CNA Strategic Studies (CSS), created in 2000, conducts high-quality research and analysis of issues of strategic, regional, and policy importance. CSS’ analyses are based on objective, rigorous examination and do not simply echo conventional wisdom. CSS provides analytic support to U.S. Government organizations and the governments of partner countries. CSS also maintains notable foundation-sponsored and self-initiated research programs. CSS includes a Strategic Initiatives Group, an International Affairs Group, and a Center for Stability and Development.

The Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG) looks at issues of U.S. national security, and military strategy, policy and operations, with a particular focus on maritime and naval aspects. SIG employs experts in historical analyses, futures planning, and long-term trend analysis based on scenario planning, to help key decision makers plan for the future. SIG specialties also include issues related to regional and global proliferation, deterrence theory, threat mitigation, and strategic planning for combating threats from weapons of mass destruction.

The Strategic Studies Division is led by Vice President and Director Dr. Eric V. Thompson, who is available at 703-824-2243 and on e-mail at thompsoe@cna.org. The executive assistant to the Vice President and Director is Ms. Rebecca Martin, at 703-824-2604.

The principal author of this study thanks especially Karin Duggan for graphic assistance; Loretta Ebner for administrative assistance; Gregory Kaminski, Laurie Ann Lakatosh, and Rhea Stone for library assistance; and Dana Smith and Anwar Fry for production assistance. A full listing of substantive contributors can be found in Peter M. Swartz and Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction and Background: Volume I, (D0026421.A1, December 2011). A full listing of all volumes in the CNA Navy Strategy series can be found on the inside back cover of this document.

Approved for distribution: May 2012

Dr. W. Eugene Cobble, Jr.
Director, Strategic Initiatives Group

This document represents the best opinion of the author at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.

Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited.
Copies of this document can be obtained through the Defense Technical Information Center at www.dtic.mil or contact CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123.

Copyright © 2012 CNA
This work was created in the performance of Federal Government Contract Number N00014-11-D-0323. Any copyright in this work is subject to the Government’s Unlimited Rights license as defined in DFARS 252.227-7013 and/or DFARS 252.227-7014. The reproduction of this work for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited. Nongovernmental users may copy and distribute this document in any medium, either commercially or noncommercially, provided that this copyright notice is reproduced in all copies. Nongovernmental users may not use technical measures to obstruct or control the reading or further copying of the copies they make or distribute. Nongovernmental users may not accept compensation of any manner in exchange for copies. All other rights reserved.
Contents

◆ CNO Admiral Frank Kelso .............................. .2
  ◆ The Way Ahead ........................................... 3
  ◆ The Navy Policy Book ................................. .21
  ◆ . . . From the Sea ....................................... .30
  ◆ Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare .............. .56
◆ CNO Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda ................. .75
  ◆ Forward . . . From the Sea ............................. .76
◆ CNO Admiral Jay Johnson ......................... .98
  ◆ Navy Operational Concept ........................... .99
  ◆ Anytime, Anywhere ..................................... .118
  ◆ Navy Strategic Planning Guidance ............... .133
◆ Companion references on USN 1990s documents .150

1990s: End of the Cold War

Reprinted from Proceedings with permission; Copyright (c) 1990 U.S. Naval Institute/www.navalinstitute.org.
ADM Frank B. Kelso III (CNO Jun 1990-Apr 1994)

- Apr 1991  *The Way Ahead*
  - Vision
- May 1992  *The Navy Policy Book*
  - Policy
- Nov 1992  *…From the Sea*
  - Vision
- Mar 1994  *Naval Warfare (NDP 1)*
  - Doctrine

ADM Frank B. Kelso III (CNO Jun 1990-Apr 1994)

- Submarine officer
  - 3rd submarine officer CNO in a row
- Served under Presidents Bush, Clinton; SECDEFs Cheney, Aspin, Perry; SECNAVs Garrett, O’Keefe, Dalton
- SECNAV John Lehman protege
- As Commander, Sixth Fleet, combat veteran of Libya crises (1986)
- CNO term clouded by criticism of handling of “Tailhook” incident (1991)
- Strained relations with USMC
- Signature programs: Total Quality Leadership (TQL): Finding USN process efficiencies; Virginia-class SSN
Had participated in development and testing of *The Maritime Strategy* throughout his career as a flag officer

Said that times had changed; the Maritime Strategy now “on the shelf” in case needed later (1990)

Called for a new “maritime policy”, vice strategy

Strove to supplement it with new visions, policies doctrines, processes, both internal & external

Fostered contributions to Navy thinking by other flag officers, e.g.: Art Cebrowski, Paul David Miller, Bill Owens

The Way Ahead (1991)

- Overview
  - Signed by SECNAV Garrett, CNO ADM Kelso, CMC Gen Gray (Apr 1991)
  - Billed as a “Way Ahead”
  - Primary targets: USN, USMC officer corps
  - Short (12 pp) UNCLAS US Naval Institute Proceedings & Marine Corps Gazette articles; & stand-alone pub
  - Drafted in OPNAV Naval Warfare directorate (OP-07)
  - Threats seen as regional
    - Re-emergent global threat unlikely but possible
  - Called for new deployment patterns, forward presence, surge, emphasis on presence & MOOTW
  - Remarkably prescient
  - Little influence at the time

The Way Ahead (1991)

- Signed by:
  - SECNAV H. Lawrence Garrett, III
  - CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, II
    - Almost 1 year in office
  - CMC Gen Alfred M. Gray, Jr.
The Way Ahead (1991)

What it was

• Billed as a “Way ahead”; “an article”
• Actually a “vision”
• Short UNCLAS US Naval Institute *Proceedings, Marine Corps Gazette* articles (Apr 1991)
• Stand-alone reprint pub
  ♦ 12 pages
• Not repeated verbatim in Posture Statements

Why it was written (I)

• To demonstrate that the Navy understood the world had changed and that the Navy was changing too
• To maintain and re-forge USN internal consensus on USN rationale
• To provide a vision with a detailed agenda for the changes the Navy foresaw it would have to make
• To provide a replacement for the suddenly-obsolete *Maritime Strategy*; replacing SLOC defense w/ “enabling”
The Way Ahead (1991)

Why it was written (II)

- To show links between the Navy & evolving Bush administration policies, refocusing on regional threats
- To provide a basis for new rationales for new, lower 451-ship “Base Force” USN force level goal
- To demonstrate Navy-Marine Corps solidarity
- To answer USAF “Global Reach—Global Power” (1990)
- Primary targets: USN, USMC officer corps

The Way Ahead (1991)

Context (I)

- 2nd year of Bush administration (1989-93)
- SECDEF Cheney (1989-93)
  - A dominant force in US defense strategy & policy making
- New CNO ADM Kelso (1990-94)
- US economy pulling out of recession; unemployment & inflation rates climbing; high U.S. gov’t deficit spending
  - Low & declining oil prices
- Fundamental change in world power relationships
- Cold War ending
  - Soviet Union still intact; military & naval power stagnating
  - Warsaw Pact disintegrating but still extant
  - Germany reunited (Oct 1990)
  - NATO expansion along south Baltic littoral (former DDR) began
  - US-Soviet maritime boundary re-confirmed (1990)
The Way Ahead (1991)

Context (II)
- Bush administration calls for a “new world order” (Sep 1990 speech)
- Operations DESERT SHIELD & DESERT STORM ongoing (Aug 1990-Feb 1991)
- Operation SEA SOLDIER IV (Jan 1991)
  - Oman amphibious exercise/ deception operation
  - Largest amphibious landing since STEEL PIKE (1964)
- Increased role of CJCS GEN Colin Powell & Joint Staff
- Press discussion of a so-called “Powell Doctrine”
  - Should US go to war, it should apply overwhelming force
- US estrangement from PRC since Tiananmen Square crackdown (Jun 1989)
  - Leadership visits, ship visits, arms sales cancelled
- Democracy comes to Taiwan (from 1987)
- Trade disputes threaten US relations with Japan
- Japanese economic crisis (1990-91)
The Way Ahead (1991)

Context (III)

- **USS Iowa** turret explosion & investigation (1989)
- Declining USN force levels & DON budgets
  - USN in 1991: 526 battle force ships; 11 new ships authorized
  - Down 42 ships from 1987; down 21 ships from 1990
  - Decommissioning of all 46 Knox-class ASW FFs began (1991)
- SECDEF cancelled A-12 (1991)
- Annual ADM Charles M. Cooke Conferences for Naval Strategists & Planners began (1990)
  - Coordinators: NPGS (CDR Brown) & NWC (Dr. Daniel)
- Unofficial DC-area “Navy Discussion Group” (1989-91)
  - Convener: CAPT Jim Stark
  - Participants included *The Way Ahead* contributors

The Way Ahead (1991)

Context (IV)

- US Navy immediate post-Cold War expectations (on eve of Operation Desert Shield & promulgation of CJCS GEN Powell “Base Force” construct):
  - US Navy Cold War strategy, concepts, doctrine, tactics & systems very adaptable to post-Cold War environment & conflicts
  - US Navy more relevant to post-Cold War environment & conflicts than other services
  - US Navy stature & budget share will go up
  - US Navy confident in its ability to control its own destiny
- Eroding of the internal USN consensus of the 1980s on USN rationale
The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ Cited references
  ♦ Title 10 of U.S. Code
  ♦ President Bush Aspen speech (Aug 1990)
    ♦ Soviet threat remote, but could recur
    ♦ US forces needed for peacetime forward presence, rapid regional crisis response
    ♦ Need to restructure US forces as well as reduce by 25%
  ♦ FMFM 1 Warfighting (1989)
  ♦ Also cited: The Maritime Strategy

Context: Other important contemporary publications (I)
  ♦ Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)
  ♦ 1st Bush National Security Strategy (1990)
  ♦ CJCS GEN Powell “Base Force” (1991)
    ♦ 451-ship Battle Force goal
  ♦ CJCS Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) (Mar 1991)
  ♦ Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
  ♦ Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)
The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
  ♦ CNO Strategic Study Group (SSG) reports
  ♦ USN “Worthington Study” on riverine warfare (Dec 1990) (ignored)
  ♦ CNA studies on USN presence & responses to crises
  ♦ “DON LIFT 2” study (1990)
  ♦ FMFM 1-1 *Campaigning* (1990)
  ♦ SECAF Rice “Global Reach-Global Power” (1990)

The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
    ♦ Global triumph of Western liberal democracy
  ♦ CAPT Charles Koburger USCGR (Ret), *Narrow Seas, Small Navies, and Fat Merchantmen: Naval Strategies for the 1990s* (1990)
The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ How it was written (I)

♦ Various aborted OPNAV staff efforts begun, responding to changes in the world (1989-1990)

♦ Key players: CAPT Dick Diamond (OP-607, later OP-603); CAPT Jim Stark (OP-OOK); HQMC PP&O

♦ Discussion venues:
  ♦ Navy Long-Range Planners’ Conference at USNA (1989)
  ♦ Unofficial “Ancient Mariners” officer study group
    ♦ Kicked around emerging naval concepts
    ♦ CAPT Jim Stark (OP-OOK) administered
    ♦ Representation from across OPNAV
    ♦ CDR Joe Sestak & “enabling” concept

The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ How it was written (II)

♦ Personalities:
  ♦ New CNO ADM Frank Kelso (Jun 1990)/ new EA CAPT Dan Murphy
  ♦ VADM Paul David Miller (OP-07)
    ♦ Former close Lehman Secretariat Kelso, Murphy colleague
  ♦ CAPT Bill Center, CDR Rick Wright (principal OP-07 drafters)
  ♦ (VADM Barney Kelly) (New OP-06)
  ♦ CAPT Dick Diamond (OP-607, then OP-603)
  ♦ CDR Mike Dunaway (principal OP-603 drafter)
  ♦ CMC Gen Gray
  ♦ HQMC PP&O LtGen Carl Mundy; AO Maj Al Heim
How it was written (III)

OPNAV Strategy Branch (OP-603) developing a new strategic concept (since Feb 1990)
- Self-initiated by CAPT Dick Diamond (Branch head)
- Unsupported by OP-06 (VADM Kelly)

SECNAV/CNO “The Way Ahead” memo tasked OPNAV Director for Naval Warfare (OP-07) to develop formal USN program planning options for discussion and decision. USMC to participate (23 Aug 1990)

3-way rivalry developed: OP-06, OP-07, & HQMC PP&O
- Competing OP-06 & OP-07 briefings all through 1990
- USMC insistence on full equality, heavy emphasis on amphibious, expeditionary warfare

How it was written (IV)

- OP-603 “Won if by Sea” briefing circulated, briefed to CMC Gen Al Gray (Sep 1990)
- OP-07 drafted Final “Way Ahead” version
  - Adopted earlier OP-603-incubated “Won if by Sea” ideas
  - CNO ADM Kelso-CMC Gen Mundy-OP-07 VADM Miller endgame at CNO Quarters
- Drafting essentially completed before Operation Desert Storm (Feb 2001)
- Published as US Naval Institute Proceedings, Marine Corps Gazette articles (Apr 1991)
- USN-USMC equality drafting, signing, publishing
The Way Ahead (1991)

Outline
- Implications of change: National security policy
- An evolving strategy
- Combined and joint operations
- Changing employment/deployment concepts
- Changing force capabilities and structure
- The Navy of the 1990s and beyond

Key ideas (I)
- "The Maritime Strategy . . . remains on the shelf."
  - Hedge vs. resurgent Soviets
- "Meeting our presence requirements with fewer assets calls for...new patterns in length and location of deployments, as well as in the composition of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups"
- "The changes occurring in our security environment will require us to break out of these hubs"
- USN SSNs “freed from a nearly full-time requirement to train for ASW in far forward areas . . . can now be available for more regional power projection and support missions"
The Way Ahead (1991)

Key ideas (II)

- “The need for focused forward presence & credible surge capability—more than historical deployment patterns—will dictate peacetime employment of naval forces”
  - Last call for “credible surge capability” until 2003
- “We must continue to distribute all forms of striking firepower among many platforms”
- “Presence; humanitarian assistance; nation-building; security assistance; and peacekeeping; counter-narcotic, counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, and crisis response operations will receive new emphasis as we focus our efforts on developing and maintaining regional stability”

