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Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence

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The Center for Naval Analyses

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To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.
—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

The background and the problem

The end of the Cold War has both increased the importance and changed the context of peacetime Navy operations. For almost five decades, although the Navy operated globally and responded to crises unrelated to the superpower confrontation, such operations were undertaken against the backdrop of either deterring or preparing for war with the Soviet Union. Peacetime operations were important primarily to the degree that they allowed the Navy to prepare for war.

The situation has changed. In the future, the Navy and the nation must treat peacetime operations as important in their own right, not simply as a preparation for war or crisis. The targets of such operations must be an ever-changing list of states, responding to changing national needs; the goal must be to influence the behavior of those states.

An emphasis on peacetime operations is, of course, nothing new. The Navy has periodically discovered and rediscovered peacetime operations as a discrete, important Navy mission. In the early 1970s, for example, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Zumwalt put peacetime presence on a par with sea control, power projection, and strategic deterrence as the four basic missions of the Navy. That emphasis has faded, however. Although Navy officers and naval analysts have always known instinctively that navies were important vehicles of peacetime influence, this knowledge has played only a secondary role in recent naval thinking and planning. For example, until recently, the formal structure of the Navy's new Joint Mission Assessment process, with the exception of strategic deterrence, was oriented exclusively toward warfighting and gave no weight to the value of presence.

Most Navy officers, whatever their warfighting specialty, wish they knew more about antisubmarine warfare or amphibious warfare or carrier operations or maritime strategy. They know that each of these subjects is an important part of the overall body of knowledge required of the proficient naval warrior. In contrast, although individual academics, analysts, and Navy officers have studied the conduct and debated the value of peacetime presence, the profession as a whole does not value presence as an important military task, demanding the same expertise and careful study as strike warfare or antiair warfare.

The Navy's failure to focus on peacetime presence arises in part because the profession lacks any consensus on how such presence relates to budget and force-structure decisions. A second factor is the difficulty of understanding, at more than a rudimentary level, how peacetime presence advances national goals. Chiefly, however, peacetime presence as a source of leverage has taken a subordinate role because the global confrontation with the Soviet Union and its surrogates has dominated professional Navy thinking. Even when the profession examined operations short of global war, it emphasized crisis response and the application of force, rather than the influence available through routine naval operations. In such an environment, it was easy to treat peacetime operations as a lesser-included case of preparing for war.

This must change. Peacetime operations are too important to be an afterthought. Without a more systematic understanding of such operations and the influence they bring, Americans cannot make intelligent decisions about the use of the Navy in specific situations, about strategy, or even about force structure. We need to understand the environment in which the United States is attempting to exert influence and the broad peacetime roles of the military in that environment. We need to understand whom we are trying to influence and to do what. Only then can we consider the implications for the Navy.

The new international environment

Nations exercise influence in a specific international setting. Several important political and military characteristics describe the international environment as the world approaches the twenty-first century. They include the following:

- *The absence of a global threat to the United States.* No threat comparable to that posed by the former Soviet Union is likely to emerge in the next decade. Future threats will be diverse, regional, and political, rather than coherent, global, military threats.
- *The lack of credible open-ocean naval opposition.* No potentially hostile power now in existence or likely to emerge can challenge the United States on the broad ocean or on those portions of the littoral seas where over-the-horizon operations are possible. Only in specific, limited cases (such as the Strait of Hormuz) are serious military threats such as mining or land-based missiles likely to be significant.
- *An increase in the number of states of direct concern to the U.S. military.* With no superpower confrontation to shape our foreign-policy priorities, considerations such as human rights, democracy, and humanitarianism will become increasingly important determinants of where the United States will become involved and where, therefore, the military, especially the Navy, may be called upon to act. As a result, it will be increasingly difficult to predict which countries will be important to U.S. policy, and thus to U.S. naval policy.
- *A growing probability that the United States will take military action in internal conflicts.* Bosnia, Somalia, and the Kurds in Iraq are all cases where military intervention, including the use of significant force, has been argued to be in the U.S. national interest, but where no direct conflict between nation states was involved.

- *An increasing concern with proliferation and arms transfers.* Traditionally, the United States has used the tools of diplomacy and of economic coercion to further its nonproliferation goals. The establishment of "counter proliferation" as a specific Department of Defense mission, and the use of nonproliferation as public justification for action against Iraq may presage a future willingness to use military action to enforce nonproliferation.
- *Growing emphasis on enforcement of international sanctions.* Not only will the increased emphasis on historic proliferation concerns lead to enforcement actions, but controlling the flow of conventional arms to combatants, both national and sub-national, including by military enforcement of arms embargoes, will also be increasingly emphasized (as in Bosnia today). In addition, military force will increasingly be used (as in Iraq and Serbia) to enforce economic sanctions.
- *A continuing political requirement, even if military considerations argue otherwise, for operations to be undertaken by coalitions.* The end of the Cold War allows the United States more flexibility to use military force, but does not necessarily mean America can employ force unilaterally. International legitimization, under the auspices of either the United Nations or regional security organizations, will continue to be necessary.

The Navy and Marine Corps have responded to this new environment in several ways. One is through the promulgation of *...From the Sea*, the naval services' new vision of littoral warfare. Another is through an increased emphasis on joint planning and joint operations. For years, although the Navy was committed by law to operating jointly, its internal ethic was built around independent operations. Now that has changed. The Navy and Marine Corps are irrevocably committed—not only by law but by conviction—to an operating philosophy of jointness. As a practical matter, it would be impossible to return to the single-service approach of the past even if anyone wanted to.

Consistent with this new outlook, the Navy must view future operations—including peacetime operations—through a joint lens, so that operational planning maximizes the contributions of all services.

The peacetime role of military forces

Any discussion of the peacetime role of the military must keep in mind a fundamental fact: military forces exist to prepare for—and, if necessary, to wage—war. Using the military differs from other means of exerting peacetime influence precisely because such use carries with it an implied threat to employ force.

At the same time, most military establishments spend most of their time at peace. Peacetime military operations are many and varied, and the peacetime employment of armies, navies, and air forces can be analyzed in many ways. At the most basic level, all peacetime military effort supports one of three basic tasks:

- *Preparing for war.* This includes training to maintain combat proficiency, operating in areas of potential conflict to ensure operational familiarity, working with allies to develop interoperability, and conducting intelligence and surveillance operations.
- *Responding to crises with action.* Military force may protect American lives, respond to natural disasters, impose solutions to local conflicts, prevent conflict from spreading, or punish aggression. Such actions are immensely important, but naval thinking since the end of the Cold War has tended to overemphasize them and to neglect the less well-defined, but equally important, task of exerting peacetime influence.
- *Advancing U.S. interests without the use of force.* This includes deterring adversaries, reassuring allies and friends, sending signals of U.S. interest, and fostering good will. In this paper, the process of advancing U.S. national interests by changing the attitude or behavior of other states without the use of force is called *influence.*

These three basic tasks have no absolute demarcation. Many peacetime actions fulfill more than one task. Deployments

to the Persian Gulf, for example, help prepare for hostilities, position forces to respond to crises quickly, and help influence both friends and adversaries in the region. Despite this overlap, the three tasks provide a useful framework for examining peacetime operations.

The most challenging of these tasks to analyze—and the one least often examined—is the third. In principle, a nation has influence if it can change the outcome of events. When not exercised by the direct use of force, however, such influence is extremely difficult to measure. We can tell what nations do, but can seldom be certain why they do it. For example, for 40 years the United States sought to deter the Soviet Union, to influence it not to attack NATO. There was no attack. Does that mean that our attempts at influence were successful, or was an attack never a real possibility? Intuitively, the "truth" is probably somewhere in the middle, but we simply lack both the analytic tools and the underlying data to know that truth with any precision.

If it is difficult to determine the extent of U.S. military influence in dramatic cases involving strategic nuclear deterrence, the European deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops to support NATO, and all the other elements of national power, it is even more difficult to evaluate the influence exerted by naval forces. Navies, by their very nature, tend to operate on the margins of national consciousness. Their influence is likely to be subtle and indirect and not easy to discern or to measure. The fact that it is hard to measure influence is an argument for better understanding and better methods of measurement. It is not, however, a reason for ignoring any available tool—including the Navy—in seeking to advance U.S. interests. When America turns to its Navy to help exercise America's military influence abroad, the Navy must be ready to meet the challenge. The first step toward being ready is to understand who is to be influenced and what they are being influenced to do.

Whom are we trying to influence and to do what?

