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From the Editors

During the planning for this and upcoming issues, the staff of the *MCU Journal*, under the direction of the new editorial board, continues fine tuning our publication strategies to acquire content that speaks to the larger issues of policy important to the Marine Corps, generally and specifically. This has led us to seek authors who can provide more than just single threads of continuity, but rather to help us craft entire issues that focus on defined topics for deeper-level conversations. To that end, the closing issue of 2016 presents what, on the surface, may appear to be five articles speaking broadly to the concerns of one region, in this case the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Upon further reading, however, the reader will discover that this issue features two distinct sections that illustrate both political science and historical perspectives relevant to the U.S. military Services and the larger Department of Defense community.

The first section—International Relations Perspectives—is led off by Dr. Robert Nalbandov's article, in which he highlights examples of positive and negative pressure dilemmas and their impact on political stability and regional conflict resolution by closely examining historical and contemporary events in the MENA (Chad and Libya) while using other historical examples to further his argument. The section concludes with M. J. Fox's analysis of political culture and risk analysis, looking specifically at contemporary cases of conflict within the small populations of Somalia, Tunisia, and Libya. If war is a continuation of politics, understanding conflict at this level is important for military and civilian leaders alike.

The journal's second section—Terrorism and Warfare: Past, Present, and Future—keeps us firmly planted in the MENA, though now the content is framed within the context of how terror and insurgency have changed over time. Dr. Jacob Stoil begins with an historical perspective on a current reality. Speaking to the present more directly, our partners from CNA—Dr. Jonathan Schroden, Dr. William Rosenau, and Emily Warner—link prevailing theories of terrorism to their actions to create a solid framework for policy makers to use in the decision-making process. These concepts are further developed by

Rebecca Yagerman in the final article as she considers the future of warfare and how American forces might apply lessons learned from almost 10 years of conflict in Afghanistan to inform U.S. actions when dealing with Islamic extremism in Mali. Overall, all three authors contribute lessons to be learned from the events of World War II and more recent conflicts. The editorial staff is preparing an expanded discussion of lessons learned, or not, for our fall 2017 issue. Please contact us directly to submit a manuscript or to receive a copy of the published journal.

The final section—Book Reviews—draws from such new releases as *Outsourcing War* by Amy Eckert, *Syria's Democratic Years* by Kevin W. Martin, and *Industrial Policy and Economic Transformation in Africa* edited by Akbar Noman and Joseph E. Stiglitz. These reviews were cultivated quite intentionally to focus further on the contemporary international relations and warfare topics highlighted by each section of the journal.

As always, the editorial staff is interested in your feedback and can be reached through both Facebook and Twitter. Come by and visit us in our new facility on the third deck of the Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center or pick up the newest MCUP releases, including the journal, in our new bookstore on the first deck.

Pressure Dilemma in International Politics

Robert Nalbandov

Abstract: As global terrorism and low-intensity conflicts replace traditional aggressive warfare strategies, the struggle to maintain political stability amid demands for retribution fuels pressure dilemmas in which conflict resolutions are rarely acceptable. The discussion on realism, anarchism, liberalism, constructivism, and positive and negative pressure dilemmas, such as Chad's claims against Libya in 1990–94; Germany's pursuit of parts of Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, which led to Britain's appeasement policy; Armenia's ongoing calls for Turkey to acknowledge and reconcile the 1915–16 genocide; and the persistent Russo-Japanese dispute over the Kuril Islands, illustrate the importance of creating institutions that support economy, technology, morality, and communication necessary for facilitating modern compellence cases.

Keywords: pressure dilemma, compellence, diplomacy, appeasement, coercion, deference, rationality, identity, low-intensity conflict, security dilemma, offensive realism, anarchy, liberalism, constructivism, consequentialism, societal security, diaspora, Armenian Genocide, Sèvres Syndrome, Kuril Islands, Sea of Okhotsk, Aouzou Strip, Horn of Africa, instability curve

Contemporary international politics normally prefers stability. The international system decisively rejects transformations because the consequences damage the existing balance and lower predictability in the

Robert Nalbandov completed his PhD in political science from the Central European University, Budapest. An assistant professor with the Utah State University's Department of Political Science, he teaches and researches U.S. foreign policy and Eurasian and African politics and security. His most recent publications include *The Crisis of the African State: Globalization, Tribalism, and Jihadism in the Twenty-First Century* (2015) and *Not by Bread Alone: Russian Foreign Policy under Putin* (2016).

international arena. Trying to preserve itself, the community of states creates rules, norms, and regulations that make change costly to implement.¹ With rare exceptions, such as the *de jure* annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine by the Russian Federation (a.k.a. Russia) in March 2014, large-scale territorial acquisition as a means of spreading influence is currently over. Hard and even soft powers have given way to modern-era globalized competition.² Old wars became new, replacing traditional aggressive warfare with limited, low-intensity conflicts and global terrorism.³

Unwilling to undo the past, countries view augmenting their size with territorial acquisitions, which is fraught with redrafting maps, as *status quo*. Simply put, no one wants to give up land no matter how fairly and justly it was obtained. On the spectrum of the land debate, there are also growing desires of some countries to rewind and rearrange the existing geopolitical equilibrium to reverse territorial and ethnic damage. Lands permanently lost, territories temporarily occupied, large-scale ethnic cleansing, and historical grievances coupled with wounded national pride provide justification for the claims made by countries seeking retroactive justice. In rare cases, these demands are satisfied and the international system changes. The most prevalent outcome, however, is a return to the *status quo* of similar dynamics across the cases—the more the country making claims (the demander) continues to pressure the opposite side (the demandee) to satisfy territorial entitlements, the more the demandee persists to reject the demander's claim.

The outcome of such interactions creates the pressure dilemma in international politics where the more the demandee pressures the demander to accept the retrospective version of justice, the less likely it will be satisfied. This cycle of cascading territorial claims eventually creates a deadlock situation where the demandee is unwilling to cease its political pressure on the demander and the latter is unlikely to concede to the claims. On both ends of the pressure dilemma spectrum, concessions are considered weaknesses of the government in charge and, therefore, unequivocally rejected. Based on the peaceful premise of interstate compellence, pressure dilemma can have two outcomes: negative persistence without viable prospects for resolution, or positive resolves with no further claims from either party in the pressure dyad. Pressure dilemmas can, thus, disappear or be solved in two cases: the claims made by one state against another are satisfied and the demandee wins, or the claims are dropped under counterpressure from the demandee and the demander wins.

To unveil the forces behind pressure dilemmas and the affect on these interactions between states, the present article will review dyads where countries posed peaceful territorial demands. Examples of positive pressure dilemmas include Chad's claims against Libya for lands lost in 1990–94, and the appeasement policy of the late 1930s regarding Germany's claims over Rhineland and

Sudetenland (parts of what became Czechoslovakia). Negative pressure dilemmas are represented here by two ongoing compellence cases—the demands made by the Republic of Armenia for the Turkish government to acknowledge the 1915 mass genocide of Armenians (and subsequent diaspora) and to return Armenian lands; and the current diplomatic standoff between Japan and the Russian Federation over the ownership of the Kuril Islands between the Sea of Okhotsk and the North Pacific Ocean. The cases were selected based on the past and current territorial claims made peacefully within the pressure dyad and the institutionalized involvement of the international community of states—the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN)—capable of mitigating or aggravating pressure dilemmas.

Pressure Dilemma in International Relations

In this case, pressure dilemma follows the classical Thucydidean tragedy scenario of security dilemma, inevitability perpetuating unsatisfied territorial demands and not necessarily the war. In the fifth century BC, Thucydides gave a great example of the unavoidable nature of the international environment: “Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us.”⁴ This principle projects a classical view of Greek tragedy on the world where none of the actors are in full control of their fates (a work of the gods or providence in ancient beliefs), which inescapably brings them to reciprocal destruction. The roots of security dilemma go to the gloomy times of perpetual conflict between antagonists at various systemic, regional, and domestic levels. The underlying assumption that “the ultimate sources of social conflicts and injustices are to be found in the ignorance and selfishness of men” fuels the rival forces turning the interaction among states into multiple zero-sum games.⁵

Security Dilemma’s Old Tale

John H. Herz first introduced the modern notion of security dilemma as a “structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening.”⁶ Robert Jervis took this point further, presenting security dilemma as a realism-inspired, equally pessimistic outlook on the international system.⁷ More recently concluded in John J. Mearsheimer’s seminal work on offensive realism, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, “the best way for a state to survive in anarchy is to take advantage of other states and gain power at their expense. The best defense is a good offense.”⁸ A perfect growing medium for

security dilemma is the systemic anarchy where, in Barbara F. Walter's words, "no central government exists to insure order, no police or judicial system remains to enforce contracts, and groups have divided into independent armed camps."⁹ Anarchy limits communication between the countries, increases uncertainty about others' intentions, and reciprocates fear of mutual annihilation. The world is essentially anarchic and represents the "war of every man against every man," to quote Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*.¹⁰ In this state of nature, dictated by the systemic anarchy, all (in this particular case, countries) are out for themselves.

Under anarchy, with no credible, universal punisher, states tend to act in their best self-interests, which always clash. Anarchy mixed with self-help situations sets preferences and imminent conflicts as the normal state of affairs, creating a gloomy and pessimistic outlook of realism on international relations.¹¹ Anarchy has its own structural limits too. According to Jack Donnelly, international security regimes, peace treaties, political and military alliances, and multinational political institutions compensate for the "absence of 'hierarchical' political order based on formal subordination and authority."¹² Acting at their own discretion, states still strive to achieve their best, vital national interests; nevertheless, their options are limited by the international political climate.

Shedding more light on security dilemma is the earliest theory of interstate interactions, realism, which "emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government . . . [making] international relations largely a realm of power and interests."¹³ Power, according to Hans J. Morgenthau, is the main variable that defines interests whereby "the objectives of foreign policy [are] defined in terms of national interest and must be supported by adequate power."¹⁴ Hobbes expresses the important but negative role the individual plays in the context of individuals forced to commit crimes of war because they were doomed to a life that is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."¹⁵ Similarly, Kenneth N. Waltz sees the causes of war "in the nature and behavior of man [whereas] wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, [and] from stupidity," which have proven to be variables perpetuated throughout human history.¹⁶

Realism further assumes that actors are utility maximizers who aim at achieving higher utility at all costs. In the words of Kjell Goldmann, weighing the pros and cons in purely rational calculus schemes "essentially leads us to derive actions from given preferences."¹⁷ These preferences are set for all current and future actors who assess anticipated costs and benefits of specific actions and usually chose the most cost-effective ones. The international system in realists' understanding represents a rational choice institution where actors' preferences are "fixed and exogenously determined."¹⁸ The sources of these preferences are secondary—rationality discards such variables as norms, val-

ues, and identities of the actors and brings in a nothing-personal-just-business approach to the international system.¹⁹

Reducing liberalism's fundamentally different views of international affairs, spiritual founder Jean-Jacques Rousseau uttered: "Each of us puts in common his person and his power under the supreme direction of the general will; and in turn we receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole."²⁰ Immanuel Kant's vision on liberalism extends beyond the level of domestic politics and proposes applying the notion of social contract at the international system level. What prevents wars, according to Kant, is the republican (or democratic) form of government, as "founded in accordance with the principles of freedom of a society of men . . . [and] constructed according to the fundamental idea of the dependence of all subjects upon a common legislature."²¹ Anarchy is also present under liberalism, but the states are considered capable of positive and peaceful interactions, even under the conditions of systemic anarchy.

Liberalists believe that "even though states exist in a condition of anarchy, progress away from a state of perpetual war can be fashioned by creating and informal 'institutions' of modernization—of economies, of technology, of human morality and of communication within and between states," which is part and parcel of democratic peace as well as complex economic and political interdependence theories.²² Interdependent states prefer to foster mutual cooperation with the purpose of individual economic benefits and collective political stability of the system. The institutional approach is present here, too, but in this case, the preferences are not given: they are created and shared by states having the common task of universal peace. Mostly, however, states are able to control their lives, defining the reality around them and not vice versa. For liberalism, human rights and freedoms as well as the harmony and interdependence on the international area represent the very forces that prevent conflicts from occurring. States are also rational actors, but "the faith in human reason that leads . . . international liberals to believe that efforts to overcome the problems of anarchy are not inevitably doomed."²³ As a result, liberals view states as the products of the interactions of individuals who shape foreign policy preferences in accordance with their views on the better world. From the above premises, liberalism clearly strives at constraining the role of an individual under the collective settings of universally accepted peace and prosperity.

A relative newcomer to the theory realm is constructivism. In 1992, Alexander Wendt published an international relations groundbreaker that launched a structural criticism on realists' understanding of the nature of conflict, claiming "self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure."²⁴ Putting agents at the center of institutional structures in the international system, Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch posit "constructiv-

ists stress that both structural continuities and processes are based on agency. Agency, in turn, is influenced by social, spatial and historical context.”²⁵ The context and identities are the main driving forces in constructivism. Similar to liberalism, the interests of constructivist actors also are endogenous. The difference is the sources: liberalist institutions determine the actors’ interests, but constructivist actors’ identities dictate what to want and how to act. In J. Samuel Barkin’s words, “the interests are shared within an identity group and form the basis for political interaction.”²⁶ In another article, Wendt argues that international politics is constructed—not preset—by the identities and interests of the actors.²⁷ The constructivists’ lens also presents rationality, but in the respect that “an action or belief may be called ‘rational’ when it makes sense to act that way,” forming the basis for relative rationality, which means that what is rational for one action could be completely irrational for others.²⁸

Identity constructs are the key to understanding how the constructivist world operates. Decision-making mechanisms in social constructivism embrace normative patterns and identity constructs that make actors’ behavior acceptable under certain conditions and intolerable under others.²⁹ The notion, levels, categories, and types of acceptable behavior are constructed by the actors themselves and not provided, which “leads us to derive actions from given identities.”³⁰ The preferences are not set; they are fluid and constantly changing. Interests and identities in constructivism, as laid down by Wendt, are “endogenous to interactions.”³¹ The actions depend not on the objective reality as such, but on the result of subjective interpretations through individual identity constructs. Constructivism, therefore, turns the objective reality into as many subjective interpretations as there are actors.

Compellence Diplomacy

Pressure dilemma closely follows in the steps of its predecessor, security dilemma, which is also deeply rooted in the history of human interactions. In ancient Rome, “wars were traditionally preceded by an embassy of complaint to the potential enemy, making demands about alleged delicts—on pain of war. This was the *recreum repetition*, usually required by gods for the initiation of a just war.”³² The classical Greek version of compellence was also about the show of force where “states did not just seem tough: they were tough and they were ready to fight . . . [leading to] an interstate system based on the brutal facts of power and prevalence of almost unrestrained competition and clashes of interests.”³³ Such exchanges of mutual grievances, according to Arthur M. Eckstein, laid the bases for the *compellent diplomacy* that is more prevalent in our times.³⁴ As a preferred tactic, peaceful compellence is undertaken without military actions since the forceful resolution of interstate affairs is a matter of simple power

balance between adversaries and the states supporting them. Viewing the dynamics of peaceful compellence where the interstate interactions are limited to peaceful actions, however, is more interesting.

At the core of compellence, the action of diplomacy “can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds.”³⁵ According to Robert J. Art, who incorporated this type of state action into his *four functions of force*, which explains “the *compellent* use of force is the deployment of military power so as to be able either to stop an adversary from doing something that he has already undertaken or to get him to do something that he has not yet undertaken.”³⁶ Similarly, Alexander George calls it *coercive diplomacy* in the following definition of interstate compellence: “Coercive diplomacy . . . employs threats of force to persuade an opponent to call off or undo its encroachment. . . . Coercive diplomacy differs, therefore, from the strategy of deterrence, which involves attempts to dissuade an adversary from undertaking an action that has not yet been initiated.”³⁷ Compellence diplomacy became one of most common behavioral patterns in the international arena, which promotes placing peaceful, historically based claims on either rational cost-calculations or the corresponding identity constructs of the members of pressure dyads.

Rationality vs. Identity

The mechanism behind the pressure dilemma is fueled by the conflict between two opposing behavioral motivators: the logics of expected consequences and appropriateness.³⁸ The first logic governs actors’ actions out of rational fear or anticipation of material losses or gains in accepting the other party’s course. Based on rational choice calculations, the logic of expected consequences assumes that “one thing we desire leads to another by causing it.”³⁹ Such an approach assumes that “people maximize utility in formally specifiable ways”; they aim at achieving higher utility at all costs.⁴⁰ In the words of Goldmann, weighing expected consequences “essentially leads us to derive actions from given preferences.”⁴¹ These preferences are set for all actors—current and future—who calculate anticipated costs and benefits of specific actions and usually chose the most cost-effective ones. The preferences are exogenous to the actors and the systems are, in Alexander A. Schuessler’s words, “in place before the theorist enters the scene and are put into place by powers independent of (and thus logically prior to) the social situation that is being studied.”⁴² Actors ask what situations are we facing, what options are available for us to act on, what benefits and costs are associated with each of our options, and how can we design actions for higher benefits and lower costs.

The second logic, the logic of appropriateness, governs the actors’ actions from their respective identity constructs. The decision-making mechanism here

is based on the theory of social constructivism, which embraces normative patterns and identity constructs that make actors' behaviors appropriate under certain conditions and inappropriate under others.⁴³ The notion, levels, categories, and types of appropriateness—or inappropriateness—are built by the actors themselves, which “leads [them] to derive actions from given identities.”⁴⁴ On the one hand, actors' interests and identities, as laid down by Wendt, are “endogenous to interactions”; in this case, actors bring them along while entering the behavioral systems.⁴⁵ On the other hand, even this endogeneity is not static: “the inner self—our preferences, desires, and self-conceptions—is constructed by and through outer forces and social structures. . . . the preferences that have been adapted to circumstances are not what the individual[s] truly want,” which means that “institutions and other corporate actors . . . may change ‘their’ social identities and thereby acquire different interests and preferences” depending on multiple factors that may dwell both inside and outside the system they are in.⁴⁶ Unlike the previous rationality-based logic, the preferences are not set; they are fluid and constantly changing, making the actions dependent, not on the objective reality as given, but on the actor's subjective reflection through individual identity prisms. States ask what situation are we facing, who are we, who are the other actors, how will we and others be affected by the optional action or actions, and how can we design our actions to be morally acceptable and ideationally correct?

In making decisions to continue to pursue or to drop pressure followed by enacting both logics, the demander and the demandee alike consider multiple sets of independent and intervening variables. The simple truth behind rational cost-calculations contends that states will be better off with additional territories and worse off after giving away chunks of land. An account of a wide array of factors, such as the potential geopolitical benefits of holding onto the territories, including the economic production capacities, natural resources, and so-called lootables, must be undertaken.⁴⁷ Under this logic, state A will start demanding lands from state B if A considers that it will be eventually better off, seeing viable prospects for success. The logic of appropriateness pushes identity considerations to the forefront of decision-making variables and holds the costs from possession or deprivation of the land as a separate variable under identity politics. Using this logic, state A will start demanding lands from state B if A considers that this step will be appropriate as far as its own identity is concerned. Doing otherwise would be tantamount to identity loss, which simultaneously means depleting nationhood. Both logics equally invoke Robert D. Putnam's two-level or even multilevel games, where compellence diplomacy within international and bilateral frameworks is limited by manifold constraints created by domestic policy issue areas and sometimes fluctuating preferences of states' electorates.⁴⁸

Mechanism of Pressure Dilemma

Inherently incompatible confluence of the two behavioral logics has an overwhelming effect on the outcomes of pressure dilemmas. Demanders demonstrating rational choice-based behavior would advocate for decreasing pressure when there are no viable chances for success. Demanders with identity-based behavior, however, would pose demands even though they are comparably weaker than their demandees and see no feasible prospects to effectively compel the latter to follow the course of action. The resulting situations are somewhat similar to intrastate security dilemmas where, according to Roe, “the actions of one society, in trying to increase its societal security (strengthen its own identity), causes a reaction in a second society, which, in the end, decreases the first society’s own societal security (weakens its identity).”⁴⁹ Only in this case, the societies are viewed on larger, state levels and are posing demands not within countries but between them.

By wanting to be better-off in terms of utility, members who are driven by multiple variables, including their identities, roles, and place in the contemporary world, as well as futuristic visions of themselves and of others, inevitably end up worse off.⁵⁰ In trying to promote vital national interests connected to the future utilization of disputed land, demanders and demandees push each other beyond their limits. The paradox is that, while no rational indicators to succumb to the pressure of the opponent may exist in either side’s planning, the dyadic members have no choice but to perpetuate the pressure dilemma. Submitting to the other side’s demands would render a severe blow to the “loser’s” prestige and international standing as well as convey economic damage in the forms of possible financial retributions and restoring territorial possessions. In addition to experiencing economic damages, members who succumb to pressure or drop their demands deny their identities, refute their whole *raison d’être*, and repudiate the collective egos of their ethnoes. The pressure dilemma is perpetuated by demanders pressing on demandees and the latter continuing to resist not merely because they rationally want to, but because in most cases, the contested territories are inseparable from their corresponding political selves. The parties to security dilemmas cannot stop the futile game of compellence and denial since giving in to the opponent’s demands will mean the destruction of the party’s own collective identity based on their possession of the lands in question.

Possible Solutions

Unlike security dilemma, whose tragic nature lies in the inability of the actors to reverse reality from its belligerent outcome, the tragic essence of pressure dilemma is in the fruitless pursuit of compellence and the denial of territorial claims by the dyadic members. In negative dilemmas, the demander cannot but

continue to press on the demandee and the latter cannot but continue to resist. The knots of interstate compellence become even tighter since there are similar vital national interests and identity constructs linked to territorial possessions on both sides of the rope. The way out of the pressure dilemma—when the outcome becomes positive—is to solve the dilemma with no further actions from either the demander or the demandee. A solution can be achieved when one or both sides give in—either the demander drops its claims or the demandee eventually succumbs to the former’s pressure.

Another way out of pressure dilemma is a resolution with the help of outside actors. Unable to level their differences or to come to a mutually acceptable outcome alone, the demander and the demandee may choose to resort to external help. Third parties would either force the demandee to accept the demander’s option or to persuade the latter to drop its claims. This process is similar in security dilemmas. Here, according to Walter, a credible third party can moderate the disagreement from outside, which “can change the level of fear and insecurity that accompanies treaty implementation and thus facilitate settlement . . . guarantee[ing] that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept.”⁵¹

To be sustainable, however, the outcomes of the pressure dilemma require some sort of international institution’s framework to legally bless the end state of the pressure dilemma. According to David Carment and Frank Harvey, externally proposed dispute “settlements . . . require the stamp of institutional legitimacy upon which long-term measures depend.”⁵² For the outcomes proposed by the third parties to be truly respected, they should enjoy a high level of impartiality within the pressure dyad. This lack of bias would further minimize the incentive for defecting from the proposed outcomes of the pressure dilemma and increase the options’ credibility in the eyes of the demander and the demandee.

Unlike in the security dilemma, the third option—the stalemate—perpetuates the dilemmatic pressure on both sides. The impasse within the pressure dyad would maintain the dilemma since no party is willing to make concessions by accepting the options presented by the other side. In worst-case scenarios, if the pressure dyad members cannot achieve consensus when choosing an acceptable mediator or arbiter, the pressure dilemma would escalate to the point where military action could be the only possible solution and, in the case of no stalemate, a possible end to the security dilemma. Thucydidean tragedy appears in the inability of both the demander and the demandee to peacefully resolve their differences and to prevent pressure dilemmas from growing into security dilemmas.

Pressure Dilemma in Action

The four cases of pressure dilemma presented below are taken from different geographic regions, cultural backgrounds, and time periods and involve diverse sets of antagonists. The presence of unsatisfied territorial grievances, relative power parity or imbalance in the pressure dyad skewed against the demander, and the importance of the cases for future theorizing on peaceful interstate compellence unites these dilemmas.

The Kuril Island Dispute (circa 1855–present)

Prior to the arrival of Russian and Japanese explorers in the seventeenth century to the Kuril Islands, they were occupied by the now-vanished nation of Ainu that named the archipelago.⁵³ In the mid-nineteenth century, Russia and Japan had their first standoff regarding territorial possession of the islands, which resulted in the Treaty on Trade and Borders (a.k.a. the Treaty of Shimoda, 1855)—the first agreement regulating their relations in the region and setting the nations' boundaries on the disputed islands.⁵⁴ The day of the treaty, 7 February, is sealed in the Japanese identity as Northern Territories Day, which Japan currently celebrates as a national holiday.⁵⁵ Another legal arrangement in the form of the Treaty of Saint Petersburg was concluded in 1875, in which Russia surrendered the Kuril Islands to Japan in exchange for the Japanese portion of Sakhalin, the biggest island in the Sea of Okhotsk.⁵⁶ In response to Russia's continuous expansion eastward and the annexation of the Liaodong Peninsula, Japan initiated the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, which it won a year later.

By the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the war, Russia ceded to Japan the previously gained southern part of Sakhalin Island.⁵⁷ The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the new entity replacing the czarist Russia, was forced to recognize these terms but refused to share “any political responsibility with the Tsarist government for conclusion of the aforementioned treaty.”⁵⁸ Through a series of negotiations and agreements during World War II, including the Cairo Declaration, the Teheran Conference, and the Yalta Conference, the USSR tried to legally justify the occupation of these islands when it joined the war against Japan in August 1945.⁵⁹ After Japan's capitulation, Soviet troops were deployed to the Lesser Kuril Ridge. In September 1951, Japan concluded the Treaty of Peace with Japan with the Allies and, according to Article 2, “renounce[d] all right, title and claim to the Kurile [*sic*] Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.”⁶⁰ To ensure full control over the islands, Soviet authorities deported the Japanese population back to Japan proper or transferred them as prisoners of

war to Soviet detention camps.⁶¹ In 1956, the parties almost reached an agreement on transferring the isles of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan in exchange for Kunashiri and Iturup (a.k.a. Etorofu), but the United States stepped in, breaking the deal out of fear that the transfer would give the USSR increased leverage in the Asia-Pacific region.⁶²

Since then, the question of ownership of the southern Kuril Islands remained a major stumbling block in Soviet-Japanese interactions and continues to challenge Russo-Japanese relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan verbalized their stance on the territorial dispute: “The Northern Territories are inherent territories of Japan that continues [*visi*] to be illegally occupied by Russia.”⁶³ The Russian position is equally adamant; according to Dimitry Gorenburg, Russian officials “claim that the islands belong to Russia, and that Japan has to accept the idea that Russia’s sovereignty extends to all four islands before proceeding to any further discussions of this matter,” continually rejecting the mere idea of having a territorial dispute with Japan and considering its ownership of the islands as a *fait accompli*.⁶⁴

There are at least three explanations for the persevering negative pressure dilemma between Russia and Japan. From a consequentialist’s logic, the strategic geography of the Kuril Islands is so imperative that neither of the pressure dyad members wants to make any concessions.⁶⁵ Geographically, the Kuril Island chain is a natural gateway for Russian trade and communications with Japan as well as the rest of the world. Control of these islands would effectively cut off the Sea of Okhotsk from outside reach and thereby give their owner dominance over the *instability curve* from the Horn of Africa to Western China, which is a focal point of Russia’s and Japan’s maritime security.⁶⁶ Mihoko Kato points to the importance of the region to the military goals of both nations: “An ice-free Northeast Passage could also provide the Russian Navy with the shortest way to mobilize from the European theater to the East Asian theater, and vice versa.”⁶⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski refers to the Kuril Islands a bit differently but with the same outlook—as one of the “three strategic fronts” of confrontation of Western civilization with the Sino-Soviet block.⁶⁸ According to Andrew Mack and Martin O’Hare, the islands “are strategically located in that they guard the southern gateways to the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific and provide the most secure passage for Soviet surface combatants and submarines in and out of the Pacific Ocean” in case of possible hostilities in the region.⁶⁹

Ownership of the islands also comes with economic benefits. The Island of Iturup holds the world’s largest deposit of rhenium (opened in 1992 on the volcano Kudryavi), which is an indispensable component of air jet engines and high-octane lead-free gasoline. According to the Institute of Volcanology and Geodynamics of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, the volcano annu-

ally produces 36.7 tons of rhenium, which is almost 90 percent of the global output.⁷⁰ Across the islands, the possible oil and gas deposits are estimated to include equivalent reserves of more than 300 million tons of oil capable of covering the energy needs of the region for 30–40 years.⁷¹ Lastly, the islands' owners receive an additional 200-mile fishing zone, which is of major industrial importance in the region.

The logic of appropriateness steps in with the social constructivist perspective, which links possession of the islands with the relevant identity constructs of the Russian and Japanese nations. Not willing to back off, political elites and the populations on both ends of the pressure dilemma have constructed national identities that include the Kuril Islands as part of their attributes and honor. Tessa Morris-Suzuki claims that the disputed border of the Kuril Islands has a significant role in creating the corresponding identities of the Russian and Japanese people, galvanizing their separate *raison d'être*.⁷² For the Japanese, the significance of WWII is focal here, in that “the continued occupation of four islands forces [them] to remember the pitiful defeat in the Second World War.”⁷³ Russia keeps the reverse symbolic significance of the islands, as they are “a reward for Russia’s sacrifices during World War II and for Russia’s agreement to enter the war against Japan at the request of its allies.”⁷⁴ Giving the islands back, thus, would mean a coarse rewrite of its victorious history, which Russia is not ready to do so far. Any territorial concessions are, thus, tantamount to the loss of the country’s identity.⁷⁵ The same reasoning applies to the Japanese side of the pressure dyad: the Japanese population would consider any Japanese administration’s dropping of the territorial claims as a major weakness and betrayal to their Japanese identity.⁷⁶ With this case, the pressure dilemma is highly unlikely to grow into an open military confrontation. Both Russia and Japan are well aware of the negative consequences of moving from peaceful compellence to military deterrence or even offense and neither is willing to jeopardize the shaky political balance in this highly sensitive region.

The Armenian Genocide (1915–16)

The centennial of the mass killings and deportations of the Armenian population from the eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire was marked in 2015. Starting in April 1915, as a result of the systematic policy of ethnic cleansing conducted by the Turkish government against its citizens of Armenian origin, according to historian Stephan Astourian, “an entire nation was uprooted from their homeland of three thousand years and came close to extermination.”⁷⁷ While the ordeal meant “total domestic Genocide” for some, for others it was merely a “shameful act” and “a reasonable and understandable response by a government to a rebellious and seditious population in time of war and mortal danger to the state’s survival.”⁷⁸ The matter of recognizing or denying the Ar-

menian Genocide—linked with the questionable ownership of the territories and the real estate previously occupied by the perished or otherwise deported Armenians—represents a clear, negative pressure dilemma. Turkey continues to deny the mere fact of systemic violence per se, and the Armenian side, including the official government of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian diaspora abroad, continues to push for the legal acknowledgment of the genocide.