The Way Ahead (1991)

Key ideas (III)

- Change is necessary due to:
  - Uncertain world; end of bipolarity & central agreed-upon threat
  - Constrained available resources
- Threats seen as regional
  - Re-emergent global threat unlikely but possible. Focus on “regional contingencies in trouble spots”
- Preparation for war with Soviets less important
  - Cut back on USN ASW forces, e.g.: SSNs, FFs)
- Still need to be on guard against possible resurgent Soviet threat
The Way Ahead (1991)

Key ideas (IV)

- Global proliferation of military technology
- Joint power-projection ops required
- Strategic sealift: “a critical component of our maritime force structure”
- Jointness seen as coordination among services, not integration

Key ideas (V)

- Zumwalt/Turner terms used as vocabulary, not as a framework
- Cited 4 elements of Bush Administration national security policy (from 1990 Aspen speech)
  - Deterrence
    - Nuclear & conventional
  - Forward presence
  - Crisis response
    - Power projection & keeping the sea lines of communication open
  - Force reconstitution
- Heavy emphasis on 1st 3 elements, especially power projection; less on reconstitution
The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ What was new? (I)
  ♦ Recognition that the world had changed dramatically
  ♦ Attempt to lead change
  ♦ Major USMC influence. USN-USMC drafting, signing & publishing equality
  ♦ Focus on what would later be called shaping
  ♦ Emphasis on credibility of forward deployed forces

The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ What was new? (II)
  ♦ Focus on special nature of naval operations in littoral regions
  ♦ Naval services to “pave the way” for other joint, combined forces
    ♦ “Enabling and participatory”
  ♦ Call for “transformation throughout the naval services”
  ♦ 451-ship “base force” goal
  ♦ Total Quality Leadership (TQL) approach initiated in USN & USMC
The Way Ahead (1991)

- Not addressed
  - World trade issues and globalization
  - Threats to the homeland
  - Piracy threats
  - U.S. Coast Guard
- Allied navies
  - But allied forces in general were discussed
- Sea-based ballistic missile defense
- U.S. merchant marine, industrial base, shipbuilding
- U.S. government interagency partners
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
- Naval arms control as an issue
- Blockade as a discrete naval operation

The Way Ahead (1991)

- Mentioned only in passing
  - Sea control
The Way Ahead (1991)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (I)


Subsequent analyses & critiques (II)

The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ Criticisms
  ♦ Reflected pre-Desert Storm Navy-Marine Corps optimism as to their future greater relevance than Army & Air Force
  ♦ Did not address lessons of the war; out of date
  ♦ Not radical enough: Did not reflect need for big changes in Navy policies, strategy, processes, organization
  ♦ Merely an attempt to save USN force structure
  ♦ Made no choices. Set no priorities against which to budget
  ♦ Developed subsequent to and separate from USN 451-ship Battle Force “Base Force” goal
  ♦ No visible USN follow-up or buy-in on vision

The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ Influence:
  ♦ Little. The Way Ahead was “way ahead” of its time
  ♦ A vision for the early 2000s, but not for the 1990s
  ♦ Seen as a valuable precedent by Naval Operations Concept (2006) drafters, especially Marines
  ♦ USN Desert Storm experience & CJCS GEN Powell Base Force concept jolted Navy from optimistic stance & triggered new Navy conceptual & procedural efforts that eclipsed The Way Ahead
The Way Ahead (1991)

- Why so little influence?
  - Salience of GEN Powell’s Base Force & USN Desert Storm experience
  - Overtaken by NCA, CINC, BUR, GNFPP 2/3-hub forward presence & MRC planning demands
  - “Tailhook” scandal eroded authority of USN leaders
  - SECNAV Garrett resigned soon, under a cloud
  - VADM Miller to CINCLANTFLT; staff scattered
  - Superseded within 6 months by “Naval Forces Capabilities Planning Effort” (NFCPE)
  - Little attempt to repeat many techniques used to develop, disseminate, & institutionalize The Maritime Strategy

The Way Ahead (1991)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - Minimal
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

Overview

- Signed by SECNAV Garrett & CNO ADM Kelso (May 1992)
- Billed as “policy” & “guiding principles”
- Primary target: USN officers & enlisted
- UNCLAS stand-alone internal USN pub
- Medium length (40 pages)
- Drafted by OPNAV CNO Executive Panel staff officers (OP-00K)
- Internal USN focus: Tied to USN Total Quality Leadership (TQL) program
- Laid out “strategic principles,” nature of USN as an organization
- Stressed importance of people, accountability, responsibility & good stewardship to US Navy culture
- Very joint. Called for integrated joint campaigns
- Little influence beyond ADM Kelso’s term
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

Signed by:
- SECNAV H. Lawrence Garrett, III
- CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, II
  - At end of 2nd year in office

What it was
- Billed as “Policy,” “principles”
- Actually, it was “doctrine”
- Included a “vision,” signed by SECNAV, CNO, CMC
- UNCLAS articles, then pamphlet (May 1992)
- 40 pages
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

Why it was written (I)

- Provide common internal USN understanding of explicit USN values, principles by all USN officers, enlisted, civilians, to increase USN performance & effectiveness
- Ref A for “Total Quality Leadership” (TQL) effort
  - Adaptation of Deming “Total Quality Management” approach in business world
  - Key to Deming’s thinking: Every company should have an “Owner’s Manual” for current employees & new hires to consult
- CNO ADM Kelso dedicated to institutionalizing TQL in USN
- CNO ADM Kelso view: Post-Cold War world now needed a Navy policy, not just a maritime strategy
- Focus on finding USN process efficiencies

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

Why it was written (II)

- Series of publicly-aired scandals called actual Navy values into question
  - “Ill Wind” DON corruption investigation ongoing (from 1988)
  - USS Iowa turret explosion, investigation, CNO ADM Kelso apology (1991)
  - A-12 cancellation & lawsuits (from 1991)
  - “Tailhook” scandal, investigation unfolding (from 1991)
- Target: USN officers & enlisted
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

♦ Context:
  ♦ 4th year of Bush (R) administration (1989-93)
  ♦ SECDEF Cheney (1989-93)
  ♦ CNO ADM Kelso (1990-94) & TQL
  ♦ Cold War over
    ♦ Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union dissolved (1991)
  ♦ Operation Desert Storm over
  ♦ USN in 1992: 466 battle force ships & declining sharply; 11 new ships authorized
  ♦ Declining DON annual budgets
  ♦ General interest (and concern) in US re: Japanese vs. US business practices

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

♦ Cited references
  ♦ Constitution of the U.S.
  ♦ American business policy books
  ♦ Title 10 of U.S. Code
  ♦ Military Code of Conduct

♦ Included Professional Reading list
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

♦ Context: Other important contemporary publications
  ♦ United Parcel Service (UPS) Policy Book

How it was written
  ♦ Drafted in OP-00K (CAPT James Stark oversaw; CDR Judith Holden coordinated)
    ♦ CAPT Stark had been heavily involved in development of Sea Plan 2000, The Maritime Strategy, run-up to The Way Ahead
  ♦ Inputs from throughout OPNAV
  ♦ OP-603 (CAPT Richard Diamond) drafted strategy & policy sections
  ♦ Used United Parcel Service (UPS) Policy Book as model
  ♦ Included The Navy’s Vision, Guiding Principles and Strategic Goals
    ♦ Signed by SECNAV Garrett, CNO ADM Kelso, & CMC Gen Carl Mundy
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

♦ Outline
  ♦ Introduction
  ♦ The Navy’s objectives
  ♦ The Navy’s structure: How we are organized, led and managed
  ♦ The Navy’s people
  ♦ The Navy’s character and reputation
  ♦ Navy operations
  ♦ The Navy’s forces

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

♦ Key ideas (I)
  ♦ Nature of the Navy as an organization
  ♦ Stressed importance of people, accountability, responsibility & good stewardship to US Navy culture
    ♦ “People” discussed before “Mission”
  ♦ Very joint. Call for integrated joint campaigns
  ♦ Laid out USN PERSTEMPO deployment policy
  ♦ Provided history of USN
    ♦ Included extensive references to past blockades
  ♦ Sought to summarize existing policy, not create new ideas
**The Navy Policy Book (1992)**

- **Key ideas (II)**
  - All four Zumwalt/Turner missions discussed, but within list of some 20-odd characteristics of naval operations
  - “Force projection is our number one warfighting priority”
  - Cited 4 elements of Bush Administration national security policy (from 1990 Aspen speech)
    - Deterrence
    - Forward presence
    - Crisis response
    - Force reconstitution

- **What was new?**
  - Focus on “policy”, not “strategy” or “strategic concepts”
  - Internal Navy orientation
  - Tie-in to TQL program
  - Discussion of Navy “core values”
  - Appended *Navy Professional Reading List*
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

- Not addressed
  - Nature of “enemies”
  - Surge capabilities & operations
  - Threats to the U.S. homeland
  - Counter-drug and anti-piracy operations
  - U.S. Coast Guard
  - Interagency partners & NGOs
  - U.S. Merchant Marine
  - Links to force level planning, programming, budgeting

- Only passing mention of USMC
  - Complementary amphibious warfare capability

- Coastal, riverine *interdiction* ops mentioned only as part of naval special warfare

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

- Subsequent analyses & critiques
    - RADM W. J. “Jerry” Holland USN (Ret)
    - LtGen Bernard E. “Mick” Trainor USMC (Ret)
    - RADM James A. Winnefeld USN (Ret)
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

♦ Criticisms
  ♦ Unnecessary & irrelevant
  ♦ A collection of homilies, good advice, uplifting thoughts, and goals
  ♦ Internal USN opposition & indifference to Total Quality Leadership (TQL) program
  ♦ USMC not adequately treated

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

♦ Influence: Little

♦ Why?
  ♦ Never intended as external document
  ♦ “Ill Wind,” USS Iowa, A-12 & Tailhook scandals had eroded influence & credibility of USN leaders
  ♦ SECNAV Garrett gone within months
  ♦ TQL had strong CNO support, but never took within the Navy, & disappeared when CNO ADM Kelso retired (1994)
  ♦ Superseded in part by DON Core Values Charter (1996)
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - Minimal
  - Cited in …From the Sea
  - Never updated or repeated

…From The Sea (1992)
...From The Sea (1992)

Signed by SECNAV O’Keefe, CNO ADM Kelso, CMC Gen Mundy (Nov 1992)

Billed as a “white paper” & “combined vision”

Primary target: Many, but esp. USN, USMC officers

Short (16 pp) UNCLAS. US Naval Institute Proceedings & Marine Corps Gazette articles; stand-alone pub; & on web

Drafted in a succession of working groups. Many fathers.

Threats seen as regional, but none specified by name

Regional, joint, forward, littoral, enabling, expeditionary ops

- Focus on early strike & power projection ops vs. the shore, in support of joint operations

- Sea control operations beyond littorals de-emphasized

- Integrated USN-USMC doctrine, operations, force packages

Wide influence. Still cited in 2010

---

...From The Sea (1992)

Signed by:

- SECNAV Sean O’Keefe
- CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, II
  - 3rd year in office
- CMC Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr.

[Images of signatories]
...From The Sea (1992)

What it was

- Billed as a “White Paper” & a “combined vision”
  - Retrospectively also termed a “strategic concept”
- Subtitle: “Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century: A New Direction for the Naval Service”
- Dated & distributed 29 Sep 1992
- Issued as USN news release Oct 1992
- Signed US Naval Institute Proceedings & Marine Corps Gazette articles (Nov 1992)
- Stand-alone pub, & on the web
- Short: 16 booklet pages; 4 magazine pages
- Unsigned versions circulated after President Clinton inauguration
- Cited in 1993-2000 DON Posture Statements
- Supplemented by 7 on-line papers (1993-4)

Why it was written (I)

- To achieve a new consensus within Navy on USN rationale
- To provide a conceptual basis for the shift in US Navy focus to joint, forward littoral, enabling, expeditionary operations in regional contingencies
- To guide Navy programmatic decisions away from sea control programs & toward power projection programs
- To highlight continuing regional naval peacetime presence, crisis response & warfighting requirements, despite ending of global anti-Soviet war requirements
- To demonstrate Navy-Marine Corps solidarity, & USN embrace of USMC concepts
- To overcome Desert Storm’s negative legacy in USN
- To demonstrate USN recognition of the importance of doctrine
...From The Sea (1992)

Why it was written (II)

- Similar reasons to *The Way Ahead*
  - To demonstrate that the Navy understood the world had changed and that the Navy had changed too
  - To leave the 1980s, the Cold War, and *The Maritime Strategy* behind
  - To provide a basis for 451-ship USN force level goal
  - To answer USAF “Global Reach—Global Power” (1990)

- To show USN was pacing evolving Bush Administration policy & strategy

---

...From The Sea (1992)

Why it was written (III)

- To catalyze Navy strategic thinking in anticipation of a possible change in Administrations
- To make up for lack of traction of *The Way Ahead*
- Fear that, without its own concepts, the Navy would wind up merely implementing the concepts of CJCS GEN Powell and others outside the Navy
- Primary target: Many, but esp. USN, USMC officers, OSD, Joint Staff
...From The Sea (1992)

Context (I)
- 4th & last year of Bush (R) administration (1989-93)
  - Election year (Pres. Bush vs. Gov. Clinton)
- Post Goldwater-Nichols Act; post-Cold War; post-Operation Desert Storm
- Bush administration calls for a “new world order” (Sep 1990 speech)
- US economy pulling out of recession
  - Unemployment & inflation rates climbing
  - High U.S. gov’t deficit spending
  - Price of oil low and declining

...From The Sea (1992)

Context (II)
- SECDEF Cheney (1989-93)
  - A dominant force in US defense strategy & policy making
- CNO ADM Kelso (1990-94)
- New players
  - OPNAV Director for Naval Warfare VADM Miller & key staff left OPNAV for Atlantic Fleet command
  - New CMC Gen Carl Mundy replaced Gen Gray (Jun 1991)
  - New DCNO for Plans, Policy & Operations (N3/N5) VADM Leighton (Snuffy) Smith replaced VADM Kelly (Jul 1991)
  - VADM Bill Owens assigned as OPNAV N8 (July 1992)
From The Sea (1992)

