Managing Chronically Short and High-Demand/Low-Density Primary Military Occupational Specialties

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Photo credit: SSgt Dominic Chavez, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician with EOD Company, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, sweeps a road with a metal detector during Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Response training at Camp Dave South Training Ground, one of the many training areas at Camp Lejeune, NC, November 4, 2010. During the training, EOD technicians were given the opportunity to brush up on their skills and find simulated IEDs scattered throughout the training grounds by fellow technicians. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by PFC Franklin E. Mercado)

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Executive summary

When this study began in February 2010, the Marine Corps had already achieved its desired endstrength of 202,000 active-duty Marines—2 years ahead of schedule. Nevertheless, significant enlisted personnel shortages remained in several important Primary Military Occupational Specialties (PMOSs). Shortages in some PMOSs have been persistent over time and thus have been termed *chronically short* (CS) specialties. Others have developed more recently as a result of increased requirements during the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan; these PMOSs are called *high-demand/low-density* (HD/LD) specialties.[1]

The Director, Manpower Management Division, requested that CNA study ways to examine CS and HD/LD specialties, taking requirements as given, and to identify policies and processes that could mitigate shortages. The goal of this study is to identify long-term strategies that will address both types of shortages. Our analyses show that there are several sources of adequately qualified accessions and Marines that could be more fully tapped to address PMOS shortages when they occur.

The Corps has enough accessions and Marines with the qualifications (e.g., high test scores, Class 1 Physical Fitness Test (PFT) scores) to fill HD/LD and CS specialty needs. It would require changes in policy to make sure that these highly qualified individuals fill vacancies where they are most needed. The Human Resource Development Plan (HRDP) requires no major changes in order to address personnel shortages. We recommend that the Marine Corps consider the advantages and disadvantages of several alternative courses of action that could eliminate PMOS shortfalls.

1. It is possible for a PMOS to be both CS and HD/LD.

Sources of additional qualified Marines

In our analyses, we define a "gold standard" (GS) Marine Corps recruit as one who could qualify for all of the CS and HD/LD specialties in terms of characteristics available in manpower databases (e.g., diploma status, aptitude scores, and waiver status). The GS recruit scores 110 or above on the General Technical section of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), 105 or above on the Mechanical Maintenance section, and 115 or above on the Electronics section, is a high school diploma graduate, and has no felony, serious, or drug waivers. This is a conservative standard for two reasons: (1) These recruits qualify for *all* CS and HD/LD specialties (not just one), and (2) Over half of accessions enter with drug waivers, many of whom qualify for HD/LD or CS PMOSs. A GS first-term alignment plan (FTAP) Marine meets the same waiver, ASVAB, and high school degree requirements as a GS recruit, but also (a) has a Class I PFT score, (b) is recommended and eligible for reenlistment, and (c) has no courts-martial or Non-Judicial Punishments.

Our analyses show that the following sources could provide larger numbers of recruits or Marines for short PMOSs:

- *GS accessions.*[2] The Marine Corps accesses between 3,000 and 6,000 GS recruits each year, 90 percent of whom choose PMOSs that are not short. These GS recruits could potentially fill entry-level short PMOSs if they could be classified into PMOSs that the Marine Corps most needs.
- *GS FTAP Marines.* Every year, between 700 and 1,400 GS FTAP Marines reenlist in the Marine Corps in PMOSs that are not short. These GS Marines could potentially fill shortages if they could be laterally moved into short PMOSs.

2. We recommend that the Marine Corps pursue *all qualified* accessions and Marines to fill HD/LD/CS billets. Our analysis of the number of GS accessions and Marines provides a lower bound estimate of how many people are qualified for any particular short PMOS. Also, it is administratively convenient to focus initially on GS individuals (who qualify for *any* HD/LD/CS PMOS) before opening the search to those who qualify for a subset of HD/LD/CS PMOSs.

- *GS nonreenlisters.* Every year, 400 to 1,000 GS FTAP Marines choose not to reenlist. They could fill shortages if they could be persuaded to fill short specialties and stay in the Corps.
- *GS accessions who are 21 or older.* Every year, there are 700 to 1,200 GS accessions age 21 or older. These accessions could possibly fill shortages in CS or HD/LD lateral-move-only PMOSs if the Marine Corps decided that the age of 21 indicated a sufficient maturity level and could therefore be a qualification in lieu of rank/experience.

We show that there are enough GS accessions and Marines to fill PMOS vacancies. Our recommendation, however, is to allow *all qualified* Marines to apply for HD/LD or CS specialties, but to focus initially on GS individuals (to simplify the job of contacting people).

Courses of action to consider to fill short PMOSs

The Marine Corps HRDP involves many different commands and departments that together work to ensure that the Corps has the manpower it needs. We believe that now—with favorable recruiting and reenlistment environments—is a good time to consider policy changes to better exploit underused manpower resources. We recommend that the Marine Corps consider the following five courses of action.

Improve the classification process for GS recruits

To more fully use the GS recruits who are accessed each year, the Marine Corps should consider ways to improve the speed and flexibility of the process for classifying these high-quality recruits from Programs Enlisted For (PEFs) to PMOSs. One way would be to provide an additional option for GS recruits to enter on "open contracts"—meaning they could be classified into whichever PMOS the Marine Corps needs as they progress through their entry-level training. This classification usually occurs during bootcamp training days 45 to 52 but could occur later for GS open-contract recruits. This change would make it easier to fill training seats that unexpectedly become available and would allow quicker adjustments to changing or increased requirements of HD/LD/CS PMOSs.

Review all reenlistment incentives and increase incentives for qualified Marines to laterally move, especially at the FTAP point

To better use the qualified GS FTAP Marines currently in PMOSs that are *not* short, the Marine Corps should consider increasing incentives for all qualified FTAP Marines to move to short PMOSs—perhaps in the form of a duty station option. Another possibility would be a specific selective reenlistment bonus (SRB). This special SRB might prove particularly attractive to GS Marines whose PMOSs are not short and offer small SRBs or no SRBs at all.

Institutionalize an early process of contacting GS Marines at their FTAP reenlistment point and encouraging them to consider moving to an HD/LD/CS PMOS

In May FY10, Manpower Management (MM) began contacting FTAP Marines who would qualify for HD/LD/CS PMOSs, and encouraged them to apply for lateral moves. This process succeeded in filling more of the short PMOSs than would otherwise have been the case, although it did not fill *all* available vacancies. If this process were institutionalized and started earlier in the fiscal year, even more vacancies could be filled.[3] The Marine Corps could specify, before the beginning of each fiscal year, a list of PMOSs that are clearly in excess of the numbers required to fill projected boatspaces for that PMOS. Qualified FTAP Marines in the oversubscribed PMOSs could be actively recruited by career planners and allowed to laterally move to short PMOSs on a case-by-case basis before the boatspaces for their original PMOSs were filled. This could place qualified Marines in short

3. We support MM's initiative and think that starting earlier in the fiscal year would achieve even better results. In May 2011, while this report was in the final stages of production, the Marine Corps released a new MARADMIN [1] that states: "Effective immediately, Marines will be identified for and offered lateral moves based upon an evaluation of their record to highly technical MOS(s) which the Marine Corps has a direct interest in filling." This new policy represents one aspect of our recommendation. Our recommendation encompasses a wider variety of PMOSs, not only those that are highly technical.

PMOSs, improving their manning without imposing the unacceptable risk that boatspaces will go unfilled in their original PMOSs.

Expand the pool of potential entrants into lateral-move-only PMOSs

To alleviate manning shortages in lateral-move-only PMOSs, the Marine Corps could transition these into entry-level PMOSs with an associated age requirement (instead of rank). This would entail risk because some previous attempts have not been successful.[4] This policy change could be made solely for GS recruits who are 21 and older.

Increase school seats and recruit lateral moves in years 2 and 3, before the FTAP reenlistment point

The current process for lateral moves allows Marines to lateral move at their FTAP reenlistment decision point. It addresses shortages in the HD/LD/CS enlisted grade structure that may have started several years earlier, when school seats went unfilled in a particular cohort. This lag time in addressing the shortage creates gaps in year groups—the short cohort will promote too fast, without gaining the experience needed for higher levels of responsibility.

Instead of addressing shortages at the FTAP reenlistment point, it would be better to address gaps immediately, with second- or third-year Marines. The process would work as follows:

1. Identify, in every HD/LD/CS PMOS, what should have been the steady-state input to maintain the PMOS.
2. Identify by name and PMOS each Marine in over-strength PMOSs who meets short PMOS requirements for a potential lateral move.

4. We heard that PMOS 2336 tried lowering rank and age requirements, but the younger, inexperienced Marines could not complete the PMOS 2336 course. However, we are recommending that these older recruits also be GS, which is likely to improve their chances for success.

3. Offer the qualifying Marine an early lateral move.

By addressing the shortfall more quickly, the Marine Corps would (a) reduce wasted school seats due to nonavailability of initial accessions, (b) increase promotions for over-subscribed PMOSs, (c) slow promotions for HD/LD/CS PMOSs, and (d) reduce the amount of SRB money spent on FTAP lateral moves.

Finally, we heard that a recruiter's own PMOS *does* influence which PEFs recruits find attractive, and that recruiters will naturally be enthusiastic about PEFs that include their PMOSs. The Marine Corps should consider whether a larger number of Marines from CS or HD/LD PMOSs can be allowed, or even required, to work as recruiters. At a minimum, the USMC should consider using current Marines in HD/LD/CS PMOSs to work with Marine Corps Recruiting Command and J. Walter Thompson to develop specific recruiting materials for their PMOSs and the associated PEFs.[5] CS and HD/LD PMOSs are exempted or often restricted from B-billet assignments, even when these Marines volunteer.

We encourage the Marine Corps to consider these courses of action at this time because accessions and reenlistments are sufficiently high, at least partially because of a weak civilian economy. When reenlistments and accessions are doing well, long-term improvements can be made with less risk of failing to meet accession numbers and manning goals.

5. These recruiting materials could be in electronic rather than paper form. For example, Marines could develop a YouTube video or web page that identifies the advantages of a HD/LD/CS PMOS.

Introduction

The Human Resource Development Plan (HRDP) has proved historically that it can meet the Commandant of the Marine Corps' Title 10 responsibilities of recruiting, training, manning, and providing qualified Marines of the right quality and quantity to execute the USMC's roles and missions. That said, the process also fails in small but critically important ways to meet all the specific manning requirements by skill required and in the right numbers. In recognition of the HRDP's successes, this study does not recommend major changes; rather, it proposes minor changes to several institutional policies within the HRDP that could improve on its outcomes.

Background

When this study began in February 2010, the Marine Corps had already achieved its desired endstrength (ES) of 202,000 active-duty Marines, but this growth did not succeed in meeting certain PMOS requirements. At the end of FY10, the Marine Corps achieved a first-term alignment plan (FTAP) specialty match of 99.7 percent—the highest ever.[6] Nevertheless, significant personnel shortages remained in several important PMOSs, especially when considering 202K-related requirements growth in future years.

Some PMOS shortages have persisted even when ES and requirements were stable. We call these chronically short (CS) specialties. Others have developed only recently due to increased requirements associated with 202K and requirements generated by Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF). These PMOSs, while not chronically short, are in high demand but have low-density status and will remain that way until manning is stabilized

6. Although this was good news, many PMOSs required lateral moves to fill retention requirements (e.g., 18XX/08XX PMOSs).

and its required targets by PMOS and rank can be sustained. We refer to these specialties as high demand/low density (HD/LD).[7]

The Director, Manpower Management (MM) requested that CNA study ways to address CS and HD/LD PMOSs, taking FY10 and FY16 requirements as given, and identify policies and processes that, once changed and incorporated, could mitigate shortages. She also asked that we describe the strengths and weaknesses of policy alternatives for managing these manning deficiencies. To do this, CNA first examined previous research and the Marine Corps' current HRDP to better understand how those methods are used to address manpower shortages and total force sustainment.

Previous research

CNA has studied short PMOSs several times in the past. We describe one of these studies here.

In the mid-1990s, the Marine Corps asked CNA to determine whether reenlistment incentives were adequate and to propose a cost-effective use of selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) and lateral moves [2]. In that work, CNA analyzed how Marine Corps planners could increase the inventory in one of two ways:

- Offer SRBs to Marines in short PMOSs.
- Allow Marines in PMOSs with an oversupply of reenlisters to move laterally into short PMOSs.