The deadlock at the core of the argument is the Armenians' charge that Turkey committed horrendous atrocities against approximately 1–1.5 million of their kin, which Turkey denies by accusing the Armenian side of grossly exaggerating the figures and the scale of atrocities.⁷⁹ Pro-Armenian authors produce evidence from the archives and written directives of the Turkish authorities that support the idea of the state-organized conspiracy, which ordered and executed the genocide.⁸⁰ The Turkish denialists claim that “careful examination of the secret records of the Ottoman cabinet at the time reveals no evidence that any of the CUP [Committee of Union and Progress] leaders, or anyone else in the central government ordered massacres.”⁸¹ Denialists also state that “to date, no evidence of any central government plot to annihilate the Armenians has surfaced.”⁸² While each camp has its own cohorts of supporters, sympathizers, and opposers, the solution of the Armenian issue has been stuck in the deadlock of mutual blame.

The reasons for the negative pressure dilemma are hidden in the remarkable mix of the two decision-making logics. The rational motivations are directly linked with the material side of what will happen if Turkey does acknowledge the fact of the genocide. As Rouben Paul Adalian claims, Armenians, “as a collectivity, had been robbed of all their wealth. They were forced to abandon their fixed assets. They received neither compensation nor reparations. As deportees, Armenians were unable to carry with them anything beside some clothing or bedding. All their businesses were lost. All their farms were left untended. Schools, churches, hospitals, orphanages, monasteries, graveyards, and other communal holdings became Turkish state property. The genocide left the Armenians penniless.”⁸³ While silenced in the official and moral discourses of both parties, the economy of accepting or rejecting genocide is always in Armenia's background.

The primary economic motivator deciding this case is the vague future of the land and other fixed assets abandoned by their Armenian owners. Quite simply, from the standpoint of possible restitutions and reparations for the descendants of genocide survivors, neither the Turkish nor the Armenian side knows exactly what will happen if Turkey acknowledges the genocide. Legal acknowledgment will inevitably cause long-lasting negative effects on the Turkish economy. Financial retributions, restitution of legal property, and satisfaction

of possible territorial claims—as vague as they are right now—would place serious economic pressure on the Turkish nation. Ambiguity on the property side augments Turkish fears about uncertain, but expectedly serious, political and economic ramifications that would arise with recognition; the less the Turks know about the true Armenian intentions, the more they fear the consequences.

An additional factor impeding Turkish recognition of the genocide is the potential issue of postgenocide settlements for its own Turkish and Kurdish citizens.⁸⁴ The census produced by the Turkish Statistical Institute in 2012 indicated 22.6 million Kurds live in Turkey, which is roughly 30 percent of the total population of 74.7 million people.⁸⁵ A simple count of Kurdish citizens in major cities that used to be occupied predominantly by Armenians prior to the genocide approximates 7 million Kurds, leaving the dwellers of the lesser settlements scattered around the same territory uncounted. In cases of land restitution, one possible option—evicting Kurdish residents from their domiciles and resettling them elsewhere followed by the entry of the genocide victims' descendants—is directly connected to the exceedingly high economic and political costs that the Turkish government is not ready to face.

The logic of appropriateness further tightens the pressure dilemma knot, linking the genocide acknowledgment directly with the *raison d'être* of the dyadic members. The identity part of the genocide denial is based on the wish of the modern Turkish nation to disassociate itself from the genocide committed by their ancestors in 1915 and the genocidaire state that no longer exists. Post-genocide Kemalist Turkish identity became a mixture of linguistic and political essences, which in contrast to the Ottoman Empire, was civic and not ethnic. Vedat Yücel and Salomon Ruysdael define a Turk as “one who . . . speaks the Turkish language . . . [and] sees self or ego as a citizen of the Turkish Republic,” which was devoid of noncivic characteristics, such as religion.⁸⁶

The identity component of Turkish denial is attached to another factor, the Sèvres Syndrome or “fear of dismemberment,” named after the Treaty of Sèvres, which ended the Ottoman Empire in 1920. According to Levon Hovsepyan, Sèvres Syndrome includes fears existential to the Turkish nation, such as “the fear of territorial dismemberment, mistrust toward the outside world, worldview based on conspiracy theories and other phobias.”⁸⁷ Jung defines Sèvres Syndrome “as the perception of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state [that] remains a feature of the social habitus of the Kemalist elite.”⁸⁸ Sèvres Syndrome is strong enough to be institutionalized in the form of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which applies legal charges for genocide acknowledgment and the decisions of the Turkish National Security Council considering the Armenian Genocide a matter of national security since 2000.⁸⁹ Similarly, Bernard Lewis claims, “Armenians, stretching across Turkey-in-Asia from the Caucasian frontier to the

Mediterranean coast, lay in the very heart of the Turkish homeland—and to renounce these lands would have meant not the truncation, but the dissolution of the Turkish state.”⁹⁰ In the modern Turkish identity construct, to acknowledge the genocide would not only mean conceding to Armenian demands but also destroying the political, civil, and secular pillars upholding the modern Turkish identity, ultimately denouncing the contemporary Turkish self.

The same zero-sum interplay of the two logics appears in the continuation of the Armenian demands for Turkey to acknowledge the genocide. From the rational choice viewpoint, the Armenian side has not come up with more or less approximated standings on exact wants. According to Nareg Seferian, “all Armenian parties agree in regards to the basic facts, and on the necessity to have the Armenian Genocide recognized as a fact. But the endgame has never been explicitly declared or remains disputed.”⁹¹ Essentially, not being clear about postacknowledgment actions, the Armenian side wants Turkey to accept and assume full responsibility for a bill presented inside a sealed envelope.

The genocide-related Armenian identity construct is a mirror image of the Turkish denialist one. The genocide has become the core of the Armenian self and currently occupies a central part in the modern-day political and cultural discourse on the Armenian people’s future as a whole, both in Armenia proper and abroad. This identity formation especially applies to the representatives of the Armenian diaspora living abroad. According to Gregory Aftandilian, as the second and third generation of the “genocide survivors, Armenian-Americans carried special burdens, many of whom were often named after murdered relatives.”⁹² The Armenian diaspora practically owes its existence to the genocide since most of its current members are the descendants of those who ran from persecution. Anny Bakalian comments, “the Genocide remains a common denominator for American Armenians, a very emotional and political ‘cause’ for mobilizing the community and maintaining stronger boundaries that separate the Armenians from the rest of the world.”⁹³ Many Armenians view terminating the push toward acknowledging the genocide as the destruction of their self, molded through generations of struggle for survival against the surrounding Muslims.

A tremendously negative reaction followed the conclusion of the protocols in 2009, which were meant to be the positive first step toward normalizing political interactions between the antagonists.⁹⁴ The leading Armenian lobby in the United States, the Armenian National Committee of America, issued the following statement calling the whole event “the success of Turkey in pressuring Armenia into accepting these humiliating, one-sided protocols.”⁹⁵ At home, the administration of Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian “was widely accused by Armenians of agreeing to a formulation that questioned the characterization of the 1915 events as genocide.”⁹⁶ Under such severe pressure from his

domestic foreign veto-players, President Sarkisian suspended the ratification of the protocols in April 2010.

The Munich “Appeasement” (1930s)

In the 1930s, as a result of the politics of appeasement, British and French leaders allowed Nazi Germany a series of territorial concessions in the form of returning Czechoslovakia’s demilitarized Rhineland and Sudetenland, eventually leading to Germany’s post-WWI rearmament. The purpose was noble, bringing “peace for our time” to European households and minimizing Adolf Hitler’s potential claims.⁹⁷ As some historians argue, the result was the complete reverse; it “not only failed to appease Hitler but made war even more likely by whetting his appetite for aggression and by undermining the credibility of Britain and France.” Thus, the preconditions for Germany to start expressing unabridged aspirations for world domination were created.⁹⁸

The roots of appeasement go back to the interwar years. According to articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), Germany was forbidden “to maintain or construct any fortification either on the Left bank of the Rhine or on the Right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the East of the Rhine.”⁹⁹ Germany was punished by the victorious nations of World War I—America, Great Britain, and France—and banned from using the industrial potential of the territories it formerly possessed for further belligerent purposes, which the war victors administered jointly under the Treaty of Versailles and Pact of Locarno (1925). At that time, popular European sentiments were tuned toward facilitating Germany’s return to the European family after the nation’s aggression during the war. In these plans, Rhineland and Sudetenland were used as pawns to make Germany abstain from possible militarization and aggression toward its European neighbors.¹⁰⁰ Germany’s peaceful compellence included diplomatic negotiations with France and Britain and the threat to use force against Czechoslovakia. The Czech position, according to P. M. H. Bell, “was appalling. To accept [the transfer of Sudetenland] meant, almost certainly, the dismemberment of their country. . . . To reject the proposals meant war and invasion.”¹⁰¹ Some scholars, including Klaus Hildebrand, consider the return of the lost land of the Rhine, and the subsequent takeover of Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland, as essential sections, or stages, in Hitler’s general *Stufenplan* for further military and political advancements in Europe, which he had started developing in the late 1930s after the German-Austrian *Anschluss* in 1938.¹⁰²

Appeasement was primarily a response to Germany’s peaceful compellence. In his historic address to Reichstag, Hitler called for remilitarization of Rhineland and argued for sovereign equality for Germany to deploy its troops wherever it wished.¹⁰³ The whole matter was presented as a part of the re-

vived German identity to protect ethnic kin elsewhere in Europe. Slightly different was the situation with Sudetenland, a part of pre-WWII Czechoslovakia. Densely populated by ethnic Germans, Sudetenland was a split-off part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and with other German-inhabited parts—such as Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia—advocated for self-determination and joining Germany. Under the insurmountable pressure from France and Britain, Czechoslovakia was eventually forced to relinquish Sudetenland to Germany.

The pressure dilemma between Germany, as the demander, and France, Great Britain, and Poland jointly acting as demandees, was positive. Germany got what it wanted within the pressure dilemma narrative—unification of the land populated by ethnic Germans—because of the suitable international climate involving two powerful external players. This climate put pressure on the central demandee, Czechoslovakia, to irreversibly accept the terms of the agreement. Ongoing debate as to why Hitler was able to seek so many concessions from Great Britain and France prior to its invasion of Poland in 1939 mainly focuses on the interplay between the two logics.¹⁰⁴ The logic of expected consequences forced France and Britain to choose between the two evils: to let Hitler unleash his wrath on Europe or to appease him by satisfying his initial territorial cravings in hopes that this would stop him from further aggression. Daryl G. Press argues that the rationale behind the conniving attitudes of Great Britain and France toward Germany's compellence were based on weighing the pros and cons of specific options and evaluating past behaviors.¹⁰⁵ Also, as Norrin Ripsman and Jack Levy claim, one of the rationales for the policy choice was to buy time for Germany's possible rearmament.¹⁰⁶

The start of WWII cannot be considered in this case as an immediate outcome of the territorial gains from Czechoslovakia since Hitler was guided by entirely different objectives, not directly linked to the possession of Czechoslovakia only. Winston Churchill, John F. Kennedy, Alfred L. Rowse, Margaret George, Ivan Maïskiï, and Maurice Cowling separately argue that the British government recognized Hitler's unreasonable design but was incapable of stopping him because of domestic constraints regarding his ideological considerations and Britain's inadequate military capabilities.¹⁰⁷ Nicholas Rowland Clifford, Ian Goodhope Colvin, Keith Middlemas, and Bradford A. Lee emphasize the international restraints, which were imposed upon British diplomacy by extensive global commitments.¹⁰⁸ As explained by Peter Trubowitz and Peter Harris, the British government had recognized Germany's goals in the late 1930s, but was unlikely to conduct a full-scale military deterrence strategy in dealing with Hitler's demands due to the capability constraints on Great Britain.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, Correlli Barnett and Paul M. Kennedy trace the origins of the appeasement policy to two trends: the increase in British global commitments and the relative decline in British military power.¹¹⁰ Hence, as Powell argues, the

sooner demandees take a firm stand, the stronger they will be if war ensues.¹¹¹ Given the declining status of Great Britain in the international system, however, the choice the nation faced in the 1930s was evident: continue to defend the empire or concentrate on deterring the growing German threat.¹¹² Even if this was the rationale behind the appeasement, France and Britain fatally failed to secure peace with Germany—the end state that they had sought to achieve in the first place.

The logic of appropriateness focuses more on the domestic than international origins of the appeasement policy in the 1930s.¹¹³ Arnold Wolfers, Martin Gilbert, Richard Gott, and A. J. P. Taylor concentrate on the personalities of key policy makers, asserting that British policy makers did not take sufficient account of Hitler's personality.¹¹⁴ They believed that Hitler was a madman, a revolutionary, or both but certainly not an orthodox political leader. In all these different and somewhat conflicting views, the identity factor was a significant catalyst for the regional system's decision to concede to Germany's compellence demands.

The Aouzou Strip Saga (1980–94)

The conflict in Chad between its various national governments and Libya during the 1980s represents a favorable, positive pressure dilemma where the relatively weak demander managed to compel the relatively strong demandee to return occupied land. Soon after decolonization in 1960, Chad was wrapped in the mayhem of constant rivalry between religious groups and clans who made up more than 200 ethnic groups that spoke more than 100 different languages. Chad fell victim to the parochial interests of its northern neighbor, Libya, and the personal interests of its leader, Muammar Qaddafi.¹¹⁵ The apple of discord, the Aouzou Strip, is a 44,000-square-mile (114,000-square-kilometer) part of northern Chad known for its vast uranium resources and mostly populated by Muslim Chadians.¹¹⁶ France transferred the strip to Italy under the Franco-Italian Agreement of 1935.¹¹⁷ In 1980, Libya annexed the strip as a result of an open military intervention.¹¹⁸ This move was a part of a major Libyan campaign of Arabization of its southern neighbor, “the cornerstone of Libyan foreign policy, seeking to extend [Qaddafi's] own influence throughout Africa.”¹¹⁹ The ensuing confrontation was quite turbulent with numerous ups and downs depending on Chad's leadership.

In June 1980, Goukouni Oueddei, head of the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Libya that allowed the Chadian government to call upon Libya should its independence, territorial integrity, or internal security be jeopardized. At that time, Goukouni was in a bloody confrontation with his former ally Hissène Habré, leader of the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), who represented a

real threat to Chadian political integrity and the government's survival. Between 7,000 and 9,000 Libyan troops armed with tanks and self-propelled artillery entered northern and central Chad in November 1980 supported by 4,500–5,000 troops from the Islamic Legion of Chad. In a month, the united front of GUNT and the Libyan-backed Islamic Legion gained control of the country's capital, N'Djamena, and won the war against FAN. In January 1981, Chad and Libya signed another agreement that allowed the two nations to merge into a unified political entity.¹²⁰ In November 1981, under pressure from the Organization of African Unity and upon the request of Oueddei, Qaddafi withdrew his forces from N'Djamena. In February 1987, Qaddafi reentered Chad with a total of 11,000 troops, but was not successful; with his two tank squadrons defeated at Wadi Doum, it was the biggest blow to Libya's regional standings.¹²¹ Suffering heavy losses, Libya retreated north to Aozou. A successful attack by the Chadian Army followed, forcing the Libyan troops to leave their base in Aozou. The status quo was restated: Chad suspended its attempts to regain the Aouzou Strip, and Libya stopped bombing the southern regions of the country. The two states subsequently signed the Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute between the Republic of Chad and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in August 1989, which effectively ended their rivalry, while the issue of the sovereignty of the Aouzou Strip remained unsettled.¹²²

Almost immediately after the two countries had resumed diplomatic relations, Chad decided to reclaim its lost land. Article 2 of the Framework Agreement contained the following provisions for the international community's participation as an arbiter in the pressure dilemma matter: "In the absence of a political settlement of their territorial dispute, the two Parties undertake . . . [t]o submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice."¹²³ Solving the pressure dilemma, upon mutual consent, was transferred to the international community, and alleviated by the presence of a mutually credible third actor—the UN. In 1990, Chad and Libya referred their dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with radically different legal interpretations. According to the demandee, Libya, the case was a "territorial dispute"; for the demander, Chad, it was a "boundary dispute."¹²⁴ The ICJ took four years to definitively close the case and positively end the pressure dilemma between Chad and Libya. On 3 February 1994, the ICJ issued the judgment that fixed the borders between the two countries on the basis of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Libya, which meant that Libya should vacate the strip.¹²⁵ On 4 April 1994, Chad and Libya signed the agreement on the practical modalities of executing the ICJ judgment rendered on 3 February 1994, which provided the legal basis for the complete withdrawal of Libyan troops from the disputed territory to be

observed by UN monitors. The withdrawal of Libyan troops was carried out within the established schedule, without any violations of the treaties, and with assistance from the UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) created by UN Resolution 915.¹²⁶ On 30 May 1994, Chadian and Libyan representatives jointly declared that the withdrawal was complete, solving the pressure dilemma with the rubber stamp of the international community.¹²⁷

Libya's long-standing interests in Chad represented a mix of logics embodied in its identity-laden support to the Muslim brethren living in northern Chad and an abandonment of its colonial past on the one hand, and the rational calculus of the purely tangible benefits Libya sought in Chad on the other. Identity wise, Libya was a stout promoter of the Muslim cause on the African continent, especially in the northern part, and pushed for North African Muslim unity.¹²⁸ By holding Chad as its colony, Libya wanted to act as a colonial metropolis itself, thus, liberating from its own colonial past. As Sam C. Nolutshungu claims, Libya was interested in establishing "at most, a pro-Libyan government, similar in ideology and willing to accept the *fait accompli* of Libyan incorporation of the Aouzou Strip."¹²⁹ The same chemistry between the logics explains Libya's decision to concede to Chadian pressure. Economically speaking, Libya could not sustain the cost of its prolonged and multidimensional presence in the Aouzou Strip. The resources, including uranium, had yet to be extracted, which would require huge investments in mining, development, and transportation. The end of the Cold War also meant the end of the Soviet Union's backing: the new Russia was engulfed in its own domestic problems.¹³⁰ Without substantial external military support, Libya could not effectively carry on the occupation of the strip.

The logic of consequentiality slowly enacted the logic of appropriateness. To get the foreign money needed for domestic purposes and continue with profitable oil trade, Qaddafi had to look righteous to the West, especially Europe. Qaddafi repeatedly mentioned that his "troops were in Chad at the request of the GUNT and its president and that they would withdraw immediately if the Chadian president demands so."¹³¹ The legal document with GUNT gave enough grounds for Libya to save face during its retreat from Aozou. Also, with the highly normative environment in Europe and the United States, financial cooperation with an aggressor country that had annexed another state's land was highly unlikely. Giving up the high-maintenance Aouzou Strip was presented as a good will gesture Qaddafi would use to prove to the West that he was cooperative.

Discussion

The examples presented above differ substantially in their geopolitical, cultural, and historical contexts, but they share a single characteristic: they are all pres-

sure dilemmas. In the two instances of positive pressure dilemmas, the international community helped find solutions. In the cases of appeasement and the Aozou Strip, the international community played a fundamental role in successfully solving the pressure dilemma even though the nature of the role was different, representing individual states in the former and the multilateral organization in the latter. In the first instance, the joint actions of France and the United Kingdom allowed Germany to control the Czech land for which it had been pressing. In the second example, Chad's pressure on Libya was resolved by the UN as a multilateral organization. During the appeasement and the Aouzou Strip conflicts, external parties acted as impartial arbiters with no stakes other than achieving positive outcomes of the pressure dilemmas. France and the United Kingdom were vitally interested in keeping peace in Europe, which was thought to have been achieved at the expense of the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia. In the matter of the Aouzou Strip, the UN was concerned with solving the long-lasting political unrest in Northern Africa. The UN was also keen to reaffirm its role of an unprejudiced and objective supranational institution capable of restraining the systemic anarchy, especially under the geopolitical conditions of the collapsed bipolar world of the early 1990s.

The instances of negative pressure dilemma revealed similar reasons behind the inability of the demanders to successfully compel their dyadic opponents. Armenia, without political support from the international community, has been unable to make Turkey acknowledge the facts of genocide for almost a century. None of the approaches—including the diaspora's lobbying of foreign governments, multiple protest actions toward Turkish political institutions, or even assassinations of Turkish officials by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia terrorist group—seem to help. The international community's involvement in this matter is minimal, limited to sporadic efforts of single states' legislatures to pass genocide bills and of leaders making public statements in support of the Armenian cause.¹³² The same disinterest of the international system is evident toward identifying a solution to the quarrel between Japan and Russia over the possession of the Kurils. The islands are too insignificant to affect vital issues on the world stage. The international community has no vested interest in forcing Russia to accept the solution presented by Japan, even though the latter claims to be "prepared to respond flexibly to the timing and manner of their actual return."¹³³ Besides, Japan's ability to shake the balance of regional forces is equally nugatory: any outcome of the pressure dilemma—either the return of the islands or Russia's continuous possession of them—will draw insignificant waves in the region's politics.

The four cases of pressure dilemmas show an overlap between the rational choice and constructivist mindsets behind the actions of demanders and demandees; however, which behavioral logic prevails when a demandee refuses

or accepts the compulsion options given to them by a demander, or vice versa, is hard to say. In all of the above cases, the official positions on both sides of the pressure dilemmas have been mixed with rational gains and losses of arguments made in support of national identities linked to the territories in question. Moreover, the combination of rational choice with identity constructs overly complicates the matter of successfully resolving the pressure dilemmas.

The scale of external participation in solving a pressure dilemma is contingent upon the willingness of the international community to accept institutional change. Systemic change, in general, is feared because the main institutional function—predicting the actors' future—is violated.¹³⁴ International regimes have to withstand the pressure put on them from external and internal actors as long as they can adapt to or show increased adaptability toward the evolving environmental realities when resistance to change is no longer an option.¹³⁵ To paraphrase Indiana Senator Richard Lugar, they should either go out of the area or out of business. The regime's actors are faced with a predicament: stay and try to adapt to the institutional change or look for another option more suitable for their needs.

The institutional stability of the international system directly correlates with the ability of the demanders to press their agendas on demandees and the success of the latter to withstand the pressure. Positive dilemmas are more likely to happen when the international community is more receptive to institutional change; that is, when evolutionary redesign is underway and windows of opportunity appear, demanders will make their move. On the contrary, when the international system reveals increased rigidity to change, pressure dilemmas would be expected to remain in the negative phase with triumphant demandees.

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Political Culture and Risk Analysis

An Outline of Somalia, Tunisia, and Libya

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Abstract: Since the 1980s, the political culture concept experienced important theoretical advances that stressed durable patterns of behavior over time. Since these theories can be applied to conflict settings and unstable states, the potential value of culture within risk analysis has emerged. Risk analysis has tended to treat political culture more as an afterthought, but the integration of several theoretical contributions allows it to be considered a starting point. Examining the contemporary cases of Somalia, Tunisia, and Libya in the frame of this alternative approach establishes the groundwork for assessing future cases while providing an added dimension to risk analysis.

Keywords: political culture, political assessment, political tension, cultural integration, risk analysis, risk assessment, national maturity, independence movements, extremists, national violence, Africa, Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, Tunisia, Libya

The political culture concept has been circulating for decades, and although it initially seemed to have limited scope, several contributors have made important advances since the 1980s. Particularly, the work of political sociologist Larry J. Diamond, political scientists Harry H. Eckstein and Lucien W. Pye, as well as others broadened political culture's applicability to a wider number of cases and stressed the importance of observable patterns

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of behavior over long periods of time. Because of this work, political culture's potential as an effective tool in risk analysis has emerged; it can be applied to conflict settings and unstable states, including current situations in contemporary Africa. Despite the underlying potential, political culture has remained dormant. This latency does not mean that risk analysis has not considered political culture, but that as a separately delineated concept, it is rarely prioritized in cases of actual or potential conflict. Instead, political culture has been treated less as a starting point and more as an afterthought.

At least some of the rising number of crises across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in recent years can be understood as resulting from either the assessment limitations of risk analysis or a failure to convince decision makers of political culture's influence and suggests the need for an additional or alternative approach. In almost all cases of conflict, or even political unrest, outside stakeholders will always have concerns regarding any signs of institutional, economic, political, and social instability. From business investors to humanitarian aid workers, both government-based and nongovernment-based outsiders have had to consider the risks involved in taking any course of action; however, there is no unified approach among analysts. Not only do the factors analysts select to study vary, but the temporal window can even range from the immediacy of a crisis to a relatively remote period on the horizon. Moreover, different risk analyses produce different results and prioritize different factors, though most overlook patterns of political behavior over long periods. Recently harkening to the important role of the past, however, President Barack H. Obama recently admitted to the failure in Libya and the need for "a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn't have any civic traditions."¹ What form those efforts might take is not specified, but the president calling attention to the significance of *civic traditions* is notable. A serious look at the civic traditions that are key to political culture was also neglected by those who supported the regime change in Syria.² In such cases, a focused political culture approach should be able to differentiate between a people's capacity to engage in organized demonstrations and the extent to which they are able to form and maintain new governments, thus reducing the amount of risk in efforts to assist in these transitions.

A focused political culture approach can suggest an assessment of people's capacity or aptitude for several political actions and activities, offering a more useful, focused assessment than a general *political assessment*. In fact, people's capacity to embrace political actions vis-à-vis their nation's political milieu is often conflated. Political assessments often include analysis and description of government and political institutions with a largely top-down emphasis that can be microscopic. A political culture approach is more bottom-up, offering a broader view that includes the population at large and the potential political

actions they will experience and indeed cocreate. The political culture approach also affords a people with agency, compared to overall political assessment, which is more focused on structure. Often, agency requires skills or aptitudes that citizens have developed over time and under conditions specific to their locales, and the talents that are identified as positive or desirable, such as a capacity for community building or decision making by consensus, sometimes need to be further developed or at least supported and maintained.

The Horn of Africa and North Africa provide some interesting cases for understanding how political culture can better inform parties interested in assessing risks in those regions. Taking Diamond's, Eckstein's, and Pye's conceptual developments and "trying them on" selected contemporary cases, such as Somalia, Tunisia, and Libya, might lay some groundwork for applying—or not applying—them to other cases in the future. The 1991 breakup of Somalia and its fragmentation into three quite distinct polities is one such case, considering the shared religion, ethnicity, clan system, and social culture as well as the unexpected, disparate, and lasting outcome. The two northern polities of Somaliland and Puntland have had an almost reflexive avoidance of prolonged armed conflict, while the south seems to have had an almost reflexive appetite for it. This contrast suggests that the inclination to reach consensus in the north, instead of reaching for weapons, is a combination of skills learned and habits formed. Tunisia and Libya as neighboring states are also two interesting cases with quite different outcomes. Here, an overview of the apparent role of political culture might more fully inform those trying to understand these disparities. This article aims to promote an extended understanding of political culture and to suggest how the approach might be informative in situations that are politically unstable, openly conflictual, or in a postconflict phase. After a brief discussion of the concept, its role is considered in the cases mentioned above, and the article concludes with a discussion on the strengths and limitations of a political culture approach to risk analysis.

Overview of Political Culture

The notion of political culture hails from the earliest times in Western political thought, from its close association with the early Greek concept of *paideia* to contemporary political analyses based on surveyed attitudes.³ By the nineteenth century, the French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville understood *paideia* as actions and attitudes that had direct and indirect political implications and pointed to the crucial role it played in determining a people's political direction.⁴ He supported the idea that political culture was in fact historically rooted, as he documented in his now famous observations of the early United States.⁵

In the mid-twentieth century, however, when the political culture concept was taken up by several scholars, it was usually treated as static and ahistorical

when applied to modern developed states. Difficult to define, political culture had limited research options since it relied heavily on attitude surveys.⁶ By the 1970s, this trend began to change due to important contributions by the scholars mentioned previously, as well as Ron Inglehart and Robert Putnam, who further developed the idea to include historical process and thus examine how political culture could and did develop over time.⁷ The focus was on observable patterns of behavior that often endured, sometimes in different forms of expression despite changes in context and time. Even though the importance of patterns of cooperation, agreement by consensus, and accommodation had been raised in previous works, scholars of the time had not elaborated sufficiently on the concepts. Pye revitalized the assertions in a 1985 essay, which stressed “mutually reinforcing” patterns of behavior over long periods.⁸

Political culture as a tool for understanding people’s response to political movements, then, was infused with new ideas, adding breadth and depth up to a point. While Pye had introduced a sense of durability, other authors picked up on this as well. In 1994, Diamond expressed political culture by applying a geological analogy that compared it to sedimentary deposits set down over time.⁹ Political material from earlier layers was not simply covered by succeeding layers, but often integrated into the next layer and combined with, or otherwise coexisted alongside, more recent sedimentary deposits.¹⁰ Even Diamond’s proposed working definition implied political culture as process, describing “a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system.”¹¹ The word *predominant* suggested not only the idea of temporality, but also to consider the possibility of competing, lesser or peripheral political cultures (i.e., political subcultures). Even so, the definition still seemed to limit political culture by suggesting it could only be observed through surveys covering a people’s beliefs, attitudes, and sentiments to list a few. The weakness of this assumption was observed by the political culture scholar Stephen Welch, who remarked that “Political culture is not supposed to be the same as public opinion. . . . Yet, it is measured by the same method as highly volatile public opinion.”¹²

Understanding the nuances of political culture calls for a more integrated consideration of the works of political culture scholars where the underpinnings for applying political culture to risk analysis can be found. Welch, for example, identifies the problem with determining political culture through surveyed attitudes, but authors Diamond, Eckstein, and Pye provide some conceptual direction to an alternative approach. Eckstein took up the idea of *orientation* in 1988, describing it as “reliant on and informed by culturally determined, cognitive, affective and evaluative elements.”¹³ He saw that a people’s orientations promoted predictability, stability, continuity, and security,

serving as a filter for all subsequent (collective) learning. Conversely, a lack of orientations left a people insecure, ungrounded, and not equipped for autonomy. Eckstein also explained that a people's orientations could be expressed through their actions as well as attitudes.¹⁴ Eckstein's discussion of actions and attitudes dovetailed neatly with an earlier work of Pye's, where four paired themes were identified as recurring within his study. Two of the paired themes, equality/hierarchy and liberty/coercion, were observable as actions. Trust/distrust were attitude-based, and particular/general were identity-based.¹⁵

Linking equality and liberty as two tangible *action* orientations opens the door for observing political culture in contexts—as in active conflicts or insurgencies over long periods, such as Vietnam or South Africa—where *attitude* surveys are not practical. Equality might be captured in several ways and would neither have to be absolute nor limited to the obvious example of its presence or absence in legislation. Equality would also be observable by the inclusiveness of the population in collaboration and alliances found within economic, political, educational, and social sectors. One example would be no ethnic, religious, or gender barriers to those seeking political office; another would be integrated schooling where it was historically segregated. A more specific equality dynamic that likely institutionalizes rivalry and conflict can be seen in Northern Ireland where 97 percent of schools are segregated between Catholics and Protestants, and integration is considered to be competition between various sports teams.