Although port visits, flyovers, and other operations often foster favorable attitudes toward the United States among the local populace, the prime target for influence is not the general public. Nor should peacetime naval operations be directed primarily at military leaders or the leaders of other navies, though influencing such leaders is important. The primary target must be the political leadership of other states.

What do we want these political leaders to do or to think? Broad U.S. political-military objectives are clear:

- First and foremost, we wish to preserve the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values and institutions intact.
- We wish to protect American lives, property, and interests throughout the world.
- We wish to promote the independence and internal stability of our allies.
- We wish to foster a stable international climate where relations among states are peaceful and harmonious and disputes are settled without resort to force.
- We wish to encourage states, in their internal behavior, to foster democracy, protect human rights, and develop free-market institutions.

Gaining these objectives requires the full use of all the instruments of national power—political, economic, diplomatic, military, and moral. The military is not suitable for pursuing all U.S. national objectives, but some may require using military forces to influence the behavior of other states. The nation needs to influence four discrete groups of states: *friends and allies*, *adversaries* (potential or actual), *uncommitted states* (those whose attitude toward the United States is a mix of friendship,

hostility, and indifference), and *unstable regimes*. For each group, the United States has both minimum and more ambitious goals:

- With *friends and allies*, the U.S. goal is, at a minimum, to reassure. America wants our allies to have no doubt about our ability and our willingness to support and protect them and their interests. We wish those friends who are not allies to understand that we are well disposed toward them. Ideally, however, we wish to do more. We would like to increase the ability—and thus the willingness—of both friends and allies to cooperate actively with us in future military coalitions.
- With *adversaries*, our minimum goal is to deter aggression or other unacceptable acts directed against the United States, our interests, or our allies. Once again, we would like to go beyond this minimum goal by defusing tension and improving relations.
- Our minimum goal with respect to *uncommitted states* (those that are neither friends nor allies) is to prevent them from becoming adversaries; ideally, we wish to convert them to friends. (Americans have traditionally referred to such states as "neutrals," a term derived from over four decades of viewing international relations through the lens of U.S.-Soviet confrontation; as the Cold War fades, the concept of "neutrality" in global terms has become more and more of an anachronism.)
- Finally, we wish to influence *unstable regimes* to respect American lives and property. The broader U.S. goal for such regimes is to restore stability, either by encouraging actions by the regime itself, or through the imposition of stability by external forces.

The role of military forces, and thus of the Navy, will differ in each case.

Influencing allies and friends

The category of "friends" includes both traditional military allies (primarily NATO, but also, e.g., South Korea) and states with which the United States maintains cordial relations but not formal alliances. With friends, whether formally allied with the United States or not, our most important political-military objective is to provide reassurance of our continued support against any potential enemy. We wish our friends both to remain aware of the extent of our military power and to be confident of our reliability. In short, we want them to remain friends.

Reassurance has both a negative and a positive component. The United States must reassure other states that we are not hostile to their interests and wish to be on friendly terms. Such reassurance is appropriate for virtually all states other than active adversaries. Active reassurance involves a smaller number of states and is far more relevant to the peacetime use of military force. For active reassurance to occur, the friend or ally must believe both that the United States is capable of undertaking whatever military action is necessary and that, if circumstances require it, America will take that action. Given the immense military power of the United States relative to virtually all other states, there normally will be little doubt of American *ability* to act. Thus, reassurance consists primarily of demonstrating American *willingness* to act.

The degree of reassurance required by individual states will depend both on the extent to which the state involved believes that it faces a military threat and on the degree to which we want that state to believe that we are committed to its security. With some states, it may be enough simply to demonstrate continuing friendly relations, even though there is little prospect that the states involved will need our military protection (or that we would supply it if they did). For example, the annual UNITAS operations with various South American nations served for years as a visible symbol of U.S. involvement and interest, even though such operations had no direct role in preparing for future

military operations. In other cases, peacetime Navy contacts can demonstrate both U.S. ability and U.S. readiness to defend against external threats and thereby actively reassure the states involved. As the security environment an individual state faces changes, the degree of reassurance America provides must naturally change as well.

In the coming years, the United States will increasingly need to add a new element to the traditional peacetime Navy role of reassurance. The most logical coalition partners for future operations are those nations that are on good terms with us, even if they are not formal allies. The second goal of peacetime operations with friends and allies, therefore, is to lay the foundation for future coalitions.

Military operations do not create coalitions; forming coalitions is inherently a political act. Each coalition must be tailored for a specific contingency. Even among nations linked by formal alliances such as NATO, coalitions must be carefully constructed. Neither the Navy nor the nation can construct such coalitions in advance. Peacetime operations, however, help make coalitions possible. More importantly, failing to operate with the military forces of other states in peacetime may preclude wartime coalitions. If military forces of different nations are unable to work together, effective coalitions are infeasible. Peacetime operations, by promoting interoperability, create the conditions that allow the future formation of effective coalitions. A major goal of peacetime Navy employment should be expanding the number and size of such potential coalitions. The political objective should be to gain universal acceptance of the concept of operating in tandem with U.S. forces; the military objective should be to increase interoperability.

The key political feature of peacetime operations involving friends is that they are cooperative and routine. ("Routine" is used in the sense of "unremarkable," rather than "frequent." In this sense, U.S. participation in the annual Coral Sea celebration is a "routine" reminder of our political-military ties to

Australia, even though it happens only once a year.) Such operations may involve extensive communication and cooperation with working levels of other governments and their military establishments. Their routine nature, however, normally requires only peripheral involvement by senior U.S. diplomats or senior levels of the host government.

Reassurance need not depend on the specific forces involved. Virtually any ship can symbolize American involvement and interest. In particular, there is no *a priori* reason why either aviation or amphibious capabilities are necessary. But there is one exception: Where a friend or ally faces a specific, defined military threat, effective reassurance requires forces with military capabilities that the friend or ally involved will perceive as both strong and relevant. Such forces show that the United States has not only the interest but also the ability to deter aggression or to defend its allies and friends against threats that they perceive to their interests.

In contrast, the more demanding goal of enabling future coalitions does depend, at least in part, on the forces involved. Although almost any U.S. forces can increase the political acceptability of military cooperation with the United States, only certain forces can help ensure the military effectiveness of future coalitions. Effective wartime coalitions require that the forces of the United states be interoperable with those forces of the friend or ally that are likely to be militarily useful in future coalition operations. As will be discussed below, this will more and more require U.S. forces that are capable of working effectively with the air and ground forces of other states.

Influencing adversaries

Peacetime operations have a different focus with respect to adversaries. (In this context, an "adversary" is one who threatens U.S. interests or allies, but not necessarily the United States itself. Thus, for example, North Korea is an adversary.) Adversaries need not be states; they may be terrorist organizations or

autonomous factions within states. Our most important political-military objective with regard to such adversaries is deterrence. We seek to influence—to deter—them both from taking actions inimical to us or that our allies perceive as threatening.

At its most fundamental level, deterrence is a state of mind. It occurs when the leaders of a particular government or organization refrain from taking a step for fear of unacceptable consequences. In essence, it is the mirror image of reassurance. For deterrence to function, two conditions must be present. First, the United States must be capable of taking action that an adversary would find unacceptable compared to the benefits to be gained by taking the step he is contemplating. Second, our willingness to take that action must not be in doubt.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States has become the sole military superpower. In this new world, there will normally be little doubt that the United States is capable of taking action that an adversary would find unacceptable. (One possible exception is deterrence of terrorist actions, where the United States may be unable to locate the terrorist group and thus is unable to inflict unacceptable retaliation.) The United States is, therefore, more likely to need peacetime military operations to demonstrate resolve than to display power. Although it is impossible to measure how much direct relevance the Navy has in deterring any specific adversary, naval operations can help to display national power and signal national will, both essential components of deterrence.

Deterring adversaries is the minimum U.S. peacetime political-military goal, but we would prefer to transform those adversaries into friends. Naval operations can be one tool in a strategy of improving relations with a given state. Naturally, contacts between navies will not, by themselves, dramatically alter relations between states. The very fact that naval presence can be temporary and low-key, rather than dramatic, makes presence potentially useful in easing tensions.

As an example, the United States used reciprocal naval visits with the former Soviet Union as one way to seek to ease tensions. Standing alone, these visits did almost nothing to transform U.S.—Soviet relations. Instead, they served as a convenient, inconspicuous way to demonstrate and reinforce the progress at reducing tensions being made at the political level. This illustrates an important point about peacetime military operations: they cannot be considered in isolation, but only as part of an overall national strategy of engagement.