In this work, CNA calculated the costs of these two alternatives by PMOS. The analysis estimated the probability of reenlisting depending on the size of the SRB and determined the relative costs of relying on both lateral moves and SRBs.

The study found that it is usually cost-effective to offer SRBs (or higher SRBs) for technical PMOSs because they have longer and more expensive associated training. Each trained Marine who leaves

7. Short PMOSs can be both CS and HD/LD, but many fall into only one of these two categories.

a PMOS with a long training pipeline is expensive to replace. Therefore, the Marine Corps can save money by using an SRB to discourage Marines from leaving.

Possible reasons for shortages

The reasons for CS or HD/LD PMOSs are many and varied.[8] The causes of shortages can be complicated. Seven examples follow:

1. *An unplanned increase in requirements for Marines in a particular PMOS, such as those who possess skills in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).* The need for larger numbers of 2336s was caused, in large part, by the enemy's increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan—an unforeseen and unplanned requirement.

2. *The rapid growth to 202K.* Part of the endstrength increase was dedicated to reinstituting all three infantry battalions of the 9th Marine Regiment, minus regimental headquarters. For example, there were not enough infantry Marines to fill all the billets in those battalions.

3. *The introduction of new major end items (MEIs) of equipment or weapon systems that require new skills/PMOSs to be operated and maintained.*[9] Often the MEIs come on line faster than the accession and training/qualifying of recruits or Marines to operate and maintain the equipment.

4. *Difficulty reenlisting Marines who have been trained in the PMOS.*

5. *A shortfall in the number of accessions with the right combination of characteristics, including physical fitness, motivation, and test scores.*

6. *Difficulty with the timeliness and availability of school seats.* The phasing of shipping recruits to entry-level training and boot-

8. This list of possible reasons for shortages comes from our interviews with monitors, MOS specialists, and occupational field (occfield) sponsors. We summarize those interviews in appendix A.

9. Sometimes the introduction of new MEIs results in increases in manpower requirements, such as those described in items 1 and 2.

camp may be a complicating factor. This is especially true of those schools operated by a Service other than the Marine Corps.

7. *An inability of the HRDP to place the right Marine who meets all PMOS qualification requirements into the right PMOS (either at accession or a later date).* This could be caused by several factors, including the recruit's or Marine's choices, or the unavailability of school seats to train for the PMOS.

As the foregoing list shows, there are many points in the HRDP process where shortages can develop—in setting requirements (items 1 through 3), reenlistments (item 4), recruiting (item 5), training (item 6), or planning and assignments (item 7). But shortages often do not become apparent and time critical until the HRDP must place the right Marine with all PMOS qualifications into the right PMOS.

Organization of this report

This report describes our findings and the policy relevance of those findings. We first describe the group of 11 focus PMOSs on which we focus (addressing reasons 1 through 3 in the numbered list). Then we describe the HRDP process and how the system currently responds to short PMOSs (addressing reasons 4 and 5 in the list).

Next, we analyze data to answer the following questions: Are there a sufficient number of qualified recruits and Marines to fill HD/LD/CS manning requirements? If so, where are they, and how can they be better used to fill and sustain those requirements (addressing reasons 6 and 7)?

Finally, we describe policy changes for addressing these shortages, including possible changes to the processes currently used to manage shortfalls.

Focus PMOSs

Identification and classification

Changes in manpower requirements—whether caused by unforeseen wartime needs, rapid growth to 202K, or changes to MEIs—are important reasons for PMOSs becoming HD/LD/CS. For this study, we identify a small set of CS and HD/LD PMOSs that reflect a range of HD/LD/CS PMOSs and the possible reasons for a PMOS to be short. We wanted at least one specialty in each of four different categories: (1) CS, entry level, (2) CS, lateral move only, (3) HD/LD, entry level, and (4) HD/LD, lateral move only.

Table 1 shows our final list of focus PMOSs.[10] The upper left quadrant includes five CS entry-level PMOSs: one each from Intelligence (PMOS 0231, Intelligence Specialist), Rotary Wing Aircraft Maintenance (6114, UH/AH-1 Mechanic), Artillery (PMOS 0861, Fire Support Man), Signals and Intelligence (2671, Middle East Cryptologic Linguist), and Ground Electronics Maintenance (PMOS 2871, Calibration Technician). These five PMOSs provide a wide range of fields for which accessions are the primary source of new personnel, and they were chronically short from FY80 to FY07.[11]

The second group in table 1, in the upper right quadrant, includes two entry-level PMOSs whose shortages increased after FY01. PMOS 0321 (Reconnaissance Man) was in much higher demand after FY01

10. Appendix B describes how we selected our 11 focus PMOSs. Appendix C describes changes in the manpower requirements and MEIs for the focus PMOSs (reasons 1 through 3).

11. We looked at PMOSs that have been historically short (not necessarily currently short) because (a) the current good recruiting and retention climate could lead us to ignore PMOSs that are likely to become short again in the future and (b) by looking at 30 years of data, we could see how the PMOSs fared in both good and bad economic conditions.

because of the operational needs of the Corps. Requirements for PMOS 0511 (MAGTF Planning Specialist) also increased after FY00, although it did not exist as a separate PMOS during many of the years between FY80 and FY09.

Table 1. Categorization of 11 focus PMOSs[a]

	Chronically short PMOS (1980 - 2009)			HD/LD PMOS (Shortages increased after 2001)		
	PMOS	Title	Grades	PMOS	Title	Grades
Entry-level PMOS	0231	Intelligence Specialist	Pvt - MSgt	0321	Reconaissance Man	Pvt - MGySgt
	6114	UH/AH-1 Helicopter Mechanic	Pvt - GySgt	0511	MAGTF Planning Specialist	Pvt - MGySgt
	0861	Fire Support Man	Pvt - MGySgt			
	2671	Middle East Cryptologic Linguist	Pvt - GySgt			
	2871	Calibration Tech	Pvt - Sgt			
Lateral-move-only PMOS	0211	Counterintelligence	Cpl - MSgt	2336	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician	Sgt - MGySgt
				0241	Imagery Analysis Specialist	Sgt - MSgt
				2834	SATCOM Technician	Sgt - GySgt

a. The categorization of PMOSs comes from our analysis. The source for basic facts about each PMOS comes from MCO 1200.17B, *Military Occupational Specialties Manual,* 15 April 2010.

The bottom of table 1 shows lateral-move-only specialties, which can be entered only at paygrades higher than private. One of these specialties, PMOS 0211 (Intelligence Specialist), has been chronically short. The other three (PMOSs 2336, 0241, and 2834) have become short, at least partly because of the growth in requirements due to wartime needs and/or 202K growth.

Reenlistment rates for these PMOSs

Difficulty reenlisting Marines was the fourth possible reason for HD/LD/CS status that we listed earlier. The reenlistment rates for these PMOSs show overall trends from FY00 to FY10. They also show persistent differences between reenlistment rates by PMOS; some specialties have had more reenlistment challenges than others.

Table 2 shows FY00 to FY10 zone A reenlistment rates for the seven entry-level PMOSs (PMOSs 0231, 0321, 0511, 0861, 2671, 2871, and 6114).[12] Reenlistment rates for FY09 and FY10 are mostly higher than the average of the 11-year period, demonstrating just how different the reenlistment climate was for the Marine Corps in the last 2 years than in preceding years.

In only two cases, PMOS 0321 and PMOS 2671, was the FY10 rate lower than the 11-year average. The highest 11-year average zone A reenlistment rate was for PMOS 0511 (41 percent), and the lowest was for PMOS 2671 (24 percent). This difference in reenlistment rates might explain why higher SRBs have been offered for PMOS 2671 than for PMOS 0511 from FY05 through FY10. Another reason could be that Marines in MOS 2671 (Middle East Cryptologic Linguist) have more job opportunities outside the Marine Corps than do MAGTF Planning Specialists (PMOS 0511).[13]

Table 3 shows zone B reenlistment rates. We observe that zone B reenlistment rates are much higher than those for zone A Marines. Among lateral-move-only PMOSs, the lowest 11-year average zone B reenlistment rate is for PMOS 2871 (38 percent), and the highest is for PMOS 2336 (86 percent). Lastly, one can see that the reenlistment

12. Zone A, or FTAP, applies to active-component Marines with 17 months to 6 years of active Marine Corps service and at least 17 months of continuous service other than for training. Zone B refers to Marines with 6 to 10 years of active Marine Corps service. Zone C refers to Marines who have between 10 and 14 years of service. In this paper, we focus on zone A and zone B, where reenlistment rates are lowest.

13. For example, in November 2010, a company called Aegis USA was offering $100,000 to $160,000 for Arab linguists.

Table 2. Zone A reenlistment rates and SRBs, FY00 to FY10[a]

		FY											
PMOS	Indicator	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Average FY00 - FY10
0231	Rate	40%	33%	32%	28%	32%	34%	30%	42%	44%	60%	56%	39%
	SRB level	4	4	1	1	5	4	5	5	6	6.5	6	
0321	Rate	26%	38%	36%	33%	25%	36%	38%	40%	28%	54%	34%	37%
	SRB level	5	3	2	2	2	4	5	5	6	7	6	
0511	Rate	52%	37%	48%	29%	39%	34%	13%	48%	33%	63%	55%	41%
	SRB level	5	4	2	2	4	1	1	2.5	3	5	4	
0861	Rate	12%	19%	26%	19%	29%	36%	40%	54%	42%	49%	49%	37%
	SRB level	1	1	0	1	1	4	5	5	6	7	7	
2671	Rate	40%	52%	27%	11%	17%	22%	11%	28%	23%	35%	17%	24%
	SRB level	5	4	2	1	1	5	5	5	6.5	7	6	
2871	Rate	42%	20%	27%	44%	24%	25%	0%	15%	17%	57%	50%	30%
	SRB level	5	5	3	2	3	1	1	1	4	5	3	
6114	Rate	26%	30%	23%	28%	24%	18%	22%	37%	30%	62%	44%	32%
	SRB level	3	2	1	1	0	1	1.5	2	3	4.5	4	

a. Source: CNA database.

rate varies considerably from year to year, especially for small PMOSs, such as PMOS 2834 and PMOS 2871.

To summarize:

- Zone B reenlistment rates are higher than zone A rates, regardless of PMOS.
- Nevertheless, our focus PMOSs sometimes have been short at both the zone A and zone B reenlistment points.
- Reenlistment rates increase when job opportunities in the civilian economy decrease (as they did between FY08 and FY09).
- Reenlistment rates are lowest for PMOSs that have opportunities in the private sector and long training pipelines (such as 2671) and are highest for PMOSs with no direct or normally recognized parallels in the civilian sector (such as 0511).

- Higher SRBs increase reenlistment rates, but SRBs themselves do not guarantee sufficient reenlistment rates. (For example, the zone A reenlistment rate for PMOS 2671 in FY10 was only 17 percent despite an SRB level of 6.)

Table 3. Zone B reenlistment rates and SRBs, FY00 to FY10[a]

		FY											
PMOS	Indicator	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Average FY00 - FY10
0211	Rate	83%	84%	78%	79%	61%	69%	58%	70%	74%	82%	71%	72%
	SRB level	5	5	2	3	0	3	3	4	6	6	5	
0231	Rate	60%	45%	47%	69%	54%	57%	69%	77%	70%	80%	78%	68%
	SRB level	0	0	0	1	0	1	3	4	6	6	5	
0241	Rate	76%	93%	58%	60%	55%	75%	72%	81%	85%	93%	88%	77%
	SRB level	5	5	0	0	0	2	2	3	NA	6	5	
0321	Rate	56%	67%	82%	85%	58%	73%	76%	71%	60%	78%	68%	73%
	SRB level	0	0	1	1	0	3	4	5	6	8	5	
0511	Rate	88%	31%	85%	85%	71%	61%	50%	52%	45%	82%	88%	65%
	SRB level	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	4	3	
0861	Rate	45%	57%	64%	82%	83%	88%	63%	88%	60%	82%	82%	72%
	SRB level	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	2	4	6	5	
2336	Rate	87%	64%	83%	77%	80%	88%	81%	82%	85%	97%	88%	86%
	SRB level	0	0	1	1	0	3	3	5	6	8	5	
2671	Rate	75%	38%	60%	22%	50%	71%	18%	71%	63%	63%	100%	53%
	SRB level	0	0	2	2	0	2	3	5	6	7	5	
2834	Rate	67%	67%	50%	80%	0%	57%	67%	77%	100%	80%	77%	73%
	SRB level	4	4	3	2	0	2	3	3	NA	4	2	
2871	Rate	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	25%	33%	0%	100%	33%	0%	38%
	SRB level	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	None	
6114	Rate	63%	38%	48%	79%	80%	80%	56%	78%	61%	71%	78%	66%
	SRB level	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	3	3	

a. Source: CNA database.

