to the Naval Institute *Proceedings*. Mikhail Gorbachev, who had become General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, began pressing for naval arms control during a speech in Vladivostok July 1986 and arguing for “sufficient defense.” The Soviets began deploying Victor-class SSNs to the U.S. East Coast. The Strategic Defense Initiative, begun in 1983, also troubled the Soviets. President Ronald Reagan held a summit with Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, on 11-12 October 1986, at which arms control was a major topic. This led to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987. The Soviets failed to capture land-attack Tomahawks in the treaty. Informal talks between the 16 NATO and the 7 Warsaw Treaty nations began in Vienna on February 17, 1987, on a mandate for conventional force negotiations in Europe. In December 1987, Gorbachev announced at the U.N. a unilateral withdrawal of 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe, and demobilization of 500,000 Soviet troops.

In January 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty members produced the Mandate for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In May 1989, President George H. W. Bush proposed a ceiling of 275,000 personnel stationed in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) by the U.S. and Soviet Union. The 1989 Brussels NATO summit formally adopted Bush's proposal. In November, the Berlin Wall fell, and in the following months, revolutions broke out in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Bush and Gorbachev agreed to speed up arms control and economic negotiations. Bush proposed even steeper reductions, and the Soviet Union negotiated and concluded troop withdrawal agreements with Warsaw Treaty states.

²²⁶ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for the Executive Director, CNO Executive Panel (OP-00K), Ser 00/7U 300099, 15 April 1987.

²²⁷ Memo From CNO to Director, SSG, Subj: STRATEGIC STUDIES Group, Ser 00/7U300114, 4 May 1987.

As a result of Gorbachev's glasnost, perestroika, and arms reduction initiatives, U.S. allies perceived less of a threat from the Soviets. This made negotiations on renewal of U.S. basing agreements more challenging in Europe and the Pacific. Budding U.S. defense relations with China came to a halt with the Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 1989. The tanker war in the Persian Gulf continued, and the Iraqis mistakenly hit the USS *Stark* (FFG-31) with two Exocet missiles on 17 May 1987. The Iran-Iraq war ended in August 1988 with a U.N.-brokered cease-fire. Some groups continued to target U.S. service members and diplomats. These included groups associated with Libya, Hezbollah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the "Red Army" in Europe, the New People's Army in the Philippines, Greek revolutionaries, and Catalan separatists.

Defense budgets of the Reagan years had hit their peak and were coming down. Trost faced implementing the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which included requirements for Joint Duty Assignments for officers to make Flag rank and the creation of a Joint Special Operations Command with separate funding and acquisition authorities. Though the law mandated changing command relations among the service chiefs and the CJCS, those relations changed little until General Colin Powell relieved Admiral Crowe as Chairman in October 1989.²²⁸

SSG VI (1986-1987)

Focus: Countering Soviet counters to the Maritime Strategy

Ambassador Bremont weighed into the SSG VI selection process in February 1986.²²⁹ He remarked that the size and composition of the Group were about optimal, but suggested that an officer from the P-3 community would have helped SSG V, and requested another officer with OPNAV experience like Bat Laplante. SSG V recommended officers from their communities and Rear Admiral Ron Marryott (President, NWC) recommended two P-3 pilots from his community. Watkins agreed with the thrust of the letter and commented to his Executive Assistant: "Let's try to identify before I leave." Three of the officers mentioned in the letter became members of SSG VI.

²²⁸ Ibid. Admiral Trost interview.

²²⁹ Marshall Bremont letter to Admiral Watkins, 4 February 1986.

On 20 March Vice Admiral James R. Hogg (OP-095) sent a memo to CNO, via the VCNO, providing nominations of 16 officers for SSG VI generated by the Deputy CNOs and Directors of Major Staff Organizations (DCNOs/DMSOs) noting that he worked with OP-01 to “reduce the list to a manageable size.”²³⁰ On 24 March, Rear Admiral Boorda (Executive Assistant to CNO) sent a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Personnel announcing that the CNO had selected:

- Captain Jerry Unruh, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain Tony Maness, USN (maritime patrol aviation)
- Captain (select) Michael F. (O.B.) O’Brien, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain (select) Frank L. (Skip) Bowman, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain (select) Michael J. Jukosky, USN (SEAL)
- Captain (select) Dennis C. Blair, USN (surface warfare).²³¹

O’Brien had recent OPNAV experience in OP-603, developing and briefing *The Maritime Strategy*.

On 2 April, the CNO approved replacing Captain (select) Jukosky with Captain Alvaro R. (Al) Gomez, USN (surface warfare).²³² Captain Maness was eventually assigned as OP-00K/CEP Director, so Captain Byron E. (Jake) Tobin (maritime patrol aviation) was selected to replace him.²³³ Watkins also formally directed that assignment to the SSG would require selectees agree to remain on active duty for two years following completion of their assignment.²³⁴

The Marine colonels assigned to the Group differed from their predecessors in that they came from other than war colleges. Colonel Anthony C. (Tony) Zinni (ground) came from Marine Corps Headquarters. Colonel Randolph (Randy) H. Brinkley came from command of Marine Air Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1. Colonel James M.

²³⁰ Director, Naval Warfare (OP-095) Memorandum to CNO, via: VCNO, Subj: SSG VI Nominations, 20 March 1986.

²³¹ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Personnel, Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG) VI, ser 00/6U300085, 24 March 1986.

²³² Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Personnel, Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG) VI, ser 00/6U300094, 2 April 1986.

²³³ Bureau of Naval Personnel Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, via: Director of Naval Warfare (OP-095) and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG) VI Assignment, 1301, PERS-444, 21 July 1986.

²³⁴ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for Distribution, Subj: GREEMAIN Requirements for Strategic Studies Group (SSG) assignment, Ser 00/6U300160, 20 May 1986.

Puckett (combat support) came from Headquarters SACLANT.²³⁵ At Marine Corps Headquarters, Zinni heard that Trost had complained to the CMC that he was only sending personnel from the war colleges, saving PCS moves. While stating that he could not predict who would be selected for generals, Kelley looked for competitive officers who could contribute after their assignment to the SSG. So he sent Zinni, Brinkley, and Puckett.²³⁶ (Zinni later retired with four stars after commanding CENTCOM).

Though the SSG was becoming well known by this time,²³⁷ some officers had better ideas. Blair requested another assignment, having already received graduate education as a Rhodes Scholar.²³⁸ He shortly received a call from Boorda telling him that he was going to the SSG.

In July 1986, Captain Michael B. Hughes, Director OP-00K sent a letter to Brement suggesting cooperation between OP-00K and SSG to “enhance the quality and utility of the recommendations we both provide CNO.”²³⁹ The letter also provided issues to be addressed at second annual long-range planners’ conference. Strategy issues included:

- Implications of protracted conventional war
- Maritime theater nuclear warfare
- Developing and integrating “short-of-war” strategies and concepts: peacetime, crisis/contingency planning, “low-intensity conflict” concepts, “Reagan Doctrine,” and counter-terrorism
- Related warfighting concepts and skills, and global and regional trends.

²³⁵ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, CNO Executive Panel, Memorandum for Admiral Trost. Subj: Meeting with Strategic Studies Group VI, OP-00K, Ser 536, 6 August 1986.

²³⁶ Hanley phone interview with General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Retired), 14 November 2015.

²³⁷ Hanley and Kennedy interview with Rear Admiral Byron E. Tobin, USN (Retired), Norfolk, VA, 13 January 2015.

²³⁸ Hanley interview with Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN (Retired), Washington D.C., 6 November 2015.

²³⁹ Letter from CAPT Michael B. Hughes (Director, OP-00K) to Marshall Brement, 7 July 1986. OP-00K served as a special staff group for the CNO, in addition to managing the CEP. The SSG was cautious about putting any OPNAV organization in a position to vet their ideas before they presented them to the CNO. However, separation from the Pentagon and the pace of the separate duties of OPNAV and the SSG ensured that coordination was focused on specific opportunities, and did not constrain the SSG.

In August, Bremont responded, requesting SSG participation in the Long Range Planners' Conference.²⁴⁰ Hanley represented the SSG at the conference. The objective of the conference was "to define principal long-term issues facing Navy which require action/decisions in the next several years." The most important product was stimulating thinking and broadening horizons of the participants—which included the CNO, VCNO, and OPNAV Flags up to the Deputy CNOs—to consider larger issues affecting the Navy's future direction. The conference preparation materials stated that the "Maritime Strategy has become a central frame of reference for Navy planning processes." It continued, to say, "The challenge now is to ensure strategy continues to evolve and considers areas essential to shaping the Navy of the future...." It listed some of these areas as tactical nuclear warfare and short-of-war strategies. It suggested the most interesting issues to address were that:²⁴¹

- The Packard Commission/NSDD 219, Defense Reorganization Act, NSDD 238 required national military strategy and provided an opportunity for Navy to exploit the maritime strategy.
- The Maritime Strategy had no nuclear component. There was a need to develop one in order to provide strategic framework for future decisions about nuclear policy, procurement, tactics, and training, as well as a need to influence the continued development of conventional strategy.
- The Navy's role in CONUS defense (ADI/SDI) needed attention to ensure that Navy was not driven by USAF or technology developers.
- Personnel force structure adjustments were warranted to increase careerists and reduce accessions in view of end strengths and adverse demographic trends.

Trost introduced the conference.²⁴² He told the assembly that he needed a 40- to 50-year horizon. He said, "Don't let budget constraints drive the future. Meet the challenge by questioning how we do business, being innovative." He pointed out that this year's SSG was challenging strategy, looking at strengths and weaknesses. His other points were: Continue to exploit our advantages against both major and minor foes. Low-intensity conflict is not new. The United States is losing its lead in ASW. We are better when we steam. The CNO can change the course of the Navy only a degree or so. Make sure that we are changing in the right direction. Define the issues. We need to be able to handle the spectrum of conflict. Project continued turmoil.²⁴³ During the conference:

²⁴⁰ Letter from Marshall Bremont to Captain Berkebile (Deputy Director, OP-00K), 19 August 1986.

²⁴¹ Second Annual Navy Long Range Planner's Conference Folder.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, Hanley notes on conference.

²⁴³ The conference did not come close to looking out 40 -50 years.

- Admiral James Busey (VCNO) projected zero real program growth in the near term, while still needing 600 ships.
- Vice Admiral Jim Hogg (OP-095) stated that it was time to change maritime strategy because Soviets had a game plan. He recommended reducing force structure to get new technology.
- Several Flag officers commented on their concerns over the need to evolve maritime strategy, and not let it stagnate.
- Vice Admiral David Jeremiah (OP-090) spoke of the need to bring people into the Navy laterally from airline pilots and other industries.
- Rear Admiral Leighton “Snuffy” Smith (OP-953), following on his SSG theme, questioned whether the threat of global conflict with the Soviets should dominate our planning process to the extent that it did.
- Rear Admiral J. F. Smith (OP-61) projected that USSR would remain the primary threat—that its internal problems were overrated. He cited the centrifugal forces within NATO and recommended closer relationships with Japan, India, and China. He argued for maintaining bases in the Philippines, and generally. Nuclear allergy, terrorism, and the narcotics trade were additional concerns.²⁴⁴

SSG VI began its orientation on 4 August 1986 and, the following week, began a strategic “spool-up” with notable NWC faculty. Professor Al Bernstein was then Chairman of the Strategy Department. Brement arranged for him to organize a program of reading and lectures by himself, Professors Eliot Cohen, and Stephen P. Rosen in the mornings, followed by seminars with well-known strategists and thinkers, such as Edward Luttwak, Sam Huntington, and Andrew Marshall in the afternoons.

The Group’s first meeting with Trost was on the afternoon of 12 August during his visit to the NWC. Rear Admirals Marryott and Baldwin, the incoming NWC President, attended. Trost congratulated the members on their selection to the SSG as the fleet’s very best representatives from each warfare specialty. His talking points included the following: He would personally control selection and follow-on assignments. Numerous predecessors had been selected for Flag. The purposes of the SSG were to tangle with issues of direct interest to the CNO that required high levels of warfighting expertise, broaden the perspectives of members, and provide the Navy leadership with non-parochial, non-bureaucratic views on strategic concepts. The SSG performance had been consistently superb, and a major contributor to all phases of maritime strategy development. Briefings received unanimous approval by high-level

²⁴⁴ These issues led to topics for SSGs VII and VIII.

officials for clear thinking and insight. The warfighting instincts of the members were still fresh; they were not viewed as bureaucrats.

He said that he intended to continue the current system of doing business, continuing the special relationship between the CNO and SSG, and meeting regularly for briefings and providing guidance. He encouraged interchanges with fleet and field commanders, and expected the SSG members to brief Navy and national leadership on findings (Navy CINCs conferences, CEP, etc.). The broad challenges facing the Navy included maintaining a high level of warfighting capability in view of the downward budgetary pressure. In order to do this, he said, “we must access and retain high quality sailors motivated to perform to high standards of excellence, rapidly develop and deploy those technologies which best support maritime strategy requirements, ensure that our strategy remains viable and dynamic ... must not be subverted by ourselves or actions taken by the Soviets. This is where I need your assistance.” He then outlined the topic he wanted them to study.²⁴⁵

Countering the Maritime Strategy

We must understand the impact of Soviet activity on the U.S. Maritime Strategy to maximize its effectiveness. Current Soviet trends, as well as possible action and reactions must be detected and defeated through advanced technology, operational techniques, or changes in strategy, if necessary. Our main interest lies in the most likely and most damaging options that the Soviets may undertake. Research should include, but not be limited to:

- A. Determine Soviet perception of and reaction to U.S. Maritime Strategy
 - a. Define actual and potential changes in Soviet maritime strategy in response to U.S. Maritime Strategy
 - b. Assess possible changes in Soviet Navy operational patterns (forward deployments of submarines and surface action groups, forward basing, etc.)
- B. Assess the impact of U.S. Maritime Strategy on trends/possibilities in Soviet technology and systems

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 00K memo, 6 August 1986.

- a. Analyze the impact of large-scale Soviet deployment of ongoing improvements in submarine quieting, cruise missiles, stealth technology, etc.
 - b. Evaluate Soviet Navy's ability to use space as a medium to thwart U.S. strategy
 - c. Assess impact of deployment of strategic defense systems by one or both sides on Soviet maritime strategy
- C. Identify those aspects of U.S. Maritime Strategy which are most vulnerable to Soviet counters

In October, SSG VI updated the CNO on their approach and met with senior OPNAV Flags, intelligence agencies, and a broad range of other organizations in the Washington D.C. area to discuss their project and develop contacts. During 22-24 October, they attended and briefed the Navy CINCs conference. From late October into early November, they met with military commands and think tanks in Europe. They conducted their first war game 10-14 November. On 4 December the Group met again with the CNO. They then visited CINCs and others in Asia.

In January 1987, SSG VI sponsored a three-day conference on the Soviet military in 2000. The first two days were unclassified sessions on Soviet society, economy, demography, and similar subjects involving top Sovietologists (Appendix D). The third day was a classified session where the intelligence community (the CIA, DIA, and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)) presented their projections of the Soviet military in 2000. The intelligence community's projections of increasing next-generation Soviet armed forces were completely inconsistent with the Soviet and Warsaw Pact social and economic challenges. SSG VI did not know how to reconcile the differences and did not attempt to do so, as the topic went beyond their tasking.

They met with the CNO at the end of January 1987 and briefed their work to OP-06 and OP-095 as well. They had added a second phase to their project in order to develop appropriate counters to negate Soviet counters to the maritime strategy.

During this period, the Navy was also conducting a long-range assessment "identifying key potential discontinuities and technological breakthroughs that could alter the way the Navy pursues maritime superiority, and long-range approach."²⁴⁶ This assessment concluded with the following points:

²⁴⁶ CNO Memorandum for all DCNOs/DMSOs, Subj: Long Range Assessment – Information Memorandum, Ser 00/7S300160, 15 June 1987

- The Soviet Union will continue over next two decades.
- The Soviets will consider prolonged conventional war.
- Asia will grow. Other countries' sources of instability, specifically Islamic Fundamentalism.
- China and Japan will pursue more independent security policies.
- The United States will lose overseas bases; there will be limits on U.S. use of foreign bases.
- There will be diffusion of economic growth and technology.
- There will be less chance of central European war, greater chance of regional conflicts. This implies more low-intensity conflict and counterterrorism.
- Technology changes will include sensors, weapons, aircraft, C3, stealth and counters, ISR, micro, bio, and directed energy.
- ASW will be an increasing challenge.
- We will see developments in command, control, and communications (C³). This implies a need to balance investments in certain capabilities against broader force structure: C³ countermeasures (C³CM); electronic warfare (EW); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and logistics.
- The Navy will need to balance technology opportunities and necessity.

SSG VI played its second war game 9-13 February. The purpose of the game was to develop and test the SSG's ideas about Red strategies that posed the greatest threat to the Maritime Strategy in the Europe/Atlantic region.²⁴⁷ Red objectives were the quick capture of West Germany and BENELUX (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg) by conventional land attack; neutralization of Blue control of Atlantic to preclude near-term Blue counterattack; then a negotiated treaty to end the conflict, consolidating Red gains. The Red strategy consisted of:

- An imaginative anti-SLOC campaign (factory to field).
- Red primary land/air attack through northern Germany into Denmark along the NATO North and Central Command seam, threatening Dutch ports and southern Norway.
- Red land/air attack on Norway from north and south axes to drive out NATO maritime forces.
- Attrition of Blue maritime forces in order to sustain support for anti-SLOC campaign through the Norwegian Sea.
- In Pacific, attrition campaign to eliminate U.S. military power in Western Pacific.

²⁴⁷ Strategic Studies Group Memorandum for Captain Paulsen, Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG) Wargame, 9 - 13 Feb 87, 16 December 1986.

- In Persian Gulf, offensive operations taking advantage of separatist political forces and draw Blue forces away from Europe.

The SSG, with intelligence professionals, played Red. During the December 4 meeting Trost had asked about the choice of Blue players for this game. Brement responded, “We plan to play the game at the level of the recent ATP game—major commanders to be knowledgeable O-6’s with operational experience on the staffs of the commanders they play.”²⁴⁸

The main differences between this Red strategy and that provided by intelligence estimates were (1) the thrust into Jutland being the Soviets’ main effort and (2) reprioritization of Soviet Navy tasks. Professional Soviet analysts who participated in the game concurred that the most dangerous Soviet strategy would involve the early seizure of Jutland and southern Norway in order to prevent NATO reinforcements as a counter to the maritime strategy, along with more Soviet SSNs forward, a larger reserve of long-range strike assets, and increased readiness level of naval forces.²⁴⁹

The SSG met again with the CNO later in February during his trip to the NWC. They held their third war game 9–13 March, investigating Blue counters to the most dangerous Red strategy. They met again with the CNO on 21 March and briefed OPNAV principal deputies, followed by the Navy CINCs conference in April, and then visits to the CINCs to get feedback on their ideas.

Over the year, Zinni documented notable events with over 50 cartoons of the “Strategic Sea Gulls.” These cartoons provide vivid representations of life in the SSG and the environment in which they worked.²⁵⁰

As in previous years, SSG VI’s Top Secret report had limited distribution, going only to top Navy leaders and the CMC. As the “most dangerous” Soviet strategy was speculative, it provided a set of indicators for intelligence to watch, but did not affect existing war plans. SSG VI continued in the role of stimulating strategic discourse and the Fellows benefited greatly from their interactions with each other and thinking through the employment of joint forces. Captain Blair later published an unclassified report on some of their findings in the *Naval War College Review*.²⁵¹

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Paper by John Battilega and Judy Grange on “How to Think About Soviet Responses to the Forward Maritime Strategy,” 11 May 1987.

²⁵⁰ SSG VI files.

²⁵¹ Captain Dennis Blair, “The Strategic Significance of Maritime Theaters,” *Naval War College Review* (Summer 1988), 29-40.

Blair's end-of-year briefing to his Naval Academy classmates SECNAV Jim Webb and the Secretary's Military Assistant Captain Tom Daly is one that members of SSG VI easily recall.²⁵² The Secretary was late, Blair had to truncate the briefing, and his familiarity with his classmates did not work to his advantage.

Bowman left the SSG for reassignment as EA to OP—095. Blair became EA to OP-090. Gomez went to the Joint Staff (J-6). Unruh became Chief of the Ops/Readiness Branch at SHAPE. Admiral Trost selected Tobin to go to COMINWARCOM, building on work he did on SSG VI. These were all good jobs, but the focus on sending SSG alumni to jobs in OP-095 and OP-06—which are directly related to Navy warfighting and strategy—was ending. Trost reassigned SSG officers throughout the Navy, and, given the requirements of the Goldwater Nichols Act, throughout the joint system.

Though the Fellows were fairly junior, two of the captain (selects), Blair and Bowman, ended their careers with four stars, and five of the six Navy Fellows in the Group made Flag. Blair and Zinni would finish their military careers as combatant commanders of joint unified theater commands, and Bowman would ultimately become Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programs.

SSG VII (1987-1988)

Focus: Dealing with Soviet and other developments in the Asia-Pacific

SSG VII convened in August 1987.²⁵³ Officers assigned to the Group included:

- Colonel James J. (J. J.) Doyle, USMC (ground)
- Captain William A. (Bill) Earner, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain Ronald D. Gumbert, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain Thomas F. (Tom) Hall, USN (maritime patrol aviation)
- Colonel William C. (Bill) McMullen, USMC (aviation)
- Captain William L. (Bill) Putnam, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain Thomas D. (Tom) Ryan, USN (submarine warfare)

²⁵² Hanley interviews with Admiral Frank L. Bowman, USN (Retired), Potomac, MD, 15 December 2014, and Rear Admiral Byron E. Tobin, USN (Retired), Norfolk, VA, 13 January 2015.

²⁵³ Of the SSGs studied here, SSG VII had very few records of their activities or study organization. Given the continuity of the program before and after this year, SSG VII had an orientation and study program similar to SSGs VI and VIII.

- Colonel John A. Woodhead, USMC (combat support)
- Captain Timothy W. (Tim) Wright, USN (carrier aviation).

Lieutenant Commander Hal Neal became the Group's Intelligence Officer.

Unlike SSG VI, this was a very senior group: Earner, Hall, Ryan, and Wright had completed their major commands. Earner and Ryan both had Ph.D.s. This was Earner's third tour in early-stage strategic planning or in the disciplines associated with strategy in the grades of commander and captain.²⁵⁴ Before that, he had taught at the NWC in Turcotte's National Decision Making Department (1977-78) and was familiar with the internal politics of the NWC before the SSG came on the scene. He had just finished a successful tour as Commander Destroyer Squadron Four in Charleston and was ready for a bigger job in Washington. Like Blair before him, he tried hard to extract myself from the SSG assignment, but to no avail.

As a junior officer, Trost had been an Olmsted scholar studying in Germany. He had broad exposure to defense diplomacy and arms control as Military Assistant to Deputy Secretaries of Defense Vance and Nitze and Under Secretary of the Navy John Warner, and valued his diplomatic role as Commander SEVENTH Fleet, CINCLANTFLT, and CNO. He believed in General Olmsted's statements that "the greatest leaders must be broadly educated" and that "living, studying, and traveling overseas" contributed to that broad education.²⁵⁵

Trost tasked SSG VII to explore political and military dynamics in Northeast Asia and identify innovative Soviet courses of action that could detract from execution of the forward maritime strategy, including arms control. He had given a similar task to the CEP, chaired by Professor Richard Cooper.²⁵⁶ This CEP Task Force commented on:

- Soviets' intentions to influence the Pacific region, citing Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok in July 1986
- Philippine base agreements
- Japanese participation in a war with the Soviets

²⁵⁴ Email from Vice Admiral William A. Earner, Jr. USN (Retired), to John Hanley, Subj: SSG Thoughts, 22 February 2015.

²⁵⁵ Edgar F. Puryear Jr., "Readiness," in *Nineteen Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership During the 20th and early 21st Centuries*, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Bruce A. Ellman, (Newport, Naval War College Press, 2010).

²⁵⁶ Memo for Admiral Trost from OP-00K, Subj: Findings of the CNO Executive Panel Task Force on the Pacific Basin - Information Memorandum, OP-00K/fb Ser. 457, 9 Sept 87.

- Aggressiveness of the Maritime Strategy²⁵⁷
- Command arrangements: Alaska, CINCCENT
- Trends in relations among Pacific basin countries
- Soviet military and diplomatic activity in the Pacific
- The ASEAN alliance
- Growing Australian regional influence
- Economic interdependence and trade
- National Politics and Foreign Policy.

The CEP made recommendations regarding Japanese defense spending, technology, and suggested improving relations with China, slowly.

As with SSG VI, the Group conducted a Strategy Symposium with Professors Bernstein, Cohen, and Rosen soon after they convened. The strategy sessions included:²⁵⁸

1. What is Strategy?
2. Clausewitz
3. The Long Term Competition - with Dr. James Roche (Northrop Analysis Center)
4. Alternatives to Clausewitz
5. Strategy for World War III - with Prof. Samuel P. Huntington (Harvard University)
6. Problems of Fighting a Long War
7. The Soviet View of Strategy - with Prof. Mark Kramer (Harvard University)
8. Limited War
9. U.S.-Soviet Competition in the Third World
10. The Nuclear Dimension of Strategy
11. Uses of Strategic Airpower: Europe 1944
12. Strategy in a Limited War: The Chinese Intervention in Korea, 1950.

They spent the remainder of August and September in orientation on national security strategy and intelligence in seminars. They met with former SSG Directors Murray and Wood, and with former SSG Fellows Rear Admirals Owens (SSG I), Armstrong (SSG II), and Hernandez (SSG IV), and Captain Bowman (SSG VI). From

²⁵⁷ This was a concern that some members of CEP raised frequently.

²⁵⁸ SSG Strategy Symposium 1987 - Syllabus and Readings.

CNWS they met with Dr. Don Daniel to discuss his department's campaign and strategy studies, and with Bud Hay to discuss the Global War Game studies and analyses. SSG VII members kept an extensive list of the people they met (Appendix E).²⁵⁹

In December, they participated in a CINCPAC staff exercise training to execute their war plans, but found that this exercise added little to their understanding.²⁶⁰ In March, they briefed the Navy CINCs conference.

SSG VII tested concepts in two war games and a political seminar.²⁶¹ They concluded that the desired post-war shape of Asia should be the major factor in determining a wartime strategy in the Pacific. They expected that Japanese support would be tepid at the outset of hostilities and that a non-belligerent PRC might not tie down Soviet forces, contrary to war planning assumptions. They believed that a Korean war was not inevitable. They noted that there was a downward trend in relations with the Philippines and that in general basing rights were increasingly fragile. They commented on Japan's rearmament. Their bottom line was that the United States was essential to the region.

Following that briefing, Admiral Trost had them brief CINCPAC, every relevant fleet and staff, the CEP, and the Office of Net Assessment. The CEP did not agree with their thinking on ASAT arms control.²⁶² Admiral Ronald Hays (CINCPAC) told them that that they were indeed independent thinkers since they had not listened to a thing that he told them about Japanese support in the event of war with the Soviets or North Korea. He turned to Admiral David E. Jeremiah (CINCPACFLT) and, after some discussion, all concluded that Japanese participation should be an objective, not an assumption in the war plans. SSG VII's ideas about assumptions in war plans for Korea also caused concern with commands there.²⁶³ The Group emphasized the shortage of amphibious lift and the importance of warning and political will of treaty allies. The Group also added a statement on nuclear escalation to their final brief, based on the CEP input.

²⁵⁹ A Fairly Complete List of SSG VII Agenda/Contacts. These contacts were listed by month but not the date that they met with the individuals.

²⁶⁰ Comment by Rear Admiral Thomas F. Hall, USN (Retired) during SSG Workshop, 20 February 2015.

²⁶¹ SSG VII CINCs Brief - March.

²⁶² SSG VII's "Fleet reaction brief to CNO."

²⁶³ Hanley interview with Vice Admiral Timothy W. Wright, USN (Retired), Williamsburg, VA, 23 December 2014.

Given the subject matter, SSG VII's report was classified Secret (all previous SSG reports had been classified Top Secret), but again received limited distribution to the Navy principals and CMC.²⁶⁴ The work of SSG VII was consistent with Trost's emphasis on providing the SSG with a broad education and providing their ideas to him and the Navy leadership. Given the declining sense of threat created by Gorbachev, the study focused more on policies involving basing, reassuring allies, and arms control than on details of naval operations. Interacting with the most senior officers in the naval services, with CINCs, and senior government officials, as in previous years, the Fellows gained confidence in their ability to perform at those levels.

Captain Earner left the SSG to become Comptroller of the Air Systems Command and a series of positions in Financial Management, capping his naval career as a Vice Admiral and Deputy CNO for Logistics (OPNAV N4). Tim Wright went to the Joint Staff and then to become Director for East Asia and the Pacific in OSD. Tom Hall became Deputy Chief of the Naval Reserve and Bill Putnam became EA to the Comptroller in OSD. Tom Ryan became the Navy's Assistant IG. Like the assignments to the SSG VI Fellows, these were good jobs, but the focus of the earlier SSG years, on naval warfare and strategy staff billets, had dissipated under Trost, in part due to the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

SSG VIII (1988-1989)

Focus: Dealing with Soviet and other developments in the Eastern Mediterranean & Middle East

On 21 January 1988, Trost requested nominations by 18 February for four captains/commanders from OP-02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, and 08. OPNAV had reorganized. OP-095 became OP-07, but remained the CNO's agent for SSG nominations.²⁶⁵ Trost wrote, "During the past seven years the Strategic Studies Group has: provided us with valuable politico-military advice, strategic concepts, enhanced development of tactical doctrine, and stimulated strategic discussions and writing. It has been an important effort that I wish to continue. ... Those you recommend should be among our very top performers and thinkers—those most likely to make Flag."

²⁶⁴ The report is available in the Navy Historical and Heritage Command and NWC archives.

²⁶⁵ Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for Distribution, Subj: Strategic Studies Group VIII, Ser 00/8U500028, 21 January 1988.

The selection procedure used for SSG VII and VIII was that OP-002 (the CNO's Executive Assistant) worked directly with CMC office for USMC nominations.²⁶⁶ For Navy nominations, OP-07 drafted a memo for CNO signature in January/February for the next year's Group, sending a copy to VCNO and OP-01, with responses coming to OP-07 for consolidation. OP-07, working with OP-01, reduced the list to include only the strongest performers. OP-01 put the list into nomination format. OP-07 then submitted nominee lists to the CNO via the VCNO. The CNO personally reviewed the nominee list and selected members. OP-002 then sent a memo to OP-01, and a copy to VCNO and OP-codes, listing selectees. OP-01 issued orders, with a two-year agreement to remain on active duty following completion of the SSG assignment.

Following exchanges of notes between OP-01, OP-07, VCNO and the CNO's office, the following officers formed SSG VIII:

- Captain Don W. Baird, USN (carrier aviation)
- Colonel Richard (Rich) Blanchfield, USMC (aviation)
- Captain Jon S. Coleman, USN (maritime patrol aviation)
- Captain Michael A. (Mike) Farmer, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain Mack C. Gaston, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain Stephen I. Johnson, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain John Kieley, USN (surface warfare)
- Colonel Ronald (Ron) Oates, USMC (ground)
- Colonel Jeffrey A. (Jeff) Wilson, USMC (combat support).²⁶⁷

Lieutenant Commander Hal Neal remained as the Group's Intelligence Officer.

Responding to a 26 February letter from Brement that suggested topics for SSG VIII, Trost concurred with the thrust of Brement's suggestion that SSG VIII focus on the Mediterranean and Middle East, and said that a tasking memorandum reflecting this general direction would be provided in the near future.²⁶⁸

In May, the CNO sent a memo tasking SSG VIII to:²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶ OP-07, Subj: Nominees for Strategic Studies Group VIII, 080153, 13 January 1988.

²⁶⁷ CNO SSG Folders: handwritten notes.

²⁶⁸ CNO letter to Ambassador Marshall Brement, 30 March 1988.

²⁶⁹ CNO Memorandum to Director, Strategic Studies Group, Subj: SSG VIII Tasking, Ser. 00/8C500220, 23 May 1988.

Explore the political and military dynamics of the Mediterranean basin both in the context of war with the Soviet Union and more likely U.S. military involvement in lower levels of conflict in the region. Include the following as points of focus in this effort:

- The role of maritime power in the Mediterranean in a war with the Soviet Union. Alternative Soviet strategies to respond to concepts of employment of U.S. maritime forces in the Mediterranean and counters to those strategies.
- The role of maritime power in the Mediterranean in lower levels of conflict where the application of force is necessary in defense of national interests.
- Impact on the Navy of changes in the global security environment as they manifest in the Mediterranean (e.g., shifts in regional balances of power, proliferation of sophisticated weaponry in the Third World, spread of Islamic Fundamentalism, restrictions to access on overseas bases, national versus alliance objectives, etc.)

SSG VIII continued the orientation pattern of the past two SSGs. They began with a strategy symposium on 15–19 August 1988, moderated by Professor Eliot Cohen with assigned readings. Prof. Mark Kramer discussed trends in Soviet military policy; Mr. Andrew Marshall addressed the future security environment; Dr. James Roche spoke on long-term competition; and Prof. Richard Schultz addressed U.S. strategies for low-intensity conflict.

The Group held their first project exploration meeting on 22 August 1988.²⁷⁰ The Group began by asking which problems the Navy could do something about. They reviewed regional problems: Israeli, Greek-Turk, Saudis, Iraq, etc., and the rationale for maintaining presence in the region. They concluded that terrorism was the most likely contingency and a key challenge was how to get allies—established to defend against the Soviets—to support broader levels of conflict. They narrowed the area of interest to Libya and East, and the period to 1990/1995. The discussion turned to broad strategic issues and geopolitical objectives: regaining the initiative and not being out maneuvered by Gorbachev’s perestroika and arms control, conflict below global war, and treaties and agreements. The topic then turned to warfighting strategic issues and objectives: NATO/US forces on the southern flank, and lower levels of conflict. The meeting went on with discussions of using Navy bilateral agreements in lieu of NATO arrangements (a theme from Watkins and SSG IV), and

²⁷⁰ SSG VIII Hanley notebook.

implications of advanced weaponry, including nuclear weapons that were very accurate and difficult to see coming.

On 23 August 1988, SSG VIII continued their project exploration addressing:

- What is the difference between the current force mix and a mix for third world contingencies?
- When do you use coercive force?
- What are our force deployments and locations?
- And noted that we don't train well for lower levels of conflict.

Following that session, they met with Captain Seaquist (SSG III, now in OSD) in the morning to discuss:

- Perspectives from the JCS
- The Chairman's Staff Group
- Prepositioning military equipment in Tunisia
- A formula for strategy—national objectives, nature of threat (how to understand opponent), forces employed, design (explaining interactions), and uncertainties (state what you do not know).²⁷¹

On 25 August, they met with Major General Yariv (former Chief, Israeli Defense Force Intelligence) on his view of the Middle East. He emphasized the elements needed for successful special operations, including exquisite intelligence and dedicated special operations forces.²⁷² The remainder of that week they went on to meet with Dr. Colin Gray on naval arms control; and Bob Wood on the SSG approach, strategy, and Soviet naval arms control.

On 30 August, they had separate meetings with the CNO and the CMC. Trost began by stating that the SSG provided an opportunity for professional advancement, and to do something “to help us.” Admiral Busey (CINCUSNAVEUR) was looking for the SSG to help his effort. Trost then toured around the region discussing issues—e.g., access to prepositioned material in Souda Bay when needed in the context of other than war with the Soviets. He expressed his personal interest, telling them that their focus ought to be on the area but that they could not divorce the near and far terms. He directed them to address what issues and allies should be the focus of U.S. efforts and what the Navy could affect. He told them to place less emphasis on gaming war. He also told them to look at the thinking in Stuttgart (EUCOM headquarters), but

²⁷¹ SSG VIII Hanley notebook.

²⁷² Notes from discussions with MG Yariv (Israel) at SSG/Newport 8/25/1988, and email from Captain Michael Farmer, USN (Retired), 10 August 2015.

noted that they could not divorce the eastern Mediterranean from the Mideast in the CENTCOM area. He told them to take into account what the Navy could do without basing, and that they needed to understand arms control and its impact on other countries and the implications of Soviet control over our Mideast oil flow. He stated that he would like to be aggressive in NATO's south, but did not have adequate force. He was not sure the Group should get down to warfighting strategy, and thought that their product most likely would be used in identifying the key issues. Their goal was to define priorities.²⁷³

The CMC, General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., met more frequently with the SSG than his predecessors and successors as CMC. He told them that he was vitally interested in low-intensity conflict, and that they needed to go beyond thinking about what was going on in/with the Soviet Union and take the study beyond confrontation with Soviets.²⁷⁴ He asked them how they saw the geopolitical-military situation: what had changed, what was most likely, and what roles the sea services would play in these conflicts. He told them to articulate a position for the CNO/CMC. He said that rigor and intellectual honesty were important; that the face of the region had changed; and that “we are looking at a potential shift in regional power balances.” He then toured the region and gave his take on the issues, ending with: “We cannot ignore international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons.” He then remarked that as base rights became more critical, maritime flexibility became more important. He said, “We don’t consider enough that the environment is tough: some of these fighters from Chad are tough; running Land Rovers through mine fields, needing few logistics.”

He saw the use of Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) in Thrace as a shaping strategy in the region, telling the Group never to look at the MEF independent of striking power—whereas the Navy had come to view it only as a command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) interface.²⁷⁵ He stated that it was no use going to Thrace unless we were going to control the region. Relations with Turkey were important. He told the Group to look at what was important before addressing how to do it—i.e., decide what you want to accomplish before deciding how to use forces in the region. The crucial discussion involved the use of naval power in other than war with the Soviets. He felt that we needed legitimate ways to support force

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, SSG VIII Hanley notebook.

²⁷⁴ Other than General Gray, CMCs typically met with the SSG as a group during their orientation and to comment on their final products. General Gray met with them more frequently, and attended most of the meetings the SSG had with CNO Kelso. Trost preferred separate meetings.

²⁷⁵ SSG II’s concept of using Marine Tactical Operations Centers in Thrace to link Navy and NATO air-ground communications remained a centerpiece of war plans.

structure. He said he would vote for the Army and Air Force if it were right for national security.²⁷⁶ He ended by addressing hot issues of the time for the Marines. Some of his points were: “don’t want to see Marine air combat elements used alone”; “tell Marines what you want to have happen, not how to do it”; and “don’t forget about Marine Special Operations capability.”²⁷⁷

The Group met on 6 September with Captain Linton Brooks (NSC staff) on nuclear forces and naval control. On 8 September they met with Bill Manthorpe on Soviet thinking and naval arms control, and again on 19 September to discuss how NATO and non-NATO contingencies formed a major split in the region, noting that the United States needed NATO to have basing for presence and contingency operations. On 20-21 September the Group met at Harvard with Bob Blackwill, Steve Meyer, Richard Haas, Bob Murray, Graham Allison, Prof. Jones (Soviet Sociologist), Heidi Crowl, David Powell, Herb Sawyer, and Joe Nye. Similar meetings continued through September and into October. Captain Ken McGruther provided a NATO CINCSOUTH brief, “What do you do for your next highest commander?” He had presented it to the NSC, General Galvin (SACEUR), and the Greeks, and would present to the Turks.²⁷⁸

On 17 October, the Group met at CNA in the morning to discuss their project and then moved to the Pentagon for afternoon meetings with OPNAV. They began with OP-611/614 on Southern NATO & area basing and military relations.²⁷⁹ The Group noted that the general tenor was a desire to move out of areas that were tough to negotiate.²⁸⁰ Across the Pentagon was a realization that agreements would be more difficult and costs higher as allies became less concerned about Soviet invasion. Bases also were becoming focal points for anti-Americanism. In their meeting with Vice Admiral Charles Larson (OP-06), Larson asked what impact changes in basing and reduced deployments would have on our ability to respond, noting that the Group could not get too generic in their approach. He thought it would be interesting to look at how to make Soviets stay clear of conflicts in the third world and what that they might pursue in arms control that would affect our capabilities, particularly submarine-launched cruise missiles. He told the Group that in June he had played a game with NATO Military and Permanent Representatives where they had problems

²⁷⁶ SSG VIII Hanley notebook.

²⁷⁷ The Navy was exploring the increased use of Marine aircraft on carriers to make up for procurement shortfalls. Also, the Marines had avoided having forces assigned to Special Operations Command, instead creating special operations capable Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUSOCs).

²⁷⁸ SSG VIII Hanley notebook.

²⁷⁹ Strategic Studies Group VIII, Agenda, 17 October 1988.

²⁸⁰ SSG VIII Agenda; SSG VIII Hanley notebook.

addressing decisions that they had never really made before. He thought it might be worth looking at nuclear weapons as deterring chemical weapons in a third-world conflict. The OP-06 hot items were: basing structure opportunities (Malta); naval SOF in war in the Med; the role of other nations' navies; mine warfare and the contribution of land-based air; and NATO data links needed to provide a picture at the brink of war in order to set rules of engagement (ROE).

They next met with Vice Admiral William D. (Bill) Smith (OP-08). He told them that they could do CNO a favor if they put their ideas through a Competitive Strategy lens. He suggested that the Group compare the Libya targeting experience to the conceptual approach. He also recommended looking at military aid to countries and what we get out of it, sensing that it was not much. He suggested that they look at timing to get out of Greece (assuming that we might). He told them that the Navy and Marines needed Patriot missiles for base protection. He noted that the Soviets survived in the Mediterranean without bases and that the CNO was on record as saying that Navy was least dependent on basing. He then discussed the Congress and budgets.²⁸¹

The next day SSG VIII met with Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, USN (DNI). He began by discussing the difference between fleet targeting and Washington targeting—i.e., substantive vs. symbolic. He stated that we did not have intelligence for precise use of force and that the Navy was not good at hitting moving targets on land. He noted that the proliferation of communications was making intelligence collection more difficult. He found that with no viable Arab coalitions it was hard to find active threats to U.S. interests. The Group then went on to meet with OP-602 on deliberate and crisis action planning, with examples, then met with JCS J5 to discuss Competitive Strategy, arms control, and Greece/Turkey relations. The Joint Staff noted that Gorbachev's charm approach was working.²⁸²

Back in Newport on 20 October, the Group met with Rear Admiral Kurth, the new NWC President, who had just come from an assignment as defense attaché in Moscow. Kurth told them that the Soviets would not present the same kind of threat in the future that they had over the past 40 years, though there were some concerns over the Soviet Army taking control. He asked the Group, "How much are you willing to pay to continue the superpower competition?"²⁸³

At the October Navy CINCs conference, Vice Admiral Bill Smith (OP-08) noted that the fleet was 17% larger than in 1982 but had the same Operations and Maintenance

²⁸¹ SSG VIII Agenda.

²⁸² SSG VIII Agenda.

²⁸³ SSG VIII Agenda.

funding. He spoke of pressure to put USMC aircraft on CVs, which was concerning the Marines. The SSG presented their brief. Admiral Busey provided no new guidance. Admiral Kelso (CINCLANTFLT) remarked that we needed to train deployed forces for third-world contingencies. Admiral Busey commented on the problems with getting targeting through EUCOM to the U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). The CNO noted that SSG VIII was on the right track with respect to arms control. The discussion focused mainly on the Soviets.²⁸⁴

From 22 October to 4 November, the Group traveled to NAVEUR Headquarters in London, EUCOM Headquarters in Stuttgart, NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and SHAPE Headquarters in Mons, and to NATO and U.S. Headquarters in Naples.²⁸⁵

On 7 November, the Group had a general discussion with Richard Perle.²⁸⁶ On 14 -16 November, CNA hosted a Political-Military Seminar, organized by Dr. Patrick Cronin and Mr. Adam Siegel, involving experts from both CNA and Washington think tanks to provide an opportunity for the SSG to explore regional dynamics in the Middle East that affected U.S. interests and examine plausible scenarios that may involve military forces. Lieutenant General William Odom, USA (Retired), Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, Mr. Jeffrey Record, Dr. Emile Nakhleh, Dr. Jim Roche, and Mr. Jed Snyder participated in the seminar.

²⁸⁴ SSG VIII Agenda.

²⁸⁵ In London the SSG met with Vice Admiral Edward H. Martin, USN (Deputy CINCUSNAVEUR); Rear Admiral Jeremy Larkin, RN; Group Captain Gordon Gilbert, RAF (Retired); and Mr. John Chipman (Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)). In Naples they met with Admiral Busey, USN (CINCUSNAVEUR/AFSOUTH); Vice Admiral James D. Williams, USN (COMSIXTHFLT); Rear Admiral Frank Gallo, USN (CTF 67); and Rear Admiral Henry G. Chiles, USN (CTF 69/COMSUBGRU EIGHT). In Brussels they met with Captain Peter Swartz, USN, and in Mons they met with Rear Admiral Jerry Unruh, USN (SSG VI), and Colonel Ted Gatchel, USMC (SSG II). SSG VIII's schedule: London-Stuttgart-Mons, 22 October-4 November 1988, Col. Blanchfield, 21 October 1988.

²⁸⁶ SSG VIII Agenda; SSG VIII Hanley notebook.

On 17 November Jonenne Walker arranged SSG visits at the State Department.²⁸⁷ On 29 November, the Group held meetings in Washington, D.C., with Herman Eilts on Israeli-Palestinian peace process and personalities; at Brookings with Richard Quant on causes for war in the region; and at CIA with Paul Draper on Libya, and with Andy Campbell and Jack O'Donnell on the region under study. Jack O'Donnell was the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Warning and former Deputy Chief of Mission in Cairo.

During the period 4-17 December members of the Group visited Egypt, Turkey, and Israel (Appendix F). The conversations were candid.

To discuss Pacific Command's role in the Middle East, on 5 January the Group met with Admiral Hardisty (USCINCPAC) and Major General James Clapper, USAF (USCINCPAC J2) in Hawaii.²⁸⁸ On the way back from Hawaii, the Group visited Space Command and NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain.²⁸⁹

On 13 January 1989, the Group visited Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Rear Admiral Chuck Lemoyne from SSG V was on the staff. While on the SSG, the admiral had written a paper for CNO Watkins against forming SOCOM, but the Navy had not been able to overcome the momentum of the Goldwater-Nichols and associated legislation. Lemoyne led a discussion of the command's background, authorities, missions, and command structure. He noted that the Marine Expeditionary Unit - Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) concept was a masterstroke on the part of the USMC to keep their forces out of the command.²⁹⁰ The Group followed up this visit with a visit to the Joint Special Operations Command on 30-31 March 1989, where

²⁸⁷ Visit of SSG to State Department Thursday November 17, 1988. The Group spoke with:

- Ambassadors David Newton and Mary Ann Casey: Near East Asia
- Lieutenant Colonel David Lambert, USA: Political - Military Affairs
- Dr. Robert Mikulak: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Mr. Gary Crocker: State Intelligence
- Captain Peter Deuterma, USN: JCS
- Dr. John Zimmerman: Strategic Technology Affairs on missile proliferation
- Dr. Richard Soloman: Director, Policy Planning
- Ambassador John Kelley: former Ambassador to Lebanon
- Mr. Charles Duelfer: U.S./Israeli Joint Political Military Group

²⁸⁸ CNO Strategic Studies Group Meeting, IPAC Commander's Conference Room, 5 January 1989.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Farmer email, 10 August 2015.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, SSG VIII Hanley notebook.

they met with Colonel David McNight among others.²⁹¹ During these visits and visits to Navy Special Operations Command in Norfolk and Air Force Special Operations Command at Hurlburt Field, Florida, the Group became aware of the mismatches in special operations equipment that hampered joint special operations.²⁹²

The Group attended a Regional Issues Symposium on 16-17 February 1989 at the NWC. The purpose of the symposium was, "To examine critical developments in key regional areas in order to assess the impacts of these developments on U.S. policy and strategy, and on U.S. - Soviet relations."²⁹³ Panels for Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia addressed the issues in each region. Professor Paul Kennedy from Yale provided an evening lecture.

On 4 April, part of the Group went to NSA for meetings with the Director, Vice Admiral Bill Studeman, USN, and relevant portions of his staff.²⁹⁴

SSG VIII presented their findings to the spring Navy CINCs conference on 14 March 1989 and prepared a final briefing for broader presentation that included essentially the same material. SSG VIII's framework began with strategic aims and threats in NATO's southern region and the Mideast. It then examined changes in these regions and in the United States, to derive a strategic posture from now into the next century focusing on opportunities for leverage as the basis for a U.S. strategy for the Mediterranean and Mideast. They briefed their findings on strategic aims and threats in NATO's south and the Mideast, followed by what they saw as the most important strategic changes. Foremost among these were the changes going on in the Soviet Union. Evaluating the effects on Soviet capabilities was difficult. As the Soviets eliminated 5,000 old tanks in Eastern Europe, they produced 300 new tanks a month. The SSG saw many of the changes in Soviet society as irreversible, but expected the competition with the United States to continue. They saw the need for the precise application of force in the lower levels of conflict that were increasingly driving U.S. force demands.²⁹⁵

The driving changes for NATO involved the diminishing perception of the Soviet threat, the potential collapse of Communism, SACEUR increasingly looking to Southern NATO as an axis of advance against the Soviets in war, the developing

²⁹¹ Itinerary for Navy Strategic Studies Group, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 30-31 March 1989, 28 March 1989.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, Farmer email, 10 August 2015.

²⁹³ Naval War College Notice 5050, From: President, Naval War College, Subj: Regional Issues Symposium, 16-17 February 1989, 9 February 1989.

²⁹⁴ SSG VIII Plan of the Day, 4 April 1989.

²⁹⁵ SSG VIII Final briefing text and slides.

European Economic Community, increasing U.S./NATO naval cooperation accompanied by challenges to U.S. basing and permission to fly over countries in the region. They suggested the implications of each change.

Factors they saw driving the Mideast included:

- Increased emphasis on Special Forces
- The shifting military balance between the Arabs and Israel that would require Israel to work hard to maintain a technological edge
- Continuing competition between the Soviets and the U.S. in the region
- Leaders without successors in Arab states
- Demographic pressures leading to greater unrest.

Changes that they highlighted for the United States included:

- Accurate, long-range power projection
- A greater role for space and C³I systems
- The economic and military emergence of the Pacific rim
- Flat or declining U.S. defense budgets
- The momentum of arms control
- The need for reestablishing ties to the Maghreb in order to provide increased access.

The briefing then provided what the SSG saw as the areas for emphasis and approaches looking at both an unlikely conflict with the Soviets and the much more likely uses of force in lower levels of conflict.

The Group then focused on selected opportunities in basing and presence (including a greater emphasis on sea basing), ASW, security assistance and military cooperation, and precision targeting. For target planning, they recommended processes both for planning targets against the Soviets in war and for lower levels of conflict. For lower levels of conflict, they recommended using SSG V's formulation of anticipating unacceptable acts to create a force options book.

Captain Mack Gaston delivered the final SSG VIII briefing on Mideast Strategy to the CNO, and later saw it reflected in U.S. naval operations in the 1991 Gulf War.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁶ John Grady, "The Oral History of Rear Admiral Mack C. Gaston, U.S. Navy (Retired) Oral History Program (Washington DC: Naval Historical Foundation, 2008).

SSG VIII's year was similar to SSG VII's in providing a broad educational experience for the Fellows to prepare them for higher rank, and providing them access and specific ideas that they could apply in future assignments. They also satisfied Trost's aim to stimulate strategic thinking among the Navy leadership. However, their briefings and limited distribution Secret report had no documented influence on Navy strategy or plans.

As with the previous two SSGs, given the effects of the Goldwater Nichols Act and Trost's desire to put good officers wherever he needed them, more SSG VIII fellows were now detailed to positions on the Joint Staff and Navy warfare specialty assignments other than OP-06 and OP-07. Mike Farmer became Assistant Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, JCS J5. Don Baird went to SHAPE. Steve Johnson, Mack Gaston, and Jon Coleman were all assigned to important OPNAV billets, but not to OP-095/OP-07 or to OP-06.

CEP Task Force on Navy Strategy Formation

On becoming Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral Mike Boorda, with the support of Admiral Bud Edney (VCNO), recommended to the CNO that he review the assignment of top talent to the SSG and a Strategic Think Tank (STT) formed in 1987 at CNA to address nuclear issues.²⁹⁷ Boorda had expressed his belief that the talent assigned to these two groups could be used more effectively in Navy staff billets. Fulfilling joint professional military education and joint duty assignment requirements of Goldwater-Nichols legislation created growing challenges for officers who had completed major command assignments. In addition, budgets were going down and BUPERS had never completed a plan for manning the 600-ship navy.²⁹⁸

The STT had been an idea promoted by Captain Linton Brooks when working for CNO Watkins.²⁹⁹ However, implementation was so slow that Brooks had gone on to the NSC and Trost had relieved Watkins as CNO by the time this new group formed. The introduction of Trident SLBM D5 warheads with hard-target kill capability and Soviet naval arms control initiatives to constrain USN submarine-launched cruise missile deployment motivated Trost to establish the STT. He put it at CNA with Rear Admiral Owens (SSG I) in charge, though Owens was commanding Submarine Group 6 in

²⁹⁷ Memorandum from John Hanley to Bob Wood, Subj: CEP Task Force on Strategy Formulation, 8 February 1989.

²⁹⁸ Hanley interview with Vice Admiral Patricia Tracey, Alexandria, VA, 28 November 2014.

²⁹⁹ Hanley interview with Ambassador Linton Brooks, Captain, USN (Retired), 4 August 2014.

Charleston, SC, at the time.³⁰⁰ CNA assigned Jim Blaker to the STT, where he began working with Owens, a relationship that extended from that point forward.³⁰¹ The STT had an impressive board that included people such as Albert Wohlstetter and Bob Murray.

In response to the recommendation from his VCNO and Chief of Naval Personnel, in January 1989 Trost created a CEP Task Force on Navy Strategy Formation “to study the issue of how we educate and employ naval officers who are able to think strategically, and who are able, as a consequence, to help plan and articulate naval and national strategy and policy.”³⁰² The proposed membership for the Task Force had the SSG’s initial director, Bob Murray, as chairman, with OP-00K Deputy and former OP-603 *Maritime Strategy* contributor Captain Thomas F. Marfiak as Task Force Director. OP-00K staffers Commander Keith Hahn and Lieutenant Commander James Stavridis (both OP-603 alumni) served as Managing Directors. The CEP Task Force had until June 1989 to provide their findings.

Given the need to cut orders for SSG IX, on 10 April 1989 Murray provided the CEP’s views on the SSG and the STT in a letter to the CNO, rather than waiting for their final report.³⁰³ The CEP found the SSG valuable to the Navy primarily for three reasons:

- First, the SSG helped prepare an officer “for more demanding and responsible leadership billets.” The Navy-wide education that they received in the use of naval forces for national purposes, their work with OPNAV and CINC staffs and interactions with joint and combined staffs made them more articulate on the naval role in national strategy and more valuable naval officers.
- Second, the SSG promoted a strategic dialogue within the Navy. The SSG acted “as a catalyst encouraging closer examination each year by OPNAV and CINC staffs on a specific area of strategic inquiry” through debating their ideas with staffs, wargaming, and briefing their work to the Navy leadership. Encouraging the staffs to step back from day-to-day issues was of “inestimable value” in creating a rich Navy strategic culture since 1981 and

³⁰⁰ Hanley and Swartz interview with Captain Michael Farmer, USN (Retired) and Dr. David A. Rosenberg (historian), Arlington, VA, 28 November 2014.

³⁰¹ Hanley phone interview with Mr. James Blaker, 18 December 2014.

³⁰² Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for the Executive Director, CNO Executive Panel (OP-00K), Subj: Task Force on Navy Strategy Formation, Ser 00/9U500059, 26 January 1989.

³⁰³ Letter from Robert J. Murray to Admiral C. A. H. Trost, USN, 10 April 1989.

made the depth and breadth of naval strategic thinking the envy of the other services.

- Third were the written products of the SSG, though, according to the CEP, this was “not the most important aspect of the SSG experience.” The work of SSGs I and II provided “original works of considerable value for campaign planning by the appropriate CINCs” and had “helped coalesce Navy thinking about maritime strategy.” Recent work had also been of value. Although “every year will not produce a pearl of inestimable value,” every SSG should aim to do so. “The standard should be work of very high quality, on a strategically significant topic of interest to you.”

In addition, the SSG was widely known as a Flagship of naval strategic thinking. Other services were emulating it.³⁰⁴ Closing down the SSG would send “unwelcome and unfortunate signals” to Congress. Also, the Navy faced a decade of “budgetary stringency and strategic change.” The Navy would need the broadly experienced officers produced by the SSG to make the case for naval forces in the years ahead. The continued personal attention of the CNO in choosing the officers, and in approving their post-SSG assignments, would remain indispensable to the SSG’s success.

The task force also recommended keeping the SSG at the NWC; retaining a widely experienced civilian director, preferably on a three-year rotational basis; and devising a program to allow the SSG members to achieve Joint Professional Military Education Phase I credit for their tour on the SSG.

The task force noted that the STT differed from the SSG in two ways: it focused on nuclear issues, rather than the application of the full range of naval power; and it was “primarily important for the value of the product it produces,” whereas the SSG was “at heart an educational experience for the officers involved.” The task force suggested three alternatives for the STT, with advantages and disadvantages:

- Place it within the OPNAV Staff and staff it primarily with military officers.
- Make it a separate Navy staff organization outside the Pentagon, but still staff it primarily with naval officers.
- Place it under CNA control, staffed primarily by civilian analysts, and directed by a civilian.

³⁰⁴ The Army had formed a similar Group at the Army War College in 1986, though with significant differences in its reporting chain and study approach.

The SSG continued as before with the Chief of Naval Personnel's concurrence, with some reduction in the number of post-major command officers assigned.³⁰⁵ The STT wound down with the fall of the Berlin Wall, morphing into the CNA Strategic Planning and Analysis Group.

SSG IX (1989-1990): The SSG shifts gears

Initial focus: Warfighting implications of a more modern but smaller Soviet fleet

Changed focus: Implications of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia

CNO Admiral Trost had decided it was time for a new SSG Director and turned to Vice Admiral Bill Smith (OP-08) to help him find a replacement.³⁰⁶ Smith recommended Robert (Robin) B. Pirie, Jr., his naval academy classmate and fellow submarine officer. Pirie had senior experience in the Congressional Budget Office, and had been Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserves, Installations, and Logistics, overseeing over 60 percent of the Defense budget in President Carter's administration. Smith would have expected Pirie to be CNO had he not run afoul of Admiral Rickover while on assignment to OSD's Systems Analysis Office.³⁰⁷ Pirie had participated in the Global War Games in the early 1980s and was familiar with naval strategy and associated issues. Smith recommended Pirie, and Trost agreed. The CNO gave Pirie no guidance other than to "get the Group up and running."³⁰⁸

Because of renovations to Pringle Hall, the NWC decided to move the SSG to Sims Hall, on the other side of campus from the main CNWS offices and farther from the NWC faculty. Hanley recommended against the move. He stated that the objective should be to integrate the SSG into the CNWS as closely as possible, respecting the special relationship of the Group to the CNO. Moving the SSG would exacerbate the strain in the relationship between the Group and the Center that had developed when the SSG and CNWS received separate directors. He suggested that efforts to move

³⁰⁵ Ibid., Hanley memo to Wood, 8 February 1989.