The key political feature of peacetime operations involving adversaries is that they are non-routine and may be confrontational. Once again, "routine" refers to the nature of the operations, not to their frequency. Such operations may be conducted on a repetitive basis—as with operations in the Norwegian fjords during the Cold War or the Sixth Fleet's periodic Freedom of Navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra—but cannot be considered routine. Either a risk of hostilities is present, as in operations like those in the Gulf of Sidra, or the exercise is designed to overtly demonstrate a military capability to threaten another state, as in fjord operations. In either case, such operations are, by their very nature, non-routine.

Peacetime operations involving adversaries usually involve limited or no direct communication between the forces involved and the government the United States is seeking to influence. Any communications required will generally be conducted only at a high political level. The United States may need some explicit communication to ensure the other government does not misinterpret the signal America is seeking to send. For example, such a government may misinterpret deployments intended to demonstrate U.S. resolve to prevent or repel an attack on an ally, seeing such deployments as threatening preemptive attack.

Because of this need to ensure the message the adversary receives is the one the United States intends to send, substantial involvement with very senior U.S. diplomats is appropriate, both in preparation for and during the conduct of peacetime

operations directed at adversaries. Substantial coordination with the Washington foreign policy and national security apparatus will almost always be required. In addition, it is important that not only the adversary but also our friends and allies in the region understand any signals we are attempting to send. In many cases, therefore, high-level discussions with these friends or allies will be called for.

In contrast to the situation with friends or allies, the effectiveness of peacetime operations to influence adversaries depends heavily on the nature of the forces involved. It might appear, at first, that, just as puny gunboats once symbolized the might of the British empire, *any* U.S. forces can serve as a reminder of overwhelming U.S. military might. There are two reasons why this approach is flawed, however. First, an adversary may misinterpret the absence of militarily significant forces from the region as a lack of interest and thus a lack of resolve. Second, by having military forces in a given region, the United States reduces the risk that an adversary may believe it can present us with a *fait accompli* before the nation has time to react. Deterrence is strengthened more by presence in strength than by minimal or symbolic presence.

Forces with significant military capabilities are required for effective deterrence for another reason. By definition, adversaries are hostile; therefore, the risk of conflict is always present. Deterrence, by its very nature, carries the not-too-subtle possibility of the use of force. Indeed, the fact that robust forces are in the area is intended to suggest a willingness to use them. Forces that an adversary believes cannot survive hostilities will have far less influence. At a minimum, therefore, forces involved in deterrence must have robust self-defense capabilities.

Mere self-defense, however, is not enough. The potential adversary must also perceive such forces as capable of exerting relevant military power. Recently, the Navy has begun to organize its major deployments around "Naval Expeditionary Task Forces." These forces, which can be tailored to fit particular

situations, combine the airpower of a carrier and the amphibious assault capabilities of several amphibious ships. They are the basic building blocks for naval power in regional conflicts. As a practical matter, forces deployed to deter adversaries should normally be such robust Naval Expeditionary Task Forces, with their significant power-projection capability, rather than individual ships. This is particularly true because operations intended to deter may, on very short notice, turn into operations to respond to a crisis.

Unlike deterrent operations, operations to improve relations with adversaries usually should involve no more than one or two ships, chosen to avoid an adverse political reaction. Although the United States should give great weight to the desires of the host country (in terms of both numbers and types of ships), this normally means avoiding aircraft carriers (with their implication of coercion), amphibious ships (with their implication of intervention), or nuclear-powered ships (which add additional complexity to an already complex political-military situation). Cruisers, destroyers, or frigates are often ideal. Because port visits conducted in conjunction with such operations have a quasi-diplomatic character, it may be helpful if the ships involved have flag officers embarked during the visit itself.

Influencing the uncommitted

The goal of peacetime operations involving uncommitted states is an amalgam of U.S. goals with respect to friends and adversaries. The nation may elect to use such operations as symbols of U.S. involvement and interest, to try to move these states to some degree of friendship. Alternatively, we may seek to deter or coerce. In some cases, perceived "neutrals," even those not generally well-disposed toward the United States, may be appropriate coalition partners.

The key political feature of peacetime operations involving uncommitted states is that, even more than is the case with friends or adversaries, such operations must be tailor-made to

the situation. In one sense, of course, each nation is a special case, but this is particularly true of those balanced between friendship and hostility. Thus, the degree of involvement with a specific government or its military, as well as the extent of coordination with the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, will vary from state to state.

Just as the political goals of peacetime operations with respect to uncommitted states must be tailored to the specific states involved, so too must the military forces to be employed. Overwhelming force is almost always inappropriate. Other states may see such force as a symbol of coercion. If so, the operation will be ineffective in gaining friendship but highly effective in creating ill-will. The same considerations that apply to operations to reduce tensions with adversaries suggest that carriers, large amphibious ships, or nuclear-powered ships should be avoided. As with attempts to improve relations with adversaries, cruisers, destroyers, or frigates may be ideal.

Navies can exert influence by means other than deploying ships. Conferences, seminars, visits of senior officials, material and technical assistance, and the provision of training all provide mechanisms for influence. Such tools can be used with any state, but may be particularly effective with uncommitted states, which are often unfamiliar with U.S. military—especially naval—capabilities.

Influencing unstable nations

Unstable nations are those in which effective government has either broken down or threatens to do so. At the extreme, there may be no organized government. These states may once have been our allies, our adversaries, or neither. It doesn't matter. Similarly, the fact that elements of three distinct attitudes—hostility, friendship, and neutrality—may be present simultaneously is also irrelevant. The political-military goal with such states is to influence those in control of military force (to the extent we can determine who they are) to respect

American lives and property and the lives and property of our allies. More broadly, the United States, almost certainly acting with others, will wish to restore stability and prevent massive loss of life.

The situation with respect to unstable states is the most complex to analyze. At one extreme, dealing with instability may require building patterns of collective action well in advance, yet such coalition building is clearly distinct from operations directly aimed at influencing unstable states. At the other extreme, it may be inappropriate to speak of "influence" at all because there may be no effective government to influence. Instead, the Navy may need to shift to the crisis-response task of protecting the lives of U.S. and friendly nationals by removing them from danger through evacuation, or even by attempting to impose solutions to local conflicts to restore stability. Such intervention may also serve broader national interests, such as the prevention of genocide.

A narrow range exists, however, where it remains meaningful to speak of influence. In cases where effective government still functions, but is threatened, the United States may have an interest—and thus the Navy may have a role—in attempting to influence or assist that government to restore or maintain stability. In addition, to the extent that the groups threatening internal stability can be identified, the United States has a clear interest in influencing those groups. Some such groups may be little more than armed mobs, whereas others may be sufficiently organized that they take on many of the trappings of a government (the Palestine Liberation Organization, for example). Especially in the event that effective government has collapsed and the central authorities no longer are in control of the country, the United States may need to influence leaders of these warring factions to respect U.S. lives and the lives of other foreign nationals.

Although in theory the United States might also want to influence such leaders to respect commercial interests and property, the days of intervention to protect business interests

are over. This does not mean that Americans are indifferent to the importance of internal stability in U.S. trading partners or to the need for a stable climate to permit U.S. investment overseas. We are not. But direct intervention to protect U.S. commercial interests is both politically and militarily infeasible in today's world. At the most, military force can help U.S. commercial interests by contributing to a climate of stability in which those interests will be able to flourish.

The key political feature of many peacetime operations involving unstable states (for example, Somalia) is that the attitude of the government may be irrelevant. By definition, this must be so; coordination is not possible if there is no government with which to coordinate. On the other hand, coordination with other states with interests in the region, as well as with appropriate international organizations, will be extensive. So, too, will be the involvement of U.S. diplomats and the Washington foreign policy and national security apparatus.

The key military requirement for U.S. forces employed in peacetime operations involving unstable states is that they be able to protect American lives if U.S. attempts at influence are unsuccessful. This implies both the ability to punish leaders of specific factions and the ability to evacuate U.S. citizens at risk. The full capabilities of a Naval Expeditionary Task Force, tailored for the specific situation, are ideal; given the fast-breaking nature of real-world crises, commanders may need to improvise with far less.

In some cases, the United States may go beyond trying to influence those in control of the government or of various factions to respect American lives and seek the broader objective of restoring stability. Such a task will almost certainly be beyond the ability of the Navy and the Marines alone. It implies the ability to intervene directly in the situation ashore. Militarily this will require ground and land-based air forces (augmented, supported, and preceded by the Navy and Marine Corps); politically, it will almost certainly require involvement of a coalition.