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HRDP and responses to short PMOSs

Human Resource Development Plan

The following discussion is based on interviews at Total Force Structure Division, Training and Education Command, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, Manpower Management (MM), and Manpower Plans and Policy (MP), as well as various conference briefings [3 through 8]. It provides background on the possible policy options for responding to the shortages in our 11 PMOSs. The Marine Corps HRDP encompasses three areas—force structure, manpower, and training—as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. Marine Corps HRDP overview[a]



a. Source: [3].

Force structure is the number, size, and composition of Marine Corps units required to perform the Marine Corps mission essential tasks. *Manpower* deals with and is affected by all aspects of recruiting/accession, classification, training, assignment, retention, promotion, and management of personnel. *Training* focuses on the making of a Marine and the gaining of a PMOS as a result of formal school attendance. The MOS Manual is central to all three enterprises.

The HRDP is based on needed capabilities, both combat and support, and addresses how many structured billets are authorized to be filled (spaces), the inventory of Marines available to fill billets (faces), and the training required for those Marines [5, 6]. It defines PMOSs, the requirements for entering those specialties, and the paygrades of those specialties. We first discuss HRDP resources and plans, and then describe classification, assignment, and training.

Resources

Resources for the payment of manpower and all training required by PMOSs are dictated by the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which specifies a multiyear planning horizon and results in three restrictions to the Marines Corps' billets and inventory: (1) money (budgeted endstrength), (2) P2T2, or Prisoners, Patients, Transients, and Trainees (the unassignable portion of the Marine Corps), and (3) precedence (which billets to buy and assign first) as determined by MCO 5320.12G, Precedence Levels for Manning and Staffing.[14]

The process for determining spaces (billets) and faces (inventory) involves a number of entities, including the following:

- Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Combat Development and Integration (MCCDC, CD&I)
- Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA)
- Total Force Structure Division (TFSD)

14. Much of this discussion is from the OccFld Sponsor/MOS Specialist Conferences [3 through 8].

- Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC)
- Training and Education Command (TECOM)
- Occupational field sponsors/advocates.

Figure 2 provides a high-level overview of the process. Each bubble in the figure refers to a generic function: (1) Deputy Commandant (DC) CD&I (TFSD) develops and mans the requirement, (2) DC M&RA (MP) develops the inventory, (3) Commanding General (CG) MCRC recruits the inventory, and (4) DC M&RA (MM) distributes and assigns the inventory. Staff working under DC CD&I begin the process shown in figure 2 by *developing the manning requirement*, which is reflected in the Table of Organization (T/O). T/Os reflect the Marine Corps' requirements by grade and PMOS on a unit-by-unit basis. T/Os reflect the Fleet Marine Forces' requirements for combat capability, before manning controls from the POM process or supporting establishment requirements are considered.

Figure 2. Manpower flow in the HRDP[a]



a. Source: [7].

The Marine Corps cannot afford to buy all the billets specified in the T/Os because of POM constraints, so CD&I uses an algorithm to reduce the number of Marines it buys, by unit. Some high-priority ("excepted") units are authorized to be manned at 100 percent, such as Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Command Elements, the Wounded Warrior Regiment Headquarters, and special operations companies with 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Marine Special Operations battalions. Others ("priority units") are authorized to be manned at 95 percent of the T/O, such as formal schools, HQMC departments, aviation training squadrons, and the Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group. All other units are manned according to their proportionate share (pro share). The results of these and other constraints are reflected in the Authorized Strength Report (ASR). The ASR reflects the structure billets that are authorized to be filled and represents the allowed manning of each T/O, by monitored command code (MCC) and grade/PMOS.

M&RA's role

The ASR is used concurrently by two different divisions within Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The MP division uses the ASR for inventory development and planning, while the MM division uses the ASR for inventory distribution and assignments. In addition, MP develops and maintains the Grade Adjusted Recapitulation (GAR).

MP's role (plans, policy, and programming)

MP develops plans to grow the manpower inventory to meet future requirements (in consultation with MCRC, MM, and other divisions within M&RA). These include:

- Accession plans
- Classification plans
- Promotion plans
- Reenlistment plans and bonuses.

The GAR is central to these plans, using as primary inputs the ASR, P2T2, and B-billets, but also including other constraints, such as legislation and grade distribution constraints. For example, pay-

grades E8 and E9 are capped by law: E8s and E9s cannot be more than 2.5 and 1.25 percent, respectively, of the authorized daily average number of enlisted members on active duty (other than for training) on the first day of the fiscal year. When the number serving in paygrade E9 is less than the number authorized, the difference can be used to increase the number in paygrade E8. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) determines the maximum number of enlisted Marines in paygrades E4 through E7 via the HRDP.

MM's role (classification and assignment)

MM concurrently uses the ASR, the Recruit Distribution Model (RDM), and the Staffing Goal Model (SGM) as the basis for distributing and assigning Marines to particular PMOSs and training seats. The staffing goals are unit assignment targets by grade and PMOS, six months into the future.

MM Enlisted Assignments 11 (MMEA-11) (Recruit Distribution Unit) classifies—and, if necessary, reclassifies—Marine recruits into their entry-level, active-duty intended PMOS (IMOS) and corresponding training.[15] MMEA-11 classifies every Marine while at bootcamp, although others have a role (e.g., MPP-20, TECOM, MCRC, the OccField Sponsor and MOS Specialist, and the Recruit Screening Offices at San Diego/Parris Island). There are different classification authorities for the seven entry-level PMOSs that we chose:

- PMOS 0231—MMEA-11
- PMOS 0261—MMEA-11
- PMOS 0511—MMEA-11
- PMOS 0861—MMEA-11
- PMOS 0321—School of Infantry, West
- PMOS 2671—Operations

15. MMEA-5 (Systems Support) supports MMEA-11 and is responsible for running and maintaining the Recruit Distribution Model. MMEA-11 has responsibility for the classification decisions that rely on the RDM.

- PMOS 2871—Marine Corps Communications Electronics School (MCCES), Twentynine Palms.

MMEA-11 classifies and reclassifies Marines by PMOS using the RDM. Starting around recruit training day 45 to 52, the RDM is run weekly and assigns recruits to a PMOS based on qualifying factors, such as:

- The needs of the Marine Corps as set by MPP-20 in the yearly Classification Plan
- The Program Enlisted For (PEF) that each recruit signs during the enlistment process
- The recruit's qualifications
- The PMOS qualifying requirements, as outlined in the MOS Manual
- Funding considerations (in some reclassification cases)
- The availability of school seats.

Based on these considerations, MMEA-11 assigns each accession to the required school in a particular training pipeline.

MMEA-11 deals exclusively in enlisted initial accessions (i.e., enlisted Marines who have never held a PMOS, including previously separated Marines returning to active duty). Therefore, all of the PMOSs that MMEA-11 classifies start at the rank of private. MMEA-6, the Enlisted Retention section, primarily handles lateral moves into both entry-level and lateral-move-only PMOSs.

The RDM attempts to classify as close to 100 percent of the targets in the Initial Classification Plan as possible, but MMEA-11 views any PMOS manned above 85 percent as being manageable for the E1–E4 inventory. An RDM run takes about a day, though additional time is needed to evaluate the decisions made by the computer algorithm.

Finally, MMEA-11 assigns Projected Training Completion dates to all the PMOSs that it classifies. The Projected Training Completion date is the date that the school is projected to end (for all single-track schools). This assists in the training production projections for manning deploying units.

The monitors at MM then assign Marines to particular billets. They make sure that the needs of the Marine Corps (for qualified Marines to fill billets) are met and that the Marine has experiences that will give him or her the opportunity to promote and fulfill career goals within the Marine Corps. This process involves both "filling" the available billets and "fitting" the Marine to the job. MM performs these activities in accordance with USMC staffing policies and manning levels.

MCRC's role (enlisted recruiting)

The recruiter is the first contact that a prospective recruit has with the Marine Corps, so the success of recruiting has a large influence over the size of the pool of qualified individuals available to fill billets.

Marines are not usually recruited to a specific PMOS. Instead, they are recruited to a PEF, which includes a group of PMOSs to which the Marine might be assigned at day 45 to 52 of recruit training.[16] Here we report some of the FY11 PEFs and their respective occupational fields (occfields) that also include an enlistment bonus (EB).[17] We mention the PEFs that include an EB because it usually indicates that a field is CS or HD/LD:

- BY—Electronics Maintenance (occfields 2100, 2800, and 5900) ($10,000 EB)
- DC—Crypto Linguists (occfield 2600) ($10,000 EB)
- DD—Intelligence (occfield 0200) ($3,000 EB)
- HE—Meteorology (METOC, occfield 6800) and Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Planner (PMOS 0511) ($5,000 EB)
- Open contract (means the Marine can be assigned to any PMOS for which he/she meets qualifying standards).

16. MPP-20, the Enlisted Plans section, and MCRC develop the PEFs.

17. An occfield is a group of specialties that are alike. For example, the 02 occfield contains intelligence specialties, and the 03 occfield contains infantry PMOSs.

PEFs change every year for a number of reasons. If a PMOS could not be filled in previous years, MCRC and MP might move it into a PEF that recruiters were successful in recruiting. Some PEFs are more difficult to recruit to than others, and sometimes MCRC and MP decide to add a bonus to a PEF during the year. For example, in FY10, the METOC PEF stood alone, and it was difficult for recruiters to meet the accession goals. Few potential recruits wanted to become METOCs, so they did not enlist for that PEF. In FY11, the PEF that includes METOC also contains MAGTF Planner (PMOS 0511), which makes the PEF more attractive.

Although "sellability" is one consideration for developing PEFs, there are other considerations. One is the ease with which a Marine could be reclassified if he or she fails the PMOS training. If a PEF includes specialties that are trained at the same location, a Marine who fails PMOS training can be reclassified and trained in a different PMOS without changing duty stations. A second consideration is a preference for grouping PMOSs that have similar requirements. This facilitates reclassification if the Marine fails in his or her originally assigned PMOS school.

All the Services have a version of an open contract, in which a recruit enlists but does not know to which specialty he/she will be assigned. When people enlist in the Air Force, Navy, or Army, or any contract other than an open one, recruits know what they'll be doing and when they'll start training. The Marine Corps is the only Service that does not have one-to-one assignment of recruits to a PMOS at accession for those who do not sign open contracts. The Marine Corps has multiple PMOSs a recruit can go into, as defined by the PEFs.

TECOM's role

TECOM plays a major role in the HRDP since it provides the school seats and determines the process that ensures that Marines recruited to a PEF are fully trained in the timeliest fashion possible. This process requires considerable coordination and planning with all HRDP stakeholders. In this subsection, we review the training tracks, as developed by TECOM, for our focus PMOSs (see table 4).

Table 4. Training tracks for PMOSs[a]

PMOS	Course sequence	Course name	Course length (days)	Service
0211	1	MAGTF Counterintelligence/Humint Basic	121	Navy
0231	1	MAGTF Intelligence Specialist entry	74	Navy
0241	1	Imagery analysis apprentice	168	Air Force
0321	1	Basic infantryman	29	Marine Corps
0321	2	Infantry rifleman course	30	Marine Corps
0321	3	Basic reconnaissance	84	Marine Corps
0511	1	Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Planners basic	35	Navy
0861	1	Artillery scout observer (USMC)	38	Army
0861	2	Fire support man	27	Navy
2336	1	DoD joint explosive ordnance disposal basic (Common core)	200	Navy
2671	1	Arabic basic	441	Army
2671	2	Cyptologic technician interpretive (Arabic)	32	Air Force
2834	1	Satellite communication systems technician	70	Army
2871	1	Calibration technician course (USMC)	182	Marine Corps
6114	1	AH-1 W and UH-1 N Power plants, power trains, and rotors maintenance	80	Marine Corps

a. Source: Formal Schools Training Division, TECOM.

PMOSs 0321, 0861, and 2671 all require more than one course to attain the PMOS, but the other eight do not. In table 4, "Course sequence" indicates a series of courses that must be taken in a specified order. For example, a prospective 0861 attends Artillery Scout Observer school before attending Fire Support Man school.