Context (III)
- Soviet Navy commander ADM Chernavin visited US (Nov 1991)
- Warsaw Pact dissolved (Jul 1991)
- Failed coup in Soviet Union (Aug 1991)
- Soviet Union dissolved (Dec 1991)
  - Russian military & naval power deteriorating
- USN CNO ADM Kelso visited Russia (Jun 1992)
- Trade disputes threatened US relations with Japan
- Japanese economic crisis (1990-91)
- Inter-Korean Basic Agreement signed (1991)

Context (IV)
  - 451-ship Battle Force goal (1991)
- Central DOD force-sizing requirement to fight 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)
- Somalia, Haiti, Iraq operations
  - Major coalition ops in DS/DS, other ops
  - Somali government collapse (1991)
- “1/3-1/3-1/3” service $ share stability era beginning
- Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP) begun (1991)
- OSD/NA fostering US defense community interest in “Military-Technical Revolution” (MTR), aka “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA)
…From The Sea (1992)

♦ Context (V)
  ◦ Reduced submarine threat perception
  ◦ USN declassification of SOSUS mission (1991)
  ◦ USN (& USAF) withdrawal from Philippine bases (1992)
  ◦ Stand up of USSTRATCOM (with USN SSBN components); & of USMC components (1992)

…From The Sea (1992)

♦ Context (VI)
  ◦ Declining USN force levels & DON annual budgets
    ◦ USN in 1992: 466 battle force ships & declining sharply; 11 new ships authorized
    ◦ Down 40 ships from 1991; down 81 ships from 1990
    ◦ Decommissioning of all 46 Knox-class ASW FFs continuing
  ◦ Publicly-aired USN scandals
    ◦ “Ill Wind” DON corruption investigation ongoing (from 1988)
    ◦ USS Iowa turret explosion, investigation, CNO ADM Kelso apology (1989-91)
    ◦ A-12 cancellation & lawsuits (from 1991)
    ◦ “Tailhook” scandal, investigation unfolding (from 1991)
  ◦ Unraveling within Navy of 1980s internal consensus on USN rationale
...From The Sea (1992)

Context (VII)

- US Navy unease following promulgation of CJCS GEN Powell “Base Force” construct
  - US Navy budget share will not go up; could go down
  - US Navy feared its control over its own destiny slipping
- USN unease over Desert Storm performance
  - Not at the forefront of DS planning or operations
  - Spotty integration with DS joint C2 & TTP
  - Little opportunity to show AAW, ASUW, ASW, amphibious prowess
  - Salience of mine threat; USN mine warfare weaknesses
- US Navy Cold War strategy, concepts, doctrine, tactics & systems might not be well-adapted to post-Cold War environment, conflicts
- US Navy could possibly be considered less relevant to post-Cold War environment & conflicts than other services

...From The Sea (1992)

Context (VIII)

- Operation SEA SOLDIER IV (Jan 1991)
  - Oman amphibious exercise/ deception operation
  - Largest amphibious landing since STEEL PIKE (1964)
- Some at-sea organizational experimentation
  - CINCLANTFLT, later SACLANT/ USCINCLANT/ CINCUSACOM ADM Paul David Miller “Adaptive Force Packaging” concepts
  - C6F VADM William Owens initiatives (1990-1992)
    - Maritime Action Groups (Surface combatants, SSNs, MPA)
    - LHD USS Wasp as sea control ship; Harriers for ASUW, AAW
- Operation SAFE HAVEN (1991)
  - CV USS Forrestal embarked 400 Marines, 10 USMC helos
  - Somalia ops (1992)
    - MPS ship (USNS 1st LT Jack Lummus) attached to ARG
...From The Sea (1992)

Context (IX)

- VADM Owens as powerful OPNAV N8 (1992)
- OPNAV joint-inspired reorganization (1992)
  - Subordination and demotion of the platform barons
  - Abolition of OP-07 and its organization by traditional naval warfare areas
- New OPNAV POM Assessment Process
  - Aimed at breaking down internal Navy community stovepipes
  - Deliberate new USN joint program organization & vocabulary
  - Designed to forge a new consensus among Navy flag officers
- New Expeditionary Warfare OPNAV division (N85), headed by USMC general (1992)

...From The Sea (1992)

Context (X)

- Unofficial DC-area “Navy Discussion Group” ongoing (1989-91)
  - Convener: CAPT James Stark (OPNAV N00K)
  - Participants included...From the Sea contributors
...From The Sea (1992)

**Cited references**
- *Navy Policy Book*
- *Marine Corps Master Plan*
- President Bush Aspen Institute speech (Aug 1990)
- “Base Force” concept (1991)

**Context: Other contemporary publications (I)**
  - USN/USMC joint, littoral, enabling ops
  - Need for naval doctrine & naval doctrine command
- NATO Alliance’s *New Strategic Concept* (Nov 1991)
  - Emphasis on cooperation w/ East & security of all Europe
- DPG, CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
- 1st CJCS UNCLAS *National Military Strategy* (Jan 1992)
…From The Sea (1992)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)

- “DON Lift 2” study & SECNAV decisions (1990)
- DOD Mobility Requirements Study (1992)
- U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Plan (1992)
- CNO SSG Reports (annual)
- USN “Worthington Study” on riverine warfare (Dec 1990) (ignored)
- FMFM 1 Warfighting (1989)
- FMFM 1-1 Campaigning (1990)
- SECAF Rice “Global Reach—Global Power” (1990)

…From The Sea (1992)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)

- CAPT Charles Koburger USCGR (Ret), Narrow Seas, Small Navies, and Fat Merchantmen: Naval Strategies for the 1990s (1990)
- CNA (Siegel) Use of Naval Forces study (1991)
- CNA Desert Storm Reconstruction Reports (1991)
…From The Sea (1992)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
  ♦ George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (1991)

…From The Sea (1992)

♦ How it was written (I)
  ♦ CAPT Diamond (OP-603) continued to refine OP-603 brief on strategy
    ♦ Presented to CNO (July 1991)
  ♦ But SECNAV Garrett tasked CNO & CMC 20 with new strategic concept effort (Nov 1991)
  ♦ 3-phase effort
      ♦ Which itself had 3 phases
    ♦ Wholesale rewriting (Spring 1992)
    ♦ End-game (and more re-writing (Summer 1992)
...From The Sea (1992)

How it was written (II)

- Phase I: Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort (NFCPE)
  - Complex, multi-faceted, formal process
    - Large working groups, seminars
    - 3-star & 4-star conferences
    - War games
  - Co-chairs: VADM Leighton Smith (OP-06) & LtGen Hank Stackpole USMC (PP&O) (OPSDEPs)
  - “Gang of Five” oversight: 3 admirals, two USMC generals
  - Working Group oversight: RADM Ted Baker & MGen M. Caulfield
  - CNA support and participation
  - CAPT (Ret) Bill Manthorpe & “Manthorpe curve” presentation
  - Several products
    - Included “White Paper.” The Strategic Concept of the Naval Service
  - NFCPE products influential but not definitive

How it was written (III)

- Phase II: Wholesale rewriting
  - Personalities: VADM Leighton Smith, LtGen Stackpole, “Gang of Five” writers, esp. BGen-SEL Wilkerson, CAPT Rusty Petrea, LtCol Chip Gregson
  - Flag officer inputs, esp ADM P.D. Miller, VADM Tuttle
  - New NFCPE co-chair BGen-SEL Wilkerson drove process toward progress & completion

- Phase III: Endgame (more rewriting):
  - VADM Smith, CAPT Petrea, Gen Krulak, new OPNAV N8 VADM Owens, new SECNAV O’ Keefe & CDR Stavridis
  - Endgame coincident w/ VADM Owens’ s new OPNAV Assessment Process & OPNAV reorganization
  - Contractor drafting & polishing support (Dr. Scott Truver)
How it was written (IV)
- USMC very much a co-equal player – and increasingly dominant -- throughout
- CMC Gen Carl Mundy had been DC, PP&O for *The Maritime Strategy* (IV)
- BGen-SEL Tom Wilkerson been principal USMC POC for *The Maritime Strategy* (I) & (II)

Origins of the name
- VADM Leighton Smith’s idea

Outline
- Introduction
- Defining the new direction
  - Naval Expeditionary Forces
  - Shaped for joint operations
  - Operating forward, from the sea
  - Tailored for national needs
- Operational capabilities
  - Command, Control and surveillance
  - Battlespace dominance
  - Power projection
  - Force sustainment
- Conclusion
- Implementation
Key ideas (I)

- Times have changed; so has the Navy
- Acknowledged demise of Soviet Union unequivocally
- “fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea to joint operations conducted from the sea”
- Asserted USN “ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate future operations”
  - “With the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations of the world claim preeminent control of the seas and ensure freedom of commercial maritime passage”
- Regional, joint, forward, littoral, enabling, expeditionary
- Shift from global threat to regional challenges
  - Enormous uncertainty in critical regions
- Extensive development of sea-shore littoral warfare concepts as focus of naval operations
  - Littoral reaches as far as 650 nm inland

Key ideas (II)

- Emphasis on integrated joint & combined operations
- Emphasis on Navy-Marine Corps integration
- “de-emphasize efforts in some warfare areas”
- Naval services as enabling & continuing to participate
- Conventional strategic defense, incl. theater missile defense
- Need to “structure a fundamentally different naval force”
  - Call for “New Expeditionary Force Packages”
  - Integrated Naval Expeditionary Forces & Naval Expeditionary Task Forces (NETFs)
...From The Sea (1992)

Key ideas (III)

- "Sealift is an enduring mission for the Navy"
- Peacekeeping, coalition building, humanitarian ops
- Naval "Maneuver from the sea" a potent tool for the JTF commander

Mandated actions, including:

- Create NAVDOCCOM (alternating RADM/MajGen command)
- COMUSNAVCENT as VADM
- Create "new naval force packages for expeditionary ops"
- Expand integration of USN & USMC TACAIR
- Fully integrate SSNs, MPA, MWF into expeditionary task forces

...From The Sea (1992)

Key ideas (IV)

- Cited 6 "maritime capabilities"
  - Powerful yet unobtrusive presence
  - Strategic deterrence
  - Control of the seas
  - Extended and continuous on-scene crisis response
  - Project precise power from the sea
  - Provide sealift if larger-scale warfighting scenarios emerge
...From The Sea (1992)

Key ideas (V)

- But later cited 4 “traditional operational capabilities”
  - Forward deployment
  - Crisis response
  - Strategic deterrence
  - Sealift
- To which it then added . . .

...From The Sea (1992)

Key ideas (VI)

- . . . 4 required “key operational capabilities”
  - in addition to the 4 traditional capabilities
  1. Command, control and surveillance
     - Naval Force commanders as Joint Force Commanders
  2. Battlespace dominance
     - Beyond mere sea control (which is never mentioned)
     - “Decisive power on and below the sea, on land, and in the air”
  3. Power projection
     - “Joint operations between Naval and Air Force strike assets . . . have become standard”
  4. Force sustainment
     - Including strategic sealift
From The Sea (1992)

Key ideas (VII)

- Based on feedback from Capitol Hill & defense policy experts:
  - Deliberately more focus on forward littoral warfighting
  - Deliberately less focus on forward peacetime presence operations & requirements
- Elevated, highlighted & integrated USMC roles within larger Navy mission set of the time

Supplemented by seven Department of the Navy supporting Policy Papers published on-line (1993-4)

- “The OPNAV Assessment Process” (May 1993)
- “Naval Forward Presence . . . Essential for a Changing World” (May 1993)
- “Carriers for Force 2001” (May 1993)
- “Force sustainment” (May 1993)
- “Joint Operations . . . From the Sea” (May 1993)
- “Working with other Nations” (Oct 1993)
- “Navy Medicine . . . Shaping the Change” (May 1994)

What was new? (I)

- Focus on strike and power projection
- No mention of sea control
- 1st mention of maritime interdiction operations
- 1st discussion of sea-based theater missile defense
- 1st discussion of maneuver from the sea
- Heavy USMC influence
- Naval Expeditionary Forces & Naval Expeditionary Task Forces
- Mandated actions
...From The Sea (1992)

◆ What was new? (II)
 ◆ 4 “key operational capabilities”
    ◆ Command, Control and surveillance
    ◆ Battlespace dominance
    ◆ Power projection
    ◆ Force sustainment
 ◆ These would morph over time into 4 Sea Power 21 “pillars”
    ◆ FORCEnet
    ◆ Sea Shield
    ◆ Sea Strike
    ◆ Sea Basing

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Not addressed
 ◆ World trade issues & globalization
 ◆ Sea control, blockade or convoy operations
 ◆ Surge capabilities & operations
 ◆ Terrorism, piracy and drug-trafficking
 ◆ Threats to the homeland
 ◆ U.S. merchant marine, industrial base, shipbuilding
 ◆ Non-governmental organizations
 ◆ Specific nations designated as threats
 ◆ Explicit de-emphasis of ASW
Subsequent analyses & critiques (I)

- Tom Barnett & Hank Gaffney, “It’s Going to be a Bumpy Ride,” US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jan 1993)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (II)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (III)

- Edward Rhodes, “‘... From the Sea’ and Back Again,” *Naval War College Review* (Spring 1999)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (IV)

- CAPT Bill Manthorpe (Ret), “Personal Reflections,” *Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly* (Fall 2005 & Winter 2006)
…From The Sea (1992)

CNA

Criticisms (I)

• Many in USN saw USMC influence as too heavy
• Some advocated drafting a Navy single-service document
• Integrated Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEFs) & Naval Expeditionary Task Forces gained little traction in USN
  • Saw change from CATF/CLF command relations as harmful
  • CVBGs, ARGs & SSNs continued to train & deploy separately
  • Many in USN saw “integration” as “subordination”. Resisted both.
• Hostility to Marines as afloat NEF commanders
• Downplayed traditional “blue water” naval tasks too much; assertion of “preeminent control of the seas’ suspect
• Not transformational enough; still informed by too much Cold War thinking
• USN can’t implement
• Despite positive statements on jointness, no call for integrated joint operations