Liberty would be discernible through a people's relative autonomy—the extent to which their lives are self-directed or governed (lightly versus heavily). To use an extreme comparison, the regimented personal lives of civilians living within Nazi Germany would have contrasted sharply with the relative resourcefulness and determination of the contemporary French Resistance. Thus, with political culture understood as a process taking place over time and indicated by equality and liberty, how consistently either of them prevail over time speaks to how deeply entrenched a political culture might be. Put another way, the political culture of a people who have been inclusive and autonomous throughout several generations is likely to be different than that of a hierarchically ordered people who have been living in a long-term context of coercion. Moreover, assessing these action-based orientations can streamline political culture research in temporal and conflictual contexts as the demands differ from those of surveys, and evaluations can be as heavy or light as resources, time, and available information permit, provided the identified themes are pursued and consistency is maintained.

Early on, Pye made another important distinction between elite political culture and mass political culture, which introduced the idea of political subcultures within the larger, overarching political culture.¹⁶ Within elite and mass

political cultures in larger and more complex societies, there is a likelihood of significant, and sometimes competing, subcultures that are usually divided along social, ethnic, religious, ideological, or geographical lines. Clarification is still needed between actual subcultures versus inevitable variations within the predominant political culture. If the subcultures are competing, the distinction is clear; however, if their interests and principles are largely compatible, exactly where variations on a predominant political culture end and political subculture begins is uncertain.

In seeking enduring patterns of behavior over time, just how far back in time one should venture depends on the intended extent of the study and the consistency and reliability of available resources. The period covered needs to be sufficiently long enough for possible patterns to emerge, of course, which would mean at least five or six generations. For this brief overview, the early nineteenth century is a realistic starting point, as it was a time when European travel and thus reporting—though at times biased—had dramatically increased. This period also offers comparative views with colonial and postcolonial eras, allowing sufficient perspective for noting patterns of liberty/coercion and equality/hierarchy in the cases used for this discussion—Somalia, Tunisia, and Libya.

Observing Political Culture

This preliminary look at patterns of political culture over time involves polities with relatively small populations. Somaliland, Puntland, and southern Somalia have a combined population of approximately 11 million, divided as 3.5 million, 4 million, and 3.5 million, respectively.¹⁷ Tunisia has a total population of about 11 million as well, and Libya's population is slightly more than 6 million, so there is some degree of comparability between them. Granted Libya's and Tunisia's populations are significantly less homogenous than the Somali polities are assumed to be, yet Somali clan identity has more priority than any overarching sense of homogeneity and thus makes for reasonable comparison to the other two countries.¹⁸ Admittedly, each of these cases has a much richer and more complex history than can be presented here, but this exercise only illustrates broad patterns that might lead to more in-depth study.

The Somali Experience

In 1991, upon the overthrowing of Mohamed Siad Barre, the country's dictator of 22 years, the Somali Democratic Republic fragmented into three main entities, ultimately becoming Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland in the northeast, and southern Somalia, which remained conflictual and is so at present.¹⁹ Each entity acted autonomously at the time. Although the past 25 years has not been a smooth road for any of them, the two northern polities have been predominantly quiet while the south has been persistently dominated by

armed conflict.²⁰ The south's conflict has changed in terms of actors, but not in any appreciable reduction of violence. In the north, any episodes of conflict were negligible in scale and duration, never approaching that of the south. The continuous violence in the south, in fact, is unprecedented in Somali history.²¹ Despite any apparent parity between the three entities in terms of ethnicity, clan system, culture, and religion, the regional variations between them do not sufficiently account for such divergent political outcomes.²²

This political disparity between the two northern regions and the south invites a historical political culture perspective. The three contemporary Somali polities share some similarities with their respective historical counterparts during the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras, not only in terms of regional space but also in terms of liberty/coercion and equality/hierarchy. The ways in which people organized themselves, their treatment by and reactions to those claiming authority over them, and how they cooperated internally all have implications, which are reflected in circumstances today. Briefly reviewing the polities individually highlights these significant overarching differences.

Somaliland

Created through a series of interclan meetings that began in 1991 and occurred for approximately two and a half years, Somaliland came into being as a fledgling liberal government. During this crucial time, and despite the numerical predominance of one clan, efforts to include other clans were immediately palpable and woven into the future government.²³ Although various problems have surfaced since, the hard fact remains that for 25 years there has been no descent into prolonged violence, and relatively speaking, Somaliland has certainly evolved for the better.²⁴

In this northwest area, governance until 1885 was a patchwork of rather relaxed, suzerain-type arrangements with limited incidents of violence. From early in the century, Somali coastal export trade through bustling seasonal markets was paramount. During this period, none of the overseeing government arrangements were in place long enough to take over the trade or the Somalis themselves.²⁵ The activities in the primary coastal markets varied over time and from one coastal market center to the next, with perhaps Berbera representing the apex of significant commercial skills and organization. Several thousand camels arrived with inland caravans, more than 70 ships from ports near and far were anchored offshore, and 5,000 temporary traders' huts were built annually. Trade would have been impossible to have taken place at all, expand, or persist without a variety of well-developed administrative and organizational skills. The need for these skills was not limited to the ports along the coast, but inland people also used them for such activities as bartering along caravan

routes and intricately herding large numbers of livestock to the ports to ensure they arrive in good health.²⁶

Trade increased exponentially after a British garrison was established in 1839 at Aden in modern-day Yemen, only a day's sailing from the Somali coast. When rephrased as cooperative and collaborative decision making and organizational proficiency, these skills created a market context of pragmatic egalitarian relations. There was no place for divisive behavior interfering with the business of trade; even fighting that arose from disagreements was regulated and permitted only at a prescribed distance from the market itself.²⁷ In this instance, Diamond's list of skills required for democracy—moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, *and* participation—was also crucial to the successful longevity of the markets.²⁸

These market skills were expressed through increasing political engagement and organization from 1885 to 1940, when the British formally established a large part of the northern coastline and its hinterland as a protectorate, but not for the purposes of colonization.²⁹ On a limited budget, the result was tentative and unambitious administrative rule that allowed the Somalis to continue their lively export trade similar to past decades.³⁰ No matter if they were forming charitable or political organizations, refusing to comply with direct orders as civil servants or military recruits, serving as British administration-employed arbiters, or demonstrating against unwanted administration interferences, the autonomy required to do so and the skills for organizing themselves was unmistakable.

Persisting into the underfunded postcolonial period from 1940 to 1960, limited British aid and Somali self-sufficiency saw the people through even famine and drought.³¹ Preparations for independence that the British were obligated to provide by United Nations (UN) agreement moved at a plodding rate. After attaining independence in 1960, the people proved to be sufficiently self-contained and voted overwhelmingly against the proposed constitution for the new Somali state.³² Through voting ambiguities this decision was disregarded, but the historical capacity for, and indeed habit of, self-reliance was undiminished. Marginalized during the new Somali Republic's brief attempt at democracy (1960–69), dormant political skills soon resurfaced after Barre assumed power and slowly tightened his grip on the north. Pockets of resistance emerged over time, and Barre's 1988 bombing of the northern city of Hargeisa was the beginning of his end; only two and a half years later, his departure signaled the birth of Somaliland. The history of the polity's foundation demonstrates a clear sense of several forms of autonomy crossing over several generations and a rather pragmatic equality born first from the necessities of commerce and then of political expediency.

Puntland

The path that led to the birth of Puntland was one of fits and starts. After the united, independent Somalia disintegration in 1991, and following various efforts at autonomous rule, Puntland came into being in 1998. Several short-lived administrations attempted to promote at least some semblance of inclusive autonomy previous to this, yet none involved protracted violence nor any lasting attempts at coercive rule. In the midst of political infighting, charges of corruption, surreptitious links to pirates, and more, the people's overall determination to avoid armed conflict and yet organize politically, seemed to suggest an intrinsic pattern towards liberal values. Today, Puntland is a struggling autonomous state with its own government and constitution, multiparty politics, legal system, lively economy, active media, access to education, and other attributes expected of a modern state. At the time of this writing, Puntland's military forces successfully and impressively countered an attempted infiltration by al-Shabaab, killing 100 of its fighters and injuring more than 50.³³

The nineteenth century, however, began with people living in a harsh and demanding physical environment, one to which they had capably adapted survival strategies during the past several centuries. Even with infrequent trade and coastal dependence on a rather unique and localized *shipwreck economy*, life was a bleak, daily survival challenge that relied on mutual cooperation and alliances rather than overt competition for resources.³⁴ Historian Wayne K. Durrill observed that "when the rains failed, no one died of starvation, and no general warfare ensued."³⁵ The enduring and carefully balanced relationship between the people and their environment changed rapidly upon the 1839 establishment of the British garrison at Aden. Provoking a leap in export trade all along the northern coastline within five short years, the region went from no livestock exports in 1839 to 15,000 head in 1844 and from more than 700 tons of gum in 1843 to an estimated 1,000–1,500 tons by 1856.³⁶ Within 20 years, a string of internal conflicts arose about depleted resources within an already resource-strained environment during periods of drought and famine.³⁷ The profound departure from the countless generations of cooperation and alliance building to maintain subsistence conditions was not a long-lasting effort; within 20 years after internal conflicts began, the clans of the northeast salvaged the remains of their former capacity for cooperation and alliance building, and transformed them to face a different challenge: Italian colonialism.

Starting in 1885, Italian efforts toward colonization dominated the lives of the northeastern Somali clans. In 1888 and 1889, the leadership from the two major sultanates, Obbia and Majeerteen, signed agreements to become Italian protectorates in return for autonomy and other concessions from the Italians, including, rather remarkably, weapons.³⁸ Overall, it was a period of sporadic internal conflicts and rivalries, increasing demands from the Italians, and con-

tentious encounters with the nationalist religious leader Mohammed Abdullah Hassan (a.k.a. Sayyid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan). Along the northern coastline, active trade still took place, but as a sign of the times, small and large forts were built in key locations. The Somali leadership complied with the Italians when they could, but since there was little experience with or appetite for direct rule, they militarily opposed any moves that appeared too demanding. With old rivals at times agreeing to cooperate against Italy, significant organized resistance to Italian rule continued into the 1920s and lasted until the Italians left in 1941. This resistance was characterized by consistency and unity of purpose throughout the colonial period.

With little incident, the clans of the northeast moved through the post-colonial period. In 1949, the UN decided that Italy would be tasked with preparing its former colony, now a UN trust territory, for independence targeted for 1960. Although the south and the northeast were thereby technically under the remit of Italy, the northeast's great distance from the south, approximately 500 miles, afforded the two regions an unintended autonomy. This sovereignty continued after independence when the new government limited their attention toward and interfered even less in the region. Perhaps the relative isolation, limited resources, and small population were blessings in disguise since they facilitated this neglect. It is no small wonder that the first open resistance to Barre's 1969 coup that took place in the 1970s was based in this region.³⁹ Puntland reflects the heritage of a largely uninterrupted experience with autonomous life, the persistent capacity for self-sufficiency, and the capacity to cooperate in, adapt to, thrive despite of, and defy throughout changing contexts, similar to the experiences of the residents in Somaliland but in a different environment.

Southern Somalia

Southern Somalia has differed from the two northern areas in several ways, most notably by 200 years of a largely uninterrupted chain of external and internal coercion and conflicts as well as natural disasters and other challenges. The region's state of constant flux can be observed when working back in time—beginning when Barre fled the country in 1991 and southern Somalia fell into well-armed, clan-based divisions that competed for power, territory, and goods at a wanton level for several years. The most common figures estimate 500,000 fatalities from 1991 to about 2008.⁴⁰ Clan faction violence was replaced eventually by the violence of al-Shabaab, then a fledgling religious extremist group. As of this writing, al-Shabaab's activity fluctuates, and its members have claimed responsibility for several acts of terrorism.⁴¹ Although the context and actors have changed, the trend toward violent coercion that characterizes southern Somalia's past 25 years dominated by armed conflict and its accompanying instability has remained.

The 30 years preceding 1991 was another period marked with instability, conflict, and sluggish political progress. A weak democratic government began in 1960, ruled 9 years, and was followed by 20 years of Barre's increasingly stormy dictatorship, but this relative instability can be traced back further. Decades of internal political, violent outbreaks preceded independence, and indeed, UN observers commented then that the Somalis in the south were not sufficiently prepared for independence.⁴² The colonial era saw southern Somalis initially living under Italian rule and Italian Fascist rule by 1923. Afterward, racially oppressive, apartheid-like laws were passed and the people were living the very lives their forebears had long feared; inhumane punishments were often meted out to those who openly opposed the Italians, and the Somali population at large was unable to effectively resist.⁴³

One of the ostensible main issues during the colonial era revolved around abolishing slavery—necessary according to international agreement, yet replaced with an indentured system that was “indistinguishable from slavery.”⁴⁴ Slavery was a uniquely southern Somali holdover from the nineteenth century, when the lush inter-riverine region west of Mogadishu was used to grow an array of crops for export and thousands of slaves were depended on to work the land. Once Italy legislated that Somalis were no longer allowed to own land, both the Somalis and their slaves either found ways to fend for themselves on less choice land or adopted other means of livelihood. In a curious twist of fate, former Somali slave owners found themselves working the land.

The immediate precolonial period was similarly restrictive, unsettling, and very different from the relative autonomy and collaborative habits of the Somalis in the north. The entire Benadir region had long been under the rule of Omani Arabs based in Zanzibar, about 750 miles south of Mogadishu.⁴⁵ The south had no vast markets as did the north; instead, Indian and Arab traders dominated the Benadir ports, and Somalis, in general, were simply not welcome. Although Somalis did indeed engage in inland trade, they stopped well short of the coast, and middlemen would complete the journey of their wares and produce for export. Moreover, this system was in no way comparable to the north; for example, caravans were observed to be only twenty camels long.⁴⁶

From natural disasters to intrusions from Zanzibar, internal conflicts, and the significant Baardheere jihad, there was never more than five years before some catastrophe or violent interference took place, and sometimes several disruptive events took place concurrently.⁴⁷ For the southern Somalis, the pattern of life in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was so immersed in conflict and division that whatever small gains were made throughout this time never found sufficient traction. In the nearly 200 years leading up to 1991, the people of the southern Somali clans had little experience with stable, inclusive, or autonomous living.

Tunisia and Libya

The brief review of Tunisia and Libya is only undertaken to grasp a broad, overall understanding of the political culture approach. A deeper study would involve the multiple layers of actors in ever-shifting roles, regional differences, and changes in context, circumstances, objectives, and stakeholders. By taking a few steps back and viewing the wider landscape in terms of selected themes, however, these two cases emerge as interesting but contrasting examples in spite of being contiguous and having been part of the Ottoman Empire.

Tunisia has proven to be the one positive result of the Arab Spring, a peptunia in the MENA onion patch. As the country that initiated the round of defiance toward authoritarian regimes in December 2010, it is now a place where “pro-democracy reverberations produce jitters in nondemocratic regimes.”⁴⁸ Indeed, 67.27 percent of eligible registered voters participated in the national election in November 2014, although the sector comprised of disenchanted and disenfranchised younger voters did not participate as much as was hoped.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, the country’s 2014 constitution, which includes liberal rights for women, is understood to have been the result of a type of *bargain politics* that allowed for power sharing and very consciously avoided Islamist extremism.⁵⁰

Even more interesting is the decision on the part of those opposing the 24 years of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s autocratic rule as president (1987–2011) to adhere to an unwavering commitment to nonviolence. Because of this commitment, the opposition in Tunisia is unquestionably credited with “achieving the most amount of political change for the lowest cost in terms of bloodshed.”⁵¹ The opposition’s aversion to armed reaction is significant, particularly when its members appear to have been baited to resort to it. Such resistance deserves a closer look, especially in view of nonviolence being considered more as “an ingrained tradition” than a practical realization of an opponent’s military superiority.⁵² The opposition’s success required an appreciable number of the skills involved with autonomous strategizing, logistics, negotiation, compromise, and long-term thinking in an atmosphere that is, and must be, inclusive: nonviolent action requires broad participation.

Previously, Tunisia had been part of the Ottoman Empire that was treated as an autonomous province for more than 200 years, from the sixteenth century until 1881, when the French established it as a protectorate. During most of the Husaynid Dynasty, which remained in place as sovereign rulers from 1705 until the French arrived, Tunisia was significantly stable, even in the midst of unsuccessful provocations that included attempted attack from Algeria in 1807 and the revolt of a military class called the janissaries in 1811.⁵³ For almost 20 years, Ahmad ibn Mustafa ruled as Bey (governor) of Tunisia (1837–55). Open to increasing European influence and ties, Ahmad initiated several legal reforms. Among the most significant reforms were the abolition of the slave

trade in 1841 and then the abolishment of slavery itself in 1846. During this time, Tunis was an important center of commerce and on the path toward becoming a modern city in the coming decades.

After generations of autonomous rule, the ambitions for independence from France arose in the early twentieth century are of little surprise. Slowly evolving into a force to be reckoned with, the people ultimately achieved success by 1956. With the exception of some small-scale civil disturbances and the wounding and killing of hundreds of demonstrators in 1938, the pattern of life for most Tunisians had been relatively without incident and increasingly progressive for several generations. A somewhat liberalized autocracy led by President Habib Bourguiba (1957–87), the polity was strongly intolerant of critical journalists, but eager to establish a secular state; modern, liberal civil rights (especially for women); and other advances for 31 years. By 1987, Bourguiba was removed from office rather quietly due to health reasons and replaced by Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.

The new presidency began in 1987 with democratic intentions and political reforms, but slowly shifted into 24 years of various abuses, an overall level of corruption described by political scientist and Middle East specialist Lisa Anderson as “personalist . . . predatory . . . breathtaking.”⁵⁴ Resistance to this shift was quietly accumulating, and by 2011, Ben Ali was compelled to flee the country amid pending arrest. Tunisia was ripe for significant change, and those behind the changes were not from any single sector of society. As the noted scholar Michael J. Willis observes “the heterogeneity of the different sections of Tunisian society . . . [i]tinerant vegetable sellers, lawyers, agricultural workers, trades unionists, computer technicians, football supporters, academics, and the urban unemployed came together to oust Ben Ali and his system.”⁵⁵ Thus, Ben Ali not only agitated people across several sectors of society, but did this so thoroughly that all sectors were sufficiently effected to collectively, but non-violently, act against him.

The fact that nonviolent change emerged after 55 years of liberal autocracy suggests it had been quietly growing all along, just below the surface and perhaps with seeds that had been sown in generations past. Sitting on a foundation of historical autonomous rule, some progressive leanings, and decades of striving for independence, the terms of Bourguiba and Ben Ali were sufficiently tolerant, or careless, to have not completely crushed popular political will. The people’s participation and support across society also accounts for Tunisia’s success. Recent improvements in media freedom have also been a positive sign.⁵⁶ Tunisia, however, is still a work in progress, and is not without problems. Concerns about contemporary power rivalries and the marginalization of youth and the grassroots groups behind nonviolent changes take place

in an atmosphere where those in power have witnessed the tenacious resolve and political capacity of these groups.⁵⁷

Contemporary Libya has had very different historical circumstances. Since the death of Muammar “King of Kings” Qaddafi in October 2011, the country has not found its way toward a unified liberal state or unified state of any kind.⁵⁸ Rather, Libya has been afflicted with various problems such as regional fragmentation and fragmented authority, several hundred armed militia groups meting out their own ideas of justice, all kinds of smuggling, and the growing presence of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).⁵⁹ Although nonviolent demonstrations, diverse political parties, and local nongovernment organizations have been present, the overriding and inescapable predominance of violent conflict renders nonviolent efforts inadequate to meet the challenges that the, almost infectious, ongoing violence presents.⁶⁰

The continued predominance of social division and violence is not only a contemporary problem, but part of a tightly linked chain spanning several generations. Unlike Tunisians, Libyans have a difficult time identifying more than a few consecutive years of peace and stability. Yet, similar to Tunisia, the Tripoli region, Tripolitania, acted autonomously from the ruling Ottoman Empire from the early 1700s to the mid-1800s. Without the Ottoman government providing direction, however, coups occurred so frequently that emerging leaders rarely stayed in place for more than a year. With the region’s economy partly reliant on income from corsairs who forced passing ships to pay tribute, the occurrences of the First and Second Barbary Wars in the early nineteenth century were hardly surprising. All of this turmoil served as a troubling foundation for the political future.

Ending piracy by the 1820s allowed a few years of respite before civil war between three sons of the previous ruler erupted in the early 1830s. The Ottoman sultan intervened to end the conflict, but order was never truly restored and tribal resistance from different groups with different aims continued until about 1858, when the last revolt leader died.⁶¹ His death led to the end of local rule and the beginning of direct Ottoman control, about 50 years of which brought significant modernization in Tripoli and a period of stability and relative peace. In sum, 150 years of turbulent coercion under a dysfunctional and despotic autonomy was more or less rescued by about 50 years of progressive but absolute rule from Constantinople as the seat of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Small pockets of resistance rose and fell as Tunisia rolled into the early twentieth century.

After the end of the Italo-Turkish War (1911–12), Italy turned its colonizing ambitions to Libya, gained control, and renamed the territory Italian North Africa. Efforts to colonize were accompanied by eventually setting up 5

major and 10 minor concentration camps for those who resisted or were simply Bedouins living in tents.⁶² As Italy continued building its empire, particularly coercive, divisive, and oppressive methods were employed with large numbers of deportations and punitive killings occurred, and high mortality rates were seen at the concentration camps.⁶³ Italy went through its own political struggles because of the First World War, and re-emerged as a Fascist state with a more strident inclination to dominate territories and people than ever. Consequently, Libyan attempts at organized resistance were effectively defeated in 1931, yet the man who was to become Libya's first king, Idris I (1951–69), continued to lead resistance from exile in Egypt between the two world wars.

Upon its defeat in WWII, Italy relinquished claims to Libya, which became an independent state in 1951 with UN membership in 1955. The new Libyan government appeared to be off to a solid start with a constitution that formally championed a range of rights in regard to equality, civil and political rights, and more, with Article 11's well-known phrase "without distinction of religion, belief, race, language, wealth, kinship or political or social opinions." Despite such promising beginnings, King Idris proved to be somewhat autocratic, and was losing support among the population by the late 1960s. The recently discovered oil wealth had led to more centralized government and almost inevitable corruption within Idris's well-established patronage network. Ruling from 1951 to 1969, and often frustrated by various events around him, the king attempted to abdicate and establish a republic more than once. In 1969, Idris stepped aside under the ruse of needing medical treatment in Turkey, creating space for Qaddafi to take over.

Qaddafi's reign and fall is complex, well-documented, and not delved into here.⁶⁴ What can be said is that, partly, due to Qaddafi's nationalization of the oil industry, he was able on the one hand to dramatically raise the living standards of the Libyan people to the highest in Africa and indeed higher than in many parts of the world.⁶⁵ On the other hand, Qaddafi's erratic leadership, radical social reforms, human rights abuses, armed militant group support, and intensely anti-Western stance cast a dark shadow on his more than 40 years in power.⁶⁶ In the twenty-first century, Qaddafi was more receptive to the West, but there was widespread discontent among the broader population. Galvanized by the Arab Spring in Tunisia, an armed resistance arose, and by August 2011, Qaddafi had been killed in an ambush. Since then, Libya has been fragmented, leaving an alarming power vacuum. Looking back, persistent nascent resistance attempts have failed to gain ground, yet resistance has also failed to be completely defeated, and instead doggedly resurfaces time and again. This resilience suggests an enduring political subculture that has managed to survive over time and has not yet had the opportunity to fully mature.

Applying Political Culture

At first glance, the preceding overviews appear to be not much more than general historical summaries. Compiled with a political culture lens, they offer some perspectives that otherwise might be easily overlooked or lost among competing information. At the very least, even a rudimentary political culture approach informs us and the tangible grasp of prevailing patterns, whether patterns of liberty/coercion or equality/hierarchy, becomes more than a mere history lesson; it reveals the nature and extent of those patterns through several generations and their possible meaning in the present. The history tells us about the overriding forces that a people have collectively lived through, what engendered their experiences. Significantly, coercion observed at one level has limited bearing because it is experienced by both perpetrator and victim. Of course, at another level, the political subcultures of perpetrators and victims can be further examined, but no matter if it is violence or cooperation, inclusive or exclusive practices, an informing first step is a macroscopic one that recognizes and characterizes the overarching, collective experience. Undoubtedly, both macroscopic and microscopic political culture each have their own stories to tell; there is no logic in faulting one for not performing the tasks of the other.

With the Somali cases, even a cursory look highlights their differing paths. The Somalis in contemporary Somaliland live pangenerationally with self-reliance, minimal violent coercion, and limited exclusion or hierarchy, all contributing to an environment, which in the long run, has been surprisingly stable. southern Somalis experience quite the opposite: pangenerational living with constant hardships, violent intrusions, and exclusionary treatment practiced both by and toward them, contributing to an environment that has been almost monotonously traumatic. Somalis in the northeast experience something in between, but more akin to their northwest neighbors. These trends—positive or negative—will not necessarily continue indefinitely, but do signal that it will take some considerable undoing to change them, which can in turn guide more than just expectations.

Tunisia and Libya have some similarities with the Somali cases. While Tunisian resistance had a conscious commitment to nonviolence, armed violence in Somaliland, past and present, has been limited and historically avoided overall. And although both Tunisia and Libya were autonomous parts of the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia's experiences in the nineteenth century were generally uneventful in terms of armed violence, and dotted with such highlights as Tunis's commercial importance, modern reforms, and ending of slavery that continued through their experience as a French protectorate. Amid advancements in the infrastructure, a liberation struggle against the French was organically develop-

ing. The struggle was not without conflict, but it never escalated to large-scale, ongoing, violent conflict. In this way, Somaliland's experiences during the nineteenth century can be similarly characterized with the British administration era, although the Tunisian liberation movement was more prevalent early on. After independence in 1956 and until 2011, Tunisians lived under somewhat liberalized autocracies under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, interestingly enough, with both men ousted without armed violence. During their terms in office, popular aspirations toward a more liberal political life never disappeared, and were present through various walks of life as evidenced by the varying groups involved in the 2011 revolution. Although Tunisia is yet on the cusp of a unified government, it nevertheless has made great gains in a short amount of time as Somaliland did by 1995.⁶⁷

Contemporary Libya is not unlike southern Somalia's past and present in terms of political fragmentation, armed militias with their own agendas, little sense of a shared or unified national identity, and the increasing presence of armed and violent Islamic extremists. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as part of the Ottoman Empire, it had few years of peace or stability, coups took place almost annually, civil war erupted, and it economically depended on piracy at different points. After deciding that direct Ottoman rule was needed, Libyans found the resultant 50 years of relatively uneventful rule was not sufficient enough of a foundation to deflect, or weather the coming storm of, the harsh rule from imperialist, and later Fascist, Italy. Despite both southern Somalia and Libya experiencing Italian Fascist rule differently, the effect of living in such coercive environments was similar in both cases: people in those countries were not prepared for self-rule and unable to affect positive change. In Libya's case, King Idris was elected by a national congress in 1951, but similar to southern Somalia, in less than 10 years his government was losing credibility. Idris was overthrown by 1969; his 18 years of unsatisfactory leadership was followed by 40 years of the troubled dictatorship of Qaddafi, which left the Libyan populace with the political fragmentation and culture of violence seen today. At what point in time might the Libyans, or the southern Somalis, have had the opportunity to develop and nurture a widespread and consistent political culture of autonomy and inclusiveness?

Conclusion

More work needs to be done on the concept of political culture, of course, such as identifying whether a certain critical population mass is required before one can claim the prevailing political culture and determining the relative weight of political subcultures and competing political cultures. Also, the role of national versus tribal identities, or that of any other group identity including gender, needs to be examined.⁶⁸ A comparative look at the role of women in

Tunisia versus Libya might reveal if women were decisive to the Tunisian success.⁶⁹ Moreover, consideration needs to be given to bias in historical reporting as well as accusations of historical determinism.

Because political culture analysis focuses on any politically relevant patterns that have developed over time, identifying and understanding them opens the door for how best to foster or marginalize their development in the present. In this way, a people's future is not locked into their past, and instead, openings for well-grounded change can be recognized and acted upon. Guided by a political culture approach, policy decisions can be made based on the knowledge of the nature of the political culture current circumstances were born out of and how severe and deeply entrenched the cultures are. A political culture approach is not meant to replace or compete with other types of analysis, but work cooperatively with them to articulate a more informed future.

Notes

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 14. Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change."
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 16. *Ibid.*, 16–17.
 17. Sources are inconsistent, but total population for all three areas ranges from more than 10 million to more than 12 million.
 18. I. M. Lewis, "Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 74, no. 4 (2004): 511.
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 20. In methodological terms, the three cases offer almost ideal cross-case comparison as well as variation in outcome; such conditions are uncommon.
 21. Abdi Ismail Samatar commented in his 1992 article, "at no time in the recorded history of Somalia has nearly one-third to one-half of the population died or been in danger of perishing due to famine caused by civil war. This calamity surpasses all previous ones and has most appropriately been called 'Dad Cunkii', the era of cannibalism." Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 4 (1992): 625.
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 27. Pankhurst, "Trade of the Gulf," 49.

28. Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy," 1.
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30. This is discussed throughout Brock Millman, *British Somaliland: An Administrative History, 1920–1960* (London: Routledge, 2014).
31. *Ibid.*, 28–108, 161, 249–51.
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35. *Ibid.*, 289–90.
36. *Ibid.*, 299.
37. *Ibid.*, 301–6.
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39. Lewis, "Visible and Invisible Differences," 503.
40. See "Secondary Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century," Necrometrics, February 2012, <http://necrometrics.com/20c300k.htm#Somalia>. For comparisons, see Bethany Lacina, *The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, 1946–2008*, Version 4.0, ed. Bethany Lacina and Gabriel Uriarte (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2009), https://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/PRIObd3.0_documentation.pdf.
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Command and Irregular Indigenous Combat Forces in the Middle East and Africa A Historical Perspective on a Current Reality

Jacob Stoil

Abstract: From the beginning of European involvement in Africa and the Middle East to the present, working with indigenous irregular forces has been, and remains, an integral part of engagement in these regions. This article examines one aspect of this relationship: the command pathways that allowed these relationships to function. By comparing the command pathways of cases in Palestine Mandate and the Horn of Africa during the Second World War, the author explores the structures that led to success and shows the importance of such cooperation. He then applies the lessons gained to suggest a way forward for contemporary operations.

Keywords: Second World War, Israel, Ethiopia, Haganah, Palmach, Irgun (IZL), Special Operations Executive (SOE), hybrid warfare, indigenous force, gray zone, force cooperation, command structure, influence operations, Horn of Africa, Syria, Palestine Mandate, East Africa Campaign, Italian East Africa, British Empire, imperial security

From the entry of imperial European forces into Africa and the Middle East to contemporary interventions, working with indigenous irregular forces historically has been, and remains, an integral part of foreign engagement in these regions. These forces differ from institutional forces in many

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regards and therefore merit special study. To date, little scholarly work has been undertaken to examine the pathways of the relationships between indigenous forces and foreign actors in the Middle East and Africa. Although at times individual indigenous forces have received narrative attention, there has been no study of the nature, structure, function, or experience of these types of forces. This article examines one important aspect of indigenous forces: the command pathways that allowed these relationships to function. The phrase *command pathways* is an amalgamation of two terms. According to the Department of Defense, *command* is the authority that an individual lawfully exercises over subordinates and “the responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.”¹ In this case, *pathways* refers to relationship pathways—those structures, norms, and practices created to allow the relationship to function. This article suggests that, based on the historical cases considered, successfully fulfilling the responsibilities of command in the case of irregular indigenous forces requires a radical alteration of the way command is understood and moving from a system in which command comes from authority to one that stems from pathways of influence.

