Organizing OPNAV (1970 - 2009)

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From: Director, Naval History and Heritage Command
To: Chief of Naval Operations
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Encl: (1) copy “Organizing OPNAV, 1970-2009”

1. The Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) is committed to providing all U.S. Navy personnel, especially decision makers, their staffs, and the faculty and students of its educational institutions with a deeper understanding of their past. Such an understanding enables the making of more sophisticated and nuanced Navy policy decisions in the present and future. To this end, NHHC is embarking on a study of the origins and development of the position of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and his staff (OPNAV), to provide needed perspective and context for current and future incumbents in that position and office. Completion of this study is timed to coincide with the upcoming 100th anniversary of the 1915 creation of the position of CNO by President Woodrow Wilson. It is intended to expand upon and update the existing literature on the subject, which is becoming outdated, especially Dr. Thomas Hone's excellent "Power and Change: The Administrative History of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946-1986" published in 1989 by the Naval Historical Center (NHHC's predecessor organization).

2. As an initial input to that effort, NHHC commissioned CNA, the Navy's Federally Funded Research and Development Center to examine recent changes in OPNAV including the latest reorganization near the end of 2009. It is NHHC's intention to use this preliminary study as one of several points of departure for its larger effort. Meanwhile, since this CNA study may have some current utility beyond its originally intended use, it is provided to you now as an attachment to this Memorandum.

3. The study was overseen and directed by Dr. Randy Papadopoulos, Acting Histories Branch head at NHHC. He would welcome comments or
Subj: STUDY "ORGANIZING OPNAV, 1970-2009"

suggestions relating to the study or to the larger NHHC effort. He can be reached at (202) 433-9669 or randy.papadopoulos@navy.mil.

J. A. DELOACH
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Director, Naval History
The outline above provides an overview of the contents of this study. Following a 1-page summary and several pages of background material, the heart of the study is a discussion of changes in the Organization of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), organized by decade.

Each decade section starts with a listing of significant changes during that decade; provides a few representative organization charts highlighting those changes; and then discusses a handful of significant issue areas in greater depth. (The issues listed above for the 1970s are repeated for each succeeding decade).

Finally, there is a brief presentation of some overall conclusions and observations that derive from the preceding data and discussion, and a listing of the written references consulted. (A listing of subject matter experts consulted can be found inside the front cover).

A glossary spelling out acronyms and abbreviations concludes the paper.

**Readers only wishing to trace the overall evolution of the OPNAV staff chronologically should just consult the “Significant changes” and “Selected organizational charts” sections for each decade.** Readers interested in more detail on the evolution of OPNAV organization for a specific issue area, such as preparing for the POM build (“program planning,” later “program appraisal”), should read the sections for each decade on the appropriate issue area, in sequence.
Reorganization has been a conspicuous and continual phenomenon in OPNAV throughout the period examined in this study. Some reorganizations have been massive; some have been small; but some degree of organizational churn has been constant.

Despite the plethora of reorganizations, large and small, their rationales have exhibited a certain consistency over time. As outlined above, all recent Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) have changed the OPNAV staff organization in some way, to try to achieve their goals.
This study responded to the concluding task of a long-standing CNA study for the Director, Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) (formerly the Naval Historical Center). The Director is himself double-hatted as part of the OPNAV staff (DNS-H).

Specifically, the study supported an NHHC/DNS-H requirement to support in turn the OPNAV Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Integration Group (QIG), which reported directly to the Director, Navy Staff. NHHC/DNS-H and the QIG tasked the study in June 2009, for completion no later than September 2009.

The CNA study director and the NHHC/DNS-H and QIG points of contact maintained close substantive contact throughout the study period.

NB: In October 2009, the QIG was re-designated the Naval Warfare Integration Group (N00X), reporting directly to the CNO.
Study task (II)

Original tasking:

The initial thought of the sponsors was to have CNA provide an update to Thomas Hone’s *Power and Change*, which covered the period from 1946 to 1986. The update was to deal with the 1986-2009 period.
The requested deliverable was a study in briefing slide format, intended to be useful to officers in OPNAV then crafting the next big OPNAV staff reorganization -- targeted for October-November 2009.

CNA was able to improve on that, and provided this CNA Annotated Briefing (CAB) instead.
Study questions

♦ What have been the significant changes to the OPNAV staff organization over the past few decades?
♦ Why were those changes instituted?
♦ What observations and conclusions can be drawn from those changes, that might prove useful to OPNAV decision-makers considering future changes?

The three sponsor study questions were straightforward, with an emphasis on the data-gathering task embodied in Question #1.
CNA’s approach to the study tasking and study questions was equally straightforward, as noted above.

The NHHC had hopes of eventually sponsoring an effort to update *Power and Change*. NHHC did not want CNA to complete such an update itself at this time, as that would have been well beyond the time and dollar resources available for the study. NHHC did want CNA, however, to provide an initial and significant input that would be useful in any such future update.

The QIG, while certainly encouraging NHHC’s plans to update the Hone book, was more interested in ensuring that CNA disseminate its draft findings in advance of the upcoming reorganization of the OPNAV staff.

The original tasking had called for a study that started with 1986 -- the end date of the period covered by Thomas Hone’s *Power and Change*. Initial research and analysis, however, indicated that the story of the 1986-2009 period could best be understood in the context of changes that had occurred since 1970.

This study therefore begins with 1970 and the changes to the OPNAV organization initiated by then-CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. To that extent it necessarily overlaps somewhat with the Hone book. Materials drawn from *Power and Change*, however, have been re-organized here so as to conform to the presentation scheme of this study.
Given the sponsors’ tasking and constraints, CNA adopted the approach outlined above.

The study was able to make use of related ongoing CNA research and analysis (for OPNAV N3/N5 on the evolution of US Navy capstone documents since 1970), as well as several previous CNA studies.

Subject matter experts who reviewed and improved drafts of the study are listed on the inside front cover.
Constraints on the study have already been discussed. Despite the plethora of potentially useful secondary sources (see the References section at the end of this study), they proved more difficult to use than anticipated. Cross-checking among sources indicated that few were error-free. CNA accordingly had to be judicious in their use.

Also, it must be noted that a study of formal reorganizations cannot reflect the entire history of an organization. This study perforce gives undue prominence to formal titles, relationships and responsibilities, and shorter shrift to procedures, personalities, cross-organizational boards & committees, informal organizations, and external links.

Thus it provides a useful outline of the history of OPNAV since 1970, but hardly a complete story or analysis.
The study was originally tasked to be in briefing slide format. The substantive sections on issue areas for each decade conform to this tasking. They are self-explanatory. In addition, however, introductory and closing sections and all organizational chart slides have been annotated, for clarity and amplification, and to improve flow.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has a vast number of responsibilities, many of the most important of which are captured above.

This study did not seek to examine the evolution of OPNAV to help him carry out all of his responsibilities. Rather, it limited itself to those highlighted above.

This sub-set of CNO responsibilities captured the primary interests of the study’s sponsors, and was amenable to data-gathering and analysis within the time and resources available.
4 significant CNO concerns

♦ How best to prep for the springtime POM build during the preceding summer & fall Program Planning/Assessment (pre-OSD Guidance) phase?

♦ How best to plan for the long term, beyond the FYDP?

♦ How best to develop naval policy, strategy & operational advice to the President & SECDEF?

♦ How best to articulate the Navy story?
  ♦ How to provide unifying vision, guidance & direction to the various disparate geographic and functional elements of the Navy, and their external supporters?

This summarizes and amplifies on the four specific CNO concerns chosen for data presentation and analysis.
A 5th concern

♦ Where on the staff to place trusted & responsive CNO agents & advisors?
  ♦ To directly harness to the CNO the acumen & energy of specific trusted named officers
  ♦ To implement explicit CNO guidance, not watered down by OPNAV directorate agendas
  ♦ To provide unfiltered advice, especially alternative views
  ♦ To do it quickly & with a minimum of interference from others

While not a CNO responsibility per se, the placement of trusted and responsive agents – and purveyors of alternative advice and views – emerged in this study as a particular strong desire by all CNOs. They regarded it as an important enabler of their activities and decisions, and it affected their organization charts.

Accordingly, the study also seeks to present and analyze data for this issue area as well.
The study is organized by decade.

Each decade section follows a similar outline, presented above.

Significant OPNAV changes during each decade are listed chronologically. This provides a sense of the scope and nature of all changes instituted by each CNO.

The same data is then reformatted and presented in a few representative organizational charts from the period.

Changes regarding each of the five study issue areas outlined previously are then outlined in greater detail.
CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt had previous OPNAV experience as the Director of Systems Analysis (OP-96). He also had had other significant experience tours in the Pentagon. Unusually junior for a Chief of Naval Operations, his immediately previous tour had been as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam. He was the first surface warfare officer to be chosen as CNO in a decade -- and the last for another two decades.

He initiated revolutionary changes in the OPNAV staff’s organization

Admiral Holloway – a nuclear-power-trained tactical naval aviator – fleeted up to the position of CNO from being Admiral Zumwalt’s Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO). He had had extensive combat experience in three wars, had commanded major fleet units in the Atlantic and Pacific, and had previously served in OPNAV in the Naval Aviation directorate.

He largely consolidated and sustained Admiral Zumwalt’s changes to the OPNAV staff organization, and made a few of his own.

Admiral Hayward was likewise a tactical naval aviator and combat veteran, and a very experienced OPNAV hand, having previously served as Director, Navy Program Planning (OP-090). He had also served successively as Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and then Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Pacific (CINCPACFLT).

Admiral Hayward made no significant changes to the OPNAV staff organization during the 1970s, in the first half of his tenure as CNO. He went on, however, to make several significant changes in the 1980s.
This chart and three subsequent, similar ones seek to capture some of the most salient aspects of the decades being discussed, to provide some context and background to the issues facing the CNOs and OPNAV.


As is evident above, the 1970s were a period of decreasing funding for Navy programs, and of major cuts in ships and personnel – especially during Admiral Zumwalt’s tenure as CNO. On the other hand, a number of new platforms and weapon systems entered the fleet during the decade that greatly increased its capabilities.

Meanwhile, the early 1970s saw continued intense combat by US forces in Vietnam, followed by withdrawal and a certain measure of détente with the Soviet Union. The end of the decade saw the beginnings of an intensification of the Cold War, due to aggressive Soviet policies and American reactions to them, as well as numerous crises in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Throughout the decade, however, US relations warmed with the People’s Republic of China.
1970s: Significant changes (I)

♦ CNO ADM Elmo Zumwalt (1970-74)
  ♦ OP-93 (Long Range Objectives Group) abolished (1970)
  ♦ Responsibilities shifted to OP-96L (1970); OP-965 (1971)
  ♦ OP-00H created temporarily to draft Project SIXTY (1970)
  ♦ CNO Executive Panel (CEP) & OP-00K created (1970)
  ♦ DCNO platform barons created (1971)
    ♦ OP-02 (Submarine Warfare) created
    ♦ OP-03 (Fleet Ops & Readiness) re-designated Surface Warfare
    ♦ OP-05 (Air Warfare) gained old OP-03 air programs
  ♦ OP-07 (DCNO for Development) became OP-098 (Director for RDT&E) (1971)

Listed here and on the next three pages are the significant changes made to the OPNAV staff organization during the 1970s, during the tenures of Admirals Zumwalt and Holloway as CNO.

Admiral Zumwalt, in particular, considerably altered the nature and form of the OPNAV staff while he was CNO.
1970s: Significant changes (II)

- CNO ADM Elmo Zumwalt (1970-74) (cont)
  - Director of Naval Intelligence:
    - Dropped from ACNO (OP-092) to division head under OP-094 (ACNO for Command Support Programs) (OP-942) (1971)
    - Incumbent DNI (RADM Harlfinger) became VADM OP-094
    - Double-hatted as Special Assistant to CNO (OP-009) (1971)
    - Retained OP-009 designation; OP-942 disestablished (1973)
  - OP-96 (RADM Turner) reorganized OP-96 branches to conform to new “Missions of the Navy” construct (c1971)
  - OP-96 designated OP-965 the Extended Planning & Net Assessment branch (c1973)
  - OP-96N (Net Assessment) split off from OP-965 (Extended Planning) (c1975)

1970s: Significant changes (III)

- CNO ADM Elmo Zumwalt (1970-74) (cont)
  - Strategic Systems Directorate (OP-097) (created 1967) downgraded to division of OP-06 (OP-62) (1972)
  - New 3-star Chief of Naval Reserve (OP-09R) created (c1973)
    - OP-01 lost Reserve responsibilities
  - OP-06 Strategic Objectives Plans branch (OP-605) redesignated as Mid and Long Range Plans & Policy Branch (c1973)
  - OP-06 Strategic Action Group (OP-60N) created (1973)
Admiral Holloway made many less changes to his staff organization than had Admiral Zumwalt.