Criticisms (II)

• Subsequent Navy programs & budgets not aligned enough with the rhetoric
  • Not enough emphasis on the littorals in Navy programs & budgets
  • Programs & budgets still too “blue water” & “high end”
  • Document developed separately from & subsequent to USN 451-ship “Base Force” Battle Force goal; and prior to VADM Owens (as OPNAV N-8) force structure changes
  • Amphibious ship force levels decreased at only somewhat lower rate as other ship types. Made up only somewhat higher % of total battle force
• Bottom line critique: The real Navy strategy was embodied in VADM Owens’s POM products and Force 2001: A Program guide to the U.S. Navy (July 1993), not … From the Sea
• Little emphasis on USN peacetime missions and forward presence for political, economic objectives
...From The Sea (1992)

✿ Influence (I):
  ✿ Some civilian defense expert commentary
  ✿ Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on joint, littoral ops

...From The Sea (1992)

✿ Influence (II):
  ✿ Modest direct influence on USN POM development
    ✿ But provided conceptual underpinnings for USN programmatic, operational emphasis on strike warfare; de-emphasis of ASW; acceptance of joint & USAF doctrine, TTP
  ✿ Considerable influence on British, Australian, Canadian, Indian, other allied & foreign naval thinking
  ✿ Influence continued despite resignation/retirement of SECNAV Garrett & CNO ADM Kelso soon after signature
…From The Sea (1992)

- Why did it have this influence? (I)
  - Active distribution by Secretariat, OPNAV, HQMC
    - Coordinated media campaign
  - Example of *The Maritime Strategy*
    - Navy at all levels hungering for a new “white paper” and a new consensus on rationale for US Navy operations
    - Declarations from SECNAV & CNO that this was it
  - Timing did not matter
    - Last months of George H.W. Bush Republican administration

…From The Sea (1992)

- Why did it have this influence? (II)
  - Legitimized and focused post-Cold War Navy on forward strike operations, reflected in DOTMLPF, especially acquisitions & divestments
  - Reflected actual fleet operations & changing fleet composition & basing structure
Why did it have this influence? (III)

- Useful in justifying concomitant changes in OPNAV organization & program planning processes
- New core ideas adopted in concomitant new OPNAV PPBS organizations and processes
- But its organizing constructs were immediately superseded for OPNAV internal program planning by Joint Mission Area Assessments (JMAs)

Influence on subsequent capstone documents

- Significant
- Focus on littoral & strike continued
- Cited in NDP-1, Forward ...From the Sea, Navy Operational Concept, “Anytime, Anywhere”; NSPGs, Naval Operational Concept, Sea Power 21, Naval Operations Concept
- 4 “key operational capabilities” repeated in NDP-1; renamed, embedded and expanded upon in NSPG 2000; and renamed yet again as in Naval Power 21, Sea Power 21, NOCJO, and Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08
From The Sea (1992)

- Influence on foreign capstone documents
  - Significant
  - Cited in:
    - Commander, Maritime Command (Canada), *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada* (1997)

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Overview
- Signed by CNO ADM Kelso & CMC Gen Mundy (Mar 1994)
- Billed as “doctrine”
- Primary target: All USN & USMC, active & reserve
- Long (76 pp) UNCLAS glossy Naval Doctrine Pub (NDP), & on the web
- Drafted & published by new Naval Doctrine Command
- Principles of war; maneuver warfare
- War, deterrence, presence, OOTW
- Close Navy-Marine Corps integration
- Very joint & combined
- “Adversaries” and “enemies” not specified, save “growing regional threats”
- Continued use as reference through 2010 (largely outside USN)

Signed by:
- CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, Jr.
  - 3rd year in office
- CMC Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr.
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- **What it was**
  - Billed as “Doctrine”
  - Long UNCLAS glossy new Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) (Mar 1994)
    - 76 pages
    - Put on the web
    - Deliberately similar in format to Joint Doctrine Pubs
  - (Finally superseded by NDP-1 *Naval Warfare* (Mar 2010))

- **Why it was written**
  - To achieve and maintain internal USN consensus on USN rationale
  - USN unhappy Desert Storm experience with USAF-dominated joint air command and control doctrine
  - Fill externally- and internally-felt need for Navy strategy & operations to become more doctrinally-based
  - To tie Navy doctrine more closely to joint and USMC doctrine – especially maneuver style of warfare
  - Provide a basis for a future family of USN doctrinal pubs
    - Part of wholesale overhaul of USN warfare Pub system (NWP 1-01)
    - First of a planned series of 6 NDPS
  - To reinforce concepts in *From the Sea*
  - Primary target: All US military & defense civilians
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Context (I)

- 2nd year of Clinton (D) administration (1993-2001)
- SECDEFs Aspin (1993-4) & Perry (1994-7)
- Outgoing CNO ADM Kelso (1990-94)
- CJCS GEN Shalikashvili
- Jointness & joint doctrinal frenzy
  - Goldwater-Nichols Act had strengthened CJCS joint doctrinal responsibilities (1986)

Context (II)

- Russian military & naval power rapidly deteriorating
- US–PRC military relations resuming (Nov 1993)
- USN still traumatized by Desert Storm experience
  - Including joint commander direction that JFACC doctrine be used
- Civil-military relations debates in academia
- Adaptive Joint Force Packages deployed, debated (1993-4)
  - CINCUUSACOM ADM Paul David Miller advocated
- USN in 1994: 391 battle force ships & declining sharply; only 4 new ships authorized
- Declining annual DON budgets
- USN-USMC differences accelerating, over joint & amphibious operations command relationships
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

♦ Context (III)
    ♦ 7 new Navy mission-area categories
      ♦ Joint strike
      ♦ Joint littoral warfare
      ♦ Joint surveillance
      ♦ Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
      ♦ Strategic deterrence
      ♦ Strategic sealift/protection
      ♦ Presence
  ♦ CNO ADM Kelso promulgated *Navy Core Values* (Oct 1992)
  ♦ *Sailor’s Creed* developed, published (1993)

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

♦ Cited references
  ♦ 1st CJCS (Powell) UNCLAS *National Military Strategy* (Jan 1992)
  ♦ *The Maritime Strategy* (1980s)
  ♦ …*From the Sea* (1992)
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- Suggested follow-on reading
    - “AirLand Battle Future”
  - Clausewitz, Corbett, Liddell Hart, Wylie, Mahan, Sun Tzu

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
  - Bottom-Up Review (BUR) (1993)
    - 2 near-simultaneous MRCs. State-on-state wars
    - USN sized for presence as well as MRCs
  - ADM Paul David Miller monographs
  - NATO Concept of Maritime Operations (1993)
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
    - Defense academics posited a crisis in US civil-military relations
  - NWP 1-01 *The Naval Warfare Publication System* (1994)
  - Annual CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG) Reports

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- How it was written (I)
  - Drafted at new Naval Doctrine Command (est. 1993)
    - CDR Rob Zalaskus (AO) with Col Marv Floom USMC (DEPCOMNAVDOCCOM)
    - Mostly fleet sailors. Few with background in strategy/concepts/doctrine
    - But also: Dr. Jim Tritten; CAPT (Ret) Sam Leeds (ex-SSG 1), Floyd Kennedy (CNA Field Rep)
  - Strong COMNAVDOCCOM command support (RADM Fred Lewis)
  - Used USAF & USA doctrine pubs as models, but more condensed
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

♦ How it was written (II)
- Adopted same paperback format as new Joint Doctrinal Pubs
  - Advocated by CAPT Peter Bulkeley, Head of NAVDOCCOM Doctrine Branch
- Little AO-level outreach for inputs/ to obtain buy-in
- Little early or continuous engagement w/ outside experts, academia
- Numerous active & retired flag review boards
- US Naval Institute edit & photos. Commercially printed
- Oral history of project recorded (Tritten-Zalaskus)

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

♦ How it was written (III)
- NDPs 2, 4, 5, 6 published
  - Naval Intelligence, Logistics, Planning, Command & Control
- NDP 3 Naval Operations never published
  - Dozens of drafts attempted
  - Sticking point issue: Command relationships
    - Possibility of a Marine Corps Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), as well as Commander Landing Force (CLF).
    - Marines pushed; Navy refused.
    - Agreement could not be reached
NDP1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Outline:

- Who we are: The nature of naval services
- What we do: Employment of naval forces
  - Deterrence, forward presence, NOOTW, sealift, joint ops, etc.
- How we fight: Naval Warfare
- Where we are headed: Into the 21st century
Key ideas (I):

- Basic roles of naval forces:
  - Maintaining maritime superiority
  - Contributing to regional stability
  - Conducting operations on or from the sea
  - Seizing or defending advanced naval bases
  - Conducting land operations essential to naval campaigns

- Naval forces accomplish these roles through:
  - Deterrence
  - Forward presence
  - Naval Operations -- Other than War
  - Sealift
  - Joint Operations
  - Naval operations in War

Key ideas (II):

- Doctrine matters to the USN
  - Link between strategy & tactics, techniques & procedures

- “The uses of military force are being redirected toward regional contingencies and political persuasion, moving away from the prospect of all-or-nothing global war with another superpower”

- US & global economic dependence on sea-based commerce, including continued oil availability

- “What we do:” E.g.: 10 characteristics, incl. Deterrence, presence, war from the sea, war at sea, sealift, etc.
  - Turner 4 missions embedded & reordered
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Key ideas (III):

- “While naval forces are built to fight and win wars, perhaps as important, is their contribution to deterring conflict”
- “. . . Naval forces prepare to fight and win wars. We also play an important role in preventing them”
- Shift from blue-ocean maritime strategy to joint, littoral, enabling operations . . . from the sea
- Littoral warfare

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Key ideas (IV):

- (Joint) distinctions between “roles,” “missions,” “functions”
- Emphasis on the offensive, task organization
- Emphasis on integrated joint & multinational ops
- Naval services as enabling force
- Naval operations– other than war
- Humanitarian assistance operations
- Combat terrorism
- Counter-drug operations
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Key ideas (V):

- All naval (not just amphibious) forces prefer *maneuver* style of warfare over *attrition* style
  - USMC influence
- USCG a major partner: “three maritime services”
  - Integration of USCG ops & relationships throughout
- Coastal/riverine interdiction a sub-set of naval SPECWAR
- Levels of war & principles of war
- USN, USMC, USCG historical vignettes
  - Technique borrowed from *Joint Pub 1*
- Recommended reading list

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Key ideas (VI):

- Critical operational capabilities naval expeditionary forces can provide:
  1. Command, control and surveillance
  2. Battlespace dominance
  3. Power projection
  4. Force sustainment
- Repeated from . . . *From the Sea* & strengthened
What was new (I)

- Naval Doctrine Publications (NDPs) themselves
- Emphasis on doctrine & its role in the Navy
- Positing of two “styles of naval warfare”: maneuver & attrition
- Applicability of maneuver style of warfare to all naval warfare, not just amphibious ops

What was new (II)

- 1st mention of maritime intercept operations (MIO)
- 1st mention of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
- 1st extended substantive treatment of HA/DR ops
- Inclusion of analysis of 9 classic Principles of War
  - Unique among Navy capstone documents
- Discussion of 3 levels of war
- Discussion of operational level of war
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- Not addressed (I)
  - Specific characteristics of “adversaries” and “enemies”
    - But “growing regional threats” mentioned in passing
  - Surge capabilities & operations
  - Mine warfare
  - Sea based ballistic missile defense
  - Sea basing
  - Threats to the U.S. homeland
  - Threats from piracy
  - U.S. Merchant Marine
  - U.S. government inter-agency partners
  - Partner navies
    - Although partner military forces generally mentioned

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- Not addressed (II)
  - Links to force levels, programming & budgeting
  - Joint Mission Area (JMA) categorization scheme used in OPNAV program planning
  - Naval Expeditionary Forces or Naval Expeditionary Task Forces
  - Little on Information Warfare
Was it “Doctrine?”

What is “Doctrine” (officially)?

“Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application”

Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (July 2001)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (I)

CAPT Wayne Hughes USN (Ret)
- Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (1986)

- ADM David E Jeremiah USN (Ret)
- COL Peter F. Herrly USA
- Col John A. Warden III USAF
- Dr. Scott Truver

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (II)

- CDR James J. Tritten USN (Ret)
  - Naval Doctrine Command in-house civilian doctrine guru (1993-6)
  - Ph.D. USC; Former OP-60 AO, NPS maritime strategy professor
  - Large oeuvre on naval doctrine (1990s), esp.:
    - “What is This Doctrine Stuff?,” US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jan 1995)
    - “Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine,” Naval War College Review (Spring 1995)

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Criticisms:

- A doctrine pub is an ineffective venue to achieve internal USN consensus
- Deterrence requires more than shows of force
- More than one “center of gravity” is possible
- Overstated Navy ability to operate autonomously
- Not enough on naval operational art; too tactical
- Imperfect fit with joint doctrine
- Too dominated by USMC concepts
- Navy needs its own single-service capstone doctrinal pub
- Endorsement of maneuver warfare & NEF concepts downgraded other important Navy equities
- Little of substance
  - Substance deferred to NDP 3, which was never signed
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- Influence: Modest
  - Little influence within the US Navy
    - VADM Morgan cited it in “Principles of War” article (2003)
    - Became basis for US Naval Academy NS 300 Naval Warfare course.
  - But secondary audiences still used, even in 2010
  - Taught at other service & allied war colleges, other schools
    - Cited in other service, allied, academic writings, e.g.:
      - Australian Maritime Doctrine (2000)
      - Coast Guard Pub 1 (2009)
      - Indian Maritime Doctrine (2009)
    - Used by modeling & simulation community, civilian naval analysts
  - Led to some Navy DOTMLPF focus on the Navy-Marine Corps Team

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- Influence:
  - Set a precedent for doctrinal pubs overseas
  - Contributed to the origins of several initial maritime doctrinal pubs:
    - The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada ’s Maritime Forces (May 1994)
      - As in US, Canadian Navy capstone documents are never identified as "doctrine"
    - Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy (Mar 1997)
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

What accounted for its modest influence? (I)

