Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts

Peter M. Swartz
with Karin Duggan

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Approved for distribution: March 2012

Dr. W. Eugene Cobble, Jr.
Director, Strategic Initiatives Group

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### 1990s: Comparing national economic power

#### Ranked by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Also percent share of world GDP*

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<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>3</td>
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Growth of world maritime trade (1990-2000)

1990s: Growth of world maritime trade

- Unprecedented high world maritime trade growth rate across the decade

Source: UNCTAD (with 2010 data added)
1990s: Comparing national defense spending

Ranked by reported defense expenditures*

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<td>UK</td>
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1990s: Global Trends in Armed Conflict*

*Center for Systemic Peace, Center for Global Policy, George Mason University
1990s: Global trends in armed conflict

- Chart based on a rating scale developed at Center for Systemic Peace, Center for Global Policy, George Mason University

- Substantial decline in all forms of warfare since end of Cold War & demise of Soviet Union (1991)

- Societal warfare remained the predominant mode of warfare, but instances fell off sharply after 1991
  - Instances of ethnic war increased in late 1980s/ early 1990s, but they too eventually fell off

- Very low level of interstate warfare
  - Dramatic decline since 1987
  - Interstate wars tended to be brief & of limited intensity

- Number, lethality of terrorism incidents peaked (1992)
  - Followed by sharp decrease

1990s: Piracy incidents reported

Reference: International Maritime Organization (IMO) Ref. T2-MSS/2.11.4.1 MSC.4/Circ. 152, 29 Mar 10 [with 2010 data added]
1990s: The world (I)

- Post-Cold War but pre-9/11
- International system expanded again
  - UN membership: 1990: 159 2000: 189
  - Uni-polar international system
- Decreasing magnitude & number of wars
- Global diffusion of low- & medium-tech military weapons & expertise
- No new nuclear states
  - But DPRK, Iran, Iraq, Libya suspected
  - Indian, Pakistani nuclear tests triggered US sanctions (1998)
- # of democracies soared; # of autocracies plummeted
1990s: The world (II)

- Globalization of world economy & society
  - Demise of the “2nd world:” progressive integration of former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states & economies into what had been “western” “free world” system
  - Rapid growth & integration of many “3rd world” economies & polities
- Higher salience in world affairs of maintenance & expansion of stable global security & economic system, compared to previous decades
- Decreased salience of interstate security competition in world affairs

1990s: The world (III)

- G-7 continued as key global economic leadership forum
  - Russia joined in some discussions (G-8) (1997)
  - G-20 established at finance minister level (1999)
- Big growth, then leveling off, in world seaborne trade
  - Far East share of world shipbuilding rose from 70% to over 80%; Western Europe share fell from 17% to 10%; US share under 1%
- Big growth in fiber optic submarine cable net
- Fluctuating but low oil prices throughout decade
  - Bracketed by oil price spikes in 1990 & 2000
- Development & use of World Wide Web revolutionized global communications & much else
1990s: The world (IV)

- US the sole remaining global superpower
  - US economic primacy
    - World’s largest economy
    - Dollar as global reserve currency
    - US investment banks dominated world finance
  - US military primacy
    - World’s most powerful military
    - World’s highest defense expenditures
    - World leader in defense technology, education
    - Primacy in the global commons (sea, air, space, cyberspace)
    - Forward global conventional military posture
    - Center of a global web of military alliances
    - Robust nuclear deterrent
    - World’s leading arms exporter
  - Continued desire by many other nations that it remain the primary world power
  - No rival super-power or coalition of powers emerged

1990s: The world (V)

- “Rogue” states: North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Serbia: Proliferation, terrorism issues
- U.S. pre-eminence in precision guided weapons
- Big growth in global ballistic missile capabilities
  - Especially China, North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan
- Increase in importance of violent transnational & sub-national non-state actors
  - Al Qaeda & other transnational terrorists
    - Al Qaeda refocusing on attacking US citizens & interests
  - Transnational crime, including drug trafficking
    - Use of submersibles, semi-submersibles (from 1993)
  - Dramatic rise in worldwide reports of pirate attacks & armed robbery at sea, especially in South China Sea & Strait of Malacca
    - ICC IMB created Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur (1992)
1990s: The world (VI)

  - US signed (but Senate would not ratify)
  - Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf began meetings; US not a member (1997)
- Large rise in number of reported global climatic, other natural disasters
  - To punish individuals guilty of genocide
  - US signs (2000), but does not submit to Senate for ratification, to protect US service personnel

1990s: The world (VII)

- Rough balance of power in western Eurasia
  - Collapse of Warsaw Pact & USSR (1989-91)
    - Russia, other republics, satellites all independent (by Dec 1991)
  - Sharp decline in Russian economic, political, military, demographic power under Yeltsin regime (1991-9)
    - Stagnation, deterioration of Russian Navy, strategic nuclear, other military capabilities
    - Kursk submarine explosion disaster (2000)
    - US Senate ratified (Sep 1991)
  - Russia opened Northern Sea Route to other nations (1991)
- Violent progressive disintegration of Yugoslavia.
  - Major ethnic violence & wars
  - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia independent
1990s: The world (VIII)

- NATO transformation, expansion, engagement w/ former Soviet, W. Pact states, incl/ Russia
  - Decline in % of GDP devoted to defense in all NATO countries (incl. US) except Greece, Turkey
  - Expansion along Baltic (Ex-DDR 1990; Poland 1999)
  - New policies, command structures, ops
    - Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) (1999)
    - New Strategic Concept (1999)
    - Trying to implement Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept
  - France still outside NATO command structure
    - Unsuccessful French bid for CINCSOUTH position (1996)
- Increased EU coordination & expansion

1990s: The world (IX)

- Major European, Canadian naval participation in 1991 Gulf War & aftermath
- Greek-Turkish naval crisis over Imia (Kardak) Aegean isles sovereignty (Jan 1996)
  - Focused UK armed forces on high-intensity expeditionary ops
  - Committed government to re-acquire fleet carriers for Royal Navy
1990s: The world (X)

- Rough balance of power in E. Asia-W. Pacific
  - Improved relations among Russia, China, India
  - PRC economic, trade & military expansion continued
    - Became net importer of energy, oil
  - Increased PRC regional power & influence
    - PRC shifted strategic orientation to south and east
      - Increased PLA modernization, including PLAN
  - US-PRC economic relations expanded

1990s: The world (XI)

- PRC proclaimed South China Sea as PRC “historic waters” (1992)
  - Asserted PRC contiguous zone authority included “security”
  - Asserted EEZ restrictions over “surveying activities” (1998)
1990s: The world (XII)

- PLAN completed shift from coastal to offshore “near seas” defense strategy & capabilities
- PLA, PLAN focus on conventional war vs. Taiwan & if necessary, sea denial ops vs. USN
- PLAN expansion & modernization
  - Purchased ex-Soviet aircraft carrier *Varyag* from Ukraine (1998)
- Continued PLAN operations in South China Sea
- PLA occupation of & military construction on Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in South China Sea Spratly Islands (from 1995)

1990s: The world (XIII)

- US-PRC naval relations rocky
  - USN searched PRC merchant ship *Yinhe* for contraband (not found), over PRC protests (1993)
  - Modest US-PRC military relations (from Nov 1993)
    - Included CNO, ship visits
  - PLAN submarine approached USS *Kitty Hawk* off Okinawa (Oct 1994)
  - USS *Nimitz* CVBG transited Taiwan Straits during crisis (Dec 1995)
  - USN announced diversion of 2 CVBGs to Taiwan following PRC missile shots near the island (Mar 1996)
  - Deteriorating PRC relations w/ Taiwan, Japan (after 1996)
  - Hong Kong reverted from UK to PRC (Jul 1997)
    - PRC, US agreed that USN port visits to continue
  - PLAN long-range task group deployments to East, South Asia, Western Hemisphere waters, ports (1997)
  - PLAN SAREXes w/ foreign navies (from 1998)
1990s: The world (XIV)

♦ East Asia-Western Pacific
  ♦ Significant thaw in US-Vietnam relations
    ♦ Diplomatic relations established (1997)
  ♦ Muslim separatist insurgencies expand in Mindanao, southern Philippines
    ♦ Emergence of Al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayef terrorists
  ♦ Unrest, revolt, counter-revolution in East Timor
  ♦ East Asian economic boom, then financial crisis (1997-8), then rapid recovery

1990s: The world (XV)

♦ Rough balance of power in central Eurasia
  ♦ China, Russia resolved most border issues, demilitarize border, establish direct presidential hotline
    ♦ Sino-Soviet border treaty (1991)
  ♦ China resumed Russian military ties, purchases
    ♦ 4 Kilo SSs, 2 Sovremenny DDGs delivered (1995-2000)
    ♦ Su-27 and Su-30 fighter a/c
  ♦ Annual meetings of “Shanghai Five” leaders (from 1996)
    ♦ PRC initiative
    ♦ PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
    ♦ Agreed on military confidence-building measures
1990s: The world (XVI)

- Korean peninsula conventional balance of power shifts in favor of economically prosperous ROK
  - Continued Stalinist dictatorship, economic disintegration in DPRK (incl. famine) under Kim family dictatorship
    - Kim Il-Sung died (1994)
    - Succeeded as “Dear Leader” by son Kim Jong-II
  - Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (1992)
    - DPRK agreed to respect Yellow Sea “Northern Limit Line”
  - DPRK nuclear weapons development program frozen by international agreement (1994)
  - DPRK fired its 1st multi-stage ballistic missile (Taepodong) over Japan (1998)
  - New ROK government “sunshine policy” toward DPRK (1998)
  - ROK-DPRK Yellow Sea naval patrol boat battles (1999)

1990s: The world (XVII)

- Israeli-Arab disputes dampened
  - Oslo Accord (1993)
- Mubarak continued as pro-US President of Egypt
- Continued anti-American hostility by Iranian theocratic regime, Libya’s Gaddafi, Syria
- Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq despite Gulf War defeat (1991) & post-war allied operations
- Iran acquired Russian Kilo-class submarines
  - 1st Gulf state w/ full-sized attack subs (from 1992)
- Political turmoil, warlordism & civil wars in Afghanistan (1989-2000); Taliban control of Kabul (1996), then most of the country; harboring Al Qaeda network & camps
1990s: The world (XVIII)

- Indian policy shifts
  - Defunct USSR no longer available as partner, benefactor
    - But Russia remained largest military supplier
  - Market-oriented economic liberalization reforms (from 1991)
    - India opened to foreign trade & investment
  - Growing preoccupation w/ PRC as strategic rival
- Continued India-Pakistan enmity & conflict
  - 1990 crisis over Kashmir Muslim insurgency. US acted as moderating influence; imposed military, economic sanctions on Pakistan
  - 1998 Indian & Pakistani nuclear tests heightened tensions; US imposed sanctions on both
  - 1999 Kargil War in Kashmir triggered US moderating influence & Pakistan military coup by Gen Musharaf
- Continued civil war in Sri Lanka between Sinhalese & Tamils, including naval operations

1990s: The world (XIX)

- No effective national government in Somalia
  - Warlords, regional separatism, civil wars, famines (from 1991)
- Anti-US Gen Omar al-Bashir in power in Sudan (from 1989)
  - Al Qaeda used Sudan as base (1992-6)
  - US added Sudan to list of state sponsors of terrorism (1993)
  - Limited foreign intervention did little to stop it
1990s: The world (XX)

- Political turmoil in Haiti
- Stability in Panama following US invasion (1989)
- Peace pact ended El Salvador insurgency (1992)
- Continued growing power & violence in Columbia of anti-government insurgents, drug cartels

1990s: The world (XXI)

- Terrorist incident numbers, lethality peaked, then plummeted (I)
- Some terrorist incidents at or from the sea
  - Tamil “Sea Tiger” terror assaults & vessel hijackings (1990s-2000s)
  - Hezbollah bombed Buenos Aires Israeli Embassy (1992)
  - Al Qaeda bombed NYC World Trade Center garage (1993)
  - Iraqis tried to kill ex-US President Bush in Kuwait (1993)
  - Islamic terrorists smuggled arms by sea from Karachi, Pakistan to Maharashtra, India (1993)
  - Right-wing US extremists bombed Oklahoma City federal bldg (1995)
  - Aum Shinrikyo cult Sarin nerve gas attack in Tokyo subway (1995)
1990s: The world (XXII)