Table 4 demonstrates the complexities of managing courses and assigning students. The shorter courses, such as MAGTF Planners Basic (35 days), begin again fairly quickly, so there is less likelihood for students to spend a long time waiting for courses. Most courses, however, are longer and/or have multiple courses in sequence. For example, the PMOS 2671 (Arabic Basic) runs 441 days. This course length limits the speed with which the Corps can train new Arabic linguists. For PMOS 0321, three courses are required: Basic Infantry-

man, Infantry Rifleman Course, and Basic Reconnaissance. Having more than one course also limits how fast new Marines can be trained. A third limitation is that, in many cases—particularly in the HD/LD/CS PMOSs—another Service leads the training courses. The Marine Corps is the primary Service for training in only 3 of the 11 PMOSs: 0321, 2871, and 6114. For these PMOSs, the Marine Corps has more ability to expand the number of training seats quickly, if necessary, because the facilities being used are its own. For example, the Marine Corps could decide to do double shifts to get more Marines through 0321, 2871, or 6114 training.

For the remaining eight PMOSs, however, another Service is the lead. The Navy is the lead for five of the PMOS courses, the Army for two, and the Air Force for two.[18] The Ground Training Branch at TECOM indicated that it requires a year or more of lead time for the Marine Corps to request and obtain additional training seats from another Service. Requests for additional training seats, if granted, mean the Marine Corps must get the total number of students to the training. If the Marine Corps does not fill the training seats, it risks losing these training seat allocations in future years.

At the Training Input Plan (TIP) Conference each spring, the TECOM Formal Schools Training Branch (C4611) brings together the training requirements sponsors to make decisions about the plan for the next fiscal year's formal course quotas by PMOS, sponsor, and student type. It also confirms the TIP for the out-years (4 years out) and sets priorities for course requirements by course capacity and/or funding constraints. The conference provides an opportunity for face-to-face interaction between requirement sponsors, C4611, and schoolhouse representatives.

Effects of course attrition on school seat planning

The planning process recognizes that—due to school attrition—Marines must be accessed and reenlisted in excess of stated PMOS requirements. The annual planning factors account for such attrition

18. The Army and the Air Force each have a course for PMOS 2671.

and estimate the overages necessary to compensate for these predicted losses. The FY11 planning factors for course attrition in the seven entry-level PMOSs that we chose follow:[19]

- PMOS 0231, Intelligence Specialist (11.4 percent)
- PMOS 0321, Reconnaissance Man (28 percent)
- PMOS 0511, MAGTF Planning Specialist (5.6 percent)
- PMOS 0861, Fire Support Man (8.8 percent)
- PMOS 2671, Middle East Cryptolinguist (13.9 percent)
- PMOS 2871, Calibration Technician (6.3 percent)
- PMOS 6114, UH/AH-1 Helicopter Mechanic (1 percent).

These planning factors provide a rough guide as to which PMOSs have high course attrition and which do not. They are based on historical patterns of schoolhouse attrition. Of course, schoolhouse attrition can vary from year to year, so these planning factors can overestimate or underestimate the true attrition for any given year. Fluctuations in attrition create the possibility of training seats going unused (when a student unexpectedly drops out).

Current options for mitigating PMOS shortages

This section has briefly reviewed the HRDP process. We described the system's monetary and manning constraints, planning process, and systems for classifying, reclassifying, and training Marines. What are the policy implications of this review?

First, the HRDP has many commands, departments/divisions, and sections that must cooperate in planning for future manpower requirements. This makes it difficult to change any policies quickly or

19. We received these planning factors from MPP-20, Enlisted Plans section. TECOM sends new planning factors once a year, although factors can be changed at other times, if necessary, based on feedback from TECOM or the occfield sponsors. The planning factors include only "hard attrites" and exclude recycle and other codes that indicate the Marine might finish the course.

to react to unplanned increases in requirements. This is especially true since any policy change can generate unanticipated challenges within any part of the HRDP. All stakeholders must agree on any changes to existing procedures. Although it does slow down how quickly a change can occur, the stakeholders minimize unnecessary or disruptive changes.

Second, the current HRDP uses several primary tools for dealing with short PMOSs:

- EBs, which can be offered for some PEFs and vary in amount to encourage qualified recruits to join more difficult-to-fill PEFs (although the classification of a Marine into a PMOS comes later)
- More focused SRBs, which can be offered to encourage Marines to reenlist in HD/LD/CS PMOSs, and to encourage qualified Marines from other PMOSs to laterally move to HD/LD/CS PMOSs (they receive the SRB once they successfully complete training for the short PMOS)
- Lateral moves to short PMOSs, which can be encouraged using other methods in addition to SRBs. For example, the Marine Corps leadership could be more aggressive in letting eligible Marines know earlier the short PMOSs for which they qualify, and the procedures for applying for a lateral move. Another way to encourage lateral moves would be to expand the number of Marines who are eligible for them.
- Reduce course attrition in short PMOSs (e.g., by increasing the course length in those sections where Marines need more time to become proficient). We recognize that this may be beyond the USMC's control because many schools are managed by the other Services.

This section has described a complex system for dealing with shortages of Marines in certain PMOSs. In the next section, we will answer the following question: Are there enough high-quality accessions, or enough Marines, to fill short PMOSs?

Are there enough entry-level accessions and/or FTAP Marines to fill HD/LD/CS PMOSs?

In this section, we explore whether the problems the Marine Corps has faced in manning the 11 focus PMOSs are the result of a lack of qualified recruits or Marines. Our approach is twofold:

- First, we analyze the accession cohorts from FY99 to FY09 and determine if there was a lack of qualified recruits or Marines in any of the accession and FTAP cohorts to meet the HD/LD/CS PMOS requirements.
- Second, we evaluate FTAP Marines at their first reenlistment point. We use a subsample of cohorts for this analysis—those who accessed in FY99 through FY06—because these are the cohorts in our sample that have reached their first reenlistment decision point by the end of FY10.

Defining "gold standard" (GS) recruits/Marines

We begin by defining a subset of highly qualified recruits or Marines who meet the majority of the HD/LD/CS PMOS requirements (those initially identifiable by MCRC and MMEA-6). We refer to these as GS recruits or Marines. We started by determining the minimum qualifications for accessing to our 11 focus PMOSs.

Table 5 presents an overview of the requirements for our 11 HD/LD/CS PMOSs. It shows the major qualifying criteria that apply across specialties, in addition to criteria that apply to only a few. For example, all PMOSs have an ASVAB test score requirement, and the table shows the composite score required for each. Other criteria in the table apply to only a few PMOSs; for example, only PMOSs 0321 and 2336 require a Class 1 PFT.

Table 5. PMOS requirements[a]

PMOS	Test score requirement	Lowest starting grade	Security requirement	Must take polygraph?	Must be citizen?	Perceptual requirement	Fitness requirement
0211	GT 110, DLPT[b] 2/2	Corporal	Top secret	Yes	Yes	Not listed	
0231	GT 100	Private	Top secret	No	Yes	Not listed	
0241	GT 100	Sergeant	Top secret	No	Yes	Normal color and stereoscopic sight	
0321	GT 105	Private	Secret	No	Yes	Not listed	Class I PFT
0511	GT 110	Private	Top secret	No	Yes	Not listed	
2671	GT 105, DLAB[c] 110	Private	Top secret	No	Yes	No speech or hearing defect	
2834	EL 115	Sergeant	Secret	No	Yes	Not listed	
6114	MM 105	Private	Not listed	No	No	Normal color perception	
0861	GT 100	Private	Secret	No	Yes	Normal color and correctable to 20/20	
2336	GT 110	Sergeant	Final secret	No	Yes	Normal color vision	Class I PFT
2871	EL 115	Private	Secret	No	Yes	Not listed	

a. Source: MCO 1200.17B, *Military Occupational Specialties Manual,* 15 Apr. 2010.
b. DLPT is the Defense Language Proficiency Test.
c. DLAB is the Defense Language Aptitude Battery.

Our accession cohort dataset does not include *all* measures of PMOS qualification, whether due to a lack of data or because a requirement is specific to only one or two PMOSs. We did not have data, for example, on recruits' or Marines' vision or their ability to pass a polygraph. In addition, an important requirement for many of these PMOSs is the ability to get a security clearance, but we do not observe a recruit's ability to get a clearance at the accession or FTAP point. Our goal is simply to determine how many recruits and Marines who possess the minimum qualifications for HD/LD/CS PMOSs, according to what we can document, *do* in fact exist. We assume that recruits and FTAP Marines who meet the GS standards would pass a polygraph and qualify for a clearance because they have no moral waivers[20] or in-service disciplinary actions or jeopardy.

20. But we allowed some irrelevant waivers to be included in GS, such as those who entered with a dependent or were from another Service.

For the purpose of this analysis, a GS recruit at the accession point is one who:

- Scored 110 or better on the General Technical (GT) section of the ASVAB
- Scored 105 or better on the Mechanical Maintenance (MM) section of the ASVAB
- Scored 115 or better on the Electronics (EL) section of the ASVAB
- Has no felony, serious, or drug waiver
- Is a high school diploma graduate (HSDG).[21]

A GS FTAP Marine is one who meets the same criteria as a GS recruit, but who also:

- Has a Class 1 PFT
- Has no courts-martial or Non-Judicial Punishments (NJPs)
- Is recommended and eligible for reenlistment.

Qualified accessions

Background

In this subsection, we demonstrate that the manning problems of the 11 HD/LD/CS specialties are not caused by a lack of sufficiently qualified recruits or Marines according to our GS metric. Figure 3 shows the number of GS recruits at accession. Roughly 5,000 to 6,000 GS recruits have been accessed annually since FY02.[22]

Figure 3 shows the number of accessions in particular categories of GT scores.[23] This figure illustrates how little is gained from adding

21. Because of lack of available data, we do not consider citizenship status in our definition of GS.
22. See appendix D for more on the GT score cutoff for GS recruits.
23. Appendix D provides this information in more detail.

accessions who are otherwise qualified but have GT scores of 100–104 or 105–109. For example, in the FY09 accession cohort, 2.8 percent scored 110–114 on the GT, 105 or better on the MM, 115 or more on the EL, *and* were HSDGs.[24] In recent years, at least 13 percent of accessions have been HSDGs with EL, MM, and GT scores that qualify them for all HD/LD/CS PMOSs.

Figure 3. Number of accessions[a] that are HSDGs, have an MM score of 105 or greater, an EL score of 115 or greater, and a GT score in the ranges shown below[b]



a. Source: CNA database.
b. In addition, those with felony, serious, or drug waivers have been excluded from this population.

24. The conclusion to be drawn from figure 3 is that, once you have selected recruits with no felony, serious, or drug waivers, and HSDG, MM of 105, and an EL score of 115, there is little to gained from loosening just the GT standard. To expand the pool significantly beyond GS, the Corps would need to loosen a criterion other than test score (e.g., a particular waiver status) or have a single test score (e.g., just MM or EL).

Potential policy changes and their implications: Consider entry-level accessions for HD/LD/CS PMOSs that start at E1

One method to increase accessions to HD/LD/CS PMOSs is to consider having recruits who meet GS qualifications fill specific PMOSs, vice being recruited to a PEF. Currently, recruiters do not sell a specific occupation but rather recruit a future Marine. This approach has not been completely successful, however, in providing the Marine Corps with enough Marines in the HD/LD/CS PMOSs to meet manning requirements and sustain these PMOSs.

A second method would be to identify, early in bootcamp, during Marine Combat Training (MCT), and up to the point of entering a PMOS school, those recruits/Marines who meet the GS but are in PEFs that don't require their basic qualifications. This group could be aggressively recruited by the Recruit Liaison Section (RLS), on a case-by-case basis, to fill the HD/LD/CS PMOSs. Special incentives could be used for this purpose. This would require an active solicitation effort while the Marine is progressing through entry-level training and incorporating all aspects of the HRDP and its stakeholders. In almost all cases, this also could require the recruit to change the contract under which he/she enlisted: Over the last 10 years, only 3.7 percent of GS accessions enter the Marine Corps on open contracts, and 96.3 percent enter on guaranteed contracts.

Is there a sufficiently qualified FTAP population?

Another possibility is that manning problems emerge from a lack of qualified reenlisters. When these Marines opt to leave the USMC at the end of their first terms, maintaining a sufficient number of careerists to train, mentor, and lead the newly PMOS-qualified Marines becomes difficult.