Admiral Holloway had been Admiral Zumwalt’s second VCNO, and had participated in some of Admiral Zumwalt’s organizational decisions, and in their initial implementation.
This organizational chart and the following one provide another look at the changes to the OPNAV staff instituted by Admiral Zumwalt.

This chart shows the organization that Admiral Zumwalt inherited.

Note that a robust Program Planning organization (OP-090) was already in place to oversee the creation of the Navy program, as demanded by the institution of the DOD-wide Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) early in the 1960s by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. This organization included a Long-Range Objectives Group (OP-93) and a Systems Analysis Division (OP-96) -- initially stood up by then-RADM Zumwalt in 1966. It also included an organization of over a dozen officers – the Operations Study Group (OSG)  -- assigned full time to participate in the work of the newly formed Navy analytical think tank, the Center for Naval Analyses.

Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNOs) included a DCNO for Fleet Operations and Readiness (OP-03) and a DCNO for Air (OP-05). Staffing naval Foreign Military Assistance was an OPNAV responsibility, under the DCNO for Plans and Policy (OP-06)

The number of DCNOs – six – was mandated by Congress.

A separate directorate for Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems had been established in 1967

(Abbreviations used in this and subsequent charts are spelled out in the Glossary, at the end of this study).
The OPNAV organization as it appeared toward the end of Admiral Zumwalt’s tenure as CNO is presented above. (Shading in this and subsequent organization charts indicates significant changes).

Note that Admiral Zumwalt disestablished the DCNO for Fleet Operations and Readiness and changed the DCNO for Development to a Director for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDTE). This enabled him to create two new DCNOs – one for Submarines and one for Surface.

He also created a Director for Tactical Electromagnetic Programs (TE) (OP-093); moved the responsibilities of the Director for Offensive and Defensive Strategic Systems (OP-097) under the DCNO for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06); and briefly moved the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) under the Director for Command Support (OP-094), while giving the DNI direct access to the CNO as OP-009.

Admiral Zumwalt set up a small, temporary staff element (OP-00H) to help him draft and promulgate his Project SIXTY capstone document for the Navy. He also set up a new permanent institution to advise him – the civilian CNO Executive Panel (CEP) – and a new staff to manage it – OP-00K.

Long-range planning responsibilities moved from the disestablished Long-Range Objectives Group (OP-93) to a new Extended Planning & Net Assessment branch (OP-965), as well as to a renamed Mid-and Long-Range Plans and Policy branch (OP-605) in the Strategy, Plans and Policy division (OP-60).

Also, a new Director of Navy Education and Training was created (OP-099), as a result of a wholesale reorganization of the Navy’s manpower, personnel and training establishment.
CNO ADM Zumwalt goals:
- Use Project SIXTY as an overarching vision
- Elevate surface warfare programs to a level – and autonomous status -- on a par with aviation programs
- Use a powerful integrating directorate (OP-090) -- supplemented by other integrating directorates -- to force integration among the community “unions”
- OP-96 to use campaign analysis & net assessment as primary tools to accomplish integration
- Fall program planning integration to influence springtime Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs)

The next 16 slides discuss the five key issue areas of the study, as the OPNAV organization evolved during the 1970s.

The five areas are:
- Prepping for the POM build
- Planning for the long term
- Advising on policy, strategy & operations
- Articulating the Navy story
- Housing trusted & responsive CNO agents

“Related changes” are detailed as well.

These slides are detailed and self-explanatory, and have no annotations. Annotations resume on page 31, at the start of the section on the decade of the 1980s.
1970s: Prepping for the POM build (II)

♦ CNOs ADMs Holloway & Hayward goals:
  ♦ Institutionalize Zumwalt organization & processes
  ♦ NWP-1, then CNO Strategic Concepts superseded Project SIXTY as overarching vision

1970s: Prepping for the POM build (III)

♦ Competitive system w/in OPNAV for resources
♦ “Resource sponsors”
  ♦ Had $ for programs: Defended, wanted more
  ♦ ADM Zumwalt created 3 “platform sponsors” ("Barons")
    ♦ OP-02 (sub), OP-03 (sw), OP-05 (av) (since 1971)
      ♦ Congressional pressure for 3-star submariner to match aviators
    ♦ The 3 Barons had most of the $; zero-sum game outlooks
♦ Other Resource Sponsors
  ♦ OP-01 (incl/ Director, NAVRES, OP-04, others. Even OP-06 (Mil Assist. (OP-63)))
1970s: Prepping for the POM build (IV)

♦ ADM Zumwalt strengthened 4 integrating directorates (DMSOs)
  ♦ OP-090 (Program Planning), OP-094 (Command Support), OP-095 (ASW), OP-098 (RDT&E)
  ♦ OP-06: Strategy, Policy & Operations; Joint matters OPSDEP
  ♦ OPNAV panels: CNO Executive Board (CEB); “pre-CEB”

1970s: Prepping for the POM build (V)

♦ OP-090 the “honest broker” & senior OPNAV 3-star for all except JCS matters
  ♦ Created in 1963
  ♦ Developed & used campaign analysis, computer-assisted modeling, Net Assessment, & war gaming techniques
1970s: Prepping for the POM build (VI)

♦ OP-96 (Systems Analysis Division) (since 1966) & Net Assessment = the drivers of the Program Planning pre-guidance phase
  ♦ Integration vehicle: CNO Program Analysis Memoranda (CPAMS) (drafted in OP-96)
  ♦ OP-96 organized along “Project SIXTY”/“Missions of the Navy” lines: Sea Control, Power Projection, Strategic Warfare (& support areas).
  ♦ RADM Turner headed OP-96 (1971-72)

1970s: Planning for the long term

♦ ADM Zumwalt abolished OP-93 (Long Range Objectives Group) (1970)
  ♦ Responsibilities shifted to OP-96L; OP-965 (1971)
♦ CNO submitted Extended Planning Annex (EPA)
  ♦ OSD mandate (c1974-5)
  ♦ OP-96L (1970); OP-965 (Extended Planning Branch) (c1973)
♦ CNO contributed to Joint long range planning documents
  ♦ JCS mandates
    ♦ E.g.: Joint Long Range Strategic Study (JLRSS); later Joint Long Range Strategic Assessment (JLRSA)
  ♦ Navy Strategic Study (NSS) (TS): Input to joint docs
  ♦ OP-605: Mid & Long-Range Plans & Policy Branch (c1973-1978)
1970s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (I)

- The domain of DCNO for Strategy, Plans and Policy (OP-06) (“The OPSDEP”)
  - CNO policy/strategy/ops advice to higher authority was/is mediated through JCS & joint strategic planning system.
  - CNO ADM Robert Carney created OP-06 in mid-1950s to support more robust CNO role as member of JCS
  - Massive, compromise-laden and/or log-rolled joint documents
  - Slow “flimsy-buff-green” paper staffing processes

1970s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (II)

- Plans & Policy Division (OP-60) billet held by a RADM (upper half)
  - OP-60B a new RADM (lower half)
  - Nuclear policy and strategy a branch of OP-60 (OP-604) (CAPT as branch head) (till 1979)
  - OP-60N a small special think tank (1973-1978)
- Separate OP-61 Pol-Mil Affairs Division, headed by a RADM (lower half)
- Also, OP-62, OP-63, OP-64
1970s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (III)

- Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) established (1975)
  - VCNO chaired.
  - Members: OP-009, OP-02, OP-06, OP-090, OP-095, OP-098, others as required
  - Assessed submarine ops, threats
  - Highly classified

1970s: Articulating the Navy story (I)

- CNO ADM Zumwalt (1970-74)
  - USN “capstone” policy & strategy documents originated with orgs/pers close to CNO (Admiral Turner)
  - Project SIXTY (1970)
    - CNO ADM Zumwalt ad hoc OP-00H committee drafted
      - Members drawn from OP-60, OP-093, OP-96
      - “Missions of the Navy” categorization scheme used later by OP-96 for program planning
  - Subsequent annual CNO Program Planning Guidance (CPPGs)
    - OP-96 drafted
    - “Missions” categories used later by program planners
  - Missions of the Navy (1974)
    - President & faculty, Naval War College, drafted
1970s: Articulating the Navy story (II)

♦ **CNO ADM Holloway** (1974-1978)
  ♦ USN “capstone” policy & strategy documents came mostly from OPNAV (no single focal shop)
  ♦ **NWP-1, Strategic Concepts of the US Navy**
    ♦ 1976, 1978 editions
    ♦ CNO ADM Holloway & OP-60N AO drafted
    ♦ Included chapter on “Navy Program Development”
    ♦ “Warfare Task” categories adopted by *The Maritime Strategy* & OP-095 program appraisal categories (1980s)
  ♦ **Sea Plan 2000** (1978)
    ♦ Working group drawn from NAVWARCOL, OP-60, OP-96, etc drafted
    ♦ SECNAV Claytor signed; Under SECNAV Woolsey oversaw

1970s: Articulating the Navy story (III)

♦ **CNO ADM Hayward** (1978-1982)
  ♦ USN “capstone” policy & strategy documents emanated from OPNAV org/pers close to CNO
  ♦ **CNO Strategic Concepts (TS), Future of Sea Power (U)** (1979)
    ♦ CNO ADM Hayward EA drafted
    ♦ Sea Control & Power Projection categories seen as useful for programming, but not for explaining Navy strategy
  ♦ President, Naval War College downgraded to 2-star vice 3-star billet (from 1979)
1970s: Articulating the Navy story (IV)

- USN Doctrine & TTP pubs overseen by OPNAV
  - Highly de-centralized development system
- USN contributions to Joint Doctrine also overseen by OPNAV
  - Tortuous, compromise-laden joint process
- NWP-2, Organization of the U.S. Navy
  - 1976, 1982 editions
  - Goal: Explain “How the Navy works”
  - OP-602 drafted
  - Included OPNAV organization & discussion

1970s: Housing trusted/ responsive CNO agents

- ADM Zumwalt created OP-00H temporarily to draft Project SIXTY (1970)
- ADM Zumwalt created OP-00K (1970)
  - Provide uniformed Navy staff support to civilian CNO Executive Panel (CEP)
  - But also became CNO “mini-staff”
  - Directly responsible and responsive to CNO
  - Hand-picked, front-running officers
- OP-06 echoed this approach
  - OP-06 Strategic Action Group (OP-60N) (1973-1978)
  - Drafted NWP-1 Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, etc.
1970s: Related changes

♦ Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) shifted around
  ♦ From ACNO (OP-092) to division director (OP-942) (1971) to Special Assistant to CNO (OP-009) (1973)
    ♦ RADM Harlfinger (OP-092) promoted to VADM; assigned as OP-094
    ♦ Brought his old directorate (OP-092) with him, now downgraded to a division under OP-094
    ♦ When VADM Harlfinger retired, OP-942 left OP-094 & came directly under CNO as OP-009 (1973)

♦ Consolidation of surface type commands into Surface Forces Atlantic and Pacific
  ♦ Reinforced creation of surface warfare “barony” in OPNAV
The study will now consider the decade of the 1980s, following the same outline used previously for the 1970s.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ADM Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>ADM Elmo Zumwalt</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>ADM James Holloway</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>ADM Thomas Hayward</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>ADM James Watkins</td>
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<td>ADM Carlisle Trost</td>
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<td>ADM Gary Roughead</td>
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Admiral Hayward’s term as CNO straddled the 1970s and the 1980s, but his most significant changes to the OPNAV organization came in the 1980s. Admiral Hayward would be the last tactical naval aviator to serve as CNO for a decade and a half.