³⁰⁶ Hanley and Swartz interview with Hon. Robert B Pirie, Bethesda, MD, 24 June 2014, and Hanley interview with Admiral William D. Smith, USN (Retired), Lorton, VA, 14 November 2014.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., Hanley interview with Admiral William D. Smith.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., Pirie interview.

back toward the original CNWS concept would benefit the SSG, CNWS, the NWC and the Navy by taking advantage of the SSGs access to leadership, intelligence, and special programs, while enhancing the College's reputation and programs. A new SSG Director offered new opportunities for enhancing cooperation.³⁰⁹ The SSG moved to Sims Hall, however, further separating the Group from CNWS and the College.

Pirie began as SSG Director in the fall of 1989. Former SSG Director Wood, the Dean of CNWS, filled in briefly to get the new Group started while awaiting Pirie's arrival.³¹⁰ Lieutenant Commander James R. FitzSimonds, USN, also joined the Group staff. He had spent two years with the Newport intelligence detachment conducting war games involving the Soviets and had been an aide to Vice Admiral Hogg at OP-095.³¹¹

With the change of directors came a clarification of the status of the SSG Director. John Lehman had moved the management of CNA from the University of Rochester to the Hudson Institute. Marshall Bremont was being paid by the Hudson Institute. In that status, he could not legally supervise government and military personnel or expend federal funds. As Program Director, John Hanley performed these functions officially. A memorandum of agreement established Pirie as a CNA field representative to the U.S. Naval War College, where he would be "responsible for designing and evaluating the Strategic Studies Group program at the NAVWARCOL and will be responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for the overall performance of the SSG."³¹²

Officers chosen to join SSG IX by the CNO and CMC included:

- Captain Douglas P. (Doug) Huth, USN (SEAL)
- Captain Jay L. Johnson, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain William J. (Bill) Kane, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain Richard G. Kirkland, USN (maritime patrol aviation)
- Captain Albert H. (Al) Konetzni, USN (submarine warfare)
- Colonel Sean K. Leach, USMC (ground)

³⁰⁹ Memorandum from Program Director for Strategic Studies, to Deputy to the President, Naval War College, via Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Subj: Location of the Strategic Studies Group, 10 May 1989.

³¹⁰ Email from Captain James R. (Jim) FitzSimonds to John Hanley, 24 June 2015.

³¹¹ Hanley interview with Jim FitzSimonds, USN (Retired), Newport, RI, 11 December 2014.

³¹² Memorandum of Understanding between the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Navy Program Planning), President of the Naval War College, President, Center for Naval Analyses, Responsibilities of the CNA Field Representative to the U.S. Naval War College, 12 October 1989.

- Colonel Alfred J. (Al) Ponnwitz, USMC (aviation)
- Commander James W. (Jim) Suhr, USN (submarine warfare)
- Colonel Dale S. Town, USMC (combat support).

On 22 May, Trost provided tasking for SSG IX:³¹³

The task of SSG IX will be particularly important as fuel for our Navy-wide strategic dialogue as we enter a period of geo-political and strategic change.

I would like the SSG, therefore, to pursue a study of the implications for the Navy of a more modern but perhaps smaller Soviet fleet. Using the year 1994 as a benchmark, it would be most helpful for the SSG to reexamine the potential strategies of both navies based on the following assumptions:

- Soviet SSBN's in deeper, less accessible bastions
- A larger percentage of the Soviet strategic reserve in mobile land-based mode.
- Consequently, potentially larger number of more capable Soviet submarines available for anti-SLOC, anti-CV missions.
- Increasing numbers of Soviet air-defense platforms, including CV based TACAIR, at sea to interdict both MPA as well as USAF manned bomber/ALCM carriers.
- The continued validity and applicability of tactics, such as the use of havens, aimed at allowing CVs to operate well forward from the outset of conflict.

The recent work of the CEP Task Force on Strategy Formation has highlighted the value of the SSG as an institution within the Navy that fosters the consideration of strategic possibilities. This task will require an extraordinary effort, but when completed will help develop the foundation for the evolution of our maritime strategy in the decade of the 1990s.

During his subsequent meeting with the SSG in the fall, Trost was specifically interested in the SSG's thoughts on whether any changes were needed to the maritime strategy.

³¹³ Chief of Naval Operations letter to the Honorable Marshall A. Brement, 22 May 1989.

The SSG orientation program continued as before, with orientation in strategy and the strategic environment, and seminars with those most knowledgeable and most expert on the SSG's tasking (Appendix G).

On 16–18 October, SSG IX played its first war game. This was essentially a rehearsal for the second game, to be held on 13–17 November. The overall objectives of the game were to explore Soviet and NATO strategies for general war in a 1994 post Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty environment. The rationale, cost, and benefits of key theater operations in current plans received particular scrutiny. Specific objectives included examining:³¹⁴

- Operations against Soviet strategic systems post-START
- Soviet submarine force operations
- Requirements for Marines and sea-based TACAIR to be positioned forward at the outset of hostilities
- The role of naval power projection in disrupting Soviet calculations and plans from the flanks against the role of defeating the main Soviet thrust directly
- Reinforcement rate requirements in a post-CFE environment

The SSG used a scenario developed by the ATP. Top Navy intelligence officers, rear admirals from OPNAV, and fleet representatives participated in the game. The big conclusion was that a Soviet ground invasion of Europe could no longer succeed. The game turned into an entrenched ground stalemate and an air war.

On 9 November 1989, the Germans opened the Berlin Wall. The SSG told Trost in early December that, as the study progressed, the Group's thinking was dominated by rapid changes in the political and military climate of Eastern Europe, predictions in the growth of third-world military capabilities, proliferation of advanced technologies, and increased lethality of weapons systems. The CNO agreed that the study should include a review of our naval strategies in other than a direct Soviet confrontation.³¹⁵

U.S. and Soviet interests intersected in the Persian Gulf, where the prospects for conflict were high. Some members of SSG IX wanted to examine the Navy's role in a conflict between Iran and Oman over the Straits of Hormuz. This would not require putting carrier battle groups into the Gulf. Others looked at Iraq. In the previous year, Saddam Hussein had fought Iran to a standstill in their eight-year war. Assad in

³¹⁴ SSG IX Wargames, three-ring binder.

³¹⁵ SSG IX Wargame #3 folder: Wargame #3 briefing.

Syria was weak. These members argued for studying an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the eastern oil fields in Saudi Arabia, while debating whether Saddam's main motivation was a desire to have control over oil or a wish to be the next Arab Gamel Abdel Nasser.³¹⁶ The Group visited the CIA to explore the possibilities. The CIA argued against a scenario involving a war between Iran and Oman, as the Omanis had learned to deal with Iran over the centuries and maintained good relations. Regarding a game exploring an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a senior intelligence official with long experience in the region said that of course this was against U.S. policy, but that he "sure hoped" the SSG would play the game.

The week of 5-9 February 1990, SSG IX played their third game. The objectives were to:³¹⁷

- Determine likely U.S. strategies for this contingency.
- Identify U.S. capabilities to react to this conflict by examining strategic reach and logistical issues.
- Identify possible strategic vacuums as a result of committing forces to this region.
- Determine likely Soviet strategies and capabilities.
- Assess the role/impact of U.S. armed forces to deter/contain/terminate the conflict, influence Soviet actions, and influence actions of the various nations involved.
- Study joint and combined task force organizations and operations, and
- Investigate the impacts of alliance structures and cohesion of the various nations involved.

Game play started on the strategic/political level and evolved to theater and tactical problems. The game involved teams for control, and for the United States, the Soviet Union, Iraq, EC/Japan/Turkey, and GCC/Egypt/Iran. The scenario involved a reduction in U.S. forces and presence, followed by an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and then Saudi oil fields. The CIA sent a strong team of experts on Iraq.³¹⁸ Mr. Mel Geiger, the Iraqi desk officer from DIA, played Iraqi leadership and forces. The usual Soviet experts played on the Soviet team. OPNAV was well represented with participants from OP-06/07/92. Others provided their experience from working on the maritime strategy and the NSC staff: Rear Admiral Bill Cockell, USN (Retired), who was CNO

³¹⁶ Hanley and Kennedy interview with Vice Admiral Albert H. Konezni, Jr., USN (Retired), Norfolk, VA, 13 January 2015.

³¹⁷ SSG IX War Game #3: Non-Central Front Regional Conflict, 5-9 February 1990, Draft Working Paper.

³¹⁸ Thank you letters, 1990 -1991.

Hayward's Executive Assistant for developing CNO Strategic Concepts; Captain Rod McDaniel, USN (Retired); and Captain Ron St. Martin, USN (Retired). Also participating were Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernson, USN (CINCLANTFLT J-5), and Rear Admiral (select) Larry Marsh (OP-81, SSG III). USCENTCOM sent only three O-4 officers because their command did not want to be involved in a game that ran counter to U.S. policy.

The Blue lessons learned noted that Iraqi military force levels were about the same size as the first echelon of Warsaw Pact ground forces and that if the United States did not have sufficient forces in the region, an adversary like Iraq could get a "quick win." Even without the Soviets, there were places in the world where the United States could become involved in high-intensity conflict. Maintaining a technological edge would remain important as armed forces like Iraq's obtained fourth-generation military equipment. The game play confirmed that the Navy was not good at attacking moving targets on land and had limitations on the rate at which it could move forces to the region. U.S. requirements for strategic lift would not decrease with reductions in Soviet force.

Although alliances and U.S. operational military command structures were designed to fight the Soviets, regional contingencies would require NATO, joint, and combined operations. NATO command structures, the Unified Command Plan, and the focus of U.S. intelligence efforts would require rethinking. The coalition partners in the game were unusual, emphasizing the importance of non-traditional coalitions.³¹⁹ The United States would need to be prepared to deal with issues surrounding combined task forces with non-traditional partners, including the Soviet Union, without jeopardizing U.S. security interests. The United States might have to compromise its preferred aims in order to accommodate the need to sustain coalitions. The speed of U.S. response was critical, but forces committed must have the sustainability to survive protracted combat. As budget pressures resulted in reduced force levels, perceptions of U.S. withdrawal would create strategic vacuums, inviting regional conflict. The spread of sophisticated, lethal weapons would not make a multi-polar world safer.³²⁰

The Soviet team approached this crisis from a completely different reference frame than it had in previous crises. Actions that the Soviets had taken since 1986 limited their options. The Soviet objectives were to demonstrate to the rest of the world that it was still a superpower and to encourage the rest of the world to help the Soviet Union with internal economic reconstruction. The Soviet cell ended up committing strategic lift and a motorized rifle division to the coalition effort to push the Iraqis

³¹⁹ Ibid., Konetzni interview.

³²⁰ Ibid., Wargame #3 briefing.

out of the Saudi oil fields and Kuwait. In addition, they worked a deal with the Japan cell to allow Japanese oil development experts into Siberia to help develop those fields and produce oil that would make the USSR and Japan less dependent on Persian Gulf oil.³²¹ Every decision that the Soviet team had to make was new.³²² The Soviet analysts concluded that now was an opportunity to shape the Soviets.

On 27 February, the Group visited Vice Admiral Diego E. Hernandez, USN (Deputy CINC U.S. Space Command) and the staff at Petersen Air Force Base.³²³ On 28 February they visited North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organizations National Test Facility at Falcon Air Force Base in Colorado. On 9-10 March, the SSG had a strategy seminar with retired admirals Harry Train, Ace Lyons, and others. The Group then participated in the First Annual Admiral Charles M. Cooke Conference for naval strategists and planners, cosponsored at the NWC by CNWS and NPS Monterey. This conference had replaced the May conference and focused more on Navy planning. Captain Mike Farmer (SSG VIII, and now assigned to the Joint Staff J-5) also attended.

The Group met with the CNO on 18 March. They began with a review of insights presented in the December brief:³²⁴

- Any future war with Soviets, though unlikely, would take on a regional character.
- “A 1988-style theater strategic offensive which would carry Warsaw Pact forces to the channel ports in three weeks will not be possible in the mid-90s.”
- Horizontal escalation was an option for the West.
- The Soviets might need to consider the first use of nuclear weapons.
- Direct application of naval power could make a difference.
- With central Europe as a buffer, naval forces were even more relevant on the flanks.
- Stealth was important.
- An anti-SSBN campaign was still feasible and even a few Soviet SSBNs could have important implications after START.

³²¹ Letter from John Battilega to John Hanley, Subj: Writeup of Soviet Team Actions in SSG Wargame III.

³²² Ibid., FitzSimonds email, 24 June 2015.

³²³ Ibid., Thank you letters, 1990 -1991.

³²⁴ SSG IX CNO March Brief folder.

Then they turned to the utility of naval forces in future regional conflict. The most likely scenario for war with Soviets would arise from a third-world conflict. The Group sought a scenario that would challenge the U.S. strategic reach. They wanted to avoid canonical war plan responses rehearsed with allies, but would entail high-intensity combat. This led to selection of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to involve U.S., Soviet, and other world powers' interests.

The game backdrop involved:

- A reduced U.S. presence in the Mideast by 1994
- A continued decline in the availability of Soviet oil for export
- Amicable Soviet-Japanese negotiations for the Northern Territories
- A strong Western European economic alliance
- Independent Warsaw Pact nations
- Continuing unrest in the Soviet Union
- An economically formidable Japan
- A militarily powerful Iraq bent on achieving regional hegemony before making a move for leadership of the Arab world
- An Iraqi 1994 ground order of battle roughly approximate to the Warsaw Pact's first strategic echelon for offensive in West in 1988
- No Iraqi nuclear weapons by 1994
- A Soviet team that was expected to align with Iraq. (It ended up working more closely with the United States and its allies. The Soviet team was pragmatic.)

This led to a discussion of how to justify the Navy, given that we could no longer use the old maritime strategy concepts.

SSG IX then went to brief their findings to the fleet. The reaction from Commander SEVENTH Fleet was that the SSG should know that Iran, not Iraq, was the enemy. On 27-28 March, the SSG attended and briefed the Navy CINCs conference.³²⁵ The Group's plan called for finalizing the final brief during the week of 30 March and assembling the written report on 7-11 April. The Group met with Mr. Paul Draper on 12 April to discuss developments in the Mideast.³²⁶ The period of 14-25 May was set aside for final briefing trips, and 29 May-1 June for contingency travel.

³²⁵ This would be the last time that the SSG interacted with the Navy CINCs conference.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, Thank you letters, from 1990 -1991.

On 15 June, the Group briefed a synopsis of the key issues and findings from the year to the CNO, CMC, VCNO, OP-06, and OP-08.³²⁷ They began by discussing findings with respect to the initial tasking for fighting the Soviets, pointing out that allied naval forces could have even more effects on the maritime flanks, and that the U.S. now controlled the timelines. They then turned to regional conflicts, anticipating a shift from a bipolar to a multi-polar world, a reduction in superpower influence, and greater regional instability accompanied by a proliferation of high-tech weapons and weapons of mass destruction, many of which were produced indigenously. They projected that mid-1990s challenges would include:

- Managing alliances
- Military responses to weapons proliferation
- Indications and Warning
- Command structures and deployment postures for crisis response
- Building domestic and international consensus
- “New” U.S. isolationism
- Understanding the “enemy”

They suggested that the strategy for regional crisis response would continue to rely on forward defense, deterrence, and alliance solidarity. Whereas the maritime strategy of the 1980s involved early global deployment, flexible forward posture, and initiative on offense, the 1990s would entail deployment to regions of possible crises, tailored response, and initiative in crisis response. They cited that naval forces were mobile, flexible, supportable, and sustainable across the spectrum of conflict. Crisis management would involve unilateral, joint, and combined task forces, new deployment plans, and new employment options. They concluded with areas for further study on these topics. According to a memo from the SSG Intelligence Officer:

The CNO and CMC were pleased with the results of SSG IX's efforts and requested [the] briefing be further disseminated to CNO Executive Panel and members of the HQMC staff. CNO also requested copies of [the] briefing, and stated he intended to use segments for his presentation at [the] Current Strategy Forum in Newport, 19-21 June 1990, just a week or so before he was to retire from the Navy.³²⁸

³²⁷ SSG IX Final Brief to CNO folder.

³²⁸ Memo From: Intelligence Officer, Strategic Studies Group, To: Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, Commanding Officer, Navy Operational Intelligence Center, Via: Officer in Charge,

The memo went on to list the issues that the CNO and CMC had commented on:

- There was no clear answer whether Soviet correlation of forces methodology was still valid. The CNO felt that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the economic and social problems within the USSR made correlation of forces calculations irrelevant.
- The CNO asked why SSG IX believed in a Soviet shift to defensive doctrine when the Soviet Navy Chief, Fleet Admiral Chernavin, was writing about offensive issues such as SLOC interdiction: He asked, “Didn’t Chernavin get the word?”
- The SSG had suggested reviewing how much intelligence should remain on the Soviets as opposed to regional problems. The CNO thought that it was “very important to know what is going on behind the scenes” in the Soviet Union. The CMC agreed, but stressed the need to “broaden the focus,” and thought some arms verification could be redirected. The CMC thought that intelligence collection priorities were “too important to leave in the hands of others” and said that “we need to take charge of this.” The CNO agreed.
- The CMC was concerned with maintaining his force structure, citing a proposal to have the USN/USMC responsible for the Pacific and USA/USAF responsible for Europe/Atlantic. He stated that the SSG brief could be used to “defeat this type of thinking.”
- The CNO and CMC agreed that there were elements in SSG IX’s final product that would require further investigation. He suggested that they be used as a foundation for SSG X’s project.

On 29 May, CINCLANTFLT requested SSG IX Game 3 reports.³²⁹ On 23 July 1990, the SSG received many requests for its game report from the Pentagon.³³⁰ When Saddam did invade, on 1 August 1990, the deployment of his forces aligned precisely with the DIA play of Iraqi forces in the game.

Navy Operational Intelligence Center Detachment, Newport, Subj: Strategic Studies Group - Issues

³²⁹ Letters From: Deputy Director, Strategic Studies Group, To: Captain Brown, Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Code N57), Subj: Strategic Studies Group IX War Game Methodology, 31 May 1990; and From: Director, Strategic Studies Group, To: Rear Admiral Bernsen, Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Subj: Strategic Studies Group IX War Game Methodology, 31 May 1990.

³³⁰ Hanley conversation with Mitch Brown, Commander USN (Retired), 23 April 2015.

The Fellows on SSG IX each took responsibility for writing sections of their final Top Secret report on how U.S. naval forces might best support U.S. military strategy in the mid-1990s: *U.S. Naval Support to the National Military Strategy: Post 1994*. The report addressed both their original tasking and the insights they had derived from their third game and subsequent interactions. It concluded that with conventional force parity and greater strategic warning, a war on the Central Front was a dead issue. NATO now controlled both nuclear and horizontal escalation options. Soviet thought was in transition, and now was an opportunity to shape Soviet thinking. Forward SSNs were still valuable, and the haven tactic continued to provide options for defense and strike. Maintaining the U.S. technological edge would remain important. The report recommended new thought processes for force building and crisis response, noting the likelihood of regional vice global war across the full spectrum of violence. New thinking would be required to calculate forces needed to meet the challenges. Defense calculus would need to shift from a Central Front war to enduring U.S. interests. The report was only distributed to senior naval leaders, and did not receive the attention that the Group's Game 3 report did.

In follow-on assignments, Richard Kirkland went to command. Jim Suhr went to OP-701, where he worked joint requirements and wrote the Summary Warfare Appraisal (an assignment similar to those given to SSG officers in earlier years). Al Konetzni went to OP-21b as Deputy overseeing the SSBN programs. Jay Johnson went to BUPERS. Ponnwitz became acting Secretary of the General Staff at HQMC.

Following Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Konetzni had the opportunity to brief CMC Gray on the SSG game.³³¹ The Commandant asked why the Group had not paid more attention to logistics. Suhr was in the briefs in the Pentagon when the invasion occurred.³³² He noted that if Saddam had gone into the Saudi oil fields, as he did in our game, it would really have hurt us. In commenting on Marine Corps gaming done after the invasion, Ponnwitz called the CMC's attention to the chapter that he had written in the final SSG IX report, *U.S. Naval Forces Support*, addressing what it would take to deter, contain, reverse, and end conflicts such as Saddam had initiated. His findings aligned well with operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

FitzSimonds, who had been instrumental in Game 3 preparations, left the SSG for a carrier in the Arabian Sea. He called back to get the SSG game book, which had a better Iraqi order of battle than he had on his ship.³³³ He noted:

³³¹ Ibid., Konetzni interview.

³³² Hanley interview with Captain James W. Suhr, USN (Retired), Norfolk, VA, 13 January 2014.

³³³ Ibid., Fitzsimonds interview.

A lot of what we played out in our Iraq game came to pass, except that Saddam did not proceed into Saudi Arabia. China paid more attention and took more action based on what we did in DESERT STORM than we did. However, the Navy did plus up precision munitions by Operation Iraqi Freedom. On our battle group in DESERT STORM we had about 12 Walleyes, 12 Bullpups, maybe a total of 3 dozen precision munitions. The Walleyes were too heavy to bring back, so it took the admiral to personally authorize using them. We dumped a lot of munitions because we could not find targets.

James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State under President George H.W. Bush, called the invasion “the defining moment of the new era.”³³⁴ His statements then went on to align with findings from SSG IX.

³³⁴ James A. Baker, III, “America’s Stake in the Persian Gulf Crisis.” *The Officer*, October 1990, pp. 35-38.

The Post-Cold War SSG Under Admirals Kelso and Boorda: Exploring the Future Security Environment and Naval Influence (1990 – 1994)

Context for SSG studies, 1990-1994

Admiral Frank B. Kelso became CNO on 29 June 1990. On 2 August, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, as President George H.W. Bush was giving a speech at Aspen on a new world order. The invasion halted nascent U.S. initiatives for shaping a post-Cold War world. Combat operations for DESERT STORM began on 17 January 1991 with aerial and naval bombardments, and ended on 28 January following a 100-hour ground campaign.

The fall of the Soviet Union affected all aspects of national security and defense planning. The USSR became the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in December 1991. The disintegration of Yugoslavia began with the succession of Slovenia in 1991 and spread into ethnic conflicts across the Balkans throughout the 1990s. The trend in naval and military planning became more regional than Soviet centered and shifted from forward defense toward forward presence; however, rationalizing force structures presented a tough intellectual problem.

Testifying before Congress in June 1990, Kelso declared that the Navy did not need a “maritime strategy” designed to counter a specific threat, but rather a “maritime policy” and a “strategy of deployments” to handle contingencies around the world.

General Colin Powell had become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in October 1989. While Goldwater-Nichols legislation had not significantly affected Admiral William Crowe’s relationships with the service chiefs when he was Chairman, General Powell

did not consult the CNO before briefing decisions to SECDEF, such as cutting the planned Navy from 551 to 450 ships.³³⁵ The Unified Command Plan, designating the areas of responsibility and tasks of the Unified and Specified CINCs and signed by the President, was under constant review.

General Powell's Base Force called for cutting U.S. force levels about 25 percent. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's Bottom-Up Review in 1993 extended the cuts to about 30 percent. At the same time, the new President Clinton in 1993 adopted a policy of engagement and enlargement. U.N.-mandated operations expanded. The services were called upon to conduct simultaneous operations in northern Iraq, southern Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, the Adriatic, Somalia, Haiti, and Burundi. U.S. forces were reinforcing South Korea in response to North Korean saber rattling. The Marine Corps had to extend deployments from six to eight months.

Responding to U.S. initiatives, the Russians opened a window in the early 1990s where the SSG could exchange views in a manner similar to exchanges with other academics and military and government officials. (The Russians began closing this window again in the latter half of the 1990s.) The United States also lifted restrictions on exchanges with China that had been put in place following China's crackdown on demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989. As of 1993, the SSG could exchange views with academics, military, and government officials in China.

The Congress's rewrite of the National Defense Act changed authorities from the CNO to CJCS/Joint Staff. It reduced the CNO's ability to go to the White House and Congress on naval strategic and operational matters. The Navy's talented strategic thinkers shifted from OPNAV to the Joint Staff.³³⁶

Adapting ideas from Dr. W. Edward Deming's Total Quality Management, Kelso instituted a Total Quality Leadership program across the Navy. In 1992, consistent with an SSG recommendation, Kelso completely reorganized the Navy staff, changing "OP" codes to "N" codes and reassigning responsibilities.

In August 1991, the Navy reopened an investigation into an explosion in one of USS *Iowa's* (BB-61's) turrets that had occurred in April 1989. The Tailhook Association's annual meeting in September 1991 caused a scandal. These events and others absorbed much of Kelso's attention for the duration of his tenure as CNO.

³³⁵ Ibid., interview with Admiral C. A. H. Trost.

³³⁶ Hanley interview with Captain Michael F. Martus, USN (Retired), 8 December 2014. Also, see Steven Wills, "The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987-1994," *Naval War College Review* 69 (Spring 2016): 21-40.

Thoughts of a “Revolution in Military Affairs” driven by information technology and precision navigation provided by the Global Positioning System (GPS), initially touted by the Soviets and noted by OSD Net Assessment, began to take hold across the military-industrial-congressional enterprise.³³⁷ With declining force structures and budgets, the defense industry and cost growth of weapons received greater attention than during the 1980s. Major consolidations of defense industry ensued.

On 19 April 1995, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City raised concerns over domestic terrorism, increasing the nation’s focus on domestic security and the Navy’s focus on developments in American society.

SSG X (1990-1991)

Focus: Strategic environment and naval challenges to 2010

SSG X convened 13 August 1990. The Group consisted of:

- Colonel Jennings B. (J. B.) Beavers, USMC (ground)
- Colonel George H. Benskin, USMC (aviation)
- Captain John A. (Jack) Cassidy, USN (maritime patrol aviation)
- Captain Edmund P. (Ed) Giambastiani, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain Dennis V. (Denny) McGinn, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain Charles B. (Chuck) Reigner, USN (submarine warfare)
- Colonel John H. Robertus, USMC (combat support)
- Captain David (Dave) Van Saun, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain William H. (Bill) Wright IV, USN (surface warfare).

Commander David J. (Jack) Dorsett became the Intelligence Officer for the SSG over the summer.³³⁸

On 15 August, the Group met with Rear Admiral (select) Donald A. Pilling, USN (Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council). On 16

³³⁷ The appropriate acronym is MICE.

³³⁸ Jack Dorsett retired as a vice admiral, the only SSG Intelligence Officer whom the Navy promoted to Flag rank.

August, they met with Mr. Andrew Marshall (Director OSD Net Assessment). On 17 August, the Group met with Rear Admiral Bill Owens (SSG I) in Newport, on his way to take command of SIXTH Fleet.

The next week the Group traveled to Washington, D.C., for meetings with Ted Neely and Bill Manthorpe, (Navy Intelligence), Vice Admiral Bill Studeman (Director, NSA), Mr. Richard Kerr (Deputy Director, CIA), John Firch (NIO Economics), and Larry Korb at CIA. On 24 August the Group had their initial meeting with Admiral Kelso (CNO) and CMC Gray, with Vice Admiral Kelley (OP-06), and Vice Admiral Bill Smith (OP-08) attending. General Gray attended most of the meetings that Admiral Kelso had with SSG X.

The new CNO began by saying that in the past the SSG has generated lots of good tactical ideas. The world of the future would be fundamentally different. He said, “Our vision in the 1980s was good; we just weren’t sure who the enemy was.” He said that oil was still the fundamental element. He asked, “Is there a way to view the future world well, identify scenarios requiring military involvement?” He suggested that John Petersen, formerly on the NSC staff, had good ideas and a decision model that the SSG should explore, adding, “We need a model to deal with the future.” He said that we have clues of some things in the future—predetermined events. Kelso believed that the USSR would not fix its economy. He suggested that key events included the Soviet 1991 five-year plan, but Gorbachev only had a four-year term so not much would change. The SSG would need to “crystal gaze” and get good ideas. He enjoined them to look at the world in a new way, not in the same way we typically did. He recommended that the SSG talk to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Admiral (Ret) Bobby Ray Inman. At the end of the year, he wanted the Group to tell him what patterns or trends would be significant for the Navy. What were the long-term trends? He said that the Iraq crisis was different since the United States did not expect confrontation with the Soviet Union. A victory over Iraq might ultimately create even greater pressure on military budget.³³⁹

Robin Pirie interjected that the SSG was already starting its work. The topic would be both high risk and exciting. However, a “model,” in the sense that the CNO described it, would be hard to come by.

The CNO emphasized that the world would not remain static. We had to be able to account for changes. We in the West did not see indicators clearly. We tended toward euphoria and ignored indicators. He reiterated that he wanted the SSG to help him be smarter about our future. He believed that the SSG would need to get computer

³³⁹ Handwritten notes, SSG meeting with CNO and CMC, 24 September 1990.

assistance for this. He expected enormous change in next 40-50 years and enjoined the SSG to account for political change as well as military.

The CMC noted a problem with how far we wanted to look out. The CNO responded that he would be happy with 5 to 10 years, but that the SSG should pick a comfortable timeframe. Pirie suggested that 20 years was a good target, since 20-year future technology would have to start now.

The CNO told the Group to look at space capabilities in 20 years, and at the impact of diesel submarines in the ongoing Iraq crisis: “What if the world is without subs, or has missiles only?” He told the SSG that they should reject assumptions that did not make sense to them or lacked any support by experts. He would not be surprised if they could not come up with a clear picture of the future. He told them that they would become better naval officers, and admonished them to take a Navy/Marine Corps view, noting that the Navy/Marine team had the ability to provide sustaining presence.

The CMC tasked them to identify what would change in our relations with other nations, suggesting that the United States was moving from “containment” to a “stability strategy.” He encouraged them to talk to outsiders, to give credibility to their thoughts and build consensus. He said that thought was needed on what the “force drivers” ought to be. What things shape our force structure? The answer needed to have a “joint flavor,” although it should emphasize a maritime perspective.

The CNO said that the picture over the next four to five years was not really muddy. His points were: We are in good shape today. The biggest problem is getting people and money to maintain what we have. We need to keep the industrial base. We have a big problem with aircraft. We have support for new DDGs and SSNs. What do we need for the next-generation Navy? We need to fit research and development (R&D) and procurement under an affordable umbrella—to phase them so that the bills would not all come due at the same time.

The CMC suggested that a fresh look by bright people was always helpful. He told the Group not to ignore issues in arms control. He said that the Navy tended always to come to the same conclusions, causing others to think of the Navy as thickheaded.

The CMC enjoined them to identify what really would make a difference.

The CNO said that he needed a rationale “why we need a navy.” He did not have a very good story for why we need a navy.

Wright remarked that the difference between the SSG and other Washington, D.C., people looking at the future was that the SSG had strong operational backgrounds and the benefit of generating dialogue.

The CNO told them that their training was primary goal of the SSG. They were unfettered by politics and should see through some of the political stereotypes. They could also educate those with whom they talked.

Cassidy summed up the tasking as developing a picture of the world in 5, 10, and 20 years, and how the USN/USMC would fit into it.

The CNO tasked them to identify alternative scenarios and their view on which were more likely. Only a maritime strategy made sense for the United States, but he needed to refocus it in a changed world. He said that we needed maritime forces to project U.S. interests anywhere we needed to. He also said that we needed to validate how we used maritime forces in the future. He told the Group not to try to rework the maritime strategy. “Look at water resources, climate, and environment,” he said. “Don’t be duped into being an advocate of one specific issue.”

McGinn offered that economics were going to be a major factor.

The CNO agreed, but said that there might be other emerging major issues. What would be the world’s future pressure points? He said there was a need to show how high-tech requirements stem from expanding high-tech threats. In a future world, if you had money, you could get high-tech weapons. But, he asked, could we get international agreement to stop the spread of high-tech weapons (subs, advance aircraft, missiles)? He added, “Don’t be conventional in your thought processes.”

Giambastiani asked the CNO to clarify what he envisioned as a scenario. The CNO responded that he could certainly pick out some tough scenarios today—e.g., the role of China during a war in Korea. He told the Group not to rule out looking backwards, but to use history to predict countries’ future positions.

The CMC said that he did not want to be scenario dependent. The CNO responded that “the world lends itself well to regional scenarios.” But, he added, it would be hard to predict credible scenarios 20 years in the future. There were too many uncertainties.

The SSG responded that historical perspective would be important and the study would need to include how the American people would react.

The CNO suggested that the SSG should make contact with Congress, stating that people such as Senator Sam Nunn and Congressman Ike Skelton were very thoughtful. The CMC thought that it would be good for Skelton to see that there was a naval group actually looking ahead.

The CMC said that it would be useful to identify enduring trends, such as population, food, and water, and show which trends would change, such as the demise of Marxism/Leninism. The CNO noted that the Russian example was fascinating. Only two years ago, the world had been bipolar. He said that our ability to communicate

made a major difference. He said that we needed to examine the future of China, and asked, Would the Japanese change?

The CNO wanted a status report at the halfway point.

Following the meeting, SSG X drafted the following as their tasking, and the CNO approved.³⁴⁰

The kinds of change that we expect to see in the next few decades will be sweeping and profound. We must develop an understanding of the factors that will shape the future security environment and the relations between these factors. We must broaden the range of concern beyond military strategy to other pillars of our national security, such as our economic vitality, our diplomacy, our skill at developing and adapting new technology, the facility with which our political process adopts and implements strategies. This should lead to a set of futures that we can anticipate as a consequence of U.S. and others' actions.

We must also use new analytical methods to help us bound the range of future possibilities so that we can devote appropriate attention to the important ones. We must develop a methodology which results in attainment of a detailed appreciation of the range of strategic environments and challenges that will confront the United States in the year 2010. This appreciation should emphasize, but not be limited to, the sorts of roles that military, especially naval, power will play in supporting our national interests in the environments deemed of most importance.

SSG X had an intensive program of meetings on the wide variety of topics needed in order to address the task (Appendices H and I). These included presentations on energy issues and policy by Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute and Richard Danzig, which had a great influence—both then and later—on Captain McGinn in particular.

Their meeting with Royal Dutch Shell in London was particularly useful. In 1984, Pierre Wack from Royal Dutch Shell's strategic planning group had visited the Naval War College.³⁴¹ Using their scenario planning technique, Shell had moved from

³⁴⁰ Based on a previous discussion with the CNO, Pirie had proposed this language in a memo to the CNO: Memorandum From: Director, Strategic Studies Group, To: Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Program for SSG X, 9 July 1990

³⁴¹ Memorandum for the SSG, From: Lynch, Subj: Notes on Shell Oil Strategic Planning Group Discussions, 4 December 1984.

number seven of the “seven sisters”—the big oil companies—to the top by anticipating the dynamics of the 1973 and 1981 oil crises. Hanley was familiar with the approach and had provided SSG X with copies of Peter Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View*, which provided a primer on the approach. Peter Hadfield, the current director of Shell’s planning group, and his staff were very generous with their time and information, spending several hours with SSG X on their techniques. At Shell, the planning group did no central planning. They carefully studied global, regional, and national trends, looking for those that reinforced each other and those that conflicted. They used these to construct a couple of plausible future scenarios that would affect the energy industry. Then, they conducted workshops with each of their major upstream (extraction) and downstream (transportation, refinement, and sales) business units. Using the scenarios and moving through a seminar process developed by the planning group, the business units developed the plans for their part of the business. SSG X was struck by the similarity to the Navy: a large-scale, global enterprise involving units with widely differing responsibilities and authorities.

SSG X conducted its first “Futures Exploration Game” on 9–12 October.³⁴² This seminar path game looked at world security in three phases, 1990-1996, 1996-2002, and 2002-2008.³⁴³ The game involved teams with U.S. subject matter experts representing U.S./North America, Arab World/Israel/Middle East, China, Europe, Japan/Far East, and the USSR (Russia and republics) to address demographics, economics, environment and resources, military capabilities and security issues, political and social issues, and technology.³⁴⁴ Adjudication used no computer or quantitative models. The aim was to uncover factors driving future security and relationships between these factors, not predict futures. Teams addressed:

- The political organization/relationships that they represented in their cells
- Issues their governments needed to address
- High-priority foreign and domestic policies
- Key events occurring over the six-year period
- What could adversely affect their aims
- Plans for implementing policies, and resource shifts.

Facilitators documented:

³⁴² Strategic Studies Group X Futures Exploration Game #1, Game Book.

³⁴³ The design was based on a path game sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment that Hanley played in 1988.

³⁴⁴ Strategic Studies Group X Futures Exploration Game #1, Game Book.

- What was most and least certain
- What unanticipated consequences occurred
- What factors were most dominant in shaping policies
- What the greatest policy concerns were
- What could have derailed policies
- What factors required more study.

The SSG found:³⁴⁵

- The predominant objective for regional powers was to maintain stability for economic growth.
- The regional powers wanted the United States to remain active in their regions.
- They perceived a declining U.S. interest in regional problems and a U.S. withdrawal as a result of reduced U.S. military presence.
- The greatest uncertainty was the USSR.
- The resolution of the Iraqi crisis would not necessarily be a defining event for the next two decades. The crisis did not address the deeper economic, political, demographic, social, and security concerns in the region.
- The biggest derailers were:
 - A U.S. withdrawal (actual or perceived)
 - A global recession or depression
 - A violent collapse within USSR or China
 - The reemergence of USSR as military threat
 - A war between North and South Korea
 - The re-militarization of Japan (in Asia)
 - Regional nationalism
 - Environmental and health concerns.

CNWS used the SSG's findings in its Future Crisis Workshops.³⁴⁶

On 16 October, the Group met with Rich Haver, who was then working in OSD Policy. The week of 23 October, the Group traveled west.³⁴⁷ They then returned to Washington, D.C., the week of 29 October (Appendix H).

³⁴⁵ Futures Exploration Game, 9 - 12 October 1990, Game Report, 4 November 1990

³⁴⁶ Future Crisis Workshops III & IV and Strategic Studies Group Future Game, 8 Nov 1990.

On 28 November 1990, the Group met with the CNO for an update. They addressed:³⁴⁸

- Where we have been
 - Europe, Pacific, Atlantic, Spacecom, Trancom, ...
 - Long-Range Planner's Conference: SSG participation on all committees,
 - Future Explorations Game, and
 - Research & Smart people
- Disciplines
 - A list of people by discipline³⁴⁹
- Wisdom: Conventional and Other
 - Cold War is over
 - Technological change is accelerating exponentially
 - Global interdependence
 - Perception of U.S. decline
 - Budget/Trade Deficit
 - Infrastructure Decay
 - Competitiveness/Education
 - Social Ills
 - Erosion of confidence in government
 - Force reductions and diffusion of power
- What we think
 - Fundamental problems persist regardless of Iraq outcome.
 - Soviet internal focus changes global security calculus.
 - There is a continued reliance on U.S. for global stability.
 - In the game, regional powers viewed U.S. presence as their peace dividend: U.S. presence = stability and economic growth.

³⁴⁷ They met with Vice Admiral Diego E. Hernandez, USN (Deputy CINC U.S. Space Command) in Colorado and Mr. Paul Davis at RAND in Santa Monica.³⁴⁷ In San Diego they met with Vice Admiral James F. Dorsey, Jr., USN (COMTHIRDFLT); Rear Admiral Robert K.U. Kihune, USN (Commander Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet); Rear Admiral George R. Worthington, USN (Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command); and Rear Admiral Bill Cockell, USN (Retired). In Hawaii they met with Admiral Huntington Hardisty, USN (CINCPAC); Admiral Charles R. Larson USN (CINCPACFLT); Lieutenant General Robert F. Milligan, USMC (CG FMFPAC); Rear Admiral Michael C. Colley, USN (COMSUBPAC).

³⁴⁸ Strategic Studies Group X: Presentation to Chief of Naval Operations, 28 November 1990.

³⁴⁹ See Appendix H for the people whom SSG X met and the subjects they discussed.

- Reduced U.S. presence was viewed as a lack of interest.
- Definitions of national security and national power are evolving.
- Technology and weapons proliferation is inevitable.
- Demographic/economic trends can indicate potential flashpoints.
- NATO must evolve or risk extinction.
- Primacy in space technology provides a critical force multiplier.
- Budget “business-as-usual” undercuts ability to retain presence.
- The focus of naval power shifts to joint power projection.
- Understanding rapid change is a challenge to Navy leadership.
 - Royal Dutch Shell approach seems to hold promise. Exploits TQL principles, ideas from bottom up, etc.
- Timeline as a vehicle for gathering data, spanning next 20 years.

On 17 December, the SSG gave a briefing to the CNO and CMC that had minor changes from the last briefing. The SSG noted that both the CNO and CMC were tired.³⁵⁰

The CNO asked, “Will you provide recommendations: resources; effects of cuts on presence; educating foreign officers?” He added, “The political process cannot adapt to change—we will need to pick up the pieces.”

The CMC asked about the process after looking at alternative future environments. He reiterated that stability was replacing containment, and asked, what national power capabilities are essential? We must be credible in the eyes of others.

The CNO interjected that there would be economic competition as long as no one had the military power to change it. Those without armed forces talk of economic competition.

The CMC asked how the Group wanted to shape environments, particularly around flashpoints. He noted the need to fix the economy in order to fix the military. Technology, social culture, etc., are the basis for economic power. He noted a decline of naval forces below a threshold for presence. How much of deficit in presence can we afford until we turn this around? He noted our following a Nixon Doctrine in Africa—withdrawal of presence.

The CNO remarked that the fundamental problems were not Navy/Marine. We needed planning to affect the course of the nation. He saw a risk in the national deficit for the near future. He noted that the character of Navy changed following

³⁵⁰ Handwritten notes by Hanley, 17 December 1990.

Vietnam. We dropped from 1,000 to 460 ships in order to modernize. Khomeini in Iran and the Soviets invading Afghanistan changed national opinion. We muddled through without a good planning process.

The CMC believed that we could fix the decline if we could explain it to the American people.

The CNO stated that the U.S. leadership role was more vital than ever. He questioned the effects of oil rising to \$60 per barrel.³⁵¹ Where was the evidence for the effect of presence? He encouraged the Group to articulate the importance of less developed regions. "What is the effect if they go down the tubes?"

On 18 December, SSG X met with Admiral Bobby Inman, USN (Retired) to discuss long-range planning from his position on the Board of Directors of Fluor, Inc., a large construction firm. He offered his views of developments and planning approaches, and suggested that the Group look at Southern California Edison as another example of good long-range planning. The Group did so. On 3 January 1991 the Group met again with Captain Seaquist (SSG III, now OSD Strategy), and on 10 January with Lieutenant General Phil Shutler, USMC (Retired), to discuss force planning.

The week of 14 January entailed another Washington trip, to meet with Paul Nitze, General Andrew Goodpaster, USA (retired), and Zbigniew Brzezinski, among others.³⁵²

On 4-8 February SSG X played its second game, "Competition and Cooperation in an Interdependent World."³⁵³ It was another free-form path game designed to explore the political, economic, and military interrelationships within the United States, Japan, and the European Community to understand the factors that might shape future Navy resources and operations. Four five-year moves covered 1995-2015. Teams included U.S., European, Japanese, and USSR/China/third world with more senior subject matter experts and a Japanese Foreign Service officer who was

³⁵¹ The price of oil had increased from \$17 to \$36 per barrel in October 1990 following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

³⁵² Their meetings included:

- 14 Jan: CAPT Mike Farmer (JCS J5, SSG VIII), on operations planning and Flexible Deterrent Options [a concept derived from SSG V and SSG VIII],
- 15 Jan: Lieutenant General Carl Mundy, USMC; Vice Admiral Kalleres, USN
- 17 Jan: Vice Admiral James D. Williams, USN (OP-07); Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, USN (prospective OP-08); Vice Admiral Daniel Cooper (OP-08)
- 18 Jan: Ambassador Paul Nitze and General Andrew Goodpaster, USA (Retired) (Atlantic Council); Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski (Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies).

³⁵³ Chief of Naval Operations, *Competition and Cooperation in an Interdependent World*, 04 - 08 February 1991, Game #2 Report.

studying at Harvard. Navy Reserve public affairs officers who worked in the news industry helped. A simulated newspaper, “International Future Times,” provided context and updates to drive the game. The control team alerted the players that events used to drive the game were not intended as predictions.

Significant observations from the game included:

- New World Order: Cold War institutions proved inadequate—no replacements were found. Focused partnerships formed depending on the issues.
- Global instability.
- Need for NATO to change.
- Different U.S. and European approaches to Mideast.
- Japan concerned over diminished U.S. engagement in Asia.
- Coalition efforts to address arms proliferation - requiring U.S. lead.
- General demand for U.S. leadership, though growing Japanese leadership in later years. Growing Japanese use of force under U.N. mandate.
- European investment in USSR, and to stabilize regions.
- Global migration, no collective action, and greater instability.
- United States ignored the third world wherever possible.
- Inability of U.S. leadership to build domestic consensus, and the international implications of this.
- Japan/United States cooperated on Taiwan.
- Japanese leadership on environmental issues—use of Overseas Development Aid.
- Soviets need cooperation with West to restore economy, but not to extent of loosening control over near abroad.
- Common perceptions of future.
- Instability in the Mideast.
- Focus of major powers to keep stability for economic growth.
- U.S. economy diminishing as a percentage of global economy.
- United States found it difficult to deal with international problems due to a lack of resources.
- Allies assumed greater burden sharing.
- Environmental issues were growing more prominent.
- United States remained the only nation with global interests and military influence.
- Search for international forums to address broad security issues.

- European Community deepening rather than broadening membership.³⁵⁴

On 15 February 1991, the SSG provided its “second sitrep” to CNO with VCNO, OP-07, OP-60, and OP-00K attending, followed by a meeting with Admiral Bill Smith. Recent operations in DESERT STORM were on the minds of the Flag officers. The Group reported that they had continued on their planned path, played a second game, and talked to Nitze, Brzezinski, and Bobby Inman. They proposed elements of a National Competitive Strategy: goals, needs, and means, emphasizing military power and economic development. The brief approach covered the Cold War, the transition period, and the future, and national security implications. A key perception involved the limits of military force in addressing fundamental security issues and the resulting need for national plans.³⁵⁵

Their presentation covered:

- Transition
 - Cooperative USSR
 - Environmental awareness
 - Consolidation of “jointness”
 - Economic realities
 - Iraq War
- Future security environments: Major forks in the road to consider
 - U.S. role: lead/engage vs. withdraw
 - Global mode: cooperation vs. competition
 - Human conditions: adaptation vs. conflict
- Future security environment and national security implications: key factors
 - No clear threat
 - Economic competition among triad (United States/Europe/Japan)
 - Have/have-not disparity widens
 - Order vs. armed conflict among nation states
 - Changing global leadership

They concluded by saying, “We may have a method here that will serve as a useful tool for program planning. In summary, Admiral, you asked us to see if we could anticipate the future as a basis for today’s planning. Some of the strains on our society and enduring regional conflicts are clear. However, the range of possible

³⁵⁴ The concepts of allies accepting more of the defense burden and Europe deepening but not broadening were linked, and did not come to pass.

³⁵⁵ CNO Brief - 15 February 1991 [Draft].

futures is broad. This slide highlights those recurring themes that will have the greatest impact on which future environment obtains.”

Summary of national security implications were:

- The security regimes of 2010 have not yet been defined.
- National security will increasingly hinge on economic success.
- The pressure/stress of population increases and global environmental issues have impact beyond anything currently envisioned.
- U.S. global leadership role will be challenged.
- Military capability will be the main ingredient of national power separating the United States from its contenders.

Comments from the meeting included:³⁵⁶

- Technology overstated: United States has advantage in training/motivation of forces.
- Role of information: effect on current war.
- Military solutions won't be solutions to these problems.
- Where are opportunities for improvement?
- Focus more on what we ought to do.
- Soviet threat resurgent?
- Be careful how to define threat.
- Fragility of economy: If we don't build, the next CVN on schedule will lose capability.

McGinn had proposed an idea for creating a matrix of countries versus stability indicators.³⁵⁷ It provided a large list of indicators that the Group mostly explored and a list of hot spots by region. Following the briefing, the Group discussed how to generate better implications for the CNO. Hanley recommended that the SSG both devise implications about what the future security environments mean and assist the CNO in generating change by creating a common vision among a broad set of decision-makers. He stated that if the Group focused on their implications, the work would end with the Group. However, if the Group could get the Navy to adopt scenario planning, it could institute the kind of change they advocated.³⁵⁸ With broad

³⁵⁶ Handwritten notes by Hanley, 15 February 1991.

³⁵⁷ Memorandum, From: Denny McGinn, To: SSG X Group Members, Subj: Stability Matrix, January 7 1991.

³⁵⁸ Memorandum from J. Hanley, How to get to implications for the CNO, 19 Feb 1998.

support among the Group, the SSG decided to use the Shell process for scenario-planning exercises.

On 25 February, the Group held a futures seminar. On 4 March, they met with Michael McGwire to discuss security of the human race. Later in March, they went to the National Defense University and met with Professor Al Bernstein, and Vice Admiral Baldwin (President, NDU). They also briefed CNO/VCNO/OP-07/Lieutenant General Hoar, USMC, on their plans. Comments from this briefing included:³⁵⁹

- Locked onto “divisions of instability.”
- Cultural differences in world ahead—a breakdown between services to get warfighting capability.
- Merge procurement (heretical idea).
- U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) as a better model for CENTCOM. NAVCENT has no resources. Have CINCPACFLT do planning, work exercises. Send forces when they need them.
- VCNO: Navy and Air Force have different opinions of JFAC. Air Force was writing the air campaign for the duration of the war. We put J2 and J3 together and prioritize target sets. Reprioritize on a daily basis. Air Force does not do battle damage assessment. LANTFLT JFAC has a different doctrine than CENTCOM. Air Tasking Order timing doesn’t work; DESERT STORM showed it. Changes were in progress on the Navy side. Need to convince Schwarzkopf (CINCCENT).
- Military side of NATO is a good network.
- Pirie: Military contacts have replaced normal diplomacy in many circumstances.
- On right track—synergism with other services; USN/USMC.
- OP-07: Joint intelligence for Liberia is no good. Need organic, flexible intelligence.
- Hoar: Unified Command Plan—three regional CINCs; one naval. We did not do well in influencing DESERT STORM. Need a game plan for Foreign Military Sales to Southwest Asia, to get a leg up on the U.K. and France.
- Command architecture for CJTF standardized.

Following this meeting, the Group met with Admiral Dave Jeremiah (VCJCS). Comments included:

- Sea change in how U.S. looks at itself.

³⁵⁹ Handwritten Hanley notes, undated.

- How to get Navy in front of joint team? Numbered fleet commander: need more/bigger staffs afloat – Corps level JTF.
- Navy OPINTEL is the greatest strength that the Navy has. Doing it all the time. Navy can drive organizational structure.
- Encourage U.S. computer industry by DoD acquisition.
- A-12 didn't push composite technology.
- Pushing technology vs. weapons systems to maintain competitiveness.
- Low-cost alternatives vs. less capable threats.
- Navy/Marine Corps are in the surgical business.

On 20 March, the Group met with Andy Marshall (Director, OSD Net Assessment), and Rear Admiral David Robinson (Joint Staff J7).

The Group formed into three teams to conduct scenario-planning exercises. The week of 15-19 April, they conducted 18 future environments seminars in the Pentagon and Washington, D.C., area with a wide variety of organizations. Each seminar asked the participants for their thoughts on the implications of the scenarios, and exposed participants to the process.³⁶⁰ Participants included:³⁶¹

- | | |
|---|--------------------------------|
| - National Security Council staff | - Department of Commerce |
| - Joint Staff | - Department of Energy |
| - Office of the Secretary of Defense | - Department of Transportation |
| - OPNAV | - Congressional Staff |
| - HQMC | - McDonnell-Douglas Corp. |
| - Center for Naval Analyses | - Southern California Edison |
| - Strategic Policy Analysis Group | - Naval War College |
| - Naval Research Labs | - National Defense University |
| - Navy/Marine Federal Executive Fellows | - Pentagon media |

Under Secretary of the Navy Dan Howard called one team in for counseling when he heard about the seminar with the Pentagon media, but let the Group proceed. Following the seminars in Washington, SSG X took their seminars on the road to fleets, CINCs, and NATO commands. They conducted a total of 33 seminars, to derive implications for the Navy.

³⁶⁰ CNO Strategic Studies Group X, Future Environments Seminar, 15 - 19 April 1991.

³⁶¹ Chief of Naval Operations' Strategic Studies Group X, Future Security Environment, SSG Seminar Series Report, April 1991.

On 29 April, members of the Group met with Dr. Abe Hoople at the Department of Energy. Admiral James D. Watkins (Retired) had become Secretary of Energy and had conducted an analysis of the future of U.S. energy under both current policies and a set of revised policies that addressed both production and conservation. This work set a standard for well-founded analysis, but failed to win political support for the proposed policies.

In May, a team traveled to Europe. They met with Professor Richard Langhorne (Cambridge University), among others.³⁶²

For their final briefing to the CNO and CMC on 3 June, McGinn was the briefer and Dorsett flipped the transparencies. The SSG had adopted the latest technology of Harvard Graphics and color transparencies made with wax. This worked well on modern projectors. However, the briefing to the CNO and CMC was in the CNO's Executive Board Room that used very old, high-wattage projectors from a back room. The Group called this the "burning brief," referencing Moses' burning bush, as the slides melted, causing McGinn to hurry through the brief.

The briefing:

- Summarized the project
 - Reviewed the methodology of study; interactions with subject matter experts; games, and scenario planning seminars
- Provided an update on the futures seminars conducted since the last briefing
- Provided a products overview
- Reviewed the range of future strategic environments
- Discussed key challenges for U.S. and naval services, and
- Showed next assignments for SSG.³⁶³

The findings suggested that the naval services needed to:

- Evolve with fewer resources.
- Maintain forward engagement.
- Optimize joint capability.
- Dominate future battle space.

³⁶² Documents reporting many trips are incomplete for all SSGs.

³⁶³ Two Navy to OPNAV staff (02, 06); rest to command. Marines to MCCDC, CINCPAC staff, ACOS Facility at Campen, CA.

The Group found that the emphasis on nuclear weapons and their utility was shifting, and they questioned the value of tactical nuclear weapons on ships. They emphasized the value of military forces in achieving national security goals by reassuring friends and to deter/coerce/punish foes to enable U.S. influence. The notable attributes of naval forces were their:

- Credibility to influence
- Flexibility: force of choice
- Efficiency: adaptable precision power for multiple missions
- Globally forward, sustainable, mobile, independent
- Complementary joint/combined synergism.

The Navy provided a “national insurance policy.”

The Group provided a table comparing the past with the future:

Past	Future
Soviet containment	Regional stability
Blue water	Littoral warfare
Global sea control	Power projection
Cold war armament	World market weapons
Set alliances	Shifting regional partners
Compelling threat	Diffuse/uncertain threat
National survival	National progress

Unlike previous SSGs, SSG X’s report set a new standard by being For Official Use Only and widely distributed. Members of the Group wrote the report for internal review and the Director’s signature.

The report covered:³⁶⁴

- Trends common to all future scenarios
- Variable trends driving differing scenarios
- Unpredictable events
- The future security environment and evolving definitions of security
- Challenges to the United States
- Challenges for the naval service

³⁶⁴ Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group, *Future Strategic Environment* (Newport RI: Strategic Studies Group, June 1991).

- Epilogue—the future security environment.

The most salient common trends were:

- Transnational economics: growing, irreversible interdependence of the global economy over the next 20 years.
- Demographic pressures: global population rise from 5 billion to over 7 billion in 20 years, with 93% of the growth in less developed nations, poorly equipped to cope with youth bulges and massive demands for food, infrastructure, education, and other services.
- Widening have/have-not gaps between countries.
- Global communications causing profound cultural changes with images of war, famine, terrorist violence, environmental degradation, crime, and the like constantly thrust into the consciousness of virtually every citizen of the world, causing unprecedented political pressures on national leaders.
- Rapid technological change, contributing to differences between more and less developed nations.
- Chronic regional tension/instability: a host of ethnic rivalries, cultural hatreds, ancient disputes, and current enmities over borders and resources would provide a fertile environment for regional instability.³⁶⁵
- Energy dependence: In 2010 industrialized nations would depend on petroleum to fuel their economies. The fact that most petroleum reserves and production capacity are located in areas of instability would continue to be a source of global insecurity.

The most important variable trends were:

- U.S. leadership: The single most important factor was the willingness and character of U.S. leadership, given the challenges of pressing domestic needs, “such as reducing budget and trade deficits, restoring competitiveness in international markets, reversing infrastructure decay, and dealing with drugs, terrorism, the underclass and other social ills.”
- Global economic competition: “The second most influential variable for the future security environment is the way in which the major trading blocs, the U.S., Japan, and the EC (European Community), conduct the competition for markets and resources that is a consequence of the interdependent global economy.” U.S. leadership would play a crucial role in determining whether

³⁶⁵ SSG X cited instability in Europe driven by the USSR, Baltic republics, and Eastern Europe, and in Asia by North Korea obtaining nuclear weapons, a more assertive Japanese foreign policy, and territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

rules of free and open markets or predatory, protectionist, beggar-thy-neighbor policies dominated.

- Environmental protection: Protection and restoration of the global environment and the task of reaching a sustainable condition with respect to both energy and the environment would be a major political issue everywhere in the world. This would be another factor in pitting haves versus have-nots and trading blocs against each other.
- Arms proliferation: Nations in regions of chronic instability have incentives to obtain modern weapons, while the major suppliers (including the United States, USSR, France, U.K.) have incentives to support their export and trade industrial bases by exporting weapons. The U.S. interest is in reducing the amount of modern weapons at large in the world and sustaining a strong technological advantage. Reconciling the tension between these competing interests would be a constant challenge.
- Shifting alliances: Problems and contingencies would require partnerships outside of the formal alliance structure, requiring thoughtful planning and great flexibility in execution.

Bad and good unpredictable events (most of which were unlikely), that would have a major impact on the future in unpredictable ways included:³⁶⁶

- The violent breakup of the USSR, possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons
- Changing alliances, including the possibility of Japan and Germany becoming more aggressive
- New regional powers such as a reunified Korea with nuclear weapons, or India or Brazil adopting aggressive policies
- The collapse of the global economy bringing on a depression that creates conditions for ideologies such as Nazism and wars of aggression
- Environmental or natural catastrophes causing severe repercussions regarding the burdens of recovery or other surrounding circumstances
- A use of nuclear weapons damaging the international order
- U.S. isolationism as a result of domestic economic problems
- Technological breakthroughs (e.g., a fusion reactor) that could provide cheap and sustainable energy.

³⁶⁶ The Director removed “Asteroid strikes earth” from the list.

The next subject was the future security environment and evolving definitions of security. SSG X emphasized that the trends discussed above were not deterministic. A wide range of outcomes was possible—some benign and cooperative, and some malignant, degenerative, and dangerous. SSG X believed that U.S. engagement would be a major factor in making a benign outcome more probable and that national security would increasingly come to hinge on economic factors and their impact on U.S. citizens. For all countries, population pressures, the distribution of wealth, and preservation of the environment would hold great sway in defining national security.

In helping assure that outcomes are consistent with U.S. interests, the SSG identified a number of significant challenges:

- Achieving a domestic consensus in prioritizing the many problems that beset the nation, and making the sacrifices needed to ensure good, long-term outcomes
- Maintaining economic strength to sustain a military posture that supports U.S. security interests, and not reducing military budgets without regard to the consequences
- Public willingness to bear the costs of global engagement and leadership, which depends on dealing with economic competitiveness
- Enabling global cooperation by creating effective coalitions to deal with regional military contingencies and challenges, including the removal of barriers to free markets, development of common approaches to environmental problems, and alleviation of the effects of overpopulation and the maldistribution of wealth.

