Mapping the Information Environment in the Pacific Island Countries: Disruptors, Deficits, and Decisions

Lauren Dickey, Erica Downs, Andrew Taffer, and Heidi Holz with Drew Thompson, S. Bilal Hyder, Ryan Loomis, and Anthony Miller

Maps and graphics created by Sue N. Mercer, Sharay Bennett, and Michele Deisbeck
Abstract

This report provides a general map of the information environment of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs). The focus of the report is on the information environment—that is, the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that shape public opinion through the dissemination of news and information—in the PICs. In this report, we provide a current understanding of how these countries and their respective populaces consume information. We map the general characteristics of the information environment in the region, highlighting trends that make the dissemination and consumption of information in the PICs particularly dynamic. We identify three factors that contribute to the dynamism of the regional information environment: disruptors, deficits, and domestic decisions. Collectively, these factors also create new opportunities for foreign actors to influence or shape the domestic information space in the PICs. This report concludes with recommendations for traditional partners and the PICs to support the positive evolution of the information environment.

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Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise
Deputy Director
China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division

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Executive Summary

Introduction

This report provides a general map of the information environment of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs). The focus of the report is on the information environment—that is, the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that play a key role in shaping opinions through the dissemination of news and information—in the PICs. In this report we undertake the following:

- Examine how these countries consume information.
- Map the general characteristics of the information environment in the region to include key actors and the ownership structure of key media outlets.
- Highlight trends that make the information environment in the PICs particularly dynamic.
- Identify factors that may contribute to the resilience or vulnerability of the information environments in the PICs.
- Identify issues likely to shape the region’s future information environment and the role of external actors.
- Highlight steps traditional partners could take to help enhance the PICs’ ability to retain autonomy in their information domains.

This report provides a current overview of how various groups and publics throughout the region consume information in the PICs. This overview can serve as a baseline for assessing the extent to which the PICs are at risk to adversarial state-sponsored propaganda, disinformation, or other influence activities.

Key findings

The information environment in the PICs is unique in its extraordinary diversity.

- The remote and disparate geography of the PICs results in highly varied access to basic infrastructure, including electricity and the internet.
• The socio-cultural diversity of the region creates wide variation in how people consume information. Residents of the region speak 24 official languages and thousands of indigenous or unofficial local languages.

The information environment in Oceania is highly dynamic. This dynamism is the result of disruptors, deficits, and decisions.

• **Disruptors:** Within the past decade, three disruptors—deregulation of the media and telecommunication sectors, the advent of submarine cables, and the proliferation of mobile technology—have reshaped the information environments in many PICs and created opportunities for new voices and platforms to emerge.

• **Deficits:** At the same time, the information environment is characterized and shaped by persistent deficits. Many smaller PICs do not have the resources or capabilities necessary to generate enough content to fill the airwaves and the pages of print media, provide sufficient training for media professionals, or develop communications infrastructure. These deficits have created gaps that are being filled by a range of foreign actors, including media outlets, governments, and international organizations.

• **Decisions:** Dynamism in the information environment is also a result of the policy choices national governments in the PICs make about how to regulate their media industry, what (if any) limits should be put on speech and press freedoms, and which foreign partners to engage with on issues that have the potential to affect their domestic information environments. Other decisions that affect the information environment include relations between the PICs and traditional partners, Australia and New Zealand; diplomatic recognition of China; development assistance from international organizations.

This dynamism of Oceania’s information environment results in simultaneous continuity and competition.

• Higher levels of connectivity enjoyed by people across the PICs have brought countless new sources of news and information via satellite TV, smartphone, and the internet.

• As traditional partners for many of the PICs, Australia and New Zealand occupy positions of privilege in the media. However, their positions are less secure than they once were.

• China’s growing presence in the region is also challenging the presence of traditional partners. As Beijing deepens its engagement with the PICs, this competition for influence in the information space is likely to intensify.
Traditional regional partners—Australia and New Zealand—are likely to face the greatest competition from emerging actors, such as China, in the following areas:

- **Filling deficits in media content.** Both Australia and New Zealand have introduced plans to provide enhanced media content to the PICs. Meanwhile, China has sought to expand its footprint in regional media through such means as establishing content-sharing agreements between state-run PRC media outlets and local media and broadcasting on shortwave radio frequencies vacated by ABC (Australia) in 2017.

- **Providing ICT infrastructure and services.** External actors, including governments and international organizations, are competing to provide infrastructure enabling connectivity and access to information in the PICs. This creates new types of risk for the governments of the PICs.
  - Digicel, a financially distressed Jamaica-based firm with ties to Chinese telecommunications company ZTE, is a primary provider of digital connectivity in many of the PICs.
  - Traditional development partners, such as the Asian Development Bank, seek to ensure that their projects are transparent and financially sustainable. In contrast, Chinese assistance for infrastructure projects—such as Huawei’s attempted cable construction in the Solomon Islands—has not always been transparent.

- **Providing media training and education.** Australia, New Zealand, and the US have traditionally led a variety of training programs for media professionals from the Pacific. China is now offering more opportunities for media professionals from the PICs to receive training and other forms of professional education in China. However, many of these programs appear to prioritize promoting a positive impression of China over meeting the needs of the PICs.

- **Maintaining status as partner of choice.** Foreign policy decisions that PIC governments make about external partners have an effect upon the information environment. China’s efforts to seek deeper political and economic ties to countries in the region provide a basis for closer involvement or cooperation in the media. As with any bilateral relationship, however, familiarity can also breed contempt—the Solomon Islands and Tonga have both experienced anti-Chinese riots since 2006.

A country’s resilience against unsanctioned interference or influence by foreign actors in its information environment may be affected by the following factors:

- Availability of diverse media voices
- Regulations to guide the licensing and operations of foreign media
- Restrictions on foreign involvement or investment in the media
Adequate domestic resources to support domestic media, including content, infrastructure, and training

Diversity of political partnerships, including with international organizations to provide development assistance in the media and related sectors.

A country’s vulnerability to unsanctioned interference or influence by foreign actors in its information environment may be affected by the following factors:

- State involvement in the media through arbitrary controls, including bans and blackouts
- Few, if any, regulations to guide licensing and operations of foreign media
- Limited restrictions on foreign involvement or investment in the media
- Inadequate domestic resources to support domestic media actors, yielding a high level of dependence on foreign partners
- Dependence on a single bilateral political partnership, which may affect narratives in the media or decisions on infrastructure partnerships.

Specific actions traditional partners—such as Australia and New Zealand—and PIC governments could take to support the growth and evolution of the regional information environment include the following:

- Bolstering and revitalizing traditional partnerships between the PICs and Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
- Strengthening and diversifying broadcast content tailored to local audiences, including content broadcast in the local vernacular
- Providing on-site media training tailored to local needs
- Providing greater access to raw news feeds
- Providing support and related training for infrastructure projects
- Providing additional resources and support for regulatory bodies and/or professional media councils
- Developing local language public education programs to support media literacy.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

This report provides a general map of the information environment of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs). The focus of the report is on the information environment—that is, the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that play a key role in shaping opinions through the dissemination of news and information—in the following 16 PICs:

- Cook Islands
- Federated States of Micronesia
- Fiji
- The French Territories (French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna)
- Kiribati
- Marshall Islands
- Nauru
- Niue
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Samoa (Western Samoa)
- Solomon Islands
- Timor-Leste
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu

Figure 1 shows a map of the countries addressed in this report.

The information environment in the PICs is unique in its extraordinary diversity. Their remote and disparate geography results in highly varied access to basic infrastructure, including electricity and the internet. More than eight million people in the PICs, many of whom live in rural communities, have no electricity supply. Internet penetration is relatively low—ranging from 11.21 percent of the population in Papua New Guinea to 49.97 percent in Fiji—and bandwidth is often quite limited or expensive. The socio-cultural diversity of the region creates wide variation in how people consume information. Literacy rates vary from 99 percent in Samoa to 63.4 percent in Papua New Guinea, which means that many residents of the latter principally rely on broadcast media for news and information. Residents of the region
speak 24 official languages and thousands of indigenous or unofficial local languages. Understanding key trends and factors that are shaping this unique information environment is a critical first step toward identifying and understanding efforts by external actors to shape the information space in the PICs.

In this report, we provide a current understanding of how these countries and their respective populaces consume information. We map the general characteristics of the information environment in the region, highlighting trends that make the dissemination and consumption of information in the PICs particularly dynamic. We identify three factors that contribute to the dynamism of the regional information environment: disruptors, deficits, and domestic decisions. Collectively, these factors also create new opportunities for foreign actors to influence or shape the domestic information space in the PICs. This report concludes with recommendations for traditional partners and the PICs to support the positive evolution of the information environment.

Figure 1. Map of the Pacific Island Countries

![Map of the Pacific Island Countries](source: CNA)
Chapter 2. Disruptors

The information environment in the Pacific is experiencing unprecedented changes. The traditional means by which information has been transmitted and consumed are being disrupted, posing new threats to the region and creating opportunities for outside actors.

Early in the 2000s, states in Oceania began deregulating and privatizing their telecommunications industries. These moves helped to lower costs; introduce new, higher-quality information and communications technology; and allowed new players to assume roles as telecom providers. The rapid construction of submarine cables in the last decade has further depressed costs associated with internet access while significantly increasing speeds.

The Pacific Islands disproportionately access the internet via mobile devices. The dominance of mobile technology in the information environment has occurred alongside of—and contributed to—an explosion in the use of social media. Telecommunications companies have calibrated their mobile offerings to allow consumers to use social media platforms, particularly Facebook, without incurring data costs. These three disruptors—deregulation, the advent of submarine cables, and the proliferation of mobile technology—are explored in more depth in this chapter.

Deregulation

Although many of the most striking changes in the regional information environment have stemmed from the introduction of advanced information and communications technology (ICT), policy decisions made in the early and mid-2000s provided the critical economic and regulatory frameworks within which technological change could occur. Aided by incentives from international development bodies, the PICs began the process of deregulating and privatizing their telecommunication sectors. Private enterprises, including foreign firms, helped lower consumer prices and began introducing the PICs to major advancements in ICT—namely, digital technology and the internet—that had emerged and similarly disrupted the information environment in the West.
Key Actor: Digicel

Deregulation created opportunities for private firms to enter the PICs. Digicel, a financially distressed Jamaica-based firm with ties to Chinese telecommunications company ZTE, is the most significant. Founded in 2001 by Denis O’Brien, an Irish national, the firm entered the Pacific market in 2006 and has expanded rapidly since.