He was succeeded by Admiral James Watkins, the first of three nuclear submariners in a row to serve as CNO. Admiral Watkins had previously served in OPNAV as VCNO under Admiral Hayward, and prior to that as DCNO for Manpower (OP-01) and Chief of Naval Personnel.

Admiral Carlisle Trost, the second nuclear submariner CNO, succeeded Admiral Watkins. Like Admiral Hayward, Admiral Trost had had extensive previous OPNAV program planning and development experience. He had served as Director of Systems Analysis (OP-96), and later as Director of Navy Program Planning (OP-090).
The 1980s saw an increase in Navy budgets and numbers of ships and aircraft, then a plateauing and some falling off.

The U.S. Navy was not only larger than it had been in the mid- and late-1970s, but also much more capable, due to the continuing entrance into the fleet of 1970s-era systems, and even newer systems first fielded in the 1980s.

The Cold War reached a new intensity during the early and mid-1980s, but at the very end of the decade it became obvious that the Warsaw Pact and indeed even the Soviet Union – and its Navy -- were collapsing.

Meanwhile, American – and US Navy – involvement in Southwest Asia continued to expand.
Listed here and on the next page are the significant changes made to the OPNAV staff organization during the tenures of Admirals Hayward, Watkins and Trost as CNO, during the 1980s

With the exception of Admiral Hayward’s expansion and elevation of OP-095’s role in Navy program planning, none of these changes was as drastic as those of the 1970s (or the 1990s).
1980s: Significant changes (II)

- **CNO ADM ADM James Watkins** (1982-1986)
  - OP-96 (Systems Analysis) abolished (1983)
    - OP-91 (Program Resource Appraisal Division) created
    - OP-96N (Net Assessment) disappeared
  - Long-range planning function subsumed under OP-00K (1983)
  - Perception Management staff took over Long Range Planning Office title and staff code (OP-00X)
    - CAPT (Ret) Bill Manthorpe moved from Net Assessment to transmogrified N00X
  - Perception Management staff later moved under VCNO as OP-09X (c1984-9)
  - Chief of Naval Reserve elevated to 3 stars (1985)

1980s: Significant changes (III)

- **CNO ADM Carlisle Trost** (1986-1990)
  - Navy systems commands reported to SECNAV as well as to CNO (1986)
  - OP-02, OP-03, OP-05 became ACNOs (1987)
  - Directors (OP-090 & OP-095) became DCNOs (OP-07 & OP-08) (1987)
  - OP-009 (DNI) became OP-092, now reporting to SECNAV (for investigative matters) as well as to CNO (1987)
  - OP-098 re-designated Director of R&D Requirements, Test & Evaluation, now principally reporting to SECNAV as well as to CNO (1987)
  - OP-63 (Security Assistance) abolished. Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) created (1989)
    - Responsibility shifted from CNO up to SECNAV
    - Director, NIPO also Deputy Assistant SECNAV (DASN)
The OPNAV staff organization and procedures established by Admiral Zumwalt in the early 1970s enjoyed a certain measure of stability through the 1980s and into the early 1990s. The main exception was Admiral Hayward’s expansion of the mandate of the Director of ASW (OP-095) in Navy program planning, and his re-designation of OP-095 as the Director of Naval Warfare. Another important change was the not unrelated downgrading of the role of the Systems Analysis Division (OP-96), and its morphing into the Office of Program Resource Appraisal (OP-91).

With the relief of long-serving Admiral Hyman Rickover as head of Navy nuclear propulsion programs in 1982, some new relationships for his successors in that role were established, including designation as a Special Assistant to the CNO (OP-00N).

Throughout the early and mid-1980s, the influence of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman on the Navy was strong. That influence even extended to the OPNAV staff. Secretary Lehman had vociferously advocated the abolition of the Systems Analysis division, especially its Extended Planning and Net Assessment branches. He was also a central player in the retirement of Admiral Rickover, and was instrumental in briefly elevating the Director of Naval Reserve to 3-star rank (Lehman was a naval reservist).

Other changes that show up are OP-06’s new responsibilities for monitoring and advising on fleet operations, which he took on in the mid-1970s. Also, in 1980, the Nuclear Warfare Policy branch (OP-604) had been elevated to a division, headed by a one-star flag officer. And OP-01 regained the training portfolio.

Finally, Admiral Hayward briefly set up a special long-range planning cell reporting directly to himself (OP-00X); This later would be folded into OP-00K.
OPNAV organization and processes remained fairly stable through the remainder of the decade. There were, however, some changes of note:

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 reduced the number of Navy DCNOs from six to five, and changed many relationships within the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy. It also sent a powerful signal that the nation was demanding more jointness from its military services.

Moreover, within OPNAV there continued to be concern that OPNAV’s platform sponsors still wielded too much power internally vis-a-vis its integrating offices.

As a result of these trends, the Directors of Naval Warfare (OP-095) and Navy Program Planning (OP-090) were elevated to DCNOs, and re-designated OP-07 and OP-08 – in part to mimic joint usage. The platform sponsors became Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations (ACNOs), but they retained their independent access to the CNO.

Also, the Director of Naval Intelligence became head of a directorate, instead of a staff assistant to the CNO, with the designation of OP-092. With the resignation of John Lehman as Secretary of the Navy in 1987, the rank of the Director, Naval Reserve reverted to rear admiral.

OPNAV lost its responsibilities for foreign military assistance to the Navy Secretariat. The Security Assistance Branch (OP-63) was abolished. In 1989 a Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) was created, its flag officer head reporting to the Secretary of the Navy as a Deputy Assistant Secretary.
1980s: Prepping for the POM build (I)

♦ CNO Hayward (1978-1982) goal:
  ♦ Use *The Maritime Strategy* as an overarching vision
  ♦ Use an additional separate, independent, 3-star integrating directorate (OP-095) to appraise USN requirements, organized by warfare area, to
    ♦ Cut across “union” & community lines
    ♦ Create a “whole of Navy” approach to building a POM to implement the *Strategy*
    ♦ Increase strategy & fleet plans & ops influence on POM
    ♦ Balance power that had accrued to OP-090 as chief integrator
  ♦ Then have barons push programs, informed by appraisals
  ♦ OP-090 to perform “honest broker” integrating function to actually construct POM and budget submissions.
  ♦ CNOs ADMs Watkins & Trost sustained this process

The next 14 slides discuss the five key issue areas of the study, as the OPNAV organization evolved during the 1980s.

The five areas are:

• Prepping for the POM build
• Planning for the long term
• Advising on policy, strategy & operations
• Articulating the Navy story
• Housing trusted & responsive CNO agents

“Related changes” are detailed as well.

These slides are detailed and self-explanatory, and have no annotations.
Annotations resume on page 46, at the start of the section on the decade of the 1990s.
1980s: Prepping for the POM build (II)

- CNO ADM Hayward broadened OP-095 mandate/organization to encompass all naval warfare areas (1980)
  - ASW, Strike, AAW, ASUW, amphibious, MIW, etc. branches
  - OP-095 also responsible for some program $

- OP-095 superseded OP-96 & Net Assessment as driver of Navy Program Planning/Appraisals (the “pre-guidance” phase) for the future
  - Warfare Area Appraisals
    - ASW, Strike, AAW, ASUW, amphib, MIW etc. appraisals
  - Summary Warfare Appraisal (fall)
  - Crossed platform lines
  - Increased dependency on computer-assisted war gaming & exercise/ops reconstruction to provide insights to decision-makers
  - OP-095 staffed by recent fleet returnees & SSG alumni (who had originally been ordered to SSG from the fleet)

1980s: Prepping for the POM build (III)

- SECNAV Lehman (1981-1987) views
  - Antipathy to OPNAV emphasis on program planning, campaign analyses, net assessment, OP-96
  - Wanted more focus on strategic thinking, fleet operational experience, & a coherent rationale for the Navy

  - Replaced by new Program Resource Appraisal Division (OP-91)
  - Net Assessment Office (OP-96N) also abolished
  - OPNAV panels: PDRC (**) PRC (***) CEB (****)
1980s: Prepping for the POM build (IV)

  ♦ OPNAV limited to 5 DCNOs; 3 ACNOs
    ♦ DCNOs = Senate-confirmed VADMs
    ♦ CNO ADM Trost ADM upgraded OP-095 & OP-090 (Directors) to OP-07 & OP-08 (DCNOs), to strengthen OPNAV integrators
      ♦ OP-07 & OP-08 designations mapped to Joint Staff office designations somewhat
      ♦ Abortive OP-06 efforts to have other OPNAV offices redesignated IAW Joint Staff practice
    ♦ Downgraded OP-02, OP-03, OP-05 DCNOs to ACNOs (1987)
      ♦ They remained VADMs, directly reporting to the CNO

1980s: Planning for the long term (I)

♦ Long Range Planning Group (OP-00X) (1980-83)
  ♦ CNO ADM Hayward created
  ♦ Defense Science Board had recommended
  ♦ Rear Admiral (LH) billet (RADM (SEL) Larson)
  ♦ CNO ADM Watkins soon moved it under OP-00K (1983)
  ♦ Develop Extended Planning Annex (EPA)
    ♦ OSD mandate
    ♦ OP-965: Extended Planning Branch (until 1983)
    ♦ SECNAV Lehman displeasure (1981)
    ♦ CNO ADM Watkins subsumed under new OP-91
  ♦ Joint long range planning documents lapsing
    ♦ Little OPNAV (OP-06) interest
1980s: Planning for the long term (II)

- Warfare & support area “master plans”
  - OP-01 Long Range MPT Strategy
  - OP-02 Attack Submarine Warfare Plan
  - OP-05 Naval Aviation Plan
  - OP-095 ASW Master Plan
  - Etc.

1980s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (I)

- Prominence in OPNAV of OP-06 (DCNO for Strategy, Plans and Policy)
  - Drafters & briefers of The Maritime Strategy
  - Primary OPNAV interlocutor with Joint Staff, at a time when CJCS & Joint Staff increasing in competence & influence
  - OP-60 billet still held by a RADM
  - Nuclear policy branch (OP-604) elevated to a Division, (OP-65), headed by a RADM (LH) (1980)
  - But OP-60B billet downgraded from COMO to CAPT (1985)
  - OP-63 (Security Assistance) abolished. Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) created (1989)
  - U.S. Army & U.S. Air Force officers assigned to OP-603 (mid-1980s)
1980s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (II)

- **Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (1986)**
  - Strongly opposed by SECNAV Lehman & many USN officers
  - Increased power of CJCS & Joint Staff
  - Joint Staff, including Director, now worked only for CJCS
    - No longer worked for JCS (incl/ CNO) as a corporate body
  - JCS documents now became CJCS documents
  - Streamlined joint document processes
  - Reduced OPNAV & other service staff influence on joint (now CJCS) documents
  - Mandated high-quality Navy officer assignments to Joint Staff

1980s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (III)

- Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) continued
  - VCNO chaired.
  - Members: OP-009, OP-02, OP-06, OP-090, OP-095, OP-098, others as required
  - VCNO (ADM Small) broadened mandate, to incl/ maritime strategy & perception management (1981)
  - Sub-panels created. Broadened participation throughout OPNAV
- Perception Management office (1983-9)
  - Took over “Long Range Planning Office” (OP-00X) (1983-4)
  - Re-assigned as N00X (1984-9)
  - Key player: CAPT William Manthorpe USN (Ret)
    - Had been OP-090 Net Assessment director
- Most details still highly classified
### 1980s: Articulating the Navy story (I)

- **Dominance of The Maritime Strategy**
  - 5 classified versions drafted in OP-60
  - 3 UNCLAS versions drafted in OP-00K
  - Higher levels of classification addressed in ATP
  - Continuity across 3 CNOs
  - Strategy CPAM (CNO’s Program Advisory Memorandum) launched annual POM development process
- USN Doctrine and TTP overseen by OP-095
- USN contributions to Joint Doctrine overseen by OP-095

### 1980s: Articulating the Navy story (II)

- **CNO’s SSG created (1981)**
  - CNO study group housed at NAVWARCOL Newport
  - Hand-picked, front-running fleet CDRs & CAPTs
  - Access to senior flags across the Navy
  - Rapidly wielded influence in OPNAV & elsewhere: At strategic, operational, tactical levels
- *NWP-2 Rev B, Organization of the U.S. Navy* ("how the Navy works") (1982)
  - Drafted in OP-602
  - Included OPNAV organization & discussion
  - Never published again (USN has no organization manual besides SNDL; hasn’t for a quarter-century)
1980s: Housing trusted/responsive CNO agents