Naval forces could gain opportunities if they were designed to:

- Provide a complementary and enabling force in joint/combined military applications.
- Respond with flexibility; anytime, anywhere.³⁶⁷
- Conduct integrated operations.
- Be an expeditionary, multi-capable force.
- Be capable of sustained, long-duration, forward-deployed operations.
- Reassure allies, foster interdependence, and deter potential foes.
- Employ precise, stand-off weapons in projecting power.
- Create uncertainty in the minds of potential aggressors.
- Guarantee freedom of the seas for ourselves and our allies.

³⁶⁷ CNO Admiral Jay Johnson used this phrase in an article “Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century” in the *Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1997.

- Conduct naval diplomacy through cooperation and bilateral relationships.

Among challenges to the naval service were:

- Recognition and acceptance of change to break down institutional barriers and seek innovative solutions. SSG X recommended greater Navy/Marine Corps integration and reorganizing OPNAV/HQMC staffs, as well as major staffs, to align with the Joint Staff.³⁶⁸
- Adapting strategies, tactics, and perhaps force structures to the changing threat.
- Evolution of the Navy with sharply declining resources.
- Maintaining forward engagement in supporting an activist foreign policy.
- Optimizing joint capabilities to get the maximum effect from constrained resources, often with the Navy in the lead.
- Adapting nuclear forces and strategic defenses, including the cost, effectiveness, and probability of use of tactical nuclear weapons aboard ships, given expected future contingencies.
- Sustaining naval forces far forward as a national insurance policy providing escalation options and tailored power projection as required to deter, contain, and/or terminate regional conflicts. “Past definitions of ‘presence’ have focused on the continuity and visibility provided by a force on station or in garrison. New definitions may place greater emphasis on well-planned exercises, well-timed visits, educating foreign officers, participation on combined staffs, deployments to crisis areas, and the like. In short, we will need to assure other that we will be present when needed, even in the face of a shrinking force structure.”³⁶⁹

Examples of future “threat multipliers” confronting naval forces included:

- Low observable technology
- Advanced and longer-range cruise missiles
- Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
- Integrated air defense systems
- Conventional submarines
- Mines
- Access to space/space-based intelligence products

³⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 27-28. CNO Kelso did reorganize the Navy staff later that year.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 20.

- Advanced electronic warfare

SSG X called for increased attention to shallow-water ASW, stand-off weapons, mine clearing, over-the-horizon operations, counter-stealth, and use of space.

The epilogue stated:

There is now on the horizon no major challenger to the United States for global preeminence in defining and assuring the security regime that will come. Nor is there a military or ideological rival such as the USSR once was. There will continue to be challenges to our security interests, not least from preoccupation with our many domestic problems. Regional powers and economic competitors will challenge our interests and test our patience and ingenuity. But the future is ours to make.³⁷⁰

Following initial distribution, the SSG provided the report to any authorized person requesting one. SSG Director Robin Pirie received letters of appreciation from:

- Admiral J. L. Johnson, USN (VCNO)
- Admiral R. J. Kelly, USN (USCINCPAC)
- Admiral J. T. Howe, USN (CINCUSNAVEUR)
- Vice Admiral Bill Owens, USN (COMSIXTHFLT, SSG I)
- Vice Admiral John K. Ready, USN (COMNAVAIRLANT)
- Vice Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle, USN, Director SPAWAR (who said, “I have benefitted from the SSG reports since its inception. This year’s report is “heads and shoulders” above all of the previous ones.”)
- Major General Donald R. Gardner, USMC (DCOS Requirements and Programs)
- Rear Admiral Irve C. LeMoyne, USN (SOCOM, SSG V)

The report did provide a context for planning across many commands in the Navy and Marine Corps. However, the Navy did not adopt scenario planning as its approach for developing strategic plans. The Total Quality Leadership office established by Admiral Kelso published a strategic planning guide as part of its overall program. Again, the exposure of the Fellows to each other and to a particularly broad set of security issues, and interactions with senior leadership and academics served them well in their positions following the SSG.

³⁷⁰ During his interview, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment Dennis McGinn noted that this was the concluding statement of his SSG, and then said, “Not so much.” Hanley interview with Hon. Dennis V. McGinn, 24 November 2014.

While SSG X was in session, the Navy was struggling to come up with a statement of purpose to replace the now-obsolete *Maritime Strategy*. In April 1991 *The Way Ahead* was published, a statement signed by the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, largely crafted in OPNAV OP-07. A useful and in many ways prescient document, it nevertheless failed to gain traction in the tumultuous international and domestic US national security climate of 1991-2.³⁷¹ While the *Maritime Strategy* had been a classified document with unclassified versions derived from it, *The Way Ahead*—like most of its successors—was an unclassified document. The unclassified FOUO SSG X report set a new standard of unclassified SSG report publication.

A long-time Navy strategy and policy expert, with extensive OP-06 experience, Bill Wright was re-assigned as OPNAV N31/N52 and, later, as N3/N5B. Ed Giambastiani went to command SUBDEVRON TWELVE, directing submarine tactical development, and then to the newly established Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) as its first Director of the Strategy and Concepts Division. He also contributed to the drafting of the Navy's new capstone document, “. . . *from the Sea*” in 1992. Spearheaded by OP-06 VADM Leighton “Snuffy” Smith (SSG V), “. . . *from the Sea*” reflected SSG X concepts of conducting power projection from the littorals rather than engaging in sea control on the open oceans. Sam Leeds (SSG I) served at NDC at the same time as a civilian. Giambastiani would ultimately become Commander Joint Forces Command (COMJFCOM), a four-star combatant commander, and Vice Chairman of the JCS. Captain McGinn went on to carrier command and later became OPNAV N-88 overseeing naval aviation, COMTHIRDFLT, and was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N-7). During the Obama administration, he has served as the Navy's civilian Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment.

Commander Dorsett joined Captain McGinn as his Intelligence Officer on the USS *Ranger* (CV-61), and LCDR Allen Banks became the SSG Intelligence Officer. Dorsett went on to become the first vice admiral to be Director of Naval Intelligence. The community of Navy intelligence officers was relatively small and had few Flag officers. However, Navy intelligence did not credit the intelligence officers assigned to the SSG with gaining the same education as the SSG, though they essentially had the same experience as SSG Fellows.³⁷²

³⁷¹ On “The Way Ahead,” see Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, *U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1991-2000): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents* (Alexandria, VA: CNA, March 2012), p. 3-20.

³⁷² A common observation during interviews with three retired officers: Vice Admiral David J. Dorsett, USN (Retired), phone, 3 December 2014; Captain Jeffrey L. Canfield, USN (Retired) and

SSG XI (1991-1992)

Focus: Trends affecting military operations and force structures, national security and military strategy, and naval roles

For SSG XI, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and the CNO agreed to add a Coast Guard captain. Given the non-traditional warfighting demands on military forces, Pirie believed it would be a good idea to have a Coast Guard officer in the Group.³⁷³ SSG XI comprised the following officers:

- Captain Stanley W. (Stan) Bryant, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain John P. Collins, Jr., USN (surface warfare)
- Captain James C. (Jim) Holloway, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain Timothy J. (Tim) Keating, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain Michael F. (Mike) Martus, USN (surface warfare)
- Colonel Dwight R. McGinnis, Jr., USMC (combat support)
- Captain George D. (Dan) Moore, USN (surface warfare)
- Colonel Garret V. H. (Gary) Randel, USMC (ground)
- Captain Raymond C. (Ray) Smith, Jr., USN (SEAL)
- Colonel Lawrence (Larry) Staak, USMC (aviation)
- Captain William (Bill) Wilkinson, USCG.

Though SSG X received accolades for its depiction of the future security environment, the CNO desired a more specific articulation of future contingencies and implications for the Navy. He did not criticize SSG X. He recognized that this was

Defense Intelligence Senior Leader, Pentagon, 19 December 2014; and Captain Allen Banks, USN (Retired), Potomac, MD, 14 December 2014.

³⁷³ Ibid., Pirie interview.

a hard problem.³⁷⁴ Therefore, based on Pirie's recommendation, Admiral Kelso tasked SSG XI to build up SSG X's work.³⁷⁵

Work done by SSG X suggests that the problems of armed conflict in the 21st century will be different from those for which we planned in the late 20th century. Using as a foundation the range of security environments that SSG X developed, and identified, SSG XI should proceed to dig more deeply into the kinds of contingencies the United States might confront in the next 20 years and how we might deal with them. The Group should examine a range of different international environments, and within them possible conflict scenarios. Clearly, a contingency, possibly several, involving the USSR is important, but there will also be others. The SSG should project hypothetical force levels, consistent with the environment selected, for ourselves, our friends and our potential adversaries. It should assess the ability of the forces projected to achieve national aims, including the deterrence of actions contrary to our interests, the management of local crises, the containment of conflicts to their region of origin and the termination of hostilities under conditions favorable to the U.S. Such a study would include a review of the interests of other major actors in the conflicts that would be generated, the appropriate security structure (NATO, U.N., ad hoc partnership), the forces needed (joint, combined or other) and the concept of operations that would be required.

SSG XI's orientation proceeded as with previous Groups. One feature of the Group was the chain of Naval Academy alumni: Ray Smith, '67; Stan Bryant, '69; Tim Keating, '71; and Jim Holloway, '73. When given assignments early in the year, the senior Naval Academy alumni tended to pass their tasks down to Tim and Jim for action.³⁷⁶ As with most groups, contributions from the Fellows were uneven and the junior officers frequently, though not always, provided major contributions.

The Group traveled to Washington, D.C., the week of 19 August. On 20 August, they met with Charlie Allen, Kent Harrington, John Cushman, Mary McCarthy, and Bob Blackwell at CIA.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: SSG XI Tasking, 11 June 1991.

³⁷⁶ Hanley phone interview with Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN (Retired), 30 January 2015.

³⁷⁷ Thank you letters from 1990-1991 correspondence file.

As in the previous year, the Group met with Dov Zakheim and Jeff Ranney, who then worked at SPA. Dov and Jeff had developed a computer model of the growth in acquisition costs of major platforms and weapons, in operations and maintenance costs (including personnel), and in research and development (R&D) expenditures, since Robert McNamara had established the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in 1962. They ran the SSG through an exercise to design the navy of 2012, using historical cost growth and projections of the U.S. economy and DoD total obligation authority, with the Navy receiving its traditional share. The U.S. Navy consisted of about 585 major ships at the time. The best that SSG could project, using the constraints of the model, was about 250 ships by 2010. The practice of replacing each ship and aircraft type with the next-generation platform, the growth of costs in the defense industry, and the growth of personnel costs drove these numbers. The result caused cognitive dissonance among some of the SSG. Some insisted that there must be something wrong with the model. On further study, the Group accepted the results of the exercise.

The Tailhook Association held their symposium that year on September 8-12 in Las Vegas. Keating attended, but did not witness the events that developed into a scandal. In later years, while at BUPERS, he would have difficult discussions with friends affected by the events.³⁷⁸

In late September, the SSG XI traveled to Europe.³⁷⁹

On 17 October, CNA and the Russian think tank ISKAN hosted the first in a series of bilateral conferences on the New Union of Former Soviet Republics, at which the SSG provided insight into the political, economic, and military potential of the republics over the next 20 years.³⁸⁰ The SSG participated. With Bob Murray as President, CNA

³⁷⁸ Ibid., phone interview with Admiral Keating.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., Thank you letters from 1990-1991. In London they met with Vice Admiral Edward W. Clepton, Jr., USN (Deputy CINCUSNAVEUR); Dr. Peter Foot and Dr. Geoffrey Till (Royal Naval College, Greenwich); and Professor Lawrence D. Freedman at King's College. In Belgium they met with the NATO staff in Brussels; General Dieter Clauss, German Army (Deputy SACEUR/SHAPE); and Rear Admiral John J. Zerr, USN (Chief Operations/Readiness Branch, SHAPE) in Mons. In Germany they met with Lieutenant General Robert Chelburg, USA (Chief of Staff, EUCOM); Rear Admiral David E. Frost (J3); Brigadier General Tony Zinni (Deputy J3, SSG VI); and the USEUCOM staff. In Italy they met with Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, USN (CINCUSNAVEUR/AFSOUTH); Vice Admiral Bill Owens, USN (COMSIXTHFLT, SSG I); and staffs in the area.

³⁸⁰ CNO Strategic Studies Group XI, Conference on New Union of Former Soviet Republics, 17 October 1991. Participants included Dmitri Ponomareff (OSD Net Assessment); Captain Ed Smith (N-092); Judy Mooers and Ron St. Martin (SAIC); Phil Petersen and Pat Cronin (NDU); Ken

had largely replaced CNWS's role in supporting the SSG. CNWS had completed its evolution into the NWC's research arm with little attention to the SSG, its original centerpiece.

Following the CNA conference, the Group met with Admiral J. W. Kime, USCG (Commandant) during his visit to the NWC, and then traveled to Norfolk, Tampa, and the Pacific.³⁸¹

SSG XI used path games, as SSG X had. They played their first game, "Forward Engagement for the New World Order," on 12-15 November 1991. The game was designed to assist the SSG with understanding the range of strategic challenges that could confront the United States in 2002-2012. It specifically intended to focus on the ability and desire of the United States to remain engaged in world affairs and the willingness of other major players on the world scene to actively promote or obstruct this involvement. Additionally, it aimed to identify critical issues that would shape the future security environment. The game consisted of three moves: 2002, 2007, and 2012. It had five player cells (the United States, Europe, the Former Soviet Union, the Mideast/Islam, and the Far East).³⁸² The players, U.S. subject matter experts and Navy strategists, were tasked to address:

- Highest-priority domestic and international policies
- National or collective strategic objectives for each major nation

Kennedy, Lauren Van Metre, Paul Olkhovsky, Tom Barnett, and Hung Nguyen (CNA); Lieutenant Colonel Mike Ennis (HQ USMC); Rear Admiral Dennis Blair (Deputy for Assessments JCS J8, SSG VI), John Hines (RAND), Captain Jim Stark (OP-00K), and Ms. Maureen Baginski. CNO Strategic Studies Group XI, Conference on New Union of Former Soviet Republics, 17 October 1991.

³⁸¹ Ibid., Thank you letters, 1990-1991. In Norfolk they met with Admiral Leon A. Edney, USN (CINCLANT/SACLANT); Admiral Paul D. Miller, USN (CINCLANTFLT); Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres, USN (COMSECONDFLT/Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic); Vice Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr., USN (COMSUBLANT); and Lieutenant General William M. Keys, USMC (CG FMFLANT). In Tampa they met with General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (CINCCENT); General Carl W. Steiner, USA (CINCSOCOM); and their staffs. In San Diego they met with Vice Admiral Edwin A. Kohn, Jr., USN (Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet); Rear Admiral Richard A. Wilson, USN (Commander, Carrier Group SEVEN); and Rear Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN (Commander, Carrier Group ONE). In Hawaii they met with Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN (CINCPAC); Admiral Robert J. Kelley, USN (CINCPACFLT); Rear Admiral William A. Earner, Jr., USN (Commander, Naval Surface Group MID-PAC/Commander Naval Base Pearl Harbor, SSG VII); and Rear Admiral Henry C. McKinney, USN (COMSUBPAC).

³⁸² SSG XI Game I Folder: Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group XI, Game Book, 12-15 November 1991.

- Global regional problems that must be solved (who will take lead and which require collective action)
- Unilateral or collective U.S. action
- Critical events/issues likely to occur that could lead to instability or generate crisis.

The SSG served as facilitators in the player cells. Significant observations included:

- Primacy of economics.
- Military power still important.
- No comparable competitor to United States, as the Soviet Union was.
- Reduced unilateralism/leadership through consensus.
- U.S. provides catalyst for consensus.
- Strong tensions between domestic spending priorities and overseas basing of U.S. forces.
- Forward engagement linked to national consensus.
- Increasing immigration pressures.

The report included other findings and areas for further study.

On 25 November, they met with the CNO. From their tasking, the Group took their mission to be as follows:³⁸³

SSG XI will investigate the range of early 21st century security risks that may affect United States interests, and explore the strategy, roles and nature of naval forces for those that best contribute to the deterrence of risks, or the solution of crises, conflicts, or hostilities on terms favorable to the United States.

They intended to focus their work on the broad range of contingencies, and, by taking a long-range view of national security interests, identify the role that naval forces can play in supporting those interests.

They had gathered information from commands and organizations in Europe, the Pacific, the Atlantic, and the United States. The common themes they found during their visits were:

³⁸³ SSG XI CNO Briefs Folder: Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group XI, Periodic Report One, 25 November 1991.

- Resurgence of the Former Soviet Union was unlikely, but their existing nuclear arsenal and large military forces could not be ignored.
- Alliances were important for demonstrating U.S. interest and commitment, maintaining regional stability, and sustaining U.S. influence, including NATO.
- Locations with the highest potential for U.S. involvement were in the Middle East and Korea, with the Middle East being most probable. Currently, more naval forces were deployed to the region than the situation demanded.
- There was grave difficulty in defining, let alone defending, force-level requirements in the absence of a major threat, despite the existence of other risks to national interests.
- Coalition/joint operations would be the way that U.S. forces would organize to deal with future contingencies. The United States needed credible force to form coalitions. The paradox of coalitions was that the United States must be seen as able to go it alone in order to inspire coalitions.
- The importance of forward presence to protect U.S. interests, promote stability, and effectively represent the United States throughout the world was undiminished. Fewer forces would require different practices. There were many concerns about overextending people and equipment, calling for a review of standard practices.
- Future spending levels would make it impossible to maintain current forces and infrastructure.

They concluded from their game that over the next 20 years:

- Economic issues and a nation's energy supply would drive international relations.
- No competitor would replace the Soviet Union. Though many did not like the United States, we were seen as an "honest broker" or, at the least, the worst alternative.
- The United States saw itself in a leadership role, working through coalitions to maintain global stability. Other countries saw the United States as the one nation most able to generate and maintain international stability, where the U.S. chose to lead regional initiatives.
- Recognizing the power of Japan and the European Community, the United States would need to broker cooperation among the power blocks to reduce the likelihood that competing interests would create problems requiring military solutions.
- There was a direct correlation between U.S. ability to influence events overseas and the presence of credible military forces. Credible forces and the willingness to use them remained important.

For future study, they intended to focus on “pressure points of instability” that derived from emerging nationalism, ethnic strife, religious conflict, and have/have-not competition. The Group believed that smaller numbers of forward-deployed forces would be sufficient as long as they could accomplish their assigned missions and would try to project the types of naval forces that could help the nation shape its future through deterrence.

The CNO asked SSG XI to accept the trends and the ranges of outcomes suggested by SSG X, and engage in two fundamental questions:³⁸⁴

1. How do we relate the trends shaping the future security environment to current decisions on force levels and security organizations?
2. How low in force levels can we go before we get into trouble?

Following this meeting, Jim Holloway wrote that the Group needed to identify its goal more clearly “as we see it” and propose a method to accomplish that goal. The primary goal was to help the CNO. They should aim to provide something that would be of use to the decision-makers running and building a 250-ship navy or a 450-ship navy, while accepting that budgets would be going down. No magic words would shift dollars from the Army or Air Force. However, if the Group was correct and the value of naval forces increased in the future, change could occur over time. He said, “Stop hand wringing and thinking ‘If only WE could somehow make THEM understand, then all of these bad things [declining budgets] would stop happening.’ ... IT IS A WASTE OF TIME.” The Group needed to plan rather than hope.

Holloway suggested that they should not focus on analysis of specific proposals for force structure as competing with ongoing efforts in OPNAV and providing no lasting value. Nor should the Group analyze what would be required to fight a regional contingency as conditions would change and staffs were already doing that. A survey of potential hot spots could change too easily. A prompt jump out to 2010 would miss the fact that U.S. actions would affect the future world and be too tied to assumptions. He stated a new appreciation for the work of SSG X in giving “the leadership a clearer understanding of the factors they would need to consider in the future not just in force planning, or conducting an operation, or fighting a contingency but in everything they do and every decision they make.” SSG XI could build on that, focusing on more strategic and military issues as a basis for defense planning. The goal of the Group would be to provide as much useful information as possible for leaders to use in making their decisions. If they tried to provide answers, they would not likely create anything of lasting value. SSG XI’s role should be creating a vision of the future in the minds of those who would be shaping the

³⁸⁴ Hanley draft memo, SSG XI Task Analysis and Game Design, 20 January 1992.

future. He then went on to suggest specific topics and organization of the Group to accomplish this goal.³⁸⁵

Hanley suggested that answering the CNO's questions depended on the behavior of others; they could not be answered independently.³⁸⁶ This was why the SSG was using gaming to deal with the dynamics of behavior. He suggested that the SSG address what military (particularly naval) capabilities would be available at a given time, and whether those capabilities would be necessary and sufficient for the range of situations that we could anticipate.³⁸⁷

The Group traveled to Washington, D.C., and Panama the week of 9 December, continuing their research and developing contacts to participate in their games.³⁸⁸

SSG XI played their next game 27-31 January 1991. This game was similar to the first, but included many senior and foreign players.³⁸⁹ The cells had mixes of foreign and U.S. experts—including three senior Russians—representing government, military, and other institutions, with experience in national defense and international security (Appendix I).

Consistent with the questions asked by the CNO, the game was designed to assist SSG XI in understanding the dynamics that would shape the development of force structures and security regimes in the coming decades. It specifically intended to focus on the effect of changes in U.S. military force structure, primarily naval, on American security aims. Specific objectives were to (all italics original):

- Address regional contingencies, arms proliferation, and great power relationships as *sources of instability*.
- Develop a deeper appreciation of perceptions and effects of *military presence* around the world.

³⁸⁵ Memo from Jim Holloway to SSG, Subj: Approach to Further Study, 15 December 1991.

³⁸⁶ SSG XI Task Analysis and Game Design, DRAFT, January 20, 1992.

³⁸⁷ Hanley received his Ph.D. from Yale in December 1991.

³⁸⁸ Ibid., Thank you notes from SSG 1990 - 1991 correspondence file. In the Washington area they met with Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, USMC (CG MCCDC) and his staff; Lieutenant General Martin L. Brandtner, USMC (Director of Operations, Joint Staff); and Major General Robert A. Tiebout, USMC (CG Marine Corps Research, Development, & Acquisition Command). They also received a briefing from Dr. Gordon Adams at the Defense Budget Project. In Panama they met with General George A. Joulwan, USA (USCINCSOUTH); Naval Special Warfare Unit Eight; the Naval Small Craft Command International Assistance Command (NAVSCIATTS), and CINCLANTFLT Detachment South.

³⁸⁹ SSG XI CNO Briefs Folder: Strategic Studies Group XI Progress Report Two, 13 February 1992.

- Evaluate the ability of the United States to influence future regional conflicts using *multilateral approaches*.

The major players represented in the game were: the European Community; Israel; Japan; Russia; the United Arab League, the United States, the Secretaries General of NATO and the U.N., and the G-8, to include both state and multinational organizations. Following introductions and briefings, each day of the game represented five years. The player cells were tasked to address their:

- Aims, impediments, and actions for the contingency situation
- Priority foreign and domestic issues
- Government revenues and expenditures
- Defense budget allocations
- Force deployments/exercise/basing plans
- Defense industrial policy, foreign military sales, technology transfer, and proliferation policy

On the final day, the participants were debriefed, relaying their observations and completing a survey on the game. Significant observations included:³⁹⁰

- A northern coalition, including Russia, would continue to be most influential in world affairs.
- Arc of Crisis centers on North Africa and Middle East.
- The Arab-Israeli problem would continue to fester over the coming decades.
- The breakup of the Former Soviet Union exacerbated the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Non-state ownership would present the most vexing problems.
- The United States would need to restructure its force investment strategy to prevent block obsolescence.

The major implications of the game were that there was “a new world order” in which the U.S. needed to sustain and guide the northern coalition. Unilateral action by states would be more difficult and globalization trends would erode the ability of states to exercise sovereignty to the extent they had in the past. While continuing to face difficulties, the U.N. would become more important as a venue for enacting or enforcing solutions to international problems. Situations with no near-term solutions included U.S. dependence on Mideast oil and U.S. involvement in Mideast peace

³⁹⁰ CNO Strategic Studies Group XI “The Future of Security in the Interdependent World” Game II Report (Draft).

processes, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, along with general arms proliferation.

Areas for further study were Russian participation in a northern coalition, ways to address the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and U.S. defense investment to ensure appropriate force levels over the next two decades.

On 12-17 January, the Group visited U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Strategic Air Command, and U.S. Space Command.³⁹¹

The week of 3 February the Group visited Lieutenant General W. E. Boomer, USMC (CG MCCDC) and his staff at Quantico.³⁹² On 12 February, they visited the World Bank and met with Mr. D. C. Rao. That week they also met with Hon. Lawrence J. Korb and a team at the Brookings Institution.

On 13 February 1992, the Group met with the CNO to provide their second progress report. The Group updated the CNO on their information gathering at Southern Command, Transportation Command, and Strategic Air Command/Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, and Space Command, and a meeting they had held with General Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the previous day. They discussed the recent game, emphasizing the critical role of great power cooperation, the importance of nuclear proliferation, the U.S. role in shaping the strategic environment in the future, and the importance of critical decisions being made now and in the upcoming years on an investment strategy for military forces.³⁹³

The Group believed in the existence of real change in the world over the next 20 years because of the extraordinarily varied pressures that would mold it. Therefore, they believed that the goal of Navy and national planners and leaders should be determining how to use our resources to shape the future strategic environment. They projected that almost all the world's armed forces would be far smaller by 2012, stating, "Continued national budget and economic problems, political pressure, and the ever escalating cost of every aspect of our business will demand smaller forces." Largely the political process would define the size of the U.S. defense budget of 2012, not strategic debate or concept. However, military concepts and plans need to affect the composition of forces. "This is where our primary effort must lie."

³⁹¹ SSG Correspondence 1992-1993. Meetings included 12-13 January: General H. T. Johnson, USAF (Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command, CINCTRANSCOM), Rear Admiral Vernon E. Clarke (USTRANSCOM J5), and the staff. 14-15 January: U.S. Strategic Air Command and Vice Admiral M. C. Colley on the Joint Strategic Planning Staff. 16-17 January they visited Vice Admiral William A. Dougherty (Deputy Commander U.S. Space Command) and the staff.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, SSG Correspondence 1993-1993.

³⁹³ SSG XI, Progress Report Two (briefing notes and slides), 13 February 1992.

They expected significant reductions in overseas basing of the Army and Air Force, which would increase the value of naval forces for presence, peacetime engagement, and crisis response. They expected the size of the U.S. nuclear strategic deterrent forces to diminish, while nuclear proliferation would increasingly dominate U.S. decision-making. The single key factor that the United States should consider in strategic planning was the need to build cooperation among the great powers of the world. The Group then went on to address their major themes: pressure points of instability, military presence, the role and utility of military forces, and core competencies (which they had added since last briefing the CNO), using the data that they had collected during their study.

CNO questions and comments during the brief included:³⁹⁴

1. What do you mean by “role of our resources” in shaping the world?
2. What is the basis for your saying that Air Force and Army will not be based overseas? What will make them CONUS based?
3. Don’t you think China is a great power? What are the elements of a great power as you define it? Can the Russians be a great power?
4. With regard to your comment on “only countries who can challenge us or surpass us technologically are Japan and Germany,” since both of these countries have agreements with us, what will cause them to change their minds?
5. What do these pressure points of instability have that will pressure our well-being? If the future world has no threats to our national security or basic well-being, why do we need a strong military?
6. Can’t the Air Force provide forward presence with bilateral exercises just as the Navy can?
7. The “Comparison of Navies” slide does not show Russia and we have no good reason not to show it. Is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that benign?
8. [The CNO looked a long time at the “Economically Feasible Force Structure” slide.]
9. Core competencies: How do you know what technology to spend on if there is no threat? Need to be specific on what to spend on and why. How would the CNO defend these expenditures (especially when we conclude that other nations would not be spending much money on defense)?
10. [CNO was not satisfied with the “Confluence of Interests” slide.]
11. Is the world really going to be as messy as you predict?

³⁹⁴ SSG XI files. “The CNO’s questions from our 13 February meeting with him.”

12. In your pitch to build new toys versus old toys, how many new ones do you think you can build by 2012? What would you modernize? You can't just say it; be specific.
13. My dilemma is what capabilities do I need? Where would I put forces forward? The problem is that requirements for forces are not made by the person who has to bear the costs. What is a sustainable force?
14. Do you think our commitments today are still left over from the Cold War? What requirement that we are doing today would you come off of? We have already come a long way. The driver for the forward presence requirement is political.
15. The things you describe in the first part of the brief require force structure to do.
16. We still must operate forward. There is a level below which the Army and Air Force could fall that would leave no need for a navy because you could not do anything.

Comments following the brief included:

- Vice Admiral Henry H. (Hank) Mauz (OP-08): The operating forces only take 25% of the budget; the big costs come from infrastructure.
- VCNO: Did not think that an investment strategy was possible.
- CNO:
 - The Navy will continue to be asked to operate. Access to the sea is the purpose of naval forces. Navies have a limited effect on what happens on land. Must consider the size of the Army.
 - Must remember that we don't control where we go. We try to figure out what we should do and where we should go, then the White House steps in and decides. The "all politics are local" discussion followed. "The world will not let us do what we want to do." Discussed the Carter administration as being too idealistic.
 - We won't be allowed to modernize much. It will have to be selective; probably nothing big.
 - Some things we can drive, but a 20-year strategy is not possible in our political system. But, it is important to try and think it through.
 - Does not care about NATO as a military alliance, but it keeps us engaged.
 - If we don't stay engaged, we will bicker about economic matters.
 - Talked about being big enough to have staying power. (Implied that deterrence only works if you have the power to back it up.)

The week of 17, February Rear Admiral Wesley E. Jordan (Director, Antisubmarine Warfare OP-71) met with the Group in Newport.³⁹⁵ Flag officers visiting the NWC often requested meetings with the SSG to provide their ideas.

In May 1992, the Group split into teams, briefed their ideas to, and received comments from senior officers at a wide variety of commands.³⁹⁶

Keating presented the Group's final brief to the CNO in June 1992. The briefing addressed SSG XI's analysis of:³⁹⁷

- Budget pressures and rising weapons costs
- Where the military fit within economic, social, political, ideological, and technological instruments of national power,
- The changing character of future conflict,
- Issues for national and military security strategy
- Deterrence, crisis response, and forward presence
- An investment strategy for a "long peace"
- Core U.S. competencies for shaping a long-term competition.

The briefing concluded that:

- The U.S. would have a smaller Navy, but remain preeminent.
- Future operations would be combined, joint, and interagency.
- The investment strategy was the key management challenge.
- Declining defense budgets in the major powers, combined with escalating arms costs and the changing battlespace, would lead future competitors to

³⁹⁵ Ibid., SSG Correspondence 1992-1993.

³⁹⁶ Ibid. The Group briefed: Major General James R. Ellis, USA (Deputy CINCENT) and the staff; General Carl W. Steiner, USA (CINCSOCOM) and his staff; Admiral Paul D. Miller, USN (CINCLANTFLT); Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres, USN (COMSECONDFLT/Commander Striking Fleet, Atlantic); Major General Harold W. Blot, USMC (CG Third Marine Air Wing); Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC (CG I Marine Expeditionary Force, FMF); Lieutenant General Walter B. Boomer, USMC (CG MCCDC); Major General Robert A. Tiebout, USMC (CG Marine Corps Systems Command); Major General James A. Brabham, USMC (CG Marine Air Ground Training and Education Command); Brigadier General James R. Davis, USMC (President, Marine Corps University); Vice Admiral Edwin R. Kohn, Jr., USN (Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific); Vice Admiral David M. Bennett, USN (Commander, Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet); Vice Admiral Jerry L. Unruh, USN (COMTHIRDFLT, SSG VI); Vice Admiral Anthony A. Less, USN (Commander, Naval Air Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet); Vice Admiral Joseph P. Reason, USN (Commander Naval Surface Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet); Major General J. M. Myatt, USMC (CG 1st Marine Division); Admiral Leon A. Edney, USN (CINCLANT/SACLANT).

³⁹⁷ Ibid., Keating interview.

rely more on missiles, diesel submarines, and electronics to combat the U.S. Navy.

Keating watched the CNO's brow furrow when he projected a U.S. fleet of between 250 and 300 ships by 2012. He saw his career flashing before his eyes. Having recently agreed to cut the Navy to 450 ships, the CNO could not endorse the fleet dropping to 300. Following the brief, Vice Admiral Leighton "Snuffy" Smith (N3/5, SSG V) told Keating not to worry.³⁹⁸

SSG XI captured their ideas in a final For Official Use Only (FOUO) report and distributed it widely. Their report began by stipulating that through understanding dominant domestic and international trends and anticipating their consequences, U.S. military leaders would be better prepared to equip and train forces and promote national security policies and military strategies to shape the future security environment in ways conducive to the interests of the United States. Key points applying to any potential future were:³⁹⁹

- No global superpower or threat is likely to emerge to challenge the United States or the world over the next 20 years.
- The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will be smaller, but will be the preeminent military forces of their kind in 2012.
- The smaller Navy and Marine Corps, operating with other services and allies, will be capable of responding effectively to the crises which will almost certainly occur over the next 20 years.
- The conflicts which the world will see in the future and which may involve the United States will be regional in nature and not global.
- The critical issues for naval leaders today are to reach a new understanding of forward presence as a tool of national influence and to develop a long-term strategy for managing defense resources in order to build the forces required for 2012.

The report then went into trends identified by the SSG and amplified on trends related to:

- U.S. budget pressures
- Historical weapons cost growth

³⁹⁸ Ibid., Keating interview.

³⁹⁹ Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group XI, *Shaping the Future* (Newport RI: Strategic Studies Group, June 1992).

- World defense spending and budget pressures similar to those on the United States
- Uncertain military requirements as historic reasons of self-defense, prestige, or hegemonic intent continued to fuel conflicts
- Changing patterns of military spending, resulting in many countries searching for lower costs.

Implications of these trends were that:

- The United States, Europe, Japan, and Russia would have similar security concerns for international stability fostering trade, development, and economic growth.⁴⁰⁰ These interests would converge in the Middle East, where political instability was a constant threat and an assured supply of oil was vital to the continued functioning of the industrialized world. These powers would have the military and economic power to take effective action in pursuit of their interests, often under U.N. mandates.⁴⁰¹
- Political, economic, commercial, social, and technological factors were becoming increasingly important relative to military and ideological instruments of national power. This would affect national decisions concerning military spending and the relative status of the powers in competition for world power and influence.
- Rising weapons costs and shrinking defense budgets would combine with aging inventories and loss of military aid, to lead to older, smaller, less technologically advanced military forces in virtually all of the non-great power nations in the future. This would cause them to search for lower costs but effective weapons such as naval mines, tactical missiles, and weapons of mass destruction.
- Reduced military spending worldwide would change the global arms industry and, combined with the growth in weapons cost, would lead to structural disarmament as force structure in the major militaries diminished.
- The global arms industry would contract.
- Future warfare would be less likely to involve engagements between large warships, large numbers of modern aircraft, or heavily armored formations.

⁴⁰⁰ China was too weak to be considered a major power at the time. *Ibid.*, p. 23. SSG IX considered China as a contender or potential future great power “probably 30 years away.” *Ibid.*, p. 26

⁴⁰¹ SSG XI saw the potential for the U.N. Military Committee to take a more active role in stopping aggression, enforcing sanctions, enforcing policies to protect human rights, and preventing the production of weapons of mass destruction. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

Regional conflicts fueled by ethnic, nationalistic, or religious differences were more likely to involve insurgents or non-state actors than nation states. Possession of weapons of mass destruction by a small state or non-state actor would lead to profound changes in future warfare.

Issues for national security strategy included:

- What national security strategy the United States should pursue following the Cold War? Rather than preparing for the reemergence of a global threat, SSG XI recommended pursuing a cooperative security strategy to shape the competition, thus minimizing the potential reemergence of a global threat.
- As U.S. leaders tasked its military to maintain order rather than wage war, preserving the role of warriors would be crucial.

The CJCS had recently promulgated a National Military Strategy consisting of strategic defense and deterrence, crisis response, forward presence, and reconstitution. SSG XI commented on each.

The Fellows viewed the task of strategic defense and deterrence as being to transform the existing doctrine (to prepare for the Cold War) into one that would address smaller nations or non-state actors (terrorist or insurgent organizations) that possessed a few weapons of mass destruction. They argued for a massive, conventional response using precision guided bombs and cruise missiles to avoid massive innocent civilian casualties.

They argued that the United States would possess sufficient forces for crisis response, though methods and timing could change, with changes to forward basing, force levels, and deployment patterns. Navy and Marine Corps forces would remain involved in the majority of crisis response situations due to their mobility, flexibility, and deployed status.

Moving from containment to a strategy of cooperative security, they argued that forward presence should be tailored to the desired regional objectives and coordinated at a joint and interagency level as one instrument of national influence, rather than based solely on crisis response requirements.

In addressing reconstitution, SSG XI departed from the National Military Strategy. They argued that reconstitution to remobilize in the event of reemergence of a global threat was outmoded and the wrong concept. Noting that the Base Force would be unaffordable over the long run, they called for a long-term force development strategy involving elements such as: infrastructure reductions; cost growth control; use of commercial technology, revised acquisition procedures, foreign production, co-production, and co-development; and maintaining key elements of the industrial base; arms sales policies, selective modernization, and focused research and development efforts.

In summarizing, they emphasized that SSG XI's goal was not to provide an answer, but to suggest a framework within which to consider the issues. These criteria involved three key concepts: cooperative strategy; Total Quality Leadership (TQL), focusing on quality and considering the system as a whole for developing forces for the future; and core competencies. They considered the United States to have as core competencies the abilities to do the following:

- Lead the world through a network of alliances using its political, economic and military strength as an indispensable balancer.
- Form military coalitions.
- Control the broad seas.
- Sustain power projection beyond our borders.

Key conclusions for the future were:

- Continuing, if not enhanced, regional crises, most likely in the Middle East
- Future warfare centered around regional conflicts, probably involving smaller forces, and possibly including non-state actors and weapons of mass destruction
- The single key issue for the Navy and Marine Corps being the development of a long-term investment strategy leading to a balanced, ready force capable of littoral warfare, power projection, including: amphibious assault, carrier battle groups, maritime prepositioned forces and sealift, and mine countermeasures.⁴⁰²
- A need to rethink all aspects of forward presence sizing and scheduling as one of several tools of national influence coordinated to achieve evolving U.S. security interests.

Summarizing a few critical concepts defining the future, they included:

- Budget issues will be central to every decision.
- The U.S. Navy will remain preeminent over the next two decades.
- Every future decision should consider not just the Navy and Marine Corps, but other armed forces and allied forces, and other government agencies.

⁴⁰² In addition to mine countermeasures, SSG XI considered tactical missile defense and space and electronic warfare—including intelligence, command and control, and communications—to be critical enabling capabilities for littoral warfare. They recommended deemphasizing open-ocean sea control and ASW. CNO SSG XI, *Shaping the Future*, pp. 35 and 55.

- In coping with the fundamental changes underway, the Navy must preserve a force “prepared to deal with the next fundamental change which will occur some day in the future.”
- The ultimate challenge for military leadership facing tremendous budget pressures and a perilous peace was to take a long view of issues and ensure a constant process of self-evaluation, examination, and advancement for the future.

SSG XI underscored “the necessity to establish closer ties with regional allies and friends as a means of augmenting our smaller deployed forces.”⁴⁰³

In April 1992, SECNAV and CNO ADM Kelso had signed out *The Navy Policy Book*. It had been largely crafted in OP-00K, and was intended to serve as the basic core statement of Navy values underpinning ADM Kelso’s Total Quality Leadership initiative. The Navy staff had also struggled all year with creating a new successor document to *The Maritime Strategy* to replace the now-ignored *The Way Ahead*, published the previous year. They were still struggling as SSG XI ended its tour at Newport.

SSG XI was the bearer of unpleasant news to the CNO and the Navy leadership regarding the coming pressures on sustaining force structure resulting in a much smaller navy. Though the trends that they identified largely came to fruition, the Pentagon’s focus on force structure (along with demands on the CNO to deal with the Tailhook scandal and the USS *Iowa* explosion) consumed the attention, limiting efforts to address the strategic implications of the SSGs findings. The Group did generate strategic discourse and debate among the naval leadership through their widespread briefings and interactions. The experience derived by the Fellows again served them well in their following assignments.

Captain Mike Martus went from the SSG to become director of ADM Kelso’s CNO Executive Panel (CEP) (OPNAV OP-00K), relieving Captain Jim Stark. Tim Keating went to a joint assignment, with the Joint Task Force Southwest Asia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He would eventually be promoted and reassigned as OPNAV N3/N5 as a vice admiral, and serve in two four-star combatant commander jobs as Commander Northern Command and Commander Pacific Command. Stan Bryant went to carrier command, while Ray Smith went to command the Naval Special Warfare Command.

SSG XI served as cover for another effort.⁴⁰⁴ CDR John Welch, USNR, was also CEO of Electric Boat. He performed an annual active duty for training with the SSG, working

⁴⁰³ Ibid., p. 36.

⁴⁰⁴ John Welch, Diesel Sub & SSG XI Industry Comments folder.

on a project for VADM Owens (OPNAV N8) regarding the feasibility of the U.S. building diesel subs for export. He also provided an industry perspective on SSG XI's findings and related reports.

SSG XII (1992-1993)

Focus: Role of military forces in sustaining U.S. influence into the 21st century

SSG XII began with Robin Pirie as Director. Following SSG XI's final briefing to the CNO, Admiral Kelso gave an outline titled "Naval Forces for the Next Century" to Pirie. Pirie understood that the CNO's fundamental concern was how military forces, particularly naval forces, were required to support national interests as we entered the 21st century. SSG XI had concluded that the credible combat scenarios for the next 20 years were of limited interest in describing the full range of usefulness that our forces have as an instrument of policy. Such scenarios were also not useful as criteria of force size and sufficiency. "Our national interests are much broader than having the ability to put down the occasional Saddam Hussein, and our influence must be applied to a vast variety of tasks. That influence is underwritten by the existence of our forces in ways not captured by playing out contingency scenarios, contrary to Les Aspin's thesis."⁴⁰⁵ Pirie went on to suggest that SSG XII could explore the role of our military forces in support and promoting U.S. interests in peace and war, and suggested the following charter:⁴⁰⁶

Explore the role of military forces, particularly, but not exclusively, naval forces in supporting and fostering United States' interests and influence in the world of the early 21st century. How will we define our interests? What challenges to them could arise? How can our military forces, working perhaps in unprecedentedly close coordination with each other and with other agencies of our government, help us to meet those challenges by new security environments?

The CNO concurred.

⁴⁰⁵ Referring to the two major regional contingency approach for assessing force structure. Rear Admiral Dennis C. Blair (SSG VI) as Deputy Director in J-8 had a hand in coming up with that formulation to put a floor on force reductions.

⁴⁰⁶ Memorandum from Pirie for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Project for SSG XII, 24 June 1992.

Bob Murray was now President of CNA. He told Pirie that he wanted him back in Washington.⁴⁰⁷ Pirie began searching for a new director. Given the character of the future security environment, and of the SSG's work in looking at the Navy working with other government agencies, he recommended retired Ambassador Francis J. McNeil to Kelso.⁴⁰⁸ McNeil had been President Reagan's special emissary to Grenada in 1983 (recommending U.S. intervention). McNeil had recently been Ambassador to Costa Rica and had extensive experience in the Orient, particularly Japan. He had also recently worked on the National Commission on Public Service—Volker Commission—on revitalizing the federal government for the 21st century. Kelso interviewed Ambassador McNeil. CNO expected the Ambassador to continue Pirie's good work and help prepare the SSG for the wider world. Just before telling the Ambassador that he had the job, he said that he needed to be sure that McNeil "would not turn the SSG into a peacenik place."⁴⁰⁹ McNeil joined the SSG shortly before trips to the Pacific and Europe, during which the directors turned over.

SSG XII consisted of more Fellows than previous SSGs and included the first female officer, Captain Patricia A. (Pat) Tracey, USN (General Unrestricted Line). The other Fellows were:

- Colonel Robert A. Beaudoin, USMC (ground)
- Captain James M. (Jim) Burin, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain Rocklun A. (Rocky) Deal, USN (carrier aviation)
- Captain Lawrence E. (Larry) Eddingfield, USN (surface warfare)
- Colonel Don D. Enloe, USMC (aviation)
- Captain Mark C. Haley, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain R. Robinson (Robby) Harris, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain Norman (Norm) Henslee, USGC
- Captain Stephen R. (Steve) Loeffler, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain William H. Shurtleff, IV, USN (carrier aviation)
- Colonel Charles O. Skipper, USMC (combat support)
- Captain Thomas L. Travis, USN (submarine warfare).

Lieutenant Commander Allen Banks continued as the Group's Intelligence Officer.

SSG XII began their orientation on 10 August 1992. A typical day began with a meeting of SSG XII to discuss their task, followed by a reading period, and an

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., Pirie and Murray interviews.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., Pirie interview.

⁴⁰⁹ Email from Ambassador Francis J. McNeil, 10 February 2015.

afternoon seminar with noted defense leaders and scholars: Mr. Andrew Marshall (Director, OSD Net Assessment), Dr. Jim Roche (Northrop Corporation), Dr. Francis Fukuyama (RAND), Prof. Sam Huntington (Harvard University), etc. On 17 August Vice Admiral Leighton “Snuffy” Smith (OP-06, SSG V) met with the Group, followed by Vice Admiral Bill Owens (OP-08, SSG I) on 21 August.⁴¹⁰

The SSG visited Washington, D.C., the week of 24 August with a schedule similar to those of previous SSGs.⁴¹¹ They met with General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC (Commandant) on 25 August and held their first meeting with the CNO on 27 August.

On 2 September they visited Harvard’s JFK School, meeting with Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, USMC (Retired), Professor Joe Nye, and the national security Fellows (military officers assigned for a year of study), and attended a conference at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. The Group returned to Newport, continuing a similar schedule and began preparing for the Navy Programming Objectives Memorandum (POM) game held at the NWC 10-12 September, at the request of the CNO.

They traveled to the Pacific 23 September-2 October, and to Europe October 12-20.⁴¹² Ambassador Frank McNeil became Director of the SSG following the Group’s trip to Europe.

⁴¹⁰ SSG XII Schedule, 6 August 1992.

⁴¹¹ Visited Admiral Bill Studeman USN (Deputy Director CIA) and staff members, HQ Marine Corps; Rear Admiral E. D. Shaefer, Jr., USN (Director, Naval Intelligence OP-92); the Naval Maritime Intelligence Center; Vice Admiral John M. McConnell, USN (Director, NSA) and staff; Rear Admiral William Pendley, USN Retired (Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs); Dr. Gordon Adams (Defense Budget Project); Mr. Robert F. Hale (Congressional Budget Office); Rear Admiral Dennis Blair, USN (Deputy Director for Assessment JCS J8, SSG VI); Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Barnett, USAF (HQ staff); Captain Keith D. Hahn, USN (Director for Defense Policy, NSC); and a variety of other Washington area organizations. Letter to Admiral Studeman from Robert B. Pirie, Jr., 10 August 1992, and *Ibid.*, SSG Correspondence 1992-1993.

⁴¹² In Yokosuka, Japan, they met with Vice Admiral Tim Wright, USN (COMSEVENTHFLT, SSG VII) and Rear Admiral Jesse Hernandez (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, SSG IV) and their staffs, and Vice Admiral Kanazake, JMSDF (Retired) (Japanese Center for Defense Studies). In Tokyo they met with Ambassador Michael Armacost and conducted roundtable discussions with staff at the U.S. Embassy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Maritime Staff Office. In Yokohama they met with Colonel Michael McCarthy, USAF (374 Air Wing). In Korea they met with General Riscassi, USA (Commander-in-Chief United Nations Forces Korea) and Rear Admiral William W. Mathis, USN (Commander U.S. Naval Forces Korea). In Singapore, they met with Rear Admiral Ron Tucker, USN (Commander Naval Logistic Group Western Pacific). In Hawaii they met with Admiral Larson (CINCPAC); Admiral Kelley (CINCPACFLT); Brigadier General Gary E. Brown, USMC (Deputy CG FMFPAC); Rear Admiral Larry G. Vogt, USN

Back in Newport, the group met with Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan, USN (Retired) on 28 October, and then traveled to Washington to provide a status brief to the CNO. The brief covered what the Group had done. They had read widely on globalization, the role of economics in national security, and the multi-polar nature of the post-cold war world, and they had met with a wide variety of scholars. They had participated in the Navy POM game, as the CNO had requested, and had come away with a better appreciation for the character of war in the post-Cold War world and some of the programmatic requirements. Initial observations were that:

- U.S. participation makes things happen worldwide.
- Many successes have been attributable to the U.S. military's influence: Greece/Turkey, Ecuador/Peru, ASEAN nations using U.S. procedures, Japanese successes.
- Non-traditional missions strengthen fragile democracies.
 - They change conditions that cause conflict.
- There is a need to be careful that non-traditional missions not become the purpose of the military rather than a peacetime use of military competencies.
- U.S. economic growth, trade, and debt were primary concerns.
- CINCs were hesitant to accept increased risks of reduced force presence.
- TYCOMs foresaw maintenance, training, and personnel shortfalls.

(USCINCPAC J5); and Rear Admiral Henry C. McKinney, USN (COMSUBPAC). On the West Coast they visited Rear Admiral James R. Stark, USN (Commander, Training Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet); Vice Admiral David E. Bennett, USN (Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet); Brigadier General Paul A. Fratarangelo, USMC (Deputy CG I Marine Expeditionary Force); Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, USN (COMTHIRDFLT, SSG VI); and Rear Admiral James R. Fitzgerald, USN (COMCRUDESGRU THREE). In England they met with Dr. Gwin Prins (Director, Global Security Programme, University of Cambridge); Vice Admiral Edward W. Clepton, Jr., USN (Deputy CINCUSNAV); Ms. Chris MacNulty (Applied Futures, Ltd.); Captain A. R. Gough, Royal Navy (Director of Naval Staff Studies, Whitehall); Colonel M. J. Meardon, Royal Marines (Director of Royal Marine Operations, Whitehall); Dr. Peter Foot (Royal Naval College, Greenwich); and Colonel Michael Dewar (Deputy Director, IISS). In Italy they met with Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, USN (CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe); Vice Admiral Thomas J. Lopez, USN (COMSIXTHFLT); Rear Admiral Dennis A. Jones, USN (CTF 69/COMSUBGRU EIGHT); Rear Admiral Daniel T. Oliver, USN (CTF 67/Commander Fleet Air Mediterranean); and Captain James F. Chandler, USN (Defense Attaché Rome). In Brussels the Group met with Admiral Bill Smith, USN (U.S. Representative to the NATO Military Committee); Charge Vershbow and Brigadier Kuening (U.S. Mission to NATO). At EUCOM headquarters in Germany they met with Rear Admiral John J. Mazach, USN (EUCOM J5) and staff, and in Mons with Rear Admiral John J. Zerr, USN (Chief, Operational Readiness Branch SHAPE) and staff. Ibid., SSG Correspondence 1992-1993.

- Partial solutions could include global sourcing, flexible deployments, Adaptive Joint Force Packages, and places not bases.
- Capabilities/technology provide greatest military influence.
- Role of maritime forces in U.S. influence would increase.
- Benefits of forward presence are difficult to articulate.

Conclusions to date were that presence produces influence, that the military is only one type of influence, and that regional strategy is required to coordinate different types of influence. The Group briefed their development of an “influence” model and a review process for coordinating/implementing regional presence and influence, which would articulate the peacetime role and challenges for naval forces. They briefed PACOM’s approach to “Cooperative Engagement.” They then briefed their plans for their first game designed to explore their hypothesis: that in face of declining resources, successful U.S. influence depends on coordinated military, economic, political, and cultural strategies that vary by region and with changing U.S. priorities.

Following the update with the CNO, the Group traveled the Western Hemisphere 2-5 November.⁴¹³

They followed this travel with meetings in Newport with Dr. Thomas H. Heriksen (Associate Director, Hoover Institution), Commander Dan Thompson USN (Hoover Institution), Ms. Maureen A. Baginski (NSA) on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Vice Admiral Jean Bertermier French Navy (Retired) on European affairs, and they attended a conference sponsored by Tufts University’s Fletcher School.

Also in November, the Navy published its long-awaited replacement to the Maritime Strategy: ... *from the Sea*. It was signed out by the SECNAV, the CNO, and the CMC. VADM Leighton “Snuffy” Smith (SSG V), now the Navy’s DCNO for Operations, Plans

⁴¹³ In Norfolk they met separately with Admiral Paul D. Miller, USN (CINCLANT/SACLANT) and Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr., USN (CINCLANTFLT), and had a roundtable with Vice Admiral Joseph Paul Reason, USN (Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet); Vice Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr., USN (COMSUBLANT); Vice Admiral Anthony A. Less, USN (COMNAVAIRLANT); Rear Admiral Robert Sutton, USN (Commander Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet); and Lieutenant General William M. Keys, USMC (CG FMFLANT). In Tampa they met with General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (CINCCENT); and General Carl W. Steiner, USA (CINCSOCOM). In Miami, they had meetings with Ambassador Ambler Moss (Director, North-South Center) and Rear Admiral William P. Leahy, USCG (Commander, SEVENTH Coast Guard District). In Panama they met with General George A. Joulwan, USA (USCINCSOUTH), the U.S. Embassy staff, and smaller commands. Ibid.

and Policy (OP-06) had done much of the writing. CAPT Ed Giambastiani (SSG X), now Director for Concepts at the new Naval Doctrine Command, also had contributed.

SSG XII played a free-form path game, “Global Vision, Regional Strategy,” on 7-11 December 1992. The game entailed three planning moves in 1993, 1996, and 2002. Players included CINC Planners, and representatives from NSC, State, CIA, House Armed Services Committee (HASC), DOE, OPNAV, and think tanks. The game examined the U.S. ability to influence others to take actions consistent with U.S. interests, based on an understanding of enduring U.S. interests but changing regional strategies. Game scenarios illuminated effects of declining U.S. forces.⁴¹⁴

The concept for the game stipulated that challenges to the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure, derive from two prime sources:⁴¹⁵

1. The emergence of a military peer with interests and aims significantly divergent from the those of the United States
2. The combination of population growth, divergence in wealth, rapid global communications (including transport), and historic ethno-nationalistic animosity, producing disorder that affects America’s ability to prosper.

The Game Design concept noted that: “Rather than facing immediate peril, these changes will obtain only over decades, if at all. Therefore, the U.S. has both the opportunity and the need to shape the developing security environment.”⁴¹⁶

The theme for the game involved investigating means for using U.S. influence to shape great power cooperation and to establish rules and enforcement mechanisms for a rule of international norms that were consistent with American interests. Whereas the last game focused on interagency processes, this would concentrate on international processes. Proposed objectives for the game were:

1. Understanding how we retain influence with fewer forces and dollars in DoD (e.g., the effect of a surge vs. forward presence military strategy)
2. Understanding the trade-offs involved between unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral approaches to regional security, and between ad hoc

⁴¹⁴ SSG XII Game 1 Report.

⁴¹⁵ SSG XII Game II Design Concept.

⁴¹⁶ SSG XII Game II Design Concept.

- vs. formal organizations (i.e., can we write organizational rules for command, etc., that we can live with?).
3. Investigating how the United States in conjunction with other world powers approach peace enforcement in non-trinitarian conflict [complex contingencies] (including non-state actors and rogue states).⁴¹⁷ Specifically addressing policies to discourage the use of nuclear weapons.
 4. Investigating policies for shaping the numbers and types of arms used in future conflict, including conventional arms as well as WMD.

The design concept then went on to suggest cells and players similar to the second game played by SSG XI, noting that the Group might find other participants during the visit of Harvard Center for the Study of International Affairs Fellows.

The major insights from the game included:

- There is no substitute for military influence in regions where nations perceived military threats or opportunities for aggression.
- Government informational tools such as educational exchange programs and development of personal ties work only over the long term, while the media has the most short-term influence.
- U.S. economic influence rests primarily on the size and robustness of the U.S. economy. USAID, sanctions, embargoes, punitive tariffs, etc., rarely provided short-term advantage.
- Political influence was effective in the short term, but it was perishable, and did not transfer from one issue to the next. Diplomacy depended upon established relationships before a crisis.
- U.S. forward presence remained a bellwether of U.S. commitment. Long-term strategies to lessen the degree to which nations felt threatened could reduce the salience of forward military presence.
- Changes in military force employment provided only marginal gains as budget cuts resulted in diminished capabilities. Home fleet or surge strategies could increase costs for strategic lift and limit intelligence and knowledge of the regions.

⁴¹⁷ Martin van Creveld introduced the term “non-trinitarian” in his book *The Transformation of War* in 1991, referring principally to warfare involving non-state actors rather than traditional governments. Clausewitz’s trinity consisted of the government (providing reason), the military (coping with chance), and the people (providing the primordial violence required for war).

- Players were split on the further utility of NATO, but had a consensus on preserving NATO fighting capabilities.⁴¹⁸
- Current U.S. interagency mechanisms did not adequately provide long-range regional strategies. Large uncertainties concerning intentions and capabilities of the Former Soviet Union, China, and India would complicate the development of U.S. strategy.
- U.S. players tried to make limited use of the Strategic Defense Initiative and theater missile defense systems to discourage use and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, but did not explore the full capabilities and limitations of such systems.

The game report then suggested a set of complex topics for further study:

- What actions can the United States take to redefine the measure of our engagement and military commitment to Europe other than the number of troops stationed there?
- How can the United States restructure forward military presence to achieve global security objectives at minimum cost?
- Are regional strategies the best way to focus American resource investment to ensure U.S. influence and world leadership?
- How can the interagency process best support U.S. strategy development and achievement of national objectives? Suggestions to be studied include:
 - Provide for CINC representatives in all interagency meetings regardless of the CINC's region.
 - Provide for CINC representatives in principal foreign affairs agencies and put agency representatives on CINC's staff where these positions do not currently exist.
 - Invite CINCs to regional Chiefs of Mission meetings as a matter of course.
 - Reconcile CINC boundaries with other departmental and agency area boundaries.
- How can the U.S. strengthen multilateral organization for global security?
- What are the rules of the road for dealing with ethnic conflicts, emerging states, non-state actors, rogue states, and internal disturbances?
- What special consideration should the U.S. give to strategies for dealing with the FSU, China, India, and Eastern Europe?
- Is it possible for the United States to “buy its way back in” in the event of the emergence of a threatening power across the sea?
- Is the U.S. military hollowing out by the way we are downsizing?

⁴¹⁸ Ambassador McNeil had a dim view of the continuing relevance of NATO.

- What political realignments could be expected after use of nuclear weapons?
- What would be the effect of a military reorganization making the force provider the force commander, as in the Pacific Command model?