Low Zone A reenlistment rates in the HD/LD/CS PMOSs may be caused by insufficient numbers of recommended and eligible Marines. In this subsection, we evaluate the quality of the FTAP cohort of Marines who hold HD/LD/CS PMOSs. We determine how many are qualified to reenlist and the propensity of those Marines to actually reenlist. This tells us whether a shortage of qualified

reenlisters or a lack of reenlistment propensity is the main cause of the manning problems faced by HD/LD/CS PMOSs. In addition, we evaluate the size of the eligible and qualified population (according to our GS methodology) in *other* PMOSs to determine the population of Marines from which the HD/LD/CS PMOSs could potentially recruit.

We compare the recommended and eligible status of Marines in the HD/LD/CS PMOSs with those in other PMOSs. Figure 4 shows the percentage who are recommended and eligible for reenlistment, for those with reenlistment decisions in FY03 through FY10 (these correspond roughly to the FY99–FY06 accession cohorts). We see no evidence that HD/LD/CS Marines are less likely to be recommended and eligible than other PMOSs. In fact, in each FY, a higher percentage of those making reenlistment decisions in HD/LD/CS communities are recommended and eligible than those who are not.

Figure 4. Percentage of FTAP Marines recommended and eligible for reenlistment (FY03–FY10[a])



a. Source: CNA database.

In addition, we show in figure 5 that, of the recommended and eligible Marines, a higher percentage of those in the HD/LD/CS PMOSs than in other PMOSs are GS. The percentage of non-HD/LD/CS Marines who are both GS and recommended and eligible for reenlistment ranges from 4 to 8 percent over this period, while the corresponding range for those in HD/LD/CS PMOSs is 10 to 18 percent. The quality of Marines in the FTAP population, therefore, does not appear to be what is driving HD/LD/CS manning problems.

Figure 5. Percentage of FTAP Marines who are both GS and recommended and eligible for reenlistment (FY03–FY10)[a]



a. Source: CNA database.

The quality of the career force is determined not only by those who are recommended and eligible for reenlistment, but, of that population, which Marines choose to reenlist. In figure 6, we illustrate the share of recommended and eligible Marines who choose to reenlist each year, in both HD/LD/CS and non-HD/LD/CS communities. As the figure shows, there is a significant number of recommended and eligible Marines who choose *not* to reenlist each year and thus leave the Marine Corps. This is true in both the HD/LD/CS and

non-HD/LD/CS PMOSs. The significant number of nonreenlisters in each fiscal year, particularly those in the non-HD/LD/CS PMOSs, is a potential source for recruiting FTAP Marines to make lateral moves into the HD/LD/CS PMOSs. Note that some highly qualified Marines in non-HD/LD/CS PMOSs cannot reenlist because of boatspace caps. This implies that earlier, focused, and increased efforts to aggressively recruit for HD/LD/CS PMOSs from other PMOSs could help reduce the current manning shortages in the HD/LD/CS PMOSs.

Figure 6. Percentage of recommended and eligible Marines who reenlist, in HD/LD/CS and non-HD/LD/CS PMOSs, for decision years FY03–FY10[a]



a. Source: CNA database.

To better determine the plausibility of this proposal, we examine the number of nonreenlisters who are GS Marines in each year. This is one segment of the relevant population for recruiting into the HD/LD/CS PMOSs. As figure 7 shows, there is a sizable population of nonreenlisters each year (whether from the HD/LD/CS or non-HD/LD/CS communities) who are GS Marines. In recent years, there

have been 800 to 1,000 Marines in this category annually. If only a small fraction of these Marines had been convinced or incentivized to reenlist into the HD/LD/CS communities, the manning shortages in those PMOSs could have been mitigated and possibly ended.

This subsection's findings suggest that there *are* sufficiently qualified entry-level recruits and FTAP Marines to fill the manning requirements of the HD/LD/CS PMOSs—at either the accession point or the first reenlistment lateral move point. This suggests that more and earlier emphasis needs to be applied to getting the right recruits and Marines into the *right* PMOSs vice the PMOSs in which they may initially want to serve. This would require starting earlier to identify qualified Marines, and increases in the incentives offered for choosing HD/LD/CS specialties.

Figure 7. Number of nonreenlisting, GS FTAP Marines, FY03–FY10[a]



a. Source: CNA database.

Lateral moves

Background

In this subsection, we discuss the Marine Corps' primary policy option for managing its career force manning shortages—lateral moves. Per Marine Corps Order 1220.5J, "Enlisted Lateral Move Program," lateral moves are defined as the "reclassification of a Marine from one career track to another" and can be used as a type of enlisted career force control (ECFC). There are, in general, two types of lateral moves: FTAP and careerist. FTAP lateral moves are those conducted at the time of first-term reenlistment, whereas careerist lateral moves are those of Marines who have *previously* reenlisted in the Marine Corps. Here, we analyze the characteristics of those who made lateral moves from FY08 through FY10 and use these findings to recommend how lateral moves could continue to be used (and possibly refined) to help mitigate the manning problems in the HD/LD/CS PMOSs.[25]

Figure 8 shows the total number of lateral movers to our selected PMOSs from FY08 through FY10. The first seven PMOSs, on the left-hand side, are entry-level PMOSs, whereas those to the right are lateral move only (these start at the rank of corporal or sergeant). As expected, the majority of lateral moves occur in PMOSs that rely *solely* on lateral moves as their accession source. Among the entry-level PMOSs, we find that 0231 and 0321 had the largest number of lateral movers. This suggests that these particular PMOSs faced shortages in the career ranks partly because of increased requirements. In addition to the number of Marines making lateral moves within this time period, it is important to consider the percentage of all new accessions to these PMOSs that were composed of lateral-move Marines. This information, for the entry-level PMOSs only, is presented in figure 9. We find that, even within entry-level PMOSs, lateral moves make up a significant share of total inputs in many cases. They were, for example, roughly 20 percent of newly acquired Marines in 0231 and 2671, while nearly 30 percent in 0321 and 0511. This indicates

25. We thank MMEA-61 (Reenlistment section) for providing these data.

that, particularly within these PMOSs, lateral moves make a significant contribution to manning.

Figure 8. Lateral moves[a] to entry-level and lateral-move-only PMOSs (FY08–FY10)[b]



a. Source: Analysis of data from MMEA-61.
b. PMOS 2871 had too few lateral movers (only three) to allow for meaningful statistical analysis.

In figure 10, we present the distribution of lateral-move Marines who made their moves as part of their FTAP reenlistments or as career Marines. As illustrated, most lateral moves from FY08 through FY10 took place as part of a Marine's first reenlistment (FTAP), regardless of whether the PMOS was entry level. This is to be expected, given the associated costs of a careerist lateral move and the lower return on investment that the USMC receives from careerist lateral moves, as reflected by the Marine's year of service (YOS) at that point. The fact that, in recent years, FTAP Marines have made up the bulk of the population of lateral movers into our 11 HD/LD/CS PMOSs suggests that the USMC should focus any efforts to identify qualified Marines within the FTAP population.

Figure 9. Lateral movers[a] as a percentage of total yearly inputs (accessions plus lateral movers): Entry-level PMOSs[b] (FY08–FY10)



a. Source: Analysis of data from MMEA-61.
b. PMOS 2871 had too small a number (only three lateral moves) to allow for meaningful analysis.

We now evaluate the quality of Marines who previously executed lateral moves, as measured by GT scores, PFT class, and the presence of any punitive actions. Although we have previously identified a significant supply of GS Marines, here we are evaluating whether these Marines make lateral moves. Figure 11 presents the average GT scores for Marines who laterally moved into our 11 PMOSs during FY08 through FY10. As noted in the figure, the average scores for all HD/LD/CS PMOSs were well above 100 and range from a high of 121 (for PMOS 2871, based on fewer than 10 Marines), to a low of 111 (for PMOS 0861).

In addition to GT scores, we evaluated the average PFT scores of lateral movers (see figure 12). It is not surprising that the two PMOSs with requirements for Class 1 PFT scores (2336 and 0321) have nearly 100 percent of known scores with Class 1 PFTs. Even among the PMOSs with lesser physical requirements, however, by far the most common PFT score is Class 1. This indicates that the Marines who laterally move are physically fit, with very few exceptions. These findings

Figure 10. Number of lateral movers who are FTAP or career Marines (FY08–FY10)[a]



a. PMOS 2871 had too few lateral movers to allow for meaningful analysis.

Figure 11. Average GT scores of lateral movers[a] (FY08–FY10)[b]



a. Source: Analysis of data from MMEA-61.
b. PMOS 2871 had too few lateral movers (only three) to allow for meaningful analysis.

Figure 12. Distribution of PFT score classes for lateral movers[a] (FY08–FY10)[b]



a. Source: Analysis of data from MMEA-61.
b. PMOS 2871 had too few lateral movers to allow for meaningful analysis.

of relatively high quality among lateral movers suggest that there are, in fact, qualified Marines with an interest in transitioning to one of the HD/LD/CS PMOSs. There is strong evidence that an increased focus on identifying GS Marines earlier in the fiscal year and encouraging them to laterally move could improve HD/LD/CS manning.

In figure 13, we show by PMOS the percentage of lateral-move Marines who had a punitive action (including court-martial or NJP). Such actions occurred while the Marines were in the Corps.[26]

In most cases, the percentage of lateral-move Marines with some form of disciplinary action in their records ranges from 10 to 24 percent. Percentages range from a low of 7.1 percent for 0511s to a high of 24.5 percent for 0241s. The fact that nearly one in four 0241s had disciplinary actions in their records indicates that negative information has not been considered a "showstopper" for a Marine to laterally

26. We understand that Marines with punitive actions will have more difficulty being approved for lateral moves in FY11 and beyond.

Figure 13. Percentage of lateral movers[a] with disciplinary actions in their records (FY08–FY10)[b]



a. Source: Analysis of data from MMEA-61.
b. PMOS 2871 had too small a number to be statistically meaningful.

move and obtain a security clearance; however, recall that our GS Marine classification omits those with such actions. This may have contributed to the continued manning challenges faced by these PMOSs because Marines with disciplinary actions are probably also more likely to be involuntarily separated, to attrite as a result of ECFC actions, or to be reclassified based on the loss of a required clearance. Thus, the use of a GS metric to identify high-quality Marines to approach regarding the possibility of a lateral move might help to mitigate the problem because our GS does not include Marines with any sort of punitive action or waiver. It is reasonable to assume that GS FTAP Marines would be less likely to attrite from qualifying schools for any other reason as well.

Potential policy changes and their implications

Recruit GS Marines aggressively and early to laterally move into the HD/LD/CS PMOSs

As shown earlier, each FTAP Marine cohort has a sizable population of GS Marines. We recommend that the Marine Corps institutionalize the practice of contacting GS FTAP Marines early in the fiscal year and urge them to consider a lateral move to a short PMOS.[27]

Change current lateral move policy to allow career planners and unit leaders to encourage qualified Marines to laterally move to HD/LD/CS PMOSs before boatspaces are filled and PMOSs are closed to reenlistments

MM would be responsible for identifying the target population of Marines.[28] Unit commanders and their career planners would be required to counsel Marines on their eligibility to move to an HD/LD/CS PMOS. Targeting these GS Marines, even in PMOSs that will have open boatspaces, will not hurt MM's ability to sustain the required numbers of fully qualified, proven performers that the PMOS needs to meet requirements, nor will it degrade the quality of that PMOS. This would simply be a recruitment process of GS Marines to fill a greater institutional need. If only a few accept, it will help fill requirements.[29]

Here we describe how this might be done. Figure 14 identifies the most common feeder PMOSs for past lateral moves into the

27. To our knowledge, MM first began the practice of contacting highly qualified Marines and encouraging them to consider applying for lateral moves to a short PMOS (i.e., PMOS 0211) in May 2010. We believe that this initiative has promise and that this practice should begin even earlier in the fiscal year and be written into policy.

28. This is one way to implement the new MARADMIN [1] of 5 May 2011.

29. On 1 May 2010, MMEA-6 identified 5,000 FTAP Marines who qualified for PMOS 0211 and contacted many about executing an FTAP lateral move to that PMOS with a $90,000 bonus. Despite that focused effort, 22 boatspaces went unfilled. If the effort had begun 8 months earlier (before start of fiscal year), more boatspaces might have been filled.

HD/LD/CS communities. In other words, these are the most common PMOSs that Marines have moved *from* to join the HD/LD/CS PMOSs.