- Terrorist incident numbers, lethality peaked, then plummeted (II)
- But still few terrorist incidents at or from the sea
  - Algerian terrorists bombed French train stations, etc. (1995-6)
  - Failed Greek terrorist bomb attack on Athens, Greece US Embassy (1996)
  - Failed Al Qaeda attack on USS Sullivans in Aden, Yemen (1999)
  - Al Qaeda bombed USS Cole in Aden harbor, Yemen (2000)

1990s: Significant non-USN operations

- Spratly Islands incidents
- Piracy
- Mindanao insurgency
- E. Timor Crisis
- DPRKN-ROKN Yellow Sea patrol boat battles
- Canada-Spain "Turbot War"
- RN Operation Palliser (Sierra Leone)
- Colombia riverine ops
- Sri Lanka civil war
- Afghan civil war
- Kargil War
- Royal Navy Armilla Patrol
### 1990s: The nation (I)

- Bush (Republican) administration (1989-1993)
- Clinton (Democrat) administration (1993-2001)
- Entering the post-Cold War era
- Democrats yielded control of Congress to Republicans (1995)
- Military the most highly-regarded US institution by US public (Gallup polls)
- Triumphalism in wake of Cold War, Desert Storm victories
- Bipartisan view of US as main guarantor of global security
- Despite successful US-led effort to revise UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) mining provisions, Senate would not ratify

### 1990s: The nation (II)

- US continued as world’s largest economy
- Increasingly healthy US economy
- Continued government policies of deregulation, privatization & globalization
- Mild, brief recession (1990-91) (Bush Administration); then modest economic growth (Clinton Administrations)
- Plummeting U.S. government deficit spending; then Clinton Administration budget surpluses
- Low (& declining) inflation, unemployment rates
- Stock market, housing booms
1990s: The nation (III)

- US dependence on imported oil rose sharply
- US free trade policy offensive, encouraging globalization
  - NAFTA (1993)
  - WTO (1995)
  - Russia in WTO (1995)
  - Full US trade relations with PRC & Vietnam
- Value of foreign trade as % of US GDP rose from 15.5% to 20.7%, across the decade
- Significant absolute & relative growth of financial services sector of the US economy

1990s: The nation (IV)

- “Peace Dividend”
- Massive consolidation of US defense industry
  - Result of mergers: 5 “primes:”
    - Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, Northrop-Grumman, Boeing
1990s: US economy & defense spending

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Source: % of GDP & TOA: FY 12 DOD "Green Book"

1990s: U.S. popular views on U.S. defense spending*

% spending too little □ % spending too much □ % spending about right

* Gallup poll data
1990s: US national security policies (I)

- Grand strategy: Replace “containment”
  - Bush administration: Establish & maintain a “New World Order” (Sep 1990 speech)
  - Clinton administration: “Engagement & enlargement”
- Maintain & if possible increase US world military primacy
  - World’s most powerful military
  - World’s highest defense expenditures
  - World leader in defense technology, education
    - Especially precision guided weapons
  - Primacy in the global commons (sea, air, space, cyberspace)
  - Forward global conventional military posture
    - Europe, Middle East, East Asia hubs
  - Center of a global web of military alliances
  - Robust nuclear deterrent
  - World’s leading arms exporter

1990s: US national security policies (II)

- Post-Cold War defense budget “peace dividend” decline; buildup resumed at end of decade
  - Began w/ CJCS GEN Colin Powell-led “Base Force” cuts (1991)
    - Then “QDR” cuts (1997)
  - Falling % of US GDP devoted to defense
  - Continued steady equivalent budget shares among the services (“1/3-1/3-1/3”)
    - Department of the Navy usually highest
    - Department of the Army always lowest
  - No dominant service
  - High peacetime OPTEMPO
1990s: US national security policies (III)

- US willingness to create & use international institutions, organizations, treaties, along with unilateral actions
- State Dept, USAID cutbacks; USIA dismembered
- So-called “Powell Doctrine”
  - Coined by the press in run-up to Gulf War (1990-91)
  - Attributed to CJCS GEN Colin Powell USA
  - Should US go to war, it should apply overwhelming force

1990s: US national security policies (IV)

- No single dominant threat to US national security
- Peaceful demise of Warsaw Pact, then Soviet Union
  - Decay & dismemberment of Soviet military, incl. Navy
- Soviet (later Russia)-US maritime boundary re-confirmed (1990)
  - U.S. Senate ratified (1991)
- Emergence of many disparate, lesser threats
- Search for overarching US security policy
  - Leaked draft GHW Bush Administration DPG (1992)
    - Permanent US primacy, preemption, ad hoc coalitions
  - Emerging activist global forward national security strategy
- US seeking to enlarge global democratic community, to improve U.S. security
1990s: US national security policies (V)

- Calls for (and some steps toward) “transformation”
  - OSD Net Assessment office (Andrew Marshall, LTC Andrew Krepinevich et al.) postulated Military Technical Revolution (MTR), later styled Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
  - New technology-based warfighting concepts:
    - Full-Spectrum Dominance, Dominant Battlespace Knowledge, Rapid Decisive Ops, Shock & Awe, Halt Phase, Network Centric Ops, Effects Based Ops
  - New TTP using speed, knowledge, precision, light forces
  - New technologies:
    - Precision-guided strike munitions (PGMs), ISR, & IT
    - Dramatic increase in PGM inventories, battlefield use
    - Especially USAF, USN, some in USA
  - ADM Owens & VADM Cebrowski in forefront
  - National Defense Panel (NDP) saw as top priority (1997)
  - Push-back from Army (MG Scales), USMC (LtGen Van Riper), others
    - Saw continued need for “boots on the ground” in strength

1990s: US national security policies (VI)

- Threat-based US military planning vs. “rogues” & PRC attacks on Taiwan
- Central DoD force-sizing requirement to fight 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)
- Search for effective “capabilities-based” analyses
- Revival of interest in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), “engagement” & “shaping”
- Major US joint ops in/over/off Iraq, Somalia (debacle), Haiti, former Yugoslavia
1990s: US national security policies (VII)

- Bush administration Gulf defense refocus from Soviets to Iraq (from 1990)
- Clinton administration “dual containment “ policy vs. Iran & Iraq (from 1993)
- Plans & ops vs. state-and non-state sponsors of terrorism, esp. in Middle East
  - State Dept. designated sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, DPRK, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan (from 1993), Syria
- Al Qaeda, other Islamic terror attacks & responses

1990s: US national security policies (VIII)

- US-PRC political, military relations strained
  - Relations – never warm -- fluctuated through decade
  - Lows: Tiananmen Square (1989); Taiwan Straits crises (1995-6); PRC EMB Belgrade bombing accident (1999)
  - US military technology transfer programs cancelled
  - Other US sanctions imposed
  - PLA often resisted US DOD efforts at contact, cooperation
- President Clinton sent USAF humanitarian assistance flights to Africa, in the wake of Hutu genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda (1994)
  - Criticized for not intervening in much greater strength
  - Illustrated US military intervention policy selectivity
1990s: US national security policies (IX)

♦ All 3 legs of “nuclear triad” retained but reduced

♦ Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP) (from 1991 on)

♦ START I Treaty signed (Jul 1991)
  ♦ Cuts in strategic warheads
    ♦ 3 USN SSBNs converted to SSNs
  ♦ Intrusive verification regime

♦ START II Treaty signed (Jan 1993)
  ♦ Ratified, but never in force (Russians withdrew 2002)
  ♦ Reduced US missile & warhead force levels
  ♦ 18 USN SSBNs cut to 14)

♦ START Treaties prepared by AMB Linton Brooks (CAPT USN Ret)

1990s: US national security policies (X)

♦ Sharp decline in size of US nuclear warhead stockpile

♦ Theater nuclear weapons retired or reduced
  ♦ All US nuclear weapons removed from Korea (1991)
  ♦ USN SSBNs provide South Korea extended deterrence

♦ BMD policy: TMD R&D and deployment; NMD R&D
  ♦ Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) succeeded SDIO (1994)


♦ No US nuclear testing (moratorium from 1992)

♦ Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) (from 1994)
  ♦ Life Extension Programs (LEPs)

♦ CTBT (1997); Senate rejected ratification (1999)
1990s: US national security policies (XI)

- US military forces stationed in Europe cut by 2/3
- Peacetime OPCON of ROK forces transferred from US to ROK command (1994)
- Strained US military relations w/ India, Pakistan
- Most US military alliances held
  - NATO expansion eastward
  - Strains with Philippines over base withdrawal (1991-2)
- Emerging importance of Singapore as ally
- Congress cut Indonesia IMET, arms sales (1992-4)
- US Arctic policy focused on scientific research, environmental protection: PDD 26 (1994)

1990s: US national security policies (XII)

- DOD roles & missions governed by DOD Dir 5100.1
  *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components* (Sep 1987)
- Some reassertion of SECDEF/OSD civilian dominance over service programming and budget decisions
  - Nascent CJCS, VCJS, Joint Staff & CINC influence on programming & budgetary decisions
- Increased OSD civilian role overseeing US military planning
- Uneasy Clinton Administration civil-military relations
  - “Don’t Ask; Don’t Tell” policy toward military gays
  - CJCS GEN Powell national & global stature
  - Academic discussions of civil-military “crisis”
1990s: US national security policies (XIII)

♦ Successive DOD defense reviews (I)
  ♦ CJCS Powell “Base Force” (1991)
    ♦ Regional vice global focus
    ♦ Reduced force levels
    ♦ Emphasis on jointness
    ♦ Phased 2-Major Regional Contingency (2-MRC) force-sizing metric
    ♦ Acknowledged role of presence & engagement
    ♦ Reduced force levels
  ♦ Commission of Roles and Missions (CORM) (1995)
    ♦ Recommended Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Reviews

1990s: US national security policies (XIV)

♦ Successive DOD defense reviews (II)
  ♦ 1st Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (1997)
    ♦ Mandated by Congress (1996)
    ♦ 3 challenges: 2-Major-Theater-Wars (2 MTW) force-sizing metric; “halt” phase
    ♦ Enemy asymmetric means
    ♦ Peacetime engagement & smaller-scale contingencies
    ♦ End strength decreases
    ♦ Dominated by tactical airpower (TACAIR) ops, capabilities
    ♦ Congressionally-mandated alternative vision to DOD
    ♦ Skeptical of two-MTW metric as strategy
    ♦ Argued for “transformation” and experimentation as immediate US defense priority
  ♦ Congress mandated subsequent QDRs (1999)
1990s: US national security policies (XV)

- Successive U.S. government East Asia strategy reports
  - President George H.W. Bush *East Asia Strategy Initiative* report (Apr 1990)
  - President George H.W. Bush *East Asia Strategy Initiative* report (Apr 1992)

1990s: US national security policies (XVI)

- Flood of new Joint Doctrine Publications
  - Massive joint doctrine development program
  - 112 Joint Pubs by 1993
  - # remained over 100 for remainder of decade
  - (From 20 joint, 12 multi-service pubs in 1982)
  - Publication timelines streamlined
1990s: US national security policies (XVII)

- Clinton Administration fostered US defense industry downsizing & consolidation
  - Post-Cold war US defense budgets declining
  - SECDEF Perry & US defense contractor CEOs “Last Supper” meeting led to major industry-led consolidations, including shipbuilding (1993)
  - Collapsing of 37 prime US contractors into 5:
    - Lockheed Martin
    - Boeing
    - Northrop Grumman
    - General Dynamics
    - Raytheon
    - (Most systems to have only 3 primes)
  - US defense contractors increased arms exports

1990s: US national security policies (XVIII)