Today, Digicel operates in six of the PICs (Figure 2). According to the company’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in 2015 Digicel was the primary mobile services provider in all of the PICs where it has a presence, with the exception of Fiji, where it holds the second largest position in the mobile market. In 2016, Digicel purchased Sky Pacific, the region’s largest satellite TV provider. The company offers a full range of mobile devices and service plans, a streaming application, internet, TV, phone, network, and cloud services. O’Brien, now a billionaire, continues to own a majority of the firm (approximately 94 percent) and serves as chair of its board of directors.

Figure 2. Digicel presence in the Pacific

![Digicel presence in the Pacific](https://www.digicelgroup.com/en/where-we-are/asia-pacific.html)

Digicel has more than 14 million customers in 31 markets across the Pacific, Central America, and the Caribbean. The company has invested heavily in communications infrastructure in the states in which it operates and has, in its words, developed a “legacy of democratizing communications.” The company offers flexible and affordable data plans that can be purchased for one hour, one day, or one week of service for as little as 30 cents at a time. Table 1 shows Digicel’s mobile phone plans alongside those of competitor state-owned and private phone companies in several PICs.
In 2017, the company announced that it had entered into a “global partnership” with ZTE, the Chinese telecommunication equipment manufacturer, as it undertakes “the largest network transformation” in its history. According to a ZTE news release, this partnership was focused exclusively on expanding and upgrading Digicel’s 4G LTE networks in the Caribbean and Central America. We did not find any indication that Digicel has relied on ZTE to support network expansion in the Pacific. However, we noted that Digicel sells ZTE (and Huawei) smartphones to users in Papua New Guinea.

Despite Digicel’s robust presence in the PICs, the company is mired in debt. O’Brien spent much of 2018 in talks to restructure the company’s debt in order to postpone looming bond repayments for two years; in late 2019, the company still remains at risk for further restructuring. Digicel has struggled to find a path in the digital age, investing heavily in telecommunications infrastructure in the markets where it operates even as social media and other new media platforms reshape the information environment.

Table 1. Select mobile data plans in the Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Telecom provider</th>
<th>Types of mobile data plans</th>
<th>Price ($US)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Digicel (private)</td>
<td>1–30-day data plans, Social media data plans, Night data plans</td>
<td>$0.30 (10MB/1 day) to $68 (30GB/30 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bmobile (state-owned)</td>
<td>1–30-day data plans on 2G/3G or 4GLTE networks</td>
<td>$0.59 (60MB/1 day) to $109 (15GB/30 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Digicel (private)</td>
<td>1–30-day data plans, many of which offer free video streaming and access to social media platforms/apps</td>
<td>$1.40 (3GB/1 day) to $12 (25GB/30 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vodafone (private)</td>
<td>Available as add-on to prepaid phone plans</td>
<td>$1.31 per MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Digicel (private)</td>
<td>2 hr–monthly or nights-only data plans, All data plans come with free access to Loop News and Wikipedia, Unlimited data “passes” come with free streaming for FM107 and Buzz FM96</td>
<td>$0.44 (3hr unlimited pass) to $26.20 (8GB/month)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Telecom Vanuatu Ltd. (private)</td>
<td>3 hrs–30 days data plans, many with free Facebook access</td>
<td>$0.44 (200MB/3 hrs) to $17.47 (3500MB/30 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Timor Telecom (private)</td>
<td>Unlimited data access packages range from 2 hrs–monthly, Data access packages that provide cheap, exclusive access to Facebook and WhatsApp</td>
<td>Unlimited data packages from $0.25 (2 hrs) to $20 (monthly); Social media packages run from $0.20 (75MB/7 days) to $2 (850MB/30 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Digicel (private)</td>
<td>1 hr to unlimited data plans, Unlimited Facebook data on weekends only (for additional $2.20)</td>
<td>$0.44 (100MB/1 hr) to $22 (10GB/30 days)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Submarine cables

Another major development that has disrupted the information environment in the Pacific is the advent and proliferation of submarine cables. Emplaced on the seafloor, these cables provide connectivity—voice, data, and internet—between areas separated by maritime space. Submarine cables wrap around and connect the continents, carrying the enormous quantities of information critical to modern social and economic life.

In 2000, Fiji partnered with several foreign private-sector firms to connect the country to the Southern Cross cable, which links Australia to the US. Ever since, there has been a proliferation of submarine cables connecting the PICs with one another and major continental landing points. Since 2012, at least nine cables have come online in the region, and five additional cables are projected to do so over the next two years (see Appendix A). A selection of submarine cables is shown in Figure 3; this figure highlights cables that are bringing connectivity to new areas. Figure 3 also identifies funding sources, ownership, and the companies responsible for cable installation. The construction of these cables has been among the most significant developments in the regional information environment, fundamentally affecting the way that information is transmitted and consumed in the Pacific.

To be sure, the introduction of submarine cables has “driven an explosion of capacity,” making the internet faster and more affordable. When Tonga’s submarine cable, which connects to Fiji, came online in 2013, it “increased internet speeds in the country to 10 gigabits from 20 to 30 megabits per second.” Vanuatu’s internet capacity increased fourfold when its submarine cable came online in 2014, and it tripled again by 2017. Meanwhile, between 2014 and 2017, Vanuatu’s total mobile data downloads increased by more than 40 times. In Papua New Guinea, Huawei Marine—a joint venture originally created between Chinese telecommunications company Huawei and British company Global Marine Systems Limited—has installed the Kumul Domestic Cable System, providing connectivity across 14 of the country’s largest cities. By late 2019, when the entire cable system is operational, it will “cover 55 percent of the total population and provide more than 70 percent of Papua New Guinea’s bandwidth requirements.” The Southern Cross NEXT cable, slated for completion in 2021, will become the largest-capacity submarine link between the US West Coast and Australia, providing triple the capacity of existing cables to Fiji, Kiribati, and Samoa. Similarly, the Coral Sea Cable System, connecting Australia, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands (see Figure 5), is expected to cut internet prices by a whopping 42 percent when it comes online in 2020.
Figure 3. Selected submarine cables in the PICs

**Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN)**
- **Year of Operation:** 2000 | Mix of Public and Private Investment
- **Landing Points:**
  - Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, United States
- **Cable Owners:**
  - SingTel Optus, Spark New Zealand, Telstra, and Verizon
- **Installed by:**
  - Alcatel-Lucent

**Interchange Cable Network 1 (ICNI)**
- **Year of Operation:** 2014 | Mix of Public and Private Investment
- **Landing Points:**
  - Vanuatu, Fiji
- **Cable Owners:**
  - Interchange (Vanuatu) and Government of Vanuatu
- **Installed by:**
  - Alcatel-Lucent

**Southeast Asia–US (SEA–US)**
- **Year of Operation:** 2017 | Mix of Public and Private Investment
- **Landing Points:**
  - Federated States of Micronesia, Guam, Indonesia, Palau, Philippines, United States
- **Cable Owners:**
  - RTI, Globe Telecom, Hawaiian Telecom, GTA, TeleGuam, and Tein
- **Installed by:**
  - NEC Corporation; Bilib Submarine Cable Corporation

**Kumul Domestic Cable System**
- **Year of Operation:** 2019 | Funding from Exim Bank of China
- **Landing Points:**
  - 14 landing points across Papua New Guinea
- **Cable Owners:**
  - PNG DataCo Ltd.
- **Installed by:**
  - Huawei Marine

**Coral Sea Cable System (CSCS)**
- **Year of Operation:** 2019 | Mix of Public and Private Investment
- **Landing Points:**
  - Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Australia
- **Cable Owners:**
  - Solomon Islands Submarine Cable Company and PNG DataCo Ltd.
- **Installed by:**
  - Alcatel Submarine Networks

**Tui-Samoa**
- **Year of Operation:** 2018 | Mix of Public and Private Investment
- **Landing Points:**
  - Fiji, Samoa, Wallis and Futuna
- **Cable Owners:**
  - Samoa Submarine Cable Company
- **Installed by:**
  - Samoa Submarine Cable Company

**Southern Cross NEXT**
- **Year of Operation:** 2021 | Mix of Public and Private Investment; Grants from ADB and World Bank
- **Landing Points:**
  - Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Samoa, Tokelau, United States
- **Cable Owners:**
  - SingTel Optus, Spark New Zealand, Telstra, and Verizon
- **Installed by:**
  - Alcatel Submarine Networks

**Manatua**
- **Year of Operation:** 2020 | ADB Loan and Funding from New Zealand Government
- **Landing Points:**
  - Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Samoa
- **Cable Owners:**
  - Samoan Submarine Cable Company, Avaroa Cable Ltd.
- **Installed by:**
  - Subcom, Avaroa Cable Ltd.

In combination with the telecommunication industry’s deregulation, the regional expansion of submarine cables has made digital technologies—and the internet in particular—far more accessible (see Figure 4). Previously, most individuals in the PICs had to use satellite links to access the internet, which were slow and often prohibitively expensive. Today, however, the capacity offered by submarine cables has lowered the costs of internet access. Although most people in the PICs access the internet from mobile devices, even fixed-broadband connections are increasing. In the mid-2000s, there were no fixed-broadband subscriptions in Papua New Guinea; today there are more than 18,000. As a consequence of the proliferation of submarine cables, observers have suggested that the region is still coming to grips with the novelty of plentiful bandwidth.

Figure 4. Internet penetration in the Pacific Island Countries

![Internet penetration in the Pacific Island Countries](image)


Note: ITU does not have data for the Cook Islands, Niue, Palau, and Wallis and Futuna.