Through the First World War, the British Empire had a tradition of working with indigenous forces. With the consolidation of the colonial system in the interwar period, that tradition of working with indigenous forces in an irregular or locally traditional structure had all but ceased in the Middle East and East Africa in favor of standing colonial forces, such as the Transjordan Frontier Force, the Arab Legion, the Somaliland Camel Corps, and the Sudan Defense Force, among many others. In the Second World War, the British Empire reinvented this tradition based on the experience of trying to contain insurgencies in Ireland, Palestine, and India.² Having realized the level of resources the empire had to expend in controlling these situations, a number of British political and military leaders wished to harness the power of insurgencies, guerrilla fighters, and irregulars against its Axis enemies.³ In many cases, the value of indigenous forces was hotly debated, but two cases of cooperation with this type of force were seen as successful by those who took part: Ethiopia and the Palestine Mandate. This article compares the pathways of command in these two successful collaborations to determine whether there were central commonalities that contributed to success.

Regions for Comparison and Contrast

The two cases examined have enough points in common to be comparable, yet have enough differences that any commonalities observed are not likely to have resulted from accidents of geography or the tactical natures of the areas.

Chief among the similarities are that many of the participants viewed cooperation with indigenous forces in Ethiopia and Palestine Mandate as successful. In addition, the foreign force in both cases was the British Empire, both areas were at least loosely under Middle East Command, and both were at their most active during the early phases of the Second World War.⁴ Moreover, the campaigns form separate axes within a broader arc of operations protecting the supply routes and flanks of North Africa and the Suez Canal. This study also maintains temporal consistency. To account for the different variables inherent in conducting a study across time periods would be beyond the scope possible in the limited space of this article and is left for a future study.

There were more differences than similarities between the two campaigns. The Ethiopian case involved tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of indigenous fighters who had been engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Italians for years before the Second World War and who had been spread over a large area. In Palestine, cooperation primarily took place between a well-organized, highly ideological paramilitary within a British colony in a very concentrated area. Other key differences were a result of the societies and organizations from which local forces were drawn and the character of the combat operations. The use of these two widely different case studies in effect controls for the majority of the possible variables that could obfuscate the line between simple correlation and causality. Thus, the cases selected and the comparative method employed renders it likely that any findings are independent rather than dependent variables and inherent to the phenomenon of indigenous force cooperation. It is impossible to conduct an exhaustive examination of both cases here. Therefore, this article deals with several examples that reflect the topic as a whole.

Contested Landscapes and Language

Both case studies exist in regions marked by contested language and narratives. Nomenclature, especially when it comes to place names and names of peoples, carries significance in the struggle over historical narrative. To avoid becoming overly involved in the regional politics of narrative, ownership, and belonging, this article employs the nomenclature (though not always the spelling choices) of the British records in most cases. In Ethiopia, this means on the whole employing the Ge'ez, or Amharic, terminology. The choice to use the Ge'ez terminology should neither be taken to imply either an affirmation or denial of any claims on the territory or attachment to the location, nor does it stem from a lack of recognition of the existence of an alternative nomenclature. Rather, it comes from the necessity to maintain consistency and clarity. When dealing with Palestine Mandate, British records are again the guide. Throughout, the author refers to the territory in question as Palestine. This does not imply any legitimacy to any given claim or historical attachment to the territory.

It is shorthand for the British Mandate for Palestine, which was the full, legal description of the territory at the time. This article employs a similar logic for other, more specific place names, referring to such places as Lydda instead of Lod or Sarafand instead of Tzrifin.

When referring to peoples, this article attempts to achieve as much clarity and consistency as possible. The term *Palestinian* is a highly contentious one. In the British records, the designation Palestinian refers almost exclusively to the Jewish population residing in the Mandate. Usually, the Arab population in the same area was referred to as *Arab*. While a distinction was made between Bedouin and Arab, no distinction was made ascribing a particular peoplehood to those Arabs residing in Palestine. This study does not endorse or deny the narrative of Arab or Jewish peoplehood within the territory that was Palestine Mandate. To refer to the Arab communities of Palestine as Palestinians would be anachronistic and unnecessarily, for our purposes, bring this discussion into scholarly debates on the topic. Except in direct quotations from sources, this article refers to the Arab population of Palestine as the British records do and the Jewish population as the *Yishuv*. In a similar manner, the use of the term *indigenous* does not imply or deny the authenticity of any claims of autochthony. Rather, it refers to the manner in which the British viewed and interacted with the forces that the populations provided as well as with the populations themselves.

Sourcing

One significant reason there has not yet been sufficient examination of this subject stems from the difficulties in obtaining trustworthy sources. Many documents employed in this examination were classified and only recently became available; though much is still missing. The lack of resources also has affected understandings of the campaign as they appear in secondary literature.⁵ Additionally, given the secrecy and organizational complexity of the British special services, many events, decisions, and discussions went unrecorded, and many records were lost, misplaced, or not logically filed.⁶ The organizational culture in the special services also apparently discouraged the maintenance of detailed records, and at various times, officers received orders to “destroy all incriminating documents,” which meant that many documents and details were forever lost.⁷ There are particular difficulties with regard to documentary evidence in the Middle East, where the empire guaranteed that it would not reveal its cooperation with certain groups. Finally, even where documents exist, there is a question as to their veracity. The politics of special operations and internecine bureaucratic warfare within the special operations and intelligence community were such that there is evidence that personnel were willing to falsify the war diary, which indicates a general willingness to write misleading official documents

and reports.⁸ This necessitates handling any official documents with care and a healthy dose of skepticism unless confirmed, at least in principle, by other external sources, including personal documents and oral histories.⁹

Indigenous Forces

Palestine and the Haganah

The background and nature of the forces involved in each of the theaters influenced the relationships that evolved and the pathways thereof. In Mandatory Palestine, the primary organization with whom the British Empire cooperated was the Haganah, by far the dominant Zionist paramilitary in the territory. The Haganah had a small standing element and a much larger reserve element, as well as its own intelligence and propaganda sections. It had training and recruitment structures and provided for some of its own logistical needs through clandestine manufacturing and smuggling. Perhaps most important for cooperation with the British, it had a centrally organized hierarchical command structure and decision-making process. This is not to say the Haganah did not have rivals, such as the Irgun Zvai Le'umi, with whom it competed for resources and personnel. The Haganah also had some subfactions. Such rivals and factions, however, did not pose a serious threat to the unity of its command structure or its freedom of operation. The Haganah also had a well-established history of cooperation with various imperial security forces during times of crisis. The Haganah proved its ability to cooperate with British authorities during the Arab Revolt of 1936–39 and many of the pathways for cooperation established during this period were reestablished or reinforced during the Second World War.

In Palestine, there existed a bewildering array of imperial and allied organizations, each with their own goals and their own relationships and pathways of cooperation with indigenous forces. Within this pantheon, however, three organizations were dominant: Palestine government, with its security forces such as the Palestine Police Force; the various imperial armed forces best referred to as the British army; and the various special services, including Section D (a direct action section of the of the Secret Intelligence Service) and Military Intelligence (Research) that amalgamated into the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Although there were differences among the various special services, for the purpose of clarity in this article, it is best to refer to them collectively under the moniker SOE. One of the many differences between the case of Palestine and that of Ethiopia is that, whereas in Palestine there was some degree of unity among the indigenous forces and little unity among the British, in Ethiopia the situation was the reverse.

Ethiopia and the Arbegnoch

In Ethiopia, the British Empire cooperated with forces known as the Patriots, or *arbegnoch*. Formed from many different groups, including the Ethiopian army, feudally mobilized retainers, bandits, and spontaneous guerrillas, the arbegnoch were the resistance against the Italians in Ethiopia. Their primary structure was roughly feudal. Yet, as economist Gene Ellis noted in his work on understanding Ethiopian society, to use the term *feudal* when referring to the structure of Ethiopian society is a misnomer in that the society was not akin to a classically European feudal system, especially considering this took place during a period of modernization and a world war.¹⁰ If these key differences, however, are kept in mind, feudal is still useful to refer to the system of patronage, rank, mobilization, and service that was so important to the structure of the arbegnoch movement. The Patriots themselves were divided along many lines, including ethnic, feudal, political, and linguistic.

Minor and midlevel arbegnoch commanders chose to serve major leaders who cooperated, in part, because of the provision of resources. These also had to keep their fighters loyal and used guns and resources to do so. Additionally, a major leader could appoint a subordinate to a position resembling something in between a governor and tax farmer able to draw resources directly from the local population.¹¹ While resources may have been a motivation for loyalty, there were other motivations embedded within the structure of Ethiopian society. The feudal structure also helped determine choices when selecting major leaders. The choice as to whom to follow centered on the power. Interviewees reported that minor leaders did not always choose to follow a major leader; rather, major leaders exercised their strength and enforced their leadership on their subordinates. In other instances, groups simply picked the most powerful regional commander to follow.¹²

In a fragmented regional situation, a group of arbegnoch without the succor of a major leader could find themselves raided by more powerful rivals or without a line of retreat when faced with Italian offensives. This created something of a stereotypical feudal relationship where, in exchange for shelter and protection, the subordinate contributed loyalty and service. This exchange was a recognized part of the feudal system that led to cooperation. Minor and midlevel commanders chose, then, to serve major leaders who were the highest regional feudal authorities—generally either a *dejazmach* or *ras* (the second highest and highest nonroyal ranks of the *mesafint* or Ethiopian hereditary nobility).¹³ In all cases, the minor and midlevel commanders served major leaders of superior feudal ranks.

Various groups of arbegnoch tended to coalesce around the remaining free members of the royal family, the military, or the *rases*, including leaders who previously fought against the emperor for power.¹⁴ This led to a divided com-

mand structure and competition among the various groups for personnel and resources.¹⁵ The arbegnoch were divided into two categories: *daraq tor* (standing arbegnoch) and *madade tor* (reserve arbegnoch, who went back to farming when pressure on their immediate area subsided).¹⁶ Each faction of the arbegnoch had its own intelligence sources consisting of *qafirs* (scouts) and *ya west arbegnoch* (those in enemy-occupied areas who supported the arbegnoch).¹⁷

For the arbegnoch, logistics were a constant problem. They relied heavily on hunting and scavenging, looting “collaborators,” and taxing the local populations.¹⁸ In some cases, the population willingly supported the Patriots and in other areas, especially where the arbegnoch were *Ambara* (one of the ruling ethnicities of Ethiopia) and the primary population was not, a somewhat traditional system of banditry (*shifita*) prevailed. In these areas, the local shifta leader would prevent raids by other shifta, the Italians, and local Italian allies in exchange for the ability to tax the local population.¹⁹ In some cases, where these shifta left to fight with the British forces, the local population was less than pleased as they were then vulnerable to raids by other marauding shifta.²⁰ Ya west arbegnoch also secured supplies, while the standing Patriots were able to produce some ammunition and had their own cattle.²¹ The arbegnoch either used previously held arms or captured weapons from Italians.²²

On the British side in Ethiopia, the situation was less complicated. Effectively, there were only the British army, the special services, and the civilian organizations of Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and the government of Sudan. Despite the diverse, imperial nature of forces and organizations of the British Empire (including South Africans, Indians, Australians, Canadians, and many others), it is best, for the sake of clarity and to avoid confusion with the forces of the Ethiopian Empire, to refer to them collectively as British. Thus, the combined army of the British Empire can be referred to as the British army.

Differences between the Haganah and the Arbegnoch

In general, the employment of indigenous forces in both these areas was to some extent necessitated by the lack of regular forces available, yet there were different specific purposes. Whereas, on the whole, the employment of indigenous forces in the Palestine Mandate was intended as a defensive measure; in Ethiopia, the cooperation with indigenous forces stemmed from the belief that the “best means of preventing the Italian forces in Abyssinia from being able to take external action might be by fomenting rebellion within their territory.”²³ The differing objectives also account for some of the differences between the pathways of the two cases. Despite these purposes, the employment of indigenous forces was not without its detractors, especially in the Colonial Office and the various local governments under its auspices. In the case of Palestine, Palestine government saw working with the Haganah as at best dangerous and

possibly quite destabilizing.²⁴ The need to overcome opposition led to adjustments in the pathways of cooperation in Palestine. In Ethiopia, the opposition to cooperation within the British administration led to problems in the historical narrative. The basis of much of the secondary source material, especially concerning southern Ethiopia, is the narrative as constructed by opponents of mobilizing Ethiopian indigenous forces.

Operational Employment

The command pathways both affected and were affected by the ways in which the British employed indigenous forces. Thus, the British and indigenous forces established pathways to support those operations that the British undertook in conjunction with the indigenous forces. The pathways reinforced the specific set of operational activities in which the indigenous forces engaged and concretized them. There is not enough space here for an exhaustive discussion of all the specific sets of operations carried out by indigenous forces in the two cases. To understand the nature of the pathways of cooperation, however, it is useful to consider several in a general sense; moreover, it is important to examine what effect they had on cooperation as well as what they say about the nature of that cooperation and the pathways.

In both Palestine and Ethiopia, most of the operational actions were either autonomous or semiautonomous but followed the general lines of British plans. In Palestine, there were several primary operational employments of indigenous forces in multiple categories, roughly termed the Jewish Settlement Police (JSP) Scheme, intelligence operations, the guides scheme, the Palestine Scheme, and the *Saison de Chasse* (Hunting Season). In the JSP Scheme, Palestine government employed members of the Haganah as a paramilitary auxiliary to the Palestine Police Force. As such, they were not only able to provide security around isolated Jewish settlements but also replaced regular military forces in many security operations, such as guarding military facilities, critical infrastructure, and transportation routes, as well as preparing to provide defenses against airborne or infiltration operations.²⁵ The intelligence operations were under the auspices of SOE and included a wide range of activities in the early years of World War II, from gathering intelligence on the Vichy order of battle in Syria to sabotage, arranging for the escape of Free French prisoners of war from Vichy custody, and screening new arrivals in Palestine for Axis links.²⁶ The guides scheme involved units from the Haganah scouting on behalf of imperial forces and guiding them across the border to the start line of Operation Exporter (the invasion of Syria and Lebanon, 1941) and acting as reconnaissance units to help in the seizure of the first operational objectives.²⁷ In the Palestine Scheme (1941–43), sections of the Haganah trained in preparation for sabotaging Palestine in the event of an Axis invasion and engaging in guerrilla warfare

afterward.²⁸ During the Saison (1944–45), the Haganah curtailed the uprising of the Irgun Zvai Le'umi and the more militant Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) in conjunction with the Imperial authorities.²⁹

One of the ways that Ethiopia was similar to Palestine was that, in Ethiopia, the indigenous forces were operationally active in unconventional ways that best suited their preexistent structure. As Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham, the commander of East Africa Force in southern Ethiopia and eventually commander for the entirety of Ethiopia, noted that “the Patriots proved most successful in harassing enemy lines of communication and in besieging isolated enemy garrisons. By carrying out these tasks, these Ethiopian forces caused the Italians considerable alarm and anxiety and lowered their morale. By this means they contained large numbers of the enemy away from the main scene of operations.”³⁰ These forces represented the main thrust of *arbegnoch* operational activity. At various times, the *arbegnoch*, however, also were involved in capturing territory independent of British activity, assaulting enemy forces in conjunction with British forces, reducing the ability of the Italians to reinforce or retreat garrisons, providing reconnaissance and scouting forces to British conventional forces, providing screening forces to cover British movements, and bringing British forces intelligence.³¹ One key aspect that all of these operational activities had in common was their autonomous nature, which in no case necessitated a direct hierarchical integration with the British forces. This was as true in Palestine as it was in Ethiopia. Such autonomy was a symptom of the nature of the balance of agency in the relationships between the indigenous forces and the British. This balance of agency also was manifest in the command pathways and may be one of the central reasons why both these cooperative arrangements were seen, at least during the war, as successful.

Command Pathways and Palestine

One of the key pathways in cooperation with indigenous forces is the way in which the foreign power transmits its intentions and desires to the indigenous forces and coordinates activity with them. In the classic hierarchical model, the expeditionary officer transmits instructions to the indigenous forces who then follow the orders. This can be termed a *structure of command*. Despite the differences in structure, however, the pathways established in both campaigns did not constitute a structure of command. These processes instead centered on the successful use of influence. In both cases, the indigenous forces retained a high degree of agency in relation to this pathway, and the pathway operated in such a way as to preserve this agency. The rationale behind this agency and the way it played out differed in the two cases.

At first glance, Palestine Mandate would seem a likely place for the establishment of a command structure rather than a *pathway of influence*. After all, it

was a British-controlled territory, and many of the indigenous forces served in British uniform and received pay directly from the government. Moreover, the Jewish population had a stake in the stability of the Mandate during the war and its protection from Axis invasion, yet such a surface understanding hides a far more complicated reality. British policies in the years leading up to the Second World War had alienated the majority of the Jewish population of Palestine. Even those who were very much pro-British found that, by the end of the Second World War, their primary identity and loyalty lay with the Yishuv, and the Haganah specifically. This loyalty and sense of communal identity gave the Haganah more ways to mobilize the population efficiently. When coupled with the significant percentage of the population who were members of the Haganah, this meant that the Haganah was able to take advantage of a deep pool of talent and bring more communal pressure to bear to achieve its objectives than the imperial authorities could possibly exercise. Moreover, throughout the Arab Revolt, the imperial authorities had allowed the Haganah to develop ever-increasing capabilities and autonomy in exchange for the Haganah's undeniably critical contribution to the security of the territory. It was only in 1939 that the Palestine government felt confident enough to reverse this trend. The experience of the Arab Revolt also meant that the Haganah, as an institution, was intimately familiar with combat operations in the Mandate territory. The clandestine nature of the Haganah, especially its involvement in arms acquisition and illegal immigration, meant that it maintained an excellent regional contact network beyond the Mandate's borders. Both these factors, as well as its ability to mobilize the Yishuv, meant that the Haganah had assets, abilities, and knowledge essential to any effort by the beleaguered forces of the British Empire to defend the territory or engage in special operations in the region. To make best use of these assets, the British needed the Haganah's willing cooperation, which in turn necessitated collaboration, not coercion. The pathways of command reflected this necessity.

The Jewish Settlement Police command pathway demonstrates this. The JSP was organized into regional battalions spread across the territory, and each unit in the battalion was widely dispersed.³² This dispersal allowed for a remote command structure; each company had a British commanding officer and deputy commander, often stationed many miles from the operational posts.³³ Members of the Haganah filled almost all subordinate positions.³⁴ The JSP primarily received its orders from the Haganah. The JSP members interviewed in the course of this research all stated that their only contact with imperial command came during training and on payday; and some even indicated that when orders came from the imperial chain of command, JSP units would not act on them until they received approval from the Haganah.³⁵

As early as 1940, the Haganah carried out the recruitment, deployment,

and much of the training of individual JSP members.³⁶ It is relatively clear that the British commanders of the JSP knew this to be the case.³⁷ This granted the JSP a high degree of autonomy within the command structure and allowed them to integrate with clandestine forces, which meant that if necessary, as during the Arab Revolt, the JSP could take part in larger Haganah operations, some of which had objectives concurrent with those of the Palestine government.³⁸ This allowed the Palestine government to make use of the Haganah's resources and provide a legal front to some of the Haganah's illegal cadres while maintaining the fiction that the Haganah was an illegal militant group with whom the empire would not cooperate or negotiate.

The command pathway between SOE and the Haganah began with Section D. Section D and the Haganah worked together to construct the pathway to preserve the separation between them. The memorandum of the first meeting between the SOE and the Haganah set out the guiding principles of this arrangement: "the D/H organisation [*sic*] is to be regarded as an entirely separate entity from Friends [the Haganah] and while each is at liberty to make the maximum use of the corresponding organization, they should in principle be separate, particularly in order to protect the interests of Friends organization."³⁹ The separation between the two organizations was a cornerstone of the structure. Liaison, at least initially, only took place at the highest levels and Section D had no specific knowledge of the Haganah's capabilities. Rather, the Haganah suggested projects that were within its capabilities.⁴⁰ On the other hand, when Section D received operational requirements from the army, it was to consider the Haganah's capabilities.⁴¹

The Haganah and the SOE also established a joint planning structure, which consisted of David Hacoheh, an extremely influential and well-connected officer in the Haganah, and a senior field officer from Section D/SOE.⁴² The SOE field commander in Palestine retained the ultimate authority to approve operations, but delegated in most cases.⁴³ The parties also agreed that equal input from the Yishuv leadership and the field commander for Palestine (i.e., Hacoheh) would be the method of arriving at all future policy decisions.⁴⁴ This was the pattern for the command pathways that were to develop; the parties were separate, but roughly equal, at least for as long as the SOE needed the Haganah.

Given this arrangement, it is clear that rather than a pathway of command, what existed was a pathway of cooperation during this period. In practice, this meant that, in many operations, Haganah operatives acted independently of the SOE. In the operation to liberate Free French prisoners of war, for example, the communication channel that updated the SOE on the progress of the operation and the resources required and expended only took place at the level of the SOE field commander.⁴⁵ The field commander had no authority to do more than request information and sanction or refuse requests.⁴⁶ This level

of autonomy formed part of the context in which imperial authorities had to achieve their operational objectives. To succeed in this, they had to develop influence, favor, and trust with the Haganah. For their part, the Haganah wanted the resources and legal sanction that the SOE could offer and therefore also had to develop influence, favor, and trust with the SOE. As the relationship evolved, the SOE eventually felt that it could not function in the region without the Haganah and was worried that the Haganah might abandon the SOE if the SOE attempted to employ much coercion toward its own goals.⁴⁷

During the period of the Friends Scheme and Palestine Scheme (1941–43), the two organizations developed much closer cooperation. They established joint training camps and Haganah units became part of formal SOE plans for the defense of Palestine. Yet despite this, there was no great alteration in the command structure. The records of the camps were in Hebrew, and the units they trained dispersed. The SOE had little to no ability to exercise oversight over them.⁴⁸ Other than a couple of inspection tours of the training camps and providing instructors, the SOE had nothing to do with the command and control of the scheme itself. Rather, it relied on the Haganah to see that it was a success.

The command structure of the scouts provided to the army for Operation Exporter had a similarly collaborative structure. The Palmach, an elite branch of the Haganah, recruited the scouts under order from the Haganah after a request for assistance from the imperial forces.⁴⁹ The structure of the arrangement was such that the scouts came into the command structure as fully formed units.⁵⁰ The scouting units of the Palmach recruited their own personnel from among Arab, Circassian, and Druse residents of the border regions.⁵¹ In this process, the Palmach did not liaise with the imperial divisions. Instead, they operated under Haganah command in Haifa, which coordinated with the overall imperial command.⁵² Once the campaign commenced, the Haganah units integrated with the divisional reconnaissance elements before demobilizing upon gaining the initial objectives.⁵³ During the short period they integrated, the command structure was at best hazy and seemed to have been rather ad hoc with regard to who was in overall command. Again, in this process, it was evident that the pathway established was not one of command; rather, it was one of collaboration, where the imperial authorities requested and the Haganah assented.

The command structure of the Saison similarly was not a case of the Haganah acting either as a local auxiliary or as a pseudogang working at the behest of an imperial master. One might argue that, in fact, the reverse was true. The complete structure of the relationship was difficult to clarify fully. However, local cooperation with the British seemed to have taken place at a high level; rarely does it seem there was any direct coordination between Brit-

ish and Haganah operational units.⁵⁴ This situation is perhaps best exemplified through an incident related by Hayim Miller, an officer in one of the units of the Saison. According to Miller, a suspect was located in Tel Aviv, at which point Miller contacted Ephraim Dekel, a senior Haganah intelligence officer who was Miller's commanding officer.⁵⁵ Imperial forces quickly surrounded the cinema and detained all patrons who matched the description that Miller had given to Dekel.⁵⁶ This case demonstrates the regular operating structure of the cooperation. The Haganah provided forces to augment British capabilities. The forces were, however, entirely independent of the British command and logistics structure. Despite the separate structures, the units of the Saison could coordinate at a lower level when necessary, though this was primarily to provide time-sensitive information regarding particular unfolding operations.⁵⁷ In these cases, it is questionable whether the imperial forces involved recognized the joint nature of the Saison units or simply acted on intelligence presented to them.⁵⁸ The one most consistent and notable feature of all the command pathways established between the British Empire and the Haganah in Palestine Mandate was that they relied on collaboration as opposed to coercion, influence instead of command.

Command Pathways and Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, even more than Palestine, instead of a command structure, the pathway centered on the currency of influence. One of the key determinants of success or failure in any given area was the ability to make use of the pre-existing local military or paramilitary structures. In most areas of Ethiopia, this meant recognizing the important local leaders, often members of the nobility, and bringing them onside. Attempts to order *arbegnoch* directly to undertake particular activities often failed for a variety of reasons, including the lack of Europeans who could speak enough of the local languages for direct communication.⁵⁹ Instead, according to the official postcampaign reports, it was found "that patriot activities proved most successful under the general direction, and in some cases, the personal leadership, of selected British Officers, though the men remained under the immediate control of their own leaders."⁶⁰ While the personnel leadership role of the British officers was undeniably important, the instructions for engagement with the *arbegnoch* insisted that this leadership should take the form of selecting objectives, prioritizing tasks, and exercising control through advice, supplies, and general encouragement.⁶¹ If, according to Avraham Akavia, who served as Major General Orde C. Wingate's deputy in Ethiopia, this was done well, then the Ethiopians were easy to work with, but if not "you couldn't move them or tell them what to do . . . they knew best."⁶² In other words, they were most certainly not under British command.

The system of command through influence was, by the start of British in-

volvement, common in Ethiopia, at least since the beginning of the *arbegnoch*. Ethiopian *arbegnoch* leaders also had to use influence to keep their forces intact. This attempt to guarantee influence manifested in the distribution of resources, in general, and money and rifles, in particular, to their followers. Even though the British were effectively using the distribution of rifles and supplies to gain the loyalty of the *arbegnoch* leaders and influence their behavior, they were less than impressed with how the *arbegnoch* leaders used the distribution of arms and supplies for a similar purpose. A report by Brigadier Daniel A. Sandford of Mission 101 (the first British mission to work with the *arbegnoch*), which stated that “the issue of rifles seems most unsatisfactory as there seems to be no proper organization, the leaders using them as bribes for their own personal ends. I have seen quite young boys strolling about with rifles which they are obviously unfit to use,” is an excellent example.⁶³ Rifles, in particular, played an important role, however, in Ethiopian society and both the British (perhaps unintentionally) and the *arbegnoch* leaders were taking advantage of a long-established tradition of patronage within Ethiopia that hinged on the distribution of arms and supplies in exchange for service and influence.⁶⁴ In some areas, this practice defined the class structure.⁶⁵

The organization of the British liaison with the *arbegnoch* changed through the campaign. Initially, the primary organization involved in cooperation was Mission 101. Mission 101 consisted of individuals and small teams dispersed around northern Ethiopia; they had the ability to distribute some funds and materials. In this, they acted with the authority of Emperor Haile Selassie, who was in exile in Sudan. This dual structure of influence, with one based in Sudan centered on the emperor and the despots in Sudan and one based in Ethiopia under Mission 101, meant that the influence of Mission 101 and its ability to achieve its objectives were undercut by the secondary pathway of command and influence.⁶⁶

This changed with the introduction of the Operations Centres (Op-Centres) under Orde Wingate. In the first instance, the Op-Centres had some forces of their own to act as a means to stimulate activity. They also had logistics convoys of arms and finances flowing directly to their headquarters in Ethiopia, where the emperor and his court were resident.⁶⁷ This ended the dual command structure and allowed them to co-opt the emperor’s authority as their own. These factors greatly increased British influence and their ability to achieve objectives.

Initially, the distribution of weaponry for influence by the British met with less than satisfactory results. Weapons were distributed, but there appeared to be no noticeable upswing in the effectiveness of the insurgency or in their cooperation with the specific objectives set by British authorities. As the cooperation evolved into the Op-Centre system, the British developed a new meth-

od of arms distribution in which they issued better quality arms to individual forces of *arbegnoch* but only after the *arbegnoch* demonstrated the ability to achieve results.⁶⁸

Haile Selassie's influence was an invaluable asset to the British attempts to achieve their objectives through the *arbegnoch*, especially when brokering peace among rival *arbegnoch*. Influence necessitated cooperation with local leaders, but also persuading local leaders to cooperate with each other. One major feature of the pathway by which the British Empire exerted influence on the *arbegnoch* was the need to overcome the divided nature of the Ethiopian resistance. The case of Iasu Zaleka illustrates how this process worked. Zaleka was an important local leader whose land had recently been raided by other *arbegnoch* already cooperating with the British. He was therefore disinclined to cooperate with the British.⁶⁹ It was not until the British were able to invoke "the Emperor's pleasure when he knew of the Tumha's loyalty and on the rich rewards which would be forthcoming when he was reinstated in his capital" that they were able to convince Zaleka to join the British with his forces.⁷⁰ Major leaders such as Zaleka then brought with them the influence and control they had over the lesser leaders in the regions. Thus, by making use of the influence of the emperor and their ability to provide resources, the British were able to establish influence, and therefore some degree of control, over the major *arbegnoch* leaders and subsequently over minor ones. This, in turn, meant that the British were reliant on the emperor and the major *arbegnoch* to achieve campaign objectives. As a result, both the emperor and the *arbegnoch* leadership had a large amount of agency in the relationship.

To influence the *arbegnoch*, the British fell back to established Ethiopian traditions, offering the leadership promises to help them fulfill local goals relative to their peers, such as the emperor's favor and largess, especially in terms of rifles and money. This helped *arbegnoch* leaders gain influence over their region and the loyalty of their followers, and thus increase their relative power. While this was an effective method of gaining more control and, once made contingent on the attainment of objectives, an effective means of stimulating desired activities, it was a pathway of influence and not by any means a pathway of command.

Conclusions

Palestine Mandate and Ethiopia during the Second World War were dissimilar in most regards, yet both were examples of successful cooperation between indigenous forces and the forces of the British Empire. They were successful in that, in both cases, the British forces were able to rely on the indigenous forces to achieve, and sometimes exceed, the strategic and operational objectives set for them. It is axiomatic that, in any military endeavor, a properly constructed

pathway is critical to success; in this respect, the pathways established in these two areas of operation were not exceptional. The pathways established for the transmission of objectives, goals, and instructions were critical to their success but these were not pathways of command. Rather, they were pathways of influence. The natures of the pathways in both cases had several commonalities. In these relationships, the indigenous actors had significant agency. This, in and of itself, is an important lesson to the study of relationships between indigenous actors and expeditionary powers.