- Leading security policy critics outside the government
  - Center for Defense Information (CDI) endured
    - VADM John J, Shanahan (Ret) Director (1994-7)
      - Had been Zumwalt-era OPNAV OP-60
  - Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) (from 1995)
    - Evolved from Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
    - LTC/Dr. Andrew Krepinevich became Executive Director
    - Increased focus on naval strategy, policy, systems
  - Cato Institute (from 1977)
    - Former naval officer Christopher Preble called for fleet to abandon combat-credible forward presence deployment strategy, instead return to CONUS ports to surge when necessary (from 1993)
1990s: US planned & actual adversaries

- Deter/plan vs. North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Cuba. Incidents.
- Deter PRC/plan to defend Taiwan
- Plans & ops vs. state-and non-state sponsors of terrorism
- Operations in Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, Former Yugoslavia, Haiti
- Military assistance in Colombia & other Latin America
- Anti-drug trafficker operations

1990s: America’s armed conflicts

- Drug War
- Haiti 1994-5
- Bosnia 1994-5, Kosovo 1999
- Afghanistan, Sudan strikes 1998
- Somalia 1992-5
- Iraq 1990-
1990s: Combatant & component commands (I)

- USPACOM
  - PACFLT
- USSOUTHCOM
  - USNAVSOF (to 1991)
  - LANTFLT (from 1991)
- USLANTCOM (to 1993)
- USACOM (from 1993)
  - LANTFLT
- USEUCOM
  - NAVEUR
  - USCENTCOM
  - NAVCENT
- USSPACECOM
  - NAVSPACECOM
- USSOCOM
  - NAV/SPACWARCOM
- SAC (to 1992)
- USSTRATCOM (from 1992)
  - PACFLT
  - LANTFLT
- USTRANSCOM
  - MSC
  - FORSCOM (to 1993)

1990s: Combatant & component commands (II)

- Fragmentation of the world ocean as distinctive theater(s) of war (especially Atlantic Ocean)
  - World ocean now divided among 5 different regional multi-environment theater combatant commanders
  - Atlantic Ocean now divided among 3 regional commanders
  - Indian Ocean now divided among 3 regional commanders
  - Pacific Ocean still divided among 2 regional commanders
  - Arctic Ocean still divided among 2 regional commanders
1990s: Combatant & component commands (III)

- USSOUTHCOM gained Caribbean, Atlantic & Pacific Ocean waters from USACOM & USPACOM (1996)
- USCENTCOM gained Indian Ocean waters from USPACOM (1996)
- USEUCOM gained European offshore waters, including North Sea, from USACOM (2000)
- USEUCOM gained South Atlantic waters from USACOM; gained SW Indian Ocean waters from USPACOM (2000)
- USACOM & USPACOM traditionally commanded by US Navy officers; No gaining command had ever been commanded by a US Navy officer
  - Exception: USMC CINCUSACOM (1994-7)

1990s: Combatant & component commands (IV)

- USSTRATCOM created (1992)
  - Gained operational command of SSBN forces from USLANTCOM & USPACOM
  - USN components: US Atlantic & Pacific Fleets
  - Joint unified regional theater command USLANTCOM became USACOM, gained major joint functional integrating responsibilities (1993)
    - Progressively lost regional responsibilities throughout the decade
### 1990s: US defense directives & reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>National Document</th>
<th>SECDEF</th>
<th>CJCS</th>
<th>Defense Document</th>
<th>CNO</th>
<th>USN Capstone Document</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>GW Bush</td>
<td>National Security Strategy, PNI, NSPA, NSDs, START Treaty</td>
<td>Cheney</td>
<td>Powell USA</td>
<td>JSPS Docs, 1st GFNPP, Base Forces, Joint Pub 1</td>
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<td>Clinton</td>
<td>National Security Strategy, PRDs, PDDs (START II Treaty)</td>
<td>Aspin</td>
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**1990s: Bush Administration directives & reports**

- **National Security Reviews (NSR)**
- **National Security Directives (NSD)**
- **Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI)** (Sep 1991)
- **National Security Strategies (NSS)** (1990-1992)
- **CJCS Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare** (Nov 1991)
- **CJCS National Military Strategy** (Jan 1992)
1990s: Clinton administration directives

- Presidential Review Directives (PRD)
- Presidential Decision Directives (PDD)
  - PDD-26: Arctic and Antarctic Regions (Jun 1994)
  - PDD-56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations (May 1997)
  - PDD-60: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (Nov 1997)

1990s: Clinton administration directives

### 1990s: Clinton administration reports

- SECDEF Bottom-Up Review Report (Oct 1993)
- CJCS Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces (Feb 1993)
- SECDEF Nuclear Posture Review Report (Sep 1994)
- Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM), Directions for Defense (May 1995)
- National Intelligence Council
  - Global Trends 2010 (Nov 1997)
  - Global Trends 2015 (Dec 2000)

### 1990s: USN dollars, numbers, capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CNO</th>
<th>CAPSTONE DOCUMENT</th>
<th>DON TOA FY 12$</th>
<th>NEW SHIPS</th>
<th>BATTLE FORCE SHIPS</th>
<th>ACTIVE PERSONNEL</th>
<th>NEW CAPABILITIES INTRODUCED</th>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>Navy Policy Book, ...From the Sea</td>
<td>$149B</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Burke-class DDG</td>
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<td>UHF FO satellite, Osprey-class MHC, Cyclone-class PC, AMRAAM, MILSTAR</td>
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Sources: TOA & Pers: FY 12 DOD, "Green Book", Ships, Congressional Research Service
### 1990s: USN active ship force levels

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Source: Naval History & Heritage Command website (Oct 2011)

### 1990s: Capstone documents & force goals

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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CNO</th>
<th>FORCE GOAL DOCUMENT</th>
<th>FORCE GOAL</th>
<th>BATTLE FORCE SHIPS</th>
<th>CAPSTONE DOCUMENT</th>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Kelso</td>
<td>DOD Base Force</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>526</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td>DOD Bottom Up Review (BUR)</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>346</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>Boorda</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>356</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>QDR #1 (USN View)</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>354</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>310</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>333</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>310</td>
<td>306</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>Shipbuilding Rep'1</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>318</td>
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1990s: USN force goals

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total battle force ships</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>451/416</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>~305/310</td>
<td>305-360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack submarines</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80/55</td>
<td>45/55</td>
<td>50/55</td>
<td>50/66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11+1</td>
<td>11+1</td>
<td>11-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface combatants</td>
<td>242/228</td>
<td>~150</td>
<td>~124</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116-133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious ships</td>
<td>~75</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36-42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1990s: USN deployment strategy

- 5 fleets: 1 forward-based, 2 forward deployed, 2 home
- Draw-down of forces in Med hub
- Changing SSN & SSBN deployments
- Continued counter-drug homeland security ops
- Routinized deployment schedules
1990s: USN operations & exercises

- SSN, P-3, EP-3 ISR ops
- SSBN deterrent patrols
- Undersea surveillance system ops
- Oceanographic surveys
- FON OPS
- Diplomatic port visits
- COMREL & Handclasp activities
- JTFXs
- Other pre-deployment exercises
- Fleet Battle Experiments
- PASSEXes
- MPFXs
- JLOTS

1990s: State of the Navy (I)

- USN the world’s dominant sea power
- High global OPTEMPO, experience, expertise
- USN combat ops were against the shore
- Minimal USN combat experience at sea
- USN sized/shaped to fight 2 joint regional wars + peacetime/crisis response forward presence
- Decline in USN conventional, nuclear force levels, tonnage & budgets
  - Heavy cuts in ship & aircraft procurement budgets
  - Tonnage decline not as great as ship count decline: More smaller ships decommissioned than larger ships
  - USN increasingly a “big ship Navy”
1990s: State of the Navy (II)

- Continued extensive, global, diverse ops, exercises (Combat, shows of force, peace ops, NEOs)
  - Long-running USN strike operations, responses off/over Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, East Asia
  - Afghan/Sudan anti-terror strikes
  - Deliberate 7th Fleet CVBG ops in/near Taiwan Straits
    - Vs. PRC provocations against Taiwan (1995-6)
  - E. Timor, Liberia, Sierra Leone interventions
  - Forward SSN, P-3, EP-3 ISR operations
  - SSBN deterrent patrols
  - Freedom of Navigation operations
  - Counter-drug operations
  - Bangladesh hurricane (1991), Turkey earthquake (1999), Egypt airliner SAR (1999), other HA/DR operations
  - USN & inter-allied exercises worldwide

1990s: State of the Navy (III)

- Routine deployment lengths continued to be standardized at 6 months.
- About 3 carriers deployed at any one time
  - Down from 4-5 in 1970s and 1980s
- Number of ships forward stationed and forward deployed remained fairly constant (WESTPAC & CENTCOM AOR)
- Number of ships in Med, NORTLANT, training off CONUS decreased
  - Decline in non-forward deployed fleet readiness across the decade
- LANTFLT remained larger than PACFLT
  - 55/45 split (22% larger)
1990s: State of the Navy (IV)

- USN strike capabilities increasingly dispersed among platform types
- Increased strike precision, networking priority
  - Desert Shield / Desert Storm “wake-up call”
  - Conventional Tomahawk transformed strike warfare
  - Accelerated USN procurement of/ training with precision guided munitions (PGMs), Tomahawk
- USS Yorktown (CG-48) “Smart Ship” experiment (1996-7)

1990s: State of the Navy (V)

- Carrier air wings increasingly optimized for strike operations
- Need for follow-on strike aircraft to A-6
  - SECDEF Cheney canceled USN A-12 stealthy aircraft development program (Jan 1991)
    - Breach of Contract litigation dragged on through 2007
  - Declining DOD budgets, but 6 DOD tactical aircraft in development
    - F/A-18E/F, F-22, F-35 JSF (3 variants)
- Decision: Rapid USN F/A-18 E/F development, deployment
- Last USN A-7s retired (1991); Last USN A-6s retired (1997)
- Declining combat radius of USN strike aircraft
1990s: State of the Navy (VI)

- Major shift in ASW operations & programs
  - Dismantling of Cold War ASW capabilities
    - All 46 Knox-class FFs decommissioned (1991-94)
    - DD-963s & MSC T-AGOS ships taken out of service
    - Big drawdown of SSN, FFG-7, P-3, S-3 forces
    - Last SH-3 Sea King helos retired (1996)
    - SOSUS array shutdowns
    - USCG cutters lost ASW missions & equipment
  - Increase in active sonar solutions to quiet littoral anti-access submarine problem
  - Concomitant increase in public concerns for marine mammal safety
- Seawolf-class SSN program truncated at 3 (1995)
- SSN force refocused on ISR, ASUW, strike
- Continued northern SSN deployments
  - USN-Russian SSN collision incidents reported

1990s: State of the Navy (VII)

- Russia no longer an important focus of USN ops & plans
  - Russian strategic & conventional effective force levels plummeted
- Build-up of accurate Trident II D-5 MIRVed SSBN/SLBM forces, for counter-force targeting. Retirement of earlier counter-value systems
  - Planned conversion of 4 SSBNs to SSGNs
- No non-strategic nuclear weapons on USN ships
- Naval arms control disappeared as a major policy issue
1990s: State of the Navy (VIII)

- Commander US Third Fleet staff & command ship USS Coronado (AGF 11) shifted homeports from Hawaii to San Diego (1991)
- COMDESRON 50 & staff permanently forward–deployed in Gulf (from 1994)
- 5th Fleet created in Arabian Gulf/Sea (1995)

1990s: State of the Navy (IX)

- Continued increasing dependence of US naval operations on space-based systems
- USN began sea-based BMD R & D (1991)
- PRC ship Yin He US intel/search incident (1993)
- USN conducted maritime interception ops (MIO); developed & deployed visit, board, search & seizure (VBSS) capabilities, TTP
- Naval Special Warfare subsumed under SOF
- Fleet Tactical Deception Groups (FLTDECGRUs) evolve into Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC), for fleet information ops (IO) support (by 1995)
- Small USNR forward port security capability
1990s: State of the Navy (X)

- All 4 Iowa-class BBs decommissioned (1990-91)
- All 9 CGNs decommissioned (1993-9)
- Major drawdown of USN intel org, capabilities, procurement; integrated into joint intel orgs, ops
- Widespread use of PCs; cell phones; networks
- VADM, then ADM William Owens (OPNAV N8, then VCJCS) “Mobile Operating Base” (MOB) advocacy & reaction
- Women became well-integrated into USN seagoing fleet
  - 1st women assigned to fly combat aircraft (1991)
  - 1st women assigned to surface combatants (1993)