These cables present the same promises and perils that they do in the developed West. Just as access to advanced information and communications technology has become a critical element of life in the developed West, states in the Pacific are also becoming increasingly dependent on the internet and its supporting infrastructure. Such dependency, of course, creates vulnerability. In January 2019, the submarine cable connecting Tonga to Fiji was severed, crippling the country’s access to the internet and plunging it “into virtual darkness for almost
two weeks.” Left without access to Facebook and email, Tongans used brief rations of internet access from the Tonga Communications Corporation during the blackout.48

Submarine cables are also vulnerable to malicious activities, including cyber-attacks, vandalism, and espionage. Because these cables carry so much information—including sensitive and high-value information—the cables may be targets for intelligence collection.49 According to a 2017 study sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security, the risks of malicious activity against submarine cables are particularly pronounced as the submarine cables approach shorelines.50 There is growing awareness in the region of the security concerns associated with cables and a particular focus on the entities responsible for their financing and construction. For example, when the Chinese technology firm Huawei announced in 2017 that it planned to construct a cable for the Solomon Islands, Australia “threatened to withhold a connection license” for the cable “because it considered Huawei a cybersecurity threat.”51 Canberra instead offered to pay for the cable itself and construct it on an accelerated timeline. In Papua New Guinea, similar pressures from the US, Australia, and Japan did not dissuade the government from upholding a deal with Huawei to lay a domestic submarine cable network.52

Figure 5. Alcatel Submarine Networks ship laying link to Coral Sea Cable System for the Solomon Islands

Mobile technology

Industry deregulation, the increased presence of both regional and external telecommunications providers, and the growing number of submarine cables have made advanced ICT—and the internet in particular—more accessible than ever. However, this disruption to the traditional information environment has been entirely mobile. The fixed-broadband internet connections that are common in the West are a novelty for most countries in the region. The overwhelming majority of individuals in the region access the internet via mobile phones or a laptop and desktop using dongles. Trends in mobile technology usage are shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Mobile-cellular subscriptions in the Pacific Island Countries

![Figure 6: Mobile telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants](source)


In the largest PICs, as shown in Figure 5, mobile phone subscriptions increased by an average of more than 20 percent from 2012 to 2017. Nearly 80 percent of the population in these states now has a mobile phone subscription, and the total number of individuals using mobile technology is likely to be even higher because many families share devices. In Samoa “mobile phones are almost universal in households (96 percent),” with 72 percent owning smart-phones. In Tonga, mobile telephone subscription rates rose from 180 in 2000 to 107,938 in 2017—meaning that there are more mobile phone subscriptions than people in Tonga. Even for remote villages in Papua New Guinea, a group will now often have access to...
a cell phone that can receive text messages. Mobile data plans are also flexible and do not require a monthly subscription fee. Indeed, a “mobile data subscription can be obtained for just one day.” The region-wide growth in the number of mobile data subscriptions is a noteworthy attribute of the dynamic information environment in the PICs. Now, more than ever before, the people of the PICs are coming online and being exposed to more types and sources of information beyond traditional print media, television, or radio.

**Social media**

Individuals in the Pacific are disproportionately using their phones to access social media. Across the region, the “use of social media, especially Facebook, was widely cited as the main use of the internet,” Further, more than 80 percent of Facebook users in the region “use their cell phones to access the social network.” Facebook is a “Top 5” internet site destination in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and French Polynesia. In several regional markets, telecoms company Digicel has customized its product line to account for and help drive Facebook’s popularity. The company briefly offered a Facebook feature phone manufactured by Alcatel in Papua New Guinea; in other markets, it offers “social data plans” that provide customers with several gigabytes of data for using social media apps.

Figure 7. Example of Facebook posts from *Vanuatu Daily Post* and *Fiji Sun*


Facebook and other social media platforms are also increasing the reach of local media outlets. For example, the *Vanuatu Daily Post’s* 2018 coverage of the evacuation of Ambae Island following a volcanic eruption reached more than 100,000 people on Facebook. More recently, coverage of Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s visit to Vanuatu in January 2019
reached 20,000 users—that is, roughly 7–8 percent of the total population of Vanuatu read a single news story posted on social media. According to one media professional in Vanuatu, stories begin to resonate with the local population due to reverberation through social media. Examples of how Facebook is leveraged by newspapers in the Pacific are shown in Figure 7.

### Chinese Social Media in the Pacific: The Growth of WeChat

In overseas Chinese communities, WeChat is among the most important social media platforms. Developed by Tencent Holdings Ltd., a Chinese multinational investment holdings conglomerate, WeChat is a multipurpose app with messaging, social media, mobile payment, and other functions integrated into one interface. WeChat is the most popular messaging and social media app in China, and as Chinese expatriates populate other countries, they may share this platform with the local population. Those traveling from Oceania countries to China are similarly likely to use WeChat to function in an environment characterized by censorship and unreliable social media access. WeChat already attracts one billion monthly users—and this number is expected to grow. As of 2018, there were nearly 3 million WeChat users in Australia and 180,000 in New Zealand; there is no similar data available on the number of users in the PICs. Digicel has, however, advertised mobile data plans in Fiji that include free access to WeChat, indicating that the app may have a user base in the region.

The possible growth of WeChat in the region has implications for its potential future impact on the information space. Current research has documented the effect of WeChat on Chinese communities in the region. Using WeChat brings people from outside China onto a social media platform regulated by the Chinese government. This means that not only can WeChat—and the Chinese government—track users from abroad, but also that users will be consuming content regulated by Chinese censorship rules. Thus the growth of WeChat in Oceania countries, beyond the ethnic or expatriate communities, has the potential to significantly impact the information the local population receives.

### Change and continuity

As digital services have become more accessible, individuals are increasingly turning to them for information. For this reason, newspapers in the Pacific—much as print media the world over—have encountered major challenges. Declining readership and falling advertising revenues have forced newspapers and magazines across the region to either fold or reduce their publication frequency. In 2013, for example, Tuvalu Echoes, the country’s only newspaper, ceased publication; since 2000, at least four newspapers have closed in Nauru. In the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), furthermore, the Micronesia Alliance, the Yap Networker, the Chuukago Shark, and the Da Ronhg have all ceased operations.
Broadcast radio, traditionally the region’s most important source of information, has become less of a central platform, particularly in urban areas with higher levels of connectivity. Moreover, because the digital and mobile revolutions have made content less wedded to particular devices, individuals are now able to listen to the radio or watch TV from their mobile phone.67

Despite improvements in the accessibility and affordability of digital technologies, challenges remain. Internet prices, for example, “remain high relative to per capita incomes.”68 An expert previously associated with the Media Development Initiative in Papua New Guinea refers to the country as “the most expensive digital community in the world.”69 Although people can purchase mobile data plans on a pay-as-you-go basis, investment in mobile data plans (see Table 1) may cost too much for portions of the population. Significant portions of the populace in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste live at or below the international poverty line, which suggests that socioeconomic conditions may have some effect on how or whether populations utilize newer, more expensive digital technology to obtain news and other forms of information.70 The challenges of accessibility and affordability tend to affect disproportionately those far from population centers, where the necessary technological infrastructure has yet to be established.71
Chapter 3. Deficits

The socioeconomic conditions of the PICs may affect the information environment, either enabling or impacting access to resources and funding to support domestic media actors. According to data from the World Bank:

- Six of the 16 countries in this study—Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu—are classified as lower-middle-income countries.
- Another six countries are considered upper-middle-income countries, including Fiji, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu.
- Only Palau and the French Territories of French Polynesia and New Caledonia are identified as high-income countries.\(^\text{72}\)

Lower-middle-income countries’ economies may lack the resources and capabilities higher-income countries possess to sustain a robust domestic media environment. These deficits have created opportunities for a range of foreign actors—including media outlets, governments, and international organizations—to help fill resource and capability gaps.

This chapter discusses the effect four categories of deficits—content, training, infrastructure, and funding—have on the information environment of the PICs.

Content deficits

Resource constraints that affect the ability of media actors to buy or produce indigenous content result in the PICs looking externally for content providers.\(^\text{73}\) Foreign actors have made their content available to the PICs through several mechanisms: broadcasting to the region, selling programming, offering content sharing agreements, and investing in local media.

Filling deficits with regional providers

As shown in Figures 8 and 9, media actors from Australia, New Zealand, and China broadcast across the PICs. Primary actors from each of these countries include

- **Australia:** Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Radio Australia and TV
- **New Zealand:** Radio New Zealand and Pasifika TV
- **China:** China Central Television (CCTV), China Global Television Network (CGTN), and China Radio International (CRI).
Of these regional content providers, it is worth noting that only the Australian and New Zealand broadcasters are providing local news—primarily via radio and online—and in local languages other than English and French. China’s CCTV has produced at least one program with local content. However, at the time of this writing, neither CGTN, the international media organization launched by CCTV in 2016, nor CRI broadcast in regional languages besides English and French.

**Key actor: ABC Radio Australia and TV**

Australia’s national broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), operates both radio and TV in the PICs (see Figure 8).

Radio Australia produces and broadcasts four programs (three daily and one weekly) that focus on regional developments and current events. In addition to direct broadcasts to the PICs, Radio Australia content can be streamed online through ABC’s media player or directly via Facebook to more than 237,000 followers. Most content is broadcast in English, such as the twice-daily news program *Pacific Beat*, which covers news and other happenings in the PICs. Only one radio program, *Wantok*, broadcasts in some regional languages—including Papua New Guinea Tok Pisin, Solomon Islands Pijin, and Vanuatu Bislama Pidgin. The current *Wantok* presenters are both Pacific Islanders, Sam Seke (originally from the Solomon Islands) and Hilda Wayne (originally from the Western Highlands in Papua New Guinea).

ABC’s international television station is available via satellite in 10 of the PICs. Content from ABC is readily available on Facebook and YouTube, and can also be streamed directly—regardless of location—from the ABC website or via mobile app. Yet at the time of writing, there are few TV programs available in regional languages. TV programs are broadcast in English and thus have a limited reach among non–English-speaking audiences.