Before the Christmas break, Captain Larry Eddingfield (the senior member) sought advice from Rear Admiral Ray Smith (SSG XI) and sent a memo to the Group asking the Group to put on paper over the holidays their thoughts on “what we have learned so far, how to define the goals of influence, and tradeoffs for optimal use of our national resources to provide for stability in a changing world and global prosperity.”⁴¹⁹ He suggested that the next step would be to divide into sub-groups and “begin to flesh out the tools of influence. He noted, “As agreed by Admiral Kelso, it would be useful for SSG XII to help articulate the case for peacetime presence and its resulting influence.” Before briefing Kelso, the Group had agreed that military and naval presence was only one component of U.S. influence, and to be most effective it had to complement political, economic, and cultural forms. The Group needed a model defining what *influence* means and they needed to “come close to knowing” most of the means and their attendant effects.

Eddingfield noted that Kelso told them that the Unified CINCs could play a key role in pulling together strategies for their regions, and that they needed to know how the interagency process did or did not play into focused strategies for regional influence “to shape the region over the long term.” The Group also needed to come to grips with the limits on the role of military presence and influence, identifying a force structure floor where influence diminishes. Eddingfield then presented his ideas for research into military, economic, political, and cultural topics, and an outline for a paper discussing influence, organizing to optimize influence, challenges to U.S. influence in the early 21st century and recommendations for addressing those challenges.⁴²⁰ The Group took note and accepted Eddingfield’s suggestions.

Following the Christmas holidays, the group met with Captain Guy R. Abbate, Jr., USN (Naval Justice School, EIMET Coordinator) on International Military Education and Training (IMET), and then traveled to Washington, D.C., 11-15 January 1993.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., SSG Correspondence 1992 - 1993.

⁴²⁰ Memorandum for SSG XII, Subj: SSG XII Project Definition, signed Larry (Eddingfield).

⁴²¹ Their meetings included:

- 11 Jan: Admiral J. William Kime, USCG (Commandant); Lieutenant General Edwin S. Leland, Jr., USA (Director, Joint Staff J5); Rear Admiral Skip Bowman, USN (Deputy Director, Joint Staff J5), Rear Admiral Michael W. Cramer USN (Joint Staff J2) and staff

At the NWC on 22 January, the SSG met with 20 foreign officers from the Naval Command College. On January 25-29 they conducted a vision-based planning exercise with Chris MacNulty and her team from Applied Futures with participation from the Joint Staff, Air Force HQ staff, OPNAV, USCG staff, the Office of Naval Research, CNA, and others to focus their ongoing research.

The Group visited a Marine Corps Capability Exercise (CAPEX) at Camp Lejeune on 23-25 January.⁴²² The week of 17 February the Group flew back to D.C. for another round of meetings.⁴²³ During the week of 10 March, they were back in Washington, D.C., and

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- 12 Jan: Hon. H. Allen Holmes (Ambassador at Large for Burdensharing, Department of State); Bill Maynes, Sandy Spector, Andrew Pierre, Doris Miesner (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
 - 13 Jan: Hon. Richard Clarke (Senior Director for International Programs, NSC)
 - 14 Jan: Mr. David Pozorski (Director, Strategic Session EUR/RPN, Department of State); Mr. Gary S. Usrey (Deputy Director, Office of Regional and Multilateral Force and Observer Affairs, Department of State); Ambassador Teresa A. Tull (Office Director for Regional Affairs, EAP, Department of State); Ambassador Robert Gelbard (Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State); Rear Admiral William C. Miller, USN (Chief of Naval Research); Mr. Jerry W. Leach (Regional Director of Eurasia and the Middle East, Peace Corps); Mr. Eugene P. Kopp (Deputy Director, United States Information Agency (USIA)); Mary Ellen Connell (USIA)
 - 15 Jan: Michael Lav and Patrick Cody (World Bank). Ibid. SSG Correspondence 1992-1993

⁴²² They met with:

- 23 Feb: Colonel Harry Barnes, USMC (Commanding Officer, Blount Island Command) on Maritime Prepositioning Program and operations,
- 24 Feb: Major General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (CG 2nd Marine Division), Brigadier General George H. Walls, USMC (CG 2nd Force Service Support Group)
- 25 Feb: Brigadier General Lawrence H. Livingston, USMC (CG Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune). Ibid.
- ⁴²³ 17 Feb: Lieutenant General Charles C. Krulak, USMC (CG MCCDC); Commander James Martin, USN (OPNAV N412G) on hollow force; Mr. Jeffrey Ranney (Systems Planning Corp)
- 18 Feb: Hon. Robin Pirie, Dr. Harlan Ullman, Dr. Bill Morgan, and Dr. Jeff Lutz (CNA) roundtable on forward presence; Rear Admiral Richard A. Allen, USN (OPNAV N81); Colonel Jim Battagini/ USMC (Joint Staff J5) on U.N.; Captain Robert C. Wagoner, USN (OPNAV N801)
- 19 Feb: Rear Admiral John S. Redd USN (OPNAV N51). Ibid. SSG Correspondence 1992-1993.

then went on to New York for meetings with U.N. officials and the U.N. Association of the USA.⁴²⁴

In April, SSG XII formed three- and four-person teams and led discussions of current issues with the local Committees on Foreign Relations in several cities. The Group found: “These frank and valuable discussions were used to present some of the Group’s ideas and to get feedback on current views of the security environment from knowledgeable individuals. These visits proved to be invaluable in providing the Group with insight into current views of issues that were under study.”⁴²⁵

In May, SSG XII presented the CNO with its final brief, “U.S. Influence in the 21st Century: A Window of Opportunity for Our Nation.”⁴²⁶

They began by asserting that the United States could not sustain the level of influence that it had enjoyed during the Cold War, but that it retained a great capability to affect world affairs. They noted differing theories on great power competition and effects of globalization. Then they stated that U.S. leadership since World War II had created an unparalleled opportunity to break patterns of great power conflict, enabling the world’s powers to work together to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

They contrasted U.S. Cold War leadership, the influence derived from DESERT STORM, the U.S. reputation as an honest broker, and the emergence of new democracies against the absence of a unifying threat, perception of U.S.

⁴²⁴ Ibid. They met with:

- 10 Mar: Admiral J. William Kime, USCG (Commandant); Colonel William Foster, USA (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Planning, HQ Department of the Army); Captain Brent Greene, USN (OPNAV N891); Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Barnett, USAF (HQ USAF)
- 11 Mar: Dr. Harlan Ullman and Margaret Daley Hayes (CNA); Colonel James M. Hayes, USMC (Plans, Policy and Operations (PPO), HQ USMC); Lieutenant Colonel Brindle, USMC (Manpower Policy Plans Programs & Budgeting, HQ USMC); Ms. Susan Rice and Major Jane Hull, USA (NSC staff); Mr. Clarence Juehl (OSD NATO Policy)
- 12 Mar: Mr. Ed Luck, Mr. Alan Song, and Mr. Robert Immerman (U.N. Association of the USA); Colonel T. K. Kearney, USAF (Military Advisor, U.S. Mission to the U.N.); Mr. Morton Halperin (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democratization and Peace Keeping).

⁴²⁵ SSG XII Final Report, “United States Influence in the 21st Century: A Window of Opportunity,” June 1993, p. 49.

⁴²⁶ SSG XII May 1993 Brief, “U.S. Influence in the 21st Century: A Window of Opportunity for Our Nation.”

disengagement, changing global economy, and domestic issues as affecting U.S. primacy in the post-Cold War international security system. Using its current strength and influence this decade, the United States had the opportunity to embed its values and interest into a new security structure for the next century.

The major theme of the SSG strategy was one of global engagement to shape a new security structure. Elements of the strategy included:

- Steps to reinforce U.S. interagency processes, shifting from responding to crises to shaping events to head off crises
- Steps to encourage major power cooperation for global security with a special emphasis on the ability of the U.N. to establish and enforce order
- Leveraging military forces by matching doctrine to capabilities and reorganizing naval, joint, and combined forces to address 21st-century realities
- Above all, an investment strategy to the preserve the readiness of our forces to meet a wide range of global security demands in the near term and ensure our ability to handle any peer competitor over the long term.

Sustaining U.S. influence would require organizing domestically and internationally for an era of uncertainty. One aim should be to exploit current U.S. influence by focusing all forms of leadership through interagency processes, building a new security structure that would incorporate U.S. values and interests.

SSG XII proposed that the U.S. interagency process should build on the kind of systematic long-range planning focused at the regional level that was then conducted by the regional CINCs. CINCs, Ambassadors, embassy staffs, and other agency people living in the region, working with their Washington counterparts, were best positioned to draft regional strategies. Strategies to cover all aspects of U.S. influence would require all agencies to consider long-range (20-year) effects of their strategies. These regional strategies would allow the NSC and the newly formed National Economic Council staffs to produce a coherent national security strategy employing all instruments of national influence. To facilitate this, SSG XII recommended:

- Aligning DoD's, State Department's, CINCs', and other agencies' (e.g., CIA's) geopolitical boundaries and areas of responsibility for world and regional affairs
- Coordinating with State Department regional bureau chiefs to ensure that Unified CINCs were represented at all regional meetings and Deputy Chief of Mission conferences
- Ensuring that political advisors and U.S. Information Agency representatives were incorporated into all CINC and component staffs, and that they participated in joint and combined exercises to provide interagency experience

- Including resource requirements defined by regional strategies in the budgeting process with an eye toward sustaining U.S. influence.

Recommendations for the sea services (Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) to sustain and enhance military influence abroad and sustain the interagency process included:

- Like the Army and Air Force, provide quality officers to the State Department, NSC, and other agencies and ensure that they receive Joint Duty credit.
- Educate sea service officers to succeed in naval diplomacy.
- Consider temporary appointments to Flag for officers serving on combined staffs.
- Consider career alternatives, such as a foreign area officer program similar to the Army's, for officers assigned to interagency and attaché positions that make them competitive for promotion.

SSG XII briefed that the best way to avoid or postpone the emergence of a peer military competitor would be to create a pattern of great power cooperation under sustained U.S. leadership. Such cooperation would also be required to confront systematic causes of conflict, legitimize intervention for redress of breaches of the peace, and leverage U.S. defense resources and foreign aid. Active leadership and application of U.S. instruments of influence would be essential. They recommended:

- Japan and Germany, as major financial contributors, participate in key security decision making and have a greater role in the U.N. Security Council.
- Treating China and Russia like great powers to open dialogue and extending peace and security, rather than attempting to contain China as a hegemonic threat.

Major power cooperation would:

- Address proliferation and use of nuclear weapons.
- Provide coalition forces to address major breaches of the peace.
- Isolate and contain internal disorder in places like Bosnia and Sudan.
- Provide international tribunals to deter genocide, terrorism, and hostage taking.
- Provide trusteeships for failed states such as Haiti and Somalia.

To foster regional cooperation, SSG XII recommended sustaining NATO's viable combat core and using NATO as a standard for other regional collective security efforts. The encouraged using the wide variety of regional economic and security organizations, and the creation of a post-containment security regime to assure a non-threatening environment in Asia.

They saw the U.N.—a U.S. construct—as the framework for maintaining peace and security, recognizing that it never worked as envisioned during the Cold War and required major powers working together. “Now” was the most propitious time to return the U.N. to its original purpose. Improved U.N. force capabilities would prevent the U.S. having to intervene in the internal stability of key states on its own. Ways to make the U.N. more effective included:

- Making the military staff committee the direct agent of the security council as specified in the Charter. During the Cold War the Secretary General had become the de facto military coordinator.
- Having a policy of inclusion for China and Russia to help solidify major power cooperation.
- Highlighting maritime intercept operations as the U.N. conducted more Chapter VII actions.

The Group observed that the decade of the 1990s was rolling along, with or without U.S. engagement. The U.S. needed to use its interagency processes, multilateral partnerships, and military influence to lay the tracks to ensure that the international security system went in the desired direction.

The Group foresaw a greater demand for naval forces than the U.S. would have, and therefore the need to work with other services and foreign partners to achieve U.S. aims, while retaining an ability for unilateral action in some circumstances. To match capabilities to challenges using doctrine, they recommended:

- Optimized precision strike against rogue actors and possible future peer competitors,
- Maximizing capabilities of forces to conduct a wide spectrum of missions in the emerging security environment, and
- Incorporating the capabilities of security partners within this spectrum of missions, while building political consensus.

Optimizing precision strike by employing intelligence, political analysis, and engineering to accomplish exact political objectives would expand the concept of strategic deterrence through devastating conventional attack. The Group recognized that this capability would not substitute for forward deployment of U.S. forces in demonstrating commitment; nor would it sway countries or individuals who provided no targets suitable to strike, such as Somali warlords or Bosnian Serbs (though Serbian Serbs could well be influenced).

The next concept involved flexible task forces employing smaller task forces with different compositions based on mission requirements and unit availability. These forces should:

- Be able to defend themselves against the regional threat

- Deploy with a range of capabilities to fulfill the most likely missions, and be ready for the full range of options with reinforcement
- Be trained and prepared for reconfiguration while deployed.

Such task forces could be centered around ships other than aircraft carriers. In addition, carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups could provide a spectrum of missions short of all-out combat. They could serve as mobile operating bases capable of moving rapidly to where they were needed and accepting a wide range of forces for short-notice operations while deployed.

The Group also recommended using standing multinational naval forces, such as those in the Mediterranean, as a means for cooperating with friends and allies. They saw that pulling forces out of a standing force for national missions would be far easier than creating a standing force when needed. They recommended making amphibious ships—augmented by Tomahawk missile shooters—the center of a Mediterranean standing force, alternating with big-deck ships from NATO allies and Mediterranean partners (France and Spain). NATO’s Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces South (CINCSOUTH) would command the force.

SSG XII saw an investment strategy for the long term as essential. Principles for investment were: First, the Navy needed to build a force that matched a strategy of global engagement in support of major power cooperation, was prepared for regional conflicts, and was advanced enough to defeat a future peer competitor. Second, future conflicts like DESERT STORM remained probable and could be more challenging. Third, alliances might falter.

Covering the Mediterranean, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific would be demanding. In a perfect world, the Navy would deploy forces to each region for the best mix of influence: deterrence in one area, crisis response in another, and assurance and humanitarian assistance in a third. Reducing deployments to only two of these areas invited trouble. The Group recommended a current investment strategy that would: maintain a force structure for engagement and keep forces ready in the short term; keep forces ready, protect the role of the warrior and prevent exploitation of U.S. shortfalls in the mid term; and protect the role of the warrior, prevent exploitation, and represent “preconstitution” against the possibility of a peer competitor in the long term. They recommended that the focus for the mid term be on updating weapons, information systems, and sensors, and developing tactics and operational concepts for their most effective use. They expressed concern that failing to maintain an ASW capability would encourage nations such as Russia and China to emphasize submarine construction. That felt that a future peer competitor unencumbered by inventories of current forces might capitalize on technological developments in the intervening decades to defeat U.S. capabilities and doctrine. Countering this would require the United States to prioritize R&D and provide enough advanced weapons to develop doctrines for their effective integration and preconstitution of the

capabilities to prevail in the next war. This would require an agile acquisition system that could win the race to production.

One recommendation to reduce pressures to hollow the force was to give the Unified CINCs a “checkbook” for operating forces deployed in their area. The services would retain fenced operations and maintenance money for service training and readiness. This approach would highlight the affordability of naval operations compared to other forces, and would reduce demands on the Navy Department to fund contingency operations from within their own budget. The JCS and OSD would allocate and adjust funding between the Unified CINCs.

Like SSG XI, SSG XII highlighted potential challenges of prolonged non-combat operations and recommended an institutional focus on warfighting. Employing the Coast Guard for constabulary tasks and other government agencies to perform their missions would be preferable to DoD focusing on these missions. The military would lend a hand in emergencies, but should not assume responsibilities for civilian tasks.

Of all of the issues that SSG XII discussed with the CINCs, only the role of the warrior and concerns over the hollowing of the forces received near unanimous agreement. They recommended the issues that they had raised in their briefing as topics for future CINCs conferences. SSG XII concluded in stating that their year had been “a unique opportunity to view the world and its future through the eyes of involved and knowledgeable people while allowing us the freedom to formulate our own vision of what tomorrow can hold.”

Following the brief to the CNO, the Group divided and briefed Unified CINCs. Harris, Loeffler, Tracey, Skipper, and Hanley were on the team that briefed in Europe. Admiral Boorda (CINCUSNAVEUR/AFSOUTH) thought that the SSG work focused too much on national policy and strategy, rather than on naval issues. Though Loeffler and Tracey had worked for him and he had supported their careers, he was not gentle in conveying his views directly to them. At the invitation of retired Vice Admiral Bertemier, French Navy (Retired), SSG XII was the first SSG to brief at the French Ministry of Defense.⁴²⁷

On 3 June, the group briefed CMC General Carl E. Mundy, USMC, with senior staff. The Commandant recommended that the SSG present the brief to Hon. Frank Wisner (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), Dr. Ted Warner (Assistant Secretary of

⁴²⁷ Ibid., Loeffler email. “While they offered us 30-45 minutes, you may recall we were there for several hours, then went for dinner on the Champs-Elysees for more discussions. Years later in 2007 I met one of the FN [French Navy] officers at that session when CNE [CINCUSNAVEUR] hosted a reception aboard USS ENTERPRISE in Cannes. He still thought our report was brilliant, but un-executable in the global environment.”

Defense for Strategy and Requirements), and Dr. John Deutsch (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology).⁴²⁸ The CNO concurred with briefing the OSD officials and CJCS, using a copy of the final briefing text revised to address comments by VCNO Admiral Arthur and CMC Mundy.⁴²⁹ The week of 16 June, members of the Group briefed Admiral Jeremiah (VCJCS). He stopped the brief after the first 10 slides or so, called in Vice Admiral Richard Macke (Director, Joint Staff) and his J-heads, and had the brief start over again.⁴³⁰ Admiral Jeremiah then set up the brief with Frank Wisner, Ted Warner, and Ash Carter. John Deutsch joined partway through. Following the brief, Frank Wisner said that the Group needed to take the brief to the White House.

Members of the Group then briefed the President's two National Security Advisors, Tony Lake and Sandy Berger. "The brief was remarkable for two reasons:

- Lake asked why we had a better approach to problems with the former Yugoslavia than the Secretary of State, and we brought up the Army Major FAO from the basement of the OEOB who dazzled them with her knowledge as a Yugoslav FAO.
- They embraced several of our recommendations wholesale including the formulation of a National Economic Council to mirror the National Security Council ... and others."⁴³¹

On 16 July, a small writing team sent the CNO the final For Official Use Only report: CNO Strategic Studies Group XII, "*United States Influence in the 21st Century: A Window of Opportunity*," Newport, RI, June 1993. On a memo authorizing wide distribution of the final report, the CNO wrote, "As always, it is a good piece of work

⁴²⁸ Letter from AMB Francis J. McNeil to Admiral Kelso, 11 June 1993.

⁴²⁹ The specific changes made to the briefing and the rationale for them are not included in the SSG files.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, Loeffler email, 9 July 2015.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.* "I became Senior Military Assistant to first Frank Wisner; then, when he left shortly after Les Aspin to become U.S. Ambassador to India, Walt Slocombe. During my years working for Walt in OSD, I got to implement some of our recommendations, most noticeable a DoD-wide FAO instruction and programs for each Service, and an SSG under Secretary of Defense direction. At one juncture, Dr. Bill Perry, when I was appointed his DPRK-ROK Team Leader, showed me a copy of our SSG XII brief to Frank Wisner with a smile on his face and then said, 'Go implement this.' As you can imagine, I was speechless."

and I have asked N3/5 to review and provide his comments as to what action we might want to take based on this report.”⁴³²

Loeffler was able to leverage the work of SSG XII in future assignments in OSD Policy and other Fellows were able to use their work on the SSG in future assignments. However, the CNO remained focused on other issues, Boorda thought that the work of the SSG was largely beyond core Navy concerns, and the Navy took little immediate action on SSG XII recommendations. Vice Admiral Pat Tracey (Retired) commented, “SSG XII did not answer leadership concerns. But everything that we looked at as possible scenarios has obtained: China, Russia, the Middle East and Islam, have-have not gaps and the turmoil in Africa.”⁴³³ Captain Robby Harris (Retired) noted that SSG XII was 12 years early in promoting whole of government solutions.⁴³⁴ The common experience of SSG studies served the Fellows well in future interactions with their SSG XII colleagues, with SSG Fellows from other groups, and in networking with those they had met in the course of their study.

Following the SSG, Steve Loeffler went to the office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. Pat Tracey, selected for Rear Admiral, went to be the Director for Personnel (J-1) on the Joint Staff. She spent much of her time there on forming Joint Task Forces for U.S. operations in the Balkans, Iraq, Africa, etc; implementing the kinds of command relationships that SSGs had envisioned beginning with SSG IX.⁴³⁵ CAPT Robby Harris went to the Navy’s Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) and later to head the CNO Executive Panel (CEP) as OPNAV N-00K. He would retire from the Navy as Executive Assistant to the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Also in July Ambassador McNeil received “out of the blue” a letter from Rear Admiral Edward D. Sheaffer, Jr. USN (DNI) stating that he would no longer provide an Intelligence Officer to the SSG, suggesting that the officer had become more of an Executive Assistant rather than doing intelligence.⁴³⁶ However, the SSG did keep its Intelligence Officer, and began placing more demand on naval intelligence.

⁴³² Ibid., SSG Correspondence 1992 - 1993.

⁴³³ Ibid., Tracey interview.

⁴³⁴ Hanley phone interview with Captain Robby Harris, USN (Retired), 14 August 2014.

⁴³⁵ Hanley interview with Vice Admiral Patricia A. Tracey, USN (Retired), Alexandria, VA, 28 November 2014.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

SSG XIII (1993-1994)

Focus: Value of and recommended enhancements to forward naval presence

In January 1993, CNO Admiral Kelso had sent a memorandum to Captain Mike Martus (N-00K and Director CEP, SSG XII), referencing his predecessor Admiral Trost's 1987 memos regarding OP-00K's relationship with the SSG, and requesting that N-00K coordinate the nomination process for the Strategic Studies Group XIII. N-00K thus replaced N-7 as the coordinator for SSG nominations. Kelso requested a list of no more than 25 officers (O6/O6-select) from Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard principals by 15 February 1993, noting that he would personally select the officers for the Group. He noted,

During the past twelve years the Strategic Studies Group has been invaluable in providing a select Group of senior officers the opportunity to expand their professional horizons and knowledge by undertaking an in-depth examination of a topic of particular importance to the Sea Services. In doing so the Groups have contributed substantively to the development of politico-military strategic concepts, enhanced tactical doctrine, and stimulated strategic discussions and thinking. The benefits of this program to the individuals involved and their respective Service has been substantial and, I want them to continue.

He went on to stress that the nominees "must be proven leaders with a solid operational background, and command experience. Additionally, nominees will normally have been screened or be serving in major command or its equivalent and clearly possess potential for promotion to Flag rank."⁴³⁷

To this point, Kelso was consistent with preceding CNOs. Then he went on to add, "In selecting nominees, you will give special consideration to individuals, especially women and minorities, whose careers do not fit traditional career patterns." Vice Admiral Leighton "Snuffy" Smith (OPNAV N-3/5, SSG V) responded to N-00Ks call for nominees and offered suggestions to the CNO on the size and makeup of the

⁴³⁷ Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for Director, CNO Executive Panel, Subj: Strategic Studies Group XIII nominations, Ser 00/3U500003, 5 January 1993.

Group.⁴³⁸ He recommended reducing the size of the Group to seven to nine, believing that “the quality of the experience suffers with the larger Group since it’s tougher to get everyone to participate.” He also recommended selecting the dominant portion from operational vice staff jobs, with a mix of post major and pre-major commands, so that “the way things are done in this town” would not dominate the process. He recommended stating that the objective of the SSG was to produce a better-rounded naval officer rather than a report, remarking that the SSG provided the opportunity for those with operational backgrounds to consider a broader strategic framework. He noted that his experience as an “SSG’er” was unforgettable and had opened horizons that he had not previously been exposed to. On the bottom of the memo he penned, “I discussed this with Bill Wright (SSG IX) and Robin Pirie; both concur.”

The Group did reduce to its previous size, comprising:

- Captain William L. (Chip) Boyd, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain (select) Jonathan W. (Jon) Greenert, USN (submarine warfare)
- Colonel Allen T. Head, USMC (ground),
- Colonel Ross J. Hieb, USMC (aviation),
- Captain (select) Joseph H. Jones, USCG,
- Captain Barbara E. McGann, USN (General Unrestricted Line),
- Captain Thomas R. (Tom - Hulk) Richards, USN (SEAL),
- Captain James A. (Rookie) Robb, USN (carrier aviation),
- Captain John C. Scrapper, USN (carrier aviation).

Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey L. Canfield relieved Allen Banks as the SSG’s Intelligence Officer.⁴³⁹

On 16 March 1993, Ambassador McNeil had sent a memo to Admiral Kelso recommending that the Group convene 9 August 1993 through mid June 1994.⁴⁴⁰ He suggested that SSG XIII be involved in drawing up a short list of themes to present to the CNO for decision in October, if the CNO did not have a topic in mind, to give the Fellows a sense of ownership in the project. He recommended that the Group operate under the same basic program principles as in the past, outlining the pattern, and

⁴³⁸ DCNO Plans, Policy, and Operations (N3/5) Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG), 16 February 1993.

⁴³⁹ Jeff Canfield is responsible for many of the records retained on SSGs XIII and XIV.

⁴⁴⁰ Director, Strategic Studies Group Memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Proposed Program for Strategic Studies Group XIII, 16 March 1993.

provided a breakdown by quarter of the SSG's operating budget of \$355,500, which did not include personnel costs.

SSG XIII got off to a quick start. The week of 6 August they met with Mr. Andrew Marshall (Director, OSD Net Assessment), Dr. Jim Roche (Northrop Corp.), received OSD Net Assessment's summer study briefs, and met with Rear Admirals Joe Strasser USN (President NWC) and Pat Tracey (Joint Staff J1, SSG XII).⁴⁴¹ By the second day, Boyd, as the senior officer on the Group, had assigned event and trip coordinators for upcoming events. By 12 August, Boyd had created a broad range of "strawman study topics for the Group including a host of future maritime warfare issues; global geostrategic/political issues; regional geostrategic/political issues; and force sizing and fiscal issues."⁴⁴²

The Group attended a SECNAV War Game 16-20 August at Quantico sponsored by Vice Admirals Bill Owens (OPNAV N8, SSG I) and Leighton "Snuffy" Smith (OPNAV N3/5, SSG V). SSG Directors Wood, Pirie, and McNeil served as higher authority for the game. Major General Tony Zinni (MCCDC, SSG VI) was the senior Marine on game control. SSG alumni Rear Admirals Al Konetzni (OPNAV N872, SSG IX) and Tom Hall (Chief of Naval Reserve, SSG VII), and Captain Mike Martus (N00K, SSG XII) also participated in the game.

The week of 23 August, the Group visited Washington.⁴⁴³ Back in Newport, they met with Dr. Bob Wood on 31 August, Vice Admiral Leighton "Snuffy" Smith (OPNAV

⁴⁴¹ SSG XIII Travel and Seminar Contacts.

⁴⁴² SSG XIII Strawman Study Topics, as of 12 August 1993.

⁴⁴³ On Monday, 23 August, they met with Rear Admiral E. D. Sheafer (Director of Naval Intelligence), followed by meetings with the CNO and Captain Ron Gumbert, USN (Assistant Deputy Director, JCS J5, SSG VIII). Tuesday morning they spent at CIA with Captain M. Collins, USN (Office of Military Affairs); Mr. Bob Blackwell (NIO for Europe); Ms. Ellen Laipson (NIC); and Mr. Mark Zlotnik (CIS), followed by afternoon meetings in the Pentagon with Mr. Bill Manthorpe (Deputy Director, Naval Intelligence) and at Systems Planning Corporation. On 24 August they met with David Tucker and Lieutenant Colonel Jay Anderson, USMC (OSD Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC)).

⁴⁴³ On 25 August they met with Dr. Andy Krepinevich and Mr. Steven Kosiak at the Defense Budget Project; Mr. Mike O'Hare, Mr. Bill Maynes, Mr. Paul Goble, and Mr. Sandy Spector at the Carnegie Endowment; Hon. Richard Clarke (NSC staff); Mr. Alexander R. Vershbow (Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs); and Rear Admiral Frances W. Lacroix, USN (Deputy Director for Force Structure and Resources, JCS J8). On Thursday, 26 August, they met with Mr. David Brown (Director of the Bureau for Indonesian, Malaysian, Brunei and Singapore Affairs, Department of State); Vice Admiral Robert T. Nelson, USCG (Vice Commandant); and General Carl E. Mundy, USMC (Commandant). On 27 August they met with Captain Keith Hahn USN (NSC staff); Mr. Penn Kemble (Deputy Director USIA); Ms. Mary Ellen

N-3/5, SSG V) on 1 September, and Dr. Max Singer of the Hudson Institute on 2 September.

The next week the Group traveled to Norfolk.⁴⁴⁴ Back in Newport, they met with Dr. David Rosenberg from Temple University, Major General Tony Zinni (MCCDC, SSG V), and Vice Admiral William A. Owens (OPNAV N-8, SSG I). On 13 and 14 September, the Group conducted a seminar on Europe to prepare for the upcoming trip. Mr. Ray Caldwell (Department of State), Mr. Jim Clunan (NWC), Dr. Harlan Ullman (CNA), and Dr. Kathleen Robertson (CNA) provided their thoughts. On 16 September, they met with Mr. Edson W. Spencer from the Commission on U.S.-Japanese Relations. On 17 September, they met with Dr. Coit Blacker (Stanford University - Pacific Cooperation Team), Lieutenant Commander Zhiqun Yang (PLA Navy), Captain 2nd Alexander Skaridov (Russian Navy), and Commander Daniel Thompson, USN, to prepare for their trip to Asia.

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's Bottom-Up Review (BUR) stated that overseas presence was a sizing and shaping requirement for military forces.⁴⁴⁵ The Secretary of the Navy tasked the CNO and CMC to add "Overseas Presence" as a seventh assessment area to the OPNAV N8's current six Joint Mission Area (JMA) assessments.⁴⁴⁶ OPNAV N3/5 would conduct a series of workshops "to examine the value and benefits which derive from forward presence and to serve as a guide to subsequent program development." They invited the fleet CINCs to attend the first workshop. From CINCUSNAVEUR, Admiral Boorda noted, "The presence study (Phil Dur's memo) is important to the Navy and to NAVEUR. We have a helpful role to play from the perspective of both the executor of presence and the customer of those providing forces to it."⁴⁴⁷ On 13 September, he directed his staff to fully engage.

Connell (USIA); and Captains Ed Smith and Conrad Ziegler, USN, at the Office of Navy Intelligence in Suitland, MD. Ibid., SSG Correspondence 1992-1993.

⁴⁴⁴ On 7 September they met with Admiral Paul D. Miller (CINCLANT/SACLANT); followed by a roundtable with Vice Admirals J. Paul Reason (COMNAVSURFLANT), Anthony A. Less (COMNAVAIRLANT), George W. Emery (COMSUBLANT), Lieutenant General W. M. Keys (Commanding General FMFLANT), and Rear Admiral T. N. Dyer (COMTRALANT). They then met with Admiral Henry H. Mauz (CINCLANTFLT). Ibid., SSG Correspondence 1992-1993 and SSG XIII calendars.

⁴⁴⁵ Memorandum for Distribution (CINCPACFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCLANTFLT, COMUSNAVCENT (Rear), N4, N8, DC/S PP&O HQMC, CG MCCDC, N2, From: N3/5, Subj: Presence Workshop, undated.

⁴⁴⁶ Building on ideas that he had while on SSG I, Vice Admiral Bill Owens created a structure of Joint Mission Area assessments to inform Navy planning, programming, and budgeting.

⁴⁴⁷ Memorandum, From: Commander in Chief, To: COS NAVEUR, 13 September 1993.

On September 17, McNeil sent a letter to CNO Kelso stating that SSG XIII had reached a consensus on studying the why and how of overseas presence in the early part of the 21st century based on their initial conversation with the CNO and meetings with military and civilian leaders. The CNO approved the following tasking:⁴⁴⁸

The United States intends to remain geopolitically engaged and to use its unrivaled leadership to help the world coalesce to meet the challenges of the coming century. In this context and in concert with our other diplomatic and military tools, the sea Services have a critical role providing the reach, both in peacetime and in conflict, to influence events in a timely fashion. Beyond the vital combat roles in regional contingencies and power projection described in current national strategy documents, maritime forces will be a central part of this country's continuing overseas engagement.

“SSG XIII will study the value of forward presence....in peacetime, in coalitions, in peacekeeping, and in emerging crises. In this context the SSG will examine how overseas presence can best be accomplished and the benefits, risks, and limitations of remaining militarily engaged in key areas of the world.” [bold in original]

The SSG project will examine the why and how of presence, traditional and non-traditional, in both the joint and combined arenas, including overseas stationing of forces, deployments, port visits, crisis response, humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, and multinational training, exercises and operations. The SSG will also look for creative ways to use presence in support or regional interests and policy goals.

In forwarding the SSG tasking up his intelligence chain of command, Canfield noted that the Group selected this area for several reasons:⁴⁴⁹

- It provided a “Big Top” under which any number of salient and interesting issues might be examined—all of which were of immediate relevance to the challenges now facing the services. The underlying question was how to leverage U.S. assets and capabilities in order to maintain our ability to influence overseas security regimes to the benefit of U.S. national interests, in the face of dramatic reductions in force.

⁴⁴⁸ Francis J. McNeil letter to Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, USN, 17 September 1993.

⁴⁴⁹ Memorandum, From: Intelligence Officer, SSG, To: Officer-in-Charge, ONI Det, Subj: Strategic Studies Group Topic, 16 September 1993.

- The timing was right. Forward presence had arrived foursquare on the national security agenda, as the NSC, OSD, and JCS used it as a basis for justifying force sizing. The meaning of “forward presence” and “overseas/regional engagement” differed considerably, depending on the group consulted, and the SSG could help clarify the concepts.

Canfield had already researched literature and intelligence resources on forward presence for the Group and asked ONI to expedite delivery of the 2010 threat study that they were preparing for N-8. The role of the SSGs Intelligence Officer changed as the Group needed less information derived from collection of secrets, but broader analysis of trends.⁴⁵⁰ The Intelligence Community faced the challenges identified by the SSG in previous years of prioritizing its coverage world-wide and by subject area, accompanied by easier access to open sources of information for policy relevant intelligence. With Goldwater-Nichols legislation, Navy intelligence facilities were becoming Joint Intelligence Centers and the Defense Intelligence Agency exercised more control. Canfield commented that the operational intelligence (OPINTEL) culture that “emphasized rapid, responsive support to the operator has been precipitously ripped out and replaced with a bureaucratic style of centrally managed and staffed intelligence support.”⁴⁵¹

In essence, without specific direction, SSG XIII chose to follow SSG XII’s study on influence with a focus on naval forces.

SSG XIII had also organized into topic and regional teams:

- Proactive/Continuing: Richards, Robb, Jones
(Overseas stationing, port visits, deployments, interagency, mil-mil, Training/IMET, MTTs, DFT, etc.)
- Reactive/Tailored: Boyd, Hieb, Head
(Surge, crisis response, interdiction, quarantine, intervention (peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcing))
- Multinational Operations: Scrapper, McGann, Greenert
(Alliances, coalitions, Bilateral and multi-lateral agreements/exercises/ops, U.N. operations)
- Europe/Africa: Boyd and McGann
- Pacific/Southeast Asia: Head, Greenert
- Atlantic/Americas: Richards, Jones, Hieb

⁴⁵⁰ Hanley interview with Captain Allen Banks, USN (Retired), Potomac, MD, 15 December 2014.

⁴⁵¹ Memorandum From: Intelligence Officer SSG, To: Deputy Director SSG, Subj: The Role of Intelligence, 5 August 1993.

- Central command/Southwest Asia: Robb, Head

To promote camaraderie, the Group agreed to conduct a social event following work each Wednesday or Thursday, with a different officer assigned to lead the event. The Group also made use of computerized calendar software to coordinate schedules.⁴⁵²

Continuing their preparations, on 20 and 21 September the Group conducted a Pacific seminar to examine the U.S. security policy vis-à-vis the far Pacific region and evolving regional security arrangements over the coming decades.⁴⁵³

The Group attended a CNO Presence workshop sponsored by Rear Admiral Philip A. Dur (N-3/5B) on 22-24 September, then traveled to the Pacific 26 September-8 October.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵² Unless otherwise noted, all schedule events are from SSG XIII weekly schedules, trip itineraries, and correspondence (thank you letters).

⁴⁵³ Memorandum From: Captain J. H. Jones, To: SSG Fellows and Invited Guests, Subj: Panel Instruction for the SSG Pacific Seminar 20 and 21 September, 15 September 1993. Participants included: Mr. Alan Romberg (Council on Foreign Relations); Mr. Harry Harding (Brookings Institution); Dr. Patrick Cronin (NDU); Rear Admiral William T. Pendley, USN (Retired) (Air War College); Prof. Bradford E. Lee (NWC); Captain (select) Robert F. Duncan, USCG (NWC); Captain Wes Moreland, USN (NWC); Mr. Chuck Downs (OSD); and Commander Lee G. Cordner, Royal Australian Navy.

⁴⁵⁴ Meetings included:

- In Hawaii:

27 Sep: Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Retired); Rear Admiral James R. Fitzgerald (Deputy CINCPACFLT); Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN (CINCPAC); Ms. Brenda Foster (Hawaii Office of International Relations)

28 Sep: Captain J. Jacoby, USN (Commander JICPAC); Brigadier General C.D. Kuhn, USMC (Deputy CG FMFPAC); Mr. Roland Recker (NSA); Mr. William Collins (Kunia RSOC Deputy J-3); Dr. Charles E. Morrison (East-West Center)

- In Korea:

30 Sep: General Gary E. Luck, USA (CINCUNK/Commander CFC/Commander U.S. Forces Korea); Rear Admiral E. Lee Watkins, III (COMNAVFORKOREA); Combined Forces Command (CFC) staff; Mr. Jim Pierce (U.S. Embassy); COMNAVFOR Korea staff

- In China:

4 Oct: Academy of Military Science senior staff and professors; Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations Director and senior staff; Deputy Commander, PLA Navy

5 Oct: Hon. Stapleton Roy (Ambassador to China)

Back in Newport, the Group then met on 12 October with Rear Admiral Al Konetzni (OPNAV N-872, SSG IX). On 15 October, the SSG hosted a CNA-sponsored group of Russian naval officers and accompanying civilians led by Dr. Sergei Rogov (Director, Institute for USA and Canada Studies, Contra Admiral Anatoly P. Rudometkin, Russian Navy (Director, Russian Naval Research Institute), and Contra Admiral A. A. Konovalov, Russian Navy (Director, Center for Military Policy).⁴⁵⁵ The Russians expressed deep concerns about NATO expansion, the U.S. Navy “kicking them while they were down,” and their inability to match the United States in the continuing military-technical revolution. They interpreted ... *From the Sea* as the United States believing that its navy could steam up to Russian coasts unopposed.

Hanley spent several hours with Rudometkin and his aides following the meeting reassuring them that the United States perceived the chances of conflict with Russia to be so low that the U.S. Navy’s focus had turned to more likely areas for conflict. The United States did not disregard the Russians or their Navy, but anticipated that the changed conditions would fundamentally affect U.S.-Russian relations, even to the point of allowing cooperation on issues of common concern. Rudometkin said, “I had to look into your eyes before I could believe you.” Rudometkin met subsequently in Russia with SSG delegations in 1995 and 1996.

The Group then travelled to Harvard to meet with Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor USMC (Retired) (Director of the military Fellows program) and his Fellows to discuss their program and seek useful research at Harvard.

SSG XIII travelled to Europe, 16–28 October.⁴⁵⁶ Back in Newport on 4 November the Group conducted a Mideast seminar with Prof. Jo-Anne Hart (Brown University), Dr.

- In Japan:

6 Oct: Mr. Katori (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director Security Treaties); Rear Admirals Fujita and Kaneda, JMSDF; Captains Handa, Kohda, and Yamada, JMSDF (Maritime Staff Office); Brigadier General M. J. McCarthy, USAF (Commander 374th Air Wing); Captain John Seiden, USN (7th Fleet); Captain Al Prescott, USN (CTF 72); Commander Hearingd USN (CTF 74); Commander Andy Singer, USN (7th Fleet); Vice Admiral Mitsuo Kanazaki, JMSDF (Retired); Mr Hisayoshi Ina (Nikkei); Ambassador Walter Mondale; William T. Breer (Charge U.S. Embassy) and staff

7 Oct: Lieutenant General Richard E. Hawley, USAF (Commander, U.S. Forces Japan) and staff, Rear Admiral Jesse Hernandez (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, SSG IV)

⁴⁵⁵ Memorandum From: Intelligence Officer SSG, To: NISRA Newport and OIC, ONI Det. Newport, Subj: Notes from SSG Meeting with Russian Representatives, 28 December 1993.

⁴⁵⁶ Meetings included:

- In Italy:

Allen Podet (SUNY Buffalo), and Captain Hugh Lynch, USN (Retired) (NWC). On 5 November, they conducted a Latin America seminar with Hon. Paul D. Taylor (NWC State Department representative); Rear Admiral David Chandler, USN (Retired) (NWC); Commander Alejandro Kenny, Argentine Navy; and Commander Jorge Minoletti, Chilean Navy. On 8 November, the Group had a seminar on the U.N. with Dr. Don Daniel and Captain Bradd Hayes, USN (CNWS). The Group attended the International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College on 8-10 November, and met with Admiral Bill Smith, USN (Representative to NATO Military Committee) on 10 November. The week of 15 November the Group traveled to Washington, D.C., and Norfolk.⁴⁵⁷

18 Oct: Rear Admiral Jon S. Coleman, USN (CTF 67, SSG VIII); Rear Admiral Dennis A. Jones, USN (CTF 69); Vice Admiral T. J. Lopez (COMSIXTHFLT)

19 Oct: DCINCSOUTH and Senior NATO officers, Admiral J. Mike Boorda (CINCUSNAVEUR)

- In England:

20 Oct: Rear Admiral D. R. Morris (Deputy CINCUSNAVEUR), Defense Attaché and Political/Military Officers at Embassy London

21 Oct: Admiral Boorda for an operations brief; Captain Ferguson and Deputy Chiefs of Staff in NAVEUR Headquarters

22 Oct: Ms. Rosemary Collis and Mr. Edward Foster (RUSI), Royal Dutch Shell Group Planning Division

- In Brussels:

25 Oct: Vice Admiral N. W. Ray, USN and International Military Staff (NATO HQ); Mr. Keith Dunn and U.S. Mission staff (NATO HQ)

- In Mons (Belgium):

26 Oct: Rear Admiral Dennis V. McGinn, USN (SSG X, SHAPE HQ); General Steinhoff German Army and SHAPE staff

- In Stuttgart:

27 Oct: Rear Admiral J. A. Lair (EUCOM), EUCOM staff.

⁴⁵⁷ Meetings with:

- 15 Nov: Hon. Stanley Roth (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs); Rear Admiral R. L. Ellis, Jr., USN, CNO; Hon. Graham Allison (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans and Policy)

- 16 Nov: Rear Admiral Skip Bowman, USN (Deputy Director JCS J5, SSG VI); Rear Admirals Philip A. Dur (OPNAV N51) and Walter F. Doran (OPNAV N31/52)

- 17 Nov: Captain Robby Harris (Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, SSG XII); Doug Necessary, Gene Reed, and Steve Saulnier (SASC/HASC staff); Gary Usery (State Department, Director Near East Asia); Mr. Douglas Gray and Mr. Joe DeThomas (State Department, Non-proliferation)

SSG XIII's update to the CNO on 15 November covered the Group's objectives, project timeline, impressions from their meetings in the Pacific and Europe, impressions on the security environment, and potential issues. They listed their objectives as being to continue the SSG Fellows' professional development, contribute to naval strategy development, and articulate an enduring rationale for naval presence. Their plan called for organizing into issue/regional teams and conducting detailed research in December and January; holding cross-team briefings/discussions and updating the CNO in February; drafting a report and briefing in March and April; and briefing OPNAV Flags, CINCs, and the CNO, and publishing their report in May. They then discussed issues and opportunities for the Navy in the Pacific and Europe, including the concerns expressed by the Russians. Their impressions of the security environment included:

- Instability in international relations following the Cold War
- No acute threat from major powers
- Ethnic resurgence in the former Soviet states
- Tribal and ethnic conflicts continuing in the third world
- U.S. leadership as essential, but in decline
- The existence of stabilizing factors, but the value of those factors being uncertain.

They discussed approaches for maintaining naval presence with declining force levels, the impact of near-continuous regional responses, the implications of ... *From the Sea*, overseas infrastructure with declining forces, and concentration of force for presence to have impact. They addressed U.S. national will to maintain forward presence, using forward presence as force level justification, services' roles in forward presence, the evolution of the Unified Command Plan, and the role of "policing activities" in diluting core Navy missions. Coalition/alliance candidate issues for focusing their study included topics of U.N. operations, the evolution of NATO, host nation burden sharing, and interoperability as technology rapidly changed. International issues for possible investigation included global media as a force multiplier and scenarios from cold war to hot peace.

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- 18 Nov, SACLANT Allied Flag Seminar: Vice Admiral Sir Peter Woodhead, Royal Navy; Rear Admiral W. J. Fallon, USN; Rear Admiral Johnston, Royal Canadian Navy; Rear Admiral Schwabe, German Navy.
 - 18 Nov, meetings at Navy Doctrine Command: Rear Admiral (Select) Ed Giambastiani (Naval Doctrine Command, SSG X); and Floyd Kennedy (CNA).

On 22 November, the Group went to the U.S. Military Academy to meet with General J. R. Galvin (Retired), and then continued on to New York for meetings at the United Nations. On 23 November, at the U.N. Association of the USA, the Group met with Derek Boothby (U.N. Director of European Affairs), who had participated in previous SSG games; Robert Gray and Colonel Kearney, USA (U.S. Mission to the U.N.); and Jeff Laurenti and John Laurence.

On 2 December, the Group met with Steven L. Head (Assistant to the Director for Tactical Systems in OSD) and Colonel John Fricas, USA (Director Joint Strategic Planning Division). On 3 December, they met with Vice Admiral William J. Flanagan, Jr. (COMSECONDFLT).

The Group then traveled to Tampa and Miami, Florida, and Panama to understand U.S. presence and security requirements in the region.⁴⁵⁸

Unlike previous Groups, SSG XIII intended to complete a draft of their report by mid-March and send it out to key Flags and their staffs for comments before going smooth. Captain Boyd's idea was to make a briefing on the project available "**on request only**" [bold in original] to all the senior leadership.⁴⁵⁹ Initial drafts of assigned sections were due on 16 December, with frequent reviews and monthly updates. On 19 December, Boyd wrote, "After several days trying to edit together the pieces we produced this week, it's pretty obvious that we weren't really ready to put pen to paper yet. Many of you told me that at the outset, but thanks for giving it a shot anyway."⁴⁶⁰ He then asked the Group to be ready to revisit the project approach after the holidays.

⁴⁵⁸ There they met with:

- 6 Dec: General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (CINCCENT); Rear Admiral Chuck Lemoyne (Deputy CINC Special Operations Command, SSG V); and Brigadier General Libutti (CINCCENT Staff)
- 7 Dec: Hon. Ambler Moss (North-South Center)
- 8 Dec: Vice Admiral W. P. Leahy, Jr., USCG (Commander 7th Coast Guard District)
- 9 Dec: Major Generals Worthington and Thompson (CINCSOUTH staff), Hon. Dean Hilton (Ambassador to Panama) and staff

⁴⁵⁹ Memorandum, From: Captain Boyd, To: SSG Fellows, Subj: Potpourri, 15 December 1993.

⁴⁶⁰ Memorandum for SSG Fellows, Subj: SSG Project - Editor's Report, 19 December 1993.

January 1994 was set aside for research and drafting the report and developing scenarios. On 4 January, the Group met for a topic development session, where they identified major issues ranging from the theory to the execution of presence.⁴⁶¹

On 10 January, Dr. Hanley and Captain Boyd attended a Naval War College roundtable discussion with Admiral Bill Owens (VCJCS, SSG I).⁴⁶² Owens came to the college to discuss how the Chairman and Vice Chairman could positively influence where the military was going and how it would get there. The wide-ranging discussion covered the need for coherent national security and national military strategies, rethinking strategy and forces across the spectrum of conflict, unresolved joint force planning issues, reorganizing commands, services, and interagency processes for the new joint strategy, and stimulating innovative planning for the future, including the Revolution in Military Affairs.

On 20 January, Boyd sent out another memo titled, “The Way Ahead, Again (and Again, and Again)” stating that he had trying “to devise the best approach to resolving our disconnects and uncertainties about the reason for, scope and nature of the project (i.e., our mission statement) so we can get on with the work at hand and devote our energies to the **subject**—forward presence—rather than to the **process** by which we accomplish our research. We have **got** to get ourselves onto the same sheet of music—and quickly. Despite our universal frustration, I think we can do so if we approach it with an intensity of purpose.”⁴⁶³ He cited as key hang-ups:

- Continuing lack of consensus as to the reason for our topic, our planned audience, what we hope to achieve and how the parts of the project fit together—our “mission statement/concept of ops”.
- Failure to adequately discuss as a Group and address in the paper the conceptual underpinnings for our study of presence—the world security environment, regional security arrangements, the definition of forward military presence.
- Uncertainty as to whether the scenario process is supposed to be our exclusive means of identifying issues to be addressed,

⁴⁶¹ Memorandum, From: Intelligence Officer SSG, To: Senior Fellow, Subj: Quo Vadis/Topic Development Session, 4 January 1994.

⁴⁶² Memorandum, Subj: Admiral William A. Owens Round-Table Discussion, 10 January 1994, Attendees/Agenda, 7 January 1994, and notes from the meeting.

⁴⁶³ Memorandum for SSG Fellows, Subj: The Way Ahead, Again (and Again, and Again), 20 January 1994.

whether we will construct the scenarios so as to highlight the key issues we've already identified, or whether some mix is what's needed.

- Disagreement as to whether the scenarios will be simply vehicles/tools for our look at forward presence or whether they will be a major part of the study in and of themselves.
- A continuing uncertainty as to whether we are trying to simply collect, aggregate and cogently convey what's known about presence (a "term paper") or instead trying to conceptually pursue the theory of presence beyond its present bounds (a "doctoral dissertation").
- A project outline which has not been thoroughly "bought into" by the Group ... or even focused on by most.

Premature direction to research and write without achieving full consensus of the above....This I know is a major frustration of many of you. Mea culpa.

He then reorganized the near-term schedule "to get the train back onto the track."

Following internal meetings aimed at promoting consensus, SSG XIII sent out a draft report for comment and conducted a strategy workshop 25-27 January, supported by the War Gaming Department. The Group employed a combination of Royal Dutch Shell processes and Total Quality Leadership (TQL) techniques. The Group began with scenarios that they had created to address implications for future conflict and challenges and opportunities for the armed services, leading to their strategic vision, key issues, and strategic options. They used TQL techniques for identifying and organizing broad issues and themes, followed by a structured discussion on how to use the results of the workshop and a work plan for the rest of the year. The Group conducted no games, and this was the only workshop that they conducted during their year.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶⁴ Workshop participants included: Colonel Jeffrey Barnett, USAF (OSD Net Assessment); Ambassador Linton F. Brooks (CNA); Hon. Richard A. Clarke (NSC staff); Mr. Jeffrey Cooper (SRS Corp.); Captain J. T. Doherty, USCG (USCG HQ); Rear Admiral (select) Edward Giambastiani, USN (Naval Doctrine Command, SSG X); Colonel C. Grubb, USMC; Dr. Stuart Johnson (NDU); Colonel J. A. Lasswell, USMC (USMC HQ); Captain Sam Leeds, USN (Retired) (Naval Doctrine Command, SSG I); Captain Mike Martus (N00K, SSG XI); Lieutenant Commander O'Callaghan; Mr. Bruce Powers (OPNAV); Dr. David Rosenberg (Temple University); Mr. Jeffrey Sands, CNA; Captain R. D. Sirous, USCG; and Dr. Bob Wood (CNWS).

Prior to the workshop, Ambassador (formerly Captain) Linton Brooks provided detailed comments to improve the draft report, noting an abrupt shift from theory to specific practices, which had been a divide in the Group.⁴⁶⁵ The conference began with the SSG reviewing its project draft, followed by lunch with individual discussions. Following lunch, the participants divided into three groups chaired by Bob Wood, Linton Brooks, and Dr. David Rosenberg, which addressed future global security environments, regional force requirements, and strategic options. Each group had a list of general SSG conclusions to evaluate. The conference concluded with a panel discussing the findings of the three groups and answering questions. The participants and the Group debated whether a brief was better than a paper and took aboard Jeff Sands' comment that "the logic of discovery was not necessarily the logic of exposition."⁴⁶⁶ In addition, the Group never achieved consensus over the wisdom of splitting amphibious ready groups (ARGs) or of devoting all available escorts to carrier battle groups rather than providing escorts to ARGs.⁴⁶⁷

Following the workshop, "Rookie" Robb wrote for the Group a very thoughtful, 77-page monograph, "From Scenarios to Strategy: Methodology for the Development of Strategic Vision." This monograph became the foundation for much of their subsequent briefings and report.

Jon Greenert attended the SECNAV POM Game, 1-4 February 1994. On 1 February, the remainder of the Group met again with Captain Keith Hahn, USN (NSC staff). On 10 February, Bob Wood briefed SSG XIV on the SECNAV POM Game. On 11 February, Hanley and Boyd attended a conference at Naval Doctrine Command. On 24 February, Mr. Jeffrey Cooper (SRS Corp.) briefed the Group.

The Group met with Ambassador Linton Brooks on 1 March. Ambassador McNeil, Hanley, and Canfield attended an Office of Net Assessment path game 1-4 March.

The Group met with Admiral Kelso on 11 March for their last brief to him as CNO. The Group had made significant progress since their update in November. They characterized their project as using overseas military presence in preparing for contingencies and shaping the security environment, aiming to develop and resolve issues, and validate enduring issues. They provided a construct for overseas military presence activities in warfighting, preparing for combat, influencing, and related

⁴⁶⁵ Letter to SSG - Frank McNeil, from CNA - Linton Brooks, Subject: Comments on the SSG Draft Report, 14 April 1994.

⁴⁶⁶ Memorandum, From: Capt. T. R. Richards, To: SSG Fellows, Subj: Comments re: 18 April Seminar, 18 April 1994.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., and Memorandum, From: Capt. T. R. Richards, To: Ambassador Francis McNeil, Dr. John Hanley, Capt. Boyd, Col. Head, Subj: Draft Article/SSG paper summary, 9 June 1994.

supporting activities for forces both in and outside the United States. They characterized overseas military presence as the majority of naval operations and essential to “engagement. They then proposed a construct for expanding the understanding of presence as a tool of influence in three possible future environments: (1) one in which the major powers (United States, Europe (NATO), Russia, and China) were disengaged and internally focused, (2) one that included multi-polar competition and cooperation, and (3) one with shared leadership among the major powers and the United Nations. They anticipated a world in transition with changing friends and adversaries and the most salient issues in flux, but with the United States as the dominant military player.

This presented an opportunity to shape the environment by engaging to affect others’ behavior, creating influence through presence. They included, as the main challenges for national military strategy, weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression, the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, economic trade and growth, and transnational threats. They went on to present a dynamic planning model to account for the changes from bi-polarity to multi-national polarity, international expectations of help from the United States following the Cold War, the demand for cooperative engagement, a diffusion of strategic deterrence, and a need for the United States to be competent around the globe. They then presented an influence construct extending Tom Schelling’s *Arms and Influence* to include encouraging and sustaining favorable acts, as well as deterring and compelling an end to unfavorable acts. They then mapped military, economic, political, cultural, and other actions onto that construct. They built a rationale for military presence around preparation for contingencies and a way to capitalize on forces that were procured for contingencies and warfighting. They then evaluated force types by their speed of response and sustainability, and political constraints and demonstration of U.S. commitment, showing the advantages of forward naval forces for other than preplanned contingencies. Issues under continuing study included:

- Presence as force level justification
- Deployment pattern options for presence operations
- Strategy, doctrine, and tactics for presence operations
- Innovative force groupings in support of presence operations.

These issues were linked. N-51 had done a study to determine the optimal size of the surface fleet required for presence using current practices for deploying U.S. forces. SSG XIII quantified how changes in the speeds with which forces deployed, stationing more ships forward, rotating crews, locations of forward deployments, or battle group composition affected could increase forward presence with a fixed number of ships. N-51 did not appreciate the SSG suggesting that there were variables to consider as opposed to the number being fixed.

Issues that SSG XIII recognized as needing further study included:

- Overseas homeporting
- Departments of Defense and State coordination
- Capitalizing on naval strengths
- Presence operations' impacts on combat readiness
- Innovative approaches to media operations
- Historical evidence of naval influence
- Country operations (IMET, Foreign staff exchanges, etc.)
- International operations and standing forces
- Training for naval influence operations
- Regional approaches to military presence
- Naval forces' role in peace support operations
- Application of multilateral peacetime operations.

Following the meeting with the CNO, Canfield offered to provide typed transcripts of meeting notes as the Group expanded and honed their study, noting that the remarks might now resonate with the Group differently than they had several months earlier.⁴⁶⁸ He provided several examples, including Admiral Boorda telling them, "Europeans don't want consultation—they want leadership. They just don't want it to look like leadership. After the Gulf War, we stopped telling people what we wanted in clear and understandable language. Clear, simple principles are missing." Also, "What is NATO worth? Whatever the U.S. wants of it—nothing or a lot."

The Group attended the Cooke Planners' Conference on 15-17 March at the NWC, which focused on expeditionary warfare and forward presence.⁴⁶⁹ On 24 March, the Group met with CMC General Mundy. On 25 March, McNeil, Boyd, Hieb, and Greenert attended a Naval diplomacy workshop at Georgetown University.

⁴⁶⁸ Memorandum, From: Intelligence Officer SSG, To: SSG Fellows, Subj: Low Hanging Fruit, 15 March 1994.

⁴⁶⁹ Revised Schedule (for Cooke Conference 15 -17 March 1994).

On 4-11 April, the Group traveled to test their ideas. They met with OPNAV, the Joint Staff, and Army, Marine, and Navy commands in Norfolk and Hawaii, concentrating on the plans and operations directorates.⁴⁷⁰

Meanwhile, in March 1994, the CNO and the CMC signed out a new unclassified naval warfighting doctrinal publication, *Naval Warfare (NDP 1)*, crafted at the new Naval Doctrine Command, where CAPT Ed Giambastiani (SSG X) was Director of Concepts, assisted by CAPT (Ret) Sam Leeds (SSG I).