Figure 14. Primary feeder PMOSs for lateral moves[a] into the HD/LD/CS PMOSs[b]



a. Source: Analysis of data from MMEA-61.
b. PMOS 2871 had too few lateral movers to allow for meaningful analysis.

By virtue of being feeder PMOSs, these are the PMOSs that historically have had more Marines of GS quality than were needed or could be retained in the PMOS. Although no single PMOS feeds most of the lateral moves to any particular HD/LD/CS PMOS, the same handful of PMOSs supply relatively large shares to each of the HD/LD/CS PMOSs. For example, PMOS 0311 is a large feeder PMOS for 8 of the 11 HD/LD/CS PMOSs, and 0151 is a significant contributor to 5 of the 11 HD/LD/CS PMOSs.

Next, we identify whether these feeder PMOSs have a sizable pool of GS Marines from which the Marine Corps might recruit to HD/LD/CS PMOSs. Table 6 presents pooled numbers of GS FTAP reenlisters and nonreenlisters for each feeder PMOS for FY08 through FY10.

As table 6 shows, there are a fair number of GS Marines (in both the reenlisting and nonreenlisting populations) who could have potentially been convinced to laterally move to an HD/LD/CS PMOS. In contrast, appendix E shows that open contract GS Marines went to PMOSs that are not HD/LD/CS; they also should be targeted.

Table 6. GS FTAP Marines (FY08–FY10)[a]

PMOS	Reenlisters	Non-reenlisters
0121	31	22
0151	18	19
0311	98	333
0341	11	66
0352	14	39
0621	16	39
0811	7	28
0844	9	13
1371	10	46
2111	10	14
2674	10	9
2822	1	4
2831	5	6
2844	19	28
2846	14	14
2847	24	15
3043	35	46
3051	1	3
3521	17	49
3531	15	28
3533	0	1
5811	19	39
6122	0	4
6413	4	10
6492	10	15
7212	4	6

a. Source: CNA database.

At a minimum, write policy to allow qualified Marines to laterally move *before* the boatspace cap is met in their PMOSs, preferably at the very beginning of the fiscal year

Under current written policy, FTAP Marines cannot laterally move until their PMOSs have filled their boatspace requirements. Allowing qualified Marines, who can be recruited into HD/LD/CS PMOSs, to

execute their lateral moves before the 100-percent fill of their own PMOS boatspaces will require a change of written policy. According to MCO 1220.5J:

> To maximize its return on training and to minimize turbulence in the force, the Marine Corps will meet its first-term reenlistment requirements in each MOS by reenlisting first-term Marines who are currently in the MOS....In those cases where the Marine Corps has an open FTAP MOS, selective reenlistment bonuses and lateral moves will be used to meet the requirements.

Thus, another policy change that could potentially increase lateral moves to short PMOSs would be to allow 03XXs (and other such PMOSs) that have large numbers who already have to execute a lateral move to continue in the Corps to laterally move at the beginning of the fiscal year—well before the boatspace cap is met. The USMC could identify and address manning shortages *earlier* in the year by aggressively recruiting qualified Marines for HD/LD/CS communities.[30] Note that many FTAP Marines might actually not be a "good fit" in their PMOSs even though they have proved adequate in those jobs.

Consider older accessions as a possible source of filling lateral-move-only PMOS shortages

In setting the qualifications for lateral-move-only PMOSs, the Corps has limited these PMOSs to Marines of a certain rank and experience level, as measured by years of service. For example, our four lateral-move-only PMOSs start at corporal or sergeant. The reasoning is that these PMOSs need more mature, experienced Marines.

Attaining the rank of corporal or sergeant might not be the only way to man those PMOSs with mature Marines. Another way would be to open these lateral-move-only PMOSs to GS recruits who are 21 or older when they start bootcamp. Although they would have attained neither rank nor service experience, they would likely be more mature by virtue of their age and life experiences. These recruits could be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Figure 15 shows that there

30. MARADMIN 273/11 allows the earlier identification of qualified Marines for highly technical MOSs. Our recommendation includes all HD/LD/CS PMOSs.

are relatively large numbers of mature (i.e., 21 years or older) recruits who are highly qualified, and thus might be able to satisfy these HD/LD/CS maturity requirements.[31]

Figure 15. Number of GS recruits[a] by age



a. Source: CNA database.

Consider increasing school seats and recruiting lateral moves in years 2 and 3, before the FTAP reenlistment point

The current process for lateral moves allows Marines to laterally move at their FTAP reenlistment decision point. It addresses shortages in

31. An additional benefit of recruiting older accessions for lateral-move PMOSs is that they access during non-JJAS months to a greater degree than do younger recruits (see appendix F).

the HD/LD/CS enlisted grade structure that may have started years before, when school seats went unfilled in a particular cohort. This lag time in addressing the shortage creates gaps in year groups. The short cohort will promote too fast, without gaining the experience needed for greater responsibility.

Instead of addressing shortages at the FTAP reenlistment point, it would be better to address gaps immediately, with second- or third-year Marines. The process could work as follows:

1. Identify in every HD/LD/CS PMOS what should have been the steady-state input to maintain the MOS.
2. Identify by name and PMOS each Marine in over PMOSs who meets short PMOS requirements for a potential lateral move.
3. Offer the qualifying Marine an early lateral move.

By addressing the shortfall more quickly, the Marine Corps would (a) reduce wasted school seats due to nonavailability of initial accessions, (b) increase promotions for over PMOSs, (c) slow down promotions for HD/LD/CS PMOSs, and (d) reduce the amount of SRB money spent on FTAP lateral moves. It also would fill gaps with an early-career Marine, allowing the lateral mover more time to get accustomed to working in the new PMOS before assuming a leadership role.

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Summary and discussion

Our analyses have revealed several potential sources of qualified Marines that the Marine Corps could tap to address PMOS shortages. These sources are large enough to make a significant difference in the fill rates of HD/LD/CS PMOSs. To attract these so-called gold standard (GS) Marines, the Corps should consider changes in its processes and policies to access recruits or Marines who qualify for our 11 PMOSs.[32] In this section, we summarize these potential sources to fill short PMOSs and the policy considerations associated with each.

For entry-level PMOSs, we found the following six possible sources of high-quality personnel.

High-quality accessions choosing PMOSs that are not short

The percentage of recruits who meet our GS criteria ranges from 9.2 percent in FY00 to 15.7 percent in FY09. These percentages mean that *each year, the Marine Corps accesses between 3,000 and 5,000 recruits who could eventually fill <u>any</u> short entry-level PMOSs* according to test score requirements, high school diploma, and waiver standards.[33]

The problem is not that high-quality accessions to fill these spots do not exist. The problem is that qualified accessions do not always choose to fill (or have not thought of filling) billets in these PMOSs. This implies that the challenge is to determine ways to channel these recruits to the PMOSs for which they are most needed and for which they have the requisite entry-level qualifications. MCRC, in accor-

32. Appendix G details processes and policies initiated by MMEA-6 and MP since February 2010. Our suggestions supplement these initiatives.

33. The number of accessions who qualify for *at least one* short entry-level PMOS is much higher. We use the GS accessions to illustrate a lower bound on the number of accessions who are qualified.

dance with the information contained in MEMO-01 and as planned for by MP, currently recruits to PEFs, which incorporate both HD/LD/CS PMOSs and others. By exception, MCRC is directed to recruit directly to a PMOS, such as 0321. We know that recruiters do not sell specific PMOSs but rather follow the long-standing tradition of recruiting a civilian to become a basic Marine. This practice, however, has not historically been able to fill HD/LD/CS PMOS requirements. If the entry-level accession efforts fail to meet requirements, the numbers will not be there to support career force needs.

We recommend that the Corps recruit more directly to these PMOSs, by either implementing more PMOS-specific PEFs or directing more GS recruits into open contracts to ensure that more GS recruits enter bootcamp under such an obligation. Once in bootcamp, GS recruits on open contracts or in PEFs that exceed the numbers required by MEMO-01 should be aggressively recruited before training day 45 to 52 to change their contracts to one of the HD/LD/CS PMOSs. This effort could be extended into the School of Infantry if needed.

Recruits interested in lateral-move-only PMOSs

By definition, a lateral-move-only PMOS is one that requires a Marine to start his or her career in another PMOS. We recommend that *occfield sponsors and PMOS specialists reassess whether some lateral-move-only PMOSs could be converted to entry-level PMOSs*. Recently, the Marine Corps adopted this approach for PMOS 2834, which merged with PMOS 2831 in October 2010. One advantage to changing a lateral-move-only PMOS to an entry-level PMOS is that it provides an expected source of Marines (from accession). The disadvantage is that it might make it more difficult for recruiters by adding PMOSs to the PEFs currently in use.

High-quality older recruits (age 21 or older)

Our analysis shows that several PMOSs that start at the FTAP reenlistment point (corporal or sergeant) have a history of not meeting requirements. The Marine Corps should consider using age as a proxy for experience and converting a lateral-move-only PMOS, such as 0211, into an entry-level accession PMOS. In our analysis, we

identify GS recruits who are 21 years or older at accession. Our assumption is that their life experiences, while not the same as in-service experiences, could support this policy change. Our analysis shows that 700 to 1,000 GS accessions each year are age 21 or older. To tap into this source of Marines for short PMOSs, the Corps would need to revise the lateral-move-only policy to allow older GS Marines who have not attained sufficient rank to enter the PMOS at accession.

High-quality reenlisters from PMOSs that are not short

We showed that each year about 700 to 1,400 reenlisters from non-short PMOSs are GS Marines who could qualify for short PMOSs. Based on these figures, the Marine Corps could encourage these high-quality reenlisters to move into short PMOSs. SRB levels are important factors (perhaps the most important factors), but other incentives could be considered, such as more choices of duty station.

High-quality nonreenlisters from PMOSs that are not short

As noted earlier, about 10 to 18 percent of Marines who choose not to reenlist (about 400 to 1,000 per year) are GS Marines. *The problem is that these Marines choose to leave the Marine Corps, but they are a potential source of Marines to fill short PMOSs if they would stay.* We recommend that HQMC develop a policy that identifies these Marines and provides commanders and career planners with the information they need to interview them. Commanders should be responsible for counseling these Marines before the fiscal year begins to tell them of the Marine Corps' need for them to continue their service in an HD/LD/CS PMOS rather than in their current PMOS. Furthermore, we recommend specifically incentivizing these Marines to reenlist and acquire the PMOS. The loss of these Marines does not improve the overall health of the Corps.

Each year, roughly 50 percent of recruits join the Corps in June, July, August, and September (JJAS). Consequently, many FTAP Marines will leave active duty during JJAS, and those who have not reenlisted by that time in the fiscal year most likely have decided that they are not going to do so. Had they been targeted or aggressively recruited

at the beginning of the fiscal year, they might have laterally moved and reenlisted in the PMOSs where they were most needed.

High-quality lateral movers

Lateral movers tend to be of high quality, with Class 1 PFTs and high GT scores. To more effectively tap this source, *written policy should be changed so that lateral moves into short PMOSs are permitted before boatspaces are filled in the Marines' current PMOSs;* current written policy prohibits such moves from taking place.[34] Our analyses show that the following PMOSs have a high number of GS Marines: 0121, 0151, 0311, 0341, 0352, 0621, 0811, 0844, 1371, 2111, 2674, 2822, 2831, 2844, 2846, 2847, 3043, 3051, 3521, 3533, 5811, 6122, 6413, 6492, and 7212. Furthermore, Marines from these PMOSs often laterally move into short PMOSs. But many don't, especially those who accessed in JJAS.

We also note that waiting until a Marine's FTAP reenlistment point to recruit lateral movers means that shortages are filled several years after the gap in enlisted grade structure was first created (often by lack of a qualified accession to fill a school seat). We encourage the Marine Corps to consider increasing school seats, and identifying and recruiting qualified Marines for lateral moves before the FTAP year (e.g., recruit second- and third-year Marines). This change would fill cohort gaps more quickly and replace them with Marines who are close in age and experience. The current practice of waiting until the FTAP reenlistment point means that vacant school seats are corrected years after the fact by Marines who have already spent several years in a different PMOS.

We encourage the Marine Corps to consider the aforementioned policy changes at this time because accessions and reenlistments are sufficiently high, at least partially because of a weak civilian economy. When reenlistments and accessions are doing well, long-term improvements can be made with less risk of failing to meet goals.

34. We understand that written policy lags behind actual practice, which currently allows Marines to apply for a lateral move to an HD/LD/CS PMOS at the beginning of the fiscal year.

Table 7 summarizes our findings and recommendations.