The limitations of a focus on peacetime operations

Naval operations and naval warfare are inherently complex and fluid. The Navy's traditional aversion to rigid doctrine reflects that fact. No single way of looking at such a complicated subject can be expected to be useful in all situations. The nation, and therefore the Navy, needs a more rigorous understanding of the role of military forces in gaining peacetime influence, but attempting to restore peacetime operations to the status of a distinct military mission faces a number of problems. We have already noted what is perhaps the most serious problem: we simply don't understand how and to what degree—or even whether—operations of the Navy in peacetime can influence others. There are other problems as well.

There are risks in presence for presence's sake

In Beirut, in the early 1980s, American Marines were sent ashore to provide "presence" in order to influence events. The results were 241 dead Marines and no discernible influence on developments within Lebanon. The lesson is clear: presence is not risk free. The near loss of USS *Stark* shows that such risks are not limited to forces ashore. As more and more states have access to shore-based cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles, Navy ships, if sent on ill-defined "presence" operations, could face increasing risks. This could be particularly true in areas of sub-national conflict (such as Lebanon in the 1980s), where combatants with no fixed territory to defend may see little risk in attacking a superpower.

Although Lebanon and *Stark* are powerful arguments against a cavalier approach to peacetime operations in unstable regions, the fact that presence operations may be risky does not reduce their necessity or their importance. The lesson from failure is not that we were wrong to try, but rather that we need a deeper understanding of what influence we can exert, how best to exert it, and the risks involved. Obviously, if U.S. military

forces will not be influential—or if their influence will be negative—they have no business being sent.

Even if presence yields influence, the Navy is neither the only instrument nor the best one

A different objection is that, whatever peacetime military influence means, the Navy is unlikely to be as useful as other military forces in obtaining it. A powerful case can be made that naval influence operates only at the margin and is seldom decisive. Except in special cases, security assistance and permanently deployed ground and air forces may be far more powerful tools of influence than are navies. In most countries, the navy is the least influential service, both within the military establishment and in the government at large. Thus, attempting to use the Navy as the sole—or even the primary—vehicle of influence is at best inefficient, and at worst useless. In an era of jointness, the Navy should leave the task of influencing other states to the other services.

This line of argument has a certain validity. Navies *are* limited in their ability to influence other states. The fact that the fleet is visible only in port cities and can depart on short notice *is* an inherent limitation on the influence it can exert. Naval leaders *are* the least influential service chiefs in most states. All this is true. It is also irrelevant. In the future, the nation will have to use the Navy as a vehicle of influence because, in many cases, it may have no other choice. The other instruments of military influence are bound to diminish in availability as pressures on the defense budget decrease overseas basing and the funds available for security assistance shrink. It is no sin against jointness to state the obvious: if the United States wants to exert routine, day-in and day-out military influence in the coming years, it will increasingly need to use the Navy to do it.

None of this is intended to suggest that navies, operating alone, can be decisive in influencing other states. They cannot. The use of naval forces must be coordinated with the many other

instruments of U.S. influence, both economic, political, and military. But the need to use the Navy for peacetime influence, despite its limitations, is not as severe a constraint on the nation as it may appear. Influence has various forms. Nations can be influenced by a single, highly visible act, such as an ultimatum or the use of force. They can also be influenced by a series of small steps taken over time. Routine peacetime operations primarily exert this later form of influence.

A focus on presence can't answer the "real" question: What kind of a navy do we need?

An increased focus on peacetime presence as an important mission, though it may add to general support for the Navy, cannot by itself make the case for the Navy's preferred carrier force structure. The 1993 Defense Department Bottom-Up Review resulted in a force structure of 11 aircraft carriers plus a training carrier, and justified the decision on the requirements of presence. This is a welcome development, but it should not be confused with analytic proof. It is not inherently impossible to use peacetime operations to help in force sizing (for years, the British sized the Royal Navy in part by the worldwide requirements of gunboat diplomacy), but we simply lack the analytic tools to go from a particular intellectual construct to a definite force size.

The Maritime Strategy called for an offensively oriented Navy capable of simultaneous operations around the globe. It did not, however, "prove" in any analytic sense that America needed 15 carriers rather than 14 or 18; attempts to claim the contrary may have weakened the Navy's case. Similarly, an increased Navy responsibility for influencing other states implies the need for a widely deployed Navy capable of operating with other nations. It does not, however, "prove" that we need 12 carriers rather than 10. Despite the results of the Bottom-Up Review, attempts to claim otherwise will, in the long run, be counter-productive and will hurt, not help, the Navy's case for a major role in the post-Cold War era. This does not mean that

understanding peacetime operations has no budgetary payoff. Reminding Congress and the Defense Department of the importance of peacetime operations may help build overall support for the Navy, especially since military budgets have historically been defended only on the requirements of war, and a large-scale war lacks credibility on the Hill as a basis for force planning.

A focus on peacetime influence dilutes our ability to remain warfighters

Both U.S. law and two centuries of tradition make it clear that the Navy exists to be ready for war. Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires the Navy to be "organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea." An increased focus on peacetime operations could cause the Navy to stray from its primary responsibility to be ready to fight and win wars. Such an outcome would be a compelling reason not to adopt any such focus. Seeking to turn the Navy into a force of seagoing diplomats organized and trained to spread or maintain influence—but not to fight wars—would be a formula for disaster. Because of this, some might fear that emphasizing the inherently secondary mission of peacetime influence risks diluting the primary mission of wartime readiness.

If the premise were correct, the loss of a warfighting edge would be a powerful argument against the Navy, or any military service, increasing the attention it devoted to peacetime operations. The premise, however, is wrong. A focus on peacetime presence is not inconsistent with maintaining wartime readiness. When the United States sends Marines to engage in humanitarian operations in Somalia, it does so in the clear recognition that those operations, though important, are secondary to the primary Marine Corps mission of remaining ready for war. In the same way, Navy peacetime presence is a secondary mission; readiness for war is and must remain the primary Navy responsibility.

If the Navy remembers this basic principle, a renewed emphasis on the peacetime use of naval forces to influence other states need not endanger the fundamental characteristic of the Navy as a fighting force. Although navies exist to fight and win wars, most navies spend most of their time in conditions of peace. The nation has always used its Navy during peacetime to spread or maintain U.S. influence. This paper is a call for systematic consideration of how to do this task better, not an attempt to displace the historic primacy of combat readiness as the major mission of the peacetime force.

Presence, no matter how important, isn't all that navies do

Peacetime operations may be an important Navy mission, but it is not the only one. The requirement to use peacetime operations to gain influence must be integrated with other Navy obligations. As the 1992 and 1993 collisions between U.S. and Russian submarines in the Barents Sea demonstrate, conflicts can arise between U.S. objectives in seeking to influence other states and the requirement to maintain operational proficiency and conduct surveillance as a hedge against war. An excessive focus on peacetime presence, some may argue, can take away from other important missions.

Of course it can, but only if Navy and national leaders fail to do their job. Conflicts among missions are, of course, nothing new. Balancing competing missions has always been a crucial responsibility of Navy and national leaders. As the Navy enters the post-Cold War era, what will be new is not the balancing role, but the addition of a rediscovered mission—peacetime operations for national influence—to the missions to be balanced.

Implications

If theory and discussion are to be of practical value, they must lead to action. The foregoing analysis suggests the following:

- Peacetime presence is an important mission for the Navy and Marine Corps to undertake on behalf of the nation.
- The objective of such presence should include preparing for coalition operations in war and exerting influence in peace.
- The proper approach to influence differs among friends, adversaries, uncommitted states, and unstable states.
- The limitations of the presence mission are important, but neither invalidate the mission nor reduce its importance.

The argument may be right or wrong. In either case, it will be meaningless unless it leads to a change in the Navy's way of doing business. Assuming the forgoing analysis is correct, what does it mean for the Navy of the 1990s? What should the Navy do?

Create a new vision

The first step is for the profession to internalize the concept of peacetime operations as a distinct, important Navy mission. Neither the difficulty nor the importance of this step should be underestimated. It has historically proved very difficult for the profession to sustain a focus on peacetime operations. The Zumwalt-era attempts to place peacetime presence on an equal footing with sea control and power projection faded quickly. Most discussions of the Maritime Strategy paid no more than lip service to peacetime presence. ...*From the Sea* alters the focus of the Maritime Strategy from global, open-ocean warfare to regional, littoral warfare, but, like its predecessor, gives relatively little emphasis to the peacetime mission. Yet without a common

vision, a new mission, especially one that runs contrary to the prevailing warfighting ethic, has little chance of being implemented effectively.