Admiral Boorda had been selected to relieve Admiral Kelso as CNO. On 14 April, Boyd, as senior Fellow of SSG XIII, sent a memo to the Executive Assistant of the prospective CNO.⁴⁷¹ In it he noted that the SSG had distributed a “for-comment” draft of their report to working-level subject matter experts and would be hosting a meeting with them in Newport the following week. He discussed the sections in the report, and then stipulated that the report would be of interest principally to Navy and Marine Corps planners, and that it was largely conceptual in nature. Rather than briefing it to a wide audience, “which may find only parts of it relevant to their needs,” he recommended that the report be distributed and briefed only to the attendees of the N-3/5 Strategic Concepts war game scheduled at NWC 16-19 May, to “get the report to the right audience and reduce TAD travel expenses.” The Group

⁴⁷⁰ These meetings included:

- At the Pentagon:
 - 4 April: Rear Admiral Philip R. Dur, USN (OPNAV N51); Vice Admiral Thomas J. Lopez, USN (OPNAV N8), JCS J8 staff
 - 5 Apr: Admiral Bill Owens, USN (VCJCS, SSG I); Captain Ron Gumbert, USN (JCS J -5 staff, SSG VII) and staff, Colonel Bob Garner, USMC (JCS J-3 staff), and staff
- In Norfolk:
 - 6 April: Major General Byron, USA (USACOM J-5); USACOM J-3 and J-5 staffs; Captain Ernie Rogers, USN; Commander Daniel Tansey, USN; Mr. Frank Moen (USACOM Joint Doctrine Division)
 - 7 April: Rear Admiral David S. Bill, III (CINCLANTFLT N-3); Rear Admiral (select) Ed Giambastiani (SSG X, Naval Doctrine Command) and staff, including Captain Sam Leeds, USN (Retired) (SSG I), Vice Admiral William J. Flanagan, Jr. (COMSECONDFLT)
 - 8 April: Lieutenant Colonel Rosewarren, USA, and staff (TRADOC LAM and Battle Lab staffs)
- In Hawaii:
 - 11 April: CINCPAC J-3 and J-5 staff; CINCPACFLT N-3 and N-5 staff; FMFPAC G-3 and G-5 staff; USARPAC G-3 and G-5 staff

⁴⁷¹ From: Senior Fellow CNO Strategic Studies Group, To: Executive Assistant Prospective Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG) XIII Project, 14 April 1994.

planned to provide a draft report to Boorda by 6 May, brief him at his convenience, and complete a final report by 29 May.

On 18 April, the SSG conducted a Forward Presence conference.⁴⁷² Their objectives were to:

- Review elements of their project draft report, including:
 - Develop understanding of post-Cold War risks and opportunities.
 - Study the mechanics and dynamics of these changes.
 - Apply this perspective to current planning, programming, and operations.
- Solicit critiques, views, opinions, and ideas on:
 - Trends in security
 - Ways to gain perspective on change
 - Current strategic options, with a maritime emphasis.

On 20 April, the SSG conducted a teleconference with EUCOM J-3 and J-5 staff. On 26 April, they met again with Admiral Bill Smith, now retired, to discuss NATO and naval presence (Admiral Smith had been the U.S. representative on the NATO Military Committee).

On 23 April 1994, Boorda relieved Kelso as CNO. Those who had wanted to remove Kelso over the Tailhook scandal and *Iowa* turret explosion succeeded in causing his early departure.

On 12 May, Ambassador McNeil forwarded SSG XIII's report to Boorda, requesting authorization to distribute it.⁴⁷³ The report noted that "the executive branch and the military services have not found it easy to explain the what, the how, and the why of presence to skeptics looking for a 'peace dividend'."⁴⁷⁴ They addressed the need for overseas military presence, how to influence the security environment, challenges for the sea services, and summarized their recommendations. Though previous SSGs had addressed many of SSG XIII's concepts, SSG XIII provided more detailed definitions and data on recent and ongoing operations.

⁴⁷² SSG XIII Conference folder.

⁴⁷³ Letter from Ambassador McNeil to Admiral Boorda, 12 May 1994.

⁴⁷⁴ Strategic Studies Group XIII, *Crisis Response and Influence: The Value of Overseas Military Presence* (Newport RI: Strategic Studies Group, June 1994).

They noted the combination of opportunities and challenges the United States faced in the emerging security environment that did not fit neatly with the missions of any single government department. They made a distinction between (1) military influence and (2) decisive force that required an adversary to succumb to our will without regard to the adversary's preferences. Then they illustrated challenges such as proliferation of WMD, the residual FSU nuclear arsenal, ethnic and regional strife, transnational threats, failure of FSU reform, and economic risk for which military force would not be decisive. They provided a conceptual model, emphasizing the need to understand the interests, strategy, thoughts, and actions of the targets of influence in order to have an effective strategy.

To address shortfalls in available sea service forces, they suggested ways to modify force groupings and take advantage of complementary joint and coalition capabilities, and increase the amount of time that forces are forward by changing deployment patterns, training, U.S. and overseas homeporting, and rotational crewing. They also recommended various means of military diplomacy to enhance U.S. influence. They differed with SSG XII on the value of standing naval forces, but provided recommendations to those of SSGs X-XII on interagency coordination, enhancing naval foreign area expertise, prevailing in combat, etc., while suggesting more fine-grained analysis to develop strategy and tailor actions.⁴⁷⁵

On 13 May, the Group rehearsed their briefing. They then briefed their report on 16 May to Rear Admiral Denny McGinn (SSG V). On 19 May, they briefed Rear Admirals Phil Dur, Richard A. Buchanan, and Richard A. Wilson at the conclusion of an N-3/5 Strategic Concepts game.

On 25 May, they received a briefing on civil-military relations from Captain John Kirby, USNR. Robb attended discussions at Stanford on U.S.-Chinese naval relations 1-3 June. On 7 June, Senior Captain Liu Zhenhuan, PLA Navy, led a delegation of five officers and a translator from the PLA Navy Research Institute to meet with the SSG at the Naval War College.

On 10 June, the Group briefed Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser (President, NWC), and then briefed Vice Admiral Philip M Quast on 15 June as he headed to command of the Military Sealift Command.

On 17 June, the Group briefed CNO Admiral Boorda with Vice Admiral Thomas J. Lopez (OPNAV N-8), Rear Admiral Philip A. Dur (OPNAV N-51), and Captain Mike Martus (N-00K, SSG XI) attending. SECNAV Dalton had just tasked Admiral Boorda with coming up with a framework for a new maritime strategy statement. Boorda had

⁴⁷⁵ The report did not include the scenario structure briefed to Kelso, reflecting the continuing division in the Group over intellectual constructs and pragmatic data and recommendations.

passed the action to N3/N5, where Rear Admiral Dur and his Strategy Branch head CAPT Joe Sestak already had strong ideas on how to replace . . . *From the Sea* with a document more centered on the concept of forward naval presence, and aimed in part at thereby justifying and preserving Navy surface combatant force structure. RADM Dur had just published an article in the June 1994 *Proceedings* laying out his argument.⁴⁷⁶

The SSG's briefing to Admiral Boorda and his strategy team built on the briefing to Kelso in March.⁴⁷⁷ It called for regional "campaign plans" (similar to SSG V), diverse scenarios for major regional contingencies, and expanding global deployment zones (e.g., deploying to the Mediterranean expanding to deploying to Europe). Recognizing that the demand for naval forces exceeded the supply, they recommended modifying force groupings and increasing the supply through more on-station time, recognizing concerns over mission capabilities of different groupings, degradation in quality of life of naval personnel, and possible impacts on readiness. They then discussed concerns over innovative naval, joint, and combined force groupings, and options for modifying deployment patterns. They showed data on what naval forces were doing when out of homeport, and projected effects of rotational crewing. They went on to suggest ways to use ship/Flag officer visits, training programs/IMET, port visits, civic action projects, staff talks, and attaché/MILGROUP/MAAG as part of a naval influence strategy. They recommended including overseas military presence (OMP) in a revision of . . . *From the Sea*, giving doctrine for OMP a priority, developing naval tactics and training deployers for operations other than war. They concluded with thoughts on effective interagency coordination and summarized their recommendations.

The CNO made clear that "he viewed the topic through a naval vice a joint Service perspective at the outset. He reminded those present that the constitution speaks of raising Armies and maintaining a Navy. A discussion followed on the use of naval forces overseas in a regulatory role—continually employed to shape the security environment rather than operating in an episodic fashion."⁴⁷⁸ He strongly affirmed that naval forces should be capable and credible. He believed that reducing response time was the most important attribute; otherwise, the Navy could be worse than the continental U.S.-based Army in accomplishing things we needed to do overseas. He emphasized that naval influence in political-military affairs was essential and that "the recent history of southeastern Europe would have evolved differently if

⁴⁷⁶ Rear Admiral Philip A Dur, U.S. Navy, "Presence: Forward, Ready, Engaged," *USNI Proceedings*, June 1994, pp. 41-44.

⁴⁷⁷ SSG mature brief with text and slides.

⁴⁷⁸ Memorandum, From: Intelligence Officer SSG, To: Director and Deputy Director SSG, Subj: Notes from final meeting between SSG XIII and CNO, 20 June 1994.

AFSOUTH were not a USN Flag officer.” He believed that transnational threats, failure of the Former Soviet Union to reform, and economic risks might be resolved through decisive action (rather than influencing the behavior of others) where the SSG did not.

When the SSG recommended changing Cold War mindsets, “CNO remarked that he does not understand what such a mindset was or is, and given the planning challenges confronting us today, the same processes and counterforce requirements apply today. The last thing we want the USN to become is the Canadian Navy - in tune with ‘the new world order’ but unable to fight. ...” He told the Group that gaps and tethers (keeping forces within certain areas) were often the only means available to get some in-port time for crews. “Explaining the risks of gaps and tethers to Congress or the American public would be political suicide. Attempting to provide the non-occurrence of untoward consequences (effective deterrence) would provide further rationale for force structure cuts.” He did not believe that the SSG had done enough research to justify their recommendations on deployment options that ran against N-51’s work, though he acknowledged that OPNAV was studying rotational crewing for deployed minesweepers. He emphasized that the Navy depended on leadership rather than more pay to motivate “our people and explain why longer deployments are necessary.” During a discussion of improving the quality of attachés and the establishment of foreign area expertise, he directed a review of Army and Air Force Foreign Area Officer (FAO) programs to incorporate the best aspects of those programs in the Navy.⁴⁷⁹

The chemistry among the officers in SSG XIII was not good.⁴⁸⁰ Boyd, as senior officer, had immediately stepped in and began directing the Group and the project at the beginning of the year. The character of the study and the temperament and creativity of the Group frustrated his efforts to run the study as a staff project. Differences in professional judgments within the Group also frustrated him. Toward the end of the year, he sent a memorandum to Boorda.⁴⁸¹ He began by stating that assignment to the SSG had been valuable to each of the Fellows, that they were better prepared to continue their careers than when they arrived, and that, hopefully, their research would be valuable to the Navy. However, he thought that the SSG could be even better. He recommended that the research product be the first concern of the Group and the experience gained be a secondary consideration. He also recommended, “Organize the SSG for task accomplishment and deemphasize collegiality,” by having

⁴⁷⁹ He had rejected SSG XII’s recommendation to establish a Navy FAO program when they briefed him in Naples the year before.

⁴⁸⁰ Hanley and Swartz interview with Admiral Jon Greenert, USN, 19 February 2015.

⁴⁸¹ From: Senior Fellow, CNO Strategic Studies Group, To: Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG), 24 May 1994.

one or more in the Group take the lead. He noted that the SSG was strongly focused on matters of national security policy and strategy, and recommended that the Group “study a problem of personal concern to the CNO.” He recommended relocating the SSG to either CNA or the Naval Academy “to increase proximity to Washington without involving the Group unnecessarily in near-term issues.” He recommended “emphasizing recent operational experience but with recent staff experience and strong academic background,” in choosing SSG Fellows and requesting that other services use the same criteria.

During their final meeting, Boorda addressed these issues.⁴⁸² He stated that the overriding goal of the SSG should be the education and intellectual broadening of the Fellows assigned. If the CNO got a useful product out of the process, that was merely a nice added benefit. The education of the Group members was the goal, not the writing of a final report. He did not want to have a senior Fellow in charge of the SSG. All Fellows should have an equal voice so that the leaders and ideas would arise naturally. The CNO went on to describe the importance of learning how to express one’s views in a group of peers. He emphasized that when one becomes a Flag officer, it is the quality of one’s thinking and the manner in which it is articulated which matters, rather than the individual’s relative rank.

He went on to describe that he would task SSG XIV to survey the future 10-year international security environment in order to define the bounds of that future. Upon delivering a briefing on the limits and implication of the possible futures, he would task the SSG to develop a set of recommended decisions that the CNO should make now in order to posture the naval service for the coming international security environment. The CNO was looking for specific recommendations rather than areas for further study. Further, he was especially concerned with ensuring that sufficient rigor of analysis underlay the resultant statements and prescriptions.

In his weekly update to Navy Flag officers Boorda wrote:⁴⁸³

I took this year’s SSG brief this week. To sum it up, I think they had an interesting product but the goal, as far as I am concerned, is not the product but the education of some very senior people who think this goal was achieved. Next year’s SSG fellows will have a slightly different approach. They will be given a task (with a briefing to give at the end that will generate, I hope, a solid educational opportunity).

⁴⁸² Ibid., Memorandum from Intelligence Officer SSG, 20 June 1994.

⁴⁸³ Letters to incoming SSG XIV Fellows from Ambassador Francis J. McNeil, 22 June 1994.

Then, with about two-three months left, they will be asked to take a portion of their work (I'll pick the portion) and turn it into a real action plan that they must then defend to the four stars. I hope this improves on already good effort as the SSG has been a success over the year if you consider education the measure of success.

He followed up on this tasking with SSG XIV.

SSG XIII published their final report as an unclassified document with a formal blue and gold cover.⁴⁸⁴

The Navy had selected McGann and Richards for Flag rank. McGann detached from the Group the end of April to participate in an investigation of cheating at the Naval Academy.⁴⁸⁵ She went on to become Chief of Naval Recruiting.⁴⁸⁶ Richards remained with the Group through the final meetings with the CNO.

Like McGann, Jon Greenert was pulled out early, and assigned to OPNAV N-801 overseeing the Navy's POM development. He would become CNO. Robb was assigned as Special Assistant to the CNO for Joint Matters, then as Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command, and head of plans at CENTCOM. Robb had been selected for Flag, but his promotion was delayed as a result of his command of Top Gun at the time of the Tailhook scandal, even though he had not attended the convention. Tom Richards went to a joint special operations command assignment. Chip Boyd went to serve on the staff of the Director for Surface Warfare (OPNAV N86).

SSG XIV (1994-1995)

Focus: Forecasting the international security situation in 2005, and action plan for the CNO

On 23 May 1994, Hanley sent a memo to Captain Scott Fry, Executive Assistant to the CNO, providing a description of the CNO's SSG that had been used to explain the

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group XIII, *Crisis Response and Influence: The Value of Overseas Military Presence* (Newport RI: Strategic Studies Group, June 1994).

⁴⁸⁵ Hanley interview with Rear Barbara McGann, USN (Retired), 11 December 2014.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., McGann interview.

Group to new Fellows and other interested parties.⁴⁸⁷ Hanley had received a call from one of the incoming SSG Fellows about the SSG being disestablished and asking whether he would be reassigned. Hanley said that he had no indication of that happening, and requested Captain Fry to advise him. The rumors were unfounded, but discussion regarding what to do with the SSG continued under Boorda.

Boorda directed the Chief of Naval Personnel to provide him by 9 April 1994 a list of not more than 20 officers (O6/O6 select) via the VCNO from which he would select six Navy, one Marine Corps, and one Coast Guard participant, based on nominations from the OPNAV three-star officers and the other services' headquarters.⁴⁸⁸ In this tasking he characterized the SSG and the type of officer qualified, as had Kelso:

During the past thirteen years the Strategic Studies Group has provided a select Group of senior officers the opportunity to expand their professional knowledge and understanding of the broad issues of national defense by conducting in-depth analyses of a subject relevant to the sea Services. The Groups have contributed substantively to the development of strategic concepts and tactical doctrine. The benefits of this program to the individuals and their respective services has been to return to the fleet individuals who are better able to perform their duties and ready to assume broader responsibilities within the defense establishment. Given the uncertainty of the future defense environment this ability should be even more in demand in the years to come.

Nominees should be established leaders with solid operational background and command experience. They should normally be screened for or serving in major command (or its equivalent) and possess obvious potential for promotion to Flag rank. Commitment to personal growth where the individual develops professional expertise outside of their warfare specialty is a critical attribute. Most importantly, nominees must possess the experience, creativity and imagination to appreciate the need for and develop the long term vision necessary to carry out their responsibilities in the years ahead. In selecting nominees, I expect special consideration will be given to individuals, especially women and minorities, whose careers do not necessarily fit traditional career patterns.

⁴⁸⁷ Memorandum, From: Dr. John Hanley, To: Captain Scott Fry, Subj: CNO Strategic Studies Group Administration, 23 May 1994.

⁴⁸⁸ Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Personnel, Subj: Strategic Studies Group XIV Nominations.

On 18 May 1994, Hanley requested from SSG XIII comments on a proposed SSG XIV orientation plan.⁴⁸⁹ The orientation had four components:

- Gaining familiarity with top-level national security documents and procedures
- Wrestling intellectually with the future security environment and roles of naval services
- Gaining familiarity with combatant commanders' concerns, regional security issues and the perspectives of allied, Chinese, and Russian military strategists
- Developing an appreciation of other domestic and global drivers affecting the strategic management of the Navy.

This essentially described the character of the orientation plan from previous years.

Hanley was feeling pressure on the SSG as an institution. He and Ambassador McNeil were having difficulties working together.⁴⁹⁰ The SSG was on probation. Both Admiral Hayward (Retired) and Admiral Boorda had called the SSG “too pol-mil and not enough mil-pol.” Hanley recommended tasking for SSG XIV that focused on the CNO’s Title 10 responsibilities as a subject more to Boorda’s liking.⁴⁹¹ On 24 July, Hanley had sent a letter to Bob Murray as President of CNA suggesting that he find a new director for the Group for the coming year. As a CNA Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) field representative to the Naval War College, McNeil had no legal authority to direct government or military personnel. In Hanley’s view, this delicate arrangement, which had existed since Marshall Bremont became director, had worked when the director served as a senior advisor to the Group. It did not work well when the director steered the Group to his particular concerns, particularly when it involved travel. On 2 August, Hanley met with Murray, who suggested that perhaps it was time for Hanley to leave. Hanley chose to remain with the Group. The friction between the director and deputy did not help SSG XIV.⁴⁹²

SSG XIV Fellows consisted of:

- Lieutenant Colonel Richard Guy Barr, USMC (ground)
- Colonel David S. Burgess, USMC (aviation)

⁴⁸⁹ Memorandum, From: Dr. John Hanley, To: SSG XIII, Subj: SSG XIV Orientation Plan, 18 May 1994.

⁴⁹⁰ Letter to Mr. Robert J. Murray, from John T. Hanley, Jr., 24 July 1994.

⁴⁹¹ Memorandum from John Hanley, CNO SSG XIV Task Proposal, undated.

⁴⁹² Hanley interview with Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, USN (Retired), 8 December 2014.

- Captain Robert F. (Bob) Duncan, USCG
- Captain Kenneth F. (Ken) Heimgartner, USN (carrier aviation)
- Commander Jo Dee Catlin Jacob, USN (General Unrestricted Line)
- Captain George S. (Dusty) Rhodes, USN (surface warfare)
- Captain Ann E. Rondeau, USN (General Unrestricted Line)
- Captain Lynn G. Wessman, USN (submarine warfare)
- Captain Robert Timothy (Tim) Ziemer, USN (helicopter aviation).

Bob Duncan came from NWC/CNWS, where he had been working with the international lawyers and participated in previous SSG events. Rondeau had specialized in strategy and policy with assignments in OP-603 and OP-00K, as well as OSD and as a White House Fellow. Jacob had a general career in protocol, recruiting, and personnel support and had been a Federal Executive Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. The other line officers were, as usual, top performing officers from their warfare specialties.

Martus (N00K, SSG XI) exchanged notes with McNeil and drafted a tasking for SSG XIV.⁴⁹³ On 6 July 1994, the CNO provided the following tasking to SSG XIV.⁴⁹⁴

SSG XIV TASKING

I would like SSG XIV to undertake a study of the prospective international environment around the year 2005, with a central, but not exclusive focus on security and the major factors that may affect the use of military and, particularly, naval forces in that time frame. The SSG study should bound the possibilities for this environment, by looking at alternative scenarios, rather than try to forecast precisely the shape of the world and its security environment, which will be contingent on future events.

You should use as a starting point for your work, the 1993 study of the CNO Executive Panel on National Security and the report of SSG X, though their respective approaches should not restrict the scope of the inquiry. Both of these studies examine, from different vantage

⁴⁹³ Memorandum, From: Executive Director, CNO Executive Panel, To: Ambassador McNeil, 29 June 1994.

⁴⁹⁴ Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for the Director, Strategic Studies Group, Subj: SSG XIV Tasking, 6 July 1994. In Admiral Hogg's copy of the CEP "Naval Warfare Innovation Task Force, Briefing to Admiral Boorda, 16 June 1995," he wrote, "Can't predict future: bound it and hedge the bounded area."

points the forces and events that could shape security in the early 21st Century. President Clinton's National Security Strategy and ... From the Sea should serve as important references for your inquiry.

In identifying national defense issues with potential to affect the use of naval forces in this future time frame, you should look at the question of what elected leaders of our nation will ask the Navy to do, and how Americans might expect it will be done. In this context, the study should address the use of naval forces across the entire spectrum of conflict, including various kinds of peace operations, whether conducted primarily by the United States or under U.N. or other coalition auspices.

Recognizing that trends change, particularly in uncertain times, your study should seek to identify not only trends that will affect the future international environment, but ways that they may change. In particular, I would like you to draw up a list of major indicators that can be used in assessing changes in the international environment.

Your study should draw upon the knowledge of experts from the military and Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the several intelligence agencies and appropriate Congressional staffs. Your efforts should also take advantage of offers of cooperation from respected private think tanks, among them, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for Naval Analyses, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Council on Foreign Relations, Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and Center for International Affairs (CFIA), the Defense Budget Project, and the International Institute of Economics (IIE). Finally, I would like you to make appropriate contacts with foreign military and civilian officials and with knowledgeable foreign observers of the international scene. Travel to major commands and theaters is to be restricted to visits which directly advance the work of the study.

I would like you to report your findings to me in early March 1995, at which time I will direct further research into specific topics, drawn from the study.

(Handwritten) Paragraphs 2, 3, & 4 are necessarily broad to give the fellows and you latitude to pursue specific avenues that offer the best educational advantages. The product I seek is not a Navy paper about forces and presence and the like but is, instead, a view of potential security situations we might experience "about mid-way" through the

next decade, what the drivers and key indicators might be and an estimate regarding the range of possibilities. The “second” tasking will flow out of the print product.

SSG XIV convened on 15 August and began their orientation with administrative activities, then began their schedule.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹⁵ SSG XIV Weekly Schedule, 15 August 1994. Reading and project planning periods are not shown below:

- 16 Aug Dr. Bob Wood (Dean, CNWS): Theories of International Behavior
 - 17 Aug Dr. Dave Richardson (Institute for International Economics)
Dr. John Hanley: SSG X/XI Review
 - 18 Aug Captain Robby Harris (SSG XII): Navy-Congressional Relations
SSG XIV Temperament Review
 - 19 Aug Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, Dr. Bob Wood, and NWC faculty
Captain Rocky Deal (SSG XII): Interagency and U.N. Issues
 - 22 Aug Dr. John Hanley: Strategic Planning in Uncertain Times
Dr. John Hanley: Reframing organizations
Ms. Chris McNulty (Applied Futures): Scenario Planning
Mr. Kirk McNulty (Applied Futures): Global Paradigm Shifts
 - 23 Aug Dr. Bob Wood, Prof. Macubin Owens (NWC): What Is Strategy?
Prof. Handel (NWC): Clausewitz and Trinitarian War
 - 24 Aug Dr. John Hanley: Alternatives to Clausewitz
Dr. John Hanley: Clash of Civilizations or End of History
National Security Strategy Critique
 - 25 Aug Commander Jim FitzSimonds (ONA, SSG IX Intelligence Officer): Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA)
Captain Bradd Hayes, USN (CNWS), Colonel Bill Clonz, USMC: U.N. Operations
 - 26 Aug National Military Strategy Critique
Captain Ed Smith, USN (OPNAV N00K): Inside ... *From the Sea*
Captain Ed Smith, USN: Forward ... *From the Sea* & CEP work
Planning for CNO meeting
 - 29 Aug RMA Roundtable
- Travel to Washington, D.C.**
- 30 Aug Receive special clearances. Meeting with CNO, Captain Ron Gumbert (Assistant Deputy JCS J5, SSG VII) on Joint Strategic Planning System; Dr. Eden Woon (OSD East Asia and Pacific); Dr. Horace Feldman on CEP Task Force on National Security, review CNO meeting

The staff arranged facilitated team-building exercises for SSG XIV in order to avoid some of the challenges that SSG XIII experienced.⁴⁹⁶ Exercises demonstrating personality and temperament indicators showed how individuals perceived and judged the same material differently and how understanding and incorporating other points of view prevented “group think” and led to stronger products.

The Group also conducted a “Way Pointing” exercise with Applied Futures to lay the foundation for launching their year’s research.⁴⁹⁷ The objectives of the workshop were to prepare SSG Fellows to think in new ways about how to prepare military organizations for a future characterized by dramatic change, and to give former SSG Fellows invited to the exercise, including the many Flag officers, a common vision of the issues facing Admiral Boorda during his tenure as CNO.⁴⁹⁸ Vice Admiral Bill

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- 31 Aug Meeting with CMC, Captain Keith Hahn, USN (NSC staff) on the National Security Strategy; Hon. Richard Clarke (NSC staff) on peacekeeping policy and practice; Dr. Andy Krepinevich (Defense Budget Project): defense budget issues; Department of State, on peacekeeping and proliferation

Travel to New York

- 1 Sep Meet with Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. Ed Luck (U.N. Association of the USA); Mr. Christopher Coleman (Department of Peacekeeping U.N.), Mr. John P. Renninger (Department of Political Affairs, U.N.), U.S. Mission to the U.N.

Return to Newport

- 2 Sep Critique Washington/New York meetings, meet with Prof. David Rosenberg (NWC) on SSG & OPINTEL
- 6 Sep Meeting with Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser (President, NWC)
- 7 Sep Meeting with Captain Larry Seaquist, USN Retired (SSG III) on waging peace, briefings by Chris and Kirk MacNulty (Applied Futures)
- 8-9 Sep Way Pointing Exercise

⁴⁹⁶ Memorandum, From: Dr. John Hanley, To: SSG XIV Fellows, Subj: Background and Preparation, 16 July 1994.

⁴⁹⁷ Memorandum, From: Deputy Director, Strategic Studies Group, To: Director of Procurement/Supply Department, Subj: Request for Contractual Services for SSG Strategic Planning Workshop, 20 July 1994.

⁴⁹⁸ In addition to the current SSG, participants included: Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski (SSG I); Captain Sam Leeds (Retired) (SSG I); Captain Larry Seaquist (Retired) (SSG III); Rear Admiral Chuck Lemoyne (SSG V); Captain Robert D. Maslowsky, USN (CINCUSNAVEUR N5/8); Captain Tom Travis (SSG XII); Rear Admiral Rick Kirkland (SSG IX); Captain Jack Cassidy (SSG X); Captain John Collins (XI); Captain Mike Martus (SSG XI); Captain Tim Keating (SSG XI); Colonel Chuck Skipper (SSG XII); Captain Norm Henslee (SSG XII); Captain Rookie Robb (SSG XIII); Colonel George Benskin (SSG X); Colonel Paul B. Davis, Jr., USAF (Industrial College of the Armed Forces); Ambassador Roscoe Suddarth (NWC State Department advisor); Professor James L. Clunan (NWC); Dr. Bob Wood (CNWS); Colonel Marvin E. Hall, USMC (JCS J5); Admiral

Owens (N8) had conducted a similar exercise with Applied Futures a year earlier for the OPNAV Flags.⁴⁹⁹

The following week began with a review of the workshop, followed by preparations for travel to the Pacific theater. On 12 September, Captain Mark Haley (CINCPAC J5 staff, SSG XII) briefed the Group on CINCPAC's strategy, Dr. Harry Harding (Brookings Institution) discussed future Chinese relations, and ONI provided overviews of China, Korea, and Japan. On 13 and 14 September, the Group conducted seminars on the Pacific with Dr. Katy Oh (RAND), Rear Admiral William Pendley, USN (Retired) (Air War College), and Mr. Donald Keyser and Mr. William T. Breer (Department of State). The Group departed for Beijing on 16 September.⁵⁰⁰

During the week of 3 October, the Group reviewed Pacific issues and implications, and began preparing to brief the CNO. They also met with Dr. Jim Roche to discuss defense industry and corporate planning on 5 October. On 7 October, the Group met with the CNO.⁵⁰¹

On 11 October, the Group debriefed their meeting with the CNO, met on European and Russian issues, and then traveled to Washington. On 12 October, the Group called on Admiral Robert E. Kramek, USCG (Commandant) at his headquarters. They then met with Rear Admiral Pat Tracey (JCS J1, SSG XII) at the Pentagon. They then went to the State Department for meetings with the Bureau of European Affairs. The

Bill Smith (Retired); Captain (Select) Jim FitzSimonds (SSG IX Intelligence Officer); Captain Jim Holloway (SSG XI); Captain Chuck Reigner (SSG X); and Colonel Al Ponnwitz (SSG IX). Critical Issues Workshop Participants List.

⁴⁹⁹ Draft letter for exercise participants from Francis J. McNeil, 24 July 1994.

⁵⁰⁰ SSG XIV Travel files. Meetings included:

- 18–21 Sep Beijing: Embassy, Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Chinese Academy of Military Science (CAMS), Naval Studies Institute
- 22–24 Sep Seoul: with the Embassy, CINCUNK, CUSNFK, Korean Institute for Defense Analyses, and Korean ministers, and touring the demilitarized zone and military bases
- 25–27 Sep Yokosuka/Tokyo: Ambassador Walter F. Mondale and embassy staff; MOFA, JMSDF, USEJ; Rear Admiral Jake Tobin (Commander USNEJ, SSG VI); Vice Admiral Archie R. Clemens (COMSEVENTHFLT); and Rear Admiral B. J. Smith, USN (COMCARGRU FIVE)
- 28–30 Sep Hawaii: CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, FMFPAC, East-West Center

⁵⁰¹ SSG XIV Weekly Schedule, 6 October 1994. No notes documenting the CNO meeting were in the files.

following day, they met with Richard Haass, Jeremy Rosner, and Tom Carothers at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and with Admiral Bill Smith (Retired) at CNA. Part of the Group went on to Norfolk for a roundtable with senior international naval officers at SACLANT and meetings at Naval Doctrine Command on 14 October, and others returned to Newport.⁵⁰²

On 17 October, Canfield provided suggestions to the Group regarding project organization based on the experiences of SSG XIII. He reviewed possible methods for addressing such an open-ended task, noting that the methodology that appeals to an individual depends on their worldview and personality. The inability to establish sufficient common ground had created “enormous difficulties” for SSG XIII. He went on to suggest criteria for scenarios to bound possible futures and suggested iterating on various methods to find one suited to the Group based on the set of issues relevant to the Group. He suggested that military-style task organization did not lend itself to expansive thinking, and recommended alternative approaches. He ended with recommendations on setting early, simple standards for graphics and provided notes on topic development from SSG XIII to assist SSG XIV in developing their approach.⁵⁰³

On 18 October, the Group met with Dr. Bob Wood on European security developments and Colonel Burgess to review the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).⁵⁰⁴ On 19 October, the Group had a roundtable with faculty from the NWC Naval Operations Department faculty, met with Prof. Fuller on Russian history and projections, and Mr. James Clunan on European security and politics. On 20 October, ONI presented a defensive travel brief and briefings on Russia, and Dr. Hank Gaffney (CNA) provided an overview of CNA’s Russian Project.⁵⁰⁵

On 25 October, the Group visited the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, meeting with Jessica Tuchman Mathews and Robert Oppenheimer, then split into teams and traveled to Europe 26 October–9 November.⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰² Canfield provided detailed notes from the meetings during the week.

⁵⁰³ Memorandum, From: Intelligence Officer SSG, To: Senior Fellow SSG, Subj: Recommendations Regarding Project Organization, 17 October 1994.

⁵⁰⁴ SSG XIV Schedule, 17 October 1994.

⁵⁰⁵ The SSG attempted to arrange a trip to Russia, but was thwarted by JCS procedures. SSG XV did succeed in visiting Russia to better understand the state of the Russian Navy and Russian security perspectives.

⁵⁰⁶ Team A went to London for meetings with Mr. John Chipman (Director, IISS) and staff; Gwyn Prins and the Global Security Programme at Cambridge University; Mr. Peter Kassler (Royal Dutch Shell Planning Group); CINCUSNAVEUR; Ambassador William J. Crowe and the embassy

Also in October, the Navy published a new capstone document, this time an unclassified “strategic concept” titled *Forward . . . from the Sea*. It had been developed largely by OPNAV N51, and signed by the SECNAV, CNO and CMC. CAPT Mike Martus at N-00K (SSG XI) and CAPT Robby Harris at OLA (SSG XII) had contributed to the document.

In November, Canfield again commented on the scenario approach that SSG XIV was adopting, recommending that they build the scenarios to illuminate the important issues, and that they specifically include “requirements for future warfare” into the international and domestic environments.⁵⁰⁷ He also expressed concerns that some of the SSG Fellows saw the scenarios as their product, rather than what would be derived from the scenario process.

During his tenure, Canfield actively contributed to the intellectual discourse within the SSG, as well as regularly tasking the intelligence community for inputs and overseeing much of the SSG administration involving the use of information technology. He also maintained excellent records. In mid-November 1994 Lieutenant Commander William M. (Marc) Luoma relieved Canfield as the SSG’s Intelligence Officer.

The Group traveled to Washington and Norfolk the week of 28 November.⁵⁰⁸ In December, SSG XIV formed subgroups around various aspects of the tasking, as the previous SSGs had done to focus the research effort, and conducted research,

staff; and MOD U.K. Team A also went to Naples for meetings with Admiral Leighton “Snuffy” Smith (CINCSOUTH/CINCUSNAVEUR, SSG V) and his subordinate commanders and American staff officers, followed by meetings with Rear Admiral Jon Coleman (COMAIRMED/CTF 67, SSG VIII) and Vice Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN (COMSTRIKESOUTH/COMSIXTHFLT). Team B went to Brussels, Mons, and Stuttgart to visit with the NATO and U.S. commands there. Team B met with Vice Admiral Norman W. Ray, USN (Deputy Chairman NATO Military Committee); Rear Admiral Denny McGinn (Chief Information Systems Branch SHAPE, SSG X); and Rear Admiral James A. Lair, USN (Director J3, EUCOM). Ibid., SSG XIV Travel files.

⁵⁰⁷ From: Intelligence Officer SSG, To: Deputy Director SSG, Subj: Scenario Component of SSG Project, 3 November 1994.

⁵⁰⁸ On 28 November they met with Ambassador Robert Oakley in Georgetown, followed by a meeting with Ms. Phyllis Oakley at the State Department. The next day several of the Group attended a briefing by Rear Admiral Dur at CSIS and joined the rest of the Group in the Pentagon for meetings with: Captain Jon Greenert (OPNAV N801, SSG XIII) on the Navy budget; Rear Admiral Cramer (Director of Naval Intelligence); Hon. Richard Danzig (Under Secretary of the Navy); and Major General Wilkerson, USMC. The Fellows then continued to Norfolk for meetings with Vice Admiral Emery, USN (COMSUBLANT); Vice Admiral Katz (COMNAVSURFLANT); and General Sheehan, USMC (Commander in Chief, USA Command) and his staff.

planning, and preparations for briefing the CNO and CMC.⁵⁰⁹ They met with Dr. Bob Wood (Dean of CNWS) on 5 December and Professor Alberto Coll (NWC) on 6 December, and conducted a video teleconference on mine warfare on 15 December. On 19 December, they traveled to Washington, D.C., met with Joe Nye, Walt Slocum, and Captain Robby Harris (Navy OLA, SSG XII), and met with the CNO and CMC to provide a status report and plans for the study.⁵¹⁰

On 4 January, the Group met with Mr. Peter Hakim (Inter-American Dialogue) on the future of Latin America and with Dr. Don Snider (CSIS).⁵¹¹ Barr took over running detailed calendars for the Group in January. Subgroups began meeting and convened on Thursday, 12 January, for status reviews, and on Friday for a “thesis conference.”⁵¹² The aim was to have the Group agree on all thesis elements by the end of the week. It became a regular practice to conduct independent research during the week and hold coordination meetings on Fridays.

Ziemer was the senior member of the Group and had won the State of Florida’s Sterling Award for quality efficiency for the success of his TQL program when in command of the Mayport Naval Air Station in Jacksonville. Believing in empowering all of the Fellows, Ziemer had few of the challenges that Boyd had encountered in trying to run SSG XIII as a staff.

During the week of 17–21 January, McNeil, Duncan, Heimgartner, and Jacob traveled to Latin America.⁵¹³ The trip included extensive visits and significant interactions with staff and internees at several displaced persons camps in Panama. Dealing with massive population upheaval and care and control of internees outside the United States was a critical mission then being executed by several services (each taking a different approach) under DoD. Riots had occurred in Panama, resulting in fatalities to U.S. National Guard troops.⁵¹⁴ The bottom lines from the trip were that although Latin America was not an immediate concern, it could emerge as an area of major U.S. concern over the next 15–20 years; that due to illegal drugs, migration, fragile

⁵⁰⁹ SSG XIV Schedule, 6 December 1994. The specific arrangement of groups is not in the record.

⁵¹⁰ No records from this meeting were in the SSG documents.

⁵¹¹ SSG correspondence 1995.

⁵¹² SSG Schedule, LTC Richard Barr, 7 January 1995.

⁵¹³ Ibid., SSG correspondence 1995. They visited the 7th Coast Guard District and North-South Center in Miami. In Panama they met with the U.S. Embassy staff; General McCaffrey, USA (CINCSOUTH); Rear Admiral James B. Perkins (Deputy CINCSOUTH); Brigadier General Rudolf F. Peksens, USAF (USSOUTHCOM J5) and the staff; and Colonel Joseph Costello, USAF (Joint Task Force Safe Haven); Hon. Myles Frechette, Ambassador to Colombia; and Colombian think tanks.

⁵¹⁴ Email from Rear Admiral Robert F. (Bob) Duncan, USCG (Retired) to Hanley, 23 June 2015.

democracies and economies, and social tensions, the militaries focused on internal security; and that possibly failed states could spill over into the United States.⁵¹⁵

On 21 January, the Group remaining at the NWC met with General J. H. Binford Peay, III, USA (CINCCENT). The week of 23 January, Rhodes and Jacob traveled to Norfolk to attend an “OPEN ROAD” conference, and the rest of the Group met with General Wayne A. Downing, USA (CINCSOCOM) at the Naval War College. On 25 January, Captain Evan Robinson (ONI-21) provided a briefing on civil maritime issues and non-traditional naval missions. The Group spent the week of 30 January–3 February on research, writing, and game preparations.

On 30 January, Ambassador McNeil, following a discussion with Captain Martus (N00K, SSG XI), sent a letter to Admiral Boorda stating that he had asked the SSG Fellows to provide preliminary thoughts to the CNO on the future of the SSG, directly, without going to the SSG staff, “inasmuch as decisions may be necessary fairly soon about what to do with it in order to start the assignment process.”⁵¹⁶ The SSG was concerned that the CNO might disestablish the Group.

SSG XIV conducted a scenario game and conference, 7–10 February 1995, to:⁵¹⁷

- Study the international environment to 2005.
 - Focus on security factors affecting the military.
 - Bound the possibilities using alternative scenarios.
- Address what elected leaders would ask Naval forces to do, and how Americans would expect it to be done.
- Identify trends affecting the future environment.
 - Develop major indicators for assessing changes.

Specific objectives included exploring the nature and limits of great power security cooperation over the next decade, and examining the budget and social pressures on decisions regarding organizing, training, and equipping the U.S. military, particularly naval forces.

The exercise involved two days of game play and a review of the game’s implications, followed by a review of the geopolitical, socio-political, economic, technology, resources, and role of the military as dimensions of plausible futures. The game had

⁵¹⁵ Latin American Trip 17–21 January 1995.

⁵¹⁶ Letter to Admiral Boorda from Ambassador Francis J. McNeil, 30 January 1995. No records of SSG XIV Fellow’s responses are in the files.

⁵¹⁷ SSG XIV Scenario Game, 7–10 February 1995, Post Game Report.

a U.S. cell representing the President’s cabinet, a domestic agenda, and JCS/services. Other cells included Europe, Russia, China, Japan, and a U.N./International cell. The game reviewed mechanisms for creation of international law; mechanisms for adjudication and enforcement; criteria for intervention; and criteria for contributing forces, organizing forces, and allocating costs. U.S. issues included: President’s Cabinet—executive decisions, international relations, and interagency issues; Domestic Agenda—federal and DoD budgets, non-traditional uses of the military, work force, and demographics; and JCS/services—Unified Command Plan, operations, force requirements, organization, training, etc.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁸ Participants included:

- U.S. leadership: Dr. Bob Wood (CNWS); Dr. Larry Smith (CNA); Ms. Mary Ellen Connell (USIA)
- Cabinet: Captain Keith Hahn (Retired) (former NSC staff); Captain Rod McDaniel, USN (Retired) (former NSC Staff); Dr. Kathy Robertson (Advanced Research Project Agency); Captain Ralph Thomas (NWC); Dr. John Hopkins (Los Alamos National Laboratory)
- Domestic Agenda: Prof. Steve Fought (NWC); Captain Ed Smith (OPNAV N00K); Ambassador Paul Taylor (NWC); Dr. Paul Walker
- JCS: Captain Ron Gumbert (JCS J5, SSG VII); Colonel Jeff Barnett, USAF (OSD/NA), Prof. Chuck Bartlett (NWC); Lieutenant Colonel Tom Clarke, USA (HQDA); Captain Norm Henslee, USCG (USCG HQ, SSG XII); Colonel Jim Lasswell, USMC (HQ USMC); Lieutenant Colonel Mike Lehnert (Joint Warfighting Center)
- U.N./International: Mr. Amitava Tripathi (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University); Dr. Pierre Coloumbe (Canadian); Colonel Tom Molino (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University); Captain Mike Simpson (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University); Ambassador Rocky Suddarth (NWC); Brigadier General Alexander “Butch” Waldrum, Royal Canadian Air Force (Retired) (United Nations)
- Asia: Ambassador Frank McNeil
- China: Dr. Wendy Frieman (SAIC); Dr. Chong-Pin Lin (American Enterprise Institute)
- Japan: Mr. William Breer (Policy Planning, State Department); Dr. Peter Woolley (CNWS)
- Korea: Min-Soon Song (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University)
- Russia: Rear Admiral Ron Kurth, USN (Retired) (Air War College, former Defense Attaché Moscow); Captain Brian Boyce, USA (Russian Research Center, Harvard University); Captain Serge Yonov, USN (Retired)
- Europe: Dr. Yves Boyer (Deputy Director CREST, Paris); Dr. Jan Breemer (Navy Postgraduate School); Mr. Uwe Kitzinger (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University); Mr. Jaques Manent (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University); Captain Chris Page, Royal Navy (Royal Naval College, Greenwich); Mr. Howard Pierce (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University). Ibid.

Time constraints limited the number of issues that could be addressed and the depth of the discussions, frustrating the participants.⁵¹⁹ In addition, some of the participants were not sufficiently expert in their assignments.⁵²⁰ Only eight of the 22 invited foreigners participated.⁵²¹ “Overall, the game proved to be very interesting to the participants and the SSG.”⁵²² The SSG concluded:

- Nations are not inclined to organize to do something about an issue unless it is compelling, it is relevant to them, and they share a common vision of the nature of the problem. “Great power cooperation” requires persuasive leadership to convince the others of a desired course of action.
- Issues are best addressed according to their scope: regional issues call for regional organizations; and wider international or truly global issues call for international organizations to act.
- Some of the international issues examined in the game (e.g., migration and refugees, protection of fisheries, and arms and nuclear proliferation) were not being addressed adequately by current organizations.

They noted that approaches to international situations would be ad-hoc responses of like-minded nations, or would require devising an international system that would evolve over time. The bottom line was that regional security structures were not likely to be effective without U.S. engagement, and that disengagement would significantly limit the U.S. ability to advance a broad range of its interests.⁵²³

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Comment by Rear Admiral Robert F. Duncan USCG (Retired) at SSG Workshop, 20 February 2015.

⁵²¹ Ibid., SSG correspondence 1995.

⁵²² Ibid., Post Game Report, p. 13.

⁵²³ Duncan email, 23 June 2015. According to Duncan: “These experiences [travel to Latin America] informed the shaping of what SSG XIV came to refer to as the “Y world”; the all-important counter construct to the familiar, bi-polar “X world.” These specific issues, cast as a mass migration from Islamic extremism out of North Africa surging across the Mediterranean, were incorporated in the SSG XIV war game, which yielded no good solutions to the problem and suggested it was a weakness that needed addressing. The comparison to current events is striking (In the game, we actually stressed France and Italy, and predicted that they would be overwhelmed. Additionally, the Latin America trip provided a great deal of material that helped form the Y world. The nexus of failed states (e.g., a “narcocracy,” which is only one such example of the broader category), and the vacuum filled by non-state actors, with potential alliances between international criminal enterprises and malefactors driven by religious or other ideological motives, migration pressures, etc., were all developed with input from experts

The next week, the Group worked on their scenario lessons learned and began development of their initial brief. On 17 February, they met with Major General Paul Van Riper, USMC, to discuss command and control, followed by a briefing by Major General James M. (Mike) Myatt (OPNAV N85) on chaos in the littorals.⁵²⁴ The Marine Corps was emphasizing that over 80% of the world's population lived near shorelines. On 22 February, the Group traveled to Camp Lejeune for meetings with MARFORLANT, and to observe a capability demonstration. They spent the week of 27 February finalizing the initial brief and writing. On 28 February–1 March, Rhodes and Jacob went to Chicago to talk to pollsters and scholars on American trends and attitudes towards the U.S. military.⁵²⁵

The first two weeks in March were devoted to rehearsing and finalizing the briefing for the CNO, reviewing their phase I report, and meeting with Rear Admiral Marsha J. Evans, USN (Commander, Navy Recruiting Command).⁵²⁶

On 20 March, the SSG briefed CNO. The briefing began with international security issues and trends (emphasizing Russia, China, weapons proliferation, Islamic extremism, resource and social pressures resulting from population growth and mixed economic development, U.S. budget, and social trends). Using these trends, the SSG bounded the future for 2005 with two worlds. The X world described “a new Cold War,” where one of the major powers presented a clear threat. In this world, defense would receive a higher share of a smaller U.S. economy, resulting from lower growth and trade protectionism. There would be less north-south cooperation and less multilateralism. The Y world was characterized mainly by the lack of a great power threat. Multilateralism would be more common, as would greater cooperation in zones of peace, though conflict in broad zones of turmoil. Open economic competition would lead to greater economic growth than in the X world, but smaller shares would be devoted to defense. DoD would be more reliant on the commercial sector as the defense industrial base diminished. Globalization would allow terrorists and criminals more freedom of action, prompting greater efforts to enforce

from our embassy team, Fedesarrollo, professors from la Universidad de los Andes, and others with whom we met and engaged on this trip.”

⁵²⁴ Duncan email, 23 June 2015. SSG correspondence 1995.

⁵²⁵ They met with Major General Neal Creighton (Retired); Robert R. McCormick (Tribune Foundation); Rear Admiral Mack Gaston, USN (Commander Naval Training, Great Lakes, SSG VIII); Ms. Candice Kane (Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority); Charles Moskos (Northwestern University); Mr. John Scully (Organized Crime Division, Department of Justice); and Dr. Jay Williams (Loyola University Chicago). *Ibid.*

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*

international law. Environmental issues and world development would rise on the scale of international concerns.⁵²⁷ The main implications for 2005 were:⁵²⁸

- Russia and China would be major regional powers, but neither would be a conventional threat on the scale of the Soviet Union.
- Other threats would dominate the international security environment.
- Naval forces would be a key instrument of U.S. foreign policy in any future security environment.
- Budget and social pressures would affect the U.S. ability to influence the international security environment.
- Information technology would fundamentally affect what was asked of our military and how it operated.

The Group projected continuing growth of China⁵²⁹ and an uncertain path for Russia following 2005, and challenges to maintaining the DoD budget if Korea unified and removed one of the two canonical major regional contingencies used to justify force levels. All the while, diffuse threats from terrorism, arms proliferation, migration, crime, etc. would continue to grow.

As issues for their further study, the Group asked:

- What are the critical elements of a naval strategy that permit us to operate in a “Y world” and quickly adapt to emerging threats in an “X world”?
- Do naval forces need a “Revolution in Naval Affairs?” Specifically, do we need to:
 - Achieve even closer integration between Navy and Marine Corps?
 - Implement a new strategic planning process for naval services?
 - Make our organizations and doctrine more adaptive to rapid informational change?
 - Review the career education process of our officer corps?

In April, Captain Mike Martus (OPNAV N00K, SSG XI) provided SSG XIV with his notes from the brief. The CNO asked why their five major powers omitted the Islamic

⁵²⁷ Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group XIV Report, *The International Environment in the year 2005*, (Newport RI, Strategic Studies Group, June 1995).

⁵²⁸ SSG XIV Phase I Brief.

⁵²⁹ Predicting it almost precisely. Comment from Bob Duncan at SSG Workshop, 20 February 2015 and *ibid*, SSG XIV Phase I briefing.

world. The SSG responded that it was because of the lack of Islamic cohesion.⁵³⁰ CNO told them that we need to operate in the Y world but be ready for the X world, and we need to build more agility into the force. He asked how should he react if either world, X or Y, or mixtures of the two were to become a reality. He told the Group to argue with themselves and make a prediction, saying, “Given what we see, here is how it is going to go—and, given this, here is what you as CNO should do in the next three years.” For example, he said, “achieve closer integration between Navy and Marine Corps and do it by undertaking the following ...; change officer education in the following way ...” He said that there was no right answer, just reasoned opinion. Majority and minority views were okay. What should the CNO do, given the next three years? There was a need to identify where the major actors were going. He said to classify the work because of its sensitivity. “Don’t need to restrict yourselves just to things Navy can do. Concentrate on Y world.”⁵³¹

Following the brief, Hanley sent a note to the Group expressing his appreciation of Admiral Boorda’s phase II tasking. The CNO had asked for predictions. The Group was comfortable bounding the possibilities, but knew that the more specific their predictions were, the more inaccurate they would be. Hanley suggested an approach for predicting the future without leaving the CNO vulnerable to lower-probability, important developments. He suggested that when the Group ran into a development that they were uncomfortable predicting, they lay out the alternatives and determine whether “we have the ability to influence the outcome.” If the answer was yes, the Group should ask what policies we should pursue to achieve the outcome we desire; if the answer was no, the Group should ask what we should monitor in order to

⁵³⁰ “Islamic extremism was a critical thread from our earliest days. We crafted our briefing to highlight ‘stressors & fault lines’ that would shape the international security environment at the targeted 10-year focus point. Key among those stressors was Islamic terrorism. The specific slide was titled ‘Mullahs, Madressas, and Mujahideen’ (which you have). In fact, when I first briefed the CNO, he stopped me on that slide and we engaged in a fairly deep dive discussion—reflecting on returning radicalized religious fighters (the Mujahideen) who had fought the Russians in Afghanistan, finding no opportunities at home in Egypt and choosing an extreme Islamic solution, supported by the fanatical religious schools (the Madressas). We discussed that this threat was not monolithic but more nuanced; for example, the symbols used by Islamic extremists in Upper Egypt were pharoanic, while in Cairo they used exclusively Islamic symbols. It was not clear, as of that time, whether such groups could find common cause. I recall the CNO concluding that “I see why they have you doing this brief!” While I was personally appreciative of Admiral Boorda’s remark, I go into this level of detail simply to make the point that we saw the Islamic threat as real, and a major thread in our Y-World; and definitely briefed it in appropriate detail. And we were right.” *Ibid.*, Duncan email, 23 June 2015.

⁵³¹ Fax from CNO Executive Panel, SSG Briefing to Boorda, 5 April 1995.

inform our policies. If the developments did not imply policy changes, they did not matter.⁵³²

On 20 and 21 March, Rear Admiral Jake Tobin (Commander U.S. Naval Force Japan, SSG VI) escorted Rear Admiral Kosei Fujita, JMSDF (Director of Operations and Plans, Maritime Staff Office) to the NWC for meetings with the staff and the SSG.⁵³³ Rear Admiral Fujita had hosted the SSG during their visits to Japan.

Following the meeting with the CNO, the small teams from the SSG went to Councils of Foreign Relations for off-the-record dinners at Des Moines, Kansas City, Little Rock, Nashville, Omaha, Pittsburg, and Worcester, MA, to make the case for the Navy's role in meeting future security challenges with audiences who were not familiar with the Navy.⁵³⁴

In April, at the invitation of Lieutenant General Tony Zinni, USMC (Commanding General I Marine Expeditionary Force, SSG VI), McNeil, Rhodes, and Burgess attended EMERALD EXPRESS. This was an exercise that emphasized Defense and State Department, NSC, and non-government organization coordination in complex humanitarian contingencies.⁵³⁵

On 18 May, SSG XIV presented their Phase II report to the CNO. They reviewed the CNO's verbal tasking and presented recommendations at three levels: inputs to national policy formulation; CINC-level through JCS and Service Chief functions; and Service Chief responsibilities to organize, train, and equip naval forces. Their approach included a global overview, regional overviews, predictions and recommendations, and wildcards to test key assumptions. They found the international security environment dominated by three key features:⁵³⁶

- The United States would seek to remain globally engaged but budget and social pressures would place limits on U.S. involvement overseas.
- U.S. defense budgets would decline, requiring fundamental changes in the way we do business.
- The Middle East would be the region of greatest instability and would place highest demands on U.S. military forces

⁵³² Memorandum, From: Dr. John Hanley, To: SSG XIV, Subj: Addressing CNO Phase II tasking, 21 March 1995.

⁵³³ *Ibid.*, SSG correspondence 1995.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁶ Strategic Studies Group XIV Phase II Report to CNO, 18 May 1995.

The predicted global operating environment until 2005 was:

- General cooperation among great powers. Russia and China would not pose major direct threats to the U.S. by conventional means.
- Reduced numbers of military forces stationed overseas, especially ground and Air Forces. As a result, the United States would rely more heavily on naval forces for credible combat power projection, particularly when time was short.
- Adversaries asymmetric to the U.S. military forces and largely land based. They would seek to neutralize U.S. naval forces through the use of high-technology weapons (including supersonic and low-observable cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, sophisticated mines, modern submarines, and weapons of mass destruction); disruption of U.S. command, control, communications, computer, intelligence (C⁴I) links; and indirect confrontation such as terrorism.

They went on to project:

- Threats being diffuse and unpredictable
- Global economic growth, particularly in Asia
- More U.N. operations with U.S. participation, however with funding shortfalls and limited effects
- No effective controls on the proliferation of high-technology weaponry and non-state and rogue actors trafficking in nuclear materials
- A biological or chemical weapon attack in the United States by 2005
- Ineffective international efforts to address depleting natural resources and environmental degradation
- Proliferation of WMD.

A minority view was that the influence of the U.N. would decline.

The Group recommended:

- Continuing to enhance/integrate national intelligence capabilities, particularly HUMINT, with priority going to the Middle East, North Africa, WMD, terrorist movements, and international crime to include drug cartels
- Supporting improvements in the U.N.'s ability to respond to peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts, while focusing the U.S. contribution on its unique competencies (e.g., heavy lift and C⁴I).
- Putting greater emphasis on working with other government agencies, including them in military exercises and/or scheduling recurring conferences

- Revitalizing the Navy political-military community, including foreign affairs and military and organizational strategic planning
- Incorporating military-to-military contacts as an explicit part of U.S. strategy to expand our influence.

They then made specific predictions, including minority views, and actions for the Middle East, Europe, Asia, the Western Hemisphere, and the United States. They concluded with wildcard events for use as excursions to test policies against their occurrence.

On 18 July, Admiral Boorda approved limited distribution of SSG XIV's For Official Use Only report and thanked Ambassador McNeil for his service during the past three years.⁵³⁷ However, he had already decided to transform the SSG and replace its director.

SSG XIV's experience was similar to that of the previous year. The Fellows felt that their year of study had been exceptionally valuable to them, and they had accurately anticipated issues that the nation and the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard should have addressed:

For our part, SSG XIV was the transition year for the SSG's intent, purpose and mission. Still, we addressed issues that remain relevant today. Memorably, the question of prospective conflict and warfare over resources other than oil (e.g., water, food) served to instigate interesting questions amongst us about the application of the principles of war and power projection in naval terms that are exceedingly relevant today. This was at a time when consecutive Third Fleet Commanders, especially VADM Denny McGinn, had been pressing toward including NGOs in various operational exercises and war games. Navy thinking had begun to understand the strategic perspective of "whole of government" operations. The strategic and operational environments were adjusting to a new strategic landscape and increasingly anticipated new players and new factors. SSG XIV generally and specifically discussed this new dynamic. There was no lack of questioning assumptions and what would later be called in popular strategic literature "black swans." On the cusp of SSG's mission changing, SSG XIV persisted with the "what if" questions that widened our personal professional apertures while also responding to the CNO's questions

⁵³⁷ Letter to Ambassador Francis J. McNeil from Chief of Naval Operations, 18 July 1995.

about the larger questions that were part of the changes affecting the strategic landscape of the U.S. naval and maritime services.⁵³⁸

Captain Rondeau went to OSD as Senior Military Assistant to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. She would retire from the Navy as a vice admiral, having served as Director of the Navy Staff and President of the National Defense University, among other assignments. Captain Wessman went on to command USS *Nevada* (SSBN 733) and subsequently became the Washington Liaison officer for the U.S. Strategic Command, heavily involved in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2001. Captain Jacobs went on to teach at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and the U.S. Naval Academy. Captain Ziemer went on to the Joint Staff and the National Military Operations Center, eventually running USAID's global effort to eradicate malaria.

⁵³⁸ Email from Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, USN (Retired), to Hanley, 17 August 2015.

The Transition Under Admirals Boorda and Johnson (1995-1997)

Pressure for changing the SSG had been building.

In January 1995, Captain Mike Martus (OPNAV N-00K) (former SSG XI and OP-603) sent a memo to CNO Admiral Boorda addressing the nomination process for the next SSG Director and Fellows. He stated, “Clearly the focus of next year’s Group should be to provide a tangible product that has direct application to your immediate needs and Navy’s warfighting requirements.” He reviewed the topics of the first eight SSGs, suggesting that the SSG might return to that mold.⁵³⁹

In April, Vice Admiral J.P. Reason (OPNAV N-3/5) forwarded a memorandum presenting his staff’s consensus for what to do with the SSG. Citing the severe strains that joint qualification and downsizing placed on top-quality commander/captain resources, the fact that Andy Marshall was standing up a SECDEF Fellowship to place high-caliber military officers with industry for a year, and the competition for Federal Executive Fellowships, they recommended reducing the SSG to four officers to conduct long-range planning under N-3/5. In his cover note, Vice Admiral Reason said that it would take more time to work, offering several possibilities for linking the SSG more closely to N-3/5 and possibly N-8. He concluded, “It appears to me that the time is ripe to make a significant change without being disruptive to a process that has matured. The process will be made leaner and more efficient.”⁵⁴⁰

In a 29 June memorandum, Admiral Boorda decided to keep the SSG and updated Trost’s memo on its functions, tasks, and organizational relationships. He maintained the essential features while clarifying relations between the Group, its director, the OPNAV staff, and the Naval War College (Appendix K).