In both cases, the British took advantage of preexisting indigenous structures and did not attempt to subordinate or supplant them. The British established a relationship built on some degree of mutual trust through the provision of resources that allowed the indigenous actors to better attain local goals in addition to the broader aligned goals of winning the war. For the Haganah, these resources took the form of training, materials, and legal sanction, which allowed them to better prepare for the future. The British provided arbegnoch leadership with weaponry, money, and status, which allowed the leadership to solidify and expand their local power bases and to elevate themselves above their rivals. It is worth noting that, when the Palestine Mandate trust broke down, the British were no longer able to effectively secure the territory. The pathways of influence established in both these cases demonstrate that the story of the successful operation of indigenous forces was, at least in these two instances, one of aligned motivation and mutual benefit and of agency, influence, cooperation, and collaboration. Above all, it was not a story of command.

The successes of these pathways of influence are not without lessons for contemporary engagements. These pathways of influence thrived for a number of reasons that current practitioners might do well to heed. In each case, the foreign forces made use of preexisting local structures and elites, paramilitary, and feudal—they did not seek to replace or supplant them. The British forces built mutual trust with the indigenous forces through the distribution of largess in exchange for effective activity; activity that such distribution also helped to stimulate. The largess provided also helped the indigenous forces achieve their local objectives: be they preparation for a future conflict, the ability to secure the loyalty of followers, or an increase in power and standing relative to their rivals. This, in turn, further secured the cooperation of the local elites who received the largess.

Finally, by using pathways of influence instead of command, the British allowed the indigenous forces to engage in operations with a degree of autonomy and through means which best suited their experiences, structures, and capabilities. It is worth noting that this is distinct from a pure mission command model. Without Britain's ability to exert influence, the indigenous forces would not necessarily have been inclined to fulfill Britain's objectives—instructions to

fulfill objectives had to be accompanied with inducement to do so. Therefore, one of the key lessons to be drawn from British success with indigenous forces in Palestine Mandate and the Horn of Africa is to build influence rather than command and to engage with the indigenous forces as they are, allowing them to achieve their own objectives and maintain their agency and autonomy rather than trying to force them into a conventional military model.

Notes

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Asking the Right Questions

A Framework for Assessing Counterterrorism Actions

Jonathan Schroden, William Rosenau, and Emily Warner

Abstract: Since the 9/11 attacks, America has dedicated an extraordinary amount of time, money, and effort to countering terrorism. It has devoted, however, comparatively little effort to developing rigorous and useful assessment frameworks to help policy makers and practitioners understand how effective these counterterrorism (CT) actions have been. To address this shortfall, this article first identifies and characterizes today's prevailing terrorism theories and their associated CT actions. For each theory, an assessment framework is created consisting of specific questions that help gauge the success or failure of CT actions and indicators that could be used to answer those questions. These assessment frameworks, which rigorously link policy to practice, should enable CT practitioners to provide policy makers and commanders direct and actionable feedback on whether the approaches chosen are having the expected impact.

Keywords: terrorism, counterterrorism, CT, assess, assessment, evaluation, M&E, theory, framework, policy, operations

The United States has dedicated an extraordinary amount of time, money, and effort to countering terrorism since the attacks on 11 September 2001.¹ Yet, for all the emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) operations and other U.S. government programs designed to prevent, to deter, or to count-

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er terrorism worldwide, the United States has devoted comparatively little effort to rigorously linking its actions to theories of terrorism/CT or to logically deriving indicators that could be used to assess how effective those actions have been.² The literature on terrorism/CT theory is robust, but policy makers are often unclear as to which theories they use to craft policy. As illustrated in this article, the literature on CT assessment is much less robust and many of the articles that discuss specific metrics or means of assessing CT operations do so in the absence of linkages to theories of terrorism and CT.

Because of the general absence of linkages between the “why” (theories) of terrorism/CT, the “how” (actions), and the “what to measure” (metrics), the latter are often ill-suited to address whether theories and their associated actions are successfully practiced. In essence, a standard quantitative metric, such as the number of terrorist incidents over time, is easy to compute but difficult to interpret without context, an inherent baseline for comparison, and a clear, unambiguous linkage to a specific theory of terrorism/CT.³ This mismatch can and often does result in miscommunications between policy makers, practitioners, and broader audiences, such as the media and general public, as to why certain CT actions are being employed and whether they are achieving desired outcomes. Worse, it has the potential to result in ineffective or counterproductive decision making by policy makers and practitioners, since the assessments they receive may not be linked to the explicit or implicit theories guiding their actions.

In this article, we will develop and present a logical and comprehensive framework for linking theories of terrorism and their associated actions to indicators that could be used to assess U.S. government CT actions and programs. Specifically, we will answer the following questions as they pertain to the practice and assessment of countering terrorism. What is the current state of CT assessment and why is a new approach needed? What are the predominant theories of terrorism today? What types of actions are most associated with each theory for countering terrorism? What questions would need to be answered to know whether these actions are successfully addressing terrorism as predicted by theory? What specific pieces of data and information (indicators) would need to be gathered and analyzed to answer those questions?⁴ These are difficult questions to answer, and definitively doing so is not possible in the space available in this forum. By providing an initial set of responses as a proof of concept of what a comprehensive, theory-derived assessment framework might look like for countering terrorism, we hope to provide a starting point for CT policy makers and practitioners interested in more rigorous approaches to assessing their policies and actions. We also hope to stimulate a broader and more rigorous discussion of the theories, the actions, the questions, and the indicators for countering terrorism and assessing U.S. performance and outcomes.

Our approach to answering the above questions parallels the organization of this article.⁵ First, we examine the literature on assessment of counterterrorism actions to highlight the lack of an effective approach and to motivate the creation of a new one. Second, we summarize bodies of research from both the academic and operational worlds to identify the most common theories of why groups or individuals engage in terrorism. Third, we identify the actions these theories suggest are most appropriate for countering terrorism in its various forms. Fourth, we use literature research, discussions with subject matter experts, and a logical reductionist approach to identify the questions that would need to be answered to know whether each theory's associated actions are effective in practice. Fifth, we use a similar approach to identify the indicators that would be used to answer these questions of effectiveness. We conclude the article with a brief discussion of how our preliminary CT assessment framework might be implemented and improved upon going forward.

The State of Counterterrorism Assessment

When considering the literature on CT assessment, it is helpful to divide the research into four major bodies by identifying the underlying motivation or starting point for each author's approach. In the first body, a relatively small number of authors examine and assess specific CT operations that have taken place in the past. The indicators that they use may be explicitly stated or implied, but these authors typically conclude their discussions with a final determination of the specific operation's success or failure.

The remaining bodies, which constitute the vast majority of the literature, examine the topic of CT assessment itself and typically highlight faults in past approaches. These publications roughly fall into one or two of three broad categories depending on whether they see CT assessments as being based on (1) method or process, (2) political dynamics or policy, or (3) theory or concept. The first category is the dominant one, as most authors approach CT assessment with the intent to improve the effectiveness of CT methods. The most common manifestation of this type of work identifies past errors in CT assessment and an original (or at least partially original) set of metrics, measures, indicators, or approaches. Other authors point to political dynamics and policy decisions as the origins of faulty CT assessments. These writers often cite a lack of clear policy goals or shifting strategies to account for deficiencies in assessment. Some of these authors offer recommendations for improvements, but not all do so. Finally, there are those who identify a more fundamental issue: one cannot conduct a CT assessment with integrity without first articulating an understanding of what terrorism is on a theoretical or conceptual basis. This final category is less common than work that emphasizes methods and metrics alone. Consequently, CT assessment methods often begin with a series of un-

identified or unarticulated assumptions that drive the focus and development of the method. We will explore specific examples from each of the four bodies of literature in the next section.

Assessments of Past CT Efforts

The literature includes several examples of CT assessments that examine a specific operation and offer analysis and commentary on its effectiveness. These assessments are useful because they implement the process of CT assessment, rather than simply describing it. Some are stronger than others in offering the explicit criteria and methods used in their assessments, but all benefit from being confined to a specific instance of CT actions, which helps bound the problem. These examples tend to argue that CT assessment has no one-size-fits-all approach. Rather, they suggest that assessments must be tailored to the specific operation of interest.

The subject of one CT assessment that uses the number of attacks as a primary indicator for success or failure, for example, is CT operations against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. Authors Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte understand these numbers in terms of deterrence or backlash, where CT operations that reduce the risk of future terrorist acts represent deterrence and those that increase that risk correspond to a backlash.⁶ The authors ultimately conclude that terrorist interventions in Northern Ireland more often resulted in backlash than in deterrence, highlighting that CT operations have the potential to decrease or increase terrorist activity depending on specific conditions.

Author Nadav Morag examines a common subject of CT assessment: Israel and its neighbors. He uses seven parameters—human life, economic impact, political impact, internal stability, international standing, economic power, and the ethical component—to study the effectiveness of Israeli CT efforts.⁷ Of note in Morag's method is his statement that “a truly scientific and unassailable analysis” of CT effectiveness is unachievable, so he offers a general idea of Israeli success.⁸ This balance between the art and science of CT assessment is a fairly common theme, with many authors emphasizing a balance between qualitative and quantitative methods when approaching the complex problem of gauging the effectiveness of CT operations.

A final, representative example demonstrates how authors have examined tactics instead of specific groups or locations to assess effectiveness. Michele Malvesti looks at the effectiveness of air strikes as a CT tool, focusing on a few examples—Libya, Iraq, and Osama bin Laden—and attempting to determine whether air strikes resulted in or contributed to the desired outcome.⁹ Malvesti asks three questions to build her conclusions. Was terrorism prevented? Were the perpetrators held accountable? And were critical nodes destroyed? Based

on this loose set of criteria, Malvesti concludes that air strikes are generally not an effective tool for countering terrorism.¹⁰

Method Focused

Most of the literature on CT assessment focuses on methods or processes used to evaluate CT actions. Authors often acknowledge the insufficiency of current methods, pointing to pervasive issues, such as problematic metrics (e.g., body counts), data challenges, and the lack of clear objectives. The most comprehensive review of past methods comes from authors Cynthia Lum, Leslie Kennedy, and Alison Sherley in their 2006 publication, *The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies*, a systematic review of more than 20,000 studies on the subject that found CT assessments with “moderately strong evaluation designs” in only seven studies.¹¹ Five of the seven subjects related to measuring the effectiveness of efforts ensuring the safety of airline passengers from would-be terrorist attacks (i.e., preventing skyjackings and providing airport security). These studies also used data that were more easily quantifiable than data sets found in other CT assessments.¹² Despite the comprehensiveness of the 2006 study, the authors did not offer concrete alternative methods that avoid the pitfalls of past approaches.

Similarly, Teun Walter van Dongen, an independent security expert, lays out a myriad of problems with current approaches to CT assessment in two publications. In 2009, the author identifies problems with attributing metrics, such as the numbers of terrorist attacks and actual victims, to the correct cause and points out that, ultimately, reduced numbers may not reflect progress.¹³ Instead, van Dongen recommends breaking success into its components and establishing a causal chain for each component. The list of components, or *success factors*, includes international cooperation, intelligence gathering, and a counternarrative to terrorism.¹⁴ In 2015, van Dongen also identified problematic metrics; failure to account for second- and third-order effects or counterbalancing setbacks that occur concurrent with progress; and general challenges associated with establishing causality in CT assessment; however, a viable alternative approach was not provided.¹⁵

Other treatments of CT assessment do, however, offer critical insight by focusing on alternatives to current methods and defending their validity and value. Some of the authors emphasize the merits of borrowing from other fields where similar work has been done. Anthony Ellis et al., for example, point to the potential application of monitoring and evaluation tools used in the development arena to CT assessment. The approach would bring in qualitative inputs, including the results of interviews and focus groups, and quantitative inputs resulting from applied new technologies.¹⁶ Other authors, including Gentry White et al., highlight the potential uniquely found in quantitative ap-

proaches, proposing a self-exciting point process model, which posits that the occurrence of an event increases the probability of another future event with the rate of increase diminishing over time.¹⁷ The authors used this model to study responses to terrorist events in Southeast Asia with results that reveal varying levels of CT effectiveness across the region. The authors recommend that these results be compared with expert assessments to help validate the method, making the implicit acknowledgment that quantitative methods alone do not suffice in building CT assessments.¹⁸

Some of the literature critical of current approaches to CT assessment does go so far as to offer alternative metrics in an attempt to move this debate forward. Edward F. Mickolus, a former CIA agent who writes extensively about CT, compares the merits of event- and group-based approaches to measuring CT effectiveness, ultimately encouraging the use of the latter.¹⁹ Event-based approaches measure things such as the numbers of terrorist incidents, whereas group-based methods emphasize the importance of terrorist behavior and include such metrics as group size, leadership, ties to other groups, ideologies, weapons, and tactics.²⁰

While some authors try to balance the need for both qualitative and quantitative methods, other authors on CT assessment bridge the gap between method-focused and policy-focused approaches, dedicating time to discussing the value and failings of both. The work of Alex P. Schmid and Rashmi Singh illustrate this balance by offering a broad set of hard and soft indicators that focused on the post-9/11 effort to counter al-Qaeda. While hard indicators focused on increases or decreases of quantitative factors (e.g., the number of al-Qaeda affiliate groups, sophistication of attacks, or recruits compared with losses), soft indicators focused on the qualitative information (e.g., perceptions of local populations toward al-Qaeda). The authors base this need for better indicators on problems with past metrics and on policy problems, such as the lack of clear objectives.²¹

Policy Focused

Another group of work on CT assessment has emerged with a more political approach that emphasizes the values, or more often the shortcomings, of CT strategy and policies. In one examination of the U.S. strategy for the Global War on Terrorism, author Harlan Ullman lists five shortfalls, called *unfinished business*, which reveal the lack of progress in the war on terror.²² These five items include the United States' failure to understand the nature of threats to national security; operation under dysfunctional organizations; the shift from a threat of massive destruction to one of massive disruption; failure to modernize and build alliances; and lack of a strategy addressing underlying causes.

Even more frequently than Ullman, Daniel Byman has written fairly consistently on the topic of CT assessment since 2001. While Byman's work touches on all three categories—method, policy, and theory—he focuses on the political underpinnings that influence measures of CT success. The proposed metrics often include such factors as cost, policy impact, and domestic and international support for CT efforts.²³ Byman also points to the inflation that can occur when the U.S. government touts its CT successes, due in part to the weakness of the metrics used.²⁴

Theory Focused

Publications that fall into the theory-focused category identify a more fundamental problem in conducting CT assessments—the lack of a theoretical or conceptual grounding of CT policies and actions on which an assessment can be built. Michael Stohl expresses this problem succinctly by highlighting the “failure to ground metrics in a theoretical understanding of the problem.”²⁵ He points to the over politicization of CT, which has resulted in far more political—rather than scholarly—approaches to assessment. Stohl offers metrics that move away from quantitative measures such as the number of incidents; instead, he emphasizes audience reactions to a terrorist act and how the act affects dynamics such as human rights. Alexander Spencer, an international relations scholar, takes a similar tack by highlighting the inherent weaknesses of a rationalist approach to measuring CT, including an overreliance on quantitative measures. Instead, Spencer recommends a constructivist approach that accounts for fear, consumer confidence, domestic and international support, and public opinion.²⁶

Additionally, Eric van Um and Daniela PISOIU identify problems in CT assessment using the critical analysis of international relations theory.²⁷ They identify a *theoretical underdevelopment* in the way analysts have approached CT assessment in the past, particularly when it comes to determining attribution or causation.²⁸ To mitigate this problem, the authors propose explicitly stating which of three categories an assessment falls into—output effectiveness (the behavior of those doing CT); outcome effectiveness (the behavior of policy makers and the targeted group); or impact effectiveness (the impact on a target audience).²⁹

The State of Assessment Is Weak

The significant debate as to the most appropriate ways to assess the effectiveness of CT actions is evident when looking across the literature on CT assessments. As we have observed in the literature on other related topics (i.e., counterinsurgency), much of this debate centers on what the right *metrics* for

assessment should be. But, because relatively few examinations of CT assessment begin by identifying the CT theories that underpin the approach or approaches used, much of the literature presupposes or infers that a particular theory is true. This tendency often leaves the argument as to the validity of a proposed assessment approach unbounded and ungrounded. The proposed indicators that many authors present may indeed be worthy of consideration, but their validity as representations of a thorough and deliberate examination of CT assessment comes into question if they are derived from an unclear, or at least unarticulated, theoretical starting point. The demonstration of a possible, rigorous, logically derived CT assessment framework begins with an identification of the predominant CT theories of the day.

Theoretical Foundations of Counterterrorism

To elucidate how to assess the effectiveness of CT approaches, the five prominent theories that explain the phenomenon of terrorism must first be identified and made explicit. A brief summary of each theory—ideology, root causes, state sponsorship, rational choice, and group dynamics—introduced in this section includes a discussion of associated key components, assumptions, illustrative examples, and activities associated with each theory.

To be clear, this group of five theories is not intended to be historically comprehensive. Some theoretical approaches, such as psychopathology, were prominent in the 1970s when the field of terrorism studies was emerging, but have since fallen out of favor among specialists.³⁰ Over time, new theories are likely to be developed. As a result, the discussion below should be viewed as a snapshot of the current state of thinking on terrorism and CT. As well, the boundaries between the five theories are necessarily fuzzy; for example, small-group dynamics and rational choice can overlap, and some state sponsorship and ideology adherents point to Baathist Iraq as a prime mover in both spheres. Subscribing to more than one theory simultaneously, therefore, is possible and reasonable given the range of positions and viewpoints among proponents of each theory.

While these categories might not speak to past theoretical approaches, these five schools of thought could be used for any future theories of terrorism. Additionally, the assessment frameworks described below are not seen as mutually exclusive. Questions and indicators may be selected from within each school of thought to generate a blended framework that spans multiple theories. More important, effective CT assessments ensure that a theory or theories are chosen and made explicit before CT actions or programs begin so that appropriate questions can be asked and indicators can be gathered at the outset of new initiatives.

Ideology (Jihadism)

At the foundation of the theoretical approach focused on ideology is the notion that certain systems of belief drive individuals to engage in terrorist activities. Specific ideologies that have been the focus of attention in the past include Communism in the decades of the Cold War and *ethnonationalism* in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, a militant, militarized, and politicized Islam, also known as *jihadism*, is the ideological engine most commonly cited for powering the most dangerous terrorist threats to the United States specifically and the West generally. The view of those espousing a *jihadist* theory of terrorism is that jihadists are deeply and indeed inevitably opposed to Western civilization, as evidenced by their quest for the reestablishment of the caliphate, the imposition of sharia law, and the spread of a reformed and purified Islamic faith.³¹

In the view of writer Paul Berman, a leading proponent of the jihadist theory of terrorism, militant Islam is a form of totalitarianism that draws on an ideational wellspring shared by communism, fascism, and Nazism where “People throw themselves into campaigns of murder and suicide because they have come under the influence of malign doctrinal systems, which appear to address the most profound and pressing of human problems—and do so by openly rebelling against the gravest of moral considerations.”³²

Jihadists engage in a total, protracted war against those they consider the enemies of Islam—a Manichean struggle that will only end with the total Western withdrawal from “occupied” Muslim lands and the destruction of Israel.³³ As such, jihadism represents an “ideology of conquest” and a “significant threat to America,” according to Richard Perle and David Frum, two prominent early advocates for the post-9/11 “War on Terror.”³⁴ Like Britain confronting the *armed doctrine* of the French Revolution, this school of thought argues that the West faces a comparable ideological challenge today.³⁵

For many who subscribe to the jihadist theory of terrorism, the use of military force is first among equals, but not the only counterterrorist instrument in their repertoire. Countering extremist ideology, promoting the spread of democracy and human rights, and maintaining a broad political coalition against jihadism all have their place, but these are secondary. Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and other named and unnamed military campaigns have had two objectives. The first was to degrade and destroy Islamist armed groups, and in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, the regimes that supported them. The second aim was to produce a powerful demonstration effect designed to signal to potential state and nonstate aggressors that the United States would commit its overwhelming military might to eliminating anti-Western terrorism.³⁶

Root Causes

Central to the root causes theory is the tenet that economic, social, political, and environmental conditions enable, contribute to, and perhaps have a causal relationship with terrorism. At the very least, sociopolitical conditions, such as poverty, relative and absolute inequality, and the lack of political freedom, create a climate amenable to exploitation by terrorists. In a February 2015 speech, President Barack H. Obama highlighted links between terrorism and various social, political, and economic ills: “The link is undeniable. When people are oppressed and human rights are denied—particularly along sectarian lines or ethnic lines—when dissent is silenced, it feeds violent extremism. It creates an environment that is ripe for terrorists to exploit.”³⁷ For their part, terrorism theorists generally argue that such conditions are insufficient to lead to terrorism. Terrorism also requires grievances, political or otherwise, and what one specialist refers to as “precipitant factors—such as leadership, funding, state sponsorship, [and] political upheaval [that] form essential intervening variables.”³⁸ Scholars also point to so-called trigger causes, which are described as events or situations that provoke or entice people to engage in terrorist actions.³⁹ An example is Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit in 2000 to the Temple Mount and al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, which helped ignite the second intifada (2000–5).⁴⁰

Adherents of the root causes theory argue that addressing the underlying causes of terrorism is essential for suppressing it on a long-term basis. Like adherents of other theories, they believe that the use of military force and other repressive instruments have a necessary role in combating terrorism, but the nature of the “engines” of terrorism (e.g., poverty, weak states, and demographic pressures) is more critical to rely on than the short-term use of military power.⁴¹ In this school of thought, relevant counterterrorism approaches include the promotion of economic development, the rule of law, good governance, education, and social justice more generally.⁴² Without such systemic approaches, adherents argue that counterterrorism becomes an exercise in “mowing the grass” rather than performing the “weeding and landscaping” aimed at reducing if not eliminating the threat.⁴³

State Sponsorship

As noted above, the boundaries between the five theories discussed in this article are blurry, and subscribing to one or more of them simultaneously is possible. Adherents of the *state sponsorship* framework do not necessarily rule out ideology, small-group dynamics, or rational choice as contributors to the phenomenon of terrorism. They seek, rather, to highlight the idea that terrorism is not always a nonstate phenomenon; regimes support terrorist groups for various *raisons d’état*. That assistance can be relatively passive (e.g., allowing

terrorists sanctuary or safe passage) or more active (e.g., providing direct financing, weapons, travel documents, or intelligence and propaganda support).⁴⁴

During the Cold War, U.S. leaders, such as President Ronald W. Reagan and his senior advisors, advanced the notion that the Soviet Union was the well-spring of international terror in the Middle East, Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean.⁴⁵ Since 1979, the U.S. Department of State has designated state sponsors of terrorism. That list once included Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and North Korea—though interestingly, never the Soviet Union—but has dwindled to three—Iran, Syria, and Sudan.⁴⁶

The United States and its international partners apply a full spectrum of instruments—including unilateral and multilateral sanctions, capacity-building and foreign assistance programs, and intelligence and law enforcement cooperation—against countries they deem to be sponsors of terrorism.⁴⁷ Since the 1980s, the United States also has used military force against a variety of state sponsors—including Libya, Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan—to compel them to abandon terrorism, turn over terrorist suspects, and depose troublesome regimes as in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁸

Rational Choice

Politicians and policy makers frequently use terms such as *senseless* and *mindless* to describe attacks by terrorists. The U.S. embassy in Kuwait decried the “senseless terrorist attack” on worshippers that took place on 26 June 2015 at the al-Imam Mosque in Kuwait City.⁴⁹ But within terrorism studies, the near-consensus is that terrorism is not the work of madmen but rather a rational, even if deplorable, strategic choice.⁵⁰ Neatly summarizing this theoretical stance, economists Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks explain, “The average terrorist behaves more or less as a homo economicus. . . . As rational actors terrorists act violently to maximize their utility, given certain benefits, costs and constraints that are linked to these actions. . . . The utility-maximizing level of terrorism is the level at which the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits of terrorism.”⁵¹

Although derived from microeconomics, this theory—at least in the way it is typically employed by terrorism specialists—offers explanations that are based on more than narrow considerations of monetary costs and benefits.⁵² In this paradigm, terrorism is instrumental and can be employed as a cost-effective strategy for broader political, religious, and social aims, as well as personal gain.⁵³

If terrorists are indeed rational actors, it follows that manipulating their cost-benefit calculations may be an effective tool for deterring terrorism. Toward that end, counterterrorism policies can be directed in two ways: raising the costs of terrorism or reducing the benefits, political or otherwise. Increasing

the cost could include both defensive measures, such as hardening potential targets, and offensive steps, such as direct military action or a no-concessions policy with respect to negotiations.⁵⁴ Reducing the benefits of terrorism could include granting concessions to aggrieved groups on whose behalf terrorists claim to be acting or by promoting democracy as a nonviolent forum for redressing political problems.⁵⁵

Group Dynamics

Although so-called lone wolves have been responsible for major acts of terrorism in North America and Western Europe, terrorism is fundamentally a group or social activity. Writing in 1968, one right-wing French extremist described the internal social demands of the terrorist underground in vivid terms: “Under the rigorous precautions of underground life, [the terrorist’s] only society is that of his brothers in arms. These ties are very strong, but they are limited to a handful of men who are bound together by danger and secrecy.”⁵⁶ Proponents of organizational or group dynamics approach terrorism by pointing to considerable theoretical and empirical evidence that argues individuals join and remain in violent underground groups to develop or maintain affective ties.⁵⁷ Scholars such as Marc Sageman have advanced the “bunch of guys” approach to explain the entry of young Western men into jihadist groups.⁵⁸ In the view of these theorists, radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization are better understood as collective rather than individual activities.⁵⁹

Given the collective nature of terrorism, organization—structure, internal dynamics, and leadership—is of paramount importance. In her studies of Italy’s Red Brigades and other European terrorists, sociologist Donatella Della Porta highlights the *totalitarian* nature of underground armed groups, where total commitment is required. According to Della Porta, “The very fact of being in an underground group requires commitment to it to become the absolute priority with respect to the other roles an individual plays.”⁶⁰ The group itself shapes the cognitive dynamics and perceptions of the outside world among its members by functioning as a filter—all external information is sorted and processed by the group.⁶¹

Law enforcement and intelligence operations designed to erode group cohesion have a prominent place in campaigns designed to counter terrorism at the organizational level. Such measures could include any of the following: direct action and targeted killings, the widespread use of informants, and repentance laws intended to encourage members to renounce violence and provide information in exchange for shorter prison sentences. Programs to counter violent extremism would have an obvious role, as would information operations intended to highlight the grim, dangerous, and futile nature of life inside a terrorist group. Given the importance of leadership, such operations could

also convey messages designed to undercut the authority and standing of senior figures—for example, criminal behavior for personal gain, sexual abuse of members, or deviation from the group’s stated goals.

Questions for Counterterrorism Assessment

With an understanding of the five theories of terrorism and their associated actions, the questions that must be answered to know whether each theory’s actions are having their intended effects will be developed. These questions were developed by reviewing the CT literature, discussing the theories with CNA’s subject-matter experts and using a reductionist approach to parse the theories’ CT actions into assessable components; however, no claim is made to have captured the universe of possible questions. This step of developing an assessment framework is inherently a blend of art and science; therefore, the questions we present below should be viewed as a starting point for further iteration by practitioners.

Ideology (Jihadism)

We identified four main actions for countering jihadist terrorism from the literature: using military force; countering extremist ideology; promoting the spread of democracy and human rights; and maintaining broad political coalitions. Below, we present sample assessment topics that we created for each action.

Using Military Force

To what extent have military operations degraded a terrorist group’s capabilities

- directly?
- indirectly?

To what extent can partner nations conduct military operations

- independently?
- assisted by the United States?

Countering Extremist Ideology

To what extent are terrorist, counterterrorist, and identified moderate groups’ messages comparatively able to

- reach target audiences?
- resonate with target audiences?
- lead the target audience to desired actions?
- compete in the messaging space with extremist groups?

Promoting Spread of Democracy and Human Rights⁶²

To what extent is the political community sovereign based on

- Participation

- Who is allowed to freely and fairly vote in an election?
- Who actually votes?
- Leadership
 - Who is eligible for public office?
 - Who attains public office?
- Legislature
 - Do officials reflect the population's characteristics?
 - To what extent is the body independent and empowered?
- Chief executive(s)
 - How is a chief executive selected?
 - How is he or she held accountable?
 - How independent, empowered, and effective is the judiciary?
- Culture
 - To what extent do political parties offer a variety of meaningful choices to voters?
 - To what extent are political decisions the product of public deliberation?
 - To what extent are media outlets independent, representative, and able to reach the citizenry?
 - To what extent is civil society independent and organized?
 - To what extent do citizens enjoy freedom
 - of speech?
 - from politically motivated persecution?
 - To what extent are subnational formal institutions and processes democratic in design and operation?

Maintaining Broad Political Coalitions

- What is the strength of the CT political coalition?
- How sensitive is the coalition to political conditions in each member country?

Root Causes

Five main promotion actions for countering root causes of terrorism were identified from the literature: economic development, rule of law, social justice, good governance, and education. Below, we present sample assessment topics that we created for each action.

Economic Development⁶³

What is the

- level of wealth?

- level of production?
- quality of life?
- level of employment?
- level of unemployment?

Rule of Law⁶⁴

To what extent are government powers limited and subject to the rule of law?

- How pervasive is corruption in the government?
- How well does the government assure the security of people and property?
- How well protected are basic, fundamental human rights?
- How open and transparent is the government?
- How effective is the government's enforcement of regulatory statutes?
- What is the level of access to civil, criminal, and informal or traditional justice systems?

Social Justice⁶⁵

How are the following distributed among the population based on

- wealth?
- goods and services?
- employment?

What is the level of access to

- health care?
- consumer information?
- education?

What is the level of participation in

- economy?
- society?
- civics?
- politics?

Good Governance⁶⁶

What is the level of

- citizens' voice?
- accountability for public officials?
- political instability?
- violence?
- government effectiveness?

- regulatory burden?
- rule of law?
- corruption?

Education

How educated is the population?

To what extent is education being provided by the following organizations in terms of

- state?
- private?
- religious?

State Sponsorship

Three main actions for countering state sponsorship of terrorism were identified from the literature: unilateral and multilateral sanctions, capacity-building and foreign assistance programs, and intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. Below, we present sample assessment topics that we created for each action.

Unilateral and Multilateral Sanctions

- Has the United States designated the country as a state sponsor of terrorism?
- What is the level of congressional support for unilateral sanctions?
- What is the level of international support for multilateral sanctions?
- What is the impact of sanctions to the economies of the
 - state sponsor?
 - United States?
 - partner nations?

Capacity-building and Foreign Assistance Programs

How capable are partner nations of securing themselves against terrorist threats emanating from the state sponsor?

What is the impact of U.S. security assistance to partner nations as it pertains to terrorism

- prevention?
- response?
- state-sponsorship?

Intelligence and Law Enforcement Cooperation

- Can intelligence and information pertaining to the actions of the state sponsor of terrorism be gathered?
- Have extradition agreements with partner nations been established?

- Have other mechanisms of effective law enforcement cooperation with partner nations been developed?

Rational Choice

Four main actions for the rational choice theory of CT were identified from the literature: raising the costs of terrorism for both hardening targets and offensive steps and reducing the benefits of both granting concessions to aggrieved groups and promoting democracy. Below, we present sample assessment topics that we created for each action.