- Continued use of OP-00K as CNO “mini-staff”
- CNO ADM Trost particularly critical of OP-06 responsiveness
  - Background as OP-96, OP-090
  - Comfortable in tasking OP-090/OP-08 organization

1980s: Related changes (I)

- ADM Rickover retired by SECNAV Lehman (1982)
  - Followed in both USN & DOE roles by succession of double-hatted 4-star submarine officers
  - Congress mandated that successors also have OPNAV hat (OP-00N, later N00N)
- CINCLANTFLT job split off from SACLANT/ CINCLANT (1985)
- Congress split Navy RADM into 1-star & 2-star ranks
  - 1-star “Commodore Admiral” rank established (1982)
  - Commodore Admirals re-designated “Commodores” (1983)
  - Commodores re-designated “Rear Admirals (Lower Half)” (RDML) (1986)
1980s: Related changes (II)

♦ SECNAV Lehman abolished Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) (1985)
  ♦ 4-star CHNAVMAT billet used to separate CINCLANTFLT from SAACLANT/USCINCLANT
  ♦ Increased SECNAV (Lehman) direct control over SYSCOMs, reducing OPNAV domination of SYSCOMs

♦ Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, Defense Acquisition Improvement Act, & SECNAV Lehman initiatives consolidated acquisition, auditing, comptroller/FM, information management, IG, legislative, public affairs under SECNAV (1986)
  ♦ ASN (RD&A) became Navy Acquisition Executive
The study will now consider the decade of the 1990s, following the same outline used previously.
Admiral Frank Kelso was the last of the three nuclear submariner CNOs of the 1980s and 90s. He was followed by Admiral Jeremy Boorda, the first surface warfare officer to become CNO in two decades. Admiral Boorda was, in turn, relieved by Admiral Jay Johnson, the only tactical naval aviator to have served as CNO during the almost three decades between 1982 and 2009.

Admiral Kelso had earlier served on the OPNAV staff in the Office of the DCNO for Manpower, Personnel and Training (OP-01); and as the Director of the Strategic Submarine Division under the DCNO for Submarine Warfare (OP-02). He had also served in the Navy Secretariat.

Admiral Boorda had previously served three tours in OPNAV, including assignment as DCNO for Manpower, Personnel and Training (OP-01). His term as CNO was tragically cut short by his suicide in 1996.

Admiral Johnson had been Admiral Boorda’s VCNO for five months when he fleet ed up to replace Admiral Boorda as CNO in 1996. He had had no previous significant OPNAV experience, although he had served in the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group (SSG) in Newport; and had had two tours – including one as a flag officer -- in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
The 1990s were a decade of significant drawdown of US naval forces. In the wake of the end of the Cold War -- and to support the national “peace dividend” -- Navy budgets shrunk; ship, aircraft and manpower numbers tumbled; and new naval warship construction fell off drastically.

Meanwhile, as always, new platforms and systems entered the fleet, improving its capabilities, especially for precision strike operations.

Demand for these operations re-occurred throughout the decade; and the fleet kept up a demanding forward and global operational schedule, including numerous combat operations (especially Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, as the decade opened).

### 1990s: Some context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CNO</th>
<th>CAPSTONE DOCUMENT</th>
<th>DON TOA FY09$</th>
<th>NEW SHIPS</th>
<th>BATTLE FORCE SHIPS</th>
<th>ACTIVE PERSONNEL</th>
<th>NEW CAPABILITIES INTRODUCED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Kelso</td>
<td>The Way Ahead</td>
<td>$162B</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>571K</td>
<td>Tomahawk use</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td>Navy Policy Book, ...From the Sea</td>
<td>$143B</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>542K</td>
<td>Burke-class DDG</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>NDP 1 Naval Warfare</td>
<td>$132B</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>510K</td>
<td>UHF FO satellite, MILSTAR, Cyclone-class PC</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Boorda</td>
<td>Fed...From the Sea</td>
<td>$117B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>469K</td>
<td>SIPPNET, Link 16, TLAM Block III, Supply-class T-AOE</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$115B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>435K</td>
<td>Fifth Fleet, DMS e-mail system</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$114B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>417K</td>
<td>Naval Strike &amp; Air Warfare Center, AMRAAM, F-14 Bombcat</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td></td>
<td>$111B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>396K</td>
<td>Seawolf-class SSN, F-14 LANTIRN pod</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
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<td></td>
<td>$112B</td>
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<td>333</td>
<td>382K</td>
<td>IT-21, JDAM, GBS satellite, JTDIS, E-6B</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$113B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>373K</td>
<td>JSOW AGM, Nulka</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Clark</td>
<td></td>
<td>$115B</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>373K</td>
<td>SLAM-ER ASM, NMCI</td>
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</table>
1990s: Significant changes (I)

- **CNO ADM Frank Kelso** (1990-1994)
  - ATP disbanded (1990)
  - Op-codes became N-codes (1992)
  - OP-07 abolished (1992)
  - OP-02, OP-03, OP-05 subordinated to new N8 (1992)
    - Re-designated N87, N86, N88
    - No direct access to CNO
    - Two stars vice 3 stars
    - New N83 (CINC Liaison Division) created
    - New N85 (Expeditionary Warfare Division) created
  - **New program planning/appraisal (now called “assessment”) procedures, committees** (1992)

Listed on this and the next four pages are the significant changes made to the OPNAV staff organization during the tenures of Admirals Kelso, Boorda and Johnson as CNO, during the 1990s.

Admiral Kelso’s changes in 1992 were revolutionary, downgrading the platform sponsors and replacing an entire integrating directorate – OP-07 – with new OPNAV-wide processes and procedures. Even the coding scheme designating OPNAV staff offices was changed.
1990s: Significant changes (II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CNO ADM Frank Kelso (1990-1994) (cont.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP-092 (DNI) became N2; 3-star N7 (Training &amp; doctrine) created</td>
<td>(1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP-06 became N3/N5</td>
<td>(1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP-094 became N6</td>
<td>(1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP-098 (3 stars) became OP-091 (2 stars)</td>
<td>(1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP-64 merged with OP-61 to form N31/N52</td>
<td>(1992-c1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Warfare &amp; Arms Control Division (OP-65) downgraded to Nuclear Affairs &amp; International Negotiations Branch (N514)</td>
<td>(1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created Naval Doctrine Command (1993)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval (Navy-Marine) command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Took responsibilities from OPNAV OP-07 for Navy doctrine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Admiral Boorda’s organizational changes were not as profound as Admiral Kelso’s, but they had substantive and symbolic importance, essentially fine-tuning organizational relationships and responsibilities that Admiral Kelso – and to a lesser extent Admiral Hayward -- had created; and giving jointness increased visibility.
1990s: Significant changes (IV)

  ♦ Sustained almost all ADM Kelso/ADM Boorda changes
  ♦ Tweaked OPNAV internal processes more than internal organizations
    ♦ New/renamed panels: IR3B (with USMC, Secretariat representatives), CEB (c1996)
    ♦ Integrated Warfare Architectures (IWARS) & CPAMs replaced JMAs & SAs

Admiral Johnson’s organizational changes – like Admiral Boorda’s -- were not as profound as Admiral Kelso’s, but they too had substantive and symbolic importance, essentially fine-tuning processes, organizational relationships and responsibilities that Admiral Kelso had created.
1990s: Significant changes (V)

♦ **CNO ADM Jay Johnson** (1996-2000) (cont)
  ♦ Created N8C division to staff Navy inputs to initial Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (1997)
  ♦ Assigned a VADM as President, NAVWARCOL (1998)
  ♦ Disestablished **Naval** Doctrine Command, & subsumed it under new **Navy** Warfare Development Command (1998)
    ♦ Subordinate to NAVWARCOL
  ♦ Designated Oceanographer of the Navy also as Navigator of the Navy (1999)
In 1992, Admiral Kelso instituted sweeping – even revolutionary -- changes to the OPNAV organization.

In keeping with joint staff practice, all “OP” codes were changed to “N” codes, and the staff was reorganized to reflect more fully the so-called “Napoleonic” staff-code usage of the U.S. Army and the Joint Staff.

At Congressional direction, the number of DCNOs was reduced to five. More importantly, the entire OP-07 organization was abolished, and the platform sponsors – now rear admirals instead of vice admirals -- were placed under a newly-empowered N8, now styled the DCNO for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments, losing their direct access to the CNO.

OP-07’s responsibilities for coordinating US Navy doctrine development devolved to a newly-created USN-USMC Naval Doctrine Command. Training was again spun off from OP-01 to become a separate Directorate (N7).

A new Expeditionary Warfare Division (N85) was created under N8, headed by a Marine major general (this represented a loss in some responsibilities for the ACNO for Surface Warfare, now N86). Also, a new CINC Liaison Division (N83) was stood up, to better represent the fleets in OPNAV programmatic deliberations, especially in their roles as unified command Navy Component Commanders.

As the Navy downsized, most OPNAV directorates lost flag officer billets, including the DCNO for Plans Policy and Operations (formerly OP-06; now coded N3/N5). The Nuclear Weapons Policy Division (OP-65) was downgraded to a branch, and the Fleet Operations and Readiness and the Pol-Mil and Current Plans Divisions had to share the same flag officer as division director (now N31/N52).
CNO Admiral Kelso’s transformational overhaul of the OPNAV staff organization endured more or less intact for the remainder of the decade.

CNO Admiral Boorda resurrected a separate division for anti-submarine warfare programs in 1996, and re-designated the Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Director of the Navy Staff. This new conformance to Joint Staff practice did not come with any increase in rank, however, or real authority. A U.S. Coast Guard rear admiral became a division director under the DCNO for Plans, Policy and Operations (N3/N5); and the Politico-Military Affairs division re-gained a full-time Navy flag officer to lead it.

CNO Admiral Johnson was faced with the requirement to contribute to (and monitor) the initial Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In 1997, he created a temporary cell for this purpose (N8C), under the DCNO for Resources, Requirements and Assessments (N8). N8C was headed by a double-hatted Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) commander.
1990s: Prepping for the POM build (I)

CNO ADM Kelso (1990-1994) goals:

♦ Institutionalize “Total Quality Management” as “Total Quality Leadership” in the Navy
♦ Use . . . From the Sea as an overarching vision
♦ Achieve internal Navy flag consensus & shared commitment to explicit Navy goals
  ♦ Replace competitive processes w/ consensus-building processes
  ♦ Create, maintain a “Band of Brothers” among junior flags
♦ Use free flow of flag officer discussion as primary technique to build POM to implement . . From the Sea
  ♦ Committees and working groups drawn from across the staff
  ♦ Organized by newly-devised non-traditional mission areas
  ♦ Cut across community & even traditional warfare area lines
  ♦ To take a broad “whole of Navy” approach
♦ Integrate joint considerations into Navy POM build

The next 26 slides discuss the five key issue areas of the study, as the OPNAV organization evolved during the 1990s.

The five areas are:

• Prepping for the POM build
• Planning for the long term
• Advising on policy, strategy & operations
• Articulating the Navy story
• Housing trusted & responsive CNO agents

“Related changes” are detailed as well.

These slides are detailed and self-explanatory, and have no annotations.