⁵³⁹ Director, CNO Executive Panel Memorandum for Admiral Boorda, Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG), 20 January 1995.

⁵⁴⁰ DCNO Plans, Policy, and Operations Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG), 14 April 1995.

In the spring of 1995, Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (Retired), then President of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), had briefed Boorda on the need to reestablish an office in OPNAV responsible for ASW. At the end of the brief, the CNO asked Hogg to remain. Boorda told Hogg that he wanted him to become Director of the SSG. Hogg had some misgivings, based upon the SSG's recent work. Boorda told Hogg that he was tasking the Group with naval warfare innovation and that Hogg could have any resources he needed. Hogg thought it was about time for him to move on to another position, having been at NDIA for almost four years.⁵⁴¹

A CNO Executive Panel (CEP) Task Force co-chaired by Dr. Charles M. Herzfeld and Mr. Tom R. Evans had been examining naval warfare innovation.⁵⁴² Walter E. Morrow, a member of the Task Force, had briefed some of their work to Boorda in Naples, Italy, when he was CINCUSNAVEUR in 1994. Boorda delayed a visit to EUCOM headquarters in order to spend more time discussing the brief.⁵⁴³ On 16 June 1995, the CEP Task Force briefed their final report to Boorda.⁵⁴⁴

On 10 July, Boorda, referencing the final briefing of the CEP Task Force on Naval Warfare Innovation, directed that the SSG serve as the nucleus for the generation of innovative concepts. "While continuing to provide the SSG Fellows an understanding of strategic concepts, international security issues, and budgetary factors as they relate to military forces and naval operations, as specified in reference (b) [the 29 June memo above], the Director, Strategic Studies Group is hereby directed to implement the naval warfare innovation process recommended by the CEP. The Director, Strategic Studies Group shall be provided necessary resources and all Navy commands shall provide the fullest possible support."⁵⁴⁵

For the next two years, the SSG Fellows' orientation proceeded as before, to provide the Fellows with wide exposure and interactions with senior commands, and to develop their appreciation for the future security environment and naval opportunities and challenges. In 1997, on the advice of Admiral Hogg and the CEP, CNO Jay L. Johnson (SSG IX) directed that "the sole mission of SSG XVII would be the development of revolutionary naval warfare innovations."⁵⁴⁶ Admiral Hogg and the

⁵⁴¹ Hanley phone interview with Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (Retired), 16 December 2014.

⁵⁴² Interview with ADM Hogg.

⁵⁴³ Interview with ADM Hogg.

⁵⁴⁴ Interview with ADM Hogg; Naval Warfare Innovations Task Force, Briefing to Admiral Boorda, 16 June 1995.

⁵⁴⁵ Memorandum, From: Chief of Naval Operations, To: Director, Strategic Studies Group, Subj: Naval Warfare Innovations Concept Generation Teams, Ser. 00/5U500133, 10 July 1995.

⁵⁴⁶ Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for the record, Subj: CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG), 12 May 1997.

CEP believed that the travel to the CINCs and study of the future security environment detracted from the focus on generating revolutionary naval warfare concepts.⁵⁴⁷ This completed the transformation of the SSG's objective from the study of strategy to prepare future three- and four-star officers and promoting strategic debate, to delivering tangible products on naval warfare innovation to the CNO.

⁵⁴⁷ Hanley interviews with Mr. Andrew Marshall, 25 November 2014, Admiral James R. Hogg, 15 December 2014, and Hanley interview with Hogg, 29 June 2015. Admiral Hogg as Director, SSG, conducted private interviews with the Fellows on their departure. Some recommended that the Group trade the time studying the future security environment for more focused effort on naval warfare innovation.

How SSGs I-XIV approached their studies

The template established by Murray for SSG I set the pattern for SSGs II-XIV, with minor adjustments in timing as the program matured.

The SSG Fellows' program began in August, nominally for a 10-month academic period that roughly coincided with the NWC schedule. The pace of the year was always fast, as befitted U.S. naval officers.⁵⁴⁸ Each year began with an extensive orientation period of:

- Readings on strategy and publications targeted at the subject the CNO had tasked the Group to study
- Seminars on the topics of readings (often with the authors of the publications and NWC faculty)
- Project planning/exploration meetings
- Travel to draw on the intellectual resources of the Navy, other U.S. government activities, the academic world, and foreign countries.

The SSG staff set a meeting with the CNO as early in the year as his schedule would permit to allow the Group to hear his guidance on their purpose and tasking firsthand. Subsequent meetings occurred about bimonthly to provide the CNO with preliminary briefs before Navy CINC conferences or otherwise provide updates and receive guidance on the study.

Shortly after meeting with the CNO, the Group would extensively discuss his guidance and/or tasking, formulate an approach for proceeding and organize into teams to address various aspects of the task, often involving regional/sub-regional teams and/or assignments to study specific topics essential to the study. SSG I originally organized around individual papers. However, subsequent Groups quickly organized around their specific study topics during the orientation in order to focus questions and issues when dealing with others. Extensive internal discussions and

⁵⁴⁸ British naval officers have been known to say that if two U.S. naval officers were marooned on a desert island, after two days they would be working nights.

oral/written trip reports shared the learning among the group and contributed to developing common views of the subject matter.

To make the most out of travel to the Washington area while meeting the CNO, the SSG would spend a week receiving appropriate intelligence briefings and meeting with leadership and experts at the Pentagon and in the Washington, D.C., area as part of their orientation. Continuing the orientation, the SSG also traveled to meet with the Unified and Navy CINCs, naval and other service commands, foreign government and military officials, academics, and think tanks in the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East or Western Hemisphere. The aim was to complete this orientation as soon as practicable, and before the Christmas holidays. The Group took over the scheduling as the study developed. Some (e.g., SSG XIII) took early control for coordinating events, and others left more of the coordination to the staff.

Meetings with appropriate senior Navy officers and joint commanders and their staffs provided knowledge of policy, plans, and mindsets, and gave the group confidence in interacting with seniors. As the program matured, more SSG alumni were in senior command, further improving the quality of SSG interactions with these commands.

Supplemented by extensive reading, the meetings with U.S. government officials, the academic world, and foreigners expanded the strategic discourse and intellectual rigor of SSG studies. SSG I established an early foundation for drawing on the full range of intellectual resources that the Group needed for its study. As subsequent Groups repeated and expanded the program of interactions, organizations that the SSG visited annually, or more often, came to know and appreciate the SSG. This enhanced the quality of the interactions and productivity of SSG visits. These visits also provided SSG Fellows with networks of experts outside the Navy.

A consistent pattern for the Group was to spend the time before Christmas looking for experts who could provide them with the answers to their complex tasking. Around the Christmas holidays, they would conclude that if someone out there had the answer, the CNO would have not assigned the task to the SSG. Panic would follow, resulting in ideas quickly coming together over the winter, maturing around the time that the Group needed to brief the spring Navy CINCs conference. Visits to leading U.S. and foreign think tanks and academic defense intellectuals were key to the SSG's ability to understand the need for innovative concepts and organizational improvements, across all of the SSGs.

Ideas came from all members of the Group: Fellows and staff. Beginning during the orientation, the Group would spend many hours (typically half of each day three or four days a week) in a conference room hashing out their ideas, and coalescing around some of the most attractive ones. The SSG often found that they invented terms, such as "combined arms ASW" that became part of their lexicon but which

they would have to explain as they briefed others. Often the Groups wrote individual point papers to trigger discussions within the Group.

From the beginning, games were a very important research and learning tool for the SSG, and an effective method for communicating ideas and achieving consensus within the Group and invited participants. Since the effectiveness of strategy depends on the dynamic interactions of complex organizations, gaming became the most appropriate method for exploring and evaluating the SSG's concepts. The games provided a basis of shared experience and a common vocabulary. The games uncovered missing details in new concepts, gave insights into new possibilities, and revealed important area of ignorance. Also, as U.S. naval officers, many favored active participation in games over passive activities such as reading books and attending lectures.

SSG I conducted four of their own war games and participated in others. During the first half of the 1980s, SSG Fellows played in the summer Global War Games before they started their year, and were encouraged to play in the Global game before departing for their next assignments. In the 1982-1984 Global games, the departing SSG Fellows played senior command roles, mostly as CINCs. During these years, the Global games were an effective way to pollinate SSG concepts widely across the Navy and with other services and government agencies. Beginning in 1985, the CINCs sent players from their staffs to represent their commands as the reputation of the Global games grew.

As CNWS and the War Gaming Department developed, they required the SSG to schedule games before each Group arrived. The standard for the SSGs became a schedule of three games: one for orientation and early exploration, one to explore and examine initial concepts, and one to examine more mature concepts with more senior participants. As the pace of the SSG did not allow the War Gaming Department to conduct their full game design and development processes, the SSG designed and developed most of its own games. The details required in order to develop games constituted most of the SSG research effort. The SSG derived much less learning from participating in others' games as players or controllers. The SSG invited relevant commands and organizations to participate in its games, both as experts and to promote the strategic dialogue. As concepts matured, more senior officials were invited to participate in the games and take SSG ideas back for implementation in their organizations. Not all SSGs used all of their scheduled games. Many Fellows carried gaming into their practices as they progressed through their careers.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁹ Owens and Cebrowski began having their staffs war game whenever they were in command. As Executive Assistant to Vice Admiral Baggett (OP-95), Owens initiated games to inform Navy investments, which he continued as OPNAV N-8. Giambastiani noted that he used gaming in

SSGs I and II used quantitative combat models as part of their studies. SSGs X and XI used regression analysis to examine cost and budget trends. SSG XIII calculated efficiencies from changing deployment parameters such as speed of advance moving to and from deployments, extending deployment durations, and using rotational crews. Other than those instances, the SSG analysis did not involve calculation.

As the world situation and CNO tasking evolved from 1981 to 1995, the SSG moved from classic war games to path games. The central issue became not “war,” but “the future.” So path games looking out over decades became important. SSGs XIII and XIV relied less on gaming than their predecessors, using workshops and seminars in their place.

The Navy requires its Flag officers to be top performers in their commander and captain (major) commands. Officers coming to the SSG often came directly from command, where they had had hundreds to thousands of officers and sailors/marines under their command. The SSG put them in an environment where eight to 13 officers were assigned to think, analyze, and write, rather than to direct the actions of others. They had one secretary among them and were responsible for their own typing.⁵⁵⁰

The environment was unique in its general disregard for lineal numbers; treating all as peers. The SSG provided a place to learn how to behave as a Flag officer dealing with peers and seniors; a place to think; a lens on the world; an opportunity to articulate ideas about problems that had no school solution; to learn that good ideas are not all accepted or have to wait for the right time.⁵⁵¹

The senior officer among them had additional duties, such as preparing thank you letters, but no authority to vet the Group’s ideas. Rarely did a senior officer try to run the Group like a staff or make decisions for the Group. The Fellows were appropriately deferential to the senior member in administrative matters but were peers when it came to thinking. Senior members experienced frustration on the occasions where they did try to dictate or limit the other Fellows’ concepts. After the

every assignment through his subsequent career, which culminated in his tour as VCJCS. Hanley interview with Admiral Giambastiani, 8 December 2014. Many others cited the value of gaming during their interviews.

⁵⁵⁰ Hon. Dennis V. McGinn (Vice Admiral, USN (Retired)) noted that his learning to type on the SSG vastly improved his communication skills. Hanley interview with Hon. Dennis V. McGinn, 25 November 2014.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.* Tracey interview.

difficulties experienced by SSG XIII in this regard, the staff began scheduling facilitated team-building sessions at the start of each year.

The CNO signed the fitness reports for Navy officers, with similar arrangements for performance evaluation in the other services. It was common for more junior officers on the Group to be promoted to Flag before the senior officer. It also was common for more junior officers to contribute the most to the studies. The SSG frequently generated controversy, which some on the threshold for selection to Flag sought to avoid.⁵⁵²

Following the Navy CINCs conference and briefing the CNO, the group would travel again to meet with many of those who contributed to their study for comments on their thoughts. They would then incorporate the comments they found constructive into their final briefing and report. In many years, most if not all of the Group would move on to their next assignments before their report was complete. In several cases, officers selected for Flag left months before the scheduled end of the year.⁵⁵³ Particularly during the early SSGs, this left the writing of the final report to a small group, or to the SSG staff. Where the final briefings to the CNO involved the entire Group, the final written reports represented the best efforts of a smaller team to capture the Group's concepts. In the 1990s, the SSG Fellows wrote the reports with staff input. Sometimes SSG staff members or former Fellows would publish an unclassified article—often in the *Naval War College Review* or U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*—reflecting their SSG experience.

During its first four years, the SSG nominally was the centerpiece of CNWS. The various other CNWS organizations supported it as a primary part of their duties, while also supporting NWC's broader educational mission. In practice, the SSG received only occasional research support, when interested and competent students participated in the Center for Advanced Research. The Group did receive support from the Center for War Gaming/War Gaming Department for games and workshops involving large numbers of outside participants throughout the period under study. The separation of the CNWS Dean from the SSG Director in 1985 created a clear separation of the CNWS and SSG staffs. Following that separation, the SSG staff consisted of the Director; Hanley as the Program Director (subsequently also Deputy Director on the arrival of Pirie); an officer as Administrative Assistant to the Director

⁵⁵² For example, comment by Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Retired) at the SSG workshop, 20 February 2015.

⁵⁵³ For example, Tim Wright departed SSG VII in January to report to the Joint Staff and Barbara McGann departed in April to conduct an investigation at the Naval Academy. Jay Johnson also left SSG IX early. Jon Greenert left SSG XIII early, and Tim Ziemer left SSG XIV early.

in 1985, replaced by an Intelligence Officer beginning in 1986; an Executive Secretary for the Director; and a Secretary for the Group.⁵⁵⁴

Prior to Hanley becoming Program Director in 1985, a variety of arrangements provided support to the SSG Director and SSG. Bob Murray relied heavily on NWC staff members Commander Ken McGruther and Professor Tom Etzold. He also kept Captain Frank Julian on from SSG I as a Deputy. Julian was relieved as Deputy by SSG I Fellow Captain Sam Leeds, who in the interval had been the Chief of Staff of U.S. SIXTH Fleet. The NWC Navy Operational Intelligence Detachment also supported the SSG.

For invited speakers, conferences, games, travel, and miscellaneous expenses, the SSG had an operating budget of \$300,000 in 1985, growing to \$355,000 by 1994 (about \$572,000 in 2015 dollars).

⁵⁵⁴ Hanley had originally come on board the SSG staff in 1981 as a contractor, providing operational campaign analysis support. In 1985 he became Program Director.

The Value of the SSG

Over the period 1981-1995 the CNOs established the functions of the SSG as the professional development of the officers assigned, the promotion of strategic discourse across the Navy, and the development of strategic and operational concepts. Under CNOs Hayward and Watkins, promotion of the reputation of the NWC was another consideration. Moreover, in truth, the reputation of the SSG enhanced the reputation of the entire Navy. The accomplishment of these functions, and the impacts of the officers and the concepts they developed on the Navy over their careers provide criteria for assessing the value of the SSGs I-XIV.

Value to the SSG Fellows

Professional development of the officers

The first thing that former Fellows cited as the value of the SSG was the value of their education, beginning with getting to know the naval and other services.

In implementing Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the Joint Staff used Benjamin Bloom's cognitive taxonomy for accrediting Joint Professional Education. The standard for war colleges was the use of learned material in specific instances. The SSG aimed for the creation of new structures and relationships and the application of value judgments, a higher level of learning.⁵⁵⁵ Rather than accepting existing military thinking and practices, the role of the SSG was to bring ideas together to create new approaches unconstrained by existing policy and doctrine that would better contribute to national security and make best use of naval forces.

Admiral Bill Owens (SSG I), who culminated his career as VCJCS, frequently referred to his experience on the SSG as an "epiphany" that had opened the narrow, periscope perspective that he had as a submariner to the other naval and joint warfare areas.

⁵⁵⁵ For a description of Bloom's taxonomy, see Donald Clark, Bloom's Taxonomy of Learning Domains, available at <http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/hrd/bloom.html>, accessed 12 November 2015.

It was a great group of guys. Not just because they were upwardly mobile and respected. The chemistry was great. Bob Murray was a wonderful leader, not telling us what to do, but we were all in it together. SSG was an eye opener to Cebrowski and me especially. Studying at Oxford and the SSG made the biggest difference in my career. I wish everybody could be exposed to that. At 20 years we were in our service stovepipes. Getting officers out of those stove pipes becomes more important as you become more senior. Not knowing about the Army or Air Force limits what you can do in your career.

For me the exposure to be what could be always caused me trouble. Broad exposure to one's own service branches and others would make a big difference in our warfighting capability.

As commander SIXTH Fleet I took the air wing off for a week and put Delta force onboard. Every naval aviator was telling me of the safety problems and how I was degrading the wing's readiness. The Delta guys flew off the CV without problem—taking 30 helos off at once with no lights. The air wing flew with Air Force F-15s and F-16s in Northern Italy for a week, and got a lot out of that.

I also got in trouble for pushing the Mobile Operating Base. The military in the planning, programming, budgeting system will not assimilate the growth of broad based technology.

What Hayward did in giving the SSG a strategic mandate was important. No one is doing it. We are not doing justice to it. The focus that Hayward had could help the country.⁵⁵⁶

Other submariners also commented on the value of broadening their experience. Captain Mike Pectorius (SSG III) commented, "The SSG period was certainly a most memorable time in my career. I formed enduring friendships there and even from the current perspective over 30 years, I still cherish the experience."⁵⁵⁷ Captain Phil Boyer (SSG V) stated, "I enjoyed the SSG and found it to be of great benefit understanding the broader picture of the Navy and the entire military outside the parochial view of the submarine service."⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid., Owens interview.

⁵⁵⁷ Email from Captain Mike Pectorius, USN (Retired) to Hanley, 24 June 2015.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid, Boyer email.

Rear Admiral Skip Armstrong (SSG II) found his year on the SSG to be the most important of his career. It gave him more confidence in his thinking. No one told the Group what to do. He worked with “incredibly smart people on the first two groups.” It was a mind-expanding year. “It would have helped me even more if I had not had to leave the Navy early for family reasons.”⁵⁵⁹

Vice Admiral Bat LaPlante (SSG V) commented on how his experience on the SSG helped him in subsequent operations, though other factors also helped him succeed as a Flag officer:

DESERT SHIELD/STORM. As COMPHIBGRU TWO, I deployed very early in Shield with 13 amphibious ships & 4th MEB embarked. The Amphibious Task Force grew to 43 ships and 34,000 people before DESERT STORM. SSG V had spent a lot of time in the Gulf region and at CENTCOM in Tampa, so I was familiar with the region, orders of battle, regional politics, and so forth. I had met the players: I knew Schwarzkopf, Mauz, Boomer and the rest. I had also learned the importance of the regional ambassadors and their country teams. All this was immensely valuable as the eight months played out.

Joint Staff. Vice Director for Logistics, followed by a promotion and Director for Logistics (J4) – Five years total, which would put anybody in a mind to retire. This was the immediate postwar period, and we were busy, particularly in the logistics business: Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans. Believe it or not, we had discussed and noodled about most of this inside the SSG, and discussed some of it informally with COCOM staffs during visits. Doing that kind of stuff takes a different mindset, and I was ready.

Frankly, though, I don’t want to leave the impression that I attribute my success as a Flag officer to my SSG experience. Some of it, clearly, but there were other influences even more powerful. For example, my first Flag tour was on Dave Jeremiah’s staff, and my time in J4 started with two years working for Colin Powell. In my opinion they are two best GO/FO in at least a generation, and I was proud and happy to emulate the both of them.⁵⁶⁰

Before the SSG, Admiral Leighton “Snuffy” Smith (SSG V), who retired from being CINCUSNAVEUR/NATO CINCSOUTH, commented that he had never thought beyond

⁵⁵⁹ Hanley phone interview with Rear Admiral Clarence E. Armstrong, USN (Retired), 15 December 2014.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid. LaPlante email.

the day after tomorrow. Even commanding a battle group was day-to-day. Every other job after the SSG required thinking two weeks to two months ahead. Serving as the J-3 at EUCOM was a completely new ball game. The SSG experience of studying force option packages for contingencies was a big help. Admiral Smith commented:

Soon after I got there [to EUCOM] we had a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Liberia. I had to argue with General McCarthy, USAF (Deputy CINCEUR) and Lieutenant General Leland, USA (EUCOM COS) that a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was the force to use and that we did not need an Army general running the operation. I also worked through possible unintended consequences with them.

During DESERT SHIELD I spoke with every Ambassador around the Mediterranean, refining our non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) plans. We knew how many people would be where. Following that I briefed General Galvin (SACEUR/CINCEUR) for two hours on the plans, naming each Ambassador. At the end I said that I had spoken enough and was out of thoughts. General Galvin told me that had not stopped me from speaking before; then congratulated me on the brief. I received a lot of kudos from my contemporaries for that work.

For DESERT STORM, I spoke to Galvin about opening a second front in Turkey. He sent me to talk to General Schwarzkopf, USA [CINCCENT]. Schwarzkopf initially was skeptical until I told him that we could chop the forces to him, but thought it would be better if he had tactical control and we provided the support. He agreed with that. We got Turkey to open their airfields. Later the Turks wanted to approve targets for sorties from their airfields and Tomahawks flying over. They pointed out that some refineries were important to them and that if we took them out they would have to rebuild them. It helped in our target selection. My SSG experience gave me the ability to work on the bigger picture.⁵⁶¹

His SSG experience also helped him write ... *From the Sea* as OPNAV N-3/5.

⁵⁶¹ Hanley interview with Admiral Leighton W. Smith, USN (Retired), 17 November 2014.

For General Tony Zinni (SSG VI), who retired from being CINCCENT, as for almost all the Fellows assigned,⁵⁶² this was his first real experience looking at something on a strategic level.

The SSG directly affected my thinking. In my next job I worked for “Snuffy” as his [EUCOM] Deputy J-3. From my SSG VI study I had an understanding of EUCOM. The understanding of how to develop strategy carried on into my tour commanding CENTCOM.... My experience on the SSG prepared me to serve as a senior commander.

This was the era of having a qualitative edge, the deep fight. We complemented Army/Air Force thinking. We also looked at NATO’s southern flank. Our gaming addressed the impact on Soviet ability to concentrate force in the center. This contributed to EUCOM planning. When I went to EUCOM I met with Army and Air Force generals commanding forces in Europe. They helped me understand the bigger picture. We had developed from being on the defense and using nukes to a much better counter offensive rather than defensive approach.

[At EUCOM] We formed a battle staff for a crisis the first day I was there and were not able to disband it the whole time I was there. Our approach provided a lot of training up the line on joint capabilities; Special Forces, etc. It paid off on the force we sent to Turkey for DESERT STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT. I attribute to “Snuffy” the broader thinking. We never stopped; three NEOs in Africa, Balkans, etc. This was an education for everyone around us. Our J-3 working with Brigadier General Dick Potter (Commanding Special Forces in EUCOM) and his Special Forces led the thinking. We added civil affairs and other capabilities that were new to the mix.⁵⁶³

Admiral Dennis Blair (SSG VI), who retired from being CINCPAC, stated that working with the “first all Navy team” as equals, thinking operationally, taught him that he knew something and the others knew something.⁵⁶⁴ The Group provided a perspective that he never had working on the Navy staff. As a battle group commander, he had an exercise off Guam and Tinian with the Marines. Joint

⁵⁶² O. B. O’Brien (SSG VI), Bill Earner (SSG VII), Mike Farmer (SSG VIII), Mike Martus (SSG XI), Robby Harris (SSG XII), and Ann Rondeau (SSG XIII) had worked on various aspects of Navy policy and strategy in assignments before coming to the SSG.

⁵⁶³ Hanley phone interview with General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Retired), 14 November 2014.

⁵⁶⁴ Hanley interview with Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN (Retired), 6 November 2014.

operations initially involved the Navy and Marines. He sent a frigate to provide gun support for the Marines. Reconstruction of the exercise showed that the frigate had made the difference. He never would have thought of it without the SSG. As CINCPAC, he tried to recreate that atmosphere of mutual respect for being experts in individual warfare areas to his work with the component commanders. “Our ideas about what naval forces could do in the maritime theaters affected my thinking as CINCPAC.”

Admiral Skip Bowman (SSG VI), who retired from Director Naval Nuclear Propulsion, gave an example of what he got out of the SSG. He was working a high-risk deal to provide nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, UAE, and Egypt. The deal would control the nuclear fuel cycle to prevent the production of nuclear weapons and build the U.S. nuclear industry rather than have these countries turn to China and Russia and leave the United States in the same position regarding nuclear proliferation that we are with Iran. He had support from the White House, the State Department, and members of Congress as it would strengthen the case for controlling Iran’s nuclear fuel, but the deal involved many high-wire agreements. He emphasized the value of the SSG education, stating that he learned much from the Group—Blair, Zinni, and O’Brien—the exposure to political-military issues, and the three-hour meetings with four-stars. “I learned to stand on my feet.”⁵⁶⁵

Rear Admiral Jake Tobin (SSG IV) noted:

The SSG had fantastic guys, and a couple of “pretty” guys—Hanley and Bremont. We focused on what we were there to do, thinking clearly about the way ahead. We knew that the CNO may buy our ideas or not, but our job was to give it the best shot. We were not consumed by daily events. This was a good place to be at a time of transition. I was selected for Flag. Trost sent me to COMINSEWARCOM. Trost told me he wanted a fresh brain. As a naval base commander I had no control over budgets and could not do simple, sensible things. I briefed Kelso and he changed the organization and authorities for the Naval Region Middle Atlantic. My final job was COMNAVFOR Japan where I worked the shore establishment.⁵⁶⁶

Colonel John Woodhead (SSG VII) found:

⁵⁶⁵ Hanley interview with Admiral Frank L. Bowman, USN (Retired), Potomac, MD, 15 December 2014.

⁵⁶⁶ Hanley and Floyd Kennedy interview with Rear Admiral Byron E. Tobin, USN (Retired), Norfolk, VA, 13 January 2015.

On an individual level I think it should, as it did in my case, serve as an alternative to Top Level School (TLS). Each discussion, briefing, etc. presented the opportunity not only to expand one's knowledge but to see the topic through the views of the other warfare areas. While this also occurs in TLS there is nothing near the opportunity for the give and take that the SSG provides. The opportunity to consider at length and in depth both strategy and its application at the international level is well beyond any school's ability.⁵⁶⁷

In his oral history, Rear Admiral Mack Gaston commented:

When I was a part of it, the SSG contributed to the conceptual foundation and technologies for innovations in naval warfighting; as an operational research and concept development center. Our assignment was to develop the Middle East Strategy. I don't know if the concept is still the same today, but the SSG still exists. I do know that it prepared me to be a Flag officer and prepared me for the Capstone course that exists for development of new Flag officers. It was an honor to serve as a member of the SSG with eight other officers. Several in my group were selected for Admiral, including Don Baird, Jon Coleman and Steve Johnson. ... I did the final briefing to the CNO on our Middle East Strategy. This strategy was used by Naval Forces in the Gulf War.⁵⁶⁸

Admiral Jay Johnson (SSG IX), whose career culminated as CNO, commented that officers did not get an opportunity to think at the three- to four-star level without being on the SSG. Being an aide did not provide the same perspective. The ability to reach for new ideas, to sit around, brainstorm, and think through future options was invaluable. The SSG was a unique experience for upwardly mobile officers. Exposure to leaders in different communities at that stage in his career helped him. Being around colleagues other than fighter pilots, such as Doug Huth [SEAL] and Al Konetzni [submarine warfare], helped him as Flag. The SSG liberated his thinking and taught him not to fear.⁵⁶⁹

Vice Admiral Al Konetzni (SSG IX) came to the SSG from squadron command as senior Fellow. His first thought on going there was that no one would yell at him. This became one of his great leadership tours, along with being a company officer at the U.S. Naval Academy and Commander of Submarine Forces in the Pacific. It really

⁵⁶⁷ Memo from Colonel John A. Woodhead, USMC (Retired), 6 February 2015.

⁵⁶⁸ Extract from RADM Mack C. Gaston, Oral History (Naval Historical Foundation, 2008).

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, interview with Admiral Jay L. Johnson, USN (Retired).

taught him to communicate. Formulating a collaborative opinion with eight other competitive guys was hard, as was dealing with some of the senior admirals they briefed. The Fellows had a lot of different styles: some did not want to take risks and wanted a neat package to brief and report; others insisted that “we are not going home until we get this done”; and some loved to travel. It taught him to use each one for their talents. He also learned a lot from watching how Navy leaders reacted—some with grace, and others with macho and a need to react to every idea. The latter were not comfortable in their place.⁵⁷⁰

For Captain Jim Suhr (SSG IX), the “two greatest values of the SSG were learning other than submarines and having the SSG on my resume.”

In 20 years I had two shore tours as a nuclear prototype instructor and as training assistant at Naval Reactors for Admiral Kinnaird McKee. The SSG was really important in exposing me to other parts of the Navy and other parts of the world.

After the SSG I went to work for Rear Admiral Jerry Johnson working the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in OPNAV N-8. I had made a decision to stay in Norfolk for the family rather than taking another position, which I knew took me out of the Flag competition. I went to NATO in Norfolk where I put together a briefing on the way ahead and in about 10 days briefed most of the NATO Chiefs of Defense. The SSG experience was really important to my ability to do that. Our trips were really good to get the CINCs’ perspectives.

After I retired I went to work at the Joint Warfighting Center on concept development. Having SSG on my resume really helped. After about 18 months, following a brief to the Joint Staff J2 and J6 in the Pentagon on command and control concepts, Dr. James A. Blackwell from SAIC hired me. He appreciated the core studies that I did at the SSG. I stayed in Norfolk and built an SAIC office while doing 2020 war games for Andy Marshall looking at how leading edge technology would affect future warfare concepts. I could talk with the Army and Marine Corps officers on Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.⁵⁷¹

⁵⁷⁰ Hanley and Floyd Kennedy interview with Vice Admiral Albert H. Konetzni, Jr., USN (Retired), Norfolk, VA, 13 December 2015.

⁵⁷¹ Hanley interview with Captain James W. Suhr, USN (Retired), Norfolk, VA, 13 January 2015.

Colonel Al Ponnwitz (SSG IX)—whose SSG had examined combat against a Soviet-backed Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—commented on how the SSG affected his next assignment:⁵⁷²

When Iraq did invade, I was temporarily moved to the Assistant Commandant's Office in the position of "Secretary of the General Staff". In this capacity I met regularly with all the staff sections of Headquarters Marine Corps to coordinate support for the deployed Marine Forces. The headquarters staff was challenged by General Gray (CMC) to identify all the requirements that needed to be met in support of the conflict. We worked day and night, often seven days a week. We would meet with CMC and the General Staff to review progress and accept new challenges. Major concerns involved force movement, combat capability, the integration with combined and joint forces, "heavying-up" the force, and projecting effective combat power in keeping with Marine Corps doctrine. I also was tasked with providing timely and accurate depiction of the battlefield each day. We had one conference room solely dedicated to this. CMC used it to wargame various courses of action and to identify and prioritize actions he, as CMC, needed to take to support the force. Issues such as accelerating the delivery of M1A1 tanks and the use of maritime prepositioned assets were identified. Much discussion also involved the reconstitution of the force and its assets once the conflict terminated. After Iraqi forces fled Kuwait, I returned to my position as the Director of Special Projects for the Commandant.

CAPT Tom Travis (SSG XII) commented that, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, as SSG tasks looked to the future, the "SSG provided a broad education for the fellows, allowing them to understand social, environmental, demographic, technical, cultural, and political issues that influence national security issues. This broad education equipped the Fellows with the background needed to knowledgeably address strategic issues affecting the Navy."⁵⁷³

Admiral Ed Giambastiani (SSG X), whose career culminated as VCJCS, stated that the SSG was the most helpful tour he ever had. The experience of working with senior guys and being well funded was critical for the SSG. The Group traveled the world and talked to experts.

⁵⁷² Memorandum from Colonel Alfred J. Ponnwitz, USMC (Retired), 12 February 2015.

⁵⁷³ Email to Hanley from Captain Thomas L. Travis, USN (Retired), 8 February 2015. *Ibid.*, Travis email.

I went to COMSUBDEVRON 12 from the SSG where I took what I learned to change the direction of the submarine force. We expanded the charter from ASW to Special Warfare, Mine Warfare, and Strike. On the SSG, I learned to focus communication to the high levels to get more action. When working for [SECDEF] Rumsfeld we did away with lengthy combatant commander's quarterly letters.⁵⁷⁴

Hon. Denny McGinn (SSG X) commented on how the broadening he received on the SSG helped him when he was COMTHIRDFLT and PACOM's JTF Commander for innovation, and later in his career. As COMTHIRDFLT, he installed a Civil-Military Operations Center on the USS *Coronado* (LPD 11) and designed exercises involving other agencies and non-government organizations working together on humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and complex contingencies involving humanitarian assistance in contested environments. He understood the value to American influence of sending a hospital ship whose work would be remembered for generations vice an aircraft carrier which would be forgotten by the people within days following a visit.⁵⁷⁵

The SSG had developed a large network of smart people to talk to in the United States and around the world. One of those was Amory Lovins (Rocky Mountain Institute CEO). Beginning with the 1973 oil embargo McGinn had understood a nexus between energy, security, and quality of life. The United States has a national affinity to energy. During the SSG, he learned a lot and was introduced to Richard Danzig and others who set the stage for early studies of Navy energy. As a vice admiral, Director for Naval Warfare (N-7), working with Amory Lovins, he was asked to speak to an American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE) conference. His appearance validated the new organization. This led to him becoming President of ACORE, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment.

The SSG gave McGinn an understanding of how complex the world is and how little control the United States has. "The final words in our 1991 report were, 'The future is ours to make.' Not so much!"⁵⁷⁶

Colonel George Benskin (SSG X) found that the professional development experienced during his tenure on SSG X:

[It] was not only rewarding to me, but greatly benefited my follow-on assignments as a staff member at the PACOM. Coming from just an

⁵⁷⁴ Hanley interview with Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, USN (Retired), 8 December 2014.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid., McGinn interview.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

operational background prior to the SSG, my year with the SSG taught me the importance and differences between operational, regional and global command levels and impacts. I was the Southeast Asia Exercise Officer during exercise Cobra Gold 92 (CG 92) when Thailand's internal political issues between their top military leaders came close to an armed conflict between the Royal Thai 1st and 2nd Armies. At the time Bangkok experienced large protests with loss of life and damage to some of the Thailand government facilities. United States military forces in country attending CG 92 (about 8,000 total) redeployed early to demonstrate the political concerns surrounding this situation by the State Department and White House. Following CG 92, I worked with PACOM's J5 staff (Strategic Plans and Policy) and the State Department to get back to normal relations between the United States and Thailand. My experience, specifically with civilian organizations and military departments, while on SSG X assisted me during this high profile issue.⁵⁷⁷

Admiral Tim Keating (SSG XI), who retired as a full admiral after commanding NORTHCOM and PACOM, was aware of the reputation of the SSG and was very happy to be selected. He noted the value of his exposure to a wide variety of thought patterns and disciplines. He enjoyed the face-to-face interactions with Flag officers and futurists presaging technologies like iPhones. The experience "stood me in very good stead for rest of career."⁵⁷⁸ He drew the short straw for the final brief to Admiral Kelso, who could not endorse the SSG findings on the future size of the Navy. He learned that delivering sound analysis would not end his career, even though the senior Flags did not like the answer.

For Captain Mike Martus (SSG XI), the main value of the SSG was in meeting the other officers. Though he had previously served in OP-06, he learned a lot about how others in the Navy perceived "what we were trying to do strategically." Robin Pirie's political perspective was also very astute and valuable. The topic, the travel, meeting senior people was also very valuable. Being out of the mainstream and working for a mentor such as Pirie helped his thinking. The subject was an excuse to see senior people and absorb what they said. "We were a select group that got the entree. All of them were talking their party line. On reflection it helped me understand why things happened."⁵⁷⁹

⁵⁷⁷ Memo from Colonel George H. Benskin, USMC (Retired), 1 February 2015.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Keating interview.

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Martus interview.

Vice Admiral Pat Tracey (SSG XII) noted that her SSG assignment came at a perfect time in her career, following major command. “That command is the last job that you have in your specialty. The SSG provided the opportunity to pull together the threads of what you needed to know to go on.” The world was in disarray. Creating strategy in 1992-93 was harder. Fewer of the capabilities we considered were modelable. The SSG was a runway for gigantic brains who had just made captain to take off. The SSG provided exposure to institutions that deal with great uncertainty. It exposed them not only to U.S. strategy, but also to partners, allies, and the competition. It taught about choosing the path. It was nine months of stepping back. “Before, my focus was on inward Navy business. This was an opportunity to work at the senior leader level with contemporaries from all parts of the naval services.”⁵⁸⁰

She added:

During our year the group debated the role of naval and U.S. forces in peacekeeping. The Marines argued that it was not appropriate. When I went to be the J-1 on the Joint Staff immediately following the SSG we stood up 12 JTFs. The year on the SSG provided exposure to how to deal with what you do not want to do. It became clear that the personnel system did not produce what you needed. We needed not just training for operations and maintenance. We need atomized skills; such as language, foreign area expertise, etc. The SSG was the transition from a career of following the rules to making the rules. As Chief of Naval Education and Training I initiated a “revolution in training.”

Rear Admiral Barbara McGann (SSG XIII) also found the SSG was an opportunity to think differently “about where we, the Navy, were and where we were going.” The Group looked beyond the rigid boundaries and got into a wide range of subjects; defense, economy, etc. “We recognized the need to game a new rule set that does not have boundaries.”⁵⁸¹

She continued:

I was not crazy about going to the SSG. I thought it was going to be like the war college. Instead, we had incredible access. I remember sitting at the table with those Chinese generals in Beijing. The environment was intimidating: sitting at the table with the head of

⁵⁸⁰ Interview with Vice Admiral Patricia A. Tracey, USN, 28 November 2014.

⁵⁸¹ Hanley interview with Rear Admiral Barbara E. McGann, USN (Retired), Newport RI, 11 December 2014.

the Chinese Navy in a communist country. These experiences were not available to many. The SSG gave me the gift of learning to think differently. The dynamic planning model that we developed taught me that nothing stays the same.

Women had come a long way in the Navy. When Barbara McGann joined, she thought that her terminal grade likely would be lieutenant. When the Navy declared shore command equivalent to command at sea for selection, the selection boards did not embrace it. Having women on the SSG marked a sea change.

Admiral Jonathan Greenert (SSG XIII), who retired as CNO in 2015, also found that talking to senior Navy officers provided examples of both good and bad behavior that provided models for his future use. Traveling around the world gave feedback on forward presence and some eye-opening interactions. During his visit to China he saw them going the direction they have taken now. They did not have the capabilities then, but knew where they wanted to go. Greenert at the time saw engagement as an important aspect of presence. The SSG opened his eyes, and then he was transferred to Japan. He had the opportunity to turn SSG XIII's theory of forward presence and influence into practice working for SEVENTH Fleet Commanders VADM Robert Natter and Walter Doran while implementing the Fleet Readiness Program and Forward Deployed Naval Forces concept. His SSG experience affected where he is now and his current policies. "The SSG clearly had an effect on me. It taught me the importance of shaping."⁵⁸²

Rear Admiral Tim Ziemer (SSG XIV) found that the experience was more of a professional enhancement than he originally realized.

The SSG was an opportunity to think and to write. I had forgotten how hard that was. Our thinking played out over the subsequent 20 years. Art Cebrowski coached us in with all his high tech stuff that we now live with. We also saw the low tech world. The year was not just learning; 60-70% of our thoughts materialized. When selected I knew that the SSG was a career enhancing assignment. I was selected for Flag and ended up leaving a bit early. The year on the SSG took me out of the Navy culture and prepared me to work on the Joint Staff, and for a tough Air Force boss.

[After a few jobs] I got a call from the White House to interview to run President Bush's malaria initiative. I did not want to come back to the government, but it was heady to go check out the White House. The

⁵⁸² Ibid., Greenert interview.

job did not say anything about the reporting chain or control/influence over money, so I turned it down. About 10 days later, Tobias, a businessman who had just joined the staff called me back to review a revised job description that addressed my concerns. So I accepted a 2-year political assignment. I submitted my resignation after the election. The new transition team contacted me and asked if I would stay. I agreed if they gave me the same authorities and control over funding. They agreed and I stayed on. This had been the longest job that I have ever had.

The latest report is that we have saved 4.4 million lives and reduced malaria by 50%. We have a vision of a malaria free world and a strategy that I learned to make while on the SSG. The opportunity to go through the SSG process; the coaching on how to read, listen, think gave me the skills that I need to succeed. We are in the middle of defense, development, and diplomacy, making foreign assistance a reality. I know the presidents and health ministers of all the countries that we deal with, and they appreciate what the U.S. is doing.

I am working with Bill Gates and have a 6-year strategy with annual funding. Our aim is to reduce malaria from 50% to 75% over the next 6 years. They have a vision of a malaria free world by 2040.⁵⁸³

Captain Jo Dee Jacob (SSG XIV) commented that SSG taught her to bound the possibilities and she uses it almost every day in leading the Girl Scouts. “We think through the best and the worst outcome, and don’t do it if we cannot take the worst.” She appreciated the worldview. She had had some exposure as a Navy Federal Executive Fellow (FEF) at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). However, coming from the narrow view of working in Personnel Support Departments, it was a big change. The experience charged her IQ rather than draining it. The investment in officers was important.⁵⁸⁴

Officer self-confidence

Many SSG Fellows remarked on how the confidence derived from meeting and briefing senior officers prepared them for future assignments.

⁵⁸³ Hanley interview with Rear Admiral Robert Timothy (Tim) Ziemer, USN (Retired), Alexandria, VA, 19 December 2014.

⁵⁸⁴ Hanley phone interview with Captain Jo Dee Jacob, USN (Retired), 17 December 2014.

Rear Admiral Skip Armstrong (SSG II) said: “It helped me gain confidence. We were in front of a lot of 4-stars with a controversial message. When we told them what we intended to do I saw a lot of eyes rolling. By the time we came back with our thinking we got a lot of support.”⁵⁸⁵

Admiral Leighton “Snuffy” Smith (SSG V) claimed that all the confidence that he had in himself came from the SSG talking to heavyweights. The CINCs were still bitter about the SSG and CNO developing the maritime strategy. He briefed General Galvin (CINCEUR/SACEUR) a week after taking his job as the EUCOM J-3, when he could have left the brief to his staff. That briefing, in turn, gave General Galvin confidence in his new J-3 that facilitated Admiral Smith’s success during the rest of his tour, and beyond. He said, “The SSG gave me the confidence not to be nervous with 5 Presidents, or the Queen of England.”⁵⁸⁶

Vice Admiral Tim Wright (SSG VII) testified:

When I was [at] 7th Fleet I worked with Generals Riscassi and Luck in Korea. 1994 was a tense time. They asked how many sorties I could give them—we planned on 5 or 6 CVs—and I told them 80%. They asked how I would defend the fleet, and I said “against what.” With a couple of Aegis and a flight of F-14s for leakers we had nothing to worry about. The problem was that I had to go back to Pearl to get authority to provide the sorties. We had a chart showing the authorization process that looked like spaghetti. I took that chart back to PACOM and made the case for change. We did change it. I would never have had the courage of my convictions to press that with CINCPAC without the SSG experience.⁵⁸⁷

Rear Admiral Tim Ziemer (SSG XIV) remembered the visit to Shell Oil in London. “That kind of thinking gave me confidence and expanded my thinking.”⁵⁸⁸

Network of SSG Fellows

The networks of SSG Fellows also carried on, within and among groups.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid., Armstrong interview.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid., Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., interview.

⁵⁸⁷ Hanley interview with Vice Admiral Timothy W. Wright, USN, 23 December 2014.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid. Ziemer interview.

Captain Sam Leeds commented, “The SSG’s most assured product is its graduates’ carrying their joint experience and friendships forward. I learned a great deal from our USMC SSG members as well as the Navy team members. ... the SSG experience widens their future field of view while building their operational and strategic level of thinking. Most as Flag officers and O6s carry those experiences and networks of friends into the naval and joint services.”⁵⁸⁹

Rear Admiral Larry Marsh (SSG III) commented:

The most valuable thing is the relationships that you develop. There were 8 of us, two submariners, two aviators, two surface officers, and two Marines. It was important to have senior level of officers with potential for promotion. We all were on a good track, and all had futures. Having worked with these guys I could contact people in other communities. I did that at the Pentagon. Andy Jampoler and I both went to be Executive Assistants. When I was at SECNAV OPA [Office of Program Appraisal] I talked to Ed Bodalato when I needed information on the Marines. They opened their networks to me.⁵⁹⁰

Both General Zinni (SSG VI) and Admiral Blair (SSG VI) commented on the value of their relationship when Zinni was CINCCENT and Blair was CINCPAC. They spoke frequently about coordinating force movements. Where they were able to talk directly and work things out, Zinni had more difficulty coordinating forces his CINCEUR counterpart. Zinni liked the ability to ratchet forces up and down, not have too many forces in theater, but use prepositioned sets for units to fall onto. To do that required a willingness to move forces quickly. Close relations between the CENTCOM and PACOM helped create opportunities that would otherwise not have occurred, such as arranging a two-carrier battle group exercise in the South China Sea when carrier schedules were very tight.⁵⁹¹

Bowman still works with Blair on the CNA Military Advisory Board looking at climate change.⁵⁹²

Captain Tom Travis (SSG XII) commented:

⁵⁸⁹ Email to Hanley from Captain Sam Leeds, USN (Retired), 11 January 2015.

⁵⁹⁰ Hanley phone interview with Rear Admiral Larry R. Marsh, USN (Retired), 22 December 2014.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Zinni interview.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, Bowman interview.

The SSG provided a common frame of reference for a cadre of officers that served throughout the U.S. military. The SSG curriculum through these years was similar year to year, projects were reviewed and commented on by previous fellows, discussion between past and present fellows was ubiquitous, and hours of discussion and collaboration among the group resulted in a clear understanding of what the significant issues were. This strong and shared frame of reference did three things:

First, with only minimum steerage, action officers who had been Fellows were able to take on complex tasks for senior officers who had also been Fellows. In my case I did start-ups for Admiral Owens (Naval Warfare Analysis Division—an idea that failed), Admiral Cebrowski (The Maritime Battle Center and Navy Warfare Development Command), and Admiral Giambastiani (The Joint Center for Operational Analysis)

Second, communications with other organizations and staffs were enhanced by an SSG connection. The meat of issues could be quickly and efficiently identified. Often times when difficult issues had to be dealt with, I would call John Hanley (or look in SSG directories) to determine who the best contact person might be.

Third, the viewpoint on many issues could serve as a starting point for complex problems. As a consequence, I found myself going to younger SSG members to get initial grounding on technical and other issues that had to be addressed.⁵⁹³

Network of experts and professionals

A robust travel budget was one of Bob Murray's deal breakers in establishing the SSG. Dialogues with the three- and four-star commanders and their staffs were highly productive, exposed the SSG to new operational ideas, and were avenues for introducing commanders to SSG's thinking in a conversational, though sometimes critical or adversarial, forum.

Learning how those most responsible and those most expert thought about strategic issues was also extremely valuable. The Fellows could arrange meetings with whomever they wanted. Talking to foreign military and government officials both gave them confidence in conducting military diplomacy, and provided them with

⁵⁹³ Ibid., Travis email.

first-hand perspectives of foreign interests, concerns, perspectives, and likely responses to U.S. actions. Talking to the foremost academic experts in the topic they were studying broadened their horizons. Through their interactions on the SSG, many Fellows maintained professional networks of military, foreign, and academic expertise that they used throughout their careers.

For Rear Admiral Larry Marsh (SSG III), after the relationships with the other Fellows, travel was most important:

I know that it can be very expensive. But getting out and seeing people was very important. We spent a lot of time in the Gulf. You remember our famous mid-air collision.⁵⁹⁴ Traveling overseas further balances you. I would recommend travel to understand the key areas. It was a very valuable experience; relationships and travel improved my understanding, helped me work on naval warfare, with the Secretary, and at the Bureau of Personnel. The international perspective also helped me when I moved on at Olmsted Foundation following my retirement.⁵⁹⁵

Colonel Andy Hesser (SSG III) found travel the most valuable part of his year: “The most valuable thing to me was the opportunity to talk to planners at major commands across the world. It opened our eyes to strategic thinking at the commands: Bahrain, Japan, Korea, EUCOM all talked to us about their assumptions and planning.”⁵⁹⁶

Vice Admiral Bat LaPlante (SSG V) stated:

One of the most important things I learned while with the SSG—probably the most important—was that the answer from the staff is often different from the commander’s answer. In cases of not-the-usual-run-of-business questions, often markedly different. I learned it the hard way, I was embarrassed by it, and I never forgot it. In my first Flag tour I was double-hatted as COMNAVLOGPAC and CINCPACFLT Staff N4. At LOGPAC I spent a lot of time making sure that my staff knew how I thought, what was important to me and what was not, etc. so that they could pretty accurately predict how I

⁵⁹⁴ See earlier section on SSG III.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Marsh interview.

⁵⁹⁶ Hanley phone interview with Colonel William A. Hesser, USMC (Retired), 29 December 2014.

would react to almost anything. I also spent time on the flip side—coaxing their opinions out of them so I could know how they thought and then try to make adjustments.⁵⁹⁷

Admiral Tom Hall (SSG VII) found that traveling around the world was the most valuable to him:

We got the attention of the highest decision makers because of our connection to the CNO. They listened to us and let us hear what they were thinking. The high-level exposure was invaluable. When I made Flag [I] had been around the world and had worked with the guy at the top. That prepared me for my Flag assignments. I turned out to be the longest serving (in history) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and finally was acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.⁵⁹⁸

Colonel John Woodhead (SSG VII) wrote:

I would submit that the travel and resultant meetings with combatant command staffs, other service staffs and foreign government officials is of great value. While the SSG is mostly and rightfully in the receive mode there is still enough interplay to make this worthwhile. Of course much of what is heard is the official position and readily available in the press and from our own government but often impressions and beliefs beyond the official are communicated.⁵⁹⁹

Vice Admiral Tim Wright (SSG VII) echoed Larry Marsh: “Working with the Fellows was part of the greatest value to me. The second thing was the access that we had. The reputation of the group and our relationship to the CNO meant that we could arrange meetings with whoever we needed.”⁶⁰⁰

Colonel Al Ponnwitz (SSG IX) also felt the main value of the SSG was “to bring together a small group of independently-minded officers to advise the CNO on issues important to the continuing, evolving, and relevant contribution of naval forces to the U.S. National Strategy.” He added, “A distinct benefit to all was the experience to travel to many varied commands and organizations and explore the role of the naval

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid. Memo from Vice Admiral John B. LaPlante, USN (Retired), 28 September 2014.

⁵⁹⁸ Hanley phone interview with Rear Admiral Thomas F. Hall, USN (Retired), 21 November 2014 and email from Hall to Hanley, 23 June 2015.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., Woodhead memo.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., Wright interview.

service in the U. S. National Strategy. It was also beneficial to meet and have discussions with the commanders and staff.”⁶⁰¹

Colonel George Benskin (SSG X) found: “Extensive travel and meetings with experts for discussions was an extremely important part of SSG X’s research and information gathering. Leading experts, both military and civilian, were from the United States and Europe and provided integral insights and background into their areas of expertise contained within the final report. These experts represented a diverse range of specialties. Many of the people interviewed were visionaries as well as top performers in their fields.”⁶⁰²

Gaming

The research that went into preparing for games and gaming from the perspectives of the NCA, Unified CINCs, other U.S. government agencies, allies, joint and naval commanders and staffs, and adversaries, with people who had experience, prepared the SSG Fellows to deal with the real counterparts for those organizations in future assignments. Admiral Leighton “Snuffy” Smith and General Tony Zinni commented on how gaming prepared them to step into turbulent times as the Director and Deputy EUCOM Operations (J3) with little additional preparation.⁶⁰³

Many others commented on the value of gaming.

Rear Admiral Larry Marsh (SSG III) said, “Include at least two war games in SSG schedule—two different war games; a long-range and a short-range focus. SSG should understand war games. Get people out of the office, put the iPhones aside, focus on the game.”⁶⁰⁴

Admiral Dennis Blair (SSG VI) stated, “The games were also valuable. I turned to gaming when Deputy at J-8. I also tried to game Afghanistan as Director of National Intelligence, but could not get the CJCS to join me.”⁶⁰⁵

Rear Admiral Tom Hall (SSG VI) said, “I took to Iceland the war gaming we did and how to test strategy. We did not do extensive gaming there, but used modeling and

⁶⁰¹ Ibid., Ponnwitz memo.

⁶⁰² Ibid., Benskin memo.

⁶⁰³ Ibid., Zinni and Smith interviews.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid., Marsh interview.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid., Blair interview.

gaming. At the SSG I learned to appreciate modeling and gaming to test the strategy.”⁶⁰⁶

Captain Mike Farmer (SSG VIII) said:

The gaming at the SSG also helped. It was my first experience gaming. I found it invaluable in fostering understanding of complex issues, creative solution approaches, and—perhaps most importantly—forming a network of trust among participants. I used gaming at the Joint Staff and subsequently with the Intelligence Community to understand complex issues and challenges. It was this process that we used in J5 to develop early options for Operation DESERT STORM. The SSG approach worked. Bringing diverse elements of the IC together was key. The connections that I made on the SSG helped. Interactions at meals and evening socials built trust in relationships.⁶⁰⁷

And Admiral Ed Giambastiani (SSG X) stated:

I remember going to the Global War Game in 1990 on my way to the SSG where we were gaming Iraq invading Kuwait just before it happened. I recall talking about the Union of Fewer and Fewer Republics. Talking to experts and gaming really helped me. We had access to what was going on in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Most of what we anticipated was right, except we expected Japan to take over the world. I learned how to do gaming at the SSG and used it everywhere after that. I remember participating in Bill Owens’ SECNAV war games with Joe Prueher in the Fall of 1991 [just after leaving the SSG]. That resulted in our moving minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. As commanding officer of NR-1 I had an appreciation for the challenges of dealing with mines. I ran six games as OPNAV N87. As the PACFLT N8 I use gaming to determine when, how, and where to engage. As OPNAV N8 I ran two games for Admiral Vern Clark (CNO) where I brought in Congress. They were great to get people away from their desks and thinking. We don’t do enough war gaming now.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid., Hall interview.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., Farmer email, 10 August 2015.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., Giambastiani interview.

In his last assignment on active duty, Larry Seaquist (SSG III) moved to Andy Marshall's office (OSD Net Assessment) and worked on international refugees, developing gaming approaches. Following retirement from the Navy, he went to work with Alvin Toffler. This gave him the opportunity to work with Gorbachev and other former world leaders on U.N. security efforts. He began working with UNESCO on "peace games," simulating complex contingencies. The number of teams was large. One game began with 9 teams; then one team split into 3, making 11 teams in that game. The focus was on how to empower the locals for self-governance.⁶⁰⁹

Access to intelligence & special access programs

The Fellows also commented on the value of access to sensitive intelligence and special access programs (SAPs)—another of Bob Murray's original deal-breaker conditions with CNO Admiral Tom Hayward. Interactions with the intelligence community taught them both what was available and how to access directly the intelligence they needed. Knowledge of special access programs taught them what they could, and could not, expect from systems reserved for war, and the challenges involved in getting permission to use these capabilities should they deem it necessary.

The SSG provided Admiral Blair (SSG VI) with his first exposure to the Intelligence Community.⁶¹⁰ Later in his career, he became the first Assistant Director at the CIA for Military Affairs and then the Director for National Intelligence. While on the SSG, he visited NSA to look at source intelligence behind estimates of Soviet naval mine inventories. The ability to study the raw intelligence allowed him to judge the confidence that he could place on reports that had been vetted through the IC.

General Zinni (SSG VI) commented:⁶¹¹

We had access to the intelligence on Soviets that I never would have had, and for the counters, we had access to all of the Black programs [SAPs] that I would never otherwise have seen. This gave us the ability to see both sides and provided an understanding of the whole cold war structure. This was really a strategic study and taught me what was involved in developing strategy. I interviewed a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) defector who had been an armored guy. He said

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid., Seaquist interview.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid. Blair interview.

⁶¹¹ Ibid., Zinni interview.

that our grain shipments were feeding the Soviet Army. This led us to think more broadly than strategic maneuver. We came up with approaches to embargo ports and cut off their access. Some things came out that were insightful. We played SAPs at a strategic level. These things helped me at EUCOM.⁶¹²

Captain Mike Farmer (SSG VIII) felt that the greatest boon to him was the relationship to intelligence as an SSN commanding officer, at OP-65, and on the SSG. He had commanded the USS *Richard B. Russell* (SSN 687). At OP-65 he had been a member of the ATP “lunch-bunch,” a follow-on to “breakfast club.” He noted:

This experience led to like accesses for SSG VIII expanding the breadth of appreciation for operational intelligence among all of us on SSG VIII. Immersion in the SSG during travel, meals, sessions, and games let us get to know each other better and build trust. We learned from each other about naval air, surface, and submarine warfare, and the USMC. I was given the OK to brief the Group on sensitive submarine operations. They never would have had that background. The SSG experience allowed us to understand the other warfare communities and the rest of the Navy and Joint Headquarters.⁶¹³

Value to the CNO

Paraphrasing philosopher and Bishop George Berkeley’s idea that “man is an idea in the mind of God,” Bob Wood noted that “the SSG is an idea in the mind of the CNO.”⁶¹⁴ The SSG Fellows and staff fully understood that the SSG existed only as the CNO perceived value in the Group. All the CNOs devoted significant personal attention to the selection of, the work by, and the follow-on assignments for, the SSG Fellows.

⁶¹² Ibid., Travis email.

⁶¹³ Email to Hanley from Captain Michael Farmer, USN (Retired), 10 August 2015.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., Wood interview.

CNO Hayward

Admiral Hayward's approach to the SSG

It was Admiral Hayward who approved Bob Murray's vision—and stipulations—and directed that the SSG be created. CNO Hayward began the practice of personally selecting the SSG Fellows. His aims for the Group were to provide future Navy leaders with the experience they would need to direct the Navy in combat should they become fleet or combatant commanders, to spur strategic discourse among the Navy leadership and officer corps, and to convince the leadership of the armed forces that the Navy was thinking. Hayward placed a premium on the academic and intellectual freedom afforded to the SSG.⁶¹⁵ His concern was providing officers an opportunity to think and becoming part of strategic dialogue, not in creating a written product. Not concerned with aligning their studies with contemporary Navy doctrine, he never created any intellectual roadblocks or directives.

He saw the SSG as a developmental year, not a staff job. He left all details of running the program to the SSG Director and his team. He approved the SSG's access to the most sensitive intelligence and Navy special programs, and supported their travel and interactions with U.S. and foreign military, government, and academic leaders and organizations to stimulate strategic thought. He also established the practice of personally approving follow-on assignments of the SSG Fellows to ensure that the Navy benefited from the year that it had invested in them and to put them on a path for higher command.