Creating a new vision will require sustained effort. Neither the Maritime Strategy nor ...*From the Sea* won instant acceptance. Without such an effort, however, other changes will not endure. Among the steps the Navy should consider are the following:

- Create an intellectual framework by formally adopting national influence as a major objective of peacetime operations. Adopt the construct set forth above, or some suitable modification, as a way to organize naval thinking and planning.
- Ensure that all lists of Navy and Marine Corps missions, whether for programmatic purposes, analysis, training, or public relations, include peacetime operations for national influence as a discrete Navy mission.
- Urge that, in future revisions of the *National Military Strategy* and its supporting documents, the Joint Chiefs of Staff place increasing stress national influence as the goal of peacetime operations.
- Encourage senior officers to stress the new peacetime mission in speeches, articles, and other contacts with the public and with the Navy at large to foster a common vocabulary and a common approach to peacetime operations.
- Stress the new approach to peacetime operations in Congressional testimony, urging other services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do the same. If possible, seek a series of hearings on the use of the military as a peacetime instrument of national influence.
- Assign the Naval Doctrine Command to develop a formal Navy doctrine for peacetime presence. Embody this new doctrine in a formal publication given wide distribution.

- Expand the coverage of peacetime operations at the Navy War College, building on some version of the analytic approach set forth in this paper to provide an intellectual framework. Encourage other services and the National Defense University to do the same.
- Commission a rigorous study of the peacetime use of military forces, especially navies, to determine, on a country or region-specific basis if possible, where attempts to use military (especially naval) force to gain peacetime influence succeeded or failed in the past and why.
- Encourage professional debate and discussion by encouraging the U.S. Naval Institute to conduct essay contests and seminars on peacetime operations similar to those conducted in the past on ASW or amphibious operations.
- Have the Naval Historical Center prepare a monograph on U.S. Navy postwar presence operations. We need to rediscover the presence mission, not reinvent it. History should have much to teach in this area.

Strengthen institutions for peacetime influence

Peacetime operations for national influence blend military and non-military considerations to an extraordinary degree. The peacetime influence of navies is built up from a large number of individual exercises, visits, and other operations. Maximizing the effectiveness of each of these individual operations will require unusual cooperation between the diplomat and the sailor. One obstacle to such improved coordination is the lack of understanding by State Department desk officers and embassy staffs of the role and capabilities of the Navy. Working through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, the Navy should improve its dialogue with the State Department at all levels.

To deepen mutual understanding between sailor and diplomat, the Navy might consider altering assignment policies so that it assigns officers to regional bureaus at State rather than

only to the Politico-Military Bureau or to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In addition, the Navy should seek to increase the number of officers assigned to the State Department through an exchange arrangement whereby additional junior Foreign Service Officers would be assigned in return to the Joint Staff, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and, if the other Services choose, other service staffs.

The Navy should also attempt to increase understanding within Washington of the value of peacetime operations to influence other nations. This means working through the Joint Staff to increase Navy involvement on those Interagency Working Groups with a regional focus. Periodically, the heads of such working groups should invite Unified Commanders to send representatives to meet with their groups. In addition, the Navy should seek close ties with the new organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, especially the office of the new Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Human Rights.

Ultimately, however, Washington cannot and should not control fleet operations. The Navy should support institutional mechanisms that foster improved coordination between military operations and foreign policy objectives at the fleet level. The Political Advisor (POLAD) to each unified commander and the Navy attachés at individual embassies provide two particularly important channels for such coordination. The Navy should consider sponsoring periodic conferences involving all POLADs from all unified commands, along with fleet, Navy Staff, OSD, Joint Staff and State Department representatives. These conferences would seek mechanisms to integrate military and diplomatic considerations in order to make more effective use of the Navy as a vehicle for peacetime influence.

At individual embassies, the Navy attaché serves as the chief—and sometimes the only—source of advice to the Ambassador and the country team on naval operations. Attaché training, however, focuses on intelligence. Attachés report to the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose directives specify their task

as collecting information, not influencing behavior. The Navy should call on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reexamine the training and tasking provided to attachés. One possibility would be to include in the attaché training pipeline a short course on peacetime operations and influence based on material developed for use at the Navy War College. For maximum benefit, such a course might be taught at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute. Also, reflecting the growing importance of political-military considerations in comparison to intelligence, attachés should formally report to the appropriate unified commander.

These steps should be accompanied by formal directives from State and Defense Departments encouraging greater direct coordination between individual ambassadors and the relevant unified commander or his major subordinates (e.g., fleet commanders) in such matters as port visits and exercises. Such coordination is not precluded now, of course, but it should be actively encouraged as a way of improving the relevance of all services, but especially the Navy, in fostering U.S. goals.

Protect operating funds

A deeper understanding of peacetime operations will help bring intellectual coherence to an important Navy mission. That is all to the good. Such an understanding will allow the Navy to accomplish the peacetime mission better. That, too, is to the good. These are not, however, the only, or even the most important, reasons for reemphasizing peacetime presence as a discrete mission. The Navy needs to advocate peacetime operations to help ensure that the Congress provides adequate operating funds to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world. Without sufficient funds, the Navy simply cannot perform its increasingly important peacetime mission satisfactorily.

Peacetime presence cannot, by itself, determine force levels, but it can—indeed, it must—influence the Navy budget. The increasing prominence of peacetime presence will place significant demands on the operating forces of the Navy. The

Navy must insist on obtaining the funds to meet those demands. This is not the same as simply calling for adequate readiness. Sufficient steaming days and flying hours to maintain a high state of readiness and training are mandatory no matter what attitude the nation takes toward a discrete peacetime presence mission. America must not return to the hollow forces of the 1970s, when elements of the U.S. military could not operate effectively and were adequate neither to prepare for war nor to wage it. Simply being ready for battle, however, is not enough. For the United States to use its Navy to exert national influence abroad will require operating funds in addition to those required to maintain combat readiness. Those funds will allow the Navy to conduct the peacetime operations on which coalitions are built, to continue to reassure allies and to deter adversaries, and to take the many small steps that, in the aggregate, create influence.

The Navy must, therefore, consistently and persistently stress the importance of peacetime operations. The peacetime mission must be prominent in internal budget discussions, in dialogue with the other services and with the Defense Department, and in presentations to the Congress. Naval officers and their civilian supporters must make it clear that the end of the Cold War has neither reduced the importance of the Navy nor eliminated the need for worldwide presence. As budgets continue to shrink, there will be continued pressure to under-fund operations. If the nation is to derive the benefits of peacetime presence, that pressure must be vigorously resisted.

Preserving funding support for an explicit peacetime presence mission will not be easy. In the abstract, everyone favors peacetime presence. Everyone wants to advance U.S. national goals without fighting. But abstract approval is not enough. The nation must recognize that the peacetime presence mission demands more funding, not less, in the post-Cold War world. Gaining that recognition will require extra effort, both to understand the mission and to articulate it before the nation. The Navy needs to make that effort.

Change deployment patterns

Traditional Navy deployments range from multiple battle groups deployed more or less full time in the Mediterranean to a handful of ships showing up once a year off West Africa or circumnavigating South America. Most of our effort has been on the first type of deployment: large numbers of ships, organized for battle, continuously deployed to areas selected for deployment based on a perceived military threat. Peacetime operations for national influence may, in contrast, require periodic deployments of smaller numbers of ships to many different areas, with deployments driven by diplomatic considerations as much as by military ones and structured to maximize contact with indigenous states.

In the same way, maximizing peacetime influence may require the United States to alter the way it conducts deployments of naval forces. Historically, a major rationale for deployments has been to prepare for war. Training has, therefore, been a crucial element of such deployments. An inherent tension exists between U.S.-only operations and operations with other nations, especially smaller states with less-capable military and naval forces. Although combined exercises maximize diplomatic benefits, real U.S. training comes primarily from U.S.-only operations. The balance appropriate for the Cold War is almost certainly not the balance appropriate for the future. Future exercise planning should give far greater weight to "diplomatic" (i.e., influence) considerations than in the past.