Raising the Costs of Terrorism

Hardening Targets

- Have the strategic aims of the group and individuals been analyzed and understood?
- Do we understand the likely targets of terrorism from various groups and individuals?
- Have vulnerability assessments of at-risk countries been conducted or acted upon?

Offensive Steps

To what extent have

- military operations deterred the actions of terrorist groups?
- terrorist groups' revenue streams and funding sources been impacted?

Reducing the Benefits of Terrorism

Granting Concessions to Aggrieved Groups

To what extent and through which sociopolitical organizations are the grievances and desires of groups and individuals prone or susceptible to terrorism

- understood?
- addressed?
- supported?
- resolved?

Promoting Democracy

The questions pertaining to participation, leadership, and culture supporting sovereignty and political coalitions, which are presented with the spread of democracy under ideology also apply to promoting democracy.

Group Dynamics

Three main actions for the group dynamics theory of CT were identified from the literature: counternetwork actions; information operations; and countering

violent extremism. Below, we present sample assessment topics that we created for each action.

Counternetwork actions⁶⁷

To what extent have counternetwork actions

- caused members to inform on or renounce the group (through free will or inducement)?
- removed members from the group?
- affected recruitment of new group members?
- impacted the group's cohesion?
- impeded the group's communication abilities?
- degraded the group's critical skills and capabilities?

Information Operations

To what extent do

- group members respect and abide by the authority of the group's senior figures?
- former group members willingly speak out against the group?

Countering Violent Extremism

Among populations vulnerable being recruited or radicalized

- What is the view of the group?
- How do views vary within the demographics (e.g., gender, age, and social standing)?
- To what extent can the group communicate
 - ideologies?
 - beliefs?
 - goals?
 - results?
- To what extent can the vulnerable population communicate back to the group?
- To what extent are individuals providing support to the group
 - overtly?
 - covertly?

Indicators for Counterterrorism Assessment

The last step in deriving an assessment framework for the various theories of terrorism and their associated CT actions is to compile indicators that could be used to answer the assessment questions. As practitioners of assessment will quickly point out, this is the most difficult and often most contentious step when creating an assessment framework. In doing so, an assessor truly

works at the interface of policy and the effects of policy—the seam in which ideas, and potentially the individuals who originated them, are tested and held accountable.

For the sake of brevity in this article, one set of example indicators is presented for the ideology theory of terrorism, specifically with an emphasis on jihadism. Example indicators for the other theories can be found in the full version of this report.⁶⁸ As with the assessment questions, these indicators were largely generated by reviewing the literature, discussing the theories with CNA subject-matter experts, and using logical reasoning to further deconstruct the assessment questions into discernible bits. Invoking the same caveat as before, these indicators should be viewed as a place for practitioners to begin and continue the evolution.

The following actions, assessment questions, and associated indicators could be used for assessing progress in countering jihadist terrorism.

Using Military Force

To what extent have military operations *directly* degraded terrorist groups' capabilities based on the quantities or frequencies of such activities as

- attempted attacks?
- successful attacks?
- recruitment rates?
- attrition rates due to
 - death?
 - capture?
 - desertion?
- financing?
 - total
 - sources
- resupply capabilities?
 - ease of access
 - prices
 - means or routes
- tactics?

To what extent have military operations *indirectly* degraded terrorist groups' capabilities based on the frequencies, quantities, or strength of such activities as

- attempted attacks?
- successful attacks?
- thwarted attacks?
- abandoned attacks?
- leaked intelligence?

- popular support by demographic (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status)?

To what extent can partner nations and their subject matter experts assess the following military characteristics independently or with U.S. assistance?

- capabilities
- proficiencies
- deficiencies (gaps)
- force size
- structure
- posture
- performance

Countering Extremist Ideology

To what extent are terrorist, counterterrorist, and moderate groups' messages comparatively able to reach target audiences based on the frequency, quality, or quantity of the following:

- print media distribution?
- website views?
- social media linkages (e.g., Facebook friends, Twitter followers)?
 - groups
 - members
- chat rooms?
- other online fora?

To what extent do terrorist, counterterrorist, and moderate groups' messages comparatively resonate with target audiences based on the level of the following over time:

- popular support by demographic (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status)?
- audience consumption of media (e.g., reading or watching)?
- social media following?

To what extent are terrorist and counterterrorist groups' messages comparatively leading to desired actions by the target audience based on the quantity of the following:

- attempted attacks?
- successful attacks?
- recruitment rates?

Promoting Spread of Democracy and Human Rights

See the assessment questions listed above. Specific indicators that align with those questions have been identified by others.⁶⁹

Maintaining Broad Political Coalitions

What is the strength of the CT political coalition for each

- Number of involved
 - countries?
 - international organizations?
- Rate over time of members in the coalition
 - joining?
 - leaving?
- Level of coalition members' involvement or commitment over time based on
 - troops?
 - other personnel?
 - monetary support?
 - diplomatic support?
- How sensitive is the coalition to political conditions in each member country?
 - Number of elections or other political transitions of coalition members scheduled over time
 - Levels of
 - popular support of coalition members' political leadership
 - support for counter/antiterrorist policies from the
 - political party
 - population

Conclusion

In our experience, debates about whether the United States is successfully countering terrorism tend to focus on actions the U.S. government has taken and whether those actions by themselves have had their intended effects. Lost in those debates is the bigger picture of whether those actions are appropriate for the theories of terrorism/CT that are guiding policy or whether those theories are the “right” ones. In the absence of this bigger picture, assessments and specific indicators used as part of the debate are often ambiguous and ineffective for those trying to make decisions pertaining to the allocation of resources, designation of priorities, or communications to various audiences. We conclude that the failure of the United States to rigorously and effectively assess its CT actions to date is the result of the general absence of linkages between the theories of terrorism guiding U.S. policy and their associated CT

actions, the questions that need to be answered to assess those actions, and the indicators that need to be gathered and analyzed to answer those questions.

As a means of addressing this issue, we created a comprehensive assessment framework for each of the five predominant theories of terrorism and their associated actions for CT. To our knowledge, this is the first time such a comprehensive mapping of terrorism theories to CT indicators has been performed. As is likely apparent in this article, creating an assessment framework of this type is an inherently difficult exercise that requires a blend of art, science, and subject-matter expertise; therefore, we do not intend for the presented framework to be prescriptive nor do we believe it should be the final word on this subject.

So how then should this framework be used? In an ideal world, policy makers would choose the prominent theories of terrorism they believe are best, implement CT actions that align with those theories, and receive assessments of those actions that answer questions and provide supporting information (e.g., indicators) that are clearly and logically linked to their theories. Ultimately, those assessments might indicate that the chosen theory and its associated actions are not leading to desired results, at which time policy makers would have clear and compelling evidence for a change in policy and, therefore, actions.

Of course, we acknowledge that in the real world this ideal linkage of theory to assessment may not always be possible. Policy makers are often political actors, and may be reticent, consequently, to stake their political futures on a specific theory of terrorism/CT that may turn out to be less effective than others. In this instance, inferring the dominant theory being employed by policy makers in their policy guidance and using the rest of our assessment framework to tailor actions, assessment questions, and indicators appropriately to that theory may still be possible. If even this is not feasible, it may be incumbent upon senior implementers to question the ambiguity of the policy provided.

Ultimately, our hope is that the provided comprehensive mapping of terrorism theories to CT indicators will make it easier for policy makers to articulate, whether explicitly or implicitly, the theory of terrorism from which they derive CT programs and actions, and for CT practitioners to design an assessment framework that aligns logically to that theory. By providing an initial assessment framework for today's theories of terrorism/CT, we hope to empower policy makers to ask the right questions about countering terrorism and practitioners to answer them.

Notes

1. The history of U.S. counterterrorism actions extends back much further in time than post-9/11. See, for example, William Rosenau, *The "First War on Terrorism?" U.S. Domestic Counterterrorism During the 1970s and Early 1980s* (Arlington, VA: CNA, October 2014), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/CRM-2014-U-008836.pdf.

2. Terms such as *assessment* and *evaluation* are used interchangeably throughout this article while acknowledging that different U.S. government agencies favor specific terms and may have definitions for them that vary somewhat from those of other agencies. See, for example, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 17, or *Department of State Evaluation Policy* (Washington, DC: Department of State [DOS], 2015), 2.
3. See the discussion on the shortfalls of using security incidents as a metric in Jonathan J. Schroden, “Measures for Security in a Counterinsurgency,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 5 (2009): 715–44, doi:10.1080/01402390903189394.
4. In the remainder of this article, we will emphasize the use of the term *indicator* as opposed to *metric* unless specifically referring to numerical indicators. Because the former carries a less quantitative connotation, it allows for the broader inclusion of nonnumerical pieces of data and information.
5. The selected approach to the questions has been effectively used by the lead author for assessing counterinsurgency operations in the past and aligns with recent changes in DOD doctrine. See Schroden, “Measures for Security”; Jonathan Schroden et al., “A New Paradigm for Assessment in Counterinsurgency,” *Military Operations Research* 18, no. 3 (September 2013): 5–20, doi:10.5711/1082598318305; *Operation Assessment*, Joint Doctrine Note 1-15 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2015), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/notes/jdn1_15.pdf; and *Operation Assessment: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment* (Eustis, VA: Air Land Sea Application Center, 2015).
6. Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte, “The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models,” *Criminology* 47, no. 1 (2009): 17–45, doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2009.00138.x.
7. Nadav Morag, “Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 4 (2005): 307–20, doi:10.1080/1057610059050156.
8. *Ibid.*, 308.
9. Michele L. Malvesti, “Bombing bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 26, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2002): 17–29, <http://hdl.handle.net/10427/76927>.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy, and Alison J. Sherley, *The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies: A Campbell Systematic Review* (Washington, DC: Crime and Justice Coordinating Group, Campbell Collaboration, 2006), 1–49.
12. *Ibid.*, 4.
13. Teun van Dongen, *Break It Down: An Alternative Approach to Measuring Effectiveness in Counterterrorism* (Berlin: Economics of Security, 2009), <https://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/6518193.pdf>.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Teun Walter van Dongen, “The Science of Fighting Terrorism: The Relation between Terrorist Actor Type and Counterterrorism Effectiveness” (doctoral thesis, Leiden University, 2015), <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/29742>.
16. Anthony Ellis et al., *Monitoring and Evaluation Tools for Counterterrorism Program Effectiveness* (Geneva: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2011), http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/integrity_policybrief_1111.pdf.
17. Gentry White et al., “Modelling the Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Interventions,” *Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*, no. 475 (June 2014), <http://aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tandi/461-480/tandi475.html>.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Edward F. Mickolus, “How Do We Know We’re Winning the War against Terrorists? Issues in Measurement,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 25, no. 3 (2002): 151–60, doi:10.1080/01490380290073158.
20. *Ibid.*

21. Alex P. Schmid and Rashmi Singh, "Measuring Success and Failure in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: U.S. Government Metrics of the Global War on Terror," in *After the War on Terror: Regional and Multilateral Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, ed. Alex P. Schmid and Garry F. Hindle (London: Royal United Services Institute Books, 2009).
22. Harlan Ullman, "Is the US Winning or Losing the Global War on Terror and How Do We Know?," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 1 (2006): 29–41, doi:10.1080/10357710500494416.
23. Daniel L. Byman, "Are We Winning the War on Terrorism?," Brookings, 23 May 2003, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2003/05/23middleeast-byman>; Daniel Byman, "Measuring the War on Terrorism: A First Appraisal," *Current History* 102, no. 668 (December 2003): 411–15; Daniel Byman, "Scoring the War on Terrorism," *National Interest* (Summer 2003): 75–84, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/scoring-the-war-on-terrorism-397>; and Daniel Byman, *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008).
24. Byman, "Are We Winning?"; Byman, "Measuring the War?"; Byman, "Scoring the War?"; and Byman, *The Five Front War*.
25. Michael Stohl, "Winners and Losers in the War on Terror: The Problem of Metrics," in *Coping with Terrorism: Origins, Escalation, Counterstrategies, and Responses*, ed. Rafael Rueveny and William R. Thompson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010), 350.
26. Alexander Spencer, *The Problems of Evaluating Counter-Terrorism* (Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2006), https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13771/1/UNISCI_Spencer12.pdf.
27. Eric van Um and Daniela Pisiou, *Effective Counterterrorism: What Have We Learned So Far?* (Berlin: Economics of Security, 2011), http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.386651.de/diw_econsec0055.pdf.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ivan Sascha Sheehan, *When Terrorism and Counterterrorism Clash: The War on Terror and the Transformation of Terrorist Activity* (Youngstown, NY: Cambria Press, 2007), 44–45; and Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). Early terrorism research focused heavily on identifying terrorist "personalities." Today, few specialists argue that such personalities exist, although some experts continue to search for a terrorist "profile" in the hopes of explaining why relatively few individuals from the same background living in similar circumstances become terrorists. John Horgan, "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618, no. 1 (July 2008): 83, doi:10.1177/0002716208317539.
31. More than 20 years ago, political scientist Samuel P. Huntington popularized the notion that the "West and the rest" (including Islam) were destined for intercivilizational conflicts. Samuel P. Huntington, "A Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), doi:10.2307/20045621.
32. Paul Berman, "Why Is the Islamist Death Cult So Appealing?," *Tablet*, 28 January 2015, <http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/188549/islamist-death-cult>. See also Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004).
33. "Jihadism as an Ideology of Violence: The Abuse of Islam for Terrorist Purposes," Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 15 June 2015, <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/fields-of-work/islamism-and-islamist-terrorism/what-is-islamism/jihadism-as-an-ideology-of-violence>. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as the Islamic State, adds an apocalyptic dimension to jihadism—the return of the Caliphate and with it, the destruction of the world. See William McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015).
34. David Frum and Richard Perle, *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2003), 238. See also Timothy J. Lynch, "Kristol Balls: Neocon-

- servative Visions of Islam and the Middle East,” *International Politics* 45, no. 2 (March 2008): 192, doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800227.
35. John M. Owen IV, *Confronting Political Islam: Six Lessons from the West's Past* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 72.
 36. For more on the purported demonstration effect of the application of U.S. military power, see James Phillips, “Iraq: One Year Later,” Heritage Foundation, 24 March 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/hl825nbsip-iraq-one-year-later>.
 37. Jim Acosta, “Obama Calls on World to Focus on Roots of ISIS, al Qaeda Extremism,” CNN News, 19 February 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/19/politics/obama-isis-extremism-speech/index.html>. See also *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: White House, July 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.
 38. Edward Newman, “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 8 (2006): 751, doi:10.1080/10576100600704069.
 39. Ibid.; and Tore Bjørgo, “Introduction,” in *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, ed. Tore Bjørgo (New York: Routledge, 2005), 3.
 40. Bjørgo, “Introduction,” in *Root Causes*.
 41. See, for example, Martha Crenshaw, “The Long View of Terrorism,” *Current History* 113, no. 759 (January 2014): 42.
 42. Alex P. Schmid, “Prevention of Terrorism: Towards a Multi-Pronged Approach,” in Bjørgo, *Root Causes*, 223.
 43. Fareed Zakaria, “Fmr CIA Director Hayden ‘We’re Going to See More of What We Saw in Texas Last Week,’” *CNN Press Room* (blog), CNN News, 10 May 2015, <http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2015/05/10/fmr-cia-director-hayden-were-going-to-see-more-of-what-we-saw-in-texas-last-week/>; and Daniel Byman, “Mowing the Grass and Taking Out the Trash,” *Foreign Policy*, 25 August 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/25/mowing-the-grass-and-taking-out-the-trash/>.
 44. Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 15. Before the emergence of modern terrorism in the late 1960s, scholars generally used the term *terrorism* to denote specific forms of violence carried out by states against noncombatants to *terrorize* them into obedience (e.g., France during the Revolution, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin). Hannah Arendt, “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government,” *Review of Politics* 15, no. 3 (July 1953): 303–27.
 45. Policy makers embraced the ideas advanced in journalist Claire Sterling’s book in which she detected Moscow’s hand behind terrorist groups in the Middle East and Western Europe—in effect, the existence of a Soviet proxy war against the United States and its allies. See Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981).
 46. “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” DOS, 20 July 2015, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm>.
 47. “Programs and Initiatives,” DOS, 5 July 2015, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm>.
 48. Martha Crenshaw, “Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism,” in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2003).
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 50. See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, “The Rationality of Terrorism and Other Forms of Political Violence: Lessons from the Jewish Campaign in Palestine, 1939–1947,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 22, no. 2 (2011), doi:10.1080/09592318.2011.573394.
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Mali and Islamic Extremism

Applying Lessons Learned from Afghanistan

Rebecca Yagerman

Abstract: More than eight years into the war in Afghanistan, military leaders realized that they had been approaching the problems of Islamic extremism the wrong way. Despite staggering similarities leading to the rise of Islamic extremism in Mali, military tactics have mirrored those used early in Operation Enduring Freedom. The lessons learned from Afghanistan need to be applied to the growing problem of Islamic extremism in Mali; enemy-centric operations alone will not garner long-term military success or lasting stability. This article addresses the similar contexts between the two countries and how lessons from Afghanistan can be applied to Mali to improve chances for lasting stability.

Keywords: Africa, Mali, Azawad, asymmetric warfare, belligerent forces, jihad, Islamic extremism, sharia, terrorist funding, peacekeeping, instability, al-Qaeda, al-Mourabitoun, AQIM, MNLA, MUJAO, MUJWA, MINUSMA, ISIL, Ansar Dine, Tuareg, Salafist, Masked Battalion, Afghanistan, French stabilization mission, PMESII, United Nations

When Islamic Salafist group Ansar Dine destroyed ancient mausoleums in Timbuktu in 2012, most media outlets compared the attack to the Taliban's destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2000. To

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say Mali is the next Afghanistan or the next Syria is, of course, an oversimplification because the geopolitical atmosphere in Mali has its own nuances and intricacies. One cannot ignore, however, the sense of *déjà vu* evoked from reading about Mali: the Islamic police enforce strict compliance with their view of sharia law, such as regulating women's dress, prohibiting fraternization with the opposite sex, destroying cultural objects and documents viewed as non-Islamic, and prohibiting games and music.¹

Over the course of Operation Enduring Freedom, many dollars were spent and lives lost. A great many mistakes were made, and lessons were learned the hard way. These lessons do not have to be relearned, and if they are applied correctly in Mali, they could help win the war against Islamic extremism there. One of the most important lessons in Afghanistan was that military offensives alone were not enough to win the war. As in Afghanistan, Mali's political and social fabric is much too complicated to be stabilized with military offensives alone, which has been the focus. Any gains achieved through military offensives, without an eye to the complexities contributing to the rise of Islamic extremism there, will be short-lived.

Even though the Bamiyan Buddhas had been destroyed almost a year prior and the Taliban had been menacing the Afghan population for years, it took the massive terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 for the world to focus its attention on Afghanistan and the problems of Islamic extremism gaining impunity in the power vacuum there. The Paris attacks on 13 November 2015 rekindled global attention to the threat of Islamic extremism growing in forgotten corners where the national government and the international community seldom make an appearance.² The week before the Paris attacks, however, President Barack H. Obama underestimated the threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), claiming ISIL had been contained.³ Shortly thereafter, the 2 December 2015 San Bernardino attacks brought the issue home to Americans. And while attacks at home remain rather isolated events, the violent attacks from Islamic extremist groups, especially those based in Mali (Bamako on 20 November 2015, Ouagadougou on 15 January 2016, Timbuktu on 5 February 2016, and Grand-Bassam on 14 March 2016) continue to increase in frequency. If we do not respond quickly and appropriately, these threats will continue to fester in the lawless regions of countries with weak central governments like Mali's and pose a threat to people in neighboring countries and farther abroad.

To understand how stakeholders can apply lessons from Afghanistan to Mali, this article addresses several key topics ripe for comparison: identifying enemies and allies, understanding the importance of local dynamics and sources of instability, understanding and leveraging foreign powers, and valuing information sharing with local counterparts. At each step of the analysis, parallels

are drawn with Afghanistan to the appropriate extent. The Afghanistan War was very expensive both in terms of the dollars spent and American lives lost. With a little effort, the expensive lessons we learned in Afghanistan can pay dividends in Mali. This will not be an exercise of taking tactics wholesale from a war in a mountainous country in central Asia and stamping them down in the deserts of West Africa, but rather, a conscientious approach that ensures that tactics and strategies used in Mali will have a lasting impact on the global war on Islamic extremism as well as on overall regional stability.

This article describes many of the conditions that make a resurgence of Islamic extremism possible in northern Mali. Descriptions of the operating environment in northern Mali, however, are only used to highlight the complexity of the dynamics and should not be taken at face value as a substitute for in-depth ground analysis. The cruxes of the comparison with Afghanistan are that a thorough analysis of the operating environment is necessary for successful operation, and that much like the early phases of the war in Afghanistan, the military intervention in Mali has largely underestimated the complexity of the situation. A critical examination of the lessons learned in Afghanistan, thus, can be useful to search for solutions to the problems in Mali from a methodological standpoint.

Oversimplifying Allies and Enemies

In Afghanistan, there was a constant barrage of individuals and groups vying for power and operating with various funding sources. Coalition governments initially made the mistake of dividing the population into two camps: those that American forces could work with and those that supported the Taliban. When American leaders backed Hamid Karzai to head the interim government in late 2001 and for the presidency in 2004, there was much optimism that he would be able to unite the country and herald in long-absent peace and prosperity.⁴ After almost a decade of his leadership, many Western diplomats and aid workers could see mixed results and wondered how someone that U.S. officials vetted and trained so carefully could take so many actions to thwart progress in his own country.⁵ The real problem lay not in Karzai's nepotistic and corrupt practices, but in Western countries naively creating the false dichotomy that "you're either with us or you're against us."⁶

Realist Objectives of Allies

The situation is not as simple as it first appears. Most organizations and individuals will work for their own interests, leading to some desirable policies and actions and some reprehensible ones. Even the United Nations (UN) is not an unfettered force for good. The international community sends thousands of

soldiers into conflict zones every year to protect civilians and prevent atrocities. Yet, every few months, there are reports of UN peacekeeping soldiers raping women or otherwise abusing the local population.⁷ Why then do militaries try to define people in terms only applicable to comic books: super heroes fighting super villains? Alliances are formed with the party “on our side.” If policy makers better understood the complexities of power dynamics in a region, they could avoid idolizing any one individual or political party and limit the inevitable disillusionment and disappointment when that individual or group fails to uphold American ideals or expectations. Not only does avoiding dichotomous classification of key actors help with our own expectation management, it is necessary for a successful stability operation—any operation that has a chance of creating a durable peace in a given region. In 2010, the *Washington Post’s* Joshua Partlow reported that Major General Michael T. Flynn, the top U.S. military intelligence officer in Afghanistan, wrote a “scathing critique” of U.S. strategy. Flynn considered the American focus on finding and killing insurgents to be less useful and more expensive than “understanding the nuances of local politics, economics, religion and culture that drive the insurgency.”⁸ Major General Flynn was aware that simply attacking the insurgent groups would not have a lasting positive impact on the war efforts. The issue in Mali is likewise much more complicated than merely tracking down and killing “bad guys” while allying with perceived “good guys” who only held that position because they opposed the bad guys.⁹

The Malian government is working closely with French forces to defeat terrorists in Mali. Yet, certain high officials in Mali’s government have likely supported al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or at least certain political figures with ties to this armed group.¹⁰ Piggybacking off of the Tuareg rebellion of 2012, AQIM provided support for the separatists as they sought control of the northern half of Mali, a region also referred to as Azawad.¹¹ The Tuaregs have long struggled for increased autonomy in Mali, where they have a strong ethnic identity, but because of colonial gerrymandering, they lack their own country. The 2012 Tuareg insurrection was initially able to succeed because of AQIM’s financial and arms support. After the Tuaregs captured Mali’s major northern cities, their then-allies turned on them, ousting them from power. Malian government officials, perhaps wanting to weaken the insurgency in the north and perhaps seeking to line their own pockets, colluded with AQIM to prevent leaders of the Azawad territory from successfully seceding from Mali.¹² Foreign soldiers and aid workers need to understand such conflicting national interests and murky motivations that can lead allies to act against the overall interest of stability at times. A discrete view of the enemy and U.S. allies is counterproductive to stability operations.

No More Simple Enemies

“There was a time, during other wars, when U.S. commanders tended to oversimplify the fight: It was the United States versus the communists—or the terrorists,” reported Tom Gjelten for NPR in 2009.¹³ The longer U.S. forces spent in Afghanistan, the more apparent it became that diagramming the threat networks in a given area of operation would inevitably produce a spiderweb of connections. Now U.S. doctrine recognizes that “threats are not static or monolithic. Threats can arise from divergent interests or competition among states, groups, or organizations in an operational environment.” But, there was a time that leaders operated under the old Cold War mentality of having to fight a monolithic enemy, which did not translate well into the new Global War on Terrorism milieu.¹⁴

Within a few years, most military and civilian personnel deploying to Afghanistan were at least nominally briefed on the various groups operating in their areas of responsibility. Army General Stanley A. McChrystal, commanding general in Afghanistan (2009–10), said in 2009 that Afghanistan had “three regional and resilient insurgencies—we don’t just have one in Afghanistan; we’ve got at least three—and then there are other subinsurgencies.”¹⁵ In other words, there was not one unified insurgent effort to overthrow the Afghan government, but rather many factors—some working together and some working against each other—all struggling to gain an advantage over the national government. Despite the initial predeployment briefings, ground soldiers and other stability workers often fell back into using the simpler terminology, referring to the enemy as the *Taliban*, *TB*, or *the insurgents*. Groups that may have been lumped into the insurgent category include Haqqani network, al-Qaeda, Taliban, narcoterrorists, Quetta Shura, and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin among others. Individuals had shifting alliances, and while all of the groups worked against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), it would be an oversimplification to lump these actors into one group.

Despite the progress made in Afghanistan to understand and distinguish the various threat elements there, a lot of the same oversimplification is now being used to describe the conflict in Mali. When discussing the February 2016 attacks in Timbuktu, Reuters reporters wrote that “militants have stepped up attacks in Mali in recent months as part of a growing regional insurgency.”¹⁶ This description is at best misleading and at worst inaccurate, as the Islamic extremist movement in northern Mali is distinct from any ethnic-based or political movements for independence. Unfortunately, the media not only uses these terms but many of the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance staff parrot the media when they teach UN peacekeeping troops who are preparing to deploy to Mali.¹⁷ The term *insurgency* has a particular meaning:

“a usually violent attempt to take control of a government: a rebellion or uprising.” Imprecise use can blur the issue for those who are less familiar with the region.¹⁸

There have been several insurgency and liberation movements in northern Mali in the past half century. The most recent insurgency was laid to rest, at least temporarily, by the Algiers Accord (20 June 2015), where the leaders of the various Tuareg groups, who had been seeking independence, agreed to lay down their arms in exchange for an increased role in the national government. Following the signing of that peace agreement, implementation has been slow, but Malian officials have made efforts to include more Tuaregs in the Malian government and give them more autonomy to govern the northern territories.¹⁹ As a result, while the peace is still fragile, and continued implementation delays could cause a resurgence of violence, the Tuareg separatists have essentially ceased hostilities. Activity by Salafist-Islamic extremists, however, has increased dramatically. The ongoing unrest in Mali since the signing of the peace accord has little to do with the Tuareg insurgency and much to do with Islamic extremists and narcoterrorists. That important, but fine, point is not clear from the Reuters article in February 2016 or from many similar articles.

Many of the people training UN peacekeepers for deployments to Mali have never actually been to Mali and rely on media reports for situational awareness. Importantly, these trainers and the soldiers they train must see beyond the media generalizations—accurate or inaccurate—and be able to impart a fuller understanding of the enemy threat networks that their soldiers may encounter. Mali’s threat network includes more than six interrelated organizations that have frequently merged and split into new groups. The following key groups and their descriptions give an idea of the complexity of Mali’s threat network.

Ansar Dine

Ansar Dine means “The Defenders of the Faith” and was founded in late 2011 by Iyad Ag Ghali, a Malian Tuareg from the Ifoghas group and former leader of several Tuareg separatist movements. Ansar Dine played a central role in the Islamist coalition that controlled much of northern Mali from spring 2012 to January 2013. In an effort to avoid discrete categorizations, it is important to note that in 2003 Ghali played a key role in securing the release of 14 tourists kidnapped by the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which later became AQIM.²⁰ He negotiated three additional hostage releases between 2008 and 2011.²¹ Ghali’s ethnicity and his constantly changing alliances may lead people to confuse his motives with those of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, the Tuareg political group that sought independence for northern Mali. Ansar Dine has claimed responsibility for the 12

February 2016 attacks on the northern Mali military base in Kidal that left three Guinean soldiers dead and dozens wounded.²²

Al-Mourabitoun

This group is led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a one-eyed Algerian and former commander of AQIM. On 4 December 2015, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (a.k.a. Abdelmalek Droukdel), leader of AQIM, confirmed a merger with al-Mourabitoun, which is currently considered the face of AQIM. Al-Mourabitoun is loyal to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the emir of al-Qaeda, and has claimed responsibility for the hotel siege in Bamako, as well as the one in Ouagadougou. Belmokhtar is likely behind the February 2016 attacks in Timbuktu.²³

AQIM

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb emerged out of militant groups, particularly the GSPC, active in Algeria's civil war (1992–2002). AQIM falls under the larger umbrella of al-Qaeda, founded by Osama Bin Laden and currently headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. In addition to its attacks within Algeria, AQIM has staged numerous kidnappings and raids in Sahelian countries. A key member of the Islamist coalition in northern Mali in 2012–15, AQIM merged with al-Mourabitoun near the end of 2015. AQIM leadership, headed by Belmokhtar, has officially condemned the actions of ISIL for dividing jihadists, and for slaughtering innocent Muslims. Yet global al-Qaeda leader, al-Zawahiri, praised ISIL's attacks on Paris.²⁴

Boko Haram

Based out of Nigeria, Boko Haram is aligned with ISIL and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (a.k.a. Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai). Although some Nigerians may be operating in Mali, the terrorist activities of Boko Haram are not coordinated with or aligned with AQIM, al-Mourabitoun, or MUJAO (see below).²⁵ Moreover, when Boko Haram and ISIL increase their terrorist activity, al-Qaeda and its offshoots increase theirs, perhaps out of a sense of friendly jihadist competition to establish an Islamic caliphate and rule the world.²⁶ The more notoriety each group attains, the better their recruiting efforts.

Macina Liberation Front

The Macina Liberation Front (MLF) was organized in February 2015.²⁷ Most of the approximately 4,000 members are ethnically Fulani (a.k.a. Peul), a predominantly nomadic herding culture with populations spread across the Sahel region.²⁸ Amadou Koufa, an extremist preacher from central Mali, leads the

MLF. Koufa's mentor is the leader of Ansar Dine, Iyad Ag Ghali. Leaders of the MLF claimed responsibility for the August 2015 hotel attack in central Mali and for the November 2015 hotel attack in Bamako. It is unclear whether MLF conducted the attack in coordination with al-Mourabitoun or whether one or both groups were scrambling for relevance by claiming responsibility for attacks committed by other groups.

Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

Founded in December 2011 as an offshoot of AQIM, MUJAO has conducted kidnappings and bombings in Algeria, Mali, and Niger. From spring 2012 to January 2013, MUJAO was a member of the Islamist coalition that controlled much of northern Mali with an especially strong presence in the northern city of Gao. In 2013, the leaders of MUJAO and the Masked Battalion announced a merger of the two, renaming themselves al-Mourabitoun. The leaders of the new group are known to be drug traffickers trading in the Sahel and southern Algeria areas.²⁹ Then in 2015, al-Mourabitoun merged with AQIM, retaining the name al-Mourabitoun.

These groups, with the exception of Boko Haram, are all very closely linked and have occasionally rotated leaders between groups. In effect, al-Mourabitoun is the current name of the groups that were once independently known as AQIM, MUJAO, and the Masked Battalion. The Macina Liberation Front and Ansar Dine are also closely linked, but distinct groups. Understanding the power structure and the cults of personality surrounding the leaders of the groups active in a given area is important for influencing stability in the region. To predict and prevent belligerent activity, it is imperative to understand how these groups are internally structured, funded, and equipped. We need to know how they are linked to each other and what their connections are with local populations and the neighboring countries. Understanding the familial and ideological ties between groups and local populations is imperative to any effort to root out Islamic extremism. Coalition forces may be able to kill Mokhtar Belmokhtar or other high-ranking officials, but without targeting the conditions that allow the groups to operate in the area, the leaders will only be replaced.³⁰

Local Dynamics and Sources of Instability

While a comprehensive understanding of enemy groups and threat networks is an integral part of any military operation, killing the "enemy" or securing a town will have short-lived results without an eye to stability operations. For any politician or analyst who argues that targeted strikes are needed without getting bogged down in "nation building," the point is missed. The question is not one of nation building, but of expending the resources required to impact lasting regional stability. As Major General Flynn noted in Afghanistan in 2010, "the

military won't be able to defeat the insurgency just by chasing Taliban fighters across the country. . . . It's not about killing our enemy."³¹ According to U.S. doctrine on unified land operations, offensive, defensive, and stability operations must be performed simultaneously during all operations.³² The lessons learned by United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan are ones that could help the French and UN forces in Mali. After more than 10 years in Afghanistan, the U.S. and NATO developed and refined the doctrine on stability, a military function that was not fully developed in traditional war and has been slow to catch on in the new age of asymmetric warfare where conflicts between nations or groups have disparate military capabilities and strategies.³³ According to analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, "understanding Afghan popular perceptions at the province, district, and local level are critical and usually ignored in official reporting. . . . success in the area must be based on Afghan terms and values and the focal point for all activity must be the impact on Afghan perceptions and attitudes."³⁴ The same is true in Mali.

It can be hard to understand why a population allows such a brutal regime to operate in its midst and to enforce laws contrary to their own beliefs. Why did members of the Afghan population allow the Taliban to brutalize them, to enforce a harsh interpretation of sharia, and to prohibit many traditional Afghan activities, such as dancing, singing, and kite flying?³⁵ The answer to that question may not be so different from the answers in Mali, where extremists have decreed that "music is not allowed, soccer is not allowed, cinema is no[t] allowed, and television is also not allowed. Everything is haram."³⁶ Reports indicate that the Tuareg rebels used violent tactics to achieve their objectives. They were known for raping and forcibly marrying off women to their men without the consent of the women or the women's families.³⁷ In some areas, such as Gao, certain elements of the population welcomed the brutal form of justice brought by the Islamic extremists. While some were sympathetic to the jihadist agenda, others merely welcomed a reprieve from the lawlessness and crime that had existed during the 2012 Tuareg rebellion.³⁸ An environment plagued by unpredictable violence is worse than one where harsh laws are imposed and strictly enforced. That was a major reason the Afghan people did not initially oppose the Taliban rule following the lawless period of civil war in the early 1990s. Even once the GIRoA did establish its own courts, many people continued to seek out Taliban justice rather than bring their cases to the government courts, citing government corruption, indifference, and ineptitude.³⁹ Without the establishment of legitimate forms of dispute resolution and judgment enforcement, either by government courts or through traditional community justice, people will likely continue to resort to the harsh sharia justice offered by Islamic militants.

To conduct any kind of stability operations, peacekeepers must first develop a clear understanding of the battlefield, which involves deeper comprehension of the social fabric in the zone of operation than what is required during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield in offensive and defensive operations that are by nature enemy-centric. Stability operations use the population as the center of gravity.⁴⁰ U.S. military doctrine directs us to review political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) factors.⁴¹ When identifying such factors for the purpose of stability operations, it is necessary not only to identify and list key factors of the society as found on the CIA's World Factbook website, but the significance of each factor as it relates to stability must also be considered.⁴² The PMESII exercise for situational awareness must be applied to the various operating environments in northern Mali for peacekeeping troops to have any chance of having an impact on stability there. Below is a cursory analysis of the PMESII factors in Mali that is important for all military troops operating in the region. Necessarily, the specific data for each subregion will vary slightly from the overall analysis of the country. Further, the dynamics that impact a region's stability change over time, and any unit deploying to Mali must constantly make sure its PMESII analysis is current.

Political Factors

Mali is, theoretically, a representative democracy. In 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was elected president following the interim government set in place after Mali's military coup d'état in March 2012. In August 2012, Cheick Modibo Diarra, the prime minister, announced the formation of a government of national unity.⁴³ With that said, the regional ethnic divisions remain. The Bambara, southern Mali's dominant ethnic group, holds most positions in government. The northern parts of Mali are largely Tuareg, but they have not traditionally been represented by the central government. The current crisis stems in part from long-standing structural conditions, such as weak and ineffective governance, and northern communities' deep-seated feelings of being neglected, marginalized, and unfairly treated by the central government. The peace accord of June 2015 purports to grant more government positions and autonomy to the Tuaregs, but has met many delays in implementation.⁴⁴

In comparison, Afghanistan's leaders attempted to address some of the ethnic tensions by creating quotas for each ethnic group in parliament. This system worked well in Afghanistan, where ethnic and familial tensions dominated the political arena during the struggle for power therein. At the same time ethnic quotas were established, peace activists ran public service campaigns encouraging cooperation and friendship between ethnicities. The author specifically remembers a message in 2012 that showed different animal species

forming bonds with each other and prompting people to consider that if monkeys and turtles can get along, human beings of different ethnicities should be able to get along also. Mali's neighbor, Niger, also ran a campaign encouraging national unity over ethnic divisions with the result that many people no longer vote along ethnic lines and there is frequent interethnic marriage. In fact, while working with the Nigerien military in 2015 and 2016, every single class member interviewed told the author that ethnic cohesion is the most important stabilizing factor in Niger. These two examples indicate that the implementation of the peace accord quotas along with a campaign for cooperation between ethnic groups might have a strong positive impact on integrating northern Mali into Mali's central government. In many parts of West Africa, however, representatives from the former colonial powers place more emphasis on ethnic distinctions than do the locals. Tying political power to ethnicity may end up creating more problems than it solves, or it may be necessary in the short term to undo the damage of colonial *line drawing*.⁴⁵ Just because ethnic quotas were an acceptable political solution in Afghanistan, does not mean they should be applied to Mali without further analysis.

While the government of Mali is technically secular, religious factors dominate the way politics plays out on the popular level. The government has a religious council that advises on major decisions. With more than 90 percent of the population following Islam, the tenets of Islamic law are important for implementing political change. The international community should be accustomed to working within an Islamic framework for governance as Afghanistan is an Islamic republic where the constitution and all the laws are based on Islamic law combined with Russian and French codes.

Military Factors

The security forces of Mali have never had a strong presence in its northern territories. The coup accelerated the collapse of the state in the north, allowing the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, the Tuareg separatist movement, to easily overrun government forces in the regions of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu and proclaim an independent state of Azawad in April 2012.⁴⁶ The population does not have strong allegiances to a government with which it has never or rarely interacted. This is not to suggest that a stronger presence of Malian security forces would create stability in and of itself, but the power vacuum created by the government's inability or unwillingness to govern in the north has left a population that primarily identifies more with ethnicity than with nationality and is vulnerable to abuses by militants. Many locals in the northern city of Gao, for example, supported the presence of MUJAO because, prior to this jihadist presence, theft and other crimes in the area were left unchecked. Even if the accused suffered horrendous punishments without

trial, the overall population had a greater sense of security and law and order with the jihadists. In the absence of power for good, the people were left with a choice of the lesser of two evils; thus, a peaceful people with moderate and tolerant religious beliefs accepted, at least to some degree, Salafist rule.⁴⁷

Malian forces now have control over all urban areas in northern Mali; however, a recent UN Human Rights Council report indicates alarming rates of arbitrary arrests and prisoner abuse by the Malian armed forces.⁴⁸ When people feel targeted or threatened by the Malian forces, they often revert to supporting the Islamic extremist groups.⁴⁹ In contrast to the reports of abuse by Malian soldiers, surveys indicate that the population responds positively to increased interaction with the police. A 2015 Afrobarometer survey reported a positive correlation between police bribes and public confidence in police. That is, as reports of police bribes decrease in Mali, popular opinion of police competency also decreases.⁵⁰ This finding is contrary to the normal trend of a negative correlation between corruption and public opinion and requires further investigation and analysis. The likely explanation for the positive correlation between the decreases in bribes and confidence in police is that there have been fewer requests for bribes—the population has had fewer encounters with the police due to police reticence to get involved in the conflict in the north. Perhaps in the areas surveyed, people are more concerned with the police taking an active role to prevent violence and crime than they are with the problem of paying an occasional bribe.

According to the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, "police are poorly trained, poorly paid, and lack resources to combat crime effectively."⁵¹ Police and emergency responders in Mali have been known to request money in return for providing what Westerners view as routine police services. Moreover, rogue police elements and bandits posing as police officers will often stop vehicles and demand money.⁵² Westerners may notice this rampant corruption and be tempted to expend resources addressing it. While addressing corruption is almost always helpful, in the case of the city of Mopti, public opinion data indicates that priority needs to be given to sending security forces out to the remote regions in the north. Some interaction with an imperfect police force would be better received than the total absence of police.

Importantly, foreign peacekeepers should be aware of the different public perceptions of the various security forces in their areas of operation. With whom they partner and the approach toward partnership arrangements with local forces can have a huge impact on public perception and thereby, mission success.

Economic Factors

Mali is among the 25 poorest countries in the world, depending on gold mining and agricultural exports for revenue and expanding its iron ore extraction in

an effort to diversify. The main threat to Mali's economy is a return to physical insecurity.⁵³ Foreign investors are unwilling to risk their investments in areas plagued by extreme violence and kidnappings of Westerners. The ability of French mining companies to continue to profit in northern Mali may be one reason that France has taken such an active role in leading the fight in northern Mali.⁵⁴

Often violence arises because of long standing conflicts over the use of resources such as land and water. Having a foreign presence fighting Islamic extremists gives people a tool to use against their personal enemies or economic rivals. Foreign forces must rely, to a large degree, on local intelligence to understand the location and identity of belligerent forces. In an area lacking an effective dispute resolution system, people sometimes turn to the foreign occupying forces to help them enforce what they see as justice. When accusing their enemies of ties to Islamic extremists will get them off a piece of land, stop them from monopolizing a water source, or provide a convenient excuse for violence, some people are quick to turn on their neighbors.

More than individual motives, Malian officials find terrorists make good scapegoats for failures of corrupt and ineffective government. In November 2015, along the border of Niger and Mali, there were several conflicts between Fulani herders and local farmers. The local population killed several of the herders and claimed the dead men were members of MUJAO. The government of Mali is reluctant to involve itself in these violent economic conflicts because it does not want to admit that it lacks control in remote regions.⁵⁵ When regular economic conflict can be blamed on a larger security threat, peacekeepers can easily be drawn in and manipulated.

Spending time in eastern Afghanistan during 2011, for example, the author was almost fooled by officials who blamed economic crimes on terrorist activity. A local judge coordinating with the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) told the PRT that he had been the victim of a Taliban explosion and had shrapnel in his leg. He told the PRT that he believed he had been targeted because of his harsh judgments against the Taliban. Upon further investigation, evidence surfaced indicating that the explosive device was left at the judge's front door following a trial in which the judge extracted bribes from both sides and then decided in favor of the party who provided the best bribe. The loser was inconsolable after losing his land-dispute case despite paying a bribe. He apparently felt his only recourse was to drop off an improvised explosive device at the judge's house, pointing to terrorists not disappointed favor seekers. Lack of effective local land dispute resolution mechanisms in this case led to violence that was blamed on terrorist groups. In 2008, the International Relations and Security Network noted "many attacks attributed to the Taliban [were] actually undertaken by tribal groups and [were] really a result tribal of disputes."⁵⁶

The ability of peacekeepers to distinguish between actual terrorist tactics and mere criminality or community conflicts is imperative because the local population's perception that the peacekeepers are unjustly taking sides in normal community disputes can inhibit mission success.

Mali remains dependent on foreign aid, yet corruption threatens the country's access to such aid. As reported by the CIA and repeated by authors on the subject, "The administration's purchase of a presidential jet for \$40 million and inflated defense contracts damaged its credibility and led the IMF [International Monetary Fund] to temporarily suspend aid in 2014."⁵⁷ If the people are aware that their government's corruption has a direct impact on their access to aid money, confidence in the government will drop, leaving the population even more susceptible to the influences of Islamic extremists.

Social Factors

The boundaries between ethnic groups are highly permeable and context-related in Mali, and while outsiders view ethnicity as a driving factor, Malians do not necessarily emphasize ethnicity in the same way. One of the secrets of Malian pluralism is *simankuya* or *cousinage*, a pact establishing a friendly relationship between certain families, neighboring groups, and ethnic groups.⁵⁸ Western preoccupation with ethnic differences will likely be more harmful than helpful in tackling problems in Mali, nevertheless, the interethnic cohesion and tolerance may be one reason for the apparent lack of resistance to the Salafist occupation. For centuries, Timbuktu has been a center for scholarship and religious tolerance. According to Abderrahmane Sissako, the Mauritanian filmmaker and director of *Timbuktu*, "it's because of this very openness that [northern Mali was] taken hostage by these extremists."⁵⁹

Many popular narratives paint the Malian people as a tolerant, peace-loving population that, without the means to defend themselves, was overrun by extremists.⁶⁰ Like many aspects of the war narrative, this picture is an oversimplification. According to Dianna Bell, a Mellon assistant professor in the Department of Religious Studies at Vanderbilt University, "Wahhabi and mainstream Sunni currents of Islam . . . [prevail] in many towns and villages throughout Mali in the present-day."⁶¹ Celeste Hicks, from the *Guardian* reports, "some Sufi leaders acknowledge that a more conservative form of Islam had already existed in Mali through the growing influence of Wahabi [*sic*] groups, which preach adherence to a fundamental reading of the Qu'ran. . . . Much of the horror expressed towards the Islamists concerned their use of violence rather than a rejection of their ideas."⁶²

The social fabric of religious beliefs in Mali is a patchwork of "Sufis practicing a mystical, reflective form of worship" living in harmony with "Wahabi [*sic*] groups, which preach adherence to a fundamental reading of the Qu'ran."⁶³

Islamic extremist groups have taken advantage of this dynamic to gain leverage in the region. The extremists' teachings are appealing to some, such as the Wahabis, and the harsh and violent tactics, which are unprecedented in the region, leave the Sufi mystics unprepared to fight back.

The spread of Islam to West Africa and its various forms of practice in the region is an extremely complex subject. It is impractical to expect peacekeeping troops, especially at the lower levels, to fully comprehend all the nuances of religious beliefs in their area of operation. Understanding enough to grasp why the extremists are able to operate and from whom they draw their support will help peacekeepers develop better programs to combat violent Islamic extremism. It is likewise important for peacekeepers to identify and support the local voices for peace and stability; for example, they may choose to give radio time or personnel security for people such as Shiekh Thierno Hady Oumar Thiam, the head of the Sufi Tidjania sect in Mali, who advocates that "our Islam needs to continue to be an Islam of tolerance or we will all be pushed towards violence."⁶⁴

Infrastructure Factors

The northern part of Mali is characterized by vast deserts, few paved roads, and porous borders with neighboring countries. The lack of infrastructure in the north creates a terrain that is easily controlled by nongovernmental forces. Similarly, in Afghanistan, insurgent and belligerent forces took advantage of the country's high mountains and steep valleys to maintain the upper hand in combat. Afghanistan's Highway 1, or Ring Road, was constantly subjected to roadside bombs to discourage movement of government and allied forces. According to the UN, improvised explosive devices have emerged as a weapon of choice in Mali. Their use impedes the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians as well as access to livelihoods, freedom of movement, and economic recovery for the population.⁶⁵

Mali's infrastructure is not evenly distributed throughout the country. In the last several years, resources have been focused on developing roads and railway lines to connect southern Mali to the Atlantic coast.⁶⁶ Many northern Malian cities receive few financial transfers from the capital for infrastructure investments, severely limiting the local government's ability to maintain existing infrastructure and deliver basic public services.⁶⁷ In an effort to stabilize the north, more resources have been dedicated to developing local government capacity and infrastructure. Moreover, such initiatives still pale in comparison to the infrastructure initiatives that are improving the economy in the southern part of the country. With few roads or airports and sparse electricity and running water, economic development in the north will struggle to keep up with the south. The disparity between the two halves of the country may have been

less noticeable before the widespread use of mobile technology. Cell phone and Internet accessibility help spread information a lot faster than before, leaving the lesser developed north aware that the government favors their southern neighbors.

Information

While Mali has many difficulties associated with developing nations, it has made significant improvements to its communication networks over the past decade. Mali ranks 50th in terms of cell phone ownership worldwide, leapfrogging many countries by skipping the process of laying down widespread landlines. There are several national and international television stations as well as publicly and privately funded community radio stations.⁶⁸ While the increase of telecommunications is a positive step for development and democracy overall, the facility with which information spreads now casts a spotlight on state actions that were previously hidden in the shadows, including highlights of unequal distribution of aid money and development projects. People who had been accustomed to living without, now have knowledge that their neighbors to the south are receiving more government services and project money, which can lead to an increased sense of disenfranchisement and potential alliances with malign actors.

Analyzing Sources of Instability

Only after becoming situationally aware—including all PMESII factors—can peacekeepers expect to effectively analyze situations for underlying sources of instability. Some may argue that the cause of instability in northern Mali is the presence of Islamic extremists, but as U.S. and allied forces learned in Afghanistan, simply killing extremists will not win the war. Peacekeepers need to understand why the extremists are able to operate in a given area and establish programs to undermine their support. Peacekeepers must seek to identify which factors diminish support for the government, increase support for malign actors, and disrupt the normal functioning of society.⁶⁹ Unfortunately, it took more than a decade of war in Afghanistan for U.S. and allied forces to learn that military action, or government programming, conducted prior to a full analysis of the environment and sources of instability will be ineffective and may have counterproductive ramifications.⁷⁰

Sources of instability must be considered at the local level, though there may be some commonality across different regions, and at this stage, pollsters can give us some insight into the general feeling about the issues among Malians in different parts of the country. While some surveys indicate expected results based on current conditions, some investigations demonstrate the complexity of understanding Mali's situation from afar. According to Gallup surveyors, public confidence in Mali's government took a drastic decline in 2012.

The timing of the Gallup polls makes it difficult to tell whether the 2012 insurrection and coup were caused by the general low opinions of the government or opinions dropped because of the political instability following the coup.⁷¹ More recent public opinion polls from Mopti, a city straddling the tumultuous north and the relative political calm of southern Mali, indicate that people are more concerned with access to government services than they are with political instability and violence.⁷² During the height of hostilities, people identified their most pressing concerns as food security and access to government services. The Gallup surveyors noted that contrary to their expectations, “the villagers were overwhelmingly focused on what they perceived as a much more important crisis: the lack of state public services and infrastructure. The coup and insurgency merely exacerbated state abandonment that had been ongoing.”⁷³ In another study surveying 900 displaced people in Mali, “the most popular idea to resolve the crisis pointed not to a security response but to government reform.”⁷⁴ These kinds of surveys are critical to isolating and addressing sources of instability. If security is not the primary concern for local residents, but rather access to government services, then peacekeeping resources should be focused on reconnecting the people with their government instead of tracking down and killing extremists.

Survey data should be applied to understanding the area surveyed and generalizations should not be drawn without enough data. Mopti’s location between the relatively stable south and the violent north makes the people of Mopti acutely aware of what services are being provided to their neighbors to the south: expectations of government services in Mopti are not being met. If survey data were available for areas, such as Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, it would not be surprising to see a vastly different set of community concerns and priorities. It is possible, even likely, that in an area that had decentralized rule since independence, an increase in government involvement might lead to negative perceptions of the government, especially if accompanied by increased requests for bribes. Therefore, regionally specific analyses of the current sources of instability need to be conducted by each peacekeeping unit on a continual basis.

Millions of dollars from the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) were spent in Afghanistan and Iraq trying to patch holes in government services, some of which were based on local priorities and others on an imposition of Western priorities. The strategy of “winning hearts and minds” was openly used to justify such expenditures. Little thought, however, was given to the importance of helping the Afghan government win hearts and minds. It took U.S. and NATO forces years to realize that while winning public support could help keep soldiers safe, it would do little for long-term stability in the region. The people know that foreign forces are there on borrowed time, and

their presence will not last. The programs failed to address public perceptions of the Afghan government. Stability—and ending insurgency or other state opposition—requires that people put their faith in their government or at least in legitimate governing institutions. Having foreign countries fill these roles in the place of the national government does nothing to increase the public's confidence in their government.

Foreign governments taking the lead on security issues can also be detrimental to public confidence in the local government. French troops are leading the fight in Mali right now to keep the extremists in check, and in terms of long-term stability, both the local population and the rebel forces know that the Malian government does not have the capability or capacity to maintain peace in its northern territories. Just as the Taliban took advantage of the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan and ISIS has been taking advantage of the lack of Coalition troops in Iraq, we can expect that al-Qaeda and its offshoots will increase their activities as soon as France reduces its presence in northern Mali unless there is an increased effort to strengthen Malian capabilities. Thus, we need to prepare for that scenario.

Understanding the sources of instability in a given region cannot be done from behind a desk. It is necessary to engage the local population, discover what their priorities are, and identify the factors undermining public support of the government or contributing to public support for the Islamic extremists. The need for soldiers to understand and address local sources of instability is exacerbated by the fact that insecurity in many regions makes scholarly studies and sociological surveys impractical and unreliable. Social scientists do not have the freedom of movement necessary to conduct surveys in the most dangerous zones. When they do publish data from such zones, special attention must be paid to the collection and analytical methods used because the reliability of such data is suspect.⁷⁵ Only after peacekeepers and other programmers understand the sources of instability can they begin to develop programming that might stand a chance of having a lasting impact on regional stability.

Understanding and Leveraging Foreign Powers

In 2011, Osama bin Laden was found hiding in Pakistan within walking distance from a major Pakistani military installation. The Pakistani government had mud on its face, so to speak, when it tried to deny that it had been intentionally harboring the world's most wanted man.⁷⁶ According to *New York Times* reporter Carlotta Gall, "the Pakistani government, under President Pervez Musharraf and his intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, was maintaining and protecting the Taliban . . . to use them as a proxy force to gain leverage over and eventually dominate Afghanistan."⁷⁷ The Afghans living near the Pakistani border understood Pakistan's role. Many Afghans refused to play

cricket because they saw it as a Pakistani game and did not want to support anything that came from a country that was constantly fostering violence in their homeland.⁷⁸ Similarly, while Iran had been opposed to the Talibization of Afghanistan, it feared a strong U.S. presence there and is suspected of supporting radical armed groups in an effort to defeat the Coalition.⁷⁹ In addition to intentional state actions to destabilize Afghanistan, the foreign flow of narcotics seriously helped fund the various insurgent and jihadist groups. The amount of foreign financial and political support for insurgents in Afghanistan is perhaps the greatest reason the conflict continues to this day.⁸⁰ Peacekeepers cannot hope to adequately address the problems in Mali without looking outside its borders to identify where the Islamic extremists are getting their training and financial support as well as their weapons.

The Islamic extremists in Mali have been getting a lot of support from nearby Libya in terms of weapons, training, and probably funding. And if tensions between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda lessen, there may be even more support pouring in from this tumultuous state. The fall of Muammar Qaddafi's regime in Libya made it easier for Ansar al-Sharia members to funnel weapons, including heavy arms, into Mali.⁸¹ According to the UN, the 2012 Tuareg rebellion "was emboldened by the presence of well-equipped combatants returning from Libya in the wake of the fall of the regime there."⁸²

Thomas Joscelyn, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, asserts that ISIL's branch in Libya is opposed to al-Qaeda and its front groups.⁸³ Yet, as ISIL gains momentum in Libya, rival al-Qaeda fighters in Mali are still accessing heavy weapons trafficked from Libya, indicating strong ties to actors in the country.⁸⁴ Most of the various extremist groups that are active in Mali are connected with, or have pledged allegiance to, al-Qaeda's Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri not the Islamic State. Al-Zawahiri's praise for ISIL's attacks on Paris, however, indicates a potential lessening of tensions between the groups, which may mean increased support for al-Qaeda offshoots in Mali. The fact that ISIL claimed responsibility for the 12 October 2016 attack in northern Burkina Faso, near the border of Mali, further illustrates the lessening of tensions in the region between the competing Islamist groups.⁸⁵

While it is easy to point fingers at foreign involvement from less stable regional actors, even France's role in the Mali conflict is a double-edged sword. The French military is taking the lead in partnering with Malian forces to maintain control of northern cities and track down and neutralize enemy targets, but certain French actions may be undermining overall stability.⁸⁶ Many African soldiers in France's foreign colonies believe France is intentionally teaching them inferior tactics.⁸⁷ Collaboration is difficult when the African counterparts believe, correctly or not, that the French soldiers do not respect them. Furthermore, the French effort has been largely enemy-centric.⁸⁸ Claude Moni-

quet, a former French intelligence officer, explained that “the French army has expelled insurgents from the cities and so what? Would they retreat? They will come back, exactly as they did in Afghanistan when the Soviets withdrew in 1989, and exactly what they will do in Afghanistan when the last American soldier will retreat.”⁸⁹ While the French have seen some success on the battlefield, they have been reticent to invest in larger stability efforts that hold the promise of longer-term results. And in the meantime, the French intervention is provoking Islamic extremists to increase their attacks on French and other European targets.⁹⁰

While the French have failed to make the best of their time in Mali, extremist groups, such as AQIM, have been able to leverage foreign powers to fund their enterprises. European willingness to pay ransoms for hostages is a major funding source for AQIM.⁹¹ The *New York Times* reports that “in its early years, Al Qaeda received most of its money from deep-pocketed donors, but counterterrorism officials now believe the group finances the bulk of its recruitment, training and arms purchases from ransoms paid to free Europeans.”⁹² In fact, between 2008 and 2014, European countries paid more than \$125 million to al-Qaeda, \$91.5 million of which went to AQIM. The bulk of the ransom money came from France.⁹³ Since the release of the last French hostage in December 2014, and discounting the Bamako hotel siege, which was short-lived and did not present an opportunity for ransom, there have been no more French hostages taken in Mali.⁹⁴ Cutting off the largest sources of funding for these extremist groups is essential to the efforts to contain them. On 14 October 2016, an American aid worker was kidnapped in Niger and taken into Mali. Because al-Qaeda affiliates in the region are usually quick to claim responsibility for attacks, the fact that no one has yet claimed responsibility indicates the kidnapping was likely committed by bandits or narco-traffickers, who will later seek to sell the hostage to MUJAO, the group with the largest presence in the area. It is official U.S. government policy not to negotiate with terrorists or pay ransoms. Yet perhaps recent events have caused bad actors in the area to believe they will benefit somehow by taking an American hostage, either through ransom or a prisoner exchange.⁹⁵

It is essential that any well-conceived plan to address stability in Mali factors in foreign interests, both official and unofficial. Many governments have interests in the situation in Mali for financial reasons, for their own nation’s security, for a play for regional influence, or for other less obvious reasons. There are also international terrorist and criminal groups—some vying for a new world order and others simply wanting to keep the situation unstable so they can continue their criminal enterprises unperturbed. Any well-conceived strategy must account for all of these factors and take measures to encourage and support the foreign interests that will positively impact stability and limit

those that have a negative influence. Increased border security might discourage the flow of arms into Mali, or human trafficking and drugs through Mali, all of which fund Islamic extremist groups there.⁹⁶ Conducted in the wrong way, however, increased border security may exacerbate tensions between local populations and the government.

Sharing Information

During the past several years, France has been collaborating with Tuareg forces in northern Mali to fight the Islamic extremists there. The ability and willingness to leverage the Tuareg's factional competition demonstrates a profound understanding of local dynamics.⁹⁷ France has been taking the lead on the fight in northern Mali despite the UN resolution, which clearly states that the mission should be African-led.⁹⁸ Some question France's motives for intervening in such a direct way, while others applaud the initiative to keep Islamic extremism in check.⁹⁹ Regardless of motive, if France does not efficiently partner, train, and share intelligence with its African counterparts, whatever gains French forces achieve in the region will be short-lived.

It is important that all efforts to neutralize Islamic extremists can be handed over to Malian forces in the near future. The concern is that the Malian security forces and justice system will not be able to effectively take over control of the situation if there is not a concerted effort to partner and communicate with them from the very beginning. As a part of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. and NATO forces took the lead on enemy targeting for reasons of efficiency and capability. They often encountered problems sharing information with their local counterparts. Sometimes communications were classified more highly than necessary out of an abundance of caution. People would even send classified communications summarizing meetings with local government counterparts, which lead to a counterproductive result where Afghan officials were banned from reading the NATO reports of the statements the officials had made themselves. Other times, there were legitimate security reasons to classify certain targeting information, but the failure to share the information regarding perpetrators who were handed over to the Afghan justice system with the government led to a failure to prosecute, and the terrorist suspects were released. To achieve sustainable security and stability, local governments need to be able to prosecute their own criminals; it is counterproductive for foreign forces do the bulk of the targeting if they are unable or unwilling to share their evidence with the local courts and prosecutors. In Afghanistan, this problem with communication not only hurt the security situation by putting terrorists back on the battlefield, but it also injured government reputations in the public eye. Without being privy to the details of the case, the population would know that a suspect had been arrested and that the courts had released the suspect

without trial.¹⁰⁰ This catch-and-release system was more detrimental to public perceptions of the government than it would have been had the criminal never been arrested in the first place.