1990s: State of the Navy (XI)

- Major OPNAV staff reorganization & redesignations (from 1992)
  - DCNO for Navy Program Planning (OP-08) redesignated DCNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments (N8)
    - OP-08 had been OP-090 before 1987
  - Platform “barons” (OP-02, OP-03, OP-05) under N8
  - 3-star DCNO for Naval Warfare (OP-07) (formerly OP-095) abolished
- Cuts in total Navy flag billets & increase in Navy-manned joint flag officer billets influenced reorganizations in OPNAV & throughout the fleet
1990s: State of the Navy (XII)

- Major OPNAV PPBS process changes, especially program planning (restyled program assessment)
  - OP-07-led warfare appraisals and N81-led CPAMs replaced by consensual Joint Mission Areas (JMAs) Assessment process
  - OPNAV resumed, developed campaign analysis efforts & models ISO POM, budget development
  - Major advances in computer power to support analyses

1990s: State of the Navy (XIII)

  - New Navy mission-area categories
    - Joint strike
    - Joint littoral warfare
    - Joint surveillance
    - Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
    - Strategic deterrence
    - Strategic sealift/protection
    - Presence
  - Deliberately created to “free thought and discussion”
- Replaced by Integrated Warfare Architectures (IWARS) 1998-2003
  - 5 new warfare sub-categories
    - Information superiority & sensors, Sea dominance, Power Projection, Air Dominance, Deterrence
1990s: State of the Navy (XIV)

- OPNAV Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy (OP-60) re-designated N51 (1992)
- OPNAV Strategy Branch Head billet (N513) downgraded from CAPT to CDR (1993)
- OPNAV Director for Strategy and Policy (N51) billet downgraded from RADM to RDML-SEL (1997)
  - OP-60B/N51B billet still held by a CAPT (since 1985)
- Waning internal OPNAV influence of N3/N5

1990s: State of the Navy (XV)

- Intra-USN strategy fora:
  - Cooke conferences (1990-95)
- Unofficial DC-area “Navy Study Groups”
  - “Ancient Mariners” (1989-91); & 1992-2003
- Episodic USN interest in improving USN conceptual thinking
  - Strategic-level efforts
    - Draft & final Capstone documents
  - Operational & tactical-level efforts
    - New Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) & naval doctrine (1992-8)
    - Maritime Battle Center created; Fleet Battle Experiments
    - NDC functions subsumed in Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), under NAVWARCOL 1998-2001)
### 1990s: State of the Navy (XVI)

- NAVWARCOL PME curriculum increased addressal of joint strategy & policy
  - Necessarily de-emphasized focus on maritime & naval strategy
- NWC Global Wargames restyled “Title X Games”
- CNO ADM Boorda shifted CNO SSG focus from *strategy to innovation & concept generation* (1995)
- VADM Cebrowski NWC president (1998-2001)
  - 1st & only 3-star president since 1979
  - New NWDC briefly subsumed under NWC (1998-2001)
    - To revitalize Navy operational and tactical thinking
    - Incl/ NAVDOCCOM functions (NAVDOCCOM disestablished)
    - Incl/ doctrine, development divisions
    - New NWDC Maritime Battle Center created to run FBEs (1998)

### 1990s: State of the Navy (XVII)

- NAVWARCOL Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) Strategy & Campaigns Department renamed Strategic Research Department (SRD) (1992)
  - Initially, mostly retired US Navy officers holding advanced degrees, plus international fellows
  - Under PNWC VADM Cebrowski, SRD & other CNWS departments began to civilianize (1998)
  - Continued Global War Games & organized international games (1994-2000)
- CNA created “Project Asia,” with focus on Chinese military (1998)
  - RADM (Ret) Michael McDevitt; LTC (Ret)/ Dr. David Finkelstein; etc.
1990s: State of the Navy (XVIII)

- Continued fall-off in Navy use of civilian graduate programs in political science & international relations
- Maturation of national security affairs curriculum at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey
- Continued detailing of active duty OP-60/N51 officer alumni to NPS to teach maritime strategy
- Top USN post-graduate-educated officers continued to be detailed to Joint Staff vice OPNAV
  - Continued effect (intended) of Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)
- Increasingly junior flag & action officers placed in OPNAV N3/N5

1990s: State of the Navy (XIX)

- Navy Core Values adopted (Oct 1992)
- CNO ADM Kelso promulgated Professional Reading Lists
- Sailor’s Creed developed, published (1993)
- DON Core Values Charter developed, published (1996)
  - Re-published (1999)
1990s: State of the Navy (XX)

- Emergence of articulate & prolific USN spokesmen for new Navy concepts
  - Examples:
    - Adaptive naval force packages
    - ADM Paul David Miller & VADM William Owens
    - Network-Centric Warfare & “Naval RMA”
    - VADMs William Owens & Arthur Cebrowski
    - Navy (& naval) maneuver warfare
      - CDRs Terry Pierce, Joseph Bouchard, Sam Tangredi
  - “Bad Press”
    - Tailhook incidents, CNO ADM Boorda suicide, etc.

1990s: State of the Navy (XXI)

- Systems in development &/or construction
  - Ships
    - Virginia-class SSN
    - Was Centurion, then New Attack Submarine (NSSN)
    - Ohio-class SSGN
    - San Antonio-class LPD
    - CVNX
    - DD-21
      - Later DD(X), DDG-1000
    - T-AKE
    - LMSR
    - MPF(F)
    - JCC (never built)
  - Aircraft
    - F/A-18E/F
    - MH-60S
    - MH-60R
    - E-6B TACAMO
  - Weapons & systems
    - Tactical Tomahawk
    - Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
    - Underwater unmanned vehicles (UUV)
    - TBMD systems
    - ERGM round (later canxed)
    - NATO Improved Link 11 (NILE)
1990s: DCNOs for Plans, Policy & Operations

- 1990 VADM Robert Kelly*
- 1991 VADM Leighton Smith* **
- 1994 VADM Paul Reason**
- 1996 VADM James Ellis**
- 1998 VADM Thomas Fargo**
- 1999 VADM Robert Natter**
- 2000 VADM Timothy Keating**

* OPNAV OP-06
** N3/N5

1990s: Directors for Strategy & Policy (N51)

- 1988 RADM P.D. Smith*
- 1991 RADM Edward Baker*
- 1992 RADM Scott Redd
- 1993 RADM Philip Dur
- 1994 RADM John Mazach
- 1997 RADM Edward Moore
- 1997 RDML John Byrd
- 1998 RDML Joseph Sestak
- 2000 RDML Miles Wachendorf

*Directors for Strategy, Plans and Policy (OPNAV OP-60)
1990s: Strategy & Concepts branch heads

- 1989  CAPT E.R. Diamond*
- 1991  CAPT Patrick Curry*
- 1993  CDR Joseph Sestak**
- 1995  CDR Joseph Bouchard**
- 1997  CDR Frank Pandolfo**
- 1998  CDR Sam Tangredi**
- 1999  CDR Philip Cullom**
- 1999  CDR Steve Lott (Acting)**
- 2000  CDR Robert Dolan**

* OPNAV OP-603

1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (I)

- Overview
  - Strategy & civil-military relations
  - Views of visionary U.S. Navy leaders
  - Naval presence, diplomacy, crisis response
  - Tactics, games & relation to strategy
  - Maritime security, peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance, & disaster response
  - US & world naval history, including strategy
  - Cold War naval strategy & policy
  - Naval arms control
  - The U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf
  - Innovation, especially interwar period
1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (II)

- New literature on strategy & on civil-military relations
  - Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History & the Last Man* (1992)

1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (III)

- Strategy & civil-military relations (II)
  - Col Harry Summers USA (Ret), *On Strategy II* (1992)
  - CAPT Bruce Stubbs USCG, *The U.S. Coast Guard’s National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century* (1992)
  - Russell Weigley, “The American Military” (1993), etc.
### 1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (IV)

- **Strategy & civil-military relations (III)**

### 1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (V)

- **Strategy & civil-military relations (IV)**
1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (VI)

- Views of visionary U.S. Navy flag officers
  - ADM Paul David Miller: 3 IFPA monographs
    - *Both Swords and Plowshares: Military Roles in the 1990s* (1992)

1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (VII)

- Views of visionary U.S. Secretary of the Navy
    - Written between appointments as Under Secretary & Secretary (1997-8)
    - Danzig’s “Big three:”
      - Renewed major military competition
      - Traumatic attack
      - Lack of domestic support
1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (VIII)

- Naval presence, diplomacy, crisis response (I)
  - Bradford Dismukes CNA studies on naval presence
    - *The Political-Strategic Case for Presence* (Jun 1993)

1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (IX)

- Naval presence, diplomacy, crisis response (II)
1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (X)

- Naval tactics & games, & relation to strategy
  - Peter Perla, *The Art of Wargaming* (1990)

1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (XI)

- New literature on maritime security, peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance, & disaster response
  - CAPT Charles Koburger USCGR (Ret), *Narrow Seas, Small Navies, and Fat Merchantmen: Naval Strategies for the 1990s* (1990)
1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (XII)

- Spate of new syntheses & interpretations of the sweep of US & world naval history, incl/ strategy
  - George Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power* (1993)

1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (XIII)

- Analyses of NATO Cold War naval strategy & policy
  - Written for contemporary Cold War relevance. Published post-Cold War; largely of historical interest
1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (XIV)

- Continued publications on naval arms control, largely in the early part of the decade (in train as the Cold War ended)
  - Andreas Furst et al., eds. *Europe and Naval Arms Control in the Gorbachev Era* (1992)
  - Barry Blechman et al., *Naval Arms Control: A Strategic Assessment* (1992)
  - On USN-Soviet Navy Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement

1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (XV)

- More historical studies on interwar naval arms control, in the early part of the decade
  - B.J.C. McKercher (ed.), *Arms Limitation & Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939* (1992)
1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (XVI)

- The U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf

1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (XVII)

- Blossoming literature on military innovation, especially US Navy in the interwar period (I)
1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (XVII)

- Blossoming literature on military innovation, especially US Navy in the interwar period (II)

1990s: Naval policy & strategy literature (XIX)

- Blossoming literature on military innovation, especially US Navy in the interwar period (III)
1990s: Public USN intelligence documents

- *Worldwide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade* (1995)
- *Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare* (1997)

1990s: US Navy basing (I)

- Base Realignment & Closure (BRAC) actions
  - 2nd BRAC round (1991): 3 naval stations closed
  - 3rd BRAC round (1993): 1 shipyard, 12 naval stations, 3 hospitals, etc., close
  - 4th BRAC round (1995): 4 shipyards, other naval facilities closed. (Last BRAC for 10 years)
- Admiral Owens unsuccessfully advocated creation of afloat Mobile Operating Bases (MOBs)
1990s: US Navy basing (II)

- “Top Gun,” “Top Dome” & “Strike U” consolidated under Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) at NAS Fallon (1996)
  - BRAC moved NAS Miramar to USMC control
- NAVSTA GITMO used to house Cuban, Haitian migrants (1991-6)
- FLTRAGRU relocated from GTMO to Mayport (1995)
- MPSRON 1 re-located from US East Coast forward to Mediterranean (1995)

1990s: US Navy basing (III)

- Consolidation & closure of NAVFAC SOSUS stations
  - NAVFACs Guam, Centerville Beach, Adak, Argentia, Keflavik, others disestablished
- USN mine warfare base shifted from Charleston SC to Ingleside TX (1992-6)
- USN transferred Kaho‘olawe Island to State of Hawaii (1994)
  - Live fire training on Kaho‘olawe Island, Hawaii had ended, following local protests (1990)
1990s: US Navy basing (IV)

- Access to Singapore facilities (1990)
  - US-Singapore MOU
- USN Philippine bases closed (1992)
  - COMLOGWESTPAC move: Subic Bay to Singapore
  - Build-up of Navy Region Center (NRC) Singapore
- AS, SSBNs leave Holy Loch, UK (1992)
- NAF Midway closed (1993)
- NAF Lajes (Azores) disestablished (1994)
- NAS Bermuda closed (1995)
- NAS Adak closed (1997)
- USN Panama bases closed (1999)