**Key actor: Radio New Zealand Pacific and Pasifika TV**

Radio New Zealand (RNZ) Pacific, a division of public broadcaster Radio New Zealand, is also a major provider of regional news. RNZ Pacific is available in 10 of the PICs, and its content can also be streamed over the internet or accessed via Twitter and Facebook. In addition to producing news bulletins in Samoan, Tongan, Niuean, and Cook Islands Maori, RNZ Pacific produces and broadcasts four English-language programs (two weekly and two daily) focusing on current events in the Pacific.

RNZ Pacific also rebroadcasts content from other regional providers—such as Radio Australia’s *Wantok* program—or is available via other providers, including the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Pacific Service and the UK-based World Radio Network.
Pasifika TV is a regional broadcasting initiative sponsored by the government of New Zealand. The network provides free-to-air news, sports, and entertainment programs; content is collated from New Zealand-based media outlets and uplinked to satellites for regional broadcasters. Pasifika TV is available in 13 PICs, 12 of which are included in this study and American Samoa.

Figure 8. Australian and New Zealand broadcasters in the PICs

Key actor: China Central Television and China Global Television Network

China’s state-run television broadcaster, China Central Television (CCTV; Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshi Tai, 中国中央电视台), is available to viewers in many of the PICs. Programming is not readily available in regional languages; instead, viewers can access English-language content or, as in the Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea, Chinese-language programming.

CCTV’s foreign-language network, China Global Television Network (CGTN; Zhongguo Guoji Dianshi Tai, 中国国际电视台), creates international news programs and other content available on CCTV. Of CGTN’s six channels, the flagship channel is CGTN English, a 24-hour news channel. CGTN Documentary also broadcasts English-language programs that promulgate Chinese government narratives, such as “One Belt One Road,” a six-episode series on the

initiative that showcases China’s footprint in participating countries, and a multi-episode series titled “Bird’s Eye China” that highlights the landscapes and culture of different Chinese provinces.92

Figure 9. Chinese state-owned media in the PICs


CCTV has also helped fill content deficits by partnering with regional media outlets to jointly produce content. In Papua New Guinea, state-owned broadcaster National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) has partnered with CCTV to co-produce Today, a 30-minute news program broadcast each Saturday that includes local news, international news, and news about China.93
CCTV also produced a Chinese-language documentary about Papua New Guinea, *Glamorous Papua New Guinea (Meili Babuya Xin jineiya; 魅力巴布亚新几内亚)*. It introduces viewers to “the mysterious and charming South Pacific country of Papua New Guinea.”94 Although the premier ceremony for the documentary was held in Papua New Guinea, the documentary is entirely in Chinese, indicating that it is likely targeted at a Chinese audience.95

### Future Potential for Chinese Media in the PICs’ Local Languages

While Chinese state-owned media does not currently provide content to the PICs in local languages—aside from English and French—news headlines suggest that the Chinese government is actively expanding its capabilities to “tell China’s story” in the regional vernacular.96

In 2012, the Research Center for Pacific Island Countries was established at Liaocheng University (*Liaocheng Daxue Taipingyyang Daoguo Yanjiu Zhongxin*; 聊城大学太平洋岛国研究中心) in Shandong Province with support from the Ministry of Education. The center’s website highlights the close relationship the 30-member staff have developed with senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. The center produces multiple Chinese-language publications, ranging from media syndications to academic research on the PICs.97

In 2017, Beijing Foreign Studies University (*Beijing Waiguoyu Daxue*, 北京外国语大学)—the top foreign studies university in China—introduced language curriculums for the PICs that have diplomatic relations with China, including Bislama, Cook Islands Māori, Fijian, Niuean, Tetun, and Tok Pisin.98 Many of the university’s graduates have careers in the foreign service and the media, such as Chinese ambassador to the US Cui Tiankai and former Xinhua editor-in-chief Xue Yongxing, indicating future potential for China to leverage these language skills in the regional information environment.99

### Key actor: China Radio International

China Radio International (CRI; *Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Diantai*; 中国国际广播电台) is a state-owned international radio broadcaster headquartered in Beijing. According to its website, it transmits to 161 countries and regions via shortwave, medium wave (AM), and FM.100

As of November 2019, CRI currently holds licenses to broadcast in Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu.101 CRI is likely able to skirt licensing in other PICs by broadcasting via shortwave, which does not require repeaters to transmit signals and, as a result, can cover far more geographic territory than FM and AM waves.102 CRI can also be streamed online and via smartphone app.103

While CRI broadcasts in English and French, the 44 languages it currently broadcasts in do not include other languages of the PICs.104 Thus even if CRI is available in the PICs, it is not certain
that large portions of the region—particularly those that speak languages besides English and French—are tuning in to the Chinese state-owned station.

### Chinese Media in Australia: The Role of the Global CAMG Media Group

Global CAMG Media Group (Huanqiu Kaige Guoji Chuanmei Jituan; 环球凯歌国际传媒集团) is an international media holding company based in Melbourne, Australia. It is 60 percent-owned by Guoguang Century Media Consultancy, a subsidiary of China Radio International. The company owns 11 radio stations in several major Australian cities, nine newspapers, websites, magazines, and other businesses. Global CAMG Media Group also runs 45 radio stations in 22 countries through 18 local companies. In the PICs, Global CAMG Media Group says it operates radio stations in Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. The company also offers online radio in Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu.

Global CAMG Media Group was established by Tommy Jiang, an Australian citizen and owner of Ostar Media Group. Jiang is a former member of the Communist Youth League who moved to Australia from Beijing in 1988. Jiang was instrumental in bringing CRI to Australia in 2007, a deal that he reportedly considers to be the hallmark of his success. Australian media reports have highlighted that Jiang strictly censors the radio stations broadcast through his companies in Australia.

The following biographical sketch summarizes Jiang's documented ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP):

- Jiang is a member of the Honorary Board of Advisors of the Western Australia chapter of the Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (ACPPRC). The ACPPRC is a branch of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPNR). CCPPNR is directly subordinate to the CCP’s United Front Work Department, a primary actor in state-led efforts to influence public opinion and government policies around the world in a way that favors Chinese interests.

- Jiang has also been affiliated with the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the political legislative advisory body of the CCP. In 2011, Jiang was invited to attend the opening meeting of the CPPCC. In 2017, he traveled to Shanxi, China as a representative of overseas Chinese for the CPPCC with a delegation of 26 other overseas Chinese.

Australian media has also reported that Jiang, motivated by his ties to the CCP, has sought to use Global CAMG and his connections to Australian politicians to influence domestic politics.
Filling deficits with content sales

Content deficits can also be mitigated through sales of licenses or redistribution rights for foreign content to regional media outlets. This practice is readily seen in the PICs TV industry, where satellite and digital television companies offer packages replete with foreign channels.

For example, Solomon Telekom sells digital terrestrial set-top boxes that conform to the Australian TV standard and provide access to digital TV stations. The box enables customers in the Solomon Islands to have 24/7 access to broadcasts of ESPN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Deutsche Welle, France 24, ABC Australia, CGTN, Channel News Asia, and RT.

In Papua New Guinea, telecommunications company Digicel similarly sells a set-top box providing free-to-air access to TVWAN and paid access to Digicel Play channels. TVWAN provides locally produced content and programs; Digicel Play offers extensive foreign content, including rugby and dramas from the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Figure 10 shows a sampling of channels offered on two regional networks: Fijian network Sky Pacific, which is owned by Digicel and available in many PICs, and Digicel Play channels available in Tonga.

Filling deficits through sharing agreements

External actors also provide programming through content-sharing agreements. For example, the Micronesian radio station 88.1 (Pohnpei) rebroadcasts ABC Radio Australia 24 hours a day. The Tonga Broadcasting Commission has similar agreements to rebroadcast programs from ABC Australia. Many government-owned radio stations in Tonga—including Radio Tonga and A3Z—have agreements to rebroadcast content from ABC, BBC, and RNZ.

Several Chinese media outlets provide content to the PICs through content-sharing agreements. For example, the Fiji Sun not only prints a Chinese-language weekly paper (Fiji Daily, Feiji Ribao; 斐济日报), but also has news exchange agreements with state-owned outlets Xinhua News Agency and China Daily. In Vanuatu, the Vanuatu Broadcasting and Television Corporation signed an agreement with China’s CCTV in 2018 to exchange content in English and French. Similarly, Tonga Broadcasting Commission has broadcast CCTV content over Television Tonga since 2006.
Figure 10. TV channels available on Sky Pacific (Fiji) and Digicel Play (Tonga)

Filling deficits through investments

External actors may mitigate deficits in the information environment by investing in local media outlets. The extent to which these investments may influence the quality or content of the media can be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

For example, the two primary newspapers in Papua New Guinea are both owned by foreign companies. Malaysian logging company Rimbunan Hijau established *The National* in 1990 “at the invitation of the government of Papua New Guinea.”[^131] The paper’s affiliation with Rimbunan does have some effect on the paper’s content; the paper rarely publishes any news story or op-ed critical of the logging industry.[^132] Rupert Murdoch’s Australia-based News Corporation also owns a majority stake in Papua New Guinea’s other major newspaper, the *Post-Courier*.[^133] According to News Corporation leadership, despite the paper’s ties to Australia, “all editorial direction and policy is made…in PNG by none other than the 100 percent Papua New Guinean editorial management team.”[^134]

Murdoch’s News Corporation also owned the *Fiji Times* until 2010, when Fiji’s government ordered all media to be at least 90 percent locally owned.[^135] Prior to divestment, the newspaper, much like the Australian government at the time, was highly critical of the country’s government following the 2006 military coup.[^136] Since divestment, the paper has at times been criticized for politicizing issues; editor-in-chief Fred Wesley has stated that the newspaper is not “hell-bent on hurting a government” and seeks “accuracy and balance.”[^137]

In Vanuatu, a Chinese immigration services firm established Vanuatu’s first English-Chinese newspaper, *Vila Times*, in 2015.[^138] The paper describes itself as “the newspaper for business-minded people.”[^139] The owner of the *Vila Times* is FPF Company Limited, a construction, media, retail, and consulting firm that helps individuals obtain passports, permanent residence permits, and other documents in Vanuatu (see Figure 11).[^140] FPF is a subsidiary of Shanpu Group Company, which provides immigration and investment services to Chinese citizens in Vanuatu and New Zealand.[^141] The Shanpu Group also has a physical presence in Vanuatu with