Table 7. Summary of major findings in policy implications of this study

Finding	Possible implications	Potential benefits	Potential drawbacks of proposal
Every year, there are about 3,000 to 6,000 GS accessions who could potentially fill short PMOSs, but only about 10 percent do.	Consider providing an option for GS recruits to enter as "open contracts" that could classify into any short PMOS.[a]	This would reduce time awaiting training and make it easier to fill training seats when there are unexpected vacancies.	This would involve a major change in the way MCRC operates and changes to inputs to the Recruit Distribution Model.
This is a time of historically high reenlistment rates and quality as measured by traditional measures (such as high school diploma status and AFQT scores).	Consider a pilot program that allows SMEs from short PMOSs to (i) work as a recruiter and/or (ii) develop recruiting materials directed at convincing accessions to volunteer for PEFs that include short PMOSs.	Recruiters are important influencers of which PEF a recruit chooses. Having a Marine from an HD/LD/CS community recruit and making recruiting materials available would encourage recruits to access into PEFs that include HD/LD/CS PMOSs.	This would involve a change in the way senior enlisted from short PMOSs are used. In most years, they are needed more in their PMOS than in recruiting.
There are many GS FTAP Marines who could potentially move laterally to short PMOSs (700 to 1,400 per year).	Consider removing the requirement, in writing, that the original PMOS must have all boatspaces filled before you can apply for a lateral move. This would only apply to Marines from PMOSs that are expected to be oversubscribed.	This would encourage Marines to think about entering a short PMOS earlier in the year.	This would change the way lateral moves are done. There would be some risk that the original PMOS would not be filled.
A considerable number of GS FTAP Marines could potentially make lateral moves to short PMOSs (700 to 1,400 per year).	Consider encouraging qualified Marines to apply for short PMOSs. Two options would be to offer SRBs for lateral moves or use a duty station option as an incentive.	Using a duty station option in addition to SRBs might draw some Marines to short PMOSs.	Adding a duty station option would make monitors' jobs more difficult by limiting the billets that Marines could fill.

Table 7. Summary of major findings in policy implications of this study

Finding	Possible implications	Potential benefits	Potential drawbacks of proposal
There are many accessions 21 or older who are GS (700 to 1,200 per year).	Consider allowing GS accessions who are 21 or over to apply for lateral-move-only PMOSs.	This would expand the pool of potential entrants to the lateral-move-only PMOSs.	This would require a redefinition of the lateral-move-only PMOSs, to include age as a criterion for eligibility. It is possible that new training materials would need to be developed.
There are 400 to 1,000 GS FTAP non-reenlisters per year.	Send letters or other communications to GS FTAP Marines before they make their reenlistment decisions. The letter should urge them to consider reenlisting in short PMOSs.[b]	This would increase the number of Marines who seriously consider laterally moving to a short PMOS.	There are costs (in time and effort) to contacting GS Marines who have not yet reenlisted.
Some unexpected training seat vacancies go unfilled because of communication difficulties between schoolhouses and MMEA-11.	Consider facilitating better/earlier communication between the schoolhouses and MMEA-11. One way to do this would be through weekly meetings (via phone or internet).	Earlier warning of unused training seats would give the system more time to reclassify recruits before they finish bootcamp.	This would involve a major change in the way MMEA-11 and the schoolhouses do business, and it would create more meetings.
Under current policy, gaps in filling school seats are primarily addressed with FTAP lateral movers, years after the gap was created.	Consider increasing school seats to about 60 percent[c] of annual requirement year round, and recruiting qualified second- and third-year Marines to fill cohort gaps.	This would fill enlisted grade structure gaps more quickly, increase promotions for over PMOSs, and reduce P2T2.	This would require "buying"/requesting school seats that would be filled during peak throughput (i.e., JJAS accessions) but would result in empty seats at other times.

a. This proposal is similar to the "EAGLE" program proposed about 10 years ago.
b. MM started doing this in FY10, and MARADMIN 273/11 makes it policy for recruiting to highly technical PMOSs [1]. However, our recommendation is to recruit for *all* HD/LD/CS MOSs, not only those that are highly technical.
c. The rationale for 60 percent of annual requirement is as follows: About 50 percent of total accessions enter during JJAS; ideally, there would be enough training seats to handle this yearly peak. Another 10 percent capacity would allow surge capacity and help accommodate reservists.

Appendix A: Discussions with MOS subject matter experts

We spoke with the monitor and/or the MOS specialist and occfield sponsor of each of the 11 focus PMOSs. The specialists did not dispute that there were sufficient GS recruits and Marines to alleviate shortages in their PMOSs, but they did not always agree with our recommended courses of action. This appendix attempts to describe their thoughts on our recommendations, and the reasons why their PMOS is CS or HD/LD.

Lateral-move PMOSs

PMOS 2336

For this lateral-move-only PMOS, we talked with the occfield sponsor, MOS specialist, and monitor. These Marines disagreed with our recommendation to consider making PMOS 2336 an entry-level specialty, or to allow GS Marines to become PMOS 2336 once they turned 21 even if they had not been promoted to sergeant. These specialists felt that one of the most important reasons that Marines' attrition from Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) school is lower than attrition for other Services is the requirement that a Marine be both 21 or over and at least a sergeant. They thought that rank is a better indicator of maturity than age.

These Marines cautioned us that there is not currently an overall shortage of PMOS 2336. Nevertheless, the PMOS 2336 specialists noted a shortage of PMOS 2336 at the ranks of gunnery sergeant, master sergeant, and master gunnery sergeant. They attributed this shortage to the fact that PMOS 2336 requirements rose so quickly in response to the Marine Corps' growth to 202K. According to TFSD statistics, PMOS 2336 requirements will grow 73 percent (385 to 667)

between 2005 and 2016. This is the largest percentage requirement increase of any of our 11 focus PMOSs.

The PMOS 2336 specialists mentioned that a few years ago the occfield sponsor recommended a consolidation of units, which would have decreased requirements for EOD technicians. This recommendation was not accepted.

PMOS 0211

We spoke with the monitor for intelligence PMOSs at MM. He thought that a major problem for PMOS 0211 was the high attrition of Marines at the schoolhouse (approximately 35 percent). The training requirement published in the TIP has seen a large increase between FY06 and FY10 (from 120 to 190, a 58-percent increase), which suggests that there is an attempt to increase the number of Marines starting school (perhaps to compensate for a high attrition rate). However, there is a fairly large backlog of Marines (60) waiting to start PMOS 0211 training. This problem is partly because of the school's length (121 days). PMOS 0211 is the only specialty with a fill rate of under 70 percent. According to statistics from TFSD, PMOS 0211 also expects a large (48.1-percent) requirement increase—from 582 in FY05 to 862 in FY16.

PMOS 0241

Our discussion with the intelligence monitor indicated that PMOS 0241 needed greater student throughput to fix periodic shortages. He indicated that PMOS 0241 used to be an Air Force school; now that it is a Marine Corps school, it needs a throughput greater than the current 34 (the TIP lists a training requirement of 49 for FY10, and has been 49 from FY08 to FY10). One possibility would be to add a third class. PMOS 0241 has a class length of 168 and offers an SRB for lateral movers of $30,750 (at E3). The requirements increase for PMOS 0241 will be large—36 percent (from 368 in FY05 to 502 in FY16).

When we brought up the idea of making PMOS 0241 an entry-level PMOS, the monitor said that this has been tried before, with PMOS 0261, and had not worked well.

PMOS 2834

PMOS 2834 has one of the highest test score standards in the Marine Corps, requiring an EL score of 115. When we talked with the monitor for PMOS 2834, he told us that the merger of PMOS 2834 and PMOS 2831 was going to help the PMOS stay healthy, by providing a natural pool of Marines entering the specialty. As we mentioned earlier, FY11 is the first time that the PMOSs have been formally merged, so it is too early to tell how successful the change will be. For the moment, however, it looks as if the merger might be helpful.

The merged PMOS 2834/31 has a shortage of Marines to fill E3 billets, and it is not certain that the Corps will be able to overcome this shortage since there are only three classes for PMOS 2834 per year, each with a maximum of 18 students. Class size is limited by the number of instructors, equipment, and space. This seems to be a major factor that limits the ability to fill the new PMOS in the future.

The monitor indicated that he was skeptical about "throwing money at the problem" by offering huge SRBs. At one point, there was an SRB of up to $90,000 to encourage Marines to make lateral moves to PMOS 2834. But this might have attracted Marines who were unqualified by test score (and had to get waivers) or were motivated to laterally move for the wrong reasons. He said that waivered lateral movers have done poorly in PMOS 2834 training.

Entry-level PMOSs

PMOS 0231

Our discussion with the intelligence monitor indicated that PMOS 0231 has reenlistment problems. Marines who are trained to be PMOS 0231s have many options outside the Marine Corps as government employees or contractors. The shortage of PMOS 0231 is most acute at 9 to 13 years because zone C SRBs have been dropped.

Of the seven entry-level PMOSs we examined, PMOS 0231 will have the largest increase in requirements from FY05 to FY16 (1,696 to 2,407—a 42-percent increase). The TIP training requirements have

been increased from FY06 to FY10 by 55 percent (from 339 to 527). The Corps is offering an SRB for current E3s who laterally move to PMOS 0231, which indicates that there is still concern about increasing the number of PMOS 0231s. This PMOS also is a feeder for other CS or HD/LD intelligence PMOSs, such as 0211 and 0241.

Despite the challenges of obtaining enough PMOS 0231s, the relatively short training time (74 days) makes it possible (in theory) to increase the number of entry-level Marines more rapidly than many of the other PMOSs on which we have focused.

PMOS 0321

The monitor for PMOS 0321 felt that, although the PMOS has been short for many years, the root cause of recent shortages has been the fact that the standup of MARSOC greatly increased the 0321 requirement. If the Marine Corps had not needed to grow more 0321s, it would be doing much better in filling vacancies. We note that, in the TIP, the increase in training requirements for PMOS 0321 is the second largest percentage increase of our focus PMOSs (301 in FY06 to 528 in FY10, an increase of 75.4 percent).

PMOS 0511

This specialty is considered less of a problem to fill than most of the other focus PMOSs, as indicated by the relatively small planned increase in requirements from FY05 to FY16 (347 to 368—a 6.1-percent increase), and the relatively small SRB ($11,500). One of the ways that this PMOS has become healthy is by increasing training requirements (up from 63 in FY06 to 101 in FY10, according to the TIP). PMOS 0511 also has been assisted by the fact that the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Planners Basic Course lasts 35 days, which allows for relatively rapid increases in school throughput.

PMOS 0861

We talked with a monitor for PMOS 0861, noting that the requirement increase from FY05 to FY16 (708 to 1,003—an increase of 42 percent) is one of the largest planned increases among our focus entry-level PMOSs. This monitor said that a lot of the increase in

requirements was driven by a report that concluded that PMOS 0861 is the best specialty for training as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). The large increase in requirements was made worse by the fact that many PMOS 0861s were assigned to individual augmentee positions during the war.

This monitor said that one cannot laterally move into a JTAC because it requires experience to call in air strikes. The major effort to counteract the shortage of PMOS 0861 has been to consolidate Fire Support by pooling efforts. There used to be a PMOS 0861 in each battery, but now they will be put into the battalions. With three 0861s in every battalion, it will be easier to replace an 0861 who is injured or otherwise unavailable for duty.

He said that PMOS 0861 will be able to meet the 202K build plan, and grade shaping is good. The fact that PMOS 0861 "caters to the Marine Corps personality" and that the promotion rate is high are all positive factors for the PMOS.

Lastly, he said that the current strength report on PMOS 0861 says that it is at 150 percent, but this is misleading. Starting in FY12, PMOS 0861 will have to start filling B-billets again, and that will make the fill rate lower than it is now.

PMOS 2671

When we talked with the PMOS 2671 monitor, he gave the following as the primary reasons for a shortage of 2671s:

1. Training attrition is very high during the 400+ days of training.
2. It is hard to find people who can get a top secret clearance with Sensitive Compartmented Information access. One cannot have family members with possible foreign influence, but many Marines interested in languages are from foreign countries.
3. The length of the training pipeline means spending 2-3 years in training and only 2 years of a 5-year enlistment doing one's job.
4. There are many opportunities for someone to get a job outside the Marine Corps—as contractors or government employees.

Although it is difficult to score high enough on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) to become a PMOS 2671 Marine, the monitor did not believe that test score requirements are the major reason for shortages. As of December 2010, there were a lot of Marines in the pipeline. He believes that PMOS 2671 will always be short because there are not enough training seats for Marines.