Finally, the Navy may need to rethink the duration and rhythm of overseas operations. Permanently deployed forces, relieved on station or at the end of carefully defined tethers, are appropriate where the task is to stand ready to repel aggression over the long term. Forces that are forward-deployed year-round also can react more quickly to crises. Stressing such semipermanent deployments may, however, not be the most appropriate way to use the Navy to gain influence. Governments, like individuals, react to change. The constant presence of the U.S. Navy

in a particular region signals that the region is important—even vital—to the United States. Although sustained presence demonstrates resolve, it may become taken for granted and thus offer only limited influence. Indeed, it may have a reverse effect: if forces are withdrawn temporarily, their brief absence may be more visible than their extended presence, and thus lead to concern that the United States is downgrading the region.

Viewed strictly in terms of maximizing influence, therefore, Navy deployments should be varied. This may also be necessary if, as suggested above, the smaller Navy of the future is required to exert influence in many more regions of the world. The United States will need to consult with friends and allies in regions of traditional U.S. deployment, especially the Mediterranean, to ensure that the gaps are not so long as to be counterproductive.

A decision to vary deployments is not trivial. It will require a conscious acceptance by the Navy leadership of the premise that defense and foreign policy considerations outweigh the disruption to personnel, logistics, and maintenance policies that will inevitably arise from less predictable deployments. The Navy must accept such a disruptive change, however, if it is to play the influential political-military role the nation will require of it in the coming years.

Future major deployments or deployments to areas visited only infrequently should be preceded by a military-diplomatic analysis of each of the states in the region conducted under the auspices of the Joint Staff and the appropriate Unified Commander. This analysis should draw upon the annual reports now generated by the country team at individual U.S. embassies; the Department of Defense should urge the State Department to include in these reports a specific assessment of the utility (or lack thereof) of peacetime military presence in advancing U.S. interests. U.S. objectives with respect to each state should then be developed in consultation with State Department desk officers and the relevant embassies. Training and exercise plans should be tailored for different states, depending on U.S. objectives and the capabilities of those states.

Prepare for coalition warfare

The overlap among the three peacetime military tasks—preparing for war, responding to crisis, and exerting influence—is nowhere more evident than in preparing for coalition warfare. It would be comforting to believe that America could meet all future national objectives through the exercise of nonviolent influence. It would also be unrealistic. The end of the Cold War has not made force obsolete; quite the opposite. The United States is in some ways better able to employ military power now that it need not remain in readiness to repel a Soviet attack. If, however, the electorate and the Congress are to continue to sanction the use of American power, the United States must normally exercise that power through coalitions.

Peacetime preparation for coalition warfare requires, above all, the development of interoperability. In considering interoperability and preparation for possible future coalition operations, the Navy should not focus exclusively—or even primarily—on navy-to-navy interoperability. For the next few years, the only navies likely to play major roles in coalition military operations are those of NATO, where interoperability already exists. Although we need to operate with other NATO navies enough to maintain proficiency, a major goal of peacetime operations should be to work with the other services to foster interoperability between U.S. forces, especially the Navy, and the air forces, and, to a lesser extent, the ground forces, of potential coalition partners.

For example, the Navy should ensure that carrier air (both fixed and rotary wing) can provide close air support, intelligence, and transportation to ground troops from other nations. Similarly, the fleet should exercise forcible insertion of small units from other nations through vertical assault. Our operating principle should be to ensure that ground units of varying levels of sophistication can be adequately supported by the U.S. Navy. The Navy should link this effort with its continuing efforts to improve jointness, working toward the day when a Joint Force

Air Component Commander on a Navy ship can coordinate sea-based and land-based airpower in support of a mixed force of troops from multiple, non-NATO countries.

Preparation for coalition warfare must be done on a systematic basis. Among the specific steps for the Navy to consider are the following:

- Direct the Naval Doctrine Command to develop procedures and doctrine for providing support in coalition warfare. Embody this doctrine in an unclassified publication that could be provided to interested nations worldwide. Both the doctrine and the document should stress simplicity.
- Emphasize multinational exercises involving sea, ground, and air forces. Because we cannot predict who will participate in a given coalition, these exercises should seek to develop "universal" operating principles. One role of such exercises should be to ensure that two non-allies will be capable of operating together in support of a common objective if required.
- Develop equipment interoperability packages to allow naval operations with ground and air forces of various nations. Such packages should be capable of being provided quickly to other states.
- Evaluate existing International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs for their contribution to laying the groundwork for future coalitions. For example, the operations portion of the course at the Navy War College should focus on operations between the U.S. Navy and the military and naval forces of smaller countries. The Navy should also seek to include the naval role in coalition warfare and peacekeeping in those courses for foreign students taught at, for example, the Inter-American Defense College.

- Encourage the assignment of more foreign army and air force students to the Navy War College. Generations of foreign navy officers have been educated at Newport and have come to understand U.S. Navy and Marine Corps capabilities. The demands of future coalition warfare may require comparable understanding by foreign officers of other services.

Coalition building does not mesh perfectly with the division of states into friends, adversaries, and uncommitted states. No two nations, no matter how friendly, can expect to have identical interests in all cases. Even our closest allies may be unwilling to participate in a specific military operation, whereas uncommitted states and even adversaries may find common ground in a specific crisis. Efforts to create coalitions, therefore, cannot be limited to those states that are unambiguously friends or allies. In a sense, all operations with the forces of other nations are exercises in building coalitions, but it is important for the Navy to recognize such coalition building as a discrete task, requiring explicit consideration in planning peacetime operations.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the Navy, like any military organization, exists to employ force in the service of national policy—in short, to wage war. Peacetime operations have influence precisely because they carry with them a constant reminder of the ability of the Navy and the nation to use force to compel or protect. The Navy must not neglect its warfighting heritage. But the demands of the post-Cold War world require greater attention to the use of the Navy to influence other nations in conditions short of war or crisis. As we enter the twenty-first century, the Navy must accept new responsibilities to keep our friends friendly, to keep our adversaries deterred and quiescent, to draw uncommitted states closer to the United States, and to either restore stability to unstable regimes or mitigate the consequences of instability.

Despite its reputation as a conservative organization, one of the great strengths of the Navy is its ability to adapt. It adapted to the dominance of the carrier in 1942. It adapted to the needs of inshore warfare in Vietnam. It adapted to the challenge of a seagoing Soviet superpower in the final decades of the Cold War. Now it must adapt to the need to use the tools of war to gain peacetime influence in an uncertain age.

Selected bibliography

Students of any aspect of American naval strategic thought during the 1970s and 1980s should consult the outstanding annotated bibliography by Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.), *The Maritime Strategy Debates: A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1988). Section VII of that bibliography, "Peacetime, Crisis, and Third World Contingencies," contains 56 entries, most from the 1970s and 1980s, on the use of naval forces in situations short of global war. Only a few of the most relevant are included here; the bulk of this bibliography is focused on more-recent writings looking forward to the post-Cold War world.

The theory of peacetime presence

The following is a brief selection of works setting forth basic concepts, theories, and examples of the use of peacetime presence (primarily by naval forces) to advance national goals. For other works, see the Swartz bibliography cited above.

Allen, Charles D. Jr. *The Uses of Navies in Peacetime,* Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. (Argues the value of sustained presence. Describes various types of political-military signals with a focus on escalation and crisis response.)

Booth, Ken. *Law, Force, and Diplomacy at Sea,* London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985. (Sets forth the relationship, both positive and negative, of the evolving law of the sea and the attitudes underlying it to traditional peacetime uses of navies. Sees continued relevance to such use.)

Booth, Ken. "Roles, Objectives and Tasks: An Inventory of the Functions of Navies," *Naval War College Review,* Summer 1977, pp. 83–97. (Lists the various activities that make up the use of navies for peacetime influence.)

Cable, James. *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force,* New York: Praeger, 1970. (One of the earliest modern attempts to examine the political roles of navies.

Focuses on coercion, suggesting that influence comes from a credible threat to use force.)

Cable, James. *Navies in Violent Peace*, New York: St. Martin's, 1989. (A survey and update by one of the most prolific writers on—and strongest advocates for—the role of naval diplomacy. Warns against underestimating the value of the peacetime uses of navies.)

Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell (eds.). *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979. (Although much of the material in this classic study is no longer relevant in a single-superpower world, the approach remains useful.)

Hagen, Kenneth J. *This People's Navy*, New York: The Free Press, 1991. (Chapters 4 and 5 of this recent general history of the U.S. Navy provide a historic perspective on the first half of the nineteenth century when peacetime influence was seen as the main Navy mission.)

Hill, J.R., RAdm., RN. *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. (Chapter 6 discusses peacetime presence, arguing that there is value in simply "being there," although "difficult to express and hard to quantify." Sees peacetime naval roles as demonstrating rights, showing resolve, landing to intervene by invitation, and evacuating noncombatants. See also Chapter 7 for operations involving the use of force.)