- Answered no major fleet need
- Lack of an *NDP 3 Naval Operations* discredited entire NDP series within USN
  - Strong USN-USMC disagreements on command relationships
- Spotty CNO follow-through & USN publicity
  - E.g.: In 1994 *Posture Statement*, but not 1995
- Salience of doctrine in USN waxed, then waned
  - USN slowly embraced TACAIR operational integration with USAF
- Not directive in nature
  - "If it stimulates discussion, promotes further study, and instills in readers a feeling of ownership . . . then *NDP 1* will have properly served its purpose"

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

What accounted for its modest influence? (II)

- USN remained wary/uninterested/un-accepting of doctrine
  - USN bristled at CJCS direction that joint doctrine is "authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise" (Jul 1994)
  - NAVDOCCOM never gained clout within or outside Navy
  - Disestablished & functions subsumed under new NWDC (1998)
- CNO ADM Kelso left office immediately after. No apparent interest by his successors
- Subsequent parade of NOCs usurped intended *NDP 1* role as bridge between strategy & tactics, techniques & procedures
- Little AO-level buy-in by OPNAV, fleets, Naval War College
  - "Not invented here"
What accounted for its modest influence? (III)

- Navy officers suspicious of emphasis on maneuver warfare, viewing it as symptomatic of too strong USMC influence
- Overshadowed by competing capstone documents
  - \ldots From the Sea (1992)
  - Forward \ldots From the Sea (1994)
- But “Doctrine” did not have negative connotations outside USN that it had inside, esp. overseas
- “Naval Doctrine Pub 1” had (unjustified) aura of importance & authoritativeness, to outsiders

Influence on subsequent capstone documents

- Minimal
- Not updated, despite tasking in NOCJO (2003), until 2010
- Otherwise, never cited

Influence on subsequent non-Navy documents

- Appreciably more
- E.g.: One of only 2 USN documents cited in Joint Pub 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (Dec 2006)
- But not cited in 1st MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (2001)
  - NDP-4 Naval Logistics cited, however.
ADM Jeremy M. Boorda (CNO Apr 1994-May 1996)

♦ Oct 1994  *Forward…From the Sea*
  ♦ “A strategic concept”

[Image]

ADM Jeremy M. Boorda (CNO Apr 1994-May 1996)

♦ Surface warfare officer
  ♦ Followed 2 aviator & 3 submariner CNOs
  ♦ Served under President Clinton, SECDEF Perry, SECNAV Dalton
  ♦ Naval War College graduate
  ♦ Most prior staff experience was in manpower & personnel areas
  ♦ As Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe and Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces Europe, commanded all NATO forces engaged in Yugoslav wars, humanitarian ops, just prior to being named CNO (1991-4)
ADM Jeremy M. Boorda (CNO Apr 1994-May 1996)

- With his staff, sought to update …From the Sea
- Also pursued (unconsummated) “2020 Vision” drafting effort
- Continued strains in USN-USMC relations
- Signature program: “Arsenal Ship”
- Committed suicide in office (1996)

Forward…From The Sea (1994)
Forward…From The Sea (1994)

Overview
- Signed by SECNAV Dalton, CNO ADM Boorda, CMC Gen Mundy (Oct 1994)
- Billed as a “strategic concept”
- Principal target: Many, esp. USN officer corps
- Short (12 pp) UNCLAS. US Naval Institute Proceedings & Marine Corps Gazette articles, stand-alone pub, & on web
- Navy drafters: OPNAV Strategy Branch (N513)
- Threats seen as regional, but none specified by name
- Emphasis on combat credible forward presence in & between 3 hubs
- Reaffirmed traditional sea control ops
- Still cited in 2006 Naval Operations Concept

Signed by:
- SECNAV John H. Dalton
- CNO ADM Jeremy M. Boorda
  - During 1st year in office
- CMC Gen Carl E. Mundy
Forward…From The Sea (1994)

What it was

- Billed as a “strategic concept”
  - Retrospectively, also termed a “white paper” and a “vision”
- UNCLAS Marine Corps Gazette (Oct 1994) article
- US Naval Institute Proceedings (Dec 1994) article
- Stand-alone pub
- Short: 12 booklet pages; 4 article pages
- Put on the web
- Cited in 1995-2000 Posture Statements

Why it was written

- To improve visibility of combat-credible forward presence as a central US naval concept, primarily to protect US Navy force structure
- To capitalize on new Clinton Administration Bottom-Up Review (Mar-Oct 1993) policy decision to use forward presence, as well as Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs), to justify US naval forces
- To supplement Bush Republican SECNAV O’Keefe’s . . . From the Sea and put Clinton Democrat SECNAV Dalton imprimatur on USN concepts
- For the Navy, to distance itself from the NETF concept
- To underpin USN arguments to influence drafting of congressionally-mandated Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) report
- Principal target: Many, esp. USN officer corps
Forward…From The Sea (1994)

♦ Context (I)
- US voters repudiated Bush administration (1992)
- 2nd year of new Clinton (D) administration (1993-2001)
  - SECDEF Aspin (1993-94); SECDEF Perry (1994-7)
  - SECNAV Dalton (1993-98)
- US economy starting to boom.
  - Unemployment rate, inflation rate, US gov’t budget deficits falling
  - Price of oil low and declining
- DOD policy emphasis on Peace Operations
- New CNO ADM Boorda (1994-96)
- US Army, Air Force downsizing forward & coming home
- 1995 Commission On Roles & Missions (CORM) pending
- Civil-military relations debate in academia

Forward…From The Sea (1994)

♦ Context (II)
- Central DOD force-sizing requirement to fight 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)
- OSD (NA) advocating Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (from 1993 on)
- “Don’t Ask; Don’t Tell” policy (1993)
- Declining USN force levels & annual DON budgets
  - 12th carrier, etc. justified by presence requirements
  - USN in 1994: 391 battle force ships & declining sharply; only 4 new ships authorized
  - Down 75 ships from 1992 (. . . From the Sea)
  - Decommissioning of all 46 Knox-class ASW FFs concluding
**Forward...From The Sea (1994)**

**Context (III)**
- Islamic terrorist attack on WTC basement (1993)
- Trade disputes threatened US relations with Japan
- Japanese economy stagnant
- Simultaneous Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti power projection ops all on-going
  - Bosnian War (1992-5)
    - NATO commander: CINCSOUTH ADM Leighton Smith (Apr 1994)
    - A principal author of... *From the Sea* (1992)
    - Commanded 1st-ever NATO real-world power projection operation (Apr 1994)
- Hutu genocide vs. Tutsis in Rwanda (1994)
  - Widespread publicity but little foreign intervention, incl. US

---

**Context (IV)**
- US reengagement w/ PRC military leadership (Nov 1993)
  - 1st engagement since Tiananmen Crackdown (Jun 1989)
- New PRC national military strategy promulgated
- PRC protested US harassment of Iran-bound PRC cargo ship *Yinhe* suspected of carrying chemical weapon ingredients (Aug 1993)
- Russian military & naval power rapidly deteriorating
- USN-Russian Navy submarine collision incidents (1992-3)
- 1st “Partnership for Peace” at-sea exercise (1994)
  - *Cooperative Venture 94*
  - Included NATO, Russian, Lithuanian, Polish, Swedish navies
Forward…From The Sea (1994)

♦ Context (V)
  ♦ CJCS Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP) process continuing
  ♦ Adaptive Joint Forces Packages deployed & debated (1993-4)
    ♦ CINCUSACOM ADM P.D. Miller
  ♦ LANTCOM became USACOM (1993)
    ♦ Adds focus on joint force integration
    ♦ Navy-Marine Corps differences on implementing Naval Expeditionary Task Force vision of . . . From the Sea & NDP 1 Naval Warfare

Forward …From The Sea (1994)

♦ Context (VI)
  ♦ VADM Owens as OPNAV N8 (1992-3)
    ♦ 7 new Navy mission-area categories
      ♦ Joint strike
      ♦ Joint littoral warfare
      ♦ Joint surveillance
      ♦ Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
      ♦ Strategic deterrence
      ♦ Strategic sealift/protection
      ♦ Presence
Forward ...From The Sea (1994)

Context (VII)

- OPNAV joint-inspired reorganization continued (since 1992)
  - Subordination and demotion of the platform barons
- New Expeditionary Warfare OPNAV division (N85), headed by USMC general (since 1992)
  - Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
  - Participants included Forward...From the Sea contributors
- CNO ADM Kelso promulgated Navy Core Values (Oct 1992)
- Sailor’s Creed developed, published (1993)

Context (VIII)

- Continued negative publicity on the Navy
  - USS Iowa turret explosion, investigation, CNO ADM Kelso apology (1989-1991)
  - “Tailhook” scandal & investigation (1991-2)
  - Accidental USN CV missile firing on Turkish DD (1992)
  - USNA cheating scandal (1992-4)
  - “Ill Wind” DON corruption convictions (1994)
Cited references

- Bottom-Up Review (BUR) (1993)
  - 2 near-simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). State-on-state wars
  - USN to be sized for presence as well as MRCs

Also cited: …From the Sea

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)

- 1st CJCS (Powell) National Military Strategy (1992)
- CJCS Report on Roles, Missions & Functions (1993)
- DoD Nuclear Posture Review (1994)
  - US nuclear arsenal reductions; retention of “hedge” forces
  - 4 SSBNs → SSGNs
  - USN eliminated ability to re-install tactical nuclear weapons on surface combatants
- PDD-26: Arctic and Antarctic Regions (Jun 1994)
- DPG, CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
- LTC Krepinevich (Ret), “Cavalry to Computer: The Patterns of Military Revolutions,” The National Interest (Fall 1994)
Forward…From The Sea (1994)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
- “DON Lift 2” study & SECNAV decisions (1990)
- DOD Mobility Requirements Study (1992)
- FMFM 1 Warfighting (1989)
- ADM P.D. Miller monographs
- CNO SSG Reports
- NATO Concept of Maritime Operations (1993)

Forward…From The Sea (1994)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
- Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992)
**Forward…From The Sea (1994)**

**Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)**

- CAPT Linton Brooks (Ret), *Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence* (CNA 1993)
- Thomas Hirschfeld, *Multinational Naval Cooperation* (CNA 1993)
- Bradford Dismukes CNA studies on naval presence
  - *The Political-Strategic Case for Presence* (Jun 1993)

**Context: Other contemporary publications (V)**

- Jan Breemer
  - “Naval Strategy is Dead,” US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Feb 1994)
- Preparatory official U.S. Navy literature
Forward…From The Sea (1994)

How it was written

- Personalities:
  - SECNAV Dalton, RADM Phil Dur (N51); CAPT Joe Sestak (N513); LCDR Ed O’Callahan (N513 AO); CDR Ed Smith; MajGen Tom Wilkerson (HQMC Plans); CAPT Robby Harris (OLA)

Development methodology

- SECNAV Dalton tasker for new framework for a new maritime strategy (Jun 1994)
- Drafted in OPNAV N51, with OLA impetus & HQMC participation
  - USMC officer in N513: Maj Art Corbett (1994-5)
  - Heavy involvement of RADM DUR & MajGen Wilkerson
- Workshop series
- Several related flag officer & contractor writings commissioned
- Contractor drafting support (Dr. Scott Truver)

Outline

- Introduction
- The strategic imperative
- Peacetime forward presence operations
- Crisis response
- Regional conflict
- Joint and combined operations
- Maintaining our new direction
- Conclusion
Key ideas (I):
- Updated and expanded strategic concepts in ...From the Sea (1992)
- Importance of forward deployed naval forces
- Importance of USN ballistic missile defense potential
- “The most important role of naval forces in situations short of war is to be engaged in forward areas, with the objective of preventing conflicts and controlling crises”
- Peace-crisis-war spectrum as organizing construct
- Resource reductions necessitate refocusing naval assets on highest priorities, most immediate challenges
- Emphasis on joint & combined exercises & ops

Key ideas (II):
- Principal threat: “aggression by regional powers”
- Humanitarian assistance & disaster response ops
- Show effects of presence (+ process)
- Extending conventional deterrence & protective cover through sea-based theater ballistic missile defense
- Long-range deep-strike operations beyond the littoral
- Early forcible entry
- Very joint & combined
- Importance of sealift and its protection
- Naval forces as enabling & continuing participatory force
- Explicit link to DON budget changes in favor of littoral warfare and power projection forces
Key ideas (III):

“Naval forces have five fundamental and enduring roles”:
1. Projection of power from sea to land
2. Sea control and maritime supremacy
3. Strategic deterrence
4. Strategic sealift
5. Forward naval presence

Reordering & “Lehman expansion” of 4 Zumwalt/Turner missions
More global perspective than . . . From the Sea

What was new?