[^131]: Rimbunan Hijau founder and CEO Tiong Hiew King (张晓聊) has prioritized the company’s investments into media for ethnic Chinese communities.[^128] Rimbunan also manages Sin Chew Media, *Nanyang Siang Pau*, and *China Press* in Malaysia and Ming Pao Enterprise Corporation, which publishes Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong, Canada, and the United States.[^129] Tiong has visited China and interacted with a number of government officials since 2007, including Li Haifeng (former head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office), and Peng Qinghua (the current Communist Party Chief of Sichuan).[^130]
its 68-hectare Rainbow City development, which is being constructed by FPF with local workers supported by Chinese expertise.¹⁴²

Figure 11. Promotional ad for FPF Company Limited


Training deficits

Due to the small size of their economies or media sectors, many of the PICs struggle to provide adequate resources for training media professionals. Existing deficits in media training across the PICs include

- Basic media skills, such as interviewing, fact-checking, broadcasting, videography, photography, and photo/video editing¹⁴³
- Media ethics, to guide the professional conduct of media practitioners¹⁴⁴
- Education, including degree programs that produce “well-qualified and experienced trainers” that can train “good journalists.”¹⁴⁵

Actors that have sought to help mitigate these training deficits include domestic grassroots organizations, academia, international organizations, and foreign media or governments.
Media councils or associations may provide training in some of the PICs; however, as research by regional media experts has shown, many of these organizations are either nonexistent or nonfunctioning. Academic institutions—including those in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, and Tonga—may provide some training, offering diplomas and/or degrees in media, journalism, or communications. Countries that are unable to provide in-country entry-level training for media professionals often look abroad for training support, as in Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu, FSM, Palau, and Niue.

Some media outlets in the PICs may have enough resources to provide in-house training to media professionals. The Vanuatu Daily Post, for example, does training in the newsroom. In January 2019, Trading Post Ltd., the owner of the Vanuatu Daily Post, announced an annual fellowship to “provide practical professional training and career-track employment to young Ni-Vanuatu people who aspire to a career in journalism.” In contrast, none of the media in Papua New Guinea offer apprenticeship programs to take on individuals with limited training and turn them into journalists.

When countries are unable to rely on existing resources and capabilities to provide training, governments and media actors may opt to look to foreign actors to help fill media training and education gaps. External actors are providing two broad categories of media training:

- Education, including programs focused on building the capacity of media students and professionals from the PICs
- Exposure and dialogues via initiatives that typically involve media professionals traveling from the PICs to other countries for training.

These categories of media training provided by external actors to media professionals from the PICs are discussed further below.

**Education and training**

PICs media professionals receive training from external actors both in their home countries and abroad.

- In-country media education and training provided by external actors includes veteran journalists providing in-house media training or multi-year capacity-building efforts led by foreign governments or international organizations.
Oversea media education and training provided by external actors typically blend training programs with exposure to the host country and culture.

**In-country media education and training**

In-country media education and training programs bring external media experts and professionals—including current or former journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international development experts—into the media sector of the recipient PIC (see Figure 12). These experts spend time in country, often embedded in local media outlets, to implement training tailored to the specific needs of each country’s media sector.

As regional media experts have noted, however, relying on external actors for training can be expensive. Also, training provided by external actors may not always be relevant or applicable to the local media environments. Moreover, while these programs provide targeted training for local media professionals, they may not adequately provide the sustained education necessary to support a more robust information environment in the PICs. According to a former team leader of the Australian Media Development Initiative, training must be “long-term, repetitious,” and “meet the cultural needs of a country”; otherwise, the efforts of external actors to provide support to media in the PICs simply won’t stick.

**Overseas media education and training**

Media professionals across the PICs have also increasingly participated in overseas media education programs. These trips are dual purpose, blending media training with exposure to a different country and culture, and vary in structure and duration (see Figure 13).

Similar to in-country media education and training, overseas training programs that are not properly tailored to the needs of PIC media professionals may have limited impact once the training ends. PIC media professionals typically need training in basic skills—news writing, interviewing, broadcasting, videography, photography, and so forth. Training and education on issues of regional importance, such as climate change, is also important to ensure that regional media professionals are able to communicate stories accurately and effectively to their audience. In contrast, training on high-tech or resource-intensive media methods may have limited effect over the day-to-day work of PIC journalists, particularly in countries with acute resource and/or technological constraints.

**Effects of media education and training programs**

While external actors may be able to help mitigate some deficits in core media competencies of the PICs by providing specialized professional training, there are significant obstacles to sustaining the benefits of these programs. According to monitoring and evaluation data from ABC’s Media Development Initiative (MDI) in Papua New Guinea, training programs may have limited impact in shaping the underlying attitudes and behaviors of media professionals, such as their willingness to exercise the responsibility of reporting on controversial issues.
Domestic factors in the media sector of the PICs—including the availability of in-country technical expertise and the retention of media personnel—may also limit the staying power of both in-country and overseas training.\(^\text{157}\)

**Figure 12. Selection of in-country media education and training programs in PICs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country providing education or training program in the PICs</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
<th>UNESCO &amp; The Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of program, PICs recipient(s), and duration</td>
<td>Pacific Media Assistance Scheme (PACMAS), an AusAID initiative funded by DFAT and ABC International Development</td>
<td>Media Development Initiative (MDI), an AusAID initiative managed by ABC International Development</td>
<td>Volunteer Service Abroad, a non-profit international development volunteer agency</td>
<td>Strengthening Media Self-Regulatory Mechanisms in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipients: Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu</td>
<td>Recipient: Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Recipient: Solomon Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td>Recipient: Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description and content</td>
<td>Improve “the capacity of journalists and communication practitioners in the Pacific to report responsibly and mediate discussion about key issues affecting development”</td>
<td>Strengthen content and enhance delivery of content from National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) and other local media, enabling more voices and views to be heard on air</td>
<td>Former New Zealand journalist to provide newsroom and editorial advice to local newspaper company, Isles Media, as well as a training course for journalists</td>
<td>Strengthen media self-regulation by building the capacity of the Timor-Leste Press Council; foster an environment conducive to a sustainable, free, independent, and professional media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intended to support Australian priorities in the Pacific, including increased economic growth, healthy and resilient communities, more efficient regional institutions, and empowerment of women and girls</td>
<td>Improved media content on major development challenges in PNG (i.e., health); organizational strengthening to support daily operations of NBC and other media</td>
<td>Former journalist provided a two-week training course to 8 journalists from Solomon Star, Island Sun, Lifestyle Television (LTV), and ZFM on topics including interviewing, feature writing, election coverage, and news writing</td>
<td>95 journalism students received two weeks of training to develop skills in interviewing, videography, photography, photo and video editing, and radio production; Timor-Leste Press Council held ethics training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13. Selection of overseas media education and training programs in PICs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country hosting education or training program for PICs media</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of program, PICs recipient(s), and duration</td>
<td>Pacific Journalism Competition, funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Journalist Visit Program (JVP) and 50+ other programs organized by Indonesian government</td>
<td>China-Asia Pacific Press Center (CAPPC), supported by China Public Diplomacy Association</td>
<td>Dongfeng Fellowship Program, organized by China Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duration: November 2017</td>
<td>Duration: Since 2000</td>
<td>Duration: Since 2016; opened to PICs media professionals in 2018</td>
<td>Duration: Month-long training since 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description and content</td>
<td>Increase capacity of PICs media professionals to cover environmental issues and raise awareness on climate change</td>
<td>Multidisciplinary training to support media development; help the Indonesian government promote global cooperation via media</td>
<td>10-month, all-expense paid fellowship for media professionals; includes Chinese language study and media training</td>
<td>Foreign journalists from Belt &amp; Road countries receive multidisciplinary media training; exposure to Chinese media and society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sponsored participation of PICs media professionals at UN climate conference, media training at DW Akademie, and access to UN and other experts</td>
<td>Training focused on improving news writing, camera operation, and non-linear editing</td>
<td>Training in journalism, China's foreign policy, socioeconomic issues in China; internship in Chinese media outlet; seminars with CCP officials</td>
<td>15 hours of media training on topics like AI in media, user experience, and drone journalism; 15 hours of courses on China; site visit to Chinese media outlets; sightseeing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Exposure and dialogues

Other forms of media training may involve introducing and exposing PIC media professionals to media operations in other countries. These initiatives often entail trips of one to two weeks overseas, organized and paid for by the host organization or government. China, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States are among the countries offering these experiential opportunities to media professionals.

For example, in 2016, a dozen journalists from the PICs traveled to Beijing for a 10-day tour at the invitation of the Chinese government. The participants did not receive any training as part of their trip, although they did visit CCTV and meet with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead, the purpose of the trip was to familiarize them with China. According to one
participant from Vanuatu, the trip “was designed to improve our understanding of lives and attitudes in China, as presented by our CCP [Chinese Communist Party] handlers.”165

PICs’ media professionals have also traveled to Japan on programs aimed primarily at familiarizing them with Japan and its relationship with the PICs. Recent programs include the following:

- In May 2015, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation invited journalists from Tonga, Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Palau to spend 10 days in Japan for a training that covered the relationship between Japan and the PICs.166
- In October 2015, as part of the Association for Promotion of International Cooperation’s (APIC) Pacific Journalist Fellowship Program, six PIC journalists visited Japan to learn about Japanese initiatives that could contribute to solving issues shared by the PICs.167
- In May 2018, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited eight journalists to cover the Eighth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM8) and participate in a range of cultural activities.168

**A Two-Way Street: Exposing Traditional Regional Media Actors to the PICs**

In 2018, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade introduced a Pacific Journalism Grant to raise New Zealand’s public understanding of and regional engagement in Pacific issues. Grant recipients were encouraged to write stories “informed by the Pacific Reset and include initiatives supported by the New Zealand Aid Program.”169 Laura Walters of Newsroom and Sally Round of RNZ Pacific were the first recipients of the grant; both used the funding to cover local effects of climate change.170

In 2019, the Walkley Foundation for Journalism, an independently funded Australian nonprofit organization, announced the Sean Dorney Grant for Pacific Journalism to provide funding for covering Pacific-island perspectives on underreported issues.171 The grant provides funding to one Australian journalist for work in any journalism medium.172 Ben Bohane was the inaugural grant recipient for his ongoing work in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville of Papua New Guinea.173

The United States also provides opportunities for exposure and dialogue to PIC media professionals. Several programs are run through the US Department of State and US embassies in the region, including the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) and the Edward R. Murrow Program for Journalists—Research and Investigation.
In 2019, Vanuatu news anchor Kizzy Kalsakau was selected to participate in the Murrow program, an annual exchange that brings journalists to the US to share practices, examine foreign affairs reporting, and build networks with media professionals in the US. The nonprofit East-West Center in recent years has also organized several programs that bring PIC journalists to the US, including:

- Jefferson Fellowships, which combine study-practicums at the East-West Center and a reporting trip taken with colleagues from other regional countries. Participants are “strongly encouraged” to generate media content during and after the program based on the experience.