He also believes that money has not solved the problem. PMOS 2671 gets an EB and proficiency pay. Proficiency pay can be up to $400 a month and can increase up to another $400 a month if the Marine knows more than one language. He thinks that the root problem is that there are not enough training seats because of a limited number of civilian instructors and facilities. There is sometimes a wait of over 2 months for the 6-month Arabic language class in San Antonio. He would like to see Marines get to the fleet faster, or try 6-year contracts.

PMOS 6114

PMOS 6114s are mechanics for UH/AH-1 helicopters. We talked with the PMOS 6114 monitor, who cautioned us that PMOS 6114 is not short "on paper" at present. In addition, he told us that the UH/AH-1 (and hence PMOS 6114) is transitioning from the old two-blade "Whiskey" model to the new four-blade "Yankee" model.

We asked why PMOS 6114 has been short in the past. He said that, from his perspective, the problem has been lack of dwell time for the 6114s; they've had back-to-back deployments, which led to an outflux of FTAP Marines.[36] One approach that has been tried is to shorten P2T2, "piling them into the school track." Another approach has been to shorten tours to reduce the outflux of 6114s who get burned out. Certainly ideas such as allowing a 6114 to fill a B-billet (in order to get a breather from deployments), or mentoring and guidance, could be helpful.

36. Another CNA study [9] found that 6114s were the second-most deployed MOS to Iraq and Afghanistan, supporting this assertion that 6114s have very little dwell time.

Appendix B: Process for selecting focus PMOSs

To ensure that we selected high-priority PMOSs in all four categories, we started with two lists: (1) a list of critical specialties that OSD requires the Marine Corps to track quarterly and (2) a list of critical PMOSs that the Marine Corps tracks internally. The PMOSs tracked by OSD met at least one of the following criteria:

- Requires technical skills, including high training or replacement costs
- Is in high demand in the civilian sector
- Is a challenge to recruit sufficient numbers
- Is crucial to combat readiness
- Has a low inventory and a high skill demand.

When this study began, there were 10 PMOSs on OSD's list: 0211, 0231, 0261, 0321, 0842, 2336, 2671, 2673, 2821/2823, and 6842.

In addition, the Marine Corps internally tracks PMOSs that are crucial to combat readiness, have severe inventory shortfalls, have steep 202K growth, and/or have new evolving mission/material requirements (such as MV-22 mechanics). When we began this study, the Marine Corps was tracking 17 PMOSs: 0241, 0431, 0451, 0511, 0651/0656, 0689, 0861, 2834, 2871, 6114, 6116, 6156, 6174, 6176, 6214, 6326, and 7257. We chose our focus PMOSs from these two lists.

We decided that the best way to determine a CS PMOS was to pick PMOSs that had been awarded SRBs most often over the last 28 years (FY80 through FY07). In contrast, HD/LD PMOSs would be those whose number of SRBs increased over the last 10 years. The last 10 years encompass Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, so many of these increased requirements were driven by those conflicts.

Along the vertical axis of figure 16, we show the number of quarters in which the 28 PMOSs were eligible for zone A SRBs from FY80 to FY07. Along the horizontal axis is the average SRB level. PMOSs with more times eligible for an SRB over the 28-year span are, in our terminology, more chronically short. The size of the circle corresponds to the size of the FY09 zone A SRB for E5 and above. For example, PMOSs 0861 and 2336 had an FY09 zone A SRB for E5 and above of $81,000 (and hence the largest circles).

Figure 16. Eligibility for a SRB and size of the SRB, FY80 to FY07[a]



a. Source: CNA database.

The 5 PMOSs in the upper right were most consistently eligible for a high SRB: PMOS 0231 (77 times), PMOS 2673 (74 times), PMOS 2671 (70 times), PMOS 0211 (73 times), and PMOS 2871 (69 times).

One other PMOS had many quarters with SRBs, although the size of the SRBs was not nearly as large: PMOS 6114 (74 times, with an FY09 zone A SRB for E5 and above of $54,000).[37]

Similarly, figure 17 shows the average SRB level and number of times a PMOS was eligible for an SRB from FY01 through FY07. PMOSs with more frequently offered SRBs here would be called HD/LD because shortages existed more recently, possibly as a response to changes in the number of Marines required during a time of war.

After excluding the PMOSs already designated as CS, the PMOSs with the most frequent SRBs from FY01 to FY07 were PMOS 0321 (11 times), PMOS 0511 (10 times), PMOS 2336 (10 times), PMOS 0241 (10 times), and PMOS 6176 (10 times). The x-axis shows the average SRB level during these 8 years. The PMOS with the highest average SRB level was 0231. PMOSs with comparatively low average SRB levels were PMOS 0656 and PMOS 0659.

We decided against including PMOS 6176 (MV-22 tilt rotor crew chief) because that PMOS is in transition. Ospreys are being phased into the fleet, and PMOS 6176 did not have a long enough history to be considered CS. Instead, we added PMOS 2834, SATCOM Tech, which has existed much longer than PMOS 6176. Although PMOS 2834 offered an SRB only 7 times, we include it in our study in order to have another lateral-move-only PMOS, and to have a 28XX occupation field PMOS (Ground Electronics Maintenance) that we could compare with PMOS 2871 (Calibration Technician). Other considerations in choosing our focus PMOSs included discussions with manpower specialists at MM and our desire to examine a variety of PMOS types.

37. Figure 16 shows two other PMOSs in the upper-right corner: 2336 and 0241. They had higher average SRBs than PMOSs 0861 and 6114, but SRBs were offered fewer times during the 28-year period we examined (62 times for PMOS 2336 and 59 times for PMOS 0241). For that reason, we did not label PMOSs 2336 and 0241 as chronically short PMOSs. However, these two PMOSs are probably both HD/LD and CS.

Figure 17. Times eligible for SRB, FY01 to FY07[a]



a. Source: CNA database.

Appendix C: Focus PMOS manpower requirements

To validate our selected PMOSs, we compare their manpower requirements from FY05, FY10, and FY16 (projected).[38] As expected, we observe requirements growth in these PMOSs (see figure 18). All but one (PMOS 2834) of our 11 PMOSs grew from FY05 to FY16, although the rates vary considerably. The requirements for PMOS 2336, for example, grow from 385 in FY05 to 667 in FY16—73 percent. Requirements for PMOS 2834, however, grew from 143 to 175 (22.4 percent) between FY05 and FY10; then they drop to 104 by FY16 (a total drop of 27 percent over 11 years). This is most likely caused by the merger of PMOS 2834 and 2831. PMOS 2834 requirements fell after the merger was completed in October 2010.

Figure 18. PMOS requirements for FYs 2005, 2010, and 2016



38. We obtained these requirements from TFSD in March 2010.

There are other growth patterns in figure 18. It shows that the second largest growth in requirements from FY05 to FY10 was a 47-percent increase in PMOS 0211, followed by PMOS 0231 (38 percent) and PMOS 6114 (35 percent). Requirements for PMOS 0511 have the smallest increase for FY05 to FY10, which suggests that the build for this relatively new PMOS was largely completed before FY05.

Appendix D: Percentage of total accessions who are GS

Table 8 demonstrates that, once accessions are selected on a number of characteristics (HSDG, MM >= 105, and EL >=115), there is relatively little payoff to loosening the GT score qualification below 110.

Table 8. Percentage of accessions[a] who are high school diploma graduates, have an MM score of 105 or greater, an EL score of 115 or greater, and a GT score in one of five ranges[b]

Year	Total acccessions	GT score				
		100-104	105-109	110-114	115+	100+
2000	31,680	0.06%	0.29%	1.23%	9.22%	10.80%
2001	30,498	0.06%	0.34%	1.29%	8.99%	10.69%
2002	31,955	0.13%	0.55%	2.03%	13.58%	16.29%
2003	32,096	0.07%	0.62%	2.13%	13.26%	16.09%
2004	30,121	0.10%	0.68%	2.11%	13.51%	16.41%
2005	31,823	0.21%	0.80%	2.53%	13.15%	16.69%
2006	31,038	0.19%	0.89%	2.38%	13.22%	16.69%
2007	33,070	0.21%	0.83%	2.19%	13.12%	16.35%
2008	36,572	0.22%	0.95%	2.47%	13.49%	17.12%
2009	30,761	0.14%	0.94%	2.77%	15.70%	19.55%

a. Source: CNA database.
b. In addition, those with felony, serious, or drug waivers have been excluded from this population.

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Appendix E: Open contract GS Marines

Figure 19 shows details on the PMOS of GS, open contract Marines. It demonstrates that, under current policy, GS open contract Marines do not go to CS/HD/LD PMOSs.

Figure 19. Ultimate PMOS distribution of GS, open contract Marines (these PMOSs capture 65 percent of these Marines)[a]



a. Source: CNA database.

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Appendix F: Accession month of recruits 21 years and older

Figure 20 shows that recruits who are 21 and older access more often during non-JJAS months than do younger accessions. Accessions under 21 enter predominantly during JJAS.

Figure 20. Percentage of 21 and older recruits who access in ONDJ, JJAS, and FMAM, by Active Duty Base Date FY[a]



a. Source: CNA database.

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Appendix G: What more is M&RA doing to address PMOS shortages?

This study started in February 2010, and the final report was finished in spring 2011. While we were conducting this study, MM and MP initiated the following activities to address PMOS shortages:

1. Around May 2010, MMEA-6 was looking for different ways to fill boatspaces for 0211 and several 267X PMOSs. MM took the quantifiable MOS prerequisites from the MOS Manual and directed MMEA-1 to conduct a data pull for every FY10 FTAP Marine who had not reenlisted and who met the prerequisites. The resulting list had over 20 Marines who met the 267X prerequisites and about 5,000 Marines who met the 0211 prerequisites.

2. MMEA-6 wrote a form letter to Marines who met the prerequisites for 267X MOSs, and personalized the names for the individual Marines and career planners. The Director of MM signed the letters and MMEA-6 mailed them to the Marines requesting that they consider laterally moving to these 267XX MOSs. For Marines who qualified for MOS 0211, MMEA-6 sent the career planners a by-name roster. In the end, the Marine Corps met all boatspace goals except for 22 spaces for MOS 0211.

3. For FY11, MMEA-6 screened all the FTAP population to determine who was eligible for MOS 0211 and 2336. They picked the 20 most qualified Marines and drafted a letter to the Director, MM for signature to send out to the Marines. A disk was delivered to the career planners at the career planner conference with the names of the eligible Marines for both FY11 and FY12. In FY12, MMEA-6 will be targeting these Marines before the reenlistment submission period so that these Marines have adequate time to laterally move through the year.

4. For STAP, MMEA-6 is working with MP to target zone B corporals and sergeants for lateral moves from over PMOSs to short PMOSs. This will be done by MOS and by cohort to correct the MOS pyramid.

5. In addition, for FY12, career planners are reporting FTAP Marines' reenlistment intentions (either "yes" or "no") via the Marine Corps Total Force System. This does not obligate a Marine to a particular decision, but it assists MMEA-6 in determining demand for a particular MOS, unit, or Marine.

6. On May 5, 2011, MARADMIN 273/11 was signed [1]. The new procedures have several parts: (1) Increased submission time to 90 days, (beginning 1 July and ending 30 September) before HQMC will commence fast-filling MOS boards, (2)Changed from a traditional recommendation system to a tiered evaluation system, and (3) Began the process, immediately, of identifying and offering Marines lateral moves based on an evaluation of their record and their ability to fill highly technical MOSs, which the Marine Corps has trouble filling. The third part of this MARADMIN represents one aspect of one of our recommendations. Our recommendation encompasses a wider variety of PMOSs, not only those that are highly technical.

In addition, HRDP stakeholders have taken several steps to improve communication between schools and MMEA-11. The Street-to-Fleet Program (MPP-20 Enlisted Plans and MMEA-11 are the primary participants) currently visits each classification authority on an annual basis to improve communications, brief current and future plans, solicit feedback, and provide education on the planning and cohort process. TECOM has provided MMEA-11 with broader access to MCTIMS (Marine Corps Training Information Management System) that allows MMEA-11 to reschedule Marines as necessary, which improves the use of school seats throughout the year. Lastly, MPP-20 produces a monthly status report that details classification plan attainment across all MOSs. MPP-20 believes that any more frequent meetings would be unproductive.

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List of figures

List of tables

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