1990s: US Navy basing (V)

- Base modernization & expansion at Bahrain
- Permanently forward deployed USN flagship left Bahrain; COMUSNAVCENT & staff moved ashore (1993)
- USN mine warfare ships permanently forward deployed in Bahrain (from 1996)
  - 2 MCMs with rotating crews (from 1996)
  - 2 MHCs with permanent crews and families (2000)
- Omani air bases upgrades & continued access
- USN CVBGs used port of Jebel Ali (Dubai UAE)
  - Port completed in 1979
1990s: State of the Navy: Military sealift (II)

- Operations Desert Shield & Desert Storm (1990-1)
  - Largest, fastest deployment of US mil. forces ever
  - 230 US government-owned/chartered sealift ships deployed
  - MSC Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) deployed
  - 79 MARAD RRF ships activated; 72 utilized
    - But 80% were late in breaking out
  - MSC used charters & Special Middle East Sealift Agreement (SMESA) vice Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) to obtain necessary US commercial shipping
    - Shortages of available US-flag civilian ships, Ro-Ros, mariners
    - Innovative ad hoc charter agreements
      - E.g.: Special Middle East Shipping Agreement (SMESA)
  - % of US military cargo shipped to theater
    - RRF: 36%
    - Other US flag ships: 35%
    - Foreign-flag (including Effective US Controlled ships (EUSC)): 29%
      - Some foreign-flag ships refused to enter Gulf
      - Some US government dissatisfaction with dependence on foreign ships

1990s: State of the Navy: Military sealift (III)

- USCINCTRANS gained more authority (1992):
  - Peacetime as well as wartime authority over MSC sealift
  - Navy lost US sealift “single manager” responsibilities
  - Became DOD “single manager for transportation”
    - Replaced MSC as single manager for sealift
  - To fund all DOD strategic sealift, incl/ RRF
- Inter-modalism shifted from MSC to US Army Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
- MSC heavily focused on other missions than sealift
  - Continued civilianization of USN Navy-manned auxiliaries to MSC civilian mariner (CIVMAR) crewing
    - New acoustic survey ships
    - Use of civilian helicopters on NFAF CLF ships
1990s: State of the Navy: Military sealift (IV)

- **DOD mobility studies**
  - *Mobility Requirements Study* (1992)
    - Recommended procurement of additional surge sealift & prepositioning ships
  - *Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update* (1994)
    - Validated 1992 recommendation

1990s: State of the Navy: Military sealift (V)

- Post-Desert Storm expansion & modernization of MSC surge sealift & prepositioning forces
  - MPSRONs for USMC expanded & rebalanced
    - Experiment: MPS MV *Lummus* in Tripoli ARG (1991-2)
    - Conversion of 3 vessels into MPF (E)
    - Obviated need to mount sea sheds & flatracks for oversized cargo on containerships
    - Allowed eventual reduction in the size of the RRF
  - Some foreign-built/US converted; most US-built
  - Some ships government-owned (USNS); some chartered (MV)
  - Civilian mariner (CIVMAR) and contracted mariner (CONMAR) crews
1990s: State of the Navy: Military sealift (VI)

- Total NDRF ship #s fluctuated
  - 1990: 329  
  - 1994: 286  
  - 2000: 325

- NDRF RFF ship #s fluctuated
  - 1990: 96  
  - 1994: 102  
  - 2000: 90

1990s: State of the Navy: Military sealift (VII)

- 8 MARAD NDRF RRF Ro/Ro ships & crane ship activated to serve in MSC Prepositioning Force (1993-4)
  - Temporary activation while Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs) being constructed / converted
  - Designated “Army Interim Brigade Afloat Force”
  - Returned to RRF (from 1997)

- New CINCTRANS- MARAD Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on funding, management & Activation of NDRF & RRF
  - Superseded 1988 MSC-MARAD MOA
1990s: State of the Navy: Military sealift (VIII)

- Reinforcement of Germany (REFORGER) exercises to test, maintain sealift surge capabilities ended (1993)
- US-South Korea reinforcement exercises (Team Spirit) suspended to encourage better North Korean behavior (1994-96)
- MSC sealift & prepositioning ship support for Somalia, Bosnia, & Kosovo contingencies
- NDRF RRF ships activated for Somalia, Haiti, Guantanamo Bay ops; Hurricane Mitch disaster relief, etc.

1990s: State of the Navy: Military sealift (IX)

- Clinton Administration Maritime Security Act of 1996 focused on US Merchant Marine military sealift utility & availability
  - Maritime Security Program (MSP)
    - Subsidies only for militarily useful civilian ships
    - Subsidies for 47 ships in exchange for DOD emergency access
  - Voluntary Intermodal Shipping Agreement (VISA)
    - DOD peacetime cargo preference in exchange for DOD emergency access
    - Seen as alternative to Sealift Readiness Program (had been unused during Operations desert Shield & Desert storm)
1990s: US-flag Merchant Marine (I)

- US economy more integrated into world economy
- International shipping tonnage to & from US ports surpassed domestic shipping tonnage (1994)
  - First time since 1820 (World Wars excepted)
- Military Cargo Preference Act of 1904 in force
  - Only US-flag ships can carry US-owned military items
- Jones Act (1920) in force
  - Only US-flag ships can carry cargoes between US ports
- Cargo Preference Act of 1954 in force
  - Private US-flag ships must carry 50-75% of US government-sponsored cargoes, e.g.: food aid

1990s: US-flag Merchant Marine (II)

- US commercial Merchant Marine decline continued
  - Ocean-going ships (1000 gross tons & over)
    - Dropped from 5% to 2% of world tonnage
    - Carried only 4% of US international trade
  - Non-government US civilian mariner #s continued to drop
    - RRF relied on availability of US civilian mariners
- Effective US Control Fleet (EUSC) also declined
  - Rose, then declined again
1990s: US-flag Merchant Marine (III)

- Clinton Administration Maritime Security Act of 1996
  - Maritime Security Program (MSP)
    - Subsidies only for militarily useful civilian ships
    - Subsidies for 47 ships in exchange for DOD emergency access
  - Voluntary Intermodal Shipping Agreement (VISA)
    - DOD cargo preference in exchange for DOD emergency access
- US government Operating Differential Subsidies (ODS) (since 1936) phasing out
- MSP subsidies less costly to government than ODS
- Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA)
  - Amended Shipping Act of 1984
  - To increase US exports & shipping competition
1990s: US shipbuilding industrial base (I)

- US commercial Merchant Marine shipbuilding averaged less than 2 per year
  - Near-cessation of US ocean-going merchant shipbuilding
  - No US government commercial ship construction subsidies (since Reagan years)
- Jones Act (1920) continued in force.
  - Sea trade between US ports must be in US-built ships
  - Most Jones Act trade (90% of tonnage) transported Alaskan oil to CONUS
- Clinton Administration restarted Federal Ship Financing Guarantee Program (1993)
  - Had been suspended by Reagan Administration (1986)

1990s: US shipbuilding industrial base (II)

- US shipbuilding industry largely dependent on US Navy orders
- Annual USN warship deliveries in double digits
- Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions closed 4 of 8 US government naval shipyards
- Major consolidations in US defense industry included “Big Six” private military shipyards
- Congress prohibited acquisition of foreign-built ships for Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
- Little military utility of most new US-built commercial ships
1990s: US shipbuilding industrial base

- Base Realignment & Closure (BRAC) actions cut USN (government) shipyards from 8 to 4
  - Closed:
    - Charleston (SC)
    - Long Beach (CA)
    - Mare Island (CA)
    - Philadelphia (PA)
  - Retained
    - Norfolk (Portsmouth VA)
    - Pearl Harbor (HI)
    - Portsmouth (Kittery ME)
    - Puget Sound (Bremerton WA)

Source: MARAD & Tim Colton.
1990s: US government naval shipyards

- Puget Sound
- Bremerton WA
- Mare Island
- Vallejo CA
- Long Beach
- CA
- Pearl Harbor
- HI
- Portsmouth
- Kittery ME
- Philadelphia
- PA
- Norfolk
- Portsmouth VA
- Charleston
- SC

= Retained
= Closed

1990s: US private naval shipbuilding

- Major consolidations in US defense industry included “Big Six” private military shipyards
  - Litton (Ingalls) bought Avondale (1999)
  - Newport News remained independent
  - “Big Six” left Shipbuilders Council of America, formed their own trade group, American Shipbuilding Association (ASA) (1996)
  - Drastic employment cuts: Newport News, GD Electric Boat, Bath
Major US private naval shipyards: 1991

1990s: Comparing military department TOA$
1990s: Comparing active duty personnel

Source: FY 12 DOD "Green Book"

1990s: USN-USMC relations
Operational cooperation
- Some conceptual, bureaucratic, budgetary differences
- USMC achieved parity & equality with – and autonomy from – USN in many areas
1990s: Operations

- Continued routine & crisis-response USMC forward deployments on USN ships
  - MEU (SOC)s on amphibious ships
  - MARDETs on non-amphibious ships (till 1997)
- Numerous USN-USMC amphibious operations throughout decade
  - Combat ops, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peace ops, shows of force, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
  - Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, West Africa, Balkans, Bangladesh, Caribbean

1990s: Operations: Desert Shield/Storm

- Amphibious feints & aborted assault plans vs. Iraq (1990-91)
  - USS Nassau as “Harrier carrier” (1991)
- Differing Desert Shield/Storm aviation experiences
  - NAVCENT chafed at Navy TACAIR subordination to CENTAF procedures
  - MARCENT retained control of its aviation assets in support of Marines on the ground
1990s: Operational experimentation

- Marines deployed to Atlantic, Mediterranean on USN carriers (1991-3)
  - COMSIXTHFLT VADM Owens a strong USN-USMC integration advocate
  - VADM Owens subsequently became DCNO, Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (OPNAV N8)
  - Experiment during Somalia ops

1990s: Ships, craft & aircraft

- 7 LHDs commissioned (1989-2001)
- USMC still committed to LCAC, AAAV, V-22
- USMC developed, deployed small riverine capability
  - Small Craft Company, II MEF (1991)
- Amphibious ship % of USN Battle Force stabilized
  - 1960s: 15%  1970s: 13%  1980s: 11%  1990s: 11%
- “DON LIFT 2” study & agreed force goals (1990)
  - But agreement dissipated through the decade
Actual lift capacity & USMC goals both reduced

USN amphibious ship count cut by 30%

Increase in capability of individual amphibious ships

“Necking down” of USN amphibious ship types
  From 6 to 3

USMC lift goals increasingly focused on # of ARGs for forward presence & crisis response ops

USMC presented 2 levels of USMC lift goals:
  “Operational requirements”
  “Programmatic goals”

### 1990s: USN amphibious ships/USMC goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actual amphibious ship force levels</th>
<th>Actual troop lift (in MEFs)</th>
<th>Amphibious lift goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>63 (LHA/LHD/LKA/LPD/LPH/LSD/LST)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3 MEB AE (P) / 2 MEF AE (O)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>12 ARGs / 2.5 MEB AE (P) / 3 MEB AE (O)</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>39 (LHA/LHD/LPD/LPH/LSD/LST)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>12 ARGs / 2.5 MEB AE (P) / 3 MEB AE (O)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>39 (LHA/LHD/LPD/LPH/LSD)</td>
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<td>12 ARGs / 2.5 MEB AE (P) / 3 MEB AE (O)</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>40 (LHA/LHD/LPD/LSD)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>44 ships (3 ARGs +2) / 2.5 MEB AE (P) / 3 MEB AE (O)</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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AE = Assault echelon  P = Programmatic goal  O = Operational requirement
**1990s: USN-USMC relations**

- Non-operational USN-USMC relations sometimes fractious
- USN-USMC disagreements over USMC share of DON budget
  - Differences over V-22 funding, USN-USMC TACAIR integration, other issues
- Under Secretary of the Navy (later Secretary of the Navy) Richard Danzig particularly active in encouraging integration