As a former thoughtful COMSEVENTHFLT and CINCPACFLT and now a member of the JCS, Hayward believed that he had a legitimate and important role as CNO in fostering Navy strategic concepts and Navy strategic thinkers. This was reflected in several initiatives during his term, of which creation of the SSG was among the most important.

Value of the SSG to Admiral Hayward

The success of SSG I and II's work on the maritime strategy exceeded Hayward's mandate to the Group. His primary concern was in giving future fleet and joint force commanders an opportunity to think deeply about warfighting before they arrived at their senior assignments. He also valued the role that the SSG played in stimulating strategic discourse and debate among the Navy leadership. He was disappointed only that some chose to retire after SSG service, and that not as many as he had intended

⁶¹⁵ Ibid., Murray interview, 5 August 2014.

were promoted to Flag and top Navy positions.⁶¹⁶ On his watch SSG I created a formal Top Secret report, but the report was of tertiary interest to Hayward

CNO Watkins

Admiral Watkins' approach to the SSG

When Watkins became CNO, he followed Hayward's practices of selecting Fellows, letting the SSG select the topic they would study, and personally approving follow-on assignments. The records clearly demonstrate that he personally ran the processes for selection and follow-on assignment. He also agreed to NWC President Rear Admiral Service's recommendation that Professor Bob Wood relieve Bob Murray as director, and Secretary Lehman's later suggestion that Ambassador Marshall Brement replace Wood. In particular, he ensured that SSG graduates filled key billets in his Naval Warfare Directorate (OP-095), another Hayward innovation that he supported and expanded on. He headed others toward OP-06, and resisted assigning former Fellows to shore billets not directly dealing with strategic and operational concepts, no matter how highly regarded the job.

As the SSG became influential, Watkins wanted to protect it from other senior officers and ensure they knew of his interest; therefore, he formalized the functions, tasks, and organizational relationships of the SSG. Under Watkins, the SSG became "the Navy's focal point on framing strategic issues and the conceptualization/development of concepts for naval strategy and tactics."⁶¹⁷ Meetings between the CNO and SSG increased to bimonthly under Watkins. He had the SSG brief at each Navy CINCs conference and had them travel widely to stir strategic debate. With SSG IV, he began the practice of assigning a topic to the SSG. The SSG became his organization, working with the ATP, to develop naval strategies as a basis for military and national strategies for deterring the Soviet Union and promoting U.S. interests in an era of "violent peace." His SSGs all produced Top Secret reports at the end of their years, as had Hayward's SSG I.

Watkins, like Hayward, had had fleet command and was now a JCS member. He too believed he had a legitimate and important role as CNO in fostering Navy strategic concepts and Navy strategic thinkers. He clearly saw himself as a player in the shaping not only of U.S. Navy strategy but of national strategy as well.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., Hayward interview.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., Memo From CNO memo to President, Naval War College and Director SSG, 12 September 1983.

Value of the SSG to Admiral Watkins

Following the success of the first two SSGs, Watkins looked to the SSG also to drive Navy strategic, operational, and tactical concepts. He appreciated the strategic dialogue that SSG III stimulated and their concepts for economic and diplomatic, in addition to military, approaches for dealing with what he called the “violent peace.” He turned directly to SSGs IV and V to develop sophisticated concepts and what came to be called “whole of government” options for deterring the Soviets and preparing for adversarial actions undermining U.S. interests. The SSG was one of his special staffs—he had others for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and nuclear matters and for understanding strategy for the Marines—that he used to prepare positions, briefs, and papers that he could take to other services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the National Security Council and President to promote his ideas.

CNO Trost

Admiral Trost’s approach to the SSG

CNO Trost followed Watkins’ practice. He had had numerous interactions with the SSG in his previous senior Flag officer assignments, and was comfortable with what he regarded as an important—and by now routine—role that it played within the Navy and beyond. He devoted at least as much time to selecting and assigning the SSG as did Watkins. He emphasized the broad education of the Group. He assigned specific tasks, using the Group to keep the *Maritime Strategy* valid, while providing him insights into the thinking in PACOM and EUCOM/CENTCOM at a time when allies questioned the need to retain U.S. military bases and access as the Soviet threat started to diminish and broader challenges to international security emerged. He began meeting with SSG VI almost monthly to discuss their work on countering potential Soviet counters to the Maritime Strategy, then reverted to bimonthly meetings with subsequent SSGs.

Trusting small staffs for specialized work, he turned to OP-00K rather than to his DCNOs and DMSOs for coordinating matters related to the SSG. He ensured that the Group maintained their access to sensitive intelligence and programs. He continued Watkins’ practice of having the SSG brief at the Navy CINC conferences and travel widely to test their ideas and promote strategic discourse across the Navy leadership. His SSGs also each produced a Secret or Top Secret report as they ended their year. On the advice of Admiral Bill Smith, he chose Robin Pirie to succeed Ambassador Marshall Bremant as SSG Director.

Trost was the Navy’s first post-Goldwater Nichols Act CNO. As his term wore on, and especially with the replacement of Admiral William Crowe by General Colin Powell as CJCS, Trost found himself increasingly constrained in the influence he could exert on matters of naval policy, strategy, and operations. Nevertheless, he maintained a

strong interest in those matters, and that was reflected in his continued strong support for the SSG, and his continued use of the SSG to examine such matters.

Value of the SSG to Admiral Trost

Trost changed the SSG's tasking from developing concepts for the Navy and the nation to developing concepts for him. Like Hayward, he viewed the SSG as providing a broad education for future Navy leaders.⁶¹⁸ The SSG had the highest promotion rate to Flag under his tenure. On the other hand, he did not follow Watkins' practice of funneling former SSG Fellows primarily into his OP-06 and OP-095 directorates, but rather sent them to a variety of important Navy shore jobs—and to command. With Goldwater-Nichols Act joint assignment policies a reality, he also ensured that those who needed to went to important jobs in OSD, on the Joint Staff and at SHAPE.

Trost's SSGs studied topics of particular interest to him, providing insights into Soviet developments, and into security issues in the Pacific and Mediterranean.⁶¹⁹ He also valued the role of the SSG in keeping the dialogue alive to validate the *Maritime Strategy* as the security environment rapidly changed during his tenure. When his VCNO and Chief of Naval Personnel questioned the value of assigning officers to SSG, he created a CEP Task Force led by Hon. Bob Murray—whose vision and efforts had led to the creation of the SSG—to study the issue. Trost decided to keep the SSG as it was.

Admiral Trost would be the Navy's last Cold War CNO.

CNO Kelso

ADM Kelso's approach to the SSG

Admiral Kelso was the Navy's first post-Cold War CNO. Records on his selection and assignment of SSG Fellows are not as extensive as those of Watkins and Trost. However, following the Tailhook scandal, and with Admiral Stan Arthur as his VCNO, he did change the selection process for SSG XII to include women. Of the four women selected as Fellows in SSGs XII-XIV, the Navy promoted two to vice admiral and one to rear admiral—a promotion rate higher than that of their male counterparts. He also broadened membership on the SSG to include U.S. Coast Guard officers, given the increased importance of maritime security operations in the post-Cold War environment.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid., Trost interview.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid., Admiral Bill Smith interview.

Facing radical changes in the global security environment, Admiral Kelso used the SSG to help him anticipate the future to decide on what kind of navy to build and retain. He also valued the education that prepared SSG officers for greater responsibilities. He continued the practice of meeting with the Group bimonthly, but often seemed distracted, at first by DESERT STORM, and then by the Tailhook scandal and the USS *Iowa* incident, which took more of his attention.⁶²⁰ Following his initial expression of interest in the future, he adopted tasking recommended by the SSG Director for SSGs XI and XII. On the recommendation of the Director, SSG XIII developed their own tasking to help the CNO deal with the new salience of forward presence in defense planning. The Group felt that Kelso was not fully invested in the subject, and that they were in direct competition with OPNAV efforts to address the same topic.

While continuing to travel broadly as previous SSGs had done for education and to stimulate strategic dialogue, the SSG was no longer invited to participate in CINCs conferences, as they had under CNOs Watkins and Trost. Also in contrast to their predecessors, the final reports of Kelso's SSGs were all labeled "Unclassified: For Official Use Only (FOUO)," ensuring a much wider readership and potential influence than their predecessors but signaling reduced importance to some. On the advice of SSG Director Robin Pirie, Kelso selected Ambassador Frank McNeil to succeed Pirie as Director.

Kelso served as CNO while the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act kicked in with a vengeance. By design, the Act constrained him in the influence he could bring to bear on matters of policy and strategy, while focusing him on his "organize, train and equip" role. Moreover, that latter role was now fraught with colossal and time-consuming difficulties, as the Navy struggled to downsize rapidly in the wake of the end of the Cold War, shedding force structure.

Value of the SSG to Admiral Kelso

By the time Admiral Kelso became CNO, the SSG was mature but the security environment was changing rapidly. Kelso looked to the SSG to help him manage reorientation of the Navy and cuts to its force structure following the Cold War. He appreciated the candor of their analysis, while not being able to accept their projections for the Navy declining from about 580 to close to 250 ships over the coming two decades. Though the SSG suggested implications of the change for the Navy and recommended that strategic perspectives and specific initiatives have more to do with DoD, joint, and Navy practices than force structure, DESERT

⁶²⁰ Ibid., Interviews with Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Rear Admiral James Stark (Retired), and Captain Mike Martus (Retired).

SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Tailhook, and the USS *Iowa* investigation distracted him from taking action on their work.

CNO Boorda

Admiral Boorda's approach to the SSG

While all CNOs after Admiral Hayward had had exposure to the SSG before becoming CNO, none had had as extensive interactions with the SSG as Admiral Boorda. As Executive Assistant to CNO Watkins, Chief of Naval Personnel, and CINCUSNAVEUR/AFSOUTH, he paid close attention to the SSG, continuing to evaluate the program against alternative uses of the talent assigned. He was directly involved in the selection and assignment of the SSG Fellows, and continued Trost's policy of sending them to command, joint billets, and challenging Navy staff billets of all kinds, not just those dealing with strategy and warfighting concepts. He also continued Kelso's policies of not inviting the SSGs to his CINCs conferences and publishing their reports mostly as unclassified FOUO documents.

He became CNO just as SSG XIII was completing their work, and preferred the OPNAV efforts aimed at achieving a particular surface combatant force structure to the more innovative SSG approaches that might allow fewer ships to accomplish forward presence.

He considered changing the SSG early in his tenure. To SSG XIII and XIV, he sent conflicting signals regarding the function of the group as professional development of the officers versus their producing a “tangible” product. He was almost silent on their role in promoting strategic discourse within the Navy. He clearly had been dissatisfied with the SSG's work when he was CINCUSNAVEUR and CNO.⁶²¹ He discouraged travel by the Group except as needed to address specific aspects of their tasking. In the end, he opted to direct the Group toward projects “inside the Navy lifelines”—i.e., long-term naval warfare innovation—rather than maritime strategy, and naval policy, operations, and tactics. He desired ideas for future Navy major platforms from the SSG's work, though he never tasked them to do so.⁶²²

Boorda was clearly a post-Goldwater-Nichols CNO, focused on the problems of “organizing, training and equipping” the Navy in a period of slashed defense budgets and rapid downsizing. He was less seized with issues of national and naval strategy and operations than his predecessors, and focused more on the need to preserve

⁶²¹ Hanley interview with Captain Robby Harris, USN (SSG XII), from his position as N00K working the transition of the SSG, 8 August 2014.

⁶²² *Ibid.* Vice Admiral Tracey (Retired), interview.

force structure, develop compelling arguments to do so, and foster technical innovation to take advantage of the Revolution in Military Affairs,

Value of the SSG to Admiral Boorda

Admiral Boorda had come up through the ranks—from sailor to CNO—and placed less value on study and education than his predecessors.⁶²³ He had long experience with the SSG when serving as CNO Watkins' Executive Assistant and believed he had better uses for the talent devoted to the SSG when Chief of Naval Personnel. He viewed the work of the SSG as being “too pol-mil and too little mil-pol.” The highly conceptual and innovative work of SSG XIII, which completed their year under Boorda following Kelso's early retirement, led to recommendations with which he disagreed. The SSG was on probation. Against advice from his deputies, however, he initially decided to keep the SSG as it was and tasked them to look 10 years into the future and tell him what he should do with his remaining three years as CNO. Like their predecessors, SSG XIV provided strategic context for his decisions and recommended practices and policies that he could adopt, but did not delve into specific Navy platforms. Again, he was dissatisfied.

Based on a recommendation from a CNO Executive Panel task force, he now decided to bring in a retired admiral as the new SSG Director, the first retired admiral to take the position, and have the SSG form concept-generation teams to develop innovative naval warfare concepts for the future. Appreciating the work of SSG XV, the first to examine naval warfare innovation, he kept the program on that track as he considered what to do over the longer term.

Both Kelso and Boorda were more interested in managing the post-Cold War Navy than in maritime strategy. As their SSGs continued their emphasis on maritime strategy in the emerging strategic environment, it became apparent that the Navy would need to work not only with other services in joint operations but also to work with a broad range of non-traditional security partners and other government agencies to accomplish national security tasks. Recommendations for doing this did not align well with efforts aimed at maintaining Navy force structure and selecting specific platform designs, which Kelso and Boorda might have found more valuable. As such, the value of the SSG to the CNOs diminished in the early 1990s, even as their work accurately envisioned the emerging security environment and pointed to future strategies and practices that the Navy would adopt.⁶²⁴

⁶²³ Ibid., interviews with Tracey and Rondeau.

⁶²⁴ This paragraph provides a summary of comments provided in interviews by SSG Directors and Fellows working for Admirals Kelso and Boorda.

Conclusion

Vice Admiral Ann Rondeau (SSG XIV) commented:

As a resource for the CNO, the group provided an operational perspective to larger strategic questions; it provided a pragmatic approach to “wicked problems” and permitted the CNO to task Navy professionals, as a diverse group with varying professional backgrounds and contexts, to consider issues from a grounded perspective. In some ways, in this period the SSG anticipated for CNO the feedback from studied sources in the Navy now more accessible through social media: a relatively experienced perspective that put a different cast on larger questions. The SSG was a Petri dish of ideas for the CNO. It allowed the CNO to tighten the aperture ring around a wide ranging specific question or a larger and more encompassing question. In combination with the other internal intellectual forces and resources available to the CNO (NWC, CEP, 00X, a vibrant and intellectually rich Navy staff and strategically minded senior leaders), the Navy intellectual heft was arguably peerless during these early years of the SSG and the SSG provided another avenue for CNO’s thinking.⁶²⁵

Value through promoting strategic dialogue

In *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986*, Newport Paper 19, John B. Hattendorf provides an extensive account on the renaissance in strategic thinking across the Navy over that decade, and the SSG’s role in promoting strategic dialogue. The SSG made significant efforts to go to the fleets, listen to the commander’s problems, and involve them in war games and briefings to “test market” SSG ideas. By their count, Bill Owens and Art Cebrowski briefed 162 Flag officers on SSG I’s work. Many senior officers enjoyed SSG’s visits and would send officers to participate in SSG war games. Those officers brought back new perspectives, and, in some cases those led to direct changes in contingency and operational plans. SSG Fellows also commented on the effects of their dialogues during interviews.

Captain Sam Leeds (SSG I) said, “The Maritime Strategy of 1980s flowed quickly to the fleets and had I think significant impact along with similar Army and Air Force

⁶²⁵ Ibid., Rondeau email, 17 August 2015.

ideas of that vintage. I can attest to doing so at SIXTH Fleet in the 1980s. The same was true at SEVENTH Fleet. When I went to SIXTH Fleet we developed charts for havens. They did not have them when I first got there. Not sure whose idea it really was, but I remember Jay Hurlburt (SSG II) briefing us.”⁶²⁶

LCDR Stan Weeks (OPNAV OP-603), as an OPNAV action officer, crafted what became the first version of the Navy’s classified *Maritime Strategy*, in 1982. His pass-down-the-line notes to his successors cited the positive influence on his efforts of the SSG, through his interactions with the SSG staff. His immediate successor, Commander Peter Swartz, followed his advice and continued the OPNAV-SSG dialogue, in building on Weeks’s work.⁶²⁷

Colonel Andy Hesser (SSG III) said, “When we briefed our Cuban strategy to CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT some 3-star thought that our ideas were stupid, but the CINC, Admiral MacDonald, liked them. We were looking at the days leading up to World War III. We did some good work and had some impact at CINCLANT.”⁶²⁸

Captain Mike Pestorius (SSG III) also provided trip reports commenting on how his travels to commands in the Caribbean resulted in staffs understanding the need for them to think about what they would do in the event of a war with the Soviets.⁶²⁹

CNO Watkins and SECNAV Lehman touted the role of the SSG in their congressional testimony in 1984 and 1985.

General Tony Zinni (SSG VI) said: “On the SSG we received a lot of attention when we went around Washington and visited major commands. The nature of our task drew the attention of the senior people. The CINCs were interested because the SSG was addressing their theater and their number one mission.”⁶³⁰

Admiral Dennis Blair (SSG VI) commented on pollinating ideas with the people they met: “Talking to people about our tasking and ideas caused them to think. We were taken seriously. We [SSG VI] came up with little new, but were able to bring together ideas from a lot of places.”⁶³¹ Blair published an article entitled “The Strategic

⁶²⁶ Ibid., Leeds interview.

⁶²⁷ Swartz recollections. Weeks’ PDL notes in Peter Swartz personal files.

⁶²⁸ Ibid., Hesser interview.

⁶²⁹ Ibid., Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Trip Report, 15 February 1984, signed by Pestorius and Hesser.

⁶³⁰ Ibid., Zinni interview.

⁶³¹ Ibid., Blair interview.

Significance of Maritime Theaters” in the *Naval War College Review* and *Naval Institute Proceedings* in 1988 based on his SSG experience.

Captain Mike Farmer (SSG VIII) related that while in Turkey meeting with the general staff, they asked who the submariner was. He identified himself and they asked him if submarines had operated in the Black Sea. He said that British ones had during the First World War, but he did not know of any operations since then. They asked what the challenges for U.S. subs would be operating in the Black Sea. He told them that reloading would be the toughest problem because of the target-rich environment. They said they could help with that and divulged a facility on their Black Sea coast, tunneled into the mountains, which could be used. He provided this information to the defense attaché and COMSIXTHFLT.⁶³²

Colonel Al Ponnwitz (SSG IX) said: “As we made our presentations to high-level commands throughout the world [on Iraq invading Kuwait], the prevalent reaction was one of absolute disbelief. CINCs would confer with their intelligence staffs who would opine that we were in error (often followed by the question, “What were you smoking at Newport?”)⁶³³

Robin Pirie (Director, SSGs IX through the beginning of XII) commented that SSG visits to CINCs at beginning and end of year had two-way impact. He also arranged for Washington Post journalist Ed Yoder, a fellow Rhodes Scholar, to meet with the group and write an article.⁶³⁴

Colonel Sean Leach (SSG IX) said:

In the course of our study we received numerous intelligence briefings on current Soviet military capabilities and probable strategic intentions. Not surprisingly, the SSG’s understanding of these topics was more advanced than that of many Flag officers we encountered when briefing our study’s progress. We often met a bow wave of resistance from senior officers when we said that a new balance of power was in the offing. They were still mired in the supposed verities of Cold War dogma and rudely dismissed our ideas out of hand. Closed minds and anti-intellectualism were frequently on display. I’ll never forget one briefing where the SECNAV, CNO and CMC were present when a future CNO thundered in anger at us that we had probably never read a book and were egregiously stupid to suggest that the Russians would ever downsize their forces. The

⁶³² Ibid., Farmer interview.

⁶³³ Ibid., Ponnwitz memo.

⁶³⁴ Ibid., Pirie interview.

SECNAV told him to pipe down because he had received some of the same briefings the SSG had, and he knew we were right!⁶³⁵

SSG staff roles in furthering wider dialogue

SSG Directors and staff also contributed to the strategic dialogue and development through interviews, briefings, and publishing articles:

- The *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* published an interview with Bob Murray, “A Warfighting Perspective,” providing an overview of the SSG and CNWS in 1983.
- The *Naval War College Review* published Bob Wood and John Hanley’s article “The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic” in 1985, providing an unclassified account of the concepts developed by the first two SSGs. The *Atlantic Community Quarterly* reprinted this article in 1986.
- Bob Murray’s presentation, “The U.S. Maritime Strategy,” appeared in the *Proceedings of a Symposium on the High North* in 1987.
- Bob Wood also wrote articles on “Maritime Strategy for War in the North” in *Defense and Diplomacy* in Sep 1986, with lots of discussion of anti-SSBN operations and some ties to the Striking Fleet, and a book chapter called “Fleet Renewal and Maritime Strategy in the 1980s” published in 1989.
- Based on the work of SSGs X and XI and his own research, Hanley published an article, “Implications of the Changing Nature of Conflict for the Submarine Force,” in the *Naval War College Review* in autumn 1993. He used this material for presentations to Professor Paul Kennedy’s international security program at Yale, to the Navy Submarine League, and to naval reserve audiences.
- In winter 2001, Hanley also published an article in *The Washington Quarterly* with Admiral Dennis Blair “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements” inspired by the work of the SSGs in the early 1990s and reflecting their implementation by Admiral Blair as CINCPAC.

⁶³⁵ Memo from Colonel Sean K. Leach, USMC, 11 February 2015.

Value to the naval service and beyond: Impacts on Navy and joint plans, concepts, exercises, and operations

The most direct impacts of the SSG on Navy and joint plans, concepts, exercises, and operations resulted from the work of SSGs I through V. The effects of SSG XI's game shortly before DESERT STORM has been discussed in previous sections of this paper. Though having no direct influence, the work of the SSG's in the early 1990s presaged the development of *A Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Security*, published in 2007. CNO Jon Greenert stated that he definitely used the thinking he had done on SSG XII in his updated 2015 strategy document, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, and Ready*.

Plans

SSG I had almost immediate impact on Navy war plans. Before Goldwater-Nichols, the services created their own war plans, through their service component commanders and functional commanders. Within the Navy, the Navy CINCs, numbered fleet commanders, and submarine forces had their own plans. COMSUBLANT took the detailed work of the SSG that had used actual submarine wartime patrol areas to compute the time to deploy the force and the effects of the sea control campaign and assigned submarines to these areas in accordance with the SSG's scheme.⁶³⁶ The plans also specified the submarine target priorities used by the SSG to enable combined arms ASW and sites for locating submarine tenders in order to reduce the distances that submarines had to transit for rearming and maintenance. In 1983 COMSUBLANT promulgated updated war plans for its submarine forces.

Similarly, SSG II affected SIXTH Fleet plans. Captain Sam Leeds had gone from the SSG to be the Chief of Staff at SIXTH Fleet. In that position, he was instrumental in ensuring SIXTH Fleet staff participation in SSG war games. When SSG II developed the haven concept for protecting carrier battle groups against Soviet bomber raids, SIXTH Fleet adopted it immediately. This allowed the fleet to stay in the eastern Mediterranean at the start of war with acceptable risk. SSG II also conducted detailed analysis of the Pacific fleet submarine force using the same analytic approach that SSG I had done for the Soviet northern flank. SUBPAC war plans then changed to mirror those in the Atlantic.

⁶³⁶ Hanley provided the SSG data and conveyed the concepts to the SUBLANT staff.

Bob Murray recalled that a SIXTH Fleet staff officer told him he used his experience in the SSG game to change war plans, and that CINCUSNAVEUR told him that SSG ideas allowed him to keep the CVs in the eastern Med rather than pull them west at the beginning of conflict.⁶³⁷

Concepts, exercises, and operations

The Maritime Strategy

The SSG gave a powerful boost to the creation and implementation of the underlying concepts of the Maritime Strategy: early, global, rapid, forward offensive joint, allied operations against Soviet forces on the NATO European flanks, in the northwest Pacific and in the Arctic, to deter war and, should deterrence fail, be capable of making a strategic difference through imaginative operations and tactics.

Combined arms ASW

Wolkensdorfer and Owens' combined arms ASW concept was the beginning of Owens' efforts to get more combat power out of a fixed set of forces by combining their capabilities. Following his assignment as Executive Assistant to Director of Naval Warfare (OP-95), in 1984 Owens commanded submarine squadron FOUR in Charleston, South Carolina. He arranged to exchange staff officers with Captain Jake Tobin, Commander Patrol Squadron 11 in Jacksonville, Florida (who would come to SSG VI), to allow them to exercise and develop covert communications whenever they had a submarine and a P-3 in nearby areas. U.S. submarine forces quickly adopted the concept.

Submarine Development Squadron 12, responsible for developing submarine tactics and technology, worked with higher commands to schedule a major NATO ASW exercise, LANTSUBASWEX 2-86, in March 1986. Captain Thomas D. Ryan commanded SUBDEVRON 12 for this exercise (and reported to SSG VII the following year). The exercise involved U.S. and allied maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), surface, and submarine forces commanded from a headquarters in Northwood, U.K. Sharing long-range contact data from surface ships and submarines with towed arrays and using negative (Bayesian) search techniques to vector MPA to targets and high probability areas for finding simulated Soviet submarines, including their new, quiet OSCAR-class SSGNs, the detection rates exceeded the availability of MPA to prosecute targets. This reversed the normal situation of attack assets waiting for a contact, as there were not enough MPA in the exercise to prosecute the adversary submarines as

⁶³⁷ Ibid., Murray interview, 5 August 2014.

they were localized. Actual Soviet submarines also transited through the exercise area, which covered the Norwegian Sea, providing actual target data.

LANTSUBASWEX 2-88 in February 1988 was smaller in scale and conducted on the edge of the Barents Sea. In addition to combined arms ASW, it employed a mobile ASW command center using a C-141 to deploy the command center and staff to a non-traditional command location in order to complicate the Soviets' ability to target it. The exercise used the NATO AWACS base in Oerland, Norway. Jake Tobin developed the mobile command center concept while on SSG VI and sponsored it in subsequent assignments. He also was Commander Patrol Wings Atlantic for ICEX-90, an extensive exercise involving U.S., U.K., and Canadian MPA and submarines conducting combined arms ASW in the marginal ice zone where the Soviets frequently hid their SSBNs.

Submarine-AWACS operations

Another SSG I concept called for US Air Force AWACS aircraft conducting maritime searches to send locating data on Soviet surface action Groups to forward-deployed submarines via LINK 11. The submarines could then position to attack the most capable anti-air platforms in these groups in order to allow MPA to operate farther forward and roll back Soviet strategic air defenses. Playing SACLANT in Global War Games exposed Rear Admiral J.D. Williams to the concept. As Commander Submarine Group 2, he arranged for exercises between submarines and AWACS that exposed the challenges in exchanging LINK 11 track data between the two platforms. In his next assignment, as Deputy CNO for Submarine Warfare on the OPNAV staff, he worked with the Air Force to make the LINK 11 systems more compatible.

Submarine force surges

Timing was a key element of the SSG's strategy. U.S. submarines had to deploy quickly into waters on the Soviet flanks to hold Soviet forces at risk and have immediate effects at the outbreak of war. To exercise this, COMSUBLANT held an exercise in 1985 to test the ability of the submarine force to deploy quickly and to test and shock the Soviets.⁶³⁸ SUBLANT repeated the exercise in 1987, calling it Agile Player when Marsh (SSG III), who had relieved Owens as Executive Assistant OP-095, was the Chief of Staff at SUBLANT. Though causing some hand-wringing on the SUBLANT staff due to the expense and disruption to normal routines, the exercises were very successful. All submarines that were not involved in major maintenance

⁶³⁸ Phone interview with Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Retired), 20 December 2014.

were underway to their wartime patrol areas within 72 hours.⁶³⁹ They returned before deploying all the way to their forward patrol areas.⁶⁴⁰

Havens

SSG II's concept of hiding naval forces in radar shadows behind land masses to force Soviet naval bombers to close within carrier air defenses before they could lock their cruise missiles onto their targets was originally controversial with some senior naval officers. However, SIXTH Fleet immediately adopted the approach and, with the help of CNA, quickly created charts showing many areas where naval forces could hide in the Mediterranean. In early 1983 PACFLT also experimented with the concept around Japan.⁶⁴¹ Soon SECOND Fleet adopted the tactic, and by 1986 it appeared that the Navy had laid railroad tracks to Vestfjord, Norway. The original concept called for identifying many areas where carriers and escorts could duck in while maintaining their mobility. However, Vestfjord became a preferred location for exercising SECOND Fleet. NORPAC '87 exercised the concept along the Aleutians.⁶⁴²

Joint operations in SIXTH Fleet

As Commander SIXTH Fleet, Owens extended his combined arms concept to joint operations in general. He exchanged staff officers with his Army and Air Force counterparts in the region and conducted joint exercises at every opportunity. He caused some controversy with his Navy colleagues and his commander, Admiral Boorda (CINCSNAVEUR), by—as previously mentioned—sending the carrier air wing ashore to operate with Air Force aircraft while embarking Delta Force helicopters on the carrier. They exercised having 30 helicopters take off simultaneously.⁶⁴³

Joint mission areas

As Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (N-8) and as VCJCS, Owens initiated a process for assessing the ability of platforms to contribute to joint mission areas, reversing the practice of platform sponsors designing their platforms according to their mission priorities. This initiative was derived from notes

⁶³⁹ Phone interview with Rear Admiral Larry R. Marsh, USN (Retired), 22 December 2014.

⁶⁴⁰ Russian admirals commented to Hanley during visits to Russia in 1995 and 1996 that they observed these exercises and were proud to have deployed near U.S. Navy ports in response to these exercises.

⁶⁴¹ Phone interview with Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (Retired), 15 December 2014.

⁶⁴² Email from Dr. Marvin Pokrant, Subj: Adventures of the OEG - Letter Serial #2, 18 December 1997.

⁶⁴³ *Ibid.* Owens interview.

that he made while on SSG I and were a direct enhancement of the capabilities that made the forward maritime strategy operationally viable.

Systems-of-systems

Building on his SSG experience, as VCJCS Owens promoted a systems-of-systems concept calling for all service intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to be interoperable so that forces could share situational awareness at the tactical level.

Net-centric warfare

Art Cebrowski is known as the father of Net-Centric Warfare (NCW). NCW was a direct extension of SSG I's concepts for linking AWACS and NATO's Air-Ground Defense Environment command and control system with naval forces for sea control, and for winning the air war in NATO's northern theater, which was the focus of Art Cebrowski's work. The SSG I concept called for using USMC Tactical Air Operations Centers (TAOC) to create a common operational air picture for land-based and sea-based air defenses. Because the Marines had to work with both NATO and the Navy, they had the only capability to bring together LINK 11 with the NATO Air-Ground Defense Environment, a land-based command and control system. This combined sea- and land-based command and control was key to providing early warning to forward-deployed carriers and land-based air forces defending northern Norway. This networking concept, similar to Owens' systems-of-systems, evolved into NCW as Cebrowski progressed through his career.

Perception Management and Flexible Deterrent Options

The U.S. Navy conducted operations to affect Soviet perceptions before CNO Watkins decided that the nation needed operational plans to deter the Soviets. Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn (SSG X) related an operation involving USS *Coral Sea* (CV 43) in 1981 in which they went into emissions control (EMCON) when in the South China Sea, then lit off their radars and communications when in the Sea of Japan, surprising the Soviets. Admiral Leighton "Snuffy" Smith also commented, "I understood that they made us fly in bad weather just to show the Soviets that we could."⁶⁴⁴ However, when Watkins decided to turn episodic activities into a strategy, SSG IV working with the ATP contributed to the creation of Navy and joint perception management strategy and plans.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., interview.

During his assignment as OP-603, Captain Larry Seaquist (SSG III) was directly involved in developing the Navy and joint perception management plans, which built on Navy and joint deterrent options.⁶⁴⁵

Following this assignment Seaquist took command of USS *Iowa* (BB-61). Knowing of the perception management plans, in August 1986 he was on the Blue side in Exercise Northern Wedding until Vice Admiral Hank Mustin took command of SECOND Fleet during the exercise. *Iowa* then switched to the Orange side simulating a surface action group. Larry had no specific orders so he headed toward Svalbard to get the Soviets' attention. The Soviets overflew frequently. That was likely the furthest north that a battleship had ever been since the Germans raided Svalbard in 1943 with two of them (and nine destroyers).⁶⁴⁶

Another example occurred while on his way to a deployment in the Persian Gulf in October 1987. After pulling into Marseilles, France, Seaquist got orders to detach from his battle group immediately with *Ticonderoga* (CG-47) and proceed to the Norwegian Sea in EMCON. Though the orders contained no explanation, Seaquist knew that this was an exercise to stress the Soviet command and control system. Keeping track of USS *Iowa* was a top Soviet priority. He departed at midnight. The Soviets went "crazy," flying all over the Med' and flushing out their AGIs." When he got up to around Trondheim Norway, he turned on his radars and observed the Soviet surveillance and command and control. The Soviets flew over within hours.

Besides drilling to prepare to execute the maritime strategy, submarine force surges were also part of the perception management plans. Owens had wanted a couple to continue and surface in the Barents Sea to really get the Soviets' attention.⁶⁴⁷

Referring to the Navy's deterrent options, Trost stated: "We did those operations and exercises to keep them off balance, not knowing what we would/could do, and to make them think that we could do more than we really could."⁶⁴⁸

In addressing the SSG's contributions, Captain Larry Seaquist wrote: "Probably the conclusive voice was CNO Watkins telling me that he now could argue every piece of the Navy on its strategic rationale—except for Marines/amphibs. Hence my assignment to figure out what those forces were for and, a year later, the historic "PhibStrat," which he considered a joint Navy-MC MOU of strategic alliance. All of

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid., Seaquist interview.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid. Owens interview.

⁶⁴⁸ Hanley and Swartz interview with Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost, USN (Retired), 19 February 2015.

that was rooted in, especially SSG 1 and SSG 2's work—and credited so by the CINCs when I presented my work.”⁶⁴⁹

Captain Seaquist viewed the best part of his career as developing the Maritime Strategy: first came SSG “1.0” fighting the Soviets; then came SSG “2.0” addressing crises; then bringing in the allies, developing PHIBSTRAT, and Navy deterrent options. By then, the Navy had a mature strategy.

Naval force options/unacceptable acts/forward presence

Admiral Leighton “Snuffy” Smith used SSG V's thinking about unacceptable acts while talking to General Galvin (SACEUR/CINCEUR) about likelihood of the Balkans falling apart following the death of Yugoslav Communist strongman Marshal Tito.⁶⁵⁰ He also had the SSG V naval force options matrices in mind when writing “... *From the Sea*” as (OPNAV N3/5). Smith remembers meeting with the SSG while working on that document.⁶⁵¹ SECNAV Sean O’Keefe required him to take out seven pages of the original draft, so he took out the sections on forward presence. Later emphasis on forward presence in the Clinton administration resulted in the document “*Forward ... From the Sea*” not long afterwards, while the SSG was itself examining naval presence and influence.

Later years

In later years, Joint Staff concepts reflected earlier work by the SSG, such as planning deterrence in codifying “Flexible Deterrent Options,” the emergence of shaping and forward presence replacing forward defense in the National Military Strategies of the 1990s.⁶⁵² But these impacts, while consistent with SSG thinking, were indirect.

Before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, SSG VIII (1988-1989) alerted CNO Trost to the rise of terrorism and growing demands for the use of the Navy across a range of military operations.

SSG IX (1989-1990) anticipated Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and foresaw needs for revisions in joint command structures and the ability to work with non-traditional security partners as a key aspect of future naval operations.

⁶⁴⁹ Email to Hanley from Larry Seaquist, 9 October 2014.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Smith interview.

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵² Email from Rear Admiral Mike McDevitt, USN (Retired) to Captain Peter Swartz, USN (Retired), 15 May 2014.

SSG X (1990-1991), looking to 2010, emphasized the shifts toward regional strategies (which previous SSGs—notably SSG III and SSG V—had advocated); the Navy moving from the blue sea into the littoral with an emphasis on power projection; shifting regional partners; diffuse and uncertain threats; and the importance of U.S. economic growth for international security.

SSG XI (1991-1992) anticipated the size of the U.S. fleet diminishing below 300 ships by 2012; future adversaries relying more on missiles, mines, and electronic warfare; and the need for the nation and the Navy to shape international security as the U.S. economy and population became a smaller portion of the world's total.

SSG XII (1992-1993) again picked up on the theme of the role of the Navy, working with “whole of government” partners to sustain U.S. influence, recommending national approaches for sustaining U.S. leadership, and joint and naval/maritime measures to align Pentagon and CINC practices to the emerging strategic environment.

SSG XIII (1993-1994) developed innovative understandings and approaches for sustaining forward presence and naval influence with smaller naval forces. His experience in this study provided a strong background for CNO Jonathan Greenert when faced with this challenge during his tenure (2011-2015).

SSG XIV (1994-1995) provided accurate predictions to CNO Boorda on the rise of Islamic terrorism and China, and the set of challenges that the nation would face in the early 21st century.

All of these groups suggested how naval forces could strengthen a U.S.-led international system through greater security cooperation with other nations, including issues such as energy, water, key commodities, and environment within the security umbrella. Though few of the recommendations of these SSGs were embraced by the Navy at the time, those writing *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21)*, published in 2007 and its recently published update, subtitled *Forward, Engaged, and Ready* could have used this body of work as the foundation for their efforts. CNO ADM Greenert did so when he approved *CS21: Forward, Engaged and Ready* in March 2015.⁶⁵³

⁶⁵³ CNO ADM Jon Greenert interview with John Hanley and Peter Swartz, 19 Feb 2015.

Critiquing the SSG: What Could Have Been Done Better?

In all its interviews and email exchanges with former SSG Fellows, directors, staff, and others contacted for this study, the research team asked, “What the SSG program could have done better?” Few suggested improvements. Some who did not participate directly in the program, however, provided some criticism. An assessment of records and the few comments that were offered suggest some key points for enhancing the success of the SSG.

Alignment with and of the CNO

Captain Robby Harris (SSG XII) had extensive experience with the SSG. He interacted with the SSG before becoming a Fellow himself during his assignment to OP-00K in 1983–1984, later as OPNAV N-00K working the transition of the SSG in 1995 with Admiral Hogg, and as an advisor to the Group since then. He noted the SSG has an audience of one, the CNO. If the CNO is happy, they are successful. “The CNO must be invested in SSG’s tasking.”⁶⁵⁴

Thomas B. Hayward, the CNO who formed the first Group, was interested principally in preparing the officers for future command. The program under Director Bob Murray clearly accomplished that. Following Hayward’s lead, the next CNO, Admiral Watkins, allowed his first two SSGs to select the focus for their studies while providing guidance. He initially was unsure of SSG III’s focus, but appreciated their results. He then directed the SSGs IV and V to develop strategies that he strongly believed the Navy and the nation needed, and he personally fostered the implementation of their ideas with the Joint Staff and NSC.

The following CNO, Admiral Trost, emphasized the education of the Group, but was keenly interested in having SSG VI Red Team the maritime strategy and accompanying war plans, despite indications that the Soviet Union was in economic,

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid., Harris interview.

social, and political decay. Dennis C. Blair (SSG VI), a Rhodes Scholar in Russian studies, felt retrospectively that Trost's tasking was off the mark:

We were studying war with the Soviets at a time they were falling apart. I took a trip across the Soviet Union on my way to Newport from Japan and saw the rot from the inside. Talking about warfighting helped the group, but was not relevant to the times. We felt under a lot of pressure to produce. Our schedule was intense. We had the legacy of the early SSGs, but that was a one-time opportunity.⁶⁵⁵

If the CNO was not aligned with the times, SSG studies were less useful. Coming at the end of his tenure, and concerned over the Soviet Navy, Trost did little with SSG IX's work on Iraq invading Kuwait, despite having approved their focusing on that topic rather than war with the Soviets. His central concern to the end of his term was on deterring and fighting the Soviets, keeping up with their continuing building program, and countering their propaganda campaign to limit USN SLBMs, SLCMs, and freedom of movement, through arms control constraints.

Kelso was interested, but not fully invested in the tasks that he approved for his SSGs. He approved what SSG Director Pirie had drafted based on their conversations. Though he found the work of his SSGs insightful, he was never fully satisfied with their findings and recommendations.⁶⁵⁶ SSG X adopted Royal Dutch Shell's approach of providing scenarios for organizations to use in developing their detailed strategies. The CNO did not adopt SSG X's approach for Navy strategic planning and found it difficult to translate their findings on the characteristics of the future into program decisions. Similarly, SSG XI focused on providing context to the Navy leadership for their decisions, rather than getting into contests with others working specific programs and force structures. Their finding that the Navy would be much smaller in 2012 was difficult for the CNO and Navy leadership to accept. Kelso was also distracted by the Tailhook scandal and the *Iowa* incident. SSGs XII and XIII focused on naval and military influence. As budgets were cut and the prospect of major war dimmed, force structure rationales rather than strategy dominated the concerns of the services and their chiefs. No one in DoD was successful in developing methods that could stand independent scrutiny for translating the psychology of presence and influence into force structure. Too many other instruments of national power come into play.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid. Blair interview.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid., Greenert interview for on SSG XIII.

As the SSG taskings broadened beyond CINC and fleet warfighting, their recommendations had less impact on the naval services. Hayward, Boorda, and others considered some of the 1990s SSG products to be “Globaloney.”⁶⁵⁷ Even SSG Fellows from earlier groups questioned the value of having warfare specialists expand their studies into economics, energy, and demography rather than focusing on their core competency in naval operations.⁶⁵⁸

Kelso and Boorda were less interested in strategy than the SSG. The SSG envisioned broad U.S., DoD, and naval initiatives to prepare the country and naval services for the future. Arguably, they had solutions for issues that these post-Goldwater-Nichols CNOs did not recognize as their problems. Though the SSG Fellows fully appreciated the way in which the assignment was preparing them for future leadership, Boorda shifted his emphasis from the educational function of the SSG to their product. He was the only CNO to prefer an OPNAV staff product to the work of the SSG and not to defend SSG work in meetings with other senior officers.

The CNOs encouraged the SSG to be unconstrained in its work and thinking, and expected them to discover and challenge all assumptions. While they were not always satisfied with SSG concepts and recommendations, they did recognize the value of the education. How satisfied they were with the overall program depended on how they weighed the education against the concepts and recommendations that the Group offered.

Roles of the director and senior member

Rank did not matter to the CNO who selected all officers for their ability to contribute. During Ambassador Bremont’s first year, he singled out the senior member, Captain Leighton “Snuffy” Smith, to do all of the briefing. After that, he let the Group decide. Mostly, directors saw their role as mentors and used their experience and reputation to open SSG’s doors to those most expert and responsible. Whenever the CNO did not have specific tasking in mind, the directors were influential in framing the SSG’s tasking. The SSG was less successful when the director inserted his preferences into SSG studies, travel, and debates. Cultural differences between Departments of Defense and State created challenges for the retired Ambassadors, both in interactions with the Group and sometimes in addressing the CNO’s concerns.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid., Stark, Martus, and Harris interviews from their perspectives as Directors of the CNO Executive Panel (OPNAV N-00K) under Admirals Kelso and Boorda.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid., Gatchel interview.

Occasionally a senior SSG Navy officer attempted to run the SSG like a staff. It never worked. The kind of study required of the SSG did not align with classic staff processes. All of the Fellows were highly qualified and worked best as a team, allowing the most competent to contribute in defining their role and contribution. Rarely did a senior officer try to limit or change a group decision, arrived at through intense discussion and debate. The senior officers met frustration and divisiveness when they did. Also, Navy Flag announcements typically occurred in December or January over this period. Usually, an officer other than the senior member would be selected for Flag during the year. Though this did not immediately change lineal numbers, it helped reinforce the concept that an ability to articulate persuasive ideas was the most effective preparation for Flag rank.

Role of the Deputy and staff

Although he did not officially hold the title, Commander Ken McGruther served the role of Deputy to Bob Murray in SSG I—overseeing and arranging many of the Group’s activities, interacting with OPNAV staff, and advising the Group. John Hanley first came to the SSG with another Navy reserve officer during annual training, then supported SSG I as a contractor. Following SSG I, Bob Murray arranged for one SSG Fellow to remain as his Deputy, orchestrating the activities of CNWS as well as the SSG, with help from professors Tom Etzold and Jim Kurth in coordinating visits with academia and government officials. Bob Wood continued the practice when he became Director, SSG, and Dean, CNWS. An Administrative Assistant coordinated the execution of budgets and facilities with the NWC, and a Secretary for the Dean worked with the Administrative Assistant on travel schedules and visitor arrangements. This arrangement continued through 1985.

In 1985, Marshall Brement became Director, SSG, while Bob Wood remained Dean, CNWS. John Hanley returned to government service in the position of the SSG “Program Director.” CNWS provided Brement with a Secretary and an Administrative Assistant. In 1986, a full-time Intelligence Officer replaced the Administrative Assistant in order to provide intelligence and some administrative support. A second Secretary supported Hanley, the SSG Fellows, and the Intelligence Officer.

Because of existing retirement legislation, SSG Directors Marshall Brement, Robin Pirie, and Frank McNeil were not government employees. Accepting a government position would have jeopardized their pensions as retired government employees. Therefore, the directors could not officially supervise or rate government employees; nor could they execute government funds. The CNO, CMC, and Coast Guard Commandant oversaw performance evaluations of the SSG Fellows. Hanley rated recommended performance bonuses and awards for the two SSG secretaries. The Officer in Charge of the Naval Intelligence detachment rated the SSG’s Intelligence Officer. Dean, CNWS, rated Hanley’s performance. The arrangement was awkward.

Some improvement came in the form of a formal memorandum of understanding between OP-090, the NWC, and CNA, executed on the arrival of Robin Pirie establishing the SSG Director as a CNA Field Representative responsible to the CNO for the overall performance of the Group. However, the arrangement required a close personal relationship between the SSG Director and SSG Program Director (known as the Deputy to avoid additional confusion). This arrangement changed soon after the arrival of retired admiral Jim Hogg as SSG Director when the law changed to allow retired military to work for the government without diminishing their pensions.

Though these arrangements were an artifact of the past, clean lines of authority made for easier administration of the Group.

Hanley worked with the SSG as a contractor and government employee over a period of almost 17 years, under six different directors. The advantage, and possible disadvantage, was continuity. As Program Director, he knew how to work with the NWC and CNWS.⁶⁵⁹ He developed a Rolodex that made arranging visits in Washington, with overseas commands, and with academic institutions efficient. Building upon early SSG seminars and staying abreast of official and academic literature, he also became efficient in creating a syllabus for each incoming group to provide a firm foundation in strategy and the topics assigned by the CNO. However, as time went on, he took over much of the SSG's orientation, providing the readings and lectures, rather than relying as extensively on outside experts, as had been the practice in the early years.

The intelligence officer assigned to the SSG, typically the best officer in the NWC intelligence detachment, though not selected by the CNO, benefited from the same seminars, discussions, games, and travel as the SSG Fellows. This officer gained the same education and experience. Though the Navy intelligence community was small, it did not appear to appreciate the opportunity to assign these officers following the SSG as the CNO's assigned the Fellows to take advantage of their experience and concepts.

At one point, the Director of Navy Intelligence intended to pull his intelligence officer from the SSG, concerned that he had become merely an Administrative Assistant. While the SSG Intelligence Officer did assist the SSG during travel, he always had duties to provide intelligence to the Group. Though the Fellows would look for staff to help them with administration, the Intelligence Officer assumed these duties as his own choice. Several SSG Intelligence Officers went beyond responding to Group requests, instead actively participating in strategic discussions and providing advice

⁶⁵⁹ As a member of the NWC/CNWS faculty, he participated in CNWS management decisions and performed additional duties as Director of the Advanced Research Program for a year, and occasionally teaching electives.

to the Group on ways to approach their study. These officers made exceedingly valuable contributions to the Group and its products.

A small staff was sufficient. Needing to rely on CNWS for occasional support maintained bonds between the SSG and CNWS/NWC, and reduced the need for the SSG to have individuals assigned full time for specific functions such as information technology support or arranging events.

Role of the Marines

The Navy officers benefited more from having Marines on the Group than vice versa. For the most part, the Marines came to the SSG directly from war colleges. They had been studying strategy and joint operations. Some found the Navy officers unprepared to address strategy since they typically had never attended a top-level school.⁶⁶⁰ Operating as air-ground teams with combat service support at various echelons of command, the Marines knew more of their service counterparts than the Navy officers typically did. Nonetheless, several Marines commented that they had learned more about the Navy, particularly submarine operations, than they could have before the SSG.

The CMC did not use the SSG like the CNO, to groom future service leaders. Though he sent good officers, he rarely intervened in the assignment of Marines to the SSG. Marines promoted only Don Lynch (SSG V) and Tony Zinni (SSG VI) to Flag rank. The Marine SSG Fellows interviewed were divided over whether the CMC should have followed the CNO's example.⁶⁶¹

Marines interviewed were unanimous that the SSG should always have USMC members, and they were unenthusiastic about U.S. Army or Air Force officers being invited to participate in the SSG.⁶⁶²

Briefings, reports, and follow-up

The SSG Fellows relied principally on briefings to convey their ideas and promote strategic discourse. Reports were occasionally relegated to the SSG staff to write,

⁶⁶⁰ Memorandum from Colonel Sean K. Leach, USMC (Retired), 12 February 2015.

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Leach and Woodhead memos.

⁶⁶² Unanimous view of the seven Marine SSG alumni participating in the SSG Workshop, 19-20 Feb 2015.

sometimes in conjunction with a rump group of SSG Fellows awaiting transfer to their next assignment after most of the Group had departed. Because of the subject matter and sensitive intelligence involved, the SSG reports in the 1980s were highly classified and distributed only to a couple dozen of the most senior Navy officers and the CMC.

Following the end of the Cold War in 1990, the studies involved exploring broad demographic, economic, social, technological, environmental, energy, and resource trends as they related to the military. Though some classified sources were helpful, most of data came from open sources. SSG reports became marked Unclassified: For Official Use Only (FOUO), making them potentially available to wider audiences. During these years, the SSG Fellows wrote their own reports, with assistance from the staff and endorsement of the director.

Trost tasked OP-00K to maintain copies of the SSG reports and look for opportunities to follow up on their ideas; however, the record does not provide any instances that this mechanism led to any follow-up.⁶⁶³ The most effective mechanism for following up on SSG ideas was for the CNO to assign the Fellows to follow-on positions where they could personally influence the implementation of their ideas; The Fellows would continue to implement what they learned as they progressed through their careers, and have an effect on their numerous audiences through SSG briefings or projects.

When asked what his Group should have done better, Admiral Jon Greenert replied that it should get started earlier, get writing earlier, and don't pull officers out early [as he had been]. He said that the program needed more structure, and that creating the product was important—not necessarily the product itself.⁶⁶⁴

Enhancing the reputation of the NWC

Creating and fostering CNWS, with the SSG as its centerpiece, was part of Hayward's, Watkins', and NWC President Rear Admiral Edward Welch's effort to enhance the reputation of the NWC.⁶⁶⁵ However, the fact that the SSG worked directly for the CNO, created a separation that worked against this aim. Problems identified in the study

⁶⁶³ Time did not allow deep research into OP/N-00K's activities. Interviews with OP/N-00K Directors reflected the usual healthy competition between the SSG and OP/N-00K for ideas to present the CNO.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Greenert interview.

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Hattendorf, p. 45.

that Bob Murray sponsored regarding the relationships in 1983 were never addressed. The relationship between the SSG and NWC faculty depended on personalities. The other organizations within CNWS had responsibilities and agendas beyond the SSG that diverted their attention. Watkins cautioned the SSG about exposing their work to others at the college. Though he discussed the role of the SSG in enhancing the reputation of the NWC publicly, he did not address it in meetings with them.

The separation of the Director, SSG, from the Dean, CNWS, in 1985 further reduced coordination in Newport, as did moving the SSG to Sims Hall in 1989, creating physical separation between the CNWS and the SSG. Pirie commented that NWC faculty provided good lectures to the SSG but the SSG had no effect on the NWC.⁶⁶⁶

Larry Marsh (SSG III) felt that the senior warfighters on the SSG should spend more time understanding what the War College could provide.⁶⁶⁷ He believed that members of the SSG “should speak to the senior NWC class for 45 minutes; perhaps over lunch so as not to interfere with curriculum. The topic could be worked out: career, experiences, views. Giving a talk requires focus. It would benefit both the SSG member and the audience. Surface warfare officers should also address the Surface officer courses in Newport.” Rear Admiral Bob Duncan (SSG XIV) thought that the SSG did not make good use of having international students at the NWC.⁶⁶⁸

Enhancing SSG education

Larry Marsh (SSG III) also commented:

We talk a lot about what is changing in Navy and Marine Corps. We need sessions on what is not changing; e.g. we are a maritime nation, borders, history, use of sea lanes commerce and warfighting. Second is jointness. Some, not all SSG have had joint experience. Also, strategic deterrence has not gone away. Core values: honor, courage, commitment. They [the SSG] should also have a session on the constitution, not a lengthy discussion. I found that we do not know our history. I got involved in producing our Navy story in the late 90s with Bob Brezenski. It is now a bit dated, but is a good refresher. Senior officers do not have time to spend on history. Take some time

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid., Pirie interview.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid., Marsh interview.

⁶⁶⁸ Rear Admiral Robert F. Duncan, USCG (Retired), CNWS Study Thoughts, 21 February 2015.

early in the SSG to go over who we are, the naval role in our nation. SSG people should know it. I'm parochial, but the SSG should have the Navy story. The key is to spend some time on it. Give them a copy of the old one. When the SSG is all over and when you are checking out, I would require each SSG member to write a ten page lessons learned and provide a critique. Put some time into what they learned on the SSG and how they could have learned more and contributed more. The critique could be one page.⁶⁶⁹

Admiral Tim Keating (SSG XI) found that the SSG had a minor downside to it. It did not provide a Master's degree as NWC did. This was the only opportunity that he had to get that degree.⁶⁷⁰

SSG Travel

Murray had made funding for travel one of his deal breakers when he established the SSG. He wanted to ensure that the Group could "maintain active contact with, and promote an exchange of views, with other portions of the office of the CNO concerned with strategy and the strategy-tactics interface, ... [and] interact as well with Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the fleet commanders in chief, numbered fleet commanders, and other U.S. government agencies concerned with strategic and politico-military affairs."⁶⁷¹ Hayward fully endorsed Murray's construct for the SSG.

The SSG testified strongly to the benefits derived from their travel. However, the ability to travel widely created sensitivities among those who did not have this privilege (or the resources for it), particularly in OPNAV and the NWC. It also created temptations for some in the SSG. NWC Presidents, who oversaw the SSG budget, cautioned the SSG to be aware of the jealousies created by their access and to be conscious of the perceptions, and reality, of their ability to travel. Col Sean Leach (SSG IX) commented on the benefits of travel but cited a case where he perceived abuse:

With generous travel allowances and privileged access to senior military and civilian leaders, SSG members were afforded invaluable exposure to the concerns, world views, and thinking processes of

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid., Marsh interview.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid., Keating interview.

⁶⁷¹ Draft white paper, "The Center for Naval Warfare at the Naval War College." Unsigned and undated. A memo—Under Secretary of the Navy, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Personnel, Subj: Center for Naval Warfare, May 1, 1981—with minor revisions followed.

some remarkably talented men. On the flip side, SSG officers were exposed to some blatant political hacks, charlatans, and Peter Principle specimens. This was all good. We live in an imperfect world. What was not good was some SSG officers using their carte blanche travel authorization to periodically visit Washington just to “schmooze” with their godfathers—there was no SSG business to attend to.⁶⁷²

Programs and budgets

The SSG was never tasked specifically to address programs and budgets. Nonetheless, the question of what impact the SSG had on Navy programs and budgets was part of this research.

Strategists and programmers debate over any effects the SSG had. The early Maritime Strategy was intended to inform the formation of Navy programs. Captain Mike Martus (SSG XI) noted: “On the Navy staff there was always tension between OP-06 and 090 as to whether the strategy should drive or support the program. As budgets were cut, the perception of the usefulness of OP-06 declined.”⁶⁷³ General Zinni (SSG VI) found:

When Owens [N-8] and Krulak [PP&O] were running their SECNAV war games, Rear Admiral Sweet Pea Allen [N81] and I worked together in developing the games. We briefed SECNAV, the CNO, and the CMC at the end. We had the Maritime Strategy as a guide. This effort tied the program to the strategy and did a better job bringing the USMC and Navy along together.⁶⁷⁴

However, Mr. Irv Blickstein, a retired senior Navy civilian with a career in Navy programming during this period, believed that the SSG had no impact on programs or budgets. He believed that strategists in OPNAV N-3/5 and in Newport need to know more about decision-making in Pentagon. They have no appreciation of how the building really works; the differences between the instructions and reality. They need to understand DoD’s and the Navy’s planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation systems and what programmers really do for a living.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷² Ibid., Leach memo

⁶⁷³ Ibid., Martus interview.

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid., Zinni interview.

⁶⁷⁵ Hanley phone interview with Mr. Irv Blickstein, 14 December 2014.

Blickstein did work for Owens as OPNAV N-8, and used the thinking he did while on the SSG to create Joint Mission Area assessments, and then as VCJCS to promote more investment in interoperability among service command and control, communications, and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance systems to implement his systems-of-systems concept. What the SSG Fellows did in subsequent assignments affected programs and budgets even if their reports to CNO did not immediately change investments.

Key Findings

While the SSG could have done some things better, this research and analysis showed that it accomplished its goals:

- It developed future senior naval combat leaders, some very senior.
- It provided CNOs with new ideas, confirmation of old ideas, nuanced ideas, and alternatives they otherwise would not have considered.
- It introduced ideas on a wide variety of policy, strategy, operational, and tactical questions among naval commanders and their staffs worldwide, and stimulated and maintained discussion and debate.
- It changed concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures across the Navy.
- It enhanced the reputation of the Naval War College.

Moreover, it also accomplished several goals that were not really in its charter:

- It led to a more joint outlook among its participants.
- It contributed to changes in national policy and strategy.
- It greatly enhanced the reputation, not only of the Naval War College, but of the United States Navy.
- It helped the Navy play its part in contributing to winning the Cold War.
- It helped the Navy prepare for the post-Cold War world.

In doing so, it cost the Navy:

- Less than a year of 120 officers' time in careers that lasted 30-40 years
- Pay and allowances of a half-dozen staff personnel every year for 14 years
- Less than \$ 600K annually in operating costs, in 2015 dollars
- Time spent by naval leaders and staff officers engaging with the SSG when they could have been doing something else
- Spaces occupied by the Fellows and staff at the Naval War College, which could have been used for other purposes (or torn down).