Annotations resume on page 70, at the start of the section on the decade of the 2000s.
1990s: Prepping for the POM build (II)

♦ Major CNO ADM Kelso OPNAV staff reorganization & re-designations (from 1992)
  ♦ DCNO for Navy Program Planning (OP-08) re-designated DCNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments (N8)
  ♦ Downgraded ACNO platform “barons” (OP-02, OP-03, OP-05) to RADM (2-stars) & put them under N8
  ♦ Abolished 3-star DCNO for Naval Warfare (OP-07)
    ♦ ADM Kelso considered it useless as an integrator
  ♦ Created new N83 (CINC liaison) division
  ♦ Created new N85 Expeditionary Warfare division
    ♦ Headed by USMC Major General (2 stars)
    ♦ Styled “Expeditionary” vice “amphibious” IAW new USMC usage

1990s: Prepping for the POM build (III)

♦ “Peace dividend” cuts in total Navy flag billets, & increase in Navy-manned joint flag officer billets, influenced reorgs in OPNAV & throughout fleet
  ♦ Navy had to give up seven 3-star billets
  ♦ New joint opportunities for USN 3-star DCINC billets
  ♦ CNO ADM Kelso decided OPNAV to absorb most USN flag cuts, not the fleet
  ♦ OPNAV staff cut by 150 billets
1990s: Prepping for the POM build (IV)

♦ ADM Kelso saw changing the process as more important than changing the organization
  ♦ From perceived traditional model: Competition, expert analyst intervention, imposed integration & opaque high-level decision
  ♦ To new model: Junior flag officer open dialogue, consensus-building and agreement, guided by 3-star N8
  ♦ USN “program planning”/ “program appraisal” phase of PPBS now styled “program assessment”

1990s: Prepping for the POM build (V)

♦ Major OPNAV program planning process changes
  ♦ Principal initial methodology: Continuous junior flag officer immersion in & discussion of integrated cross-warfare assessments, to build leadership consensus on Navy future
  ♦ Also, OPNAV resumed -- & further developed -- modeling, simulation & campaign analysis efforts ISO POM, budget development
    ♦ OPNAV 1st service HQ to develop/use joint campaign analysis
  ♦ Plus war games, seminars, experienced-based capability evaluations, expert outside opinion
  ♦ Programs assessed by horizontal teams of AOs, then flags, from across OPNAV & Fleet, to tap expertise, build commitment, break down community stovepipes
    ♦ CWGs, JMATs & SATs, R3B, CNO ESC
    ♦ Disbanded 10 previous formal boards
      ♦ Said to have had negative influence on changes & integration
1990s: Prepping for the POM build (VI)

- New Joint Mission Areas (JMAs) & Support Areas (SAs) assessment process (Sep 1992-1998)
  - New cross-cutting Navy joint mission-area categories
    - Joint strike
    - Joint littoral warfare
    - Joint surveillance
    - Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
    - Strategic deterrence
    - Strategic sealift/protection
    - Presence (added later)
  - Deliberately & creatively designed to
    - "Free thought and discussion"
    - Make Navy think & act in joint context

1990s: Prepping for the POM build (VII)

  - Assessment Division (N81) oversaw assessment process for N8
    - Gathered in assessment functions from OP-07
    - Provided analytical resources to support JMAs and SAs
    - Orchestrated N8-chaired wrap-up Investment Balance Review (IBR)
  - Individual resource sponsors themselves chaired cross-cutting JMA teams
  - "We designed the structure to build interaction and consensus"
    ADM William Owens, OPNAV N8 (1992-4)
  - But N81 expert analysis role increasingly became heart of JMA process, overshadowing collective role of flags
1990s: Prepping for the POM build (VIII)

- CNO ADM Boorda (1994-96) sustained this process
  - *Forward . . . From the Sea* superseded . . . *From the Sea*
  - CNO injected his own priorities forcefully into the process (e.g.: arsenal ship concept)
  - Concerned with power that had accrued to N8 as sole integrator
    - Died before changing organization, however

1990s: Prepping for the POM build (IX)

- CNO ADM Johnson (1996-2000) goal:
  - Purposely keep Navy low-profile
    - Included no big organizational changes
    - Reaction to torrent of USN bad publicity in 1990s
  - JMAs increasingly seen as less important than & un-influential on Resource Sponsor SPPs
  - Flags increasingly saw JMA participation as a time sink
  - Criticism: “Only an Owens” could achieve consensus among flags using N8/ JMA system
1990s: Prepping for the POM build (X)

♦ JMA\hs replaced by Integrated Warfare Architectures (IWARS) & CNO Program Assessment Memoranda (CPAMS)
    ♦ 5 new warfare sub-categories
      ♦ Information superiority & sensors
      ♦ Sea dominance
      ♦ Power projection
      ♦ Air dominance
      ♦ Deterrence
  ♦ New/renamed panels: IR3B (with USMC, Secretariat reps), CEB (c1996)

1990s: Prepping for the POM build (XI)

♦ Assessment Division (N81) developed IWARS & CPAMS
  ♦ Used Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) to generate inputs from Resource Sponsors, Fleets, SYSCOMs, HQMC
  ♦ N81-developed Summary CPAM
    ♦ Based on IWAR analyses
    ♦ Included new programs, cost savings, offsets, program mod/canx recommendations
    ♦ Reported out to successive layers of USN, USMC, DON leadership
1990s: Planning for the long term (I)

- Concept generation & development
  - New Joint terminology for long range planning
  - Traditionally decentralized in US Navy
- CNO Strategic Studies Group
  - CNO ADM Boorda changed mandate & horizon: Long-range concept-generation & innovation incubator (1995)
  - Put retired 4-star & former Director of Naval Warfare (OP-095) (ADM Hogg) in charge (vice former civilian officials)
  - Result in part of CNO Executive Panel (CEP) advice

1990s: Planning for the long term (II)

- Concept development
  - OPNAV CNO Executive Panel (N00K) long range planning billet continued
  - OPNAV N3/N5 Strategy & Concepts Branch continued (N513)
1990s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (I)

♦ ATP disbanded (1990)
  ♦ End of Cold War
  ♦ Soviet submarine, other naval threats no longer of central USN concern
♦ OPNAV reorganization designed to signal new USN approach to joint policy, strategy & ops
  ♦ USN responses to changes occasioned by Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)
  ♦ Adoption of N-codes similar to Joint Staff J-codes (1992)
  ♦ New attention to programs of other services during USN POM build
  ♦ AVCNO re-designated Director Navy Staff (c1996)
    ♦ Conscious mimicking of Director of Joint Staff position

1990s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (II)

♦ Waning internal OPNAV influence of N3/N5
  ♦ End of Cold War & demise of The Maritime Strategy
  ♦ Lessened service capabilities to influence CJCS, CINCs, & joint system
  ♦ Enormous power concentrated in new OPNAV N8 (since 1992)
    ♦ New OPNAV N8 relationships with new Joint Staff J8
1990s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (III)

- OPNAV Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy (OP-60) re-designated N51 (1992)
  - OP-60/N51 billet downgraded from RADM to RDML-SEL (1997)
  - OP-60B/N51B billet still held by a CAPT (since 1985)
  - Nuclear Warfare & Arms Control Division (OP-65) downgraded to Nuclear Affairs & International Negotiations Branch (N514) (1992)
- End of Cold War de-emphasized role of USN nuclear weapons

1990s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (IV)

- N31 merged with N52 to form N31/N52 (1992-c1996)
  - Diluted OPNAV flag officer attention paid to international engagement
- Then N31 functions subsumed under new Operations & Interagency Support Division (N32), headed by USCG RDML (c1996)
1990s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (V)

- Top USN post-graduate-educated officers continued to be detailed to Joint Staff vice OPNAV
  - Especially affected OPNAV N3/N5
- Increasingly junior flag & action officers placed in OPNAV N3/N5

1990s: Articulating the Navy story (I)

- Continual USN interest in improving USN conceptual thinking
  - Strategic-level efforts
    - Numerous draft & final Capstone documents
      - Many drafted in OPNAV
    - VADM as President, Naval War College (1998-2001)
  - Operational & tactical-level efforts
    - Created Naval Doctrine Command (NAVDOCCOM) (1992-8)
      - Took responsibility for doctrine from OPNAV
    - Created Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
      - Under NAVWARCOL (1998-2001)
1990s: Articulating the Navy story (II)

- Constant churn. No single focal OPNAV shop
- CNO ADM Kelso (1990-1994)
    - OP-07 drafted
    - N00K drafted
  - ... *From the Sea* (1992)
    - Working groups drafted
  - *NDP 1: Naval Warfare* (1994)
    - NAVDOCCOM drafted
- Naval warfare categories promulgated in these capstone documents (and in the fleet) not echoed in assessment categories used by OPNAV N8

1990s: Articulating the Navy story (III)

- CNO ADM Boorda (1994-1996)
  - *Forward ... From the Sea* (1994)
    - N51 drafted
- CNO ADM Johnson (1996-2000)
  - *Navy Operational Concept* (1997)
    - Working group, then N51 drafted
  - *Anytime, Anywhere* (1997)
    - N00K drafted
    - N51 drafted
    - Categories echoed somewhat in OPNAV assessment process
1990s: Articulating the Navy story (IV)

♦ CNO ADM Frank Kelso created Naval Doctrine Command (1993)
  ♦ Joint Navy-Marine command
    ♦ Although USMC general officer never assigned
  ♦ Took responsibilities from OPNAV for Navy doctrine
    ♦ Reorganized and revitalized NWP system
    ♦ Drafted new capstone Naval Doctrine Publication
    ♦ Unable to agree with USMC on Naval Operations doctrine pub (NDP 3)
  ♦ Represented US Navy in development of joint, allied doctrine
    ♦ Explosion of joint doctrine
      ♦ Freed from Service vetoes

1990s: Articulating the Navy story (V)

♦ CNO ADM Johnson chose VADM Arthur Cebrowski as NAVWARCOL president (1998-2001)
  ♦ Only 3-star president since 1979
  ♦ Personally proselytized on aspects of new Navy thinking
    ♦ E.g.: Network Centric Warfare, precision strike, Streetfighter inshore combat craft
1990s: Articulating the Navy story (VI)

♦ ADM Johnson created new Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
  ♦ Initially subsumed under NAVWARCOL (1998-2001)
  ♦ To revitalize Navy operational and tactical thinking
  ♦ Incl/ NAVDOCCOM functions (NAVDOCCOM disestablished)
  ♦ New NWDC Maritime Battle Center created to run Fleet Battle Experiments (which were often actually demonstrations) (1998)

1990s: Housing trusted/ responsive CNO agents

♦ Continued use of OP-00K (later N00K) as CNO “mini-staff”
♦ Ad hoc arrangements to staff Navy inputs to 1st Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
  ♦ Temporary establishment of N8C division (1997)
  ♦ CVBG commander double-hatted as Director
1990s: Related changes

- Large cut in number of authorized Navy flag officers in early years of decade
  - Increased requirement for Navy flag officers to man joint commands & staffs
- USN focus on ASW reduced, then somewhat increased
  - N84 division created (1996)
    - Limited by lack of rank (CAPT John Morgan); lack of funds
Finally, the study will consider the first decade of the twenty-first century, from 2001 through September 2009.
2000s: Chiefs of Naval Operations

- 1970 ADM Elmo Zumwalt
- 1974 ADM James Holloway
- 1978 ADM Thomas Hayward
- 1982 ADM James Watkins
- 1986 ADM Carlisle Trost
- 1990 ADM Frank Kelso
- 1994 ADM Jeremy Boorda
- 1996 ADM Jay Johnson
  - 2000 ADM Vern Clark
  - 2005 ADM Michael Mullen
  - 2007 ADM Gary Roughead

The first three CNOs of the 21st century were all surface warfare officers. In fact, assuming Admiral Roughead serves out the normal length of his term, the Navy in 2011 will have had surface warfare officers as CNO for 13 of the preceding 17 years since 1994.

Admiral Vern Clark served an unusually long term as CNO (the second longest after Admiral Arleigh Burke) and made numerous changes to the OPNAV organization throughout that time. Admiral Clark had had several preceding tours in the Pentagon, including three tours in OPNAV. His flag officer experience ashore was largely on joint staffs, however, especially the Joint Staff in Washington, where he had been the Director for Operations (J-3) and the Director of the Joint Staff. His academic education was in business administration, He often cited his joint and business backgrounds as contributing to his organizational decisions.

Admiral Mullen had had extensive OPNAV experience prior to being named CNO, having served as Deputy Director and then Director of Surface Warfare (N86); DCNO for Resources, Requirements and Assessments (N8); and VCNO. His tour as CNO was cut short when he was selected to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2005.

Admiral Roughead was serving as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces when he was unexpectedly selected for CNO, to relieve ADM Mullen. While he had previously served several tours in the Navy Secretariat, he had had no prior OPNAV experience.
The first decade of the twenty-first century saw growth in U.S. Navy budgets again, largely due to the exigencies of combat operations against and in Afghanistan and Iraq, in the wake of the 9-11 Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Nevertheless, ship and aircraft numbers continued to fall, as did personnel numbers (although in the latter instance this was as a result of deliberate Navy policy to shed expensive manpower).