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**1990s: Program issues: Ships**

- Increased USMC amphibious ship requirements
  - MAGTF weight/square/cube growth
- New Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) ship designs
  - USMC pushed for sea basing
  - USN had cost concerns
1990s: Program issues: aircraft

- Declining budgets & increasing but diverging aviation requirements & costs caused tensions
- F/A-18 aircraft issues (resolved)
  - USMC declined F/A-18E/F; wanted more F/A-18C/Ds
  - USN wanted to close F/A-18C/D line
  - SECNAV-CNO-CMC agreement
    - F/A-18 C/D line to close. USN to buy F/A-18E/F. Excess USN F/A-18C/Ds to go to USMC

1990s: Integration accomplishments

- Some increased USN-USMC staff, management, & support integration
  - USMC MajGen became OPNAV Expeditionary Warfare director (N85) (1993)
  - Naval Special Warfare boat crew training on MCAS Cherry Point NC bombing range (from 1991)
  - USN-USMC-USCG National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) created (1994)
  - Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) instituted (2000)
    - Strong SECNAV Danzig push
1990s: Increased USMC autonomy, status

- More USMC generals became unified CINCs (1992)
  - Gen Sheehan appointed SACLANT/CINCUSACOM (1994)
    - 1st non-Navy SACLANT/CINCUSACOM
- USMC components established at unified combatant commands (1992)
- Increased USMC general officer numbers
- CMC & staff moved into Pentagon spaces (1996)
  - USN gave up spaces within DON space allocation
- No drop in USMC active end strength in 1990s
  - Contrast with US Army, USN, USAF
  - Inter-service end strength ratios altered significantly

1990s: USMC outlook changing

- USMC viewed itself as nation’s expeditionary force
- Disavowed its earlier Cold War plans, *Maritime Strategy* participation
- Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) command & control doctrine differences
- USMC retained role in sustained operations ashore
- USMC tried to focus USN attention beyond blue-water operations
1990s: USMC on USN ships & bases

- Last MARDETs removed from non-amphibious USN ships (1997)
- USMC Security Companies on USN bases disestablished (from 1998)
- USMC FAST companies tasked to augment USN base security as needed instead

1990s: Differences over the “littoral” (I)

- Both USN & USMC shifted focus in 1990s toward operations in the “littoral”
- “Littoral” seen as having both sea & land elements
- USN view:
  - Strike missions on the littoral -- from the sea -- predominate, so USN plays predominant role. Amphibious operations are one of many other missions on or from the sea, like AAW, ASW, ASUW, EW, mine warfare, etc.
USMC view:
- The sea is a staging area for ground operations ashore.
- Operational maneuver of Marines from the sea to the land (and on the land) – reaching far inland -- is principal military mission in the littoral.
- At least co-equal with all other operations on or from the sea.
- Strike from the sea should primarily support Marines ashore.
- USMC is at least a co-equal – & probably the dominant – service in the Littoral.

1990s: NAVDOCCOM
- Naval Doctrine Command (NAVDOCCOM) established in Norfolk VA (1993)
- Concept: Integrated Navy-Marine Corps command
- Initial plan:
  - Navy flag officer commander; Marine general officer deputy
  - To be relieved by Marine general officer commander, Navy flag officer deputy
1990s: NAVDOCCOM issues

- USMC did not disestablish its own service doctrine organization & meld it into NAVDOCCOM
- USMC did not provide a general officer commander or deputy
- USN concerns at “2-way USMC influence on USN doctrine”
  - USN needed to continue to coordinate with MCCDC
  - O-6 USMC deputy within NAVDOCCOM
  - E.g.: NDP 3 Naval Operations never agreed on/signed
- Continued simultaneous USMC development of single-service visions, concepts, strategy & doctrine
  - E.g.: CMC signed MCDP 3 Expeditionary Operations (1998)

Naval Doctrine Publications (NDPs)

- Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare
- Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence
- Naval Doctrine Publication 3: Naval Logistics
- Naval Doctrine Publication 4: Naval Planning
- Naval Doctrine Publication 5: Naval Command and Control
- Naval Doctrine Publication 6: Naval Operations
1990s: Other doctrinal efforts

- Joint Pub 3-02 *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* signed (1992)
  - Superseded 1986 edition
  - No further revision for a decade
- USMC maneuver warfare focus
  - MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (1997)

1990s: USMC experimentation & concepts

- CMC Gen Charles Krulak agenda (1995-9):
  - Instill mindset of change-acceptance, creativity & persistent innovation into USMC
  - Emphasized culture of “Marines as innovators”
  - Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory created (1995)
    - Subsequently Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL)
    - Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE), etc.
- 12 new USMC warfighting concepts developed
  - 1996-8
  - Some Navy participation
  - UNCLAS
  - Widely disseminated
### 1990s: USMC warfighting concepts (I)

- USMC warfighting concepts #1-#6 (1996-8)
  - CMC, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS)* (1996)
  - CG MCCDC, *Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM)* (1997)

### 1990s: USMC warfighting concepts (II)

- USMC warfighting concepts #7-#12 (1998)
1990s: USMC in USN “capstone” documents

- USN “capstone” documents
  - . . . *From the Sea* (1992)
  - *Forward . . . From the Sea* (1994)
  - *Anytime, Anywhere* (1997)
- CMCs & CNOs co-signed **bolded** pubs above (1991-94)
  - Important role of BGen Tom Wilkerson USMC

1990s: USMC in USN “capstone” documents

- *Way Ahead, . . . From the Sea, Forward . . . From the Sea* published in *Marine Corps Gazette*
- . . . *From the Sea, Forward . . . From the Sea* cited in seminal USMC OMFTS concept of 1990s
- 1994 a high-water mark of USMC influence on USN capstone documents
- Hiatus in co-signed CNO-CMC capstone documents (1995-2001)
1990s: USN-USMC differences aired

♦ Mundy-Kelso-Mixson discussion of Department of the Navy (DON) Navy-Marine Corps program and budget splits; & USMC influence in DON budget
  ♦ Former CNO ADM Frank Kelso, USN (Ret) response, US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Jan 1996)
  ♦ Former OPNAV Director Air Warfare (N88) RADM Riley Mixson USN (Ret) response, US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Feb 1996)

1990s: USN-USCG relations
### 1990s: Context for USN–USCG Relations

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### 1990s: USN-USCG relations (I)

- **USCG in Department of Transportation**
- **USCG cutters, WPBs, PSUs lost planned anti-Soviet wartime roles, with end of Cold War**
  - USCG cut all “defense-only” requirements & capabilities
  - USCG eliminated ASW as a WHEC capability (1992)
  - USCG removed remaining ASW & ASUW systems from 12 WHECs; dropped E-2Cs
  - Decreased USN funding of USCG defense gear
- **USCG gained roles in new DOD joint Major Regional Contingency (MRC)/Major Theater War (MTW) plans of 1990s**
  - Used non-defense capabilities in defense roles
1990s: USN-USCG relations (II)

  - Maritime intercept operations
  - Environmental defense
  - Deployed port security
  - Peacetime engagement
  - Coastal sea control ops
  - (Based on USCG core capabilities)
- USCG officially joined US intelligence community

1990s: USN-USCG relations (III)

- CAPT Bruce Stubbs USCG, *The U.S. Coast Guard’s National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century*
  - Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies (1992)
  - Seminal work on USN-USCG relationships
- USN-USCG NAVGARD Board for policy coordination continued
- USN-USCG Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ) concept expanded to include overseas forward deployments (1994)
  - Foreign & US forward port security, coastal sea control
  - COMDT USCG ADM Loy initiative; focus on surface forces
1990s: USN-USCG relations (IV)

- USN-USMC-USCG National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) created (1994)
- USCG joined USN-NOAA Joint Ice Center to form new National Ice Center (1996)
  - CO of National Ice Center is CO of Naval Ice Center
- President’s Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions, The U.S. Coast Guard of the 21st Century (Jan 2000)

1990s: USN-USCG relations (V)

- Major USCG Cuba, Haiti ops (1993-5)
  - Operation Able Mariner to block Haitian migrants (1993)
    - 17 USCG vessels; 5 USN ships
    - Then Haiti denied USN entry; but allowed USCG cutters (1993)
    - USCG deployed cutters, law enforcement detachments (LEDETs), buoy tenders, patrol boats, port security units (PSUs)
    - 1st naval force into Haiti
  - Operation Able Vigil to rescue, detain Cuban migrants (1994)
    - USN support
    - Largest USCG operation since Vietnam War; largest joint peacetime op in USCG history (38 USCG vessels)
  - USCG in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (Sep 1994-5)
1990s: USN-USCG relations (VI)

  - USCG PSUs, LEDETs, a/c deployed in theater
  - No cutters deployed in theater
- USN-USCG counter-drug ops intensified
  - USCG-led JTFs 4, 5 now USCG-led JIATFs East, West (1994)
  - USN aircraft. USN warships w/ USCG LEDETs
  - USCG established armed helo HITRONs (1999)
- USCG Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) consolidated under 3 Tactical Law Enforcement Teams ((TACLETs))

1990s: USN-USCG relations (VII)

- Periodic WHEC forward deployments ISO regional CINCs & NCCs
  - 1st WHEC deployed integrated into USN CVBG (1995)
- USCG Caribbean Support Tender (CST) (1999)
  - USCGC *Gentian* (WIX-290)
    - Former buoy tender (WLB-290)
  - Multi-national crew for in-theater Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) ops
1990s: USN-USCG relations (VIII)

- USCG HH-60 Jayhawk SAR helo in service
  - Based on USN SH-60 Seahawk helo frame
- USN salvage and rescue ship USS Edenton (ATS-1) transferred to USCG (1997)
  - Became USCGC Alex Haley (WMEC 39)
- USN NAVSEA oversaw construction of research icebreaker USCGC Healy (WAGB-20)
- Aborted USN plan to transfer 7 USN PCs to USCG

1990s: USN-USAF Relations
1990s: USN-USAF Relationship: Bottom Lines

- Strengthened Goldwater-Nichols Act roles for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commanders became the new joint norm
  - Decline in influence of both service staffs over operations
  - New unified Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) created.
- Demise of Soviet Union and Soviet Navy shifted interest in both services toward shore target strike operations and capabilities, and forward presence; away from strategic deterrence, sea control and counter-sea ops and capabilities
- USN-USAF cooperation increased across the board; rivalry eased
  - Contentious issues still surfaced, however

1990s: USN-USAF Relationship: Bottom Lines

- 1991 Desert Storm experience a powerful wake-up call for the Navy
  - Navy suddenly not pleased with itself, its strategy, its systems, and its operational performance
  - Navy sought to improve throughout the decade, including closer cooperation – and integration – with joint – and USAF – policies and procedures
    - Closer integration into USAF Air Tasking Order (ATO)
    - USAF primary tanking source for Navy carrier aviation
    - USN assumed Electronic Warfare (EW) and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) capabilities previously shared with USAF
1990s: Context for USN–USAF Relations

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1990s: The U.S. Air Force (I)

- Drastic cuts
  - Fighter/attack inventory cuts
    - From 4200+ (1991) to 2500 (end of decade)
    - Continued transition to, increased reliance on Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), stealth technology
  - New aircraft purchase cuts
    - USAF aircraft fleet age increase
    - F-4G *Wild Weasel* and EF-111A *Raven* electronic warfare (EW) aircraft retired
  - Space, C4ISR, mobility systems took increased share of USAF budget, at expense of combat aircraft
1990s: The U.S. Air Force (II)

- E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) battle management and command and control aircraft introduced (1991)
- B-2 Spirit stealth bomber introduced (1993)
- Cruise missile reductions
  - ALCM numbers cut drastically; all GLCMs destroyed
- Increased USAF use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
  - RQ-1 Predator reconnaissance UAV introduced (1995)

1990s: The U.S. Air Force (III)

- SECDEF Cheney fired Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Gen Dugan over public comments re: potential operations vs. Iraq (1990)
- Historic USAF internal reorganization (1992-3)
  - Strategic Air Command (SAC), Tactical Air Command (TAC), Military Airlift Command (MAC) inactivated
  - New Air Combat Command (ACC), Air Mobility Command (AMC) activated
  - SAC bombers to ACC
  - SAC Tankers to AMC
  - SAC ICBMs to Air Force Space Command
1990s: The U.S. Air Force (IV)