In 2014, the Navy began to take action to revitalize its “strategic enterprise” and again promote dialogue, debate, and competence in maritime strategy across the service. It sought to achieve the state it was in during the 1980s when the SSG served

in this role for the CNO. Should the CNO decide to recreate this capability and conduct the kinds of studies that the SSG had done during the 1980s and early 1990s, this study finds that:

- CNO needs to personally want it, engage frequently with it, use it, and take an active part in selecting Fellows and assigning them to their next job.
- SSG must work directly for the CNO, and nobody else
- Fellows need to be front-running upwardly mobile senior officers with potential for growth
- Size matters. The group should be kept small, with warfighters at the core.
- Naval contributions to joint warfighting need to be at the heart of the effort, with a focus on developing Navy policy, strategy, operations, and tactics as part of the joint force.
- Topics should deal with classified warfighting issues of current importance to the CNO, and Fellows need to have access to intelligence and special access programs and concepts
- The Group should avoid participation in the Navy's PPBE process, but be aware of contemporary issues. Likewise, it should avoid extensive futurology, but be aware of emerging trends.
- Fellows need access to top Navy and joint leaders and their staffs, especially forward overseas. Consequently, they need a robust travel budget, which must not be abused.
- The Naval War College is an ideal setting. However, the CNO, NWC President, SSG staff, and NWC teaching and research faculty all have to work actively at maximizing the mutual benefits and breaking down stovepipes. That will not automatically happen just because the SSG is in Newport.
- The Group should utilize war gaming as a primary tool for identifying, examining, and solving Navy warfighting problems. Gaming has several virtues. A particular one is that it resonates with naval officers as a useful tool, requiring active participation.
- Gaming and overseas command access should be supplemented with operations analysis, lectures, seminars, civilian expert inputs, OPNAV meetings and briefings, participation in ongoing high-level US Navy events (e.g., Flag Officer conferences, International Seapower Symposium, Current Strategy Forum).
- The Group should use classified briefings as the primary means of communicating SSG questions, ideas and findings, supplemented by classified written reports and UNCLAS articles.

- The staff, especially the director and deputy director, must be chosen with great care. Experienced senior DoD civilian officials make especially good directors. The staff should always include an intelligence officer.
- As it did in the 1980s and early 1990s, the SSG must start with a bang— not just slowly evolve—to set precedents for all that follow. Analogies between today and the 1970s make this an opportune time for such an entity, focused on warfighting strategies.

Appendices

Appendix A: SSG IV Program

This appendix is included to provide an overview of SSG IV's program and a detailed appreciation of the kinds of people and topics the SSG dealt with during their year of study.

1984

- 16 Jul-16 Aug SSG IV officers arrive (SSG IV Orientation Folder)
- 13 Aug NWC Orientation - President introduces SSG
- 14 Aug Convocation: SSG meets with ADM Kidd and PCC students
- 15 Aug SSG Reading Period
- 16 Aug 0830-0930: Meet with RADM Service (PNWC)
0930-1030: Meet with Dean of Academics
1100-1130: Meet with Director Center for War Gaming
1600: Phibstrat brief to VADM Baggett (OP-095)
- 17 Aug 0830: SSG meeting with Dr. Wood (project planning)
- 20 Aug SSG I/II Briefs
- 21 Aug Library tour; SSG Planning Session
- 22 Aug SSG III Brief & PHIBSTRAT Seminar
- 23 Aug Soviet Brief: Prof. Alvin Rubinstein; intelligence brief by CAPT Hartman (CO NOIC Det.)
- 24 Aug Morning: NOIC Briefs: facilities, NIE 11-83-15, etc.
Afternoon: planning period
- 27 Aug (DC) Briefings by: Rich Haver, OP-009Y; RADM Bobby Bell, OP-095B; Maritime strategy brief, OP-603
- 28 Aug (DC) Visit NOIC and NISC
- 29 Aug (DC) Dr. Wood, CAPT Leeds, COL Browning, CAPT Rogers meet with CNO re: PHIBSTRAT Briefing; rest of Group visit CIA (POC Mr. MacEachin)
- 30 Aug Morning: Planning Session

1300-1500: Third World Threats to U.S. Interests - The Middle East, Prof. Daniel Pipes (NWC)

31 Aug 0830-1000: Third World Threats to U.S. Interests - The Middle East, Prof. Alvin Bernstein (NWC)
Afternoon: Planning Session

4 Sep (URI) CNWS Retreat (CAPT Hernandez); COMSUBDEVRON 12 visit (CAPT Lynch); Washington, Quantico Visit COLs Browning, Lloyd, Medlin

5 Sep (URI) CNWS Retreat (CAPT Hernandez); Washington, Quantico Visit COLs Browning, Lloyd, Medlin

6 Sep Morning: Planning Session
Afternoon: NSC/DoD decision making, Prof. D. Hall (NWC)

7 Sep 0900: SSG Planning Session with Dr. Wood

10 Sep 0830-0900: Passport pictures
0900-1130: USMC Seminar
1300: SSG Planning Session

11 Sep 0830-1130: SSG planning for CNO meeting
1330-1430: Passport meeting
1430: SSG planning for CNO meeting

12 Sep Morning: to DC
1000-1100: NMCC Brief (Joint Staff)
1300-1400: NATO organization; problems with swing strategy; DPO; alert procedures; discussion of "how it works outside wiring diagrams" (Joint Staff)
1400-1500: RRP Brief; 4100 series war plans (defense of Europe); some of 5000 series relative to Japan and Korea (Joint Staff)
1530-1630: Brief on Norway/Denmark (Chairman's Staff Group)

13 Sep 1500-1630: SSG meet with COMO Ed Anderson

14 Sep First meeting with CNO to discuss tasking

17 Sep 0800: SSG Planning Session/CNO Debrief

18 Sep 0800-1000: GWG Series Brief, Bud Hay (CNWS staff)
1000-1130: CWG Brief on Gaming Mechanics
1330: Planning Session

19 Sep 0830: SSG Planning Session

20 Sep 0830-1130: NOIC Briefs: Soviet War Plans, Soviet Readiness, SPETZNAZ discussion

21 Sep SSG Planning Session

25 Sep 1000-1100: Meet with Jim Roche, Northrop Analysis Corporation
1230-1330: Meet with COMO Armstrong
1500-?: Meet with NSC members: Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Geoff Kemp, CAPT Phil Dur

26 Sep 0930-1300: State Department

1400: Gordon Riggle [SSG III]: Senate Armed Services Committee
 1830–2130: CSIS dinner

27 Sep 0900–1000: Meet John Bird (CIA) and General Dick Bowman (Ret.)
 1300: Meetings at NSA

1 Oct 0900–1300: Meeting and lunch with ADM Inman

9–11 Oct SSG Planning meetings

12 Oct Second meeting with CNO reviewing status and plans

15–16 Oct SSG Planning Meetings

17 Oct 0830–1030: CAPTs Sexton and Lynch meet with Mr. Punaro (SASC)

18 Oct 1000: (JFK School, Harvard) Meet with Mark Cancian, Assistant Director
 1030: (JFK School, Harvard) Meet with Dr. Gregory Treverton
 1200: (JFK School, Harvard) Lunch with Dean Graham Allison, Associate Dean Bob Blackwill, Professor Ernest May, Mark Cancian, SSG
 1400: (JFK School, Harvard) Meet with Prof. William Ury, Director of the Nuclear Negotiation Project

19 Oct 0830–1015: SSG Seminar, Soviet War Plans, Mr. Wayne Wright

22 October 0830: SSG Meeting

23–25 Oct SSG attend CINCs conference, SSG Brief 1345 on 23 October

26 October 0830: SSG Meeting

27 Oct–10 Nov European Trip

27–28 Oct Travel to London

29–31 Oct Meetings in London/Oxford/Uxbridge; CINCUSNAVEUR, FMFEUR, MOD U.K. Navy, Oxford Analytica, RAF

1 Nov Travel to Brussels

2 Nov Meetings in Brussels; US Mission NATO/US DELMC; USNMR SHAPE

3–4 Nov Travel to Paris

5 Nov Meetings in Paris; Embassy/MOD roundtable, French Institute for International Relations

6 Nov Travel to Stuttgart and EUCOM briefs

7 Nov EUCOM briefs and travel to Naples

8–9 Nov Meetings in Naples; 6th Fleet, CINCSOUTH, CTF 60/67/69

10 Nov Return to Newport

3 Nov CAPT Lynch and Hanley attend Seminar with Royal Dutch Shell Strategic Planning Group at NWC

19–20 Nov SSG Seminar Game

21 Nov 0830: SSG Planning Session

23 Nov SSG Independent Research

26–27 Nov Washington War Game

28 Nov SSG Planning Meeting

29 Nov SSG Seminar: Soviet Correlation of Forces, Dr. John Battilega (SAIC)

30 Nov SSG Planning Meeting

6 and 13 Dec 1030: CNWS Weekly Planning and Coordinating Meeting

9-11 Dec Chaplain's Conference

19 Dec CAPT O'Brien to attend meeting with COMO Dorsey

1985

4-8 Feb Westpac Trip

18-22 Mar SSG 4-2 [ATP] War Game

15-19 Apr JCS War Game [Hernandez memo 19 November 1984]

29 Apr USMC Officers Brief SSG USMC Option in Norfolk, VA

1 May Senator Goldwater speaks to NWC

3 May 1430: Sub ops brief; SSG Brief to CNA (COL Lloyd, CAPT Sexton, and COL Browning)

14 May 1315: Surface Ship Advanced Tactical Sonar Array Brief
1430: ASW Task Appraisal Brief
1700: SSG Reunion Cocktail Party & Dinner

15-17 May May Conference

15 May 0800-1130: Working SSG Reunion Conference; SSG IV presents CINC briefing
1200: May Conference Begins
1530: SSG meets with ADM Hayward

16 May 0830: May Conference Continues
0830: SSG Meeting on outchop brief

17 May 1400: (DC) CNO Executive Panel Brief

18 May 0800: Outchop briefing to Dr. Wood

22 May Outchop brief to RADM Service

24 May 1000: Brief CNO
1400: Brief SECNAV

Appendix B: CNO Watkins' Address to the 1985 International Sea Power Symposium

This appendix provides a slightly edited version of Admiral Watkins' address to the International Seapower Symposium in 1985, demonstrating his commitment to deterrence and belief in gaming as a way to explore concepts and create a common appreciation among allies, leading to action.

Bilateral discussions among our navies and ongoing maritime initiatives can help deter major conflict. Sea power of free-world nations, united behind the cause of peace, has no more important use than to accomplish this objective. Successful deterrence of conflict is the real victory. Of course, if deterrence fails, we must be ready to fight and win. Unfortunately, we tend to focus our planning efforts too narrowly on war winning, leaving little time for the more delicate, and perhaps even more difficult, task of planning to avoid war in the first place.

Deterrence, as we know it today, is a complex concept with several specific meanings. First and foremost, deterrence is the ability to keep armed conflict from ever being the immediate and automatic result of political crisis.

In this form, deterrence involved convincing any potential aggressors that the risk involved in their embarking on adventuristic actions is greater than possible benefits to be derived. Historically, potential aggressors are seldom deterred by empty threats and rhetoric. Invariably, a credible deterrent policy must be underpinned by ready and capable forces - as well as a well-considered and workable strategy to employ those forces - so that muscle behind words is there for all to see and respect.

But, accomplishing the deterrent task in a maritime context requires a sophisticated concept for employment of maritime power. It is not enough for individual nations to be strong. Rather, there must be a coalition of forces within a framework of mutually-shared national objectives in which to multiply potential strengths of participants through cooperation and coordination. That framework is based on both global and regional strategies that make common sense for the nations involved.

Before our modern age, maritime power and strategies were designed primarily to achieve victory at sea in time of declared war. Today, we develop our alliance force postures and strategies to meet first, the key objective of deterrence of war since the efficacy of war declaration in the nuclear age has become blurred, at least for the major powers.

To achieve a comfortable margin of deterrence in an age of significantly different ideologies between political enemies, western democracies should

try to find new relationships in dynamic coalitions which can be more ready to meet challenges in this era of violent peace. This is the only way to show a constant and visible deterrent signal to those bent on destroying the democratic way of life.

The next meaning of deterrence, no less critical in value than in its global context, is related to keeping various regions of the world stable. This is a role in which naval force are particularly suited to make a critical, strategic difference.

Western allied maritime presence in key regions helps to ensure troubled waters and littoral countries do not become a breeding ground for armed conflict, festering unchecked and undeterred into war. This, in general cannot be a result of simply applying unilateral maritime presence, for no one nation can bear the total burden for long, since the coalition of forces in today's opposing political ideologies can too quickly turn the tide if the western nation seems to be alone. In most cases, therefore, attempts to reach regional stability should be wholly in consonance with the principal of demonstrated willingness of allies and friend to share the burdens of deterrence.

In contemplating this noble objective from the maritime perspective, we are faced with paradoxes that frequently accompany useful strategic concepts; that we can only maintain a credible peace by adopting regional positions of armed strength and maritime superiority. In the case of the U.S., this translates to a maritime strategy which says that only by aggressively preparing for forward, offensive sea control and power projection can our Navy contribute successfully to help ourselves and our friends to defend mutual national and international interests.

The United States Navy recognized the international initiative it must take to remain a vital steward of the values shared by freedom-loving nations. To fulfill this role, our Navy is often asked to deal on a bilateral or multilateral basis with friends and allies in peacetime. These relationships, to be meaningful, then, must be firmly based on the bedrock of respect, equality of sovereign nations of the free world, and honest evaluation an enumeration of commitments to each other.

During our recent experience of war gaming a deterrent strategy to avoid global conflict here at the Naval War College, the vital importance of well-tried and tested bilateral deterrent strategies, was underscored. Our lesson, and my central message to all of you, my colleagues, is this: together our efforts can make a difference in avoiding the precipice of war. As our gaming continues to show, a synergistic, fully-cooperative process of political and military moves can strengthen deterrence while enhancing already good relationships between countries.

...

Now, we fully recognize that scarce operating funds, and other naval commitments, can make real-world tests extremely difficult. For this reason, the U.S. Navy has offered use of its wargaming facilities here in Newport. At the wargaming facility we can economically and effectively test regional maritime strategies, including their contribution to deterrence, both on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Ministry of Defense or Foreign Affairs players are encouraged to participate.

War games conducted to date have confirmed the value of this approach, and have served not only to validate political usefulness of regional strategies under development, but also helped identify areas of military interoperability where further improvements are required.

War games are an ideal vehicle to test those aspects of bilateral agreements which provide the basis for pre-conflict, crisis response-coordinated operations. Here we can determine if a united show of force and mutual resolve can be expected to defuse a crisis before it escalates.

...

If there are any charges or obligations which we, as leaders of free world maritime nations, must take upon ourselves, it is this - we can be the engine of influence upon the policy professionals and government leaders of the world. In this connection, we should encourage their vision and broaden the depth of their strategic understanding. We must clearly emphasize the confluence of maritime interests. We must work closely together—in our respective governments and among ourselves, speaking our common language of maritime experience—to promote the building and testing of bilateral and multilateral strategic concepts.

Appendix C: SSG V Program

This appendix is included to provide an overview of SSG V's program and detailed appreciation of the kinds of people and topics the SSG dealt with during their year of study.

1985

5-7 August	Reading and personal time
8 August	0830: Welcome aboard/Review Orientation Schedule (CAPT Leeds [SSG I]) 1000: CNWS Organization (CAPT Leeds/CDR Meyertholen) 1100: Tour Naval War College (ENS McGowin) 1315: NWC Orientation Brief (CAPT Burdick) 1430: Tour NOIC Spaces/War Gaming Department and NOIC Briefs (CAPT Estes)
9 August	0900: TAD Travel Claims Brief (Mr. Koohy) 1000: Library tour (Ms. Varoutsas) 1100: Security Procedures (CAPT Hartman) 1330: Check-in/Free time
12 August	0830: Welcome/SSG Seminar (Dr. Wood) 0930: Soviet Naval Strategy; NIE 11-15 (LCDR Simeral) 1300: SSG II Review (CAPT Hurlburt)
13 August	0830: SSG IV Review (COL Browning) 1000: NWC Convocation 1030: SSG I Review (John Hanley) 1330: SSG Seminar
14 August	0830: SSG III Review (CAPT Seaquist) 1330: SSG Seminar
15 August	0830: Soviet Planning System (Dr. Battilega) 1330: Correlation of Forces (Dr. Battilega)
16 August	0830: Amphib Study Brief (CDR McDonald/LtCol Fisher) 1330: SSG Seminar
19 August	0830: Introduction: The Soviets in the Third World (Prof. Kurth) 0930: Philippine Study (LCOL Finlayson) 1330: SSG Seminar
20 August	0830: SSG seminar - USMC Capabilities (SSG Marines) 1330: The Soviets in Latin America (Prof. Kurth)

21 August	0830: SSG Seminar 1330: SSG Planning Session
22 August	1300: The Terrorist Threat (Prof. Bernstein) 1500: Domestic Constraints on Anti-terrorist Action (LCOL Farrell)
23 August	0830: The Soviets in the Middle East (Prof. Pipes) 1030: SSG Planning Session 1330: SSG Planning Session
26 August	SSG Planning Sessions
27 August	Fly to DC 0900: OP-603 meeting 1300-1500: Meet with Bill Manthorpe (09X), COMO Pendley [OP-60], CAPT Linton Brooks (OP-60B) Remainder of afternoon: meetings as desired
28 August	0930-1130: Meet with Rich Haver (OP-009B) 1400-1600: Visit NSA (Ft. Meade)
29 August	0900-1130: Visit NAVOPINTCEN (Suitland) 1300-1630: Visit NISC (Suitland)
30 August	SSG Planning Session
Week of 2 September	SSG Planning Sessions
3 September	0900: Meet with RADM Marryott (PNWC)
9 September	Travel to D.C. 0900: FMS Brief (OP-63); LaPlante/Boyer/LeMoyné 1300-1600: Discussion with NSC Staff; LCOL Ollie North; AMB Jim Matlock; COL Ty Cobb (USA); CAPT Jim Stark; COL Bob Unhart (USAF); CAPT Rod McDaniel; possibly Robert McFarlane
10 September	0830-0945: Discussion with Gordon Riggle [SSG III] and members of SASC staff 1000: Attend Hearing: SECNAV/SASC Seapower Subcommittee 1245: Arrive State Department 1300-1400: Discussions with Mr. Mark Palmer, Deputy Ass't Secretary for European Affairs 1415-1455: Discussions with AMB Morton Abramowitz, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1500-1530: Discussions with AMB Allen Holmes, Director, Bureau of Public Military Affairs 1530-1630: Discussions with COL Dave Mabry, USMC (possibly joined by AMB Oakley): Terrorism
11 September	0900-1030: Discussions with Mr. Gary Crocker, Director, Office of Theater Forces

	1030-1200: Discussions with Ron Goddard, Dep. Dir. Central American Affairs
	1300-1500: Black Program in-briefs with CAPT Dewispeleare (OP-09J)
	1500-1600: Briefings/Discussions with Mr. Bill Manthorpe (OP-09X)
12 September	0830-1130: Briefings by DIA 1200-1600: Briefings/discussions at CNA (Brad Dismukes host)
13 September	0830: Briefings CIA, return to Newport
23 September	Meeting with CNO
25-27 September	Peacetime Naval Strategy Seminar
16 October	Meeting with CNO
24 October	Briefing to CINCs Conference
22 November	Seminar War Game
25-27 November	SSG 5-1 Game

1986

13 February	0930: Briefing to CNO Executive Panel 1300: Briefing to ADM Small
“End of February”	Second War Game
28 February	Meeting with CNO
8 April	Meeting with Bob Murray
14 April	Brief to CINCUSNAVEUR (Admiral Moreau)
5 May	Brief to CNO
End of May	Brief to OPSDEPS and JCS

Amb. Brement Schedules

1985

9 September	0830-1000: Open 1000-1200: Amphibious/Bilateral Brief (Prof. Kurth) <u>NWC ORIENTATION</u> 1330: Dean of Academics (CAPT Burdick) 1415: Strategy Department (CAPT Watts) 1445: Management Department (CAPT Watts) 1515: Operations Department (CAPT Watts)
10 September	0930-1130: SSG Overview (CAPT Leeds) 1330-1500: Tour War Gaming (CAPT Brisbois) 1500: Open

11 September	0900-1130: Global Briefs (Bud Hay/Art Begelman) 1130-1530: SSG I/II (John Hanley)
12 September	Morning: Third World Topics (Prof. Kurth) 1330-1530: SSG III/IV (Dr. Wood, Prof. Kurth, CAPT Leeds)
13 September	Morning: Planning Session for SSG V (Dr. Wood, Prof. Kurth, John Hanley, CAPT Leeds)
16 September	0900-0930: NWC ID Cards (with Mrs. Brement) 0945-1100: SSG Washington Debrief 1100-1200: Global War Game (Bud Hay/Art Begelman) 1330-1400: Security Brief (CAPT Hartman) 1430-1630: Third World Topic (Prof. Kurth)
17 September	0830-0945: Nat'l Intel. Estimates (CAPT Montgomery, SSG) 1000-1200: Meet with Army SSG (Dr. Wood, CAPT Leeds, Mr. Hanley, SSG V reps.) 1300-1600: CIA Seminar (CAPT Montgomery, SSG)
18 September	0900: Carpets/Drapes (Salesman) SG Planning Sessions
19 September	0800-0825: Oper. & Intel. Brief (Staff-Spruance Auditorium) SSG Planning Sessions
20 September	SSG Planning
1986	
4 March	No-Host Dinner O'Club (for Space Symposium)
7 March	Luncheon at ADM Marryott's quarters for RADM Ed Anderson
11 March	Luncheon for Admiral Hogg (Graduation Speaker)
25-26 March	Washington, DC, trip (CNO Briefing)
2-4 April	Spring CINCs Conference Annapolis
16-18 April	Conf. on Pol.-Mil. Decision-making, Pacific Grove, CA
May	Out-brief Travel
17-19 June	Current Strategy Forum
20 June	NWC Graduation
14 July-01 August	Global War Game
11-22 August	OSD Strategy Seminar [Andy Marshall Summer Study]

Appendix D: List of Participants for the “Soviet Military in the Year 2000” Conference, January 1987

This appendix provides a list of experts attending the-SSG sponsored conference, “The Soviet Military in the Year 2000.” It uncovered problems in Soviet society that would lead to the end of the Soviet Union in a few years, though most in the U.S. defense establishment could not accept the idea of an end to the Cold War.

Dr. David E. Albright (Air War College)
Ambassador Morton Abramowitz (Department of State)
Mr. John Battilega (Science Applications International Corporation – SAIC)
Mr. Arthur H. Begelman (CIA)
Mr. William L. Bell, Jr. (CNA)
Mr. John Bird (National Intelligence Council – NIC)
Dr. Robert Blackwell (CIA)
Mr. James R. Blaker (Hudson Institute)
Colonel Fred C. Boli, USA (NDU)
Captain Linton F. Brooks, USN (NSC staff)
Rear Admiral John S. Calhoun, USN (OP-06B)
Mr. Richard A. Clarke (Department of State)
Captain W. H. Cracknell, USN (Naval Intelligence Command)
Mr. Bradford Dismukes (CNA)
Mr. Keith Dunn (NDU)
Dr. Thomas Etzold (NWC)
Mr. Doug Garthoff (CIA)
Ms. Judy Grange (SAIC)
Dr. William G. Griffith (Massachusetts Institute of Technology – MIT)
Dr. Dale R. Herspring (Department of State)
Dr. Thomas E. Hone (BAH Inc.)
Mr. Stephen Hosmer (RAND)
Prof. Christopher Jones (University of Washington)
Mr. Roger E. Kanet (University of Illinois)
Dr. Jacob W. Kipp (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College)
Dr. Edward A Kolodziej (Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security)
Mr. Jack Kramer (Mary Washington College)
Professor Mark M. Kramer (Harvard University)
Mr. Laurence R. McGuire (Naval Intelligence Support Center)
Bill Manthorpe (OP-09X), Dr. Voytech Mastny (Boston University)

Mr. Michael MccGwire (Brookings Institute)
Major General Steve Nichols USA (CIA)
Dr. Joseph L. Noguee (University of Houston)
Mr. James Noren (CIA)
Mr. David Powell (Harvard University)
Ms. Karen L. Puschel (Department of State)
Dr. Jeffrey Record (Institute for Foreign Policy Analyses)
Mr. Alan S. Rhem (CNA)
Ms. Priscilla T. Rhem (CIA)
Prof. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (University of Pennsylvania)
Mr. Benjamin Rutherford (CIA)
Prof. Herbert Sawyer (Harvard University)
Ms. Harriet F. Scott and Mr. William F. Scott (Scott School of Soviet Policy)
Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, USN Retired (BDM Corporation)
Dr. Dmitri Simes (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
Mr. Sheldon W. Simon (Arizona State University)
Mr. Richard Solomon (Department of State)
Ambassador Richard F. Starr (Hoover Institution)
Professor John E. Talbott (University of California Santa Barbara)
Dr. Ivan Volgyes (Institute for International Studies)
Mr. Robert Weinland
Mr. James T. Westwood (E-Systems Inc.)
Mr. Wayne A Wright (OP-OO9B1)
Mr. John Young (CIA)

Appendix E: SSG VII orientation

This appendix is included to provide an overview of SSG VII's orientation program and detailed appreciation of the kinds of people and topics the SSG dealt with during their orientation.

In August and September 1987, sessions included:

- Dr. Colin Gray, on geopolitics and maritime strategy
- Dr. Edward Luttwak, on strategy formulation
- Mr. Helmut Sonenfeldt, on Soviet long range intentions
- Prof. Donald Zagoria, on the strategic situation in the Pacific
- Mr. Bill Manthorpe, on Soviet theory of war
- Dr. John Battilega and Ms. Judy Grange, on Soviet operational and program planning
- Prof. Bruce Scott, on strategic planning, security, and economic competition
- Mr. Jim Auer on Japanese political, economic and military policies
- Captain Vincent Gilroy, USN, on insights into the Philippines.

For their intelligence overview, they met with:

- Naval Intelligence
 - Rear Admiral Bill Studeman (Director, Naval Intelligence)
 - Mr. Richard Haver
 - And received special access program and naval intelligence briefings
- National Security Agency
 - Lieutenant General William Odom (Director, NSA)
 - Mr. Tom Sullivan, on Soviet reactions to the U.S. maritime strategy
 - And received NSA briefings
- Central Intelligence Agency
 - Mr. Doug MacEachin, on Soviet Affairs
 - Mr. John Bird (National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Warning)
 - Dr. Bob Blackwell (NIO for the Soviet Union)
 - And had meetings with other area analysts

They spoke with Colonel John Hines, USA, and Commander George Kraus, USN, at the OSD Office of Net Assessment. They met with Dr. Phil Depoy (President, CNA) and his vice presidents for a CNA overview and briefings on topics related to the year's study. At OPNAV they met with N00K, CEP task forces, OP-06/60/61, OP-07, OP-08, OP-02, OP-03, and OP-05.

At Harvard's JFK School they met with:

- Hon. Robert (Bob) J. Murray, to introduce the visit
- Ambassador Robert Blackwill, on arms control and current strategy
- Prof. Stephen Meyer, on evolving Soviet military doctrine
- Dean Graham Allison, on competitive strategies
- And Prof. Greg Treverton, on confidence building and crisis management

At Harvard's Russian Research Center, they met with:

- Prof. David Powell, Prof. Zena Sochor, and Prof. Lubko Hajda, on Soviet demography
- Prof. T. Anthony Jones, on Soviet social change
- And Prof. Heidi Kroll, on the Soviet economy

In October, the Group met with General George B. Crist, USMC (CINCCENT), and received briefings on Persian Gulf war plans and the Middle East/Southwest Asia area.

In October and November, they visited CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and subordinate commands, meeting with:

- Admiral Ronald J. Hays, USN (CINCPAC)
- Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN (CINCPACFLT)
- Lieutenant General Edwin Godfrey, USMC (Commander FMFPAC)
- Vice Admiral Paul Miller, USN (COMSEVENTHFLT)
- Rear Admiral Guy Reynolds, USN (COMSUBPAC)
- Major General J. B. Davis, USA (Vice Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces)
- Brigadier General Mike Sheridan, USMC
- Rear Admiral E. R. Kohn, USN (Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Fleet)
- Rear Admiral Jerome Smith, USN.

They also met with:

- In Australia:
 - Ambassador Laurence W. Lane, Jr., on Australia's role in the Pacific region
 - Vice Admiral M. W. Hudson, Royal Australian Navy (RAN), on Australia's role in the Pacific Area

- Mr. Ross Babich (Australian National University), on Australia's strategic and regional concerns and the role that Australians see for themselves in the pursuit of Western security interests
- Mr. Alan Behm, on the Australian security outlook
- Mr. Paul Dibb, on Australia's role from a strategic viewpoint in the Pacific area
- Mr. Robert McClelland (Deputy Director, Office of National Assessment), on Australia's role from a strategic viewpoint in the Pacific theater
- Rear Admiral Sinclair, RAN, on a study of Australia's role and the capabilities that her armed forces would offer in any regional or global conflict
- Commodore G. F. Hopkins, New Zealand Navy, on a study of New Zealand's role in the Southwest Pacific region
- In China:
 - Ambassador Winston Lord, who provided frank and insightful comments about China and her future
 - Admiral Liu Xeng Wen, Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), on the Peoples Liberation Army Navy
 - Admiral Pei Duan, PLAN, on understanding of our common strategic interests in the Western Pacific
 - Admiral Wang Zuyao ,on enhancing understanding of our common strategic interests in the Western Pacific
 - Prof. Tun Wa Ko, PLAN (Retired)
- In Japan:
 - Ambassador Michael J. Mansfield, on the status of U.S./Japanese relations
 - Vice Admiral Makoto Sakuma, JMSDF, on a detailed study of Japan's critical role in the region and the world
 - Vice Admiral Ikuo Takasaki, JMSDF
 - Rear Admiral Kieyu Yoshikawa, JMSDF, on Japanese strategic and tactical issues
 - Mr. Kazuhiko Sawada, on the Pacific and the key role Japan plays in the destiny of the region (issues facing Japan and U.S. as allies)
 - Vice Admiral Paul D. Miller, USN (COMSEVENTHFLT), on multiple Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and U.S. commands in Japan and warfighting issues involving amphibious, strike, and ASW campaign options
 - Rear Admiral James D. Cressey, USN (U.S. Naval Forces Japan), on the question of Japan in or out during war, and problems of interoperability, technology transfer, and integration of U.S./JSDF forces

- Lieutenant General Charles Dyke, USA, on roles and missions of the U.S. Army in Japan
- Major General Gustafson, USMC, on U.S. forces in Japan
- In Korea:
 - Ambassador James Lilly on political, economic, and military future of the Republic of Korea
 - General Louis Menetrey, USA, on relations with Korea
 - Rear Admiral William C. Pendley (U.S. Naval Forces Korea-USNFK), on political and military issues existing in Korea

Appendix F: SSG VIII Visits to Egypt, Italy, Turkey, and Israel

This appendix provides details of the extensive meetings that SSG VIII arranged during visits to Egypt, Italy, Turkey, and Israel in pursuing their study of political-military developments in the Mediterranean and Mideast. It is typical of SSG foreign visits, which included meetings with U.S. diplomats and senior foreign government and military officials.

Four members of the Group traveled to Egypt 4-6 December and met with:⁶⁷⁶

- Ambassador Frank Wisner, on his views of Egypt and its relations with the United States
- Major General Cooley, USA, Office of Military Cooperation
- The Egyptian Foreign Ministry
- Ralph Hughes and Charlie McCoy, U.S. Embassy
- Major General Abdel Rahman, Chief of Egypt's military intelligence
- Lieutenant General Saleh Abou Shanaf, Chief of Staff of Egypt's armed forces
- Vice Admiral Sharif al Sadak, Chief of Egypt's navy.

In Italy on 4-6 December, four members of the group met with COMSIXTHFLT and CINCOSOUTH/CINCUSNAVEUR.

The Group joined up in Istanbul, then traveled to Ankara and back to Istanbul. In Turkey on 6-11 December they met with:

- Mr. William F. Rope, Deputy Chief of Mission
- Captain James E. James, USN: naval attaché
- Lieutenant Colonel Carlton L. Betts, USAF, Air attaché
- Vice Admiral Mustafa Turuncoglu, Vice Chief of the Turkish Navy
- Vice Admiral Guven Erkaya, Commander Sea Area North, Turkish Navy
- Admiral Orhan Karabulut, Turkish Navy
- General Asir Ozocer, Turkish Army
- General Dogan Gures, Commander 1st Turkish Army
- Major General Ergodan Ozual, Turkish Army
- Rear Admiral Turhan Ozer, Commander Turkish Straits

⁶⁷⁶ SSG VIII Egypt Trip: 4 -6 December 1988, and Ibid., Farmer email 10 August 2015.

- Major General Fred Elam USA: Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
- Mr. Tom Carolan: Consul General Istanbul.

The Group visited Israel on 11-17 December. They met with then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, visited the Golan Heights, an Israeli Air Force Base, battlefields, and other historic sites, and toured an Israeli Gul submarine, and went underway on a Sa'ar 5 class corvette. Among other meetings, the Group attended a reception at the Israeli embassy on 14 December, which included:⁶⁷⁷

- Rear Admiral Abraham Ben-Shoshan, Chief of the Israeli Navy
- Commodore Ami Ayalon, Deputy Chief of the Israeli Navy
- Commodore Ishi Haramati, Director of Logistics
- Commodore Rafi Appel, Director, Israeli naval intelligence
- Captain Gavriel Nave, Chief of Israeli naval personnel
- Captain Alex Eyal, finance
- Commodore Yitzhak Almog, Director SAAR 5 and Dolphin program
- Major General Dani Yatom, Chief of Planning
- Colonel Yanithan Lerner, Lieutenant Colonel Alex Schneider, and Major Amir Bar-or: Israeli strategic planning branch
- Brigadier General Ron Goren, Deputy Commander Israeli Air Force
- Colonel Hanan Yalon (Retired), MOD Director Foreign Relations
- Rear Admiral Ze'ev Almog (Retired), former navy chief and current Director, Israeli Shipyards, LTD

⁶⁷⁷ 14 December, Reception.

Appendix G: SSG IX Washington Orientation Schedule

This appendix is included to provide an overview of SSG IX's orientation and appreciation of the kinds of people and topics the SSG dealt with during their orientation. It does not include the foreign travel portion of their orientation.

The week of 21 - 25 August 1989, SSG IX visited Washington:

- 21 Aug 0800-0900 Indoctrination into OP-092 Programs
 0900-0945 Meet with DNI
 1000-1230 OP-092 briefings
 1400-1545 Briefings by CNA
 1600-1730 Briefings by CEP
- 22 Aug 0800-1530 Indoctrination into OP-08 Programs
 1100-1230 Meet with CNO
 1530-1600 OP-603 Organization overview
 1600-1700 Meet with OP-07
- 23 Aug 0800-0900 Meet with Assistant CMC
 0930-1630 Briefings at Suitland
 NIE 11-15
 Evolution of SSBN Bastions
 Readiness and Readiness methodology
 Combat Coefficients
 SPEAR Overview
 SWORD Overview
 NTIC/TSG Overview
- 24 Aug 0800-1500 Briefings at NSA
 NSA Overview
 Soviet Navy
 Soviet Indications and Warning
 Soviet Air Defense
 Remote Operating Facility Tour
 1315-1345 Meet with Director NSA
 1630-1730 Meetings with OP-06/07/08
- 25 Aug 0830-1345 Meetings at CIA
 Soviet Union under Gorbachev
 Soviet Economy and Defense Industry
 Soviet Naval Strategy

During a trip to Washington, D.C., the Group met with:

- 29 Oct Rear Admiral Flannigan, USN (Office of Legislative Affairs)
- 30 Oct Jim Clunan (AFSOUTH Political Advisor)
- 31 Oct Lieutenant General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (Plans, Policy and Operations, HQ USMC), Major General Donald R. Gardner (Requirements and Programs), and Major General Mathew P. Caulfield, USMC (Deputy Commander Training and Education)
- 2 Nov Alice M. Rivlin (Brookings Institution)

Back in Newport they met with Captain Jack Greenwald, USN, and Jack O'Neill (NWC) on 6 November, to discuss the rule of law.

Appendix H: SSG X Orientation Meetings

This appendix provides an overview of SSG X's 1990 orientation and detailed appreciation of the kinds of people and topics the SSG dealt with during their orientation, including while on foreign travel, for which they kept few records.

- 27 August: Bob Wood presented “Framework for Long Range Planning.” He had developed it for the Navy’s Fifth Annual Navy Long Range Planner’s Conference, held 28-29 November 1989, in Annapolis, which he and John Hanley had attended. He provided a framework of the International Political System, Ecosystem (including global warming and sea changes, population/resource imbalances, ...), Techno-Economic System, Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation. He discussed zones of conflict, then and addressed Mission and Force Structure Implications.⁶⁷⁸
- 28 Aug William Van Dusen Wishard, futurist
- 29 Aug George Baer (NWC), strategy
- 30 Aug Captain Larry Seaquist, USN (Office of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources/SSG III), defense planning
- 4 Sep Norman Polmar, deterrence, presence, force projection
- 5 Sep Lieutenant Colonel Steve Fought, USAF (Retired) (NWC), nuclear issues)
- 6 Sep Michael Vlahos, Cultures
- 7 Sep Captain Ron St. Martin, USN (Retired), recommended who to meet on various topics.
- 10 Sep Iraq planning debrief
- 11 Sep Amory Lovins (CEO Rocky Mountain institute), Energy
- 12 Sep Rear Admiral Mike McDevitt, USN (Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, SSG II), Asia; Colonel Ted Gatchel, USMC (NWC, SSG II, former Special Assistant to SACEUR), Europe
- 13 Sep Jim O’Brasky (Naval Surface Warfare Development Center, Dahlgren), Alternative future worlds
- 14 Sep Brigadier General Davis, USMC

During a trip to Europe, the Group met with:⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁸ Long Range Planning Conference 89 Folder: Robert S. Wood, “Framework for Long Range Planning.”

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid., Thank you letters, 1990–1991.

- 17 Sep In Naples: Admiral Jonathan Howe, USN (CINCUSNAVEUR/Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe), Vice Admiral James D. Williams USN (COMSIXTHFLT/Commander Strike Force South), Rear Admiral select Bill Terry USN
- 18 Sep Rear Admirals Chiles/Ryan/Cressey/Fry, USN; Captains McGruther/Slocum, USN (NAVSOUTH); Brigadier General Mitchner
- 19 Sep In London: MOD U.K., Vice Admiral Ilg, USN (Deputy CINCUSNAVEUR); Dr. Willem van Eeelen (General Secretary, Western European Union)
- 20 Sep Royal Navy (Greenwich), International Institute for Strategic Studies
- 21 Sep NAVEUR)/FMFEUR staffs; Peter Hadfield (Royal Dutch Shell), on Scenario Planning
- 22 Sep At Cambridge: Michael McGwire, Gwyn Prins (Global Security Programme), on Pangia, force and security
- 24 Sep At EUCOM Headquarters: Brief on General Galvin's thinking, J-heads meetings, including Rear Admiral Leighton "Snuff" Smith, USN (J3, SSG V) and Brigadier General Tony Zinni, USMC (Deputy J3, SSG VI)
- 25 Sep In Brussels: Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (U.S Representative to NATO Military Committee-MILREP), and NATO Roundtable; Admiral Thomas (RN)/etc.; General Fryer, Dave Nicholas (U.S. Mission Defense Advisors); John Kornblum (Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission to NATO)
- 26 Sep At SHAPE Headquarters: Rear Admiral Donald W. Baird, USN (Chief Operations/Readiness Branch, SSG VII), DCINC Roundtable

Meetings continued back in Newport:

- 1 Oct Dov Zakheim & Jeff Ranney (System Planning Corporation), on the defense budget environment
- 2 Oct John Petersen, on paradigm shifts
- 4 Oct Captain Roger Barnett, USN (Retired)
- 5 Oct Indian Chief of Naval Service in the morning, followed by Bob Bisson, on finding water from space satellites in the afternoon.

During a trip to Washington, D.C., the Group met with:

- 29 Oct Rear Admiral Flanagan, USN (Office of Legislative Affairs)
- 30 Oct Jim Clunan (AFSOUTH Political Advisor)
- 31 Oct Lieutenant General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (Plans, Policy and Operations, HQ USMC), Major General Donald R. Gardner (Requirements and Programs), and Major General Mathew P. Caulfield, USMC (Deputy Commander Training and Education)
- 2 Nov Alice M. Rivlin (Brookings Institution)

Appendix I: SSG X Liaison List

The SSG X Liaison List is included to provide a complete list of people with whom the whole group met as part of their research.

Strategic Studies Group X Liaison List

Strategic Studies Group X has held substantive discussions with the following commands and distinguished individuals in an effort to obtain a broad, joint perspective on issues related to national decision making and strategic planning process:

Office of the Secretary of Defense:

- VADM William Owens, Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense and Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet
- Mr. Andy Marshall, Director, Office of Net Assessment
- Mr. Richard Haver, Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Policy
- RADM Scott Redd, OSD/ISP
- CAPT Larry Seaquist, OSD/ISP
- LT COL Eden Woon, OSD/ISA
- CDR Torkel Patterson, OSD/ISA

Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Staff:

- ADM David Jeremiah, VCJCS
- ADM Frank Kelso, CNO
- GEN Merrill McPeak, Chief of Staff, USAF
- GEN A. M. Gray, CMC
- RADM Thomas Fox, Dep. Dir. International Negotiations, J-5
- RADM David Robinson, Joint Staff, J-7

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations:

- ADM Jerome L. Johnson, VCNO
- VADM Richard M. Dunleavy, OP-05
- VADM Jerry O. Tuttle, OP-094
- VADM J.D. Williams, OP-07
- VADM Roger F. Bacon, OP-02
- VADM Robert K. Kihune, OP-03
- RADM Anthony A. Less, OP-06

U.S. Commander in Chief, Atlantic:

- ADM Leon Edney, CINC
- ADM Paul D. Miller, CINCLANTFLT
- LGEN C.E. Mundy, CG, FMFLANT
- VADM J.K. Ready, COMNAVAIRLANT
- VADM Michael P. Kalleres, COMSECONDFLT
- VADM Henry G. Chiles, COMSUBLANT

U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific:

ADM Huntington Hardisty, CINC
ADM Charles Larson, CINCPACFLT & CINCPAC
ADM Robert J. Kelly, CINCPACFLT
LGEN R.F. Milligan, CG, FMFPAC
VADM Jerry L. Unruh, COMTHIRDFLT
VADM Edwin D. Kohn, COMNAVAIRPAC
RADM Michael C. Colley, COMSUBPAC
RADM Lyle F. Bull, DCINC, CINCPACFLT
RADM William T. Pendley, CINCPAC Dir. Plans & Policy
RADM Larry G. Vogt, CINCPAC Dir. Plans & Policy
RADM Thomas D. Paulsen, CINCPACFLT, Dir. Plans and Ops

U.S. Commander in Chief, Space:

VADM Diego Hernandez, DCINC
VADM William Dougherty, DCINC

U.S. Commander in Chief, Transportation

VADM Paul Butcher, DCINC
MGEN John Stanford, Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics

NATO/SHAPE/EUCOM:

ADM James Hogg, U.S. Rep. to NATO Military Comm.
ADM Jonathan Howe, CINC, NATO Southern Region
ADM William Smith, U.S. Rep. to NATO Military Committee
VADM Leighton Smith, Dir. Operations, USCINEUR
BGEN Anthony Zlnni, Dep. Dir. Ops, USCINEUR
RADM Don Baird, Chief, Ops/Readiness, SHAPE

U.S. Commander in Chief, Central Command

Dr. Earl Rubright, Science and Technical Advisor

Department of the Army:

Dr. William Howard, Director, Space and Strategic Programs, Office of the Secretary of the Army

National Security Council:

RADM Donald Pilling, Dir., Defense Policy & Arms Control
COL Mike Hayden, Asst. Dir., Defense Policy & Arms Control

Central Intelligence Agency:

Mr. Dick Kerr, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. John Furch, National Intelligence Officer (Economics)
Mr. Gordon Oehler, National Intelligence Officer (Science, Technology and Proliferation)
Mr. David Jenkins, Demographics

National Security Agency:

VADM William Studeman, Director
RADM James S. McFarland, Dep Dir for Plans and Policy

Department of State:

AMB Richard C. Barkley, former U.S. Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic
Mr. Paul Berg
Mr. Charles Skinner

Department of Energy:

Dr. Fenton Carey, Special Asst for Space Programs
Dr. Abram Haspel, Chief Economist, Director Office of Economic Analysis

NASA:

Dr. John Schumacher, Deputy Administrator

Center for Navel Analyses:

Hon. Robert Murray, President
Dr. Gary A. Federici

Representatives from Business:

AMB B.R. Inman, former Dep. Dir. of Central Intelligence
Ms. Mitzi Wertheim, IBM
Dr. Kathe Robertson, McDonnell-Douglas
Dr. Alberto de Benedictis, SINMECCANICA

Foreign Officials:

Mr. William Van Ekelon, Secretary General, Western European Union
Mr. Toshinori Shigaie, Japanese Foreign Ministry/Harvard University

Representatives from Strategic Think-Tanks/Academic institution:

GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster, former SACEUR/CINCEUR
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor
VADM John A. Baldwin, President, National Defense University
Dr. Al Bernstein, National Defense University
CAPT Jim Giblin, National Defense University
Mr. Michael Vlahos, CSFA
Dr. Vic Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analysis
Dr. Paul Richenbach, Institute for Defense Analysis
Dr. Robert Barnett, NSR
Dr. Paul Davis, RAND
Dr. Robert Levine, RAND
Dr. Dan Fox, RAND
RADM Gary Wheatley, Hudson Institute
Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Amer. Academy of Arts and Sciences
Dr. John Battilega, SAIC
Dr. Judy Grange, SAIC
Dr. Wendy Frieman, SAIC
Mr. Ron St. Martin, SAIC
Dr. Kazuhiko Kawamura, Vanderbilt University
Dr. Eugene Brown, U.S. Army War College
CAPT Paul Bloch, Naval Postgraduate School
CDR Mitch Brown, Naval Postgraduate School

Others:

Mr. Jim Lloyd, former member of U.S. Congress from Calif.
CAPT Rod McDaniel, USN (ret.), former NSC Staff Member

Dr. Henry Walker, Environmental Research Labs
Mr. Ron Morse, ESI
Mr. Ed Yoder, syndicated columnist

Appendix J: SSG XI Game 2 Participants

This list is included to demonstrate the depth and breadth of U.S. and foreign expertise used by the SSG XI to explore their concepts. Other SSG's games included foreign participation, but not as extensively as this one.

Participants

UNITED STATES

President	Hon. Robert (Bob) J. Murray	CNA
National Security Advisor	RADM Donald (Don) L. Pilling	NSC Staff
National Security Advisor	Mr. Craig Chellis	NSC Staff
OMB	Dr. Dave Graham	IDA
Secretary of State	LGEN Bernard (Mick) E. Trainor (USMC Ret.)	Harvard
Under Sec. of State	Mr. Thomas Lewis	Naval Research Proj. Office
U.N. Ambassador	Mr. Tom Handel	OP-92
Secretary of Defense	Dr. Vick Utgoff	IDA
Under Sec. Def. Policy	Mr. Tim Tyler	OSD/DSAA
Under Sec. Def. Acquisition	Dr. Mike Salomone	Georgia Tech
Secretary of HHS	CAPT Mike Eck (USNR)	NAVRES
DoD Comptroller	CAPT Bob Rachor	Navy Budget Ofc.
President's Science Advisor	Dr. Susan Bales	OP-00K
Chairman JCS	RADM Dennis (Denny) C. Blair	JCS (J-8)
Theater Commander	RADM (Sel) James (Jim) Stark	OP-00K
Congress	Hon. James (Jim) F. Lloyd	U.S. Citizen
Pres. Press Sec'y	LCDR Kathy Woodcock	CHINFO
Coordinator	CAPT Mike Martus	SSG
Coordinator	CAPT Stan Bryant	SSG
Facilitator	CDR Bob Drews	WGD

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

E.C. President	Mr. Roif Tlmans	Harvard Fellow
French P.M.	Dr. Don Daniel	CNWS
French CHOD	VADM Jean Betermier (FN-Ret.)	Henri Conze Int'l
German P.M.	Dr. Ulrich Brandenburg	Harvard Fellow
German CHOD	CAPT Dr. Werner Rahn	CNWS
U.K. P.M.	COL Michael Dewar (RA-Ret.)	IISS
U.K. CHOD	CDR Jeremy Parker (RN)	CNWS
U.N. Ambassador	Dr. Robert Levine	RAND
Pres. Eur. Arms Commission	Dr. Kathy Robertson	McDonnell Douglas
E.C. Trade Rep.	Dr. Susan Clark	IDA
Coordinator	CDR Jim Holloway	SSG
Facilitator	MAJ Chuck Schoonover	WGD

RUSSIA

President	Amb. Vladimir Kulagin	MFA
Foreign Minister	Dr. Sergey Fedorenko	NWC Consultant
U.N. Ambassador	Dr. Vladimir Ivanov	Harvard Fellow
Defense Minister	Dr. John Hines	BDM
Chmn. State Cmte on Def.	Mr. Ted Neely	OP-92
Pres. Adv. On Military Affairs	Dr. Genady Kotchetkov	ISCAN
Economic Advisor	Dr. Lawrence Modesett	CNWS
Minister of Industry/S&T	Dr. Alexander Menshikov	VIMPEL
	Mr. Russ Milheim	NAVMIC
	Dr. Ethan Kapstein	Harvard
	Ms. Judy Mooers	SAIC
NATO Liaison	CAPT Dan Moore	SSG
Coordinator	LTCOL Dan Sickenger	WGD
Facilitator		

JAPAN

Prime Minister	Mr. Yoshihiro Nishida	MFA/Harvard
Foreign Minister	Mr. Naoaki Arisawa	Kyodo News
		Service/Vanderbilt
Trade Minister	Mr. Hiroshi Ohsawa	MITI/Vanderbilt
Finance Minister	Dr. Pat Cronin	NDU/INSS
Defense Minister	LTCOL Noboru Yamaguchi	JSDF/Harvard Fellow
CHOD	COL Randy Gangel	CINCPACFLT
U.N. Ambassador	CDR Paul Giarra	OSD/ISA
Science Advisor	Ms. Wendy Frieman	SAIC
Coordinator/Emperor	COL Gary Randel	SSG
Facilitator	LCDR Joe McNamara	WGD

ARAB LEAGUE

President	Dr. Robert Satloff	Wash. Inst. for NE Policy
Syria	COL Ed Badalato (USMC Ret.)	Energa Tech Inc.
Egypt/Jordan	Mr. John Knubel	LMI
Iraq	CDR Gail Dady	OP-40
Saudi Arabia (GCC)	Prof. Hugh Lynch	CNWS
"	CDR Jan Smith	CNWS

Appendix K: Admiral Boorda's Memorandum on SSG Functions, Tasks, and Organizational Relationships

This appendix provides CNO Boorda's update to CNO Trost's memorandum on the SSG's functions, tasks, and organizational relationships following his decision to keep the SSG, but before transitioning it to naval warfare innovation. Captain Mike Martus (then NOOK and formerly SSG XI) drafted the memo and the CNO revised it. It captures the tensions CNO Boorda felt between the SSG's role in preparing officers for higher command and producing recommendations upon which he could act.

Memorandum

From: Chief of Naval Operations,
To: Director, Strategic Studies Group
Subj: Strategic Studies Group (SSG)
Ser 00/5U500128
29 June 1995

The SSG was to be a means of advancing the development of naval officers as well as a source of innovative thought regarding strategic concepts, operations and tactics. The SSG was to:

- Provide SSG Fellows an understanding of strategic concepts, international security issues, major foreign policy objectives and budgetary factors as they relate to the use of military forces, particularly in the context of maritime operations.
- Conduct individual and directed Group study and research, to include exposure to the thinking of senior military officers and civilian leaders in the government, industry and academia.
- Undertake studies and analysis for expanded understanding of existing and alternative views on naval strategy, plans, operations, fiscal resources, warfare requirements, and technology as they relate to the topic of study assigned by the CNO.
- Serve as a catalyst for innovative thinking and problem solving and as a means for the timely exchange of ideas among those responsible for organizing, supplying, equipping and training as well as the employment of naval forces.

- Maintain a dialogue with Groups and institutions, military and civilian, foreign and domestic with recognized expertise in the area under study.

The SSG would be tasked directly by the CNO and report solely to the CNO. No tasking from external sources would be levied on the SSG except through the CNO. The CNO would personally assign officers to the SSG and approve follow-on assignments of Navy officers in all cases. The CNO would approve distribution of the study products prepared by the CNO.

The Director of the SSG would remain responsible for designing and evaluating the SSG program as well as the overall performance of the Group, providing guidance and direction to the SSG Fellows through the senior officer assigned (as noted in the Memorandum of Understanding for the CNA Field Representative to the Naval War College). Ultimately, the Fellows were directly responsible to the CNO for their work.

The SSG would maintain liaison with OPNAV N-3/5, N-8, N-2, and the Chief of Naval Research to remain abreast of timely issues of particular importance to their assigned tasks. Direct liaison with the Joint and Service staffs, operational commanders, U.S. government entities such as the National Security Council, Department of State, etc., as well as non-government and foreign entities was authorized and encouraged.

The Group was also to take maximum advantage of the Naval Postgraduate School as well as its collocation with the Naval War College, particularly CNWS, by leveraging the ongoing studies and research at the college as it applied to their functions and tasks.

The President, NWC was to act as a resource to the SSG drawing on his operational knowledge and professional background; make available to the SSG the expertise resident in the faculty and staff as well as the research and learning activities of the college, and provide full program, facility and administrative support to the SSG.

N00K would be the CNO's central point of contact for matters affecting the SSG.

Appendix L: Biography of Dr. John T. Hanley, Jr., Relevant to the SSG

From Peter Swartz, CNA Project Director:

Dr. John Hanley, the primary author-analyst of this report, was a participant in most of the activities described in this document. He supported SSG I and all subsequent SSGs until 1998. No one else has had the breadth, depth, and length of John's service with the SSG during this period. This appendix is included to ensure that the reader understands John's relationship to the phenomena it describes and analyzes. This biography is itself an important part of the SSG story.

John Hanley graduated from Dartmouth College in 1971 with highest distinction in engineering science. He took a year's leave of absence from the Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps to complete requirements for a master's degree in engineering science, during which he designed a nuclear reactor that could power Dartmouth. He received his commission as an ensign in 1972.

He went on to Nuclear Power School and prototype training, finishing at the top of his class, and received orders to USS *Guitarro* (SSN 665), the newest submarine in the Pacific Fleet. He contributed to developing tactics using the first submarine-towed sonar array (STASS) and digital processors (BQR-20 series), and wrote the target motion analysis techniques portion of a TACMEMO. Commander Submarines Pacific adopted *Guitarro's* TACMEMO for the Pacific submarine fleet. He served as officer of the deck during two very productive special operations in the western Pacific in 1975. Following the deployment, *Guitarro* received the first submarine-launched Harpoon missile in the Pacific Fleet and developed tactics for its employment. In the shipyard, he served as Engineering Training Officer and oversaw installation of the first digital submarine sonar (BQQ-5) and fire control system (MK-117).

Rather than accept an assignment as a Chief Engineer of a submarine in new construction or overhaul, he chose to join the Navy Reserve and to go work for Sonalysts, Inc., a small defense consulting firm in 1977. There he contributed to writing the *Coordination in Direct Support (CIDS) Fleet Exercise Analysis Guide* and participated in designing, conducting, and analyzing antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in 10 fleet exercises in all four numbered fleets over a two-and-a-half-year period. The program collected and analyzed all ASW communications and command arrangements for using submarines in Direct Support of carrier battle groups, using a variety of prototype communications from extremely low frequency radios to lasers. He worked with Naval Electronics System Command in developing command and control simulations (the Warfare Environment Simulator) using the fleet data. He also wrote exercise analysis guides for Over-the-Horizon Targeting, Fleet Command and Control, and the 1980 Tactical Development and Evaluation Program Master

Plan, in addition to conducting other studies related studies and analyses. In the Navy Reserve, he served with Commander Submarine Development Squadron TWELVE's tactical analysis group, designing, participating in, and analyzing submarine ASW exercises.

In 1982, he was told of an opportunity to work with the new Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (SSG) at the Naval War College in Newport during his two-week annual training period. He and a colleague reported to Newport and received tasking to develop timelines for deploying the Soviet Northern Fleet using specified parameters and mission priorities, and accompanying timelines for deploying the U.S. Atlantic submarine fleet to flood the area north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. He then began an analysis of combat operations, using calculations and data involved in designing U.S. submarine ASW exercises. He also began to analyze combined-arms ASW tactics, rather than having maritime patrol air, submarine, and surface ASW forces operate independently, using data from the CIDS program. On the last day of the two-week training period, Hon. Robert J. (Bob) Murray (Director, SSG) and Captain (Select) William A. Owens, USN, invited Hanley to lunch and requested that he remain with the Group.

Hanley began sharing an office with Owens and Captain (Select) Arthur K. (Art) Cebrowski, USN, continuing campaign analyses for establishing sea control and conducting ASW against Soviet SSBNs using—and comparing—combined arms versus independent operations. He drafted the first SSG's report, using the analysis and SSG briefings, then helped the staff make preparations for SSG II (1982-1983). Hanley used his Navy Reserve activities to assist in implementing SSG ideas in the U.S. submarine forces. Dr. Bob Wood relieved Murray as Director, SSG. Wood asked Hanley whether he would consider a government job as Program Director for the SSG (Hanley was a vice president at Sonalysts), Hanley agreed, and the SSG staff went about establishing the billet. In the fall of 1983, Hanley embarked on a Ph.D. in Operations Research half-time at Yale to learn about O.R. techniques that could be applied to strategic analysis, with Wood's blessing. In 1985 the Navy authorized and funded the billet for Program Director; arranging the SSG program, advising the SSG, and overseeing the SSG budget and staff. Hanley returned to government service just as Ambassador Marshall Bremont took over as Director, SSG.

Hanley continued work three days a week with SSG and two days a week taking classes at Yale through 1987. He became convinced that strategic analysis did not admit typical O.R. quantification. Strategy involves the interaction of two or more parties. Therefore, Hanley concentrated on game theory and gaming as the focus for his Ph.D. studies. The kind of gaming that he was designing and conducting with the SSG was best suited to those studies. His dissertation advisor, Professor Martin Shubik, was very interested in the Global War Games, so Hanley wrote his dissertation on gaming and the Global War Games. He took ten weeks leave without

pay in 1989 to focus on his dissertation, and was awarded his Ph.D. from Yale in 1991.

In 1989, Hon. Robert B. Pirie, Jr., became Director, SSG, and Hanley adopted the role of Deputy Director in addition to his formal position as Program Director. Hanley also served as Deputy under Ambassador Francis J. McNeil and Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (Retired). He assisted Admiral Hogg in transitioning the SSG to a focus on naval warfare innovation through his departure in December 1998. He commanded three naval reserve units, including COMSUBDEVRON TWELVE during the period from 1991 to 1998, and retired in 2000.

Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN (SSG VI) invited Hanley to join him as his Special Assistant when appointed to command U.S. forces in the Pacific in 1998. Hanley assisted in developing, writing, and implementing Pacific Command policy and strategy through Blair's tour, informed by the work that he had done with the SSG. In 2002 Art Cebrowski, now retired from the Navy (as a vice admiral), invited Hanley to help him establish the Office of Force Transformation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Hanley then went on to become Deputy Director of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) (2003), serve as Deputy Director for Advanced Concepts in OSD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (2007), work on competitive strategies in OSD Strategy (2008), and serve as Director for Strategy at the Office of the Director for National Intelligence (2010). He retired from government service in 2012 and works as an independent consultant.

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