Luttwack, Edward N. *The Political Uses of Sea Power*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1974. (Develops a theory of "suasion," which is similar—though more nuanced—to what this paper calls influence. Useful in distinguishing between focused and unfocused efforts and in its stress on the importance of political context and of the perceptions of the state being influenced.)

Mandel, Robert. "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy," *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 30, Number 1 (March 1986). (Examines the effectiveness of "gunboat diplomacy" based on analysis of 133 incidents from 1946 to 1968. Concludes that the most effective use involves a *fait accompli* with force displayed but not used, undertaken by a state that has engaged in war in the target's region and that is better prepared militarily and more stable politically than the target state.)

Post-Cold War peacetime naval presence

As part of the overall examination of the roles of maritime forces following the Cold War, a number of analysts have begun to consider the peacetime role of the military forces, including the Navy and Marine Corps. They include the following:

Armstrong, Lt.Col. Charles L., USMC. "Blueprint for Intervention," *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 1990, pp. 55–59. (Sets forth the operational requirements for "intervention," especially that undertaken in cooperation with the established government to deal with internal threats or drug traffickers.)

Art, Robert J. "A U.S. Military Strategy for the 1990s: Reassurance Without Dominance," *Survival*, Winter 1992–93, pp. 3–23. (Calls for a national strategy of "insurance and reassurance" involving, *inter alia,* forward presence aimed at deterrence, promotion of stability, and reassurance, all of which will combine to foster both economic interdependence and a reduction in the pressure for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.)

Breemer, Jan S. "Where Are the Submarines?", United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, January 1993, pp. 37–42. (Also reprinted in shortened form in *The Submarine Review*, October 1992, pp. 28–38 under the title "Deterrence, Naval Presence, and the Submarine Fleet.") (Argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, submarines can play an important peacetime presence role.)

Ditzler, Brent Alan. "Naval Diplomacy Beneath the Waves: A Study of the Coercive Use of Submarines Short of War," Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1989. (Concludes, based on surveying both the literature of naval diplomacy and the history of submarine peacetime employment, that submarines have utility in naval diplomacy and that their utility is likely to increase in the future.)

Guertner, Gary L. "Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces," *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1993, pp. 141–151. (Argues for a future strategy of conventional deterrence based on technological superiority. Asserts that forward presence is central to such a strategy in order to demonstrate U.S. leadership and

commitment, preserve regional power balances, and contain security problems.)

Hagen, Kenneth J., Capt., USNR (Ret.). "What Goes Around...," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1992, pp. 88–91. (Argues that the post-Cold War world may see a return to the type of naval diplomacy practiced for most of the nineteenth century.)

Kelly, R.J., Adm., USN. "What's Prudent in the Pacific?" United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, January 1992, pp. 66–69. ("The two most important goals in keeping naval forces forward deployed in the Pacific are to deter any potential adversary and to assure friends and allies of our resolve to support common interests.")

Lasswell, James A., Lt.Col., USMC. *Is Presence Still A Viable Mission?* Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, May 1990. (Argues that, although a role remains for presence, reductions in force structure and the proliferation of advanced weapons require changing to intermittent, rather than continuous, presence and establishing a policy of retaliation if presence forces are attacked.)

William H. Lewis and Christopher C. Joyner. "Proliferation of Unconventional Weapons: The Case for Coercive Arms Control," *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 10, Number 4 (October–December 1991). (Argues that military action to remove Iraqi military forces from Kuwait has set a precedent for the use of military force to compel adherence to bans on weapons of mass destruction. Although not mentioning the Navy—or any other service—the thesis has obvious implications for future naval peacetime missions.)

Owens, Thomas Mackubin. "Why Planning Naval Forces Is Different," *Defense Analysis*, Volume 9, Number 1, pp. 43–50. (Argues that sizing naval forces based on the post-Cold War threat will result in insufficient forces to meet presence goals.)

Pendly, William T. "U.S. Security Strategy in East Asia for the 1990s," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1992, pp. 7–15. (Argues that the end of the Cold War will have less impact in the Pacific than in Europe. Forward-deployed naval forces will still be needed to support political and economic influence, respond in crises, and avoid the perception of a regional security vacuum that needs to be filled by some other power.)

Sands, Jeffrey I. *Multinational Naval Cooperation in a Changing World: A Report on the Greenwich Conference*, Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, October 1992. (Describes multinational naval cooperation both for traditional coalition operations and for emerging non-traditional peacetime operations. Based on a December 1991 international conference.)

Sestak, Joseph A., Jr., Cdr., USN. "America's Great Communicators," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 1988, pp. 80–86. (Sees surface ships as valuable in sending signals both because of their deterrent effect and because of their ability to be withdrawn.)

Swartz, Peter M., Capt., USN. "Floating Bases: Moving Out to Sea?" *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Volume 34, Number 2/1989, pp. 65–71. (Calls for emphasis on sea basing and on innovative technology to provide support for overseas presence as bases ashore are reduced.)

Authoritative statements on presence

The United States has not, to date, embraced the systematic approach to peacetime presence for national influence advocated in this paper, but there has been no lack of authoritative statements on the continuing importance of forward presence in the post-Cold War world. The following are among the most relevant:

Aspin, Les. "Force Structure Excerpts, Bottom-Up Review," Washington, DC, Defense Department handout, September 1, 1993, pp. 15–17. (Discusses the U.S. requirements for presence and states that the Navy force level of 11 carriers plus a training carrier has been derived to meet those requirements.)

Aspin, Les. "Remarks at the Annual U.S. Air Force Senior Statesman Symposium, June 24, 1993," *Inside the Navy*, June 28, 1993, pp. 9–10. (The Secretary of Defense discusses the importance of presence, says the number of carriers will be determined in part by presence requirements, and describes ways other services can compensate for carrier shortfalls.)

Boorda, Jeremy M., Adm., USN (interview). "Sanctions, Solidarity, and Super Allies," *Seapower*, September 1992, pp. 9–17. (The European naval component commander and Commander in Chief of NATO's Southern Region asserts that forward

deployed forces deter, generate access, foster coalitions, and support alliances.)

The Hon. H. Lawrence Garrett, III; Frank B. Kelso, Adm., USN, and Carl E. Mundy, Gen., USMC. *Department of the Navy 1992 Posture Statement*, Washington: Navy Department, February—March 1992, pp. 13–4. (In a brief aside in a primarily programmatic document, the Navy Department's senior leaders call for continuous presence in critical regions to deter, promote stability, support allies, ensure interoperability, and position for crisis.) See also Admiral Kelso and General Mundy's *Department of the Navy 1993 Posture Statement*, pp. 13–4, which summarizes the varied types of peacetime operations undertaken by the Navy.

Howe, Jonathan, Adm., USN. "From Containment to Engagement—American Leadership for Peaceful Change," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Volume 37, Number 6/1992, pp. 68–71. (President Bush's Deputy National Security Advisor calls for U.S. engagement primarily in economic and diplomatic terms, but notes that only continued worldwide deployment of U.S. forces can preserve international stability.)

Mundy, Carl E., Jr., Gen., USMC. "Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projection: Into the 21st Century," *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 1992, pp. 14–17. (Remarks delivered at a November 1991 conference at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The Commandant argues for the Marine Corps as a "forward presence, crisis deterrent, containment force," needed to prevent problems, respond to them, or keep them from spreading.)

"Naval Forward Presence: Essential for a Changed World," One of a series of... *From the Sea* follow-on policy papers reprinted in *Inside the Navy*, May 31, 1993, pp. 19–21. ("Although naval forward-presence operations provide a host of statecraft tools, their most important missions are deterring and, if necessary, winning regional conflicts such that U.S. security and economic interests are protected.")

National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington: The White House, January 1993. (Calls for a strategy of "collective engagement" discussed mostly in broad policy terms. Cites forward presence in terms of lending credibility to alliances and foreshadowing collective response to aggression. As of

July 1993, a replacement document was being prepared by the Clinton Administration.)

Sean O'Keefe; Frank B. Kelso, II, Adm., USN; and C.E. Mundy, Jr., Gen., USMC. *...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, Washington, Department of the Navy, 1992. (Also issued as a brochure with no date or authors) (The Navy vision of the future, focused on littoral warfare, but calling for naval forces to "project a positive American image, build foundations for viable coalitions, enhance diplomatic contacts, reassure friends, and demonstrate U.S. power and resolve" through forward operations in peacetime.)