Emphasis on “preventing conflict”
Efforts to measure effects of presence
1st use of concept & term “sea bases”
Not addressed (I)

- 4 “key operational capabilities” from ... From the Sea & NDP-1 Naval Warfare
- Surge capabilities & operations
- Mine warfare
- Convoy operations
- Terrorism, piracy, or drug-trafficking
- Specific nations designated as threats
- Threats to the U.S. homeland

Not addressed (II)

- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Merchant Marine
- U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
- U.S. government interagency partners
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
- Globalization
- Naval Expeditionary Forces or Naval Expeditionary Task Forces
- Joint Mission Area (JMA) categorization scheme used in OPNAV program planning since 1992
## Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)

### Supporting & critical literature & analyses (I)
- CAPTs George Galdorisi & Bruce Linder, “From the Sea to Where?” *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (Feb 1995)

### Supporting & critical literature & analyses (II)
- ADM Frank Kelso, USN (Ret) response (US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Jan 1996)
- Dov Zakheim et al., *Political & Economic Implications of Global Naval Presence* (SPC) (Sep 1996)
Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)

Supporting & critical literature & analyses (III)

- Prof. Robert Looney et al. studies at NPS Monterey

Supporting & critical literature & analyses (IV)

- Dr. Ed Rhodes, “‘. . . From the Sea’ and Back Again,” *Naval War College Review* (Spring 1999)
- Dan Goure, “The Tyranny of Forward Presence,” *Naval War College Review* (Summer 2001)
Supporting & critical literature & analyses (V)
- Daniel Whiteneck, *Naval Forward Presence and Regional Stability* (CNA) (Sep 2001)
- LCDR Jeff Macris, “Reform is Overdue,” US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Nov 2001)

Criticisms (I)
- Navy needed a new strategy & mission-oriented analysis; got this “white paper” instead.
- Effects of naval forward presence hard to quantify & prove
  - Over-promised positive effects
- Focus on presence downgraded importance of readiness of CONUS forces to surge
- USN forces should be -- and can be -- justified by warfighting requirements
Forward…From The Sea (1994)

♦ Criticisms (II)
- Navy set itself up for future force level cuts if SECDEF were to downgrade presence mission, or if ROW anti-access strategies were render USN forward presence untenable
- Naval forward presence is costly & unsustainable
- Not new & innovative; just an update of the Navy’s Cold War presence patterns & arguments
- Little traction on Capitol Hill

Forward…From The Sea (1994)

♦ Criticisms (III)
- Focus on “enabling” downplayed USN continuing participatory roles during major combat ops
  - “Foyer…From The Sea” canard
- Naval presence often unnecessary as joint force enabler
- Despite positive statements on jointness, no call for integrated joint operations. A step back from NDP-1
- Parochial focus on uniqueness of naval forward presence effects triggered strong backlash from Army & Air Force
- “Combat-credible forward presence” viewed as an oxymoron by other services. Forward offshore naval force packages viewed as not combat-credible, providing little US political or military leverage
  - To US Army, only “boots on the ground’ could influence others
  - To US Air Force, Navy forward CVBG firepower not robust enough to influence others
Criticalisms (IV)

- USN programs, budgets not well aligned with the rhetoric
  - Not enough emphasis in programs & budgets on the littorals
  - Programs & budgets still too “blue water”
  - Document developed subsequent to & separately from Bottom Up Review (BUR) 346-ship USN Battle Force force level goal (1993)
- Rendered out of date by US policy & strategy changes following 9-11 Al Qaeda attacks on America (2001)

Criticalisms (V)

- The Marine rap on Forward . . . From the Sea
  - A step backward in Navy-Marine Corps integration
  - CMC signed, but many Marines unenthusiastic
  - Saw Forward . . . From the Sea as having eroded their gains made in . . . From the Sea
    - No assertion of unquestioned current USN ability to command the seas, as in . . . Forward From the Sea
    - Forward presence emphasis touted a predominantly Navy at-sea capability not necessarily integrated with USMC ops ashore
    - Ditto ballistic missile defense
    - Far inland ops would pull Navy strike aviation away from the littoral
    - Focus on jointness & sealift diluted Navy-Marine Corps team
    - Support in the document for Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEF) tepid & non-specific
Forward…From The Sea (1994)

♦ Influence (I)
  ♦ Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on naval forward presence
  ♦ Widely cited; touted in Posture Statements; solidified Forward Presence as central USN tenet; Resource for flag officer speeches & testimony
  ♦ USMC often (but not always) ignored it
  ♦ Influence on Australian, Canadian, Indian, other allied & foreign naval thinking

Forward…From The Sea (1994)

♦ Influence (II)
  ♦ Helped make Navy budget case for at least two years (but sowed seeds for subsequent Army/Air Force counter-attacks)
  ♦ Joint Staff, other services opposed as parochial, but emulated
    ♦ Other services developed arguments for their own contributions to forward presence, & increased their own focus on/ capabilities for forward presence
  ♦ Joint Staff & CINCs pressed for more control over forward naval ops, more naval integration with other service forward ops
Forward…From The Sea (1994)

Why did it have the influence it did? (I)

- Strong SECNAV Dalton & CNO ADM Boorda support
- Advocacy by intelligent & aggressive USN flag officers, branch heads, action officers
- Reflected strong perceived USN need to explain forward presence rationale
- Responded to national strategy
- Reflected actual fleet deployments and operations
- Accompanied by a large Navy-sponsored supporting literature

Why did it have the influence it did? (II)

- USMC concern that USN returning to “blue water” focus
  - Mention of sea control and maritime supremacy
- Capitol Hill interest was focused on naval wartime requirements, not peacetime ops
- Continued to legitimize and focus post-Cold War USN on forward strike ops, as reflected in DOTMLPF, especially acquisitions and divestments.
Forward…From The Sea (1994)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - Significant
  - Focus on naval forward presence continued
  - Cited in *Navy Operational Concept; Anytime, Anywhere; NSPGs; Sea Power 21; Naval Operations Concept*

- Also cited in OPNAV Instruction 3501.316, *Policy for Carrier Battle Groups* (17 Feb 1995)

Forward …From The Sea (1994)

- Influence on foreign capstone documents
  - Significant
  - E.g.: cited in:
May 1997  *Navy Operational Concept*
Nov 1997  *Anytime, Anywhere*  
  ❖ A vision
Aug 1999  *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance*  
  (POM-02) (SECRET)
Apr 2000  *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance*  
  (POM-03) (UNCLAS)

❖ Naval aviator  
  ❖ 1st aviator CNO since 1982
❖ Served President Clinton; SECDEFs Perry, Cohen; SECNAVs Dalton, Danzig
❖ VCNO for 5 months prior to being named CNO  
  ❖ No significant previous OPNAV experience
❖ Armed Forces Staff College graduate & former CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG) member
❖ Signature program: F/A-18E/F
ADM Jay L. Johnson (CNO May 1996-Jul 2000)

♦ Policy & strategy statements got little publicity
  ♦ Aimed at internal Navy audiences only
♦ Tried to maintain low Navy public profile, in the wake of previous adverse publicity
  ♦ E.g: USS Vincennes Iran airliner shoot-down, USS Iowa turret explosion, USNA sexual harassment, A-12 aircraft cancellation, “Tailhook” investigation, CNO ADM Boorda suicide, etc.
♦ Reluctance to sign up to all of SECNAV Danzig concepts
♦ Continued USN-USMC disagreements

Navy Operational Concept (1997)
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- Overview
  - Signed by CNO ADM Johnson (Jan 1997)
  - Billed as an “operational concept”
  - Current & future concepts
  - Principal target: USN officer corps
  - Very short (8 pp.) UNCLAS. CNO e-mail to flags; then on web; then Sea Power article
  - Drafted by working group, then OPNAV Strategy Branch (N513)
  - Tied to CJCS strategy & vision
  - Operational maneuver & speed of command concepts
  - Little influence

Signed by:
- CNO ADM Jay L. Johnson
  - During 1st year in office
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

What it was
- Billed as an “Operational concept”
- Actually both current & future concepts
- Short: 8 pages.
- UNCLAS.
- CNO Jan 1997 e-mail to flag officers, then published on the web; then later in Sea Power (May 1997)
- Cited in 1998 Posture Statement & OPNAV N51-drafted OPNAVINSTs

Why it was written (I)
- To stimulate internal USN doctrine & concept innovation & USN contributions to joint doctrine
- To answer some internal Navy concerns that USN forward presence & enabling focus had become stale & even counter-productive in joint, OSD arenas
- To set forth new concepts of naval operational maneuver & speed of command
- To present a Navy concept of equal stature to USMC’s Operational Maneuver From the Sea
- To highlight that USN not only enabled, but also complemented & amplified, & was useful post-conflict
- To tie Navy to CJCS Joint Vision 2010
- Principal target: USN (& USMC) officer corps
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- Why it was written (II)
  - *Not to supplant or compete with... From the Sea or Forward... From the Sea* as Navy capstone documents and program drivers
  - SECNAV Dalton pleased with *Forward... From the Sea*. Saw no need to replace it

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- Context (I)
  - 2nd Clinton (D) administration term (1997-2001)
  - US economy booming
    - Unemployment rate, inflation rate
    - U.S. government budget deficits disappearing
    - Price of oil low but fluctuating
  - SECDEF Perry (1994-7)
  - 1st *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) in progress
  - *National Defense Panel* (NDP) deliberations ongoing
  - Increasing jointness
  - CNO ADM Boorda (1994-96)
    - NOOK “2020 Vision” draft (1995-7) (aborted)
    - “Arsenal ship” concept (1995-7) (aborted)
  - New CNO ADM Johnson (1996-2000)
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

♦ Context (II)
  ♦ US force planning for 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)
      ♦ North Korean nuclear weapons program frozen by international agreement (1994)
  ♦ Reduced US interest in military ground interventions overseas
      ♦ Failed Somali interventions 1993-4
      ♦ Minimal intervention in Rwanda genocide (1994)
      ♦ Khobar Towers Islamic terrorist bombing (1996)
      ♦ US not a party; Senate would not ratify
  ♦ Russian military & naval power badly eroded

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

♦ Context (III)
  ♦ USN port visits to PRC resumed (Mar 1995–Feb 1996)
      ♦ 1st port visits to PRC since 1989
  ♦ PLAN occupied Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in Spratly Islands (Feb 1995)
  ♦ Periodic US-PRC mutual naval ship visits (since Mar 1995)
  ♦ Russians delivered 4 Kilo SSs & 2 Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (1995-2000)
  ♦ Taiwan Straits Crises (Jul 1995-Mar 1996)
      ♦ USN Carrier battle group deployed through Taiwan Strait (Dec 1995)
      ♦ Response to PRC threats to influence Taiwan parliamentary elections
      ♦ Two USN carrier battle groups diverted toward Taiwan
      ♦ Response to PRC SRBMs fired into waters near Taiwan prior to 1st democratic Taiwan presidential election
  ♦ PLAN ships visited US Pacific ports (Mar 1997)
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Context (IV)

- Southern Watch & Adriatic SEAD & strike ops (from 1991)
- US Fifth Fleet created (1995)
- USAF AEF deployment to Bahrain (1995)
- Operation Desert Strike (1996)
- Korea show-of-force (1994)
- Aum Shinrikyo cult biological attack in Japan (1995)
- Rising incidence of piracy in East Asian waters (from 1995)

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Context (V)

- Declining USN force levels & annual DON budgets
- 1997 QDR USN force goal: 305 ships
- USN in 1997: 354 BF ships & declining; only 4 ships authorized
- Plummeting readiness of non-deployed fleet units
  - Reduced surge capability
- F/A-18E/F procurement priority
- Abortive OPNAV 2020 Vision effort
- Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE) begun (1996)
- USMC frictions
  - Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) (1996)
  - MCDP1-1 Strategy (1997)
  - Major MCCDC concept development efforts on-going
Context (VI)

- OPNAV program planning still using Joint Mission Areas Assessment Process (JMAs) (Sep 1992-1998)
  - 7 Navy mission-area categories
    - Joint strike
    - Joint littoral warfare
    - Joint surveillance
    - Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
    - Strategic deterrence
    - Strategic sealift/protection
    - Presence
  - Consensual processes becoming increasingly centralized, bureaucratized & routinized

Context (VII)

- Influence of network-minded flag officers (ADM Owens, Tuttle, Clemins, Cebrowski)
- CNO ADM Boorda redirected SSG from “strategy” to generation of “innovative future naval warfare concepts” (1995)
  - Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
  - Participants included NOC contributors
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

♦ Cited references (I)
    ♦ “A Strategy for Flexible and Selective Engagement”
    ♦ First CJCS vision statement
    ♦ Heavy influence by ADM Owens & VADM Cebrowski

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

♦ Cited references (II)
  ♦ New CNO ADM Johnson “vision for the Navy” speech (1996)
    ♦ 4 guiding stars: operational primacy, leadership, teamwork, pride
    ♦ Drafted by CNO speechwriter LT Bryan McGrath
  ♦ *…From the Sea* (1992)
  ♦ *Forward…From the Sea* (1994)
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
  ♦ 3rd Clinton National Security Strategy (1996)
  ♦ DoD Nuclear Posture Review (1994)
    ♦ US nuclear arsenal reductions; retention of “hedge” forces
  ♦ DOD Mobility Requirements Study (1995)
  ♦ DOD-DOT MOA on USN & USCG (1995)

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
  ♦ OPNAV Instruction 3501.316, Policy for Carrier Battle Groups (17 Feb 1995)
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
- CMC “Operational Maneuver From The Sea” (OMFTS) concept (1996)
- MCDP 1 Warfighting (1997)
- NAVDOCCOM Multi-lateral Maritime Operations (MMOPS) pub (1996)

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
- Andrew Krepinevich, A New Navy for a New Era (CSBA, 1996)
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

How it was written: Two phases

- I. USN-USMC draft Naval Operational Concept (1995-6) (aborted)
  - II. USN-only Navy Operational Concept (1996-7)

- USN mistrust of USMC influence led to a USN-only document

- SECNAV Dalton insistence that Forward... From the Sea remain as Navy strategic concept & not be superseded during his tenure

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

How it was written: Origins

- USMC developing Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) concept; wary of F... FTS & N00K “2020 Vision” precision strike emphasis as USN return to “blue water”

- USN wary of NDC, NDP 1; lack of an NDP 3

- OPNAV N513 skeptical of future utility of F... FTS

- OPNAV N513 (CDR Joe Bouchard) briefed Navy 3-star Integrated Resource Requirements Review Board (IR3B) on long range naval concepts/planning needs (Aug 1995)

- Strong CMC Gen Krulak entreaties to CNO ADM Boorda

- So...IR3B tasked OPNAV N513 (CDR Bouchard) & HQMC Plans Division (LtCol Jay Paxton) to plan to develop a Naval Operations Concept to guide future planning
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

How it was written: Naval Operational Concept phase (1995-6) (I)

- NOC intended as bridge betw/ FTS & FTS (naval strategic concepts) & present & future USN & USMC doctrine, TTP, across spectrum of ops
- Initially used Business Process Reengineering (BPR) techniques from US industry & USMC OMFTS experience
- Project Team created BPR “activity model” (Oct-Dec 1995)
  - OPNAV N513, N812; HQMC Plans, PP&O; MCCDC; NDC; SRA
  - Personalities: CDR Bouchard (N513), CDR Pat Tracey (N812), LtCol Jay Paxton (PP&O)
- Documented in SRA Corporation report Naval Operational Concept Project (Jan 1996)

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

How it was written: Naval Operational Concept phase (1995-6) (II)