As always, new platforms and systems continued to enter the fleet, increasing its capabilities. The fleet, however, was about the smallest it had been in about a century, in terms of battle force numbers, and was stretched to maintain two major forward-deployed combat-ready forces in the Arabian Sea and also in the western Pacific, where the People’s Republic of China was rapidly expanding its military and naval capabilities.
Listed above and on the next six pages are the significant changes made to the OPNAV staff organization during the tenures of Admirals Clark, Mullen and Roughhead as CNO, in the first decade of the twenty-first century (the 2000s).

Admiral Clark’s changes were numerous, continuous and affected almost every office in OPNAV. Taken as a whole, they changed OPNAV almost as much as the revolutionary changes of Admirals Zumwalt and Kelso.
2000s: Significant changes (II)

- CNO ADM Vern Clark (2000-2005) (continued)
  - Director of Navy Staff (DNS) elevated from RDML to VADM (2001)
  - CHNAVRES elevated from RADM to VADM (2001)
  - Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) created (2001)
  - NWDC placed under CFFC (2001)
  - ATFP Division (N34) created in N3/N5 (c2001)
  - OPNAV QDR cells for QDR 2001 & QDR 2006
  - Navy Operations Group morphed from 2001 QDR cell

2000s: Significant changes (III)

- CNO ADM Vern Clark (2000-2005) (cont)
  - N6 & N7 merged into N6/N7 (2002)
  - N00Z Strategic Actions Group created (2002)
  - N71 Navy Missile Defense Division created
  - N79 elevated to N00T (2002)
  - N52 (Pol-Mil Policy) merged into N51 (c2002)
  - USN O-7 (SEL) relieved USCG O-7 as N31 (2002)
  - Information Operations Policy branch (N515) became Division (N39), under flag officer (c2002)
  - N81 double-hatted as N00X (2003)
2000s: Significant changes (IV)

♦ CNO ADM Vern Clark (2000-2005) (cont)
  ♦ New N3/N5 VADM John Morgan re-designated all N3/N5 internal office codes from numbers to letters (2004)
  ♦ Oceanographer/Navigator of the Navy to N7 as N7C vice special ass’t (N096) (c2005)
  ♦ Director of Naval Education and Training (N00T) merged under DCNO for Manpower & Personnel (N1), now styled DCNO, Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (2005)
Admiral Mullen made one major adjustment to Admiral Clark’s legacy (essentially going back to a Kelso-based system that placed the platform sponsors under N8, abolishing Admiral Clark’s N7 directorate).

ADM Mullen also created a Navy Enterprise Office (N09X) under the VCNO, to bring private industry best practices into OPNAV and other Navy headquarters practices. OP-09X was headed up by a rear admiral (lower half) and focused on improving Navy PPBE processes; reducing total ownership costs (TOC); and implementing Navy business transformation.

ADM Mullen otherwise largely left the OPNAV staff as he found it. He was only CNO for half the usual CNO tour, however.
2000s: Significant changes (VI)

♦ CNO ADM Gary Roughead (2007- )
  ♦ Elevated N2/DNI from 1 star to three stars (2008)
  ♦ For QDR 2009, created QDR Integration Group (QIG) under DNS VADM John Harvey (2008)
  ♦ DNS VADM Harvey abolished N3/N5 “Deep Blue” division & added its billets to QDR Integration Group (QIG) (2008)
  ♦ Restyled N09X as Enterprise Integration & Analysis office
  ♦ Briefly restyled N1 as DCNO (Total Force) (from DCNO, Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPT&E)
    ♦ Then re-styled N1 back again to DCNO, MPT&E (2008-9)

Admiral Roughead and his subordinates made several changes to the OPNAV staff organization during the first two years of Admiral Roughead’s tenure as CNO.
Key among ADM Roughhead’s initial changes was re-establishment of a separate OPNAV division (N52), to focus on supporting the CNO’s and the Navy’s engagement efforts with foreign navies and other appropriate U.S. and foreign entities, to spearhead the Navy’s Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) initiative.
Toward the end of the second year of his term as CNO, Admiral Roughead announced a major change in the OPNAV organization: He consolidated the N2 and N6 organizations and set up a new Naval Warfare Integration Division reporting directly to the CNO, to take effect beginning in October-November 2009. N81 would continue as the Navy’s lead analytical organization, but would lose its N00X double-hat, and its discreet direct access to the CNO.
CNO Admiral Vern Clark made numerous changes to the OPNAV staff, some quite significant. Very early in his tenure as CNO, Admiral Clark moved fleet readiness responsibilities from the DCNO for Plans, Policy and Operations (N3/N5) and other offices to the DCNO for Logistics (N4), whom he re-titled DCNO for Fleet Readiness and Logistics.

In a major departure from Admiral Kelso’s re-organization, he also quickly re-established an N7 -- styled the DCNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs -- as a counter-weight to N8 -- now restyled the DCNO for Resources, Requirements & Assessments. The new N7 inherited the platform ADCNOs (N75, N76, N77, N78) from N8. Also, a new Warfare Integration Division (N70) was created.

Furthermore, Admiral Clark raised the rank of the Director, Navy Staff from Rear Admiral (Lower Half) to Vice Admiral -- further mimicking Joint Staff practice (Earlier, as a Vice Admiral himself, Admiral Clark had served as Director of the Joint Staff).

The position of Director of Navy Training was downgraded from a Vice Admiral directorate head to an SES division director (N79). On the other hand, and at Congressional direction, the position of Chief of Naval Reserve was re-elevated to Vice Admiral rank, reverting to its status in the early 1970s and - briefly -- again in the mid-1980s.

For the second Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a special cell was created under N8, although much preparatory work had been done in N51. The incumbent N51 flag officer, RDML Sestak, moved with some of his officers to N8 to head up the cell.
As his long five-year tour as CNO progressed, Admiral Clark made more adjustments (which he often referred to as “alignments”) to the OPNAV staff.

In 2002, he combined the N6 and N7 functions into the same directorate (N6/N7). He created a Navy Missile Defense Division within N7 (N71) and placed the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) on his staff, double-hatted as a 3-star special assistant, in 2002.

In 2002 he also stood up a Strategic Actions Group (SAG) (N00Z) on his personal staff, which began to take on many of the more substantive duties – including drafting policy papers and testimony -- formerly carried out by his CNO Executive Panel staff (N00K). N00K became more focused on just supporting the Panel.

In 2003, ADM Clark double-hatted the Director, Assessments Division (N81) -- Rear Admiral Sestak -- as a direct-report special assistant for assessments (N00X).

Following the Al Qaeda 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Admiral Clark morphed the QDR cell -- established earlier that year -- into a multi-mission organization called “Deep Blue,” which eventually came under the aegis of OPNAV N3/N5. N3/N5 also created a Special Projects Office, at the behest of then-VCNO Admiral Mullen.
This chart represents some of the remaining changes made on his watch by Admiral Clark, as well as changes instituted by Admiral Mullen, his successor as CNO in 2005, and his subordinates.

In 2005, the DCNO for Manpower (N1) regained the training portfolio. The rank of the Chief of Navy Education and Training (CNET) was downgraded to rear admiral, and he was placed under the N1.

The N8 CINC Liaison Division was disestablished, since many of its functions were now being carried out by the new Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk.

In 2003, VADM Mullen, as OPNAV N8, abolished the N81 Operations Study Group (OSG), which had participated in CNA studies and analyses for 35 years.

Then, after he became CNO in his own right in 2005, Admiral Mullen reversed his predecessor’s policy and eliminated the N7 Warfare Requirements position, merging the N7 divisions – including the warfare integration division – back under N8 in 2006. At the same time he re-created a separate N6 – a 3-star DCNO for Communications Networks.

To implement his various Navy enterprise initiatives, Admiral Mullen set up a new flag officer position -- Director, Navy Enterprise (N09X)

Meanwhile, in 2004 a new DCNO for Plans, Policy and Operations, VADM John Morgan, made numerous changes to his own organization: He re-organized all his divisions; changed his title to DCNO for Information, Plans and Strategy; abolished office “number” codes in favor of “letter” codes; set up a new Strategic Actions Group to develop and communicate ideas on a new maritime strategy for the sea services; and re-subordinated the Pol-Mil Division as a branch under N51 (now styled N5SP).
Admiral Gary Roughead became CNO in 2007. Under his aegis the OPNAV Director of Naval Intelligence (N2) was elevated to the rank of Vice Admiral; and the Director of Naval History became the Director of the Naval History and Heritage Command, with a new N-code (N-DNS).

In late 2008, Vice Admiral Douglas Crowder relieved Vice Admiral John Morgan as DCNO for Information, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5). VADM Crowder re-organized the directorate yet again. He changed his title to DCNO for Operations, Plans and Strategy; and re-elevated the International Security (formerly Pol-Mil affairs) Branch to division status, headed by a flag officer and re-titled International Engagement. He folded the N3/N5 Strategic Actions Group into his Strategy and Policy Division (N51), and absorbed as a subordinate division a Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO).

Meanwhile, earlier in 2008, the Deep Blue organization, which VADM Crowder had once headed, had been moved from N3/N5 to the office of the Director of Navy Staff (DNS). It was then re-tasked and re-styled the Quadrennial Defense Review Integration Group (QIG). Its flag officer, RADM William Burke, had previously headed the OPNAV Assessments Division (N81). Also in 2008, N09X was renamed, to better reflect its actual functions.

In October and November 2009, Admiral Roughead made two further major changes in the OPNAV staff organization: He consolidated the N2 and N6 organizations, adding the Oceanographer/Navigator and elements from N3/N5 and N8 as well; and created a separate Naval Warfare Integration Group (N00X), responsive directly to himself.
2000s: Prepping for the POM build (I)

♦ CNO ADM Clark (2000-2005) goals:
   ♦ Increase level of constructive “tension” & competition in internal OPNAV POM-building
      ♦ Revive idea of two rival integrating directorates
   ♦ Change the organizing OPNAV assessment template to *Sea Power 21* “capability pillars”
      ♦ IAW new DOD emphasis on “capabilities-based” (vice “threat-based”) assessments
   ♦ Increase *current fleet readiness* & elevate its salience in OPNAV programming & budgeting processes
   ♦ Better integrate USN organizations & processes with *joint* organizations & processes
   ♦ Accommodate new OSD PPBE system (2003)

The next 35 slides discuss the five key issue areas of the study, as reflected in the evolution of the OPNAV organization during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The five areas are:

- Prepping for the POM build
- Planning for the long term
- Advising on policy, strategy & operations
- Articulating the Navy story
- Housing trusted & responsive CNO agents

“Related changes” are detailed as well.