- National defense policy favored short-range TACAIR over long-range bombers
  - Assumed USAF TACAIR and USN carrier forward access and TACAIR forward basing
  - Assumed relatively small countries/areas as possible targets
- Heavy influence of TACAIR pilots within USAF
- Still no US Air Force officers assigned to command regional joint unified commands

1990s: The U.S. Air Force (V)

- USAF transformed its TACAIR deployment strategy
  - Forward-based theater garrisons reduced
  - 2/3 of USAF active personnel in Europe withdrawn
  - CONUS-based “Aerospace Expeditionary Forces” (AEFs) created to surge respond to contingencies, worldwide
    - AEF to Bahrain (1995)
    - 10 AEFs stood up (1999)
  - Conscious and publicly acknowledged emulation of Navy rotational forward deployment practices
1990s: The U.S. Air Force (VI)

♦ USAF intellectual institutions evolved
  ♦ Air University CADRE organization continued
  ♦ Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC) created at Maxwell AFB, reporting to Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) (1996)
  ♦ Changing Air Staff “Checkmate” division missions throughout the decade
    ♦ Controversial influence on in-theater ops & high visibility during Gulf War (1990-1991)
    ♦ Reversion to studies & analysis activities (after 1991)
    ♦ Increased operational planning support to theater commanders (late 1990s)

1990s: The U.S. Air Force (VII)

♦ USAF airpower theory refinement
  ♦ Air power seen as directly contributing to, and perhaps solely responsible for, achieving high-level strategic objectives in conventional war
  ♦ Conventional air campaigns seen as preparatory to, not just integrated with, ground campaigns, and potentially decisive in themselves
  ♦ Relationships between air and space hotly debated
1990s: USAF Capstone Publications (I)

♦ SECAF Rice, *Global Reach-Global Power* (1990)
  ♦ Published before Operations Desert Shield/ Desert Storm
  ♦ Top-down Pentagon-created guidance
  ♦ Inspired in part by success of *The Maritime Strategy*

  ♦ Drafted by Air University CADRE organization
  ♦ Based more on actual historical experience than predecessors


1990s: USAF Capstone Publications (II)


  ♦ Emphasized Air Campaigns and US Air Force strategic role in conventional war
  ♦ Emphasis on space operations
  ♦ Complex, Air Force-wide development process

♦ AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine* (1997)

1990s: U.S. Air Force Visions and Doctrine

- AFDD 2-1.4 *Countersea Operations* (1999)

1990s: U.S. Navy Capstone Documents

- Periodic mention of USAF contributions, capabilities, limitations or dependence on US naval power in USN capstone strategy, policy and concept documents of the decade
  - Especially . . . *From the Sea* (1992)
1990s: USN-USAF Staff Relationships

- Routine Navy and Air Force (NAVF) Board meetings
- USN derided USAF concept of “virtual presence”
  - USAF decried Navy claims of autonomous at-sea operations, rapid response
- SECDEF designated USAF-dominated US Transportation Command as combatant commander and single-manager for all Defense Department transportation assets, in peace and war
  - Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) no longer Defense Department single-manager for Sealift

1990s: USN-USAF Operational Relationships

- Major integrated air operations by both services throughout the decade, especially over:
  - Iraq (Operations Desert Storm, Southern Watch, etc.)
  - The former Yugoslavia (Operations Deliberate Force, Allied Force, etc.)
- Increasing USN dependence on USAF E-3 Sentry AWACS support in Iraq (Operations Desert Storm, Southern Watch)
- Increasing USAF dependence on USN/USMC EA-6B Prowler support for electronic warfare
- Continued forward USN Military Sealift Command (MSC) prepositioning of USAF munitions
1990s: USN-USAF Operational Relationships

- Converted T-AGOS ship USNS *Invincible* redesignated as missile range instrumentation ship (T-AGM-24). MSC to operate in continued support of USAF missile test data-gathering programs (Apr 2000)
- New York Air National Guard (ANG) 109th Airlift Wing took over Operation *Deep Freeze* US Antarctica scientific program military support mission from USN units (1996-1999)
  - USN Antarctic Development Squadron VXE-6 decommissioned (1999)
  - USN MSC ships and cargo-handling battalion continued to provide sea-borne support

1990s: Exercise Relationships

- USN exercised joint air operations using Air Force-driven joint doctrine
  - Initial examples
    - Joint USCINCLANT exercise *Ocean Venture 92*
    - Joint USCINCPAC exercise *Tandem Trust 92*
  - Characteristics
    - Integrated Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) staffs
    - Joint Targeting Coordination Boards created
    - Improved communications between forces at sea and ashore
  - Other joint exercises (e.g., *Northern Edge*)
- USN developed, tested “JFACC afloat” and sea-based Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) capabilities
1990s: Education and Training Relationships

- Increased joint USN-USAF education and training consolidation
- USN/USAF developed common primary trainer aircraft
  - T-6 *Texan II* Joint Primary Air Training System (JPATS)
  - Joint program; USAF as Executive Service
- USN/USAF consolidated Naval Flight Officer (NFO) and some USAF combat systems officer training at NAS Pensacola (from 1994)
  - Command of USN Training Squadron TEN (VT-10) alternated between USN and USAF (from 1997)
- Continued Navy-USAF pilot exchanges: Squadron and flight instructor duty and test pilot schools, war college exchanges

1990s: USN-USAF TACAIR Relationships (I)

- Operation *Desert Storm*: Navy surprised and chagrined to be (by CINC direction):
  - Directed by USAF-led Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), supported by a largely USAF staff
  - Subsumed within centralized USAF-designed joint Air Tasking Order (ATO), by CINC direction
- USN unfamiliar with JFACC, ATO processes, unable to link to USAF Computer-Assisted Force Management System (CAFMS)
- USN dependent on scarce USAF tanker refueling
- USAF tended to downplay capabilities of USN BGM-109 *Tomahawk* land-attack (TLAM) cruise missiles
- But Navy contributions real: Ops, intel, SEAD
1990s: USN-USAf TACAIR Relationships (II)

Post-Desert Storm: Increasingly tight US naval aviation joint integration IAW USAF-led doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)
- USN adapted rapidly to USAF-led doctrine and TTP, in wake of Operation Desert Storm (e.g., improved Air Tasking Order (ATO) processing, improved Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) participation by Naval and Amphibious Liaison Elements (NALEs))
- Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch over Iraq acted as laboratories for increasing USN-USAF TTP cooperation and coordination
- USN still critical of JFACC concept, concerned at rigidity of ATO in joint NATO strike operation Deliberate Force (strike ops vs. Bosnian Serbs)
- Increased USAF and USN strike precision
  - Navy capabilities came up to Air Force levels

1990s: Electronic Warfare Relationships (I)

- Success of (scarce) US Navy Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) platforms, weapons, and systems in support of all services during Desert Storm
  - Especially High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) missile-shooting aircraft
  - But some in USAF criticized what they saw as profligate USN expenditure of HARM weapons, shooting without positive locks on enemy targets
1990s: Electronic Warfare Relationships (II)

- USN, USMC EA-6B Prowler became sole US military tactical airborne electronic attack capability
  - Deployment of USN expeditionary squadrons, detachments to/from land bases
    - Carrier-capable (including USAF crews)
  - USAF provided some crews to Navy squadrons (from 1997)
  - USAF saw reduced need for SEAD through EW, given stealth low-observable characteristics of F-117, B-2, F-22 & anticipated Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
  - USAF F-4G *Wild Weasel* aircraft retired (by 1996)
  - USAF EF-111A *Raven* aircraft retired (by 1998)

1990s: Electronic Warfare Relationships (III)

- Non-stealthy USN F/A-18 *Hornet* aircraft required electronic warfare aircraft for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)
  - Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Cheney cancelled USN A-12 *Avenger II* stealthy attack aircraft development program (1991)
### 1990s: Aerial Refueling Relationships

- Increasing USN dependence on USAF
  - Short-legged USN F/A-18C/D force
  - Longer-legged USN F/A-18E/Fs under development; Long-legged USN F-14s scheduled to retire
  - Post-Cold War USAF tanker support emphasis shifted from SAC bombers to USAF TACAIR, other TACAIR
  - More USAF tankers modified to refuel USN TACAIR aircraft
  - USN organic carrier-based KA-6D *Intruder* tanker aircraft retired (by 1997)
    - Replaced by S-3B *Vikings* equipped with aerial refueling system (“buddy stores”)
  - Some continuing Navy TACAIR chagrin at having to be refueled by USAF

### 1990s: Strategic Nuclear Relationships (I)

- USN SSBN forces finally placed under operational command of a joint unified commander: USCINCSTRAT (1992)
- Reduced USAF focus on nuclear deterrence mission, forces
- USN nuclear deterrence focus unchanged
1990s: Strategic Nuclear Relationships (II)

- USN Strategic Communications Wing ONE and its land-based E-6A *Mercury* "TACAMO" SSBN communications aircraft relocated to Tinker AFB, OK (1992)
  - Inherited *Looking Glass* National Command Authorities (NCA) airborne strategic command and control role from USAF (1998)
  - Multi-role E-6B aircraft 1st deployed (1998)

1990s: Airlift Relationships

- Increasing USN dependence on USAF for long-haul airlift of critical parts, supplies, personnel
- Land-based intra-theater airlift issues
  - Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) recommended reduction & assignment of most USN Operational Support Airlift (OSA) aircraft to USAF, to be managed by USTRANSCOM (1995)
  - USN sought to retain admin and operational authority over USN OSA aircraft, under USN fleet commanders
  - DEPSECDEF (former CORM chairman) transferred scheduling authority in CONUS for USN OSA aircraft to USCINTRANS (1996)
  - Scheduling authority for overseas theater USN OSA transferred to geographical unified commanders (1996)
  - USN retained ADCON over OSA VR squadrons and aircraft
1990s: Space Relationships (I)

- Continued high USN use of USAF space systems
- Continued modest USN funding of space systems
- USN “leverage” strategy to influence USAF decisions
  - USN contributed enough resources to justify a role in decision-making
- USAF favored and Navy opposed designation of Space as a CINC Area of Responsibility (AOR) for USCINCSPACE

1990s: Space Relationships (II)

- USAF-led Global Positioning System (GPS) operational; joint use in *Desert Storm*
- USAF passed FLTSATCOM control to Navy
- Navy and USAF developing UHF Follow-On to replace FLTSATCOM
- National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) intelligence flow increased to all services, including Navy
  - NRO existence, mission declassified (1992)
1990s: USN-USAF Systems Relationships (I)

- Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program
  - USAF continued development. Chose Lockheed prototype. Became F-22 *Raptor*
  - Navy terminated Navy Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF) variant development due to weight, cost, complexity issues (1991)
- USAF-USN Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program (from 1993)
  - Eventually evolved into F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
- Atrophy of USAF capabilities to support maritime campaigns
  - *Harpoon* anti-ship missiles removed from B-52s (1989)

1990s: USN-USAF Systems Relationships (II)

- Navy developed, built up stocks of precision-guided munitions (PGMs)
  - Caught up to USAF
- Joint Navy-USAF development of weapons systems:
  - AGM-154 Joint Stand-off Weapon (JSOW-A)
  - AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)
  - AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM)
  - GBU-31/32/38 Joint Direct Action Munition (JDAM)
- USN deployed USAF-developed Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) pod system on USN F-14s (1997)
Oceanographer of the Navy – USAF Director of Weather “Navy-Air Force Cooperation Implementation Action Memorandum” (NAVAF Agreement) (Jan 1993)

- To evaluate potential areas of cooperation, in the wake of Operation Desert Storm meteorological support issues
- 19 initiatives identified for study, possible implementation

1990s: USN-US Army relations
### 1990s: Context for USN–US Army relations

#### World Events

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#### Key Events:
- **Gulf War**
- **Somalia ops**
- **Yugoslav split**
- **Southern Watch**
- **Somalia/Adriatic Ops**
- **Iraq TLAM strike**
- **Desert Strike**
- **Taiwan Straits crisis**
- **Desert Fox**
- **DPRK missile shoot**
- **Kosovo ops**
- **Canal to Panama**
- **USS Cole attack**