- Pacific Islands Journalism Reporting Tour, which brought together 12 journalists for a three-week dialogue, study, and reporting tour in various locations in the US and a “capstone” in the PICs. The tour was funded by the US Department of State.

Opportunities for external actors

Anecdotal information indicates that PICs would be interested in more media training from external actors, especially local on-the-job training. A 2008 Australian assessment of media in the Solomon Islands found that local journalists preferred in-house training because they could get immediate feedback on their work from trainers in the newsroom. This finding was echoed by a media professional in Vanuatu, who noted that media trainers often believe skills development to be synonymous with classroom time and workshops. Expatriate trainers that provide in-country media training tend to emphasize workshops and classroom training sessions as the best mechanisms for education and professional development. However, as this media professional noted, on-the-job training may be the most effective way to ensure that journalists internalize new skills and build confidence in their capabilities.

Infrastructure deficits

A combination of difficult geography and resource constraints has created challenges for the PICs in sustaining the domestic infrastructure necessary for media operations. Tropical weather patterns, including devastating cyclones, can destroy radio and mobile phone towers; fiscal and technological constraints may prevent investment in new media or information capabilities, such as submarine cables.

These infrastructure deficits—and correlated deficits in technical resources and know-how—have yielded opportunities for external actors to enter the information environments of the PICs. In Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands, governments, international organizations, and private companies have stepped in with infrastructure assistance.
Rehabilitation of Fiji’s AM radio infrastructure

In 2015, Fiji received a $15 million grant from the government of Japan for the rehabilitation of Fiji’s medium wave AM radio infrastructure and transmission, enabling AM stations to reach all 300 islands of Fiji. The country’s prime minister stated at the launch of a newly rehabilitated medium wave AM transmission facility that, “this is a truly historic moment, as never before has every Fijian been able to simply switch on the radio and instantly become part of our national conversation—the dialogue and flow of information [...] keep us connected, even across tremendous distance.” The renewed reach of AM transmissions gives more Fijians access to information disseminated via radio, including state-owned Fiji Broadcasting Corporation (FBC).

Electrification and mobile phone networks in Papua New Guinea

Infrastructure deficits—including access to electricity and mobile phone service—are particularly acute in Papua New Guinea, where about 85 percent of the population lives in remote rural areas and only 10 percent of the entire population is connected to the electric grid.

Digicel (see Chapter 2) has been a primary provider of basic services in infrastructure in Papua New Guinea. When Digicel entered Papua New Guinea in mid-2007, mobile phone networks covered 4 percent of the country, with zero coverage in most rural areas. As of the end of August 2018, coverage had increased to 95 percent of the country. This tremendous growth in coverage can be attributed to Digicel’s construction of 1,100 cell towers across the country. The towers were constructed as part of a World Bank project aimed at providing access to telecommunications infrastructure in remote areas. Digicel has also worked with the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation and the government of New Zealand to bring solar-powered mobile phone charging stations to 500 villages in Papua New Guinea.

Submarine cable construction in the Solomon Islands

In late 2016, the Solomon Islands government contracted with Chinese telecommunications company Huawei to construct the country’s first-ever submarine fiber optic cable running from Sydney to Honiara. The contract had been expected to go to Xterra, a British-American company, with funding support from the Asian Development Bank. When Huawei was given the contract, allegations emerged from the Solomon Islands parliament that Huawei had paid $5 million to then–Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s political party to secure the contract. The lack of transparency in the government’s decision to contract with Huawei further prompted the Asian Development Bank, as provider of the concessional financing for the project, to withdraw its support.
When Huawei was awarded the contract under the Sogavare administration, Australian intelligence and security chiefs warned against the deal—particularly, Australian involvement as a landing point for the Chinese-made cable. In 2018, after Sogavare had been removed from office during a no-confidence vote, Australia stepped in to help his successor, Prime Minister Rick Houenipwela, build this key piece of infrastructure. Australia’s prime minister at the time, Malcolm Turnbull, announced that Australia would jointly fund construction of the cable network, effectively taking the contract from Huawei. The Solomon Islands government accepted the offer, one that then—Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop explicitly characterized as “an alternative to [China’s] offer.” Bishop further commented that Australian support in filling this infrastructure gap was also likely to be cheaper, faster, technically superior, and more resilient. The cable landed in the Solomon Islands in July 2019, and it is expected that the system will come online in early 2020.

**Funding deficits**

Funding deficits or budget crises in the PICs may have an impact on the media, creating opportunities for external actors to provide financial backing and/or media content.

In Papua New Guinea, persistent budget crises have affected government operations, including the media. State-owned broadcaster National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) frequently does not have enough money to pay its bills, in part because provincial governments do not provide the broadcaster with funding for operations. In December 2017, for example, NBC’s Radio Bougainville went off the air: PNG Power shut off NBC Bougainville’s generators because the broadcaster could not pay for fuel. Similarly, NBC’s radio broadcasts to the provinces have stopped due to the lack of provincially funded infrastructure.

In Vanuatu, persistent funding shortfalls at the state-owned broadcaster, Vanuatu Broadcasting and Television Corporation (VBTC), set the stage for a short-lived joint venture with a Chinese firm, Guilin Ceke Equipment Co. Limited (CEKE). In December 2015, VBTC and CEKE formed a company, Vanuamedia Digitalmedia Limited (VDL), to establish and manage a digital television network throughout Vanuatu. The service, launched in August 2016, provided access to 50 channels, including local television, Chinese channels, a New Caledonian TV channel, TV5 Monde, and Japan’s NHK.

CEKE was an attractive partner to VBTC because it offered equity financing; the Chinese firm invested $500 million in the joint venture rather than debt financing offered by other potential partners. According to former VBTC general manager Fred Vurobavaru, VTBC’s partnership with CEKE would help mitigate funding shortfalls while supporting VTBC’s ability to “provide effective service delivery to the whole country.”
CEKE’s motivations for partnering with VBTC are less clear. One plausible explanation is that the partnership supported the global growth of China’s digital television standard. According to a 2017 project from Tsinghua University, Vanuatu was one of 14 countries that had adopted China’s digital television standard, known as Digital Television Media Broadcasting (DTMB). DTMB is incompatible with equipment deployed in other Oceania countries and requires the use of equipment sourced in China, including antennae and decoders, in order to watch VDL programming.

VBTC shut down VDL in 2018 after it discovered that VDL was operating outside of Vanuatu's laws. In March 2018, VBTC removed VDL from the air and submitted an application to the Supreme Court of Vanuatu for the liquidation of VDL. The Supreme Court placed VDL in liquidation in August 2018.
Chapter 4. Decisions

National governments of the Pacific Island Countries are actively making decisions that affect the nature of their domestic information environments. Unlike the disruptors and deficits identified in previous chapters, decisions are directly within each country’s control. In other words, national governments in the PICs can—and do—actively choose how free they want their press to be, the extent to which foreign actors are permitted to engage in the media environment, and the extent to which they rely on foreign partners to mitigate deficits. These decisions collectively contribute to the overall resilience or vulnerability of the domestic media landscape against influence or interference by unsanctioned foreign actors.

In this chapter, we focus on the types of decisions national governments in the PICs make that are most likely to affect the media environment. We identified three primary categories of decisions:

- Decisions about freedoms of the press and freedoms of speech
- Decisions on how—or whether—to control foreign involvement in the media and related industries
- Decisions about foreign partners—and the effects political partnerships have on the media and related industries.

Appendix B identifies decisions made by the governments of each of the PICs that create resilience or expose vulnerabilities in the information environment. A separate annex provides additional analysis of the factors contributing to resilience and vulnerability in each of the PICs included in this report.

Decisions about press and individual freedoms

The decisions national governments make about freedoms afforded to the press as well as individual freedoms of speech influence the diversity of voices available within the PICs. These freedoms shape not only the tone and content of information disseminated within a country's media, but also how individuals consume and discuss information.

Freedom of the press and speech, if widely respected, nurtures diversity in the information environment. In Palau, for instance, the government widely respects and encourages media freedoms. Palauan government officials and the Palauan Media Council have publicly expressed concern about the lack of media freedoms in other PICs, including neighboring Nauru. Despite financial constraints, the government’s respect for media
freedoms has supported the growth of a robust domestic media sector, including a significant presence of private actors.\textsuperscript{208}

In Timor-Leste, the constitution not only enshrines media freedoms but also mandates the existence of a national broadcasting entity.\textsuperscript{209} The public radio and television services, RTTL (Radio-Televisão Timor Leste), are mandated to function as “impartial” actors in order to “protect and disseminate the culture and traditional values” of Timor-Leste and “guarantee opportunities for the expression of different lines of opinion.”\textsuperscript{210} Despite laws upholding media freedoms, RTTL’s dependence on government financing may ultimately condition the station’s leadership to heed these requests. In January 2019, for instance, the Secretary of State for Social Communication (SECOM) reportedly asked the newsroom to change coverage of sensitive stories for political reasons.\textsuperscript{211}

Tonga, by comparison, has adopted a restrictive approach to media freedoms: national law permits freedom of speech and the press so long as it does not slander the King and the royal family.\textsuperscript{212} In practice, this legal stipulation has been applied arbitrarily by government officials. In June 2017, when Prime Minister ‘Akilisi Pohiva found content from the Tonga Broadcasting Commission (TBC) personally offensive, he fired some of TBC’s leadership.\textsuperscript{213} In August 2019, slurs targeting the Tongan royal family via Facebook generated widespread media coverage of a possible ban on access to the social media platform.\textsuperscript{214}

**Even if press freedoms and individual freedoms are enshrined in national law, governments may still seek to control narratives and content disseminated by the media.** Governments may rely on national legislation on media content, libel, or defamation; censorship; or other ad hoc media bans to control media outlets and the type of narratives that reach their populations. These actions are likely to affect the diversity of both local and foreign actors and narratives available in the media.