These slides are detailed and self-explanatory, and have no annotations. Annotations resume on page 102, at the beginning of the next (and final) section, which discusses answers to the study’s questions.
2000s: Prepping for the POM build (II)

- CNO ADM Clark created N4 (Fleet Readiness & Logistics) as advocate for current fleet readiness & requirements (2000)
- ADM Clark re-created N7 (Warfare Requirements & Programs) as advocate for future fleet readiness & requirements (2000)
  - Gave N8 “high 80s” platform ACNOs & divisions to N7
  - Created new N70 Warfare Integration division
- ADM Clark sought built-in tension betw/ N8 “honest broker” & N4 & N7 current & future requirements advocates
  - Criticisms: Tension not always achieved; logrolling, consensus & fair-sharing still evident in cases

2000s: Prepping for the POM build (III)

- OPNAV refined joint campaign analysis POM efforts, begun in 1990s
  - Reflected SECDEF Rumsfeld direction: “Capabilities-based” vice “threat-based” assessments
  - New N7 executive agent & lead
  - Yielded N7 Integrated Sponsor’s Program Proposal (ISPP) for presentation to N8
2000s: Prepping for the POM build (IV)

♦ Panels
  - CEB (later CNO Forum)
  - New VCNO-chaired Navy Requirements Oversight Council (NROC) (later Navy Capabilities Board (NCB))
  - To validate USN requirements
  - To prepare USN positions for Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)

♦ CINC (now COM) liaison
  - CFFC now represented Fleet requirements in assessment process
  - N73 (CINC liaison division) abolished

2000s: Prepping for the POM build (V)

♦ OPNAV Director of Navy Staff (DNS) upgraded to VADM (2001)
  - CNO Clark decision
  - Continued OPNAV mimicking of Joint Staff
  - VADM Patricia Tracey initial 3-star incumbent
  - An additional integrator
  - But also a new layer of review & delay

♦ Special assistant to the CNO for assessment (N00X) created
  - As double-hat for N81 (2003-9)
  - As separate warfare integration office (Oct 2009)
2000s: Prepping for the POM build (VI)

♦ OPNAV assessment constructs continued to evolve
    ♦ Information superiority & sensors
    ♦ Sea dominance
    ♦ Power projection
    ♦ Air dominance
    ♦ Deterrence (became “homeland defense” in 2002)
  ♦ 4 “Independent Capability Analysis & Assessment” (ICAA) “Naval Capability Pillars” (2003 through 2009)
    ♦ Sea strike
    ♦ Sea shield
    ♦ Sea basing
    ♦ FORCENet
    ♦ Sea shaping (from 2005)

2000s: Prepping for the POM build (VII)

♦ Capability pillars
  ♦ Reflected SECDEF Rumsfeld push for “capabilities-based” (vice “threat-based”) planning
  ♦ Promulgated in Sea Power 21 (2002)
    ♦ “Sea Shaping” pillar came later
  ♦ Reflected in internal organization and processes of:
    ♦ OPNAV N80
    ♦ OPNAV N81
    ♦ ONR
    ♦ NWDC
    ♦ Others
  ♦ Campaign analysis a major tool
2000s: Prepping for the POM build (VIII)

♦ CNO ADM Mullen (2005-2007) goals:
  ♦ Reduce tensions, rivalries & resultant wasted effort
  ♦ Return to one major integrating division
  ♦ Increase salience of C4I in POM development process

♦ ADM Mullen OPNAV organizational changes
  ♦ Re-merged N7 back into N8 (now DCNO for Warfighting and Resource Requirements) (2006)
  ♦ Re-created N6 as separate 3-star DCNO for Communications Networks (2006)
  ♦ Continued use of Sea Power 21 capability pillars to organize assessment phase

2000s: Prepping for the POM build (IX)

♦ CNO ADM Roughead (2007- ) goals:
  ♦ Elevate C4ISR status & visibility; reduce OPNAV – & Navy -- platform-centric focus; USN to be DOD cyberwar leader
  ♦ Break down barriers among Navy communications, intelligence, space, signals intelligence, oceanography and other communities & programs
  ♦ Increase direct analytical support to the CNO himself re: USN programmatic & budgetary decisions
    ♦ Reduce total CNO dependence on one powerful organization (N8) for analyses & recommendations
  ♦ Understand, assess & compare full life cycle costs of new systems, not just acquisition costs
2000s: Prepping for the POM build (X)

♦ CNO ADM Roughead OPNAV organizational changes
  ♦ Created new Information Dominance directorate (N2/N6) (Nov 2009)
    ♦ Consolidated N2 & N6 directorates; N8 networks, sensors, electronics offices; N3/N5 IO & MDA divisions; Oceanographer of the Navy; some NETWARCOM functions
    ♦ N2/N6 to be resource sponsor for all unmanned systems; EP-3 & E2C aircraft; Navy space & EW systems; oceanographic ships
    ♦ N2/DNI VADM David Dorsett 1st N2/N6
  ♦ Transformed N00X from N81 double-hat to independent naval warfare integration group organized around A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower core capabilities, personally reporting to CNO
    ♦ Retention of N81 as Navy’s assessors and analysts
    ♦ Continued N81 use of Sea Power 21 capability pillars to organize assessment phase (at least through 2009)
  ♦ Made N4 the lead for reducing total ownership costs (TOC)

2000s: Planning for the long term (I)

♦ USN intellectual focus on present & near future
  ♦ A few long-term Navy concepts developed
    ♦ In joint parlance, “concepts” are long-range
    ♦ Successive NOCs (not always “long-term”)
      ♦ Navy Operational Concept (NOC) (1997)
      ♦ Naval Operations Concept (2006)
      ♦ Draft Naval Operations Concept (planned to be signed in 2010)
    ♦ CNO & CMC, FORCEnet Concept (Feb 2005)
    ♦ NAVWARCOL alternative futures effort ISO new maritime strategy development (2005-6)
  ♦ Not much else (formally)
  ♦ But concepts are often generated, developed ad hoc
2000s: Planning for the long term (II)

♦ USN neglected formal broad future concept development (till 2008)
  ♦ CNO ADM Roughead designated COMNWDC as Executive Agent for Concept Generation & Concept Development (2008)
  ♦ OPNAV oversight of concept development (N3/N5)
    ♦ Concepts Branch (N511) created (2009)
♦ CNO Executive Panel (N00K) billet continued
♦ CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG)
  ♦ Continued as long-term concept generation & innovation incubator
  ♦ Focus shifted to 10-15 yrs out, vice 20-30 yrs out (2008)
♦ Ad hoc efforts continue throughout the Navy

2000s: Planning for the long term (III)

♦ Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (2006-9)
  ♦ Originally “Navy Adaptive Planning Process (NAPP)
  ♦ Lays out alternative futures & strategic options
  ♦ OPNAV N51 lead. Other OPNAV involvement. Contractor supported.
  ♦ VCNO memo directed tasks for CY 08/09 (Feb 2008)
2000s: Planning for the long term (IV)

♦ Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (2006-9) (Cont)
  ♦ Designed to drive USN NSP & POM development
    ♦ Initial advocates: N8B (Ms. Jo Decker), N81 staff (CAPT John Yurchak, CDR Bryan Clark); later N3/N5 (VADM John Morgan)
    ♦ NSPs ISO POM 08 & POM 10 developed by N5SC AOs, with low -- but increasing -- NAPP/NSPP influence
    ♦ NAVWARCOL Global 08 War Game “Implementing the Maritime Strategy” used 4 NSPP-developed alternative futures
    ♦ NSG ISO PR 11 incorporated NSPP “key success factors”
    ♦ NSP ISO POM 12 = 1st true NSPP-driven NSP
      ♦ CAPT Mark Montgomery (N513); CDR Steve Kelley as primary AO

2000s: Planning for the long term (V)

♦ CNO ADM Roughead “Futures” senior leader fora
  ♦ DNS managed process
  ♦ QIG (later N00X) provided staff support
2000s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (I)

- N3/N5 prominence within OPNAV (2007)
  - Vehicles: Development of a “new maritime strategy” & “1000-Ship Navy” initiative
  - N3/N5 acquired $ for elaborate & unprecedented Navy-wide development & promulgation efforts
  - Publicly embraced by successive CNOs
  - “1000-Ship Navy” morphed into Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP)
- VADM Douglas Crowder (2008-)

2000s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (II)

- OPNAV N3/N5 reorganizations & re-designations
  - N52 (Pol-Mil Policy) became a branch of N51 (c2002)
    - No USN flag officer now focused exclusively on engagement
  - USN RDML-SEL relieved USCG RDML as N31 (2002)
  - VADM Morgan re-designated N51 as N5SP (2004)
    - Re-designated N513 as N5SC
  - N3/N5 VADM Crowder re-re-designated N5SP as N51 (Dec 2008)
    - N5SC re-re-designated as N513
  - N3/N5 VADM Crowder upgraded/civilianized N51B billet from CAPT to SES (2009)
  - N51 International Engagement branch again became a division (N52; 2 stars) under N3/N5 (2009)
    - Salience of Global Maritime Partnerships & international naval engagement
2000s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (III)

♦ OPNAV Strategic Concepts Group (N513) briefly decimated by 9/11 attack on Pentagon (2001-2)
  ♦ Navy Command Center demolished
♦ N5MS branch created within N5SP (c2005)
  ♦ Focused on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
  ♦ Headed by flag officer
  ♦ Became separate Maritime Security division (N5MS) (2009)
  ♦ Shifted to new N2/N6 (Nov 2009)

2000s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (IV)

♦ Discrete Nuclear Weapons Policy branch re-created within N51 (N514) (2009)
  ♦ SECDEF concerns at reduced service attention to nuclear policy, post-Cold War
  ♦ Triggered by USAF nuclear weapons incidents
♦ Royal Navy officer assigned to N51 staff (2009)
2000s: Advising on policy, strategy, ops (V)

- Creation of N00Z (2002)
  - CNO ADM Vern Clark decision
  - CAPT Frank Pandolfe = initial incumbent
  - Took on task of drafting principal CNO guidance document *Sea Power 21*
  - Drafted annual *CNO Guidance (CNOG)* documents
  - Drafted CNO testimony (vice N00K)
  - Created & maintained CNO Engagement Calendar (2007-)
  - Headed by CAPT (2002-9)
  - Headed by GS-15 (2009-)

2000s: Articulating the Navy story (I)

- Continuous stream of capstone documents (I)
- CNO ADM Clark (2000-2005)
    - Categories echoed in OPNAV assessment categories & processes
- CNO ADM Mullen (2005-2007)
2000s: Articulating the Navy story (II)

♦ Continuous stream of capstone documents (II)
♦ CNO ADM Roughead (2007- )
    ♦ Navy – Marine Corps – Coast Guard collaboration
    ♦ N5SAG drafted, w/ USMC, USCG, other USN reps in support
    ♦ New categories of Navy capabilities still not echoed in OPNAV assessment categories as of 2009
  ♦ Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (CH 1) (2007)
    ♦ Classified Navy-only document
    ♦ N51 draft; N81 assist
    ♦ Classified Navy-only document
    ♦ N51 draft; N81 assist
  ♦ Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12 (2009)
    ♦ Classified Navy-only document
    ♦ N51 draft; N81 assist

2000s: Articulating the Navy story (III)

♦ Continuous stream of capstone documents (III)
♦ CNO ADM Roughead (2007- ) (cont)
  ♦ DRAFT NDP 1: Naval Warfare
    ♦ Navy- Marine Corps – Coast Guard collaboration
    ♦ Planned to be signed in 2010
    ♦ NWDC draft; OPNAV contributions
  ♦ DRAFT Naval Operations Concept
    ♦ Navy- Marine Corps – Coast Guard collaboration
    ♦ Planned to be signed in 2010
    ♦ OPNAV N51 lead Navy drafter
2000s: Articulating the Navy story (IV)

- CNO ADM Clark placed NWDC under CFFC; ADDU to NAVWARCOL (2001)
  - CFFC to focus on CONOPS development
  - NWDC to focus on doctrine, concepts & fleet experimentation
- QIG took on part of developing/telling Navy story function (2009)

2000s: Housing trusted/responsive CNO agents (I)

- QDR cells
  - 2nd OPNAV QDR cell (2001)
    - Concept: For QDR 2001, start w/ strategy focus, then programs
    - Created initially under N3/N5, as N51 (RDML Sestak) responsibility
    - Then -- by design -- shifted to N8 as separate division (N8QDR)
      - RDML Sestak & some N51 AOs shifted; augmented by N8 officers
    - But at end-game, N3/N5 (VADM Keating) oversaw
      - N8 gapped (VADM Giambastiani left; VADM Mullen not on board yet)
  - N8QDR division (2005-6)
    - Temporary N8 division stood up to staff Navy inputs to QDR 2006
    - Under RDML Walsh, later RDML Davenport
  - QDR Integration Group (QIG) (2008-9)
    - Created in 2008; augmented by billets from abolished “Deep Blue”
    - Reported to Director of Navy Staff
    - Initial focus on creating “Navy Story” for QRM, QDR 2009, etc.
    - Staffed “CNO Futures” fora
2000s: Housing trusted/ responsive CNO agents (II)

♦ **Naval Operations Group** cell (2001-2)
  ♦ Origins as OPNAV N8 QDR cell for QDR 2001
  ♦ QDR cell morphed following 9/11 attacks
    ♦ To give intellectual support to new USN GWOT roles after 9/11
    ♦ Secretariat for “CNO War Council” constituted after 9/11
    ♦ Flag officer in charge: RDML Sestak
  ♦ Reported directly to CNO