### 1990s: USN-US Army relations (I)

- Post-Goldwater-Nichols Act & post-Cold War environment increased number, frequency, intensity of Army-Navy interactions, relationships.
- Progressive Unified Command Plan (UCP) changes reinforced this.
  - Disappearance of largely-land & largely-ocean theaters.
- Each service now focused on same land-sea AORs: Iraq/ Persian Gulf, Somalia/Arabian Sea, Haiti/Caribbean, former Yugoslavia/Adriatic.
  - Army ground troops increasingly reliant on USN – not just USAF – for close air support.
1990s: USN-US Army relations (II)

- Continued central Army premise: Heavy combat forces will provide decisive defeat
  - Validated in Operation Desert Storm
- Army & DON TOA reduced by about same fraction
- Operations Desert Shield/Storm (1990-91)
  - Extensive USN MSC sealift support for US Army
  - Issue: Validation of 1980s AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine & The Maritime Strategy in 1st Gulf War
  - COL Harry Summers, On Strategy II: Both validated
  - VADM William Owens, High Seas: Only ALB validated
- Operation UPHOLD/RESTORE DEMOCRACY (Haiti) (1994)
  - US Army 10th MD & Special Forces troops & helos poised to launch airmobile assault from 2 USN carriers

1990s: USN-US Army relations (III)

- Major US Army redeployments & force cuts
  - Cuts more severe in active force than in Guard
  - 80% of US Army troops in Germany withdrawn
  - Army considering more “expeditionary” options
- Army developing new Crusader self-propelled howitzer & Comanche armed scout helicopter
- 3 US Army generals in a row as CJCS (1989-2001)
- High-level “Army-Navy Board” meeting (Nov 1992)
  - CNO, CSA, other leadership participated
  - Briefings & discussion. Largely informational.
- USN briefly emulated Army doctrine-based example
  - Naval Doctrine Command, Naval Doctrine Pubs (1993-8)
1990s: USN-US Army relations (IV)

- Continued Army interest in & requirement for USN fast sealift & forward prepositioning
- Continued delivery of US Army Logistic Support Vessels (LSV) for theater-level tactical sealift
- Army-Navy Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) exercises & symposia

1990s: USN-US Army relations (V)

  - Navy lead in drafting
- Army FM 1-564 Shipboard Operations (Jun 1997)
  - TTP for US Army helo ops from USN, USCG ships
  - Joint test & evaluation to integrate USA, USAF helos on USN warships
  - HQ at NAS Patuxent River
  - Dedicated At-Sea Tests (DASTs)
1990s: USN-US Army relations (VI)

♦ USN-US Army conceptual issues
  ♦ Navy stressed virtues of unobtrusiveness and modulated forward presence offshore, with no adverse impact on national sovereignty or local sensitivities, and freedom from locally-imposed constraints
  ♦ Army stressed primacy of “boots on the ground” as most effective physical & visible symbol of commitment, & tool of forward US military presence
  ♦ Army decried Navy focus on technological solutions to military problems
  ♦ Yet Army itself moving increasingly toward technological solutions in 1990s

1990s: USN-US Army relations (VII)

♦ Post-Cold War requirements to change doctrine & concepts in both services
  ♦ Army FM 100-5 “Operations” (“AirLand Battle Future”) (1993)
  ♦ TRADOC Pam 525-5, AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond (1 Aug 1991)
  ♦ To re-design the Army
1990s: USN-US Army relations (VIII)

- Army periodically mentioned in Navy capstone documents of 1990s
- Well integrated into
  - *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* (1994)
- Mentioned in passing in
  - "The Way Ahead" (1991)
  - *From . . . The Sea* (1994)
- Not mentioned at all in
  - "Anytime, Anywhere" (1987)

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1990s: USN-foreign navy relations
1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (I)

- USN focus: Coordinating & integrating allied capabilities in real world regional contingencies
  - Desert Shield/Storm set tone
- Exercises, education & training, technology transfer
  - NATO exercises smaller, fewer; command structure leaner
  - Continued increase in international meetings & staff talks
- Wide NATO pub declassification, dissemination
- CJCS & CINCs increasingly drove policy
  - Theater Engagement Plans, etc.

1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (II)

- Major multi-lateral coalition Desert Shield/Desert Storm & follow-on naval ops (1990- )
  - Naval coalition pushed hard by OPNAV
  - Enabled by prior NATO interoperability programs
- Multilateral naval operations off Somalia (1991-95)
- Bi-lateral Navy-to-Navy staff talks programs continued
- ONI-hosted annual Quadrilateral All-Source Submarine Conferences (QASSC) begun (1991)
  - Initial focus on Russian submarines gradually broadened
- Integration of selected allied warships into USN CVBGs (from 1995)
- NSWC Port Hueneme-hosted annual international users fora on MK 41 VLS begun (1997)
1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (III)

- Intel & communications collaboration
  - AUSCANZUKUS
- US-Japan BMD study & research cooperation
- ISS on-going biennially at NWC Newport RI
- NAVWARCOL curricula for foreign officers
  - Other foreign navy educations & training
- Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) ongoing
- USN International Preparatory School for Saudi Navy at Pensacola expanded to include other nationalities, became International Technical Training Preparatory School (1991)

Multinational Maritime Operations pub (1996)
Allied officers assigned to new USN NAVDOCCOM in Norfolk (1993-8)

NAVDOCCOM-led *Multi-lateral Maritime Operations* (MMOPS) pub effort (1996)

NAVDOCCOM lead; international working group

Signed by COMNAVDOCCOM

Available to all navies on the web

Unclassified generic multinational doctrine

Collection of fundamental principles

USN interest waned following publication

Became basis for NATO AJP 3.1 *Allied Joint Maritime Operations* (Apr 2004)

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NATO relationships

NATO conducted 1st real-world naval ops, in/from Adriatic Sea off/over former Yugoslavia

Command structures, staffs, plans & exercises cut back & evolved. USN continued to dominate

- NATO trying to implement Combined Joint Task force (CJTF) concept (from 1993)
- French returned to NATO Military Committee (1995)
- Unsuccessful French bid for NATO Southern Region command
- Allied Command Channel abolished (1997)

NATO expanded in Baltic

- Germany unified; Poland joined NATO (1999)

Rationalization, standardization, interoperability

- Expansion, wide distribution of UNCLAS EXTAC pub series
- Cooperative development of NATO Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)

Accidental USN CV missile firing on Turkish DD (1992)
1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (V)

- NATO *Concept of Maritime Operations* (1993)
- Partnership for Peace (PfP) relationships
  - NATO organized PfP (1994)
  - PfP naval exercises (from 1994)
  - PfP navies join BALTOPS
- Chiefs of European Navies (CHENS) (1992-)
  - CNE an observer
- Regional Seapower Symposium (since 1996)
- Intra-NATO issues:
  - Canada-Spain “Turbot War”
  - Greek-Turk Aegean Imia Crisis

1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (VI)

- European allied navies modestly increased cruiser, destroyer, large amphibious ship inventories; slashed ASW ships & coastal submarine, craft #s
- RN deployed US Trident D-5 missiles as UK strategic deterrent, with USN assist (1994)
- 1st E-2Cs delivered for new FN CVN CDG
1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (VII)

- USN use of European naval systems, designs
  - Danish-built MSC prepositioning ships (1993-4)
  - French-built MSC prepositioning ship (1994)
  - USN Osprey-class (MHC-51) mine-hunters
    - US-built; Italian Lerici-class design
  - Norwegian Penguin anti-ship missiles
    - For USN SH-60B Seahawk LAMPS III helicopters
  - USN Cyclone-class (PC-1) patrol coastals
    - US built; based on British Ramadan-class patrol craft design for Egyptian, Omani, Kenyan navies

1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (VIII)

- East Asian relationships
  - JMSDF, ROKN, RTN, RAN relationships expanded
    - JMSDF deployed USN Aegis AAW system (1993)
    - Singapore Navy relationships expanded
  - RIMPAC, Western Pacific Naval Symposia (WPNS) continue, expanded
  - CARAT exercises instituted in SE Asia (1995)
  - Cobra Gold exercises continued, expanded
- USN-PLAN relations fluctuated
  - Flag contacts, port visits
  - US DOD-PRC MND military maritime safety consultative agreement (1998)
1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (IX)

- Annual USN-Russian Navy INCSEA meetings continued
- RUKUS talks formalized & expanded
  - Included games, then at-sea exercises
- West African Naval Symposium (1992)
  - One-off

1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (X)

- Latin American navy relationships (I)
  - UNITAS continued
    - Bi-lateral riverine operations included (from early 1990s)
    - Canada, France joined (1993)
    - STANAVFORLANT joined (1997)
    - Atlantic phase became multinational (1999)
    - Pacific, Caribbean phases became multinational (2000)
  - IANC continued
  - Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network (IANTN)
    - HF communications system replaced by VSAT (1994)
    - Secretariat moved to Roosevelt Roads PR (1994)
1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (XI)

- Latin American navy relationships (II)
  - Resumption of close Navy-to-Navy relations with Chilean Navy
    - Following restoration of democratic government in Chile, lifting of US sanctions (1989)
    - Operation Black: Chile provided diesel submarines for USN Third Fleet ASW training (from 1994)
      - Evolved into Third Fleet-Escuadra TEAMWORK exercises (1995)
  - USN riverine MTTs to Bolivia, Colombia, Peru

End of the 1990s: State of Navy

- Navy ended decade with mixed morale
  - Pride in its operational record, especially presence, multi-platform strike, joint integration, especially with USAF
  - Success of current ship types; strike aviation plans
  - Acceptance of and consensus around “... From the Sea” concepts, esp. primacy of power projection
- But
  - Great concern at decline in ship numbers & non-deployed fleet readiness
  - Worry over decline in ASW capabilities
  - Concern at increased PLAN anti-access capabilities
  - Unease at relationships with USMC
  - Concerns over force protection after USS Cole attack
The 1990s vs. the 1980s (I)

- Multiplicity of possible regional threats vs. one central high-priority global threat
- No immediate or near-term challenger to USN supremacy at sea vs. Gorshkov Soviet Navy blue-water challenges
- Reduced defense & naval budgets & force levels vs. Reagan defense & naval build-up
- US alliance systems similar in both decades
- Shift in overseas basing system from the Atlantic & Europe to Southwest Asia, Arabian Sea, & the Gulf

The 1990s vs. the 1980s (II)

- Increasingly integrated US military jointness vs. cooperative & coordinated jointness
- Increased number, intensity of real-world ops
- Heavy operational demand for sealift & prepositioning ships
- Quickening pace of computer technology advances & integration into naval operations
- Focus on naval littoral operations vice separate sea & projection ashore ops
The 1990s vs. the 1980s (III)

- Naval forces as *enabling* forward insertion of USA & USAF, vice *connecting* forward USA & USAF to CONUS bases.

The 1990s vs. the 1980s (IV)

- **1990s:**
  - Navy budgets decreasing, then turning around at end
  - Navy force levels decreasing throughout the decade
  - Navy force level goals decreasing also, but *lower* than current force levels
  - Navy non-deployed fleet readiness plummeting, then starting to turn around

- **1980s**
  - Navy budgets increasing, then turning down at end
  - Navy force levels increasing, then decreasing somewhat
  - Navy force level goals steady at 600; *higher* than current fleet force levels
  - Navy readiness improved, then starting to fall off
The 1990s vs. the 1980s (V)

- Navy capstone documents
  - Mostly UNCLAS vs. mostly CLAS documents
  - USMC as co-equal player (or non-player) vs. one of many contributors
  - Many core concepts & names vs. one

- Possible explanations:
  - Changed, changing and uncertain world environment (Cold War ended)
  - Changed US administration policies
  - Changing USN reactions to same
  - Plethora of 1990s national security & national defense pubs (9 NSSs, NMSs, QDR, CORM, NDP, JV2010, etc.)
  - Ubiquity of Powerpoint & desktop publishing after 1990
CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context