For example, governments in Fiji and Papua New Guinea have passed legislation to regulate media content and, where necessary, impose censorship. The Fijian Media Industry Development Authority (MIDA) was established in 2010 to ensure that “nothing is included in the content of any media service which is against public interest or order, or national interest, or which offends against good taste or decency and creates communal discord.”\textsuperscript{215} The Papua New Guinea National Censorship Policy (2010) has a similarly vague standard, requiring content to meet standards of “morality, decency, and propriety generally accepted by a reasonable adult person in Papua New Guinea.”\textsuperscript{216}

National legislation in the Solomon Islands and Samoa treats defamation and libel as criminal offenses, which in practice leads many media entities to self-censor. Government authorities in the Solomon Islands, for instance, have filed or threatened to file charges against the media.\textsuperscript{217} In Samoa, Parliament voted in 2017 to reinstate a criminal libel law in order to crack down on anonymous online bloggers and fake social media accounts. The legislation punishes
“crimes against a person’s reputation” propagated in the media with fines or imprisonment.\textsuperscript{218} The reinstated legislation has so far been used primarily by the government in lawsuits against anonymous bloggers, Facebook users, and the \textit{Samoa Observer}.\textsuperscript{219}

In some instances, governments have turned to ad hoc bans or blackouts to restrict media content. According to American scholar James Stiefvater, these bans are an attempt by regional governments to “figure out what to do” and how to “effectively regulate malign sources of information” in the growing digital media space.\textsuperscript{220} For example:

- The government of Kiribati banned the now-inactive \textit{Kiribati Independent} from continuing operations in 2012 after it published stories that displeased the government. The government justified the ban with claims that the paper had breached national legislation.\textsuperscript{221}

- In Nauru, the government of former President Baron Waqa sought to purge content on Facebook and other websites that ran counter to “the values that helped build [Nauru].”\textsuperscript{222} A four-year ban on Facebook was lifted in January 2018, even as the Nauruan government continued to develop legislation for regulating online content.\textsuperscript{223}

- In Papua New Guinea, the government of Prime Minister Peter O’Neill blocked Facebook for a month in 2018 in a purported attempt to weed out fake accounts. The O’Neill government also previously imposed censors in 2010 after citizens leaked copies of a report on corruption.\textsuperscript{224}

- Government officials in Samoa and the Solomon Islands have threatened to impose bans to block content that shows domestic politics in a negative light.\textsuperscript{225}

\textbf{Corruption, a significant challenge for small island developing states in the Pacific, may have an effect on the information environment.}\textsuperscript{226} According to the annual Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International, public sector corruption remains a challenge in most of the PICs.\textsuperscript{227} In Papua New Guinea, for instance, the “massive disrespect for rule of law” has significant negative implications for the health of democratic institutions and civil liberties.\textsuperscript{228} The information environment there is in stark contrast to Vanuatu’s, where youth activists in particular have demanded greater government accountability and citizen participation.\textsuperscript{229}
Corruption in the Pacific Island Countries

According to Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), public sector corruption remains a pervasive problem in the Pacific Islands. Corruption is a vulnerability that may be exploited by foreign media actors to engage in the information environment.

The 2018 CPI ranks the following PICs on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean):

- Papua New Guinea: 28
- Timor-Leste: 35
- Solomon Islands: 44
- Vanuatu: 46

At the time of writing, the CPI did not have data on the other countries included in this study.

Decisions on controlling foreign involvement in the information environment

National governments can also make decisions to regulate, restrict, or control foreign involvement in the information environment. The regulations a national government decides to impose on foreign involvement in the information environment—through regulatory bodies, national legislation, or other mechanisms—will affect the role or reach of nonlocal media actors in the PICs.

Countries with strong central governments—and a strong government voice in the media—may have fewer foreign actors in the information environment. A stronger government voice in the media is likely to affect the number of nonlocal actors as well as the type of available media content. An overview of state-owned or state-affiliated media outlets in the PICs is shown in Table 2.
### Table 2. State-owned media outlets in the PICs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of media (newspaper, radio, TV)</th>
<th>Name of media outlet</th>
<th>Name of government owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji²³¹</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>FBC TV</td>
<td>Fiji Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>FBC Radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Territories²³²</td>
<td>TV and Radio</td>
<td>La Première (La 1ère)</td>
<td>France Télévisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati²³³</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Te Uekara</td>
<td>Broadcasting and Publications Authority of Kiribati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Radio Kiribati</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru²³⁴</td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>Mwienen Ko, Nauru Bulletin, Nauru Gazette</td>
<td>Nauru Media Bureau Government Information Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Nauru Television</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Radio Nauru</td>
<td>Nauru Broadcasting Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue²³⁵</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Television Niue</td>
<td>Niue Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Radio Sunshine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>MHTV</td>
<td>National Telecommunications Authority, whose majority shareholder is the Marshall Islands government²³⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>National Broadcasting Corporation</td>
<td>Government of Papua New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands²³⁸</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>TTV</td>
<td>Solomon Telekom Company Limited (Our Telekom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Gizo FM, Wantok FM, Lata FM</td>
<td>Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste²³⁹</td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>Jornal da República, Lian Foin Sa’e</td>
<td>Government of Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TV, Radio</td>
<td>Rádio-Televisão Timor-Leste (RTTL)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga²⁴⁰</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Television Tonga</td>
<td>Tonga Broadcasting Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Radio Tonga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Radio Tuvalu</td>
<td>State-owned by the Government of Tuvalu²⁴¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Vanuatu Broadcasting and Television Corporation (VBTC)</td>
<td>Vanuatu state-owned broadcaster²⁴²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
National laws on foreign investment in the media or related sectors will impact the extent to which foreign actors engage in the information environment. In half of the 16 countries included in this study, foreign actors must apply for a permit or other form of government authorization to own, operate, or otherwise conduct business activities in a country (see Table 3).

For instance, in Papua New Guinea, the National Information and Communications Technology Authority (NICTA) requires that applications for individual ICT licenses include "evidence of Papua New Guinea citizenship" and financial statements of any corporation that the applicant(s) is associated with. Additionally, foreign companies will be licensed to operate ICT platforms only with a certificate from the government body responsible for facilitating foreign investment, the Investment Promotion Authority (IPA). Preference is supposed to be given to local citizens; however, in practice, the government also considers joint ventures that comply with the IPA's rules and guidelines.243

Table 3. Selected regulations on foreign actors in PIC media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of regulation</th>
<th>Description of regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji**</td>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>At least 90% of a media organization must be owned by citizens of Fiji permanently residing in Fiji244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati**</td>
<td>Foreign investment</td>
<td>Foreign investors must provide details on the type and amount of the investment; local partners are not required245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands*</td>
<td>Foreign investment</td>
<td>Non-citizen investments require a government license; these investments must either incorporate as a domestic company or register as a foreign entity246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru*</td>
<td>Licensing</td>
<td>Any communications service, or any actor that operates a communications network, must apply for a government license valid for up to 15 years247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>Foreign investment</td>
<td>Foreign investors must maintain minimum investment level of US$500,000 for most businesses248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea**</td>
<td>Licensing</td>
<td>Application to own or operate information or communications technology licenses requires proof of PNG citizenship249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign investment</td>
<td>All foreign investments must receive approval from the government's Investment Promotion Authority (IPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa*</td>
<td>Licensing</td>
<td>Foreign business operators require government approval; they must also submit proof of funding and a business plan250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Foreign ownership in media cannot exceed 30%251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates countries where passport sales may provide a loophole to existing regulations.
** Indicates countries with paths to citizenship for foreigners.

Source: CNA.

Even in countries where restrictions on foreign investment may theoretically prevent foreign involvement in the media, loopholes may be found. In several PICs—the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu—passport sales are a source of national revenue.252 These
sales also provide foreigners a path to investment as a local citizen. In other countries, including Fiji, Kiribati, and Papua New Guinea, foreigners can apply for citizenship after a set period of residency in the country.

Restrictions on foreign investment in the media vary across the region, with at least two countries adopting a particularly welcoming approach to foreign actors in the information environment. The Republic of the Marshall Islands, while requiring noncitizen investment to incorporate as a domestic limited company or register as a foreign enterprise, welcomes investment from all countries equally. Similarly, the 2015 National Broadcasting Policy released by the Solomon Islands Ministry of Communications, Aviation, and Information Technology explicitly states:

The Solomon Islands Government considers that the quality and content of broadcasting in the Solomon Islands is not threatened at the present time by foreign ownership of local broadcasting license holders. [...] The government considers that, for the foreseeable future, the benefits that are likely to follow from increased foreign investment in the broadcasting sector are likely to outweigh the detriments. Accordingly, the Solomon Islands Government does not propose to introduce foreign ownership restrictions on broadcasting licensees...

Notably, despite this openness to foreign involvement in the media, many of the primary sources of information in the Solomon Islands—the Solomon Star, Island Sun, SATSOL, and Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation—are owned either by the government or private domestic actors.

**Media regulatory bodies, which are present in all 16 of the PICs, have varying roles in implementing restrictions on foreign involvement in the media.** Some of these regulatory bodies are affiliated with the government; others are situated in the private, nongovernmental sectors (see Table 4). In general, the functions of these regulatory bodies focus on overseeing two types of regulations:

- Regulations on media or broadcast licensing, and
- Regulations on media or broadcast content.