♦ **“Deep Blue”** cell (2002-2008)
  ♦ Evolved from original Naval Operations Group
  ♦ Successive roles evolved over time
  ♦ Led by succession of thoughtful young flag officers
    ♦ RDMLs Stavridis, Crowder, Mahon, Cullom etc.
  ♦ Assigned to OPNAV N3/N5, but linked to CNO
  ♦ DNS (VADM Harvey) & N3/N5 (VADM Morgan) abolished (2008)

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2000s: Housing trusted/ responsive CNO agents (III)

♦ **N00Z** Strategic Actions Group created (2002)
  ♦ Conceptualized Sea Power 21
  ♦ Took on role of CNO “mini-staff” from N00K
  ♦ Directly responsible & responsive to CNO

♦ **N81 double-hatted as N00X** (2003-2009)
  ♦ Initiated by ADM Clark (CNO) & RADM Sestak (N81)
  ♦ Relationship continued through successors
  ♦ Little-publicized, officially-sanctioned, direct, close-hold back channel of analytical communication between N81 & CNO, used on occasion to circumvent perceived OPNAV chain-of-command filtering

♦ **Independent Director for Naval Warfare Integration (N00X)** created (Oct 2009)
  ♦ Reporting directly to the CNO
  ♦ Used QIG billets
2000s: Housing trusted/responsive CNO agents (IV)

♦ N3/N5s echoed this approach
  ♦ N5 Navy Special Projects Cell (N3N5NSP) (2003- )
    ♦ Established by VCNO ADM Mullen under N3/N5 VADM Green
  ♦ N5 Strategic Actions Group (SAG) (2004-8)

2000s: Related changes (I)

♦ N7 (Naval Training) directorate downgraded to SES-headed N79 division (2000)
  ♦ 3-star CNET double-hatted as Director, Navy Education & Training (N00T)
♦ N79 elevated to N00T (2002)
♦ Director, Navy Education and Training (N00T) merged under DCNO for Manpower & Personnel (N1) (2005)
  ♦ N1 now styled DCNO, Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPT&E)
  ♦ CNET billet downgraded to RADM (2 stars)
  ♦ N1 briefly restyled DCNO (Total Force) from DCNO, Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPT&E); then re-styled back again to DCNO, MPT&E (2008-9)
2000s: Related changes (II)

♦ “Lead-follow” TYCOMs created (2000)
   ♥ 3-star “Lead” TYCOMs in Fleet viewed as Navy community leaders (“barons”)
   ♥ “Follow” TYCOMs from 3 stars to 2 stars
♦ Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
   ♥ Double-hat of CINCLANTFLT
   ♥ To provide consolidated fleet requirements to OPNAV (to OPNAV N7, later N8)
   ♥ To standardize fleet training & other practices
   ♥ To act as USN component & supporting commander to several joint commands
   ♥ New designation for U.S. Atlantic Fleet
   ♥ Fleet Forces Command disestablished

2000s: Related changes (III)

♦ CNO ADM Clark created NAVNETWARCOM (2002)
   ♥ TYCOM responsibilities under CFFC
♦ Information Operations (IO) branch (N515) became N3/N5 Division (N39) under flag officer (c2002)
♦ N2/DNI elevated from 1 star to three stars (2008)
♦ ADM Roughead created FLTCYBERCOM/C10F (Oct 2009)
   ♥ USN component of new joint USCYBERCOM
   ♥ Reporting directly to CNO in admin chain-of-command
♦ NAVNETWARCOM changes (2009)
   ♥ NAVNETWARCOM ops shifted to FLTCYBERCOM/C10F
   ♥ NAVNETWARCOM “Man, train & equip” functions shifted to OPNAV N2/N6 & NAVCYBERFORCOM (new information dominance TYCOM under USFFC)
2000s: Related changes (IV)

- COMSUBGRU TWO RDML Kenny established Center for Submarine Counter-terrorism Operations (CSCO) (2005)
  - SSBN USS *Ohio* re-commissioned as SSGN-726 (2006)
- CSCO re-designated Center for Expeditionary Counter-terrorism Operations (CECO) (2007)
  - Expanded to support Navy surface & aviation forces in War on Terror
- CNO ADM Roughead re-designated CECO as Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO); moved it to OPNAV N3/N5 as N3/N5IW (2008)
  - To deliver rapidly Navy counter-terrorism (CT) & counter-insurgency (COIN) effects & capabilities
  - Special status, to protect initiatives & programs

2000s: Related changes (V)

- CHNAVRES elevated from RADM to VADM (2001)
  - Congress directed all service reserve components be headed by 3-star officers
  - Part of OP-96/OP-91/N81 billet structure since 1966
- Oceanographer of the Navy
  - Also Navigator of the Navy (2000)
  - To N7C as division director vice special ass’t (N096) (2005)
  - N84 (2006)
  - To N2/N6 (2009)
  - 1st career USN oceanographer assigned as Oceanographer/Navigator of the Navy (2009)
2000s: Related changes (VI)

♦ Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) created (Jan 2006)
  ♦ CNO ADM Clark initiated; CNO ADM Mullen established
  ♦ An FFC TYCOM & force provider
  ♦ Included Seabees, EOD, Maritime Civil Affairs, Expeditionary Training Command, Maritime Expeditionary Security Force, Combat Camera, Naval Expeditionary Intelligence, Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support, Riverine Group, Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center
  ♦ Initially funded out of supplemental budgets

2000s: Related changes (VII)

♦ Continued cuts in number of authorized USN flag officers (through 2004)
  ♦ Then increases for rest of decade
    ♦ Back to early post-Cold War levels
  ♦ First U.S. Air Force officer assigned to CNO SSG (2009)

♦ CNE/C6F staff consolidation, reorg (2005)
  ♦ Abandoned so-called “Napoleonic” staff org/codes that have characterized OPNAV since 1992
  ♦ Cross-staff teams to encourage consensus, innovation
What have been the significant changes to the OPNAV staff organization over the past few decades?
- Recounted above

Why were those changes instituted?
- CNO goals & priorities
  - Especially, to develop & implement an integrated, balanced vision for the Navy
    - Ensuring limited resources properly allocated
  - Also, to respond to external direction
  - To ensure staff responsiveness & multiple inputs
    - Despite less clarity in accountability
  - To protect “orphan” programs & functions
  - To solve a host of other problems

From the data gathered on numerous previous OPNAV reorganizations since 1970, the above key rationales were gleaned.

Most importantly, the changes were instituted by Chiefs of Naval Operations. The OPNAV staff is their staff, and successive CNOs have sought make it responsive to their needs – chief among which is usually construction of a balanced and integrated program and budget.

CNOs are not, however, complete masters in their own house. They often re-organize to obey direction from the Congress, the President, the Secretary of Defense, and/or the Secretary of the Navy.

They often also create special staffs to ensure responsiveness, despite understanding that this often can dilute accountability. The desire for staff responsiveness often trumps concerns about clarity in staff accountability.
Study questions . . . and answers (II)

♦ What observations & conclusions can be drawn from those changes, that might prove useful to OPNAV decision-makers considering future changes?
  ♦ CNO goals remain fairly constant
  ♦ Means to achieve them have varied widely
  ♦ All CNOs try, often through reorganizations

♦ Why?
  ♦ Developing & implementing a programmatic vision for the Navy is the CNO’s #1 job
  ♦ Reorganizing his staff is within the CNO’s purview
  ♦ CNOs change (and differ)
  ♦ The US national security environment changes

Our observations and conclusions – outlined above – are straightforward.
Study questions . . . and answers (III)

♦ Long-range planning and concept development have been particularly hard for CNOs to organize for
  ♦ Yet the long-lasting nature (and expense) of naval platforms make this particularly advisable

♦ Why has this been so hard?
  ♦ Competing interests
    ♦ The national security establishment, including OPNAV, is focused primarily on current operations & issues, & near-term program & budget decisions
  ♦ Difficulty
    ♦ “Prediction is hard, especially about the future”
      Attributed to Yogi Berra
  ♦ Heavily operational US Navy culture

One particular issue area that stands out in this analysis for its lack of success is OPNAV staffing for long-range planning and concept development. Long-range planning and concept development initiatives and staffs come and go. There has been little continuity of effort. Many of the earlier studies consulted for this study made a similar point.

Long-range planning is difficult, and potential distractions from it on a staff like OPNAV are often overwhelming. It is, however, an issue area of enormous import to the Navy, given the extended length of time – and expense -- it takes to plan, build and deploy naval systems.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended next steps (general)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>♦ Widely circulate this study to elicit recommended improvements to it</td>
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<td>♦ Tap additional sources</td>
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<td>♦ Search OPNAV archives for primary sources</td>
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<td>♦ Mine oral histories</td>
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<td>♦ Conduct interviews</td>
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<td>♦ Expand scope</td>
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<td>♦ Goals</td>
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<td>♦ Committees &amp; processes (formal &amp; informal)</td>
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<td>♦ Personalities</td>
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<td>♦ Patterns of relationships &amp; communications</td>
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<td>♦ Answer the “why?” questions in more depth</td>
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This study has been, by design, only a preliminary one. Sponsors and others may wish to examine particular issues of staff re-organization further. This slide and the next one offer some possible directions that such an examination could take.
Recommended next steps (specific)

♦ Consider drafting new, updated editions of:

The three basic reference works in this field are useful but well out of date. It would be helpful to future generations of U.S. Navy staff officers if they could be updated.
This study focused considerable attention on the OPNAV program planning process (also known variously as appraisal or assessment). It has only scratched the surface, however, of this all-important — even central — facet of the work of OPNAV. More detailed research and analysis should prove helpful to OPNAV.

On the other hand, the study touched only very lightly on the evolution of the OPNAV staff as regards manpower and personnel, command and control, research and development, and related issues. A more thorough study of each of these areas should yield useful insights.
The reference list serves two functions:

- To document all sources consulted by the author
- To provide others with a starting point for further research and analysis of OPNAV organizational changes

For a list of subject matter experts (SMEs) consulted by the author, see the inside front cover. The SMEs provided responses to specific questions, and commented on earlier drafts of the study.

No formal interviews were conducted, in accordance with study sponsor resource and time constraints.

Successive editions of NWP 2 were the only primary sources consulted, given sponsor tasking and study funding and time constraints.
References (II)

♦ Recurring documents
  ♦ Selected trade journal articles
    ♦ Esp. Inside the Navy, Defense Daily
    ♦ Sections on OPNAV organization
  ♦ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings annual May “Naval Review” issues
    ♦ Flag officer listings (1970-2009)
    ♦ OPNAV organization charts (1988-2009)
    ♦ Described contemporary Navy program assessment processes

References (III)

♦ Recurring documents (cont.)
  ♦ Department of Defense *Telephone Directory* (tri-annual) (from 1971)
    ♦ OPNAV organization, office codes, personalities
  ♦ Student Study Guide, DON PPBE Basic Course (SAIC)
    ♦ Continually updated slides on planning & program planning/ appraisals/ assessments
References (IV)

♦ CNA studies
  ♦ Frederick Thompson & Christopher Trenholm, OPNAV Functional Reorganization Study (1990)
  ♦ Jeffrey Sands, On His Watch (1993)

References (V)

♦ CNA studies (continued)
  ♦ Peter Swartz et al., The OPNAV Fellows Program (2004)
  ♦ Barry Messina et al., NWDC Phase II Study Results (2007)
References (VI)

♦ Other studies & reports

References (VII)

♦ Other published sources
<table>
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<th>References (VIII)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>♦ Unpublished paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>♦ Unpublished wall chart</td>
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<tr>
<td>♦ Michael Bair and CAPT Jonathan Kan USN (Ret), <em>Integration and Innovation, 1941-2008</em>, Posted in OPNAV spaces (2008-9)</td>
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<td>♦ Thomas Hone interview notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>♦ Interview with former CNO ADM Carlisle Trost USN (Ret) (1998)</td>
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<td>♦ Interview with former CNO ADM Frank Kelso USN (Ret) (1998)</td>
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### Glossary

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<td>ACNO</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<td>ADDU</td>
<td>Additional duty</td>
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<td>C4I</td>
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### Glossary (continued)

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## Glossary (continued)

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CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context