In addition to partnering with and training Malian forces, a larger effort needs to be placed on sharing information and stability operations tactics with the other African and UN troops operating in Mali. Currently the predeployment training for African countries contributing to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, known as MINUSMA, does not have a standardized or in-depth module on understanding the conflict in Mali or the local sources of instability.¹⁰¹ In fact, despite the fact that MINUSMA is purportedly a stabilization mission, where the *S* stands for stability, the UN does not have any clear doctrine on stability operations.¹⁰² Instead, the MINUSMA predeployment training focuses on military maneuvering, driving, shooting, and practicing task organization. All are important military functions, but sending UN peacekeepers to Mali without giving them the tools to impact stability in their area of operation is a waste of resources that not only limits their ability to affect stability in the area, but also puts their own soldiers at greater risk than necessary. The more the soldiers are able to improve the stability in a region, not only by neutralizing the enemy's ability to wage war but also by strengthening government accountability to its people and undermining factors that cause the people to support Islamic extremists in their midst, the safer it will be for soldiers operating in the area.

Conclusion

Applying the lessons learned from Afghanistan does not mean we need to take programs and trainings that the United States used in Afghanistan and apply them directly to the problems in Mali. Quite the opposite. If nothing else, American policy makers learned in Afghanistan that cookie-cutter solutions rarely work. When officials decided to emulate the successful local Iraqi policing program, Sons of Iraq, by creating a similar Afghan program called Village Stability Operations, hopes were high that they had found a way to allow the locals to police their own problems.¹⁰³ For a variety of reasons, however, results were meager at best. The lack of success may have been due to a range of differences between Afghanistan and Iraq. But the United States' inability to account for these differences doomed the program to failure. What works in one location cannot be imported wholesale to another.

More emphasis needs to be placed on training soldiers to identify and target sources of instability, meaning peacekeepers need to be trained not only with basic military skills but also on how to conduct in-depth situational awareness and analysis. Forces should move toward a more nuanced approach to threat matrices and local dynamics and away from black-and-white classifications of the enemy that lumps all belligerent groups together. Moreover, intelligence

units need to be trained to expand their focus from enemy-centric to population-centric measures so they can understand and address local priorities. Since belligerent groups use complex means to fund their operations, military and civilian stakeholders in Mali will also need training on how to identify and neutralize funding sources for those groups.

All of these lessons were learned slowly and painfully during more than a decade of war in Afghanistan. Many people with experience in Afghanistan never even saw the lessons implemented. Now, the challenge is to apply the lessons learned to the problems facing Mali without starting again from ground zero. If peacekeepers can do that, perhaps they will be able to prevent another extended engagement, promote sustainable conditions for stability, and snuff out the fuel that has been feeding Islamic extremism in the Sahel.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Outsourcing War: The Just War Tradition in the Age of Military Privatization. By Amy E. Eckert. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016. Pp. 200. \$39.95 (hardcover).

Since the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, private contracting in support of combat operations has been a subject of great interest to academics and professional soldiers alike. It continues to be a hotly debated and relevant topic for the consideration of readers. Much of the recent literature has concentrated on the employment of these so-called private armies in the theater of war, but most have failed to examine the character of their employment relative to the Western just war tradition. Amy Eckert challenges many prominent thoughts on the subject of the just war tradition through a concise treatment of military privatization as we have come to know it in the twenty-first century.

Unlike the preponderance of works on military privatization that predate our recent conflicts, Eckert fairly argues that the character of war today and the just war tradition continue to allow us to address the challenges posed by private military companies (PMCs). Eckert states, “The just war tradition in its present form incorporates a certain set of assumptions about the state. The state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence has become central to our understanding of the state and, by extension, to our moral reasoning about war” (p. 4). Academics and students of war will be familiar with many of the sources and theories Eckert uses to frame her argument, such as those of Michael Walzer and Peter Singer.

While her argument is made clearly, the introduction suffered from poor organization as Eckert unpacks the components of the discussion, then explains the structure of her work, which could potentially confuse a less familiar reader. In the section titled “Origins of the Current Market for the Force,” Eckert speaks to two important facets, explaining why nations elect to use PMCs—necessity and choice (pp. 9–10). Moreover, professional soldiers will seek a discussion of understanding PMCs either to satisfy strategic ends through the necessity of using these private companies or using them as a tactical means, in essence, a method of choice, but will not find this discussion. In fact, the

experience of many veterans of our recent wars demonstrates that PMCs have been used as a strategic choice, as well as a tactical necessity. Force caps have been used in our recent wars, placing restrictions on the military, thus, dictating how many servicemembers can be in the theater of war. As commanders wanted to maintain combat power and their staffs, PMCs were predominately used in the fields of logistics and fixed-site security in the rear areas. Proof of this is reflected in the many current arguments about future force structure, as modern military thought is generally devoid of executing operational logistics or rear area security. Regardless of whether PMCs were used for strategic choice or tactical necessity, their use has been prominent before and during conflicts.

As *Outsourcing War* is centered around the state's use of violence, legitimate use of PMCs is largely examined through the lens of *Jus ad bellum* (right to war) and *Jus in Bellum* (law in war). Missing until much later in the work is the concept of *Jus post bellum* (justice after war), which is not mentioned until pages 93–94, and not nearly in the same fashion. This is not really the author's fault, as she follows the same logic as military operations have over the last 15 years. Planners gave thought to these topics before and during conflict, with no real consideration of war termination and the responsibilities it brings. The real strength of Eckert's work is the historical context she provides in her second chapter, showing how states have used privateers to do violence on their behalf throughout the ages. Without saying it, Eckert confirms what the professional soldier knows about the nature of war as immutable, while the character of war continuously changes with the times.

From chapter 3, readers will find an interesting section on “legitimate authority and individual right” (pp. 72–73). Eckert provides a well-developed explanation of how the state and the individual interact when it comes to the use of force by a soldier to kill for the state. Continuing from chapter 2, Eckert expands her thought by explaining where the majority of PMCs are located today; most are generally providing personnel not for the “tip of the spear,” but in rear area support operations. Moreover, in keeping with the fluid nature and complexity of the battlefield, Eckert correctly highlights the obvious exceptions to the rules and provides an instructive chart titled “Privatization and jus ad bellum norms” (p. 96).

In chapter 4, Eckert provides a useful look at jus in bello and the law of armed conflict. Of particular use to academics and professional soldiers is the discussion of proportionality. Eckert states, “Proportionality further limits the legitimate use of force during war. As a jus ad bellum principle, proportionality requires that the benefits of war taken as a whole be in proportion to its cost” (p. 120). Said differently, how can the combatant restore the just peace through the use of just war? The clear question of debate in this chapter is how do states and nonstates classify PMCs? Should they be considered “combatants?”

The fifth and final chapter of Eckert's work examines the "ethics of war" through the lens of private forces and the public/private divide. Most unfortunately, Eckert demonstrates a lack of knowledge when she cites Martin van Creveld's 1991 controversial book that reinterprets Clausewitz's classic trinity. Shockingly, in a work about the Western tradition of just war, Clausewitz is mentioned only once on page 83 in a rather trite way. The lack of a strong theoretic base, such as one Clausewitz would certainly provide in *On War*, severely limits the utility of *Outsourcing War* for serious consideration in military education or training.

In sum, Eckert's work serves as a valuable contribution to continuing the dialog between academics and professional soldiers on the subject of the just war tradition, but it is too short to be considered an exhaustive treatment and lacks a strong underpinning of the character and nature of war as known to professional soldiers as demonstrated by Clausewitz. While a well-annotated work that considers states, international law, and PMCs, the fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of war and how it relates to the use of PMCs keeps this work from being of true utility in the classroom for either aspiring academics or military leaders.

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Syria's Democratic Years: Citizens, Experts, and Media in the 1950s. By Kevin W. Martin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015. Pp. 234. \$85.00 (hardcover); \$35.00 (paperback); \$34.99 (e-book).

For three solid decades, most authors writing about Syria have focused on "high politics," either during Ottoman times, French colonial rule, or the power struggle under the Baath regime since 1963. With the orphaned exception of Elizabeth Thompson's seminal work, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (2000), all of these works have dissected Syrian society horizontally and vertically along class and sectarian lines. Generally, authors have neglected the country's cultural history and the influence of mass media on postwar Syria. This applies both to works published in Arabic and English on Syria. Professor Kevin Martin stands out as a notable exception to the norm with his new book, *Syria's Democratic Years*. It starts with the collapse of Adib al-Shishakli's military regime in 1954 and ends with the hastily created union with Egypt in 1958. Those were the golden years

of Syrian democracy; a time when the presently war-torn country was ruled by a sophisticated class of urban notables, drenched in a fascinating mix of conservatism and modernity. Unlike veteran Syriatologists, who have delved into the coups and countercoups of the 1950s, Kevin Martin steers clear from the upper echelons of Damascus power, concentrating instead on three exceptional Syrian entrepreneurs—products of their times, no doubt—who tried revolutionizing their country using print and broadcast media in the promotion of Syrian nationalism, good citizenship, and social modernity. Martin fleshes out postcolonial Syrian society, making his book an overnight classic for the Middle East library and an absolute must for scholars of post-Ottoman Syria.

The crux of *Syria's Democratic Years* is the focus on Syrian media in the 1950s, which means that for more than a decade he rummaged through piles of Syrian periodicals published prior to their suspension in 1963 by the Baath regime. Finding them was not an easy task since Damascus has only a small number of research centers and most of the documents related to the pre-Baath era have been damaged, lost, or forgotten. Major research also was conducted by using memoirs and unpublished papers, both in Arabic and English, and in U.S. government archives and Syrian legal papers. He meticulously went through the daily broadcasts of the state-run Damascus Radio, a herculean task in its own right. The research could have been enriched, however, with first-hand interviews with Syrian figures who had been active in the 1950s and whose testimony certainly would have enriched the book had they been tracked down in old age and interviewed thoroughly. In the bibliography, for example, only three interviews are cited, one with a celebrated playwright and two with interviewees simply referred to as “Anonymous.”

The heroes of Martin's book are neither the generals who staged coups nor the fez-wearing notables of the Damascus aristocracy but rather, three middle-class modernizers who recognized the flaws of Syrian society and tried to fix them, awaiting help neither from state nor from political parties or foreign powers. True to his focus on cultural history, Kevin Martin mentions Syria's two presidents of 1954–58 only one time each, both in passing reference. The major players in this narrative used the mass media of the day—radio broadcasts and print journalism—to promote law, modern science, medicine, and a professional civil service. One of them was Najat Qassab Hasan, a ranking polymath who excelled as a writer, humorist, attorney, and radio host. After establishing himself as a celebrated lawyer, earning fame for his eloquence and wit, Qassab Hasan became a patron of the arts, greatly influencing the Syrian theatrical scene in the 1960s and 1970s. He also wrote on judicial reform in the Damascus press and launched his own radio program in 1952, “The Citizen and the Law,” which is studied at length by Kevin Martin and forms a corner-

stone of his book. Qassab Hasan gave legal advice, free-of-charge, reminding citizens of their rights and duties before the law, and answered questions live on air. A nation that lacks proper awareness of its laws will never rise, he argued, and never achieve proper social and political evolution. Qassab Hasan's show aired nonstop from the early 1950s until 1977.

Qassab Hasan's program was modeled after that of another pioneer Syrian, Sabri Qabbani, a practicing medical doctor who created a similar interactive program in 1947 on Damascus Radio, "Your Doctor Behind the Mic." Qabbani became the "virtual family doctor" of Syrian families, giving them medical advice, answering questions they would send through the mail, and lecturing on public health. He warned against curing disease through unprescribed drugs and unlicensed professionals, a practice that was common in Syria and remains so in 2016. He also spoke out against religious figures who claimed to have healing powers and answered unorthodox questions about sexually transmitted diseases. His approach went hand-in-hand with Najat Qassab Hasan's, empowering Syrians with legal and medical knowledge to build their inner esteem first, and then their societies.

The third example that Martin uses is that of Adnan al-Malki, the 37-year-old Syrian officer who was gunned down in a highly controversial assassination at a Damascus football stadium in April 1955. At the time, Malki, a little known deputy chief-of-staff of the Armed Forces, was lionized in Syria's print media, namely through the official outlets of the Syrian Army and Syrian Police. A cult following was created through these two magazines, depicting Malki as the "perfect soldier" and "perfect martyr," thus portraying him as a role model for aspiring young Syrians wanting to join their newly created army. This event occurred just a few years after the Syrian Army was created in the aftermath of France's evacuation and shortly after its defeat in the Palestine War of 1948. The army needed a hero and so did Syrian society. Hailing from urban notability, Malki was young, charismatic, and he had died for a cause, depicted at the time as his firm commitment to Arab nationalism.

For a Syria outsider, the three protagonists of Martin's historical study might seem antiheroes who achieved mythical stature despite the fact that their achievements lacked conventional heroism or battle merit. Ultimately, the radio shows of Qabbani and Qassab Hasan did not create a healthier society or one that firmly abides by the law and respects it. Adnan al-Malki received his war medals for no particular military feat. The three of them tried, however, with various degrees of success, to raise awareness in Syrian society. Whether they succeeded or not is not the point of *Syria's Democratic Years*. The author looks at the three case studies through the broad prism of democracy, nationalism, media influence, and good citizenship. Due to the current war in Syria, which

has eclipsed the 1950s completely and dwarfed it into a forgotten and bygone era, such success stories are not only inspirational but much needed for Syrian society. Due to the hardships of war, this ancient society currently lacks leadership and innovation, and it might find role models to follow in the stories of Najat Qassab Hasan, Sabri Qabbani, and Adnan al-Malki. Moreover, it reminds policy makers, inside and outside of Syria, that individuals can influence social and political constructs that lead to peaceful or war-racked nations.

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Industrial Policy and Economic Transformation in Africa. By Akbar Noman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Pp. 312. \$60.000 (hardcover); \$59.99 (e-book).

During the past decade, Africa has undergone a remarkable economic transformation. Once branded by the *Economist* as, “The Hopeless Continent,” Africa has begun to soar. The gross domestic product (GDP) of the 11 largest economies in sub-Saharan Africa grew by 51 percent in the last 10 years, a figure that is twice the global average and nearly four times the rate of the U.S. economy during the same time. This is undeniably a good news story, but much of that growth has been built on the price of raw materials. In particular, the fate of many of Africa’s fastest growing economies—such as Angola, Nigeria, and Algeria—have been tied closely to the price of oil. Some of Africa’s other boom countries have relied heavily on commodities such as natural gas, timber, or minerals. The continent has been largely unable to develop a manufacturing sector that could better insulate it from the fluctuations of commodity prices. In fact, the percentage of GDP coming from the manufacturing sector has declined since the 1980s (p. 102).

So how can continental leaders change this and lay the groundwork for sustainable development? That is the question the new book *Industrial Policy and Economic Transformation in Africa* tries to answer. The Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and Akbar Noman, a senior fellow at Columbia University’s Initiative for Policy Dialogue, edited this ambitious collection of essays and case studies. The book includes nine chapters written by subject-matter experts from across the globe. Each chapter addresses a different aspect of industrial policy, a term that applies to anything the state does to alter the way resources are allocated in an economy that differs from how they would be allocated if

the economy was left untouched. Despite the name, it does not apply strictly to industry and includes policy affecting finance, information technology, and agriculture.

The book begins by rejecting many of the stereotypical, but popularly accepted, reasons for Africa's lagging industrial sector. Economist Ha-Joon Chang of the University of Cambridge writes that a variety of factors—such as a tropical climate, geography, culture, and a tragic history, which are often blamed for the continent's economic failings—are neither decisive nor insurmountable to finding sustainable growth options. In a rebuke to the culture argument, Chang points out that the stereotypical view of Germans in the nineteenth century held by other Europeans was that of plodding and unintelligent workers. Today, it is the exact opposite. Similar critiques were hurled at Korean and Japanese workers prior to those countries becoming industrial juggernauts. Chang notes, “Those transformations happened mainly because of economic development, which created societies in which people have to behave in more disciplined, calculating and cooperative ways. . . . These historical examples show that culture is more of an outcome, rather than a cause, of economic development” (p. 38).

The country that gets particular attention in the book, with two chapters dedicated to it, is Ethiopia. Landlocked and lacking mineral wealth, the nation has succeeded in building a diverse economy by, in part, offering assistance to various industries. Assistance has ranged from offering incentives for investors, strengthening the supply chain, improving infrastructure, making land near the airport available for exporters, and offering discounted rates for air freight. Ethiopia is now the fastest growing economy in the world, according to the World Bank, with an airline that is the envy of Africa; a thriving tourist sector; heavy investment in clean energy; and growing industries tied to coffee, leather products, and agriculture.

In his chapter, Go Shimada, an international relations professor, analyzes one interesting aspect of Ethiopia's growth. In 2009, late-Prime Minister Meles Zenawi championed borrowing a Japanese system for improving manufacturing productivity and quality called *kaizen*, which strives to continuously improve manufacturing processes from the bottom-up. In a pilot project, 28 firms, including agroprocessing, chemical, metal, leather, and textile industries, instituted the practices. Over the course of six months, the companies saw an average gain of \$30,000 in profits, and the highest performers were selected for further assistance. Ethiopia's leaders also established a “Kaizen Unit” within its Ministry of Industry with governmental officials trained as experts in the system. Shimada declares that the “results of the Ethiopian case imply that learning on various levels will strengthen Africa's private sector for industrial development,

allowing it to become competitive.” He argues then that this “approach will enable African countries to sustain their economic growth, diversifying their economies and generating jobs” (p. 119).

Ethiopian policy also has stimulated growth in its leather and cut flower industries. The results of providing assistance in these industries are encouraging. Exports of flowers rose from \$150,000 in 2007 to \$210 million in 2011. Exports of leather goods rose from \$67 million in 2004–5 to \$110 million in 2010–11 (p. 19). Ethiopia’s heavy government involvement in these industries is evidence that industrial policy in Africa will not look like it does in Europe or North America. The book’s editors believe this is appropriate. Stiglitz has been an outspoken critic of the “Washington Consensus,” a series of reforms imposed on the developing world in the 1990s that called for open markets, privatization, and deregulation and encouraged low inflation and small deficits. Stiglitz believes this economic policy helped create a “lost quarter century” of stagnation in Africa (p. 3). The book thus offers positive examples from across the developing world addressing how industrial policy has been used effectively by governments to spur growth.

Several chapter authors address the larger questions that remain, especially what role the state should play in fostering growth in Africa. The two countries most often lauded for their growing and diversified economies are Ethiopia and Rwanda. This praise is deserved, but critics point out that both countries are single-party states where individual freedoms are severely curtailed. For example, Ethiopia’s ruling party held an election in 2015 where it won every seat in the parliament. Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame recently won a vote to amend the constitution, allowing him to stay in power until 2034. So, is autocracy a part of the African growth model? Should African citizens make the Faustian bargain of giving up their rights in exchange for 5–10 percent GDP growth? To this, economists Danny Leipziger and Shahid Yusuf of George Washington University offer an answer. They argue that the latest research indicates that growth within a democratic system is built on a more solid foundation and is better able to withstand changes than growth in an autocratic system. “In a globalized world, countries are more exposed to external shocks and will require collective action and sacrifices if a liberal multilateral trade regime is to be sustained and climate change curbed” they write. “Under such conditions, democracies are better placed to win the support of the majority and to more equitably distribute rewards or burdens” (p. 244). The challenge going forward will be for citizens of African countries to demand greater freedoms while preserving and expanding on their recent economic gains. This new collection of writing from a group of stellar economists offers a palette of ideas and begins to paint a picture of what Africa’s industrial policy could and should look like.

Those of us who count ourselves as “Afro-optimists” can only hope the continent’s leaders in government and in the boardrooms will take note of these recommendations and use them to build on the early gains of the twenty-first century.

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Geopolitics and the Quest for Dominance. By Jeremy Black. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016. Pp. 352. \$85.00 (hardcover); \$32.00 (paperback); \$31.99 (e-book).

The word *geopolitics* has long had a close association with tough-minded realist and materialist global-level foreign policies. “Telling it like it is” is the way this type of foreign policy is often put in the current vernacular. Historian Jeremy Black ties geopolitics closely to realism, in a complex sentence, as “the policy and the study of using geography and any factors attendant upon it, to understand, or influence, or, outright govern inter-state relations, and international relations more generally” (p. 18). He desires to save geopolitics from the critical geographers and Marxists whom he claims have captured the word for their left-wing critiques of realist versions of world politics. Yet, he also wishes to open a dialogue about the virtue of using the lens of geopolitics to do international history. He is far more successful with the latter in the early chapters of this new title than he does with the former in the later ones.

Geopolitics and the Quest for Dominance begins with a broad overview of usage of the term geopolitics, pointing out its ambiguities and limitations, while suggesting its utility as long as a precise fixed definition is eschewed. The term thus has the capacity to have a range of meanings projected onto it, from the determining effects of a state’s global positionality in relation to land and sea to subjective perceptions of overall spatial context. Eight chapters then historicize international history into geopolitical eras in which different “types” of geopolitics, understood as both a sort of thinking about geography stimulating policy and a set of conditions constraining that policy, from ancient times to the present. The book concludes with two chapters on more recent topics, with one on geopolitics since the 1990s and one titled “Geopolitics of the Future.” A brief set of conclusions warns specifically against the prophetic character of much geopolitical writing and the dangers of the Eurocentrism and single-factor determinisms to be found in some contemporary writing claiming the

mantle of geopolitics. In general agreement, by way of example, beware of those who claim Vladimir V. Putin's foreign policy is all about finding warm-water ports for the Russian Navy.

As a very broad overview of looking at world politics geopolitically, *Geopolitics and the Quest for Dominance* has a number of notable strengths. The first and most important lies in the author's historicizing of geopolitics as having different meanings and effects in different eras. Thus, the age of imperialism (1890–1932) differed profoundly in what constituted geopolitics than, for example, the Nazi (1933–45) and Cold War (1945–90) periods. The precise “mix” of ideological and material factors at play in producing geopolitical effects was different in each era. So it is, also, today in a world in which corporate globalization and shadowy terrorist and criminal networks operate beyond the confines of the contemporary state system *sensu stricto*. The early chapters on (1) spatiality and frontiers and (2) maps, referring broadly to the world before the nineteenth century, also are particularly convincing in suggesting that geopolitics was at work long before the word itself was first invented in 1899. Although, of course, the broader term *political geography*, with none of the connotation of the entirely global or worldwide aspect, has had a much longer history and can often be applied in a way similar to the way Black uses geopolitics. This reader wishes that the focus on mapping had been sustained across the book because the chapter on maps is incredibly well sourced. It also strongly suggests how important cartographic representations have been to the entire history of geopolitical framings. Finally, the book is written in the form of a lively and accessible chronological narrative without much distracting analytical apparatus. The comprehensive sourcing in the literature is particularly impressive. As the footnotes reveal, there is little that Black has not read, or at least encountered, that is of immediate relevance to his theme.

There are alas some problems. The “geo” in geopolitics is consistently regarded in an ad hoc manner as a pastiche of influences. It is rarely explicitly given its due—as it is implicitly in the maps chapter—as being centrally about how the world is constituted, mapped, and labeled in pursuit of political goals. In this alternative construction, geography never has direct effects, rather policies and the significance of different places for those policies are always mediated by the interpretations and actions of political leaders and publics. It is called human agency. There are frequent hints that the author understands this to be the case but he seemingly cannot bring himself to openly admit it. He wants to have his “objective” cake and his “subjective” one too. “Politicizing” geopolitics is also something only others do, particularly those enamored with “critical” viewpoints that are all seemingly Marxist or Marxisant. These terms, as used in this book, are pejorative ones rather than ones of analysis.

Yet, this book could have benefited from more critical attention to many other terms that also are used mostly unselfconsciously, such as *realism* or *dominance*. The loosely invoked term *realpolitik*, for example, has an interesting intellectual history in which the author might be expected to at least show some interest. See, for example, John Bew's *Realpolitik: A History* (2016). In addition, given the book's full title, where might the seemingly eternal "quest for dominance" come from? Is it not reasonable to at least *question* its eternity and universality? This is what critical analysis is about: attending self-consciously to one's assumptions and use of terminology. Yet, Black seems to think it is shameful that many of those recently engaged in writing about geopolitics in a critical vein have received the attention that they have. In fact, it could be said that the very historicizing of geopolitics that is a positive feature of this book reflects the influence of the writing of some of those who have abjured classical geopolitical determinism for a more critical approach.

Finally, in his discussion of geographical scale—the local and the global—in relation to the "Geopolitics of the Future" chapter, Black could have reflected critically on recent conflicts to give his argument more empirical validity. For example, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as David Kilcullen shows in *Blood Year: Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror* (2016), Western interventions have stirred up the veritable hornet's nest, "you can't fight without fighting" (p. 232). But even as you do so, nation building is on the rocks, and it is now all about keeping war over there rather than have it come over here. Yet, and at the same time, as Dominic Tierney tells us in *The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts* (2015) there are opportunities for politics and diplomacy in resolving geopolitically intricate conflicts, but only if we do not always insist on turning them into zero-sum global contests. Timing, then, is everything. Politics works well only before it descends into warfare. That Black finally does tilt in this direction by seeing the vital importance of the local within the global in contemporary conflicts, however, suggests that he does find some use in thinking geopolitically beyond the "seductive simplicities of broad-brush approaches" (p. 270). In this reader's opinion, he should have made this point a more central part of his overall argument.

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From Gulag to Guantanamo: Political, Social and Economic Evolutions of Mass Incarceration. By Wesley Kendall. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. Pp. 176. \$100.00 (hardcover); \$32.95 (paperback); \$31.99 (e-book).

In the nineteenth century, Argentina's immigration policy was based on the notion that to govern is to populate (*gobernar es poblar*). In thinking about Wesley Kendall's examination of prisons, the subtitle of his book could follow that train of thought under the pretext of "build it and we will fill it." This book explores how and why the majority of Americans has accepted uncritically the need for policies of mass incarceration and how corporate interests have cultivated the fear harnessing it to the engine of entrepreneurial exploitation to generate immense profits. Kendall also examines whether economic incentives solely drove the private prison industry or rather some other social and political factor contributed to the public policy calculus of privatization. Within the United States, it is no secret that crime has become an epidemic of disastrous proportion. Crime impacts us all, but it has the greatest impact among minority groups, especially African Americans. As Kendall points out, "the U.S. population constitutes 7 percent of the world total, yet holds 25 percent of the planet's incarcerated inmates" (p. 20). Political opportunists and pundits alike have capitalized on the fear of crime to advance political careers as well as legislation that have had a tremendous detrimental effect on society. At the height of federal and state budget shortfalls due to sequestration and reduced revenue collection, there has been a push for prison privatization. Prison privatization was thought to be the panacea to the prison population explosion. Rather than states taking care of its prisoners, the prisoners would be the responsibility of the gods of the market place, while the federal and state governments would save its taxpayers hard to come by dollars and cents.

There are five chapters in this book, and each chapter is guided by the following research question: can economic incentives supersede general public benefit in the shaping of incarceration policies? In chapter 1, "A Prime on the Evolution of the Penitentiary," Kendall takes a sociological perspective and evaluates prisons as a cultural phenomenon. He discusses the evolution of American prisons and considers how prisons are viewed by different segments of society. Kendall also discusses the criminalization of poverty by looking at two contending theories: the conservative theory and the liberal utilitarian theory. Applying the conservative theory, social welfare programs were created to encourage participation in society, resulting in the increased wanton dependency and the mentality of unearned entitlements thus perpetuating a culture of welfare reliance. In the words of the late Ronald W. Reagan, a culture populated by "welfare queens" perverted the system. According to the liberal utilitarian theory, on the other hand, social and environmental circumstances

play an outcome-determinative role in crime rates. For liberal utilitarian theory proponents, crime is not as an outcome of an individual being a welfare recipient but rather as a consequence of the individual's upbringing in the federally supported housing projects without a chance for social or economic mobility.

Chapter 2, "The Institution of American Slavery and the Evolution of Modern Mass Incarceration: A Critical Assessment of Forced Labor in America and China," is a case-study focusing on Arizona's Perryville women's prison and its use of prisoners as subcontractors for Wal-Mart and the Chinese Laogai Labor Camps, which allegedly use prison labor to manufacture goods for Wal-Mart stores worldwide. Kendall explores how freedom has become historically equated with economic power, commoditized, and then efficiently exploited through U.S. prisons. For the author, this explains how U.S. prisons evolved into one of mass incarceration. Kendall looks specifically at the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, which "removed the ban on interstate trade of prison-produced goods and legalized the privatization of prisons" (p. 53).

Kendall in chapter 3, "Reaping Refugees: Privatized Immigration Detention Centers," considers the economics of asylums in both the United States and Australia. His discussion of the "Pacific Solution" in Australia illustrates how the U.S.'s drive to prison privatization has spread to other countries. Refugees in both America and Australia have become commodities in the marketplace, and governments worldwide have outsourced the responsibility of housing and rehabilitating criminals to the private sector. While the private sector is supposedly responsible for the housing and rehabilitation of criminals under its tutelage, the outcome in many instances is less than desirable. As Kendall succinctly states, "private prisons that operate in the singular pursuit of profit invariably neglect the quality of services in order to maximize cost savings and revenue, jeopardizing the public interest in imposing a just and human punishment, as well as fail to impart some rehabilitation treatment to foster future deterrence" (p. 30). In the end, first-time criminals are placed in jails and prisons with long-time career criminals, where they are indoctrinated into gangs and cartels. Upon leaving prison, rather than being rehabilitated, those individuals learn new tricks of the trade, and most will likely be involved in criminal activities once back out on the street. Thus, imprisonment leads to a high rate of recidivism in the United States.

Chapter 4, "Condemned Kids: The Incarceration of Children for Profit," describes the sad and tragic reality of crime in the United States. The author looks at the new reality regarding the American criminal justice system, where "increasingly excessive and draconian laws" are used to sentence children to adult prisons to serve lengthier sentences (p. 5). The social construction of children as "super-predators" and, therefore, deserving lengthier sentences in either juvenile detentions or adult prisons has become the norm in the criminal

justice system. The statistics are staggering. As Kendall points out, “in the United States, five hundred thousand youth are annually incarcerated in juvenile detention centers; on any given day, roughly twenty-six thousand children are in penal confinement” and “two hundred thousand of these children in the United States are prosecuted as adults under the draconian laws, with half of those cases arising out of nonviolent offenses related to drug or property crimes” (p. 124). Minority groups comprise the majority of those prosecuted under these laws and sentenced to harsh prison penalties. The case of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania illustrates how two judges, Judges Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan, disproportionately sentenced minority children and used children “as pawns to enrich” themselves in the process (p. 131).


In chapter 5, “From Gulag to Guantanamo: State-Sanctioned Torture and the Global Convergence of Corporate States,” Kendall examines torture and political dissent in the United States and Russia, focusing on the privatization of enhanced interrogation in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. Readers will appreciate Kendall’s discussion of two key concepts in light of the privatization of prisons in the twenty-first century—predatory policing and violent entrepreneurs. Predatory policing is the practice of using violence as a means of preserving the interests of state-affiliated businesses as well as extracting rents from the public, while the advent of violent entrepreneurs highlights how brutal businessmen market organized violence and converted it into cash.

Kendall offers the reader an insightful view into the political, social, and economic evolutions of mass incarceration across the globe. But most important, Kendall calls attention to an important issue—privatized prisons and whether society should continue placing inmates in them.

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
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