- USMC drove not only OMFTS but other nascent USMC concepts into the paper
  - Included USMC concepts for non-naval ops
- OPNAV suspicion of USMC influence on NOC manifesting itself in increased USMC budget share vis-à-vis Navy
- OPNAV N8 preference for capstone documents to justify current & programmed forces vice innovative changes in direction not reflected in POM
- Tepid support by NAVDOCCOM for what they viewed as rival effort to ill-fated NDP 3
- Joint USN-USMC effort terminated after CNO ADM Boorda died
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

How it was written: Navy Operational Concept phase (1996-7) (I)

- CNO, OPNAV N3/N5 saw need for USN-only future concept
- Personalities: CDR Bouchard (N513); VADM Cebrowski (N6); CNO, ADMs Boorda & Johnson
- Drafted in OPNAV N513 (CDR Joe Bouchard)
  - Emphasized N513 “Concepts” vice “Strategy” role
- Heavy OPNAV N6 input (VADM Art Cebrowski)
- N513 saw as counter to (aborted) OPNAV N00K “2020 Vision”
  - Decried what it saw as “2020 Vision” over-emphasis on decisive precision strike deterrent & warfighting concepts
- Widely vetted in Navy before signature

How it was written: Navy Operational Concept phase (1996-7) (II)

- New CNO ADM Johnson a “customer,” not an author
  - Viewed NOC as internal USN document to guide further concept & doctrine development, and as counterpart to USMC OMFTS concept
- CHINFO did not want NOC to compete with OPNAV N8’s contractor-developed Force 2001: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy. Recommended NOC only be published on web
- Principal target: USN (& USMC) officer corps
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

**Outline**
- Introduction
- How the Navy operates
- Peacetime engagement
- Deterrence and conflict prevention
- Fight and win
- Our course for the 21st century
- Conclusion

**Key ideas (I)**
- Guidance on CNO operational primacy “guiding star”
- Discussed concepts more than strategy
- Peace-crisis-war spectrum as organizing framework
  - “Peacetime engagement -- deterrence and conflict prevention -- fight and win”
- Taken from CJCS National Military Strategy
- …FTS & F…FTS continue to drive US Navy
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Key ideas (II)

- Naval forces decisive” in small-scale contingencies; and “integral” to larger joint campaigns
- Naval forces not only enabling but also complementary & amplifying, & also useful post-conflict
  - “Naval operations continue throughout the joint campaign”
- “Combat-credible forward presence”
  - 1st use of the term
- Focus on Navy peacetime engagement roles (cf. “2020 Vision” focus on warfighting & deterrence)

Key ideas (III)

- Rapid innovation to “transform the Navy into a 21st century force”
- Two key “closely related concepts”:
  - Naval operational maneuver
    - CAPT Bouchard championed
  - Speed of command
    - VADM Cebrowski championed
- USN can serve as afloat JFACC & afloat CJTF
- Forward deployment “hubs” & dispersal from same
- Effects-based deep precision naval fires
  - Incorporated from aborted N00K 2020 Vision draft
  - Seen as a part of the USN’s concept, but not the centerpiece
- Protection for joint and coalition forces ashore
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Key ideas (IV)
- Navy-Marine Corps team
  - Emphasis on Expeditionary Ops as in ... From the Sea
- MIO ops mentioned, though just in passing
- Strategic sealift, pre-positioning & protection of same
- Future USN modernization & innovation concepts IAW CJCS Joint Vision 2010
  - Most of NOC dealt with the present; last part dealt with future
  - Fleet Battle Lab experiments
  - Cooperative Engagement Concept (CEC)
  - Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)
  - Integrated joint fires
- Priorities implicit, not explicit

What was new?
- Publication of an “operational concept”
  - As opposed to a “strategic concept”
- Close integration with CJCS documents
- Emphasis on speed of command
- 1st use of term “combat-credible forward presence”
- 1st use of term “protective shield”
- 1st discussion of Navy post-conflict roles (“Phase IV”)
  - “Naval forces can remain on scene after the joint campaign concludes to enforce sanctions and to maintain a U.S. presence for regional stability”
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Not addressed (I)
- Zumwalt/ Turner “4 missions” framework
- . . . From the Sea’s “4 key operational capabilities” framework
- OPNAV program planning Joint Mission Area categories
- World trade issues
- Surge capabilities and operations
- Convoy operations
- Mine warfare
- Terrorism
- Piracy
- Drug trafficking
- Specificity as to threats
- Threats to the U.S. homeland

Not addressed (II)
- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Air Force & U.S. Army
- Foreign partners, including partner navies
- U.S. Merchant Marine
- U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
- U.S. government interagency partners
- Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
- Links to force level planning, programming & budgeting
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Subsequent analyses & critiques

- Edward Rhodes, “. . . From the Sea’ and Back Again,” Naval War College Review (Spring 1999)
- Amund Lundesgaard, U.S. Navy Strategy and Force Structure After the Cold War (Nov 2011)

Criticisms

- Unnecessary
- Little known
- Relationship to NDP 1 (1994) unclear
- Relationship to “Anytime, Anywhere” (1997) unclear
- “Operational Concept” terminology merely a cover for OPNAV N513 effort to supplant F . . . FTS strategic concept
- Not enough on traditional warfighting themes
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

**Influence:**
- Little immediate or direct impact
- But . . .
  - Launch platform for concepts that would become “Network Centric Warfare,” and then “FORCEnet” in *Sea Power 21*
  - Launch pad for concepts that would become “Sea Shield” in *Sea Power 21*
- Cited in 1998 & 1999 editions of:
  - DON Posture Statement
  - OPNAV N8-generated *Vision, Presence, Power: Program Guide to the U.S. Navy*
- Cited in *Eurasia Review* article as emphasizing requirement for USN forward presence (Jan 2012)

---

**Why so little influence?**
- Little CNO ownership, involvement, follow-through
- Little internal Navy leadership support
- Never meant for wide distribution outside USN
  - So never discussed in non-Navy publications read by naval officers
- Never distributed in hard copy within the Navy
- Competition with other Navy capstone documents & *Program Guide*
- USMC & NAVDOCCOM ignored
- Superseded by *NOCJO* (2003)
Navy Operational Concept (1997)

♦ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  ♦ Minimal
  ♦ Cited in *Anytime, Anywhere* (1997)
  ♦ But precedent considered valuable by OPNAV, HQMC, & MCCDC. Superseded by NOCJO (2003)

---

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

"Reprinted from Proceedings with permission. Copyright © Nov. 1997 U.S. Naval Institute/ www.navalinstitute.org"
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

- **Overview**
  - Signed by CNO ADM Johnson (Nov 1997)
  - Billed as a “vision”
  - Principal target: Many, esp. USN officer corps
  - Very short (3 pp.) UNCLAS US Naval Institute *Proceedings* article
  - Drafted by CNO Executive Panel staff (N00K)
  - Emphasis on warfighting, sea control, power projection
  - USN “operational primacy”
  - Direct, decisive USN influence ashore
  - Document had little influence

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

- **Signed by:**
  - CNO ADM Jay L. Johnson
    - During 2nd year in office
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

What it was
- Billed as a “Vision”
- Subtitle: “A Navy for the 21st Century”
- UNCLAS Nov 1997 US Naval Institute *Proceedings* article
- Very short: 3 pages
- Title, concepts, but not text, repeated in 1998 Posture Statement

Why it was written (I)
- To correct a perceived lack of positive USN public presence, on the part of several important senior OPNAV officers
- To correct a perceived lack of US Navy vision
- To re-emphasize US Navy warfighting capabilities especially sea control -- not just forward presence
  - To highlight especially capabilities to conduct sea & area control & precision strike operations
  - To assert the decisive nature of Navy warfighting contributions
- Principal target: Many, including USN officer corps
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

♦ Why it was written (II)
  ♦ *Not to supplant* or compete with... *From the Sea, Forward... from the Sea*, or the Navy Operational Concept (NOC) as Navy capstone documents and program drivers
  ♦ SECNAV Dalton pleased with *Forward... From the Sea*. Saw no need to replace it

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

♦ Context (I)
  ♦ Essentially same as for NOC (1997)
  ♦ 2nd term of Clinton administration (1993-2001)
  ♦ US economy booming
    ♦ Unemployment rate, inflation rate
    ♦ U.S. gov’t budget deficits plummeting
    ♦ Price of oil fluctuating but low
    ♦ Stock market volatility (Asian financial crisis (from Jul 2007))
  ♦ SECDEF Perry (1994-97)
  ♦ CNO ADM Johnson (1996-2000)
    ♦ USN keeping low public profile
  ♦ Central DoD force-sizing requirement to fight 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)
    ♦ North Korean nuclear weapons program frozen by international agreement (1994)
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

Context (II)
- Reduced US inclination for military ground intervention overseas
- Southern Watch & Adriatic Ops
- Operation Desert Strike (1996)
- Rising incidence of piracy in East Asian waters (from 1995)
- Russian military & naval power badly eroded

Context (III)
- Erratic US naval relationships with PRC
  - PLAN occupied Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in Spratly Islands (Feb 1995)
    - 1st port visits (PVSTs) to PRC since 1989
  - Russians delivered 4 Kilo SSs & 2 Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (1995-2000)
  - Taiwan Straits Crises (Jul 1995-Mar 1996)
    - USN Carrier battle group deployed through Taiwan Strait (Dec 1995)
      - Response to PRC threats to influence Taiwan parliamentary elections
    - Two USN carrier battle groups diverted toward Taiwan
      - Response to PRC SRBMs fired into waters near Taiwan prior to 1st democratic Taiwan presidential election
  - PLAN long-range task group deployments to East, South Asia, LATAM, US waters, ports (1997)
  - Hong Kong reverted to China; USN PVSTs allowed (Jul 1997)
  - USN CNO Johnson visited China (Oct 1997)
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

Context (IV)
- Declining USN force levels & annual DON budgets
- 1997 QDR USN force goal: 305/310 ships
- USN in 1997: 354 BF ships & declining; only 4 new ships authorized
- Plummeting readiness of non-deployed fleet units
  - Reduced surge capability
- Accelerated F/A-18E/F procurement
- Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE) began (1997)
- 1st USN CVN port visit presence at Guam since 1961 (1997)
- USS *Nimitz*/ CVW 9 EastPac “SURGEX” (Jul 1997)
  - Carrier strike high sortie rate demonstration
- USS *Yorktown* (CG-48) “Smart Ship” experiment (1996-7)

Context (V)
- OPNAV program planning still using Joint Mission Areas Assessment Process (JMAs) (Sep 1992- 1998)
  - 7 Navy mission-area categories
    - Joint strike
    - Joint littoral warfare
    - Joint surveillance
    - Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
    - Strategic deterrence
    - Strategic sealift/protection
    - Presence
- Consensual processes becoming increasingly centralized, bureaucratized and routinized
  - Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
  - Members included *Anytime, Anywhere* authors
- Major on-going USMC concept development effort
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

Cited references

- ...From the Sea
- Forward...From the Sea
- Navy Operational Concept

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)

- N00K “2020 Vision” draft for ADM Boorda (1996)
- NFCPE output (pre-1994)
  - 2 Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) became 2 Major Theater Wars (MTWs); state-on-state war
  - Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
  - Shape, respond, prepare (including “transform”)
### Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

**Context: Other contemporary publications (II)**
  - “Shape, respond, prepare now”
- CMC *Operational Maneuver from The Sea* (OMFTS) concept (1996)
- MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (Jun 1997)
- New USMC concepts on STOM, MOUT (1997)
  - Saw future US forward access threatened
- DOD *Mobility Requirements Study* (1995)

---

### Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

**Context: Other contemporary publications (III)**
- DOD-DOT MOA on USN & USCG (1995)
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
  ♦ Greg Vistica, Fall From Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy (1996)
  ♦ Andrew Krepinevich, A New Navy for a New Era (CSBA, 1996)

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

♦ How it was written
  ♦ Overseen by “CNO Strategic Planning Group” (CSPG)
    ♦ VCNO ADM Don Pilling, OPNAV N3/N5 VADM Jim Ellis, OPNAV N6 VADM Art Cebrowski, OPNAV N8 VADM Connie Lautenbacher, CHINFO RADM Kendall Pease, OPNAV N00K CAPT Robby Harris
  ♦ Drafted in N00K (CAPT Ed Smith, CAPT Robby Harris)
  ♦ Repackaged some earlier N00K CAPT Smith “2020 Vision” concepts
  ♦ CNO ADM Johnson a “customer,” not an author
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

Outline
- New challenges, old realities
- Sea and area control
- Power projection
- Presence and deterrence

Key ideas (I):
- Emphasis (priority) on warfighting missions
  - Naval presence discussed but not highlighted
- Navy-Marine Corps “Operational Primacy”
- “The US Navy will influence, directly and decisively, events ashore from the sea -- anytime, anywhere”
- “We can and will fight our way through any opposition”
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

Key ideas (II):
- VADM Turner’s “4 Missions” modified & re-ordered
- “Broad missions”
  - Sea (and area) control
  - Power projection
  - Presence
  - Deterrence
- Importance of sea (and area) control
  - “at the core of U.S. security requirements lies one prerequisite: Sea control”
  - “expanded area control is our greatest challenge”

Key ideas (III):
- Power projection 1000 miles or more from the coast
  - “Mass the effects of distributed but precise fires from the sea”
  - “Disorient and shock an enemy sufficiently to break his resistance”
- “Naval presence to foreclose an enemy’s options entirely”
- Continuity: …From the Sea, Forward…From the Sea & Navy Operational Concept
- Passing reference to shaping, littorals, deterrence, enabling, joint integration, allies, USMC, cooperative engagement, sealift, sea-based missile defense
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

♦ What was new?
  ♦ Return to focus on warfighting, especially sea control
  ♦ Added emphasis on decisive role of Navy
  ♦ 1st mention of uses of Navy as a “force-in-being” since *The Way Ahead* (1991)
    ♦ Will also be last mention in any USN capstone document (as of 2010)

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

♦ Not addressed (I)
  ♦ 4 “critical operational capabilities from . . . *From the Sea* & *NDP 1*
  ♦ The *Navy Operational Concept*’s 2 key concepts
    ♦ Naval operational maneuver; Speed of command
  ♦ OPNAV program planning joint mission area categories
  ♦ World trade issues, “globalization”
  ♦ Surge capabilities & operations
  ♦ Mine warfare; blockade; convoy operations
  ♦ Humanitarian assistance/disaster response
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

- Not addressed (II)
  - Specificity as to threats
  - Threats to the U.S. homeland
  - Terrorism, piracy and drug-trafficking
  - U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army
  - U.S. Merchant Marine
  - U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
  - U.S. government inter-agency partners & NGOs
  - Links to force level plans, programs, budgets

- Very little on USMC roles

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

- Subsequent analyses & critiques
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

♦ Criticisms
  ♦ Little known
  ♦ Too ambitious
  ♦ Too parochial
  ♦ Backed away from emphasis on forward naval presence
  ♦ Decisive role for USN not reflected in subsequent real-world joint ops, e.g. Kosovo (1999)
  ♦ Not well aligned with national defense policy
  ♦ Relationship to Navy Operational Concept (1997) unclear

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

♦ Influence
  ♦ Influenced CNO SSG guidance & subsequent SSG products
  ♦ Helped drive USN “Revolution in Training” program, to enable decisive influence
  ♦ Catchy title had more influence than content
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

Why did it have the influence it had?