Powell, Colin L., Gen., USA. *National Military Strategy*, Washington, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992. (The JCS Chairman sees forward presence as one of the four foundations of a national military strategy, along with strategic deterrence and defense, crisis response, and reconstitution. Presence operations "demonstrate our commitment, foster regional stability, lend credibility to our alliances, and enhance crisis response capability.")

Examples and case studies

Influence through peacetime presence is gained through a wide variety of specific types of operations. Recent descriptions of some of the many different types of peacetime operations include:

Aceves, William J. "Diplomacy at Sea: U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the Black Sea," *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1989, pp. 33–55. (Reviews the history of Black Sea Freedom of Navigation Operations, assessed as successful in terms of both law and strategy.)

Allison, George, Capt., USN. "The United States Navy and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1993, pp. 22–35. (Assesses problems and proposes solutions for cases where U.S. influence is best exercised under United Nations auspices.)

Boma, James R., Lt.Cdr., USNR. "Troubled Waters off the Land of the Morning Calm," *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1989, pp. 33–55. (A case study of Freedom of Navigation planning off a hostile coast, blending legal, operational, and political factors.)

Delerey, Tom, Cdr., USN. "Away, the Boarding Party," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1991, pp. 65–71. (The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard participate in international operations to enforce an embargo.)

Ditzler, Brent A. "British Submarine Diplomacy: The Falklands Crises," *The Submarine Review*, April 1993, pp. 48–56. (Analyzes the specific role of a single nuclear submarine as a case of "naval diplomacy" or deterrence.)

Jones, James L., Col., USMC. "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: Humanitarianism and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1991, pp. 98–107. (The Marine Corps and the conduct of humanitarian operations under threat of attack.) For other perspectives on the same operation, see the series of short articles in the February 1993 *Marine Corps Gazette*, pp. 16–43.

McDonald, Wesley L., Adm., USN (Ret.). "The Convoy Mission," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1988, pp. 36–44. (Analyzes the peacetime escort of shipping in the Persian Gulf.)

Olson, George P., Capt., USMC. "Don't Drink the Water," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, July 1993, pp. 81–82. (Gives suggestions for dealing with local populations in ways that will enhance America's image.)

Sands, Jeffrey I. *Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United Nations,* CNA Research Memorandum 93-40, July 1993. (Examines possible missions, organizing principles, and command and control arrangements for U.S. Navy involvement in United Nations peacekeeping and peace enforcement.)

Siegel, Adam B. *Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) From Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991,* CNA Research Memorandum 91-211, October 1991. (Also published in a slightly different form in "An American Entebbe," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1992, pp. 96–102.) (Describes the evacuation of 281 people from 30 nations in the midst of a civil war, with lessons learned for both the military and the State Department.)

Siegel, Adam B. *A Sampling of U.S. Naval Humanitarian Operations,* CNA Information Memorandum 132, November 1990. (A sampling of U.S. Navy disaster relief, rescue at sea, refugee assistance, emergency medical assistance, nation building and

goodwill, and other humanitarian activities over four decades. Not a complete list, but a sample of the broad scope of humanitarian operations.)

Smith, William D., Adm., USN. "Peacemaking From the Sea," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, July 1993, pp. 25–28. (Argues that Navy and Marine Corps forces have substantial capability to conduct both peacekeeping and peace enforcement.)

Stackpole, H.C., Jr., Lt.Gen., USMC. "Angels From the Sea," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1992, pp. 110–116. (A report—including lessons learned—by the commander of a major humanitarian operation in the wake of the April 1991 typhoon that killed 139,000 people in Bangladesh.) For a view from the Bangladeshi side, see Shaifiq-ur-Rahman, Captain, Bangladesh Navy, "Disaster in Bangladesh: A Multinational Relief Effort," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1993, pp. 59–72.

Pugh, Michael C. "Peacekeeping—A Role for Navies," *Naval Forces*, Volume XIII, Number 4 (1992), pp. 8–10. (Describes the challenges and offers solutions for using navies in peacekeeping operations under international auspices.)

Wilkenson, Paul. "The Problem of International Terrorism With Particular Reference to the Maritime Environment," in Ellman Ellingsen (ed.), *International Terrorism as a Political Weapon*, Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1988. (Analyzes the combating of maritime terrorism as another potential peacetime Navy mission.)

Crisis response

A special form of peacetime presence is crisis response, which can, of course, involve the use of force. The literature on this subject is extensive; only three of the more fundamental works are listed here. See the Swartz bibliography for other examples. In addition, most of the documents listed under "Authoritative statements on presence," above, devote at least as much attention to crisis response as to peacetime presence.

Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan. *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, Washington:

Brookings Institution, 1978. (The use of military forces in crises, comparing naval and other forces.)

Siegel, Adam B. *The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946–1990,* CNA Research Memorandum 90-246, February 1991. (Summarizes 207 uses of the Navy or Marine Corps to respond to crises short of war. Analyzes by region, duration, type of forces involved, and involvement of other services.)

Zelikow, Philip D. "Force Without War, 1975–82," *Journal of Strategic Studies,* March 1984, pp. 29–54. (Updates Blechman and Kaplan.)

Other service perspectives

Although it is an underlying assumption of this paper that naval forces are uniquely suited to exercise national influence through peacetime presence, Army and Air Force proponents are also examining the peacetime roles of those services. Among the results are the following:

Barnes, Rudolph C., Jr., Lt.Col., USAR. "The Diplomat Warrior," *Military Review,* May 1990, pp. 55–63. (Calls for giving greater weight to diplomatic considerations in Army peacetime operations, with particular reference to planning for low-intensity conflict.)

Boudreau, Robert N., Lt.Col., USAF. "The New AFM1-1: Shortfall in Doctrine," *Airpower Journal,* Winter 1992, pp. 37–45. (An Air Force officer argues that the Air Force has neglected the potential role of airpower—specifically airlift—as a peacetime source of influence.)

Rice, Donald B. (Secretary of the Air Force). *The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach, Global Power,* Air Force White Paper, June 1990. (The Air Force vision of the future calls for, among other things, the Air Force to "Build U.S. Influence—Strengthening Security Partnerships and Relationships" through security assistance, training, logistics aid, and global air movement in peacetime. Suggests that forward presence can be replaced by airpower with global reach.)

Rice, Terry L., Col., USA. "Forging Security Through Peace," *Military Review,* April 1992, pp. 14–26. (Argues for a greater Army

role in "nation assistance" as a way to use the peacetime military to foster democracy. Focuses on internal stability.)

Sullivan, Gordon R., Gen., USA. "Power Projection and the Challenge of Regionalism," *Parameters*, Summer 1993, pp. 2–15. (The Army Chief of Staff sets forth his vision of a regional, power-projection strategy in which forward presence is sustained from the United States and used for crisis response and coalition building.)

Critiques and counter arguments

Few argue against peacetime presence in the abstract; its importance is more often ignored than challenged. Some, however, have expressed skepticism about its value.

Arnett, Erich H. *Gunboat Diplomacy and the Bomb*, New York: Praeger, 1989. (Argues that, in the long run, the United States will be able to protect only the most important regional interests in the face of nuclear proliferation.)

Center for Defense Information. "The U.S. as the World's Policeman? Ten Reasons To Find a Different Role," *Defense Monitor*, Volume XX, Number 1 (1991). (Argues that overseas presence is costly, is required neither by existing treaties nor by the requirements of U.S. national security, and does not contribute to U.S. influence.)

Crist, George B., Gen., USMC (Ret.). "A U.S. Military Strategy for a Changing World," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1990, pp. 16–24. (Rejecting a strategy of forward deployments as impractical and a "Fortress America" strategy as unwise, calls for a "power-projection strategy" built around deployable forces based in the United States. Focused exclusively on crisis response and war, with no weight given to the value of presence.)

Lehman, John. "Half Speed Ahead," *Policy Review*, Number 53 (September 1990), pp. 17–19. (The former Secretary of the Navy argues for maintaining force structure through a massive shift to the reserves, dismissing as insignificant the resulting reduction in overseas presence.)

Luttwack, Edward N. *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, New York: Simon and Shuster, 1984. (Mostly about other subjects, but takes time out on pages 222 and 247–8 to denigrate the value of routine peacetime naval presence. "[P]recisely because the

presence of our fleets is a matter of routine, few people other than our own admirals pay much attention to them.")

O'Rourke, Gerald, Capt., USN (Ret.). "Our Peaceful Navy, United States Naval Institute *Proceedings,* April 1989, pp. 79–83. (Sees the end of the Cold War as reducing the need for global deployments.)