- Little CNO involvement, ownership, follow-through
- Subsequent real-world ops: USN not the “decisive” service
  - E.g.: Kosovo ops
- Catchy title captured Navy officer corps view of the essence of their service

Influence on subsequent capstone documents

- Developed strike, defense & basing concepts that would become Sea Strike, Sea Shield, & Sea Basing pillars in *Sea Power 21*
- Reflected and sparked renaissance of Navy thinking on sea control
- Catchy title repeated in *NSPG 2000*, next CNO (ADM Clark) maiden speech, *Naval Power 21, Sea Power 21*, posture statements, etc.
  - *Sea Power 21* overview article ended with the words: “anywhere, anytime”
Overview

- Signed by CNO ADM Johnson (Aug 1999; Apr 2000)
- Billed as “strategic planning guidance” to influence POM decisions
- Principal target: DON planners, programmers & budgeters
- Very long, detailed, stand-alone pubs (55 & 90 pages)
- 1st was SECRET; 2nd was UNCLAS
- Drafted in OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (N513)
- Forward presence & knowledge superiority
- 5-Dimensional battlespace
- Potential adversary capabilities specifically identified
- Modest, short-term influence
Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000) CNA

Signed by:
- CNO ADM Jay L. Johnson
  - During 3rd & 4th years in office

What it was
- Billed as “strategic planning guidance”
  - Subtitle: “(With) Long Range Planning Objectives”
- Increasingly lengthy & detailed stand-alone pubs
  - NSPG 1999: 55 pages
  - NSPG 2000: 90 pages
- Aug 1999 NSPG was classified, due to intel section
- Apr 2000 NSPG was UNCLAS, to widen influence, especially to potential adversaries
- Cited in DON 2000 Posture Statement

Why it was written

- To try to ensure Navy POM-02 and POM-03 development was influenced by strategy and policy considerations
- To take credit beyond the Navy for doing so (2000)
- To catalyze Navy strategic thinking in anticipation of certain change in Administrations
- To re-establish N-51-drafted top-down CNO guidance as the starting point for OPNAV POM development
- To advance the influence and ideas of OPNAV N51 (& RDML Sestak) within the Navy

Context (I)

- 2nd term of Clinton administration ending (1993-2001)
- 2000 an election year (Bush vs. Gore)
- SECDEF Cohen (1997-2001)
  - New SECNAV Danzig (1998-2001)
- “Engagement–enlargement”
- Feb 1999 “Clinton Doctrine”: Selective US intervention
- QDR 97 experience assimilated; QDR 2001 impending
- Price of oil climbing again
- But US economy still robust
  - Unemployment rate, inflation rate falling.
  - U.S. government budget in surplus
- Central DOD force-sizing requirement to fight 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)

Context (II)
- Periodic mutual USN-PLAN ship visits
  - USN CNO Johnson visited China (Oct 1997)
- PLAN observers at US RIMPAC exercise (Jul 1998)
- PLAN SAREXes w/ foreign navies (from 1998)
- New PRC PLA warfighting doctrine (1999)
- Russians delivered 4 Kilo SSs & 2 Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (1995-2000)
- NATO Kosovo air-only campaign vs. Serbia (Mar-Jun 1999)
- NATO accidentally bombed PRC Belgrade embassy (May 1999)
- PLA built structures on Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in Spratly Islands in South China Sea (1999)

Context (III)
- US-Vietnam diplomatic relations established (1997)
- Pakistan tested 1st nuclear weapon (1998)
- DPRK Taepo-dong (unsuccessful) third stage (potential ICBM) missile test (1998)
- North-South Korean Yellow Sea naval clashes (1999)
- India-Pakistan war in Kargil, Kashmir (1999)

♦ Context (IV)

♦ Russian military & naval power badly eroded
♦ Combat-credible-forward presence-in-3- hubs = accepted USN dogma
♦ Osama bin Laden issued *fatwa* declaring individual duty of every Muslim to kill Americans & their allies (Feb 1998)
♦ Operation *Infinite Reach* (USN attacked Afghan, Sudan targets) (Aug 1998)
♦ Operation Desert Fox Iraq bombing (Dec 1998)
  ♦ Initial attacks by sea-based TACAIR, TLAM only, for surprise
♦ Canal returned to Panama (1999)


♦ Context (V)

♦ USN re-focus on readiness
  ♦ To arrest plummeting readiness of non-deployed forces
♦ Modestly rising DON budgets; plateauing force levels
♦ 1997 *QDR* USN force goal: 305/310 ships
♦ 2000 USN *Interim Long Range Plan* goal: 305-360 ships
♦ USN in 1999: 317 Battle Force ships; 4 new ships authorized
♦ Accelerated entry of F/A-18E/F into the fleet
  ♦ A-12 Breach of Contract litigation continues
♦ Unpublished N51 “4x4” and “Beyond the Sea…” drafts
  ♦ SECNAV Danzig-CNO ADM Johnson differences
♦ Protests over Navy bombing range on Vieques, Puerto Rico, preoccupy OPNAV N3/N5 & staff (1999-2001)

Context (VI)
- OPNAV program planning JMAS replaced by new Integrated Warfare Architectures (IWARS) (1998)
- 5 new warfare IWAR categories
  - Information superiority & sensors
  - Sea dominance
  - Power projection
  - Air dominance
  - Deterrence
  - Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
  - Participants included NSPG contributors

Context (VII)
- VADM Cebrowski NWC president (1998-2001)
  - 1st & only 3-star president since 1979
  - New NWDC subsumed under NWC (1998-2001)
    - Included NAVDOCCOM functions
    - NAVDOCCOM disestablished (1998)
  - To revitalize Navy operational and tactical thinking
  - Included doctrine and concept development divisions
  - New NWDC Maritime Battle Center created to run FBEs (1998)
- Major USMC concept development effort ongoing
- USAF stood up 10 AEFs (1999)
Cited references (I)
  - 2 Major Theater Wars (MTWs)
  - Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
- SECDEF FY02-07 Defense Planning Guidance
- SECNAV POM-02 and PR-03 Planning Guidance

Cited references (II)
  - “Shape, Respond, Prepare Now”
- …From the Sea (1992)
- Forward…From the Sea (1994)
- USMC Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) concept (1996)
- USMC Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) concept (1997)
- Naval Operations in the Information Age concept
- Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP)

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)

- NATO Strategic Concept of the Alliance (1999)
  - Emphasis on crisis management
- NAVDOCCOM Multi-lateral Maritime Operations (MMOPS) pub (1996)
- Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)
- MCDP 1 Warfighting (1997)
- Large family of USMC concepts (1996-8)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)

- CAPT Charles Koburger USCG (Ret), Sea Power in the Twenty-First Century (1997)
- ADM Paul Reason, Sailing New Seas (1998)
  - “Street Fighter” small ship concept
- Richard Danzig, The Big Three: our Greatest Security Risks and How to Address Them (Feb 1999)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
  ♦ Joint CINC Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs)
    ♦ 1st in an increasingly influential quadrennial series

♦ How it was written (I)
  ♦ Advocated earlier by CAPT Joseph Bouchard (N513) (1997)
  ♦ Drafted in OPNAV N51 (RDML Joseph Sestak)
  ♦ Built upon several earlier & concurrent aborted N51 strategy efforts
    ♦ CAPT Sam Tangredi (N513) “4 X 4” (1998)
    ♦ RDML Sestak “Beyond the Sea” (1999)
♦ How it was written (II)
  ♦ Vehicle for unpublished OPNAV N51 “Beyond the Sea…” concepts
    ♦ Became “Naval Concept: Power…Presence…Knowledge: a Narrative Concept for the Information Age”
  ♦ Personalities:
    ♦ Main conceptualizer & driver: RDML Joseph Sestak (N51)
      ♦ Harvard U. Ph.D.
      ♦ Had helped develop Forward . . . From the Sea
    ♦ Drafters: CDR Craig Faller, LT Chris Cavanaugh
  ♦ ONI provided threat assessment
  ♦ Intended to be an institutionalized annual Navy process
    ♦ But only two were ever signed

♦ Outline (Apr 2000 edition)
  ♦ Preface
  ♦ Navy strategic planning guidance
  ♦ The strategic environment
  ♦ The maritime concept
  ♦ The process
  ♦ Long range planning objectives
  ♦ Directed studies
  ♦ Conclusion
Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000) CNA

Key ideas (I)

- New organizing framework of “Means, Ways, Ends”
  - “Means” = 2 highest naval strategic priorities:
    - Forward presence & knowledge superiority
    - Sea control the prerequisite for forward presence
  - “Ways” =
    - Battlespace control - Battlespace attack - Battlespace sustainment
  - “Ways” (and knowledge superiority ”Means”) descend from . . . From the Sea 4 “key operational capabilities”
    - Command, control and surveillance -- Battlespace dominance
    - Power projection -- force sustainment

Key ideas (II)

- “Overarching strategic imperative:” Maritime power projection
- Inform force posture decisions
  - Format designed to fit next stage of POM process
  - Provide prioritized set of concept-driven capabilities to IWARs, for further POM development
  - Provided highly detailed discussion of USN program planning processes
    - Numerous priorities (ranked in 5 tiers)
    - Risk

Key ideas (III)

- Included “Maritime Concept” built on . . . FTS and F . . . FTS.
- Included explicit & detailed ONI assessments
  - Potential adversary capabilities & Probable Other Areas of Concern
  - Identified China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Iraq by name
- USN environment is expanded beyond sea control to 5-dimensional battlespace
- Navy focus on “the littorals and the land beyond”
- Heavily influenced by USMC OMFTS

Key ideas (IV)

- “Rogue states,” non-state actors
- Regional, not global threats
- “Sea Strike” (from Strategic Studies Group): “Shock” ops
- USN as enabling force & shield
- Maritime interception operations
- Counter-terror, counter-drug, humanitarian assist, information operations

Key ideas (V)

- "Building close working relationships with other governmental and non-governmental security actors are also priorities"
- Discussion of refining current Navy operational concepts & development of future concepts
- Topics for further study & analysis
  - Extensive list
  - Reminiscent of Project SIXTY, & Maritime Strategy "uncertainties"


What was new? (I)
- Detailed Navy strategic planning guidance
- Repeatedly-stated alleged link between strategy & new OPNAV Integrated Warfare Architecture (IWAR) program planning process
  - But NSPG categories differed from IWAR categories
- Most explicit identification of potential threats since The Maritime Strategy
- Calling out 3 “ways”
  - Battlespace Control
  - Battlespace Attack
  - Battlespace Sustainment

What was new? (II)
- 1st development of concept of globalization
- 1st discussion of naval counters to threats to US homeland itself – not just along US coasts
- 1st discussion of Information Operations (IO)
- 1st use of the term “peer competitor”
- Non-state actors & pirates identified as threats
  - (“Non-state actions” had been mentioned in passing in The Maritime Strategy (1989))
- Evolution of speed of command (NOC) to knowledge superiority (NSPG)
- Discussion of Navy concept development role, processes and examples
Not addressed
- Priorities among numerous explicit threats discussed
- World trade issues
- Surge capabilities & operations
- Convoy operations
- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
- IWAR warfare categorization scheme

Subsequent analyses & critiques

♦ Criticisms
  ♦ Constrained by 1997 QDR & 305-ship force level goal
  ♦ Did not meaningfully influence POM
  ♦ Created yet another new short-lived vocabulary
  ♦ Was never institutionalized
  ♦ Too long and complex to be well assimilated by busy staff officers
  ♦ Not designed to mesh well with subsequent OPNAV IWAR program planning processes

**Influence:**
  ♦ Modest, short-term
  ♦ Focused Navy efforts on next (2nd) QDR (2001)
  ♦ Continued development of what would become Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and FORCEnet

Why such influence as it had?
- Little real CNO involvement, ownership, follow-through
- CNO ADM Johnson, N3/N5 VADM Natter, N51 RDML Sestak all detached later that year
- New CNO Clark had other ideas on how to improve USN POM development
  - Did not sign subsequent NSPG 2001 draft
  - Changed process: Created N7, etc.
- Length & complexity hindered use
- Too closely identified with RDML Sestak to achieve wide influence or institutionalization

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
- Continued development of what would become Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and FORCEnet “pillars” of Sea Power 21
- Idea of issuing detailed strategic planning guidance to guide Navy program planning would be resurrected in 2006 with Navy Strategic Plan
1990s: Text & content of each document


1990s: Other analyses of each document

♦ “‘. . . From the Sea’ and Back Again,”
  ◦ Edward Rhodes
  ◦ *Naval War College Review* (Spring 1999)

♦ “The United States Navy Since President Ronald Reagan,”
  ◦ Kenneth Hagan & Michael T. McMaster

♦ *US Navy Strategy and Force Structure After the Cold War*
  ◦ Amund Lundesgaard
  ◦ Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (2011)

  ◦ CAPT Peter Haynes USN
  ◦ Ph.D. dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (2011)
CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context