Licensing regulations, which are often replete with bureaucratic requirements, affect the extent to which foreign media actors are permitted to operate within a country. In Papua New Guinea, for instance, foreign media actors must request licensing from the National Information and Communications Technology Authority (NICTA), a government authority responsible for both regulation and licensing within the information and telecommunications sectors.

Several governments have adopted measures requiring both local and nonlocal media actors to register with the government. The Timor-Leste Media Act, for instance, requires foreign media organizations to register the organization and individual correspondents with the Press
In Fiji, the Media Decree requires all media organizations—local and nonlocal alike—to register with the Media Industry Development Authority and disclose proprietor(s), shareholders, other media interests, and an overview of operations. Foreign media seeking to conduct training in Fiji must also secure government approval. Such bureaucratic processes, which place media actors under added government scrutiny, may deter actors seeking to engage in the domestic information environment.

Governments may also impose quotas on the types and timing of foreign content broadcast domestically; they may also set designated time slots to broadcast content from both domestic and foreign sources. For example:

- Radio Tonga has set times for broadcasting the news in English—BBC News is at 1800, ABC or RNZI is at 1900 and 0715, and the local news is at 0700.
- In Papua New Guinea, NBC National (Voice of Papua New Guinea) is designated for public service programming. Live-streaming of parliamentary sessions is supplemented with hourly domestic news bulletins throughout the 21 hours of daily airtime. (See Figure 14.)
- In Vanuatu, radio stations and free-to-air TV networks, such as Television Blong Vanuatu, are required to broadcast a minimum of 80 percent Vanuatu content in any of the three national languages or other local languages.

**Figure 14. Papua New Guinea’s NBC Radio discussion on Bougainville Referendum**

Source: National Broadcasting Corporation Papua New Guinea (@NBCPNG), "@pngnri Bougainville #referendum #Research Project Team Leader Dr Thomas Webster will be on @NBCPNG Radio at 10am today to give a summary of key points from the National Conference on #Bougainville Referendum," Twitter, Jun. 25, 2018, 7:07pm, https://twitter.com/pngnri/status/1011385466862489600.
## Table 4. Media regulatory bodies in the PICs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name of regulatory body</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cook Islands</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia</td>
<td>Cook Islands Media Association</td>
<td>Volunteer association for media professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Territories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Communication Commission of Kiribati</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>Broadcasting and Publications Authority</td>
<td>Operates with “corporate status”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>National Telecommunications Authority</td>
<td>Private corporation with “significant ownership by the national government”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>Broadcasting Corporation of Niue</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>Palau National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority</td>
<td>Private, established by the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>National Information and Communications Technology Authority</td>
<td>Statutory government body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>Office of the Regulator</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Broadcasting and Media Board</td>
<td>Office of the Telecommunications Commission of the Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>National Communications Authority of Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Statutory authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Ministry of Information and Communications</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>Tuvalu Telecommunications Corporation</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>Tuvalu Media Department</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister (after a brief privatized period)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Telecommunications and Broadcasting Regulator</td>
<td>Statutory body operating independently from the government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.
Foreign media coverage of sensitive domestic news stories in the PICs has occasionally generated pushback from regional governments. In some instances, concerns about how media actors—particularly from Australia and New Zealand—portray the PICs have led to bans targeting foreign media actors. Examples include the following:

- In 2009, the Fijian government “unplugged” Radio Australia because it did not like its coverage of the country’s political upheaval. The government also deported and blacklisted journalists from Australia and New Zealand for reporting on former coup leader Frank Bainimarama’s abrogation of the Fijian constitution. The Fijian government also imposed a blackout upon domestic and foreign media entities 48 hours prior to the September 2014 election—the first election since the country’s military coup.

- Australian and New Zealand media did not receive media permits to cover the Kiribati response to a tragic ferry sinking in waters surrounding Kiribati in January 2018. The government of Kiribati determined that, following the tragedy, it would “not be an appropriate time to carry out interviews.” When a commission of inquiry report on the tragedy was released in September 2019, New Zealand media was unable to obtain a copy.

- The Nauruan government banned ABC (Australia) from attending the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in September 2018 due to the outlet’s perceived history of “blatantly report[ing] false information about Nauru.” Media coverage of the Manus refugee facility on Nauru was particularly sensitive, prompting the Nauruan government to revoke accreditation for New Zealand journalists believed to have interviewed refugees.

- In October 2019, Kiribati was in the news again for its media permit–issuing practices. An Australian journalist and film crew from Nine News were detained at their hotel after they arrived to cover Kiribati’s recent change in diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China. Media coverage of the incident suggests that the Australians may not have followed proper procedures in securing media permits. In one statement, Nine News said the media permit paperwork had been submitted prior to arrival. Kiribati immigration officials suggested they had entered under false pretenses and continued to conduct media interviews at their hotel despite the lack of a permit.

- In November 2019, the Vanuatu Labour Commissioner officially refused and revoked the work permit of Canadian national Dan McGarry, the media director of Vanuatu’s Daily Post. The paper’s founder, Marc Neil-Jones, attributed the government’s decision to some of McGarry’s recent news writings—including his piece on how China “convinced Vanuatu to enforce Chinese law within its own borders.”
Foreign media seeking access to cover local stories in the PICs can usually do so with few to no obstacles from immigration processes or authorities. There are, however, notable exceptions in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. Both countries have implemented immigration processes that place a higher burden upon foreign media (see Table 5).

Table 5. Selection of immigration and visa restrictions on foreign media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description of restriction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Nauru             | - Visiting foreign media must formally request permission to enter Nauru; non-refundable visa payment of $AU8,000 ($US5,767)\(^{296}\)  
- Media are not permitted to cover stories on the refugee population\(^{297}\) |
| Papua New Guinea  | - Letter from the sponsoring organization outlining reasons for travel, submitted to the office of the Prime Minister, the National Executive Council, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade\(^{298}\)  
- Additional paperwork required to access asylum processing center\(^{299}\) |

Source: CNA.

Decisions about foreign partners

National governments in the PICs also make decisions about their bilateral, trilateral, and/or multilateral partnerships. Some decisions on foreign partnerships may help mitigate deficits in the information environment; others may be a result of national political decisions and interests, with less immediate consideration for the media landscape.

There are three types of decisions about foreign partners that are likely to have the most salient effects on the information environment:

- Relations between the PIC government and traditional regional powers like Australia and New Zealand
- Diplomatic recognition of China
- Development assistance from international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank, UN, or World Bank, for media or telecommunications projects.

**Australia and New Zealand are important traditional partners for many of the PICs—including in the information environment.** As shown in previous chapters, Australian and New Zealand media actors figure prominently in the regional landscape; both countries are also significant sources of development assistance in many of the PICs (see Figure 15).
Australian policy initiatives that focus on the information environment in the PICs include the following:

- Since 2008, the Pacific Media Assistance Scheme (PACMAS) has offered varying levels of support to journalists and the media in the PICs, providing both technology and training to regional media actors. PACMAS is funded by the Australian government and managed regionally by ABC International Development.

- The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper commits Australia to supporting a more resilient region through intensified engagement with PIC partners. This ongoing initiative, known as the “Pacific Step-up,” notably includes an $AU2 billion Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) to provide support for infrastructure development in telecommunications and other sectors, as well as separate funding for the Coral Sea Cable System.

- The Australian government announced in January 2019 an $AU17.1 million grant to distribute commercial TV programs via free-to-air networks in the Pacific. As of November 2019, these programs have yet to air in the PICs; academics have raised additional concerns about whether Australian commercial TV is even relevant to Pacific Island viewers.

New Zealand is a similarly important partner to the PICs, earmarking nearly 60 percent of its total annual overseas aid budget for the PICs since 2015.

- In conjunction with the government’s “Pacific Reset” agenda, the New Zealand government announced in September 2018 that it would spend $US6.6 million over three years to expand the Pacific Cooperation Broadcasting Service. The broadcasting company, which has previously hosted media professionals from the PICs, will use this funding to produce short-form stories with guidance from the Foreign Ministry showcasing New Zealand’s connections to the Pacific.

Even as these traditional partnerships evolve, other regional partners—including Japan and Indonesia—are emerging with increased engagement and development assistance offered across the PICs.
Countries that choose formal diplomatic recognition of China—rather than Taiwan—create opportunities for Chinese media to enter the information environment. Twelve of the 16 PICs included in this study recognize China; the remaining four countries—Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, and Tuvalu—recognize Taiwan (see Figure 16). The countries that maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan have limited, if any, Chinese (PRC) media present in the information environment. China’s CCTV-4 is available in the Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea, but we found no indication that other forms of Chinese media are presently broadcasting to the other three countries maintaining formal ties to Taiwan. These countries notably do not host media outlets from Taiwan; however, they are likely able to receive shortwave radio broadcasts from Taiwan Radio International.

**Chinese Media in Fiji and Papua New Guinea**

During Chinese president Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit to Fiji, only Chinese journalists were permitted into the room where Xi delivered his speech to Pacific leaders. Two Fijian journalists who tried to defy the ban were removed by Chinese security—and told to obtain the full text of the speech from Chinese state-media outlet Xinhua.

In Papua New Guinea, during the 2018 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings, Chinese officials purportedly ordered the microphones of local broadcaster EMTV to be removed from the dais where Xi was to deliver his speech. Only China’s CCTV was allowed to record Xi’s speech. Regional media outlets, including ABC Australia, were also not permitted to cover a meeting between Xi and PIC leaders.
Bilateral political relations with China may also provide a basis for developing closer media ties. For example, China provided critical political support to Fiji—while Western governments imposed sanctions—after the 2006 military coup that installed then-Commodore Frank Bainimarama in power. In September 2014, Bainimarama was elected as prime minister in Fiji’s first post-coup elections. Two months later, in November 2014, the Fiji Sun signed news exchange agreements with Chinese state-media outlets Xinhua and China Daily. Other countries that have close political ties to China, such as Papua New Guinea or Tonga, may also be more inclined to welcome infrastructure projects in media and other related sectors, including from Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei.

The eight PICs countries that have signed on to participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—Cook Islands, Fiji, Micronesia, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu—
may opt to join the Belt and Road News Network (BRNN). Headquartered in Beijing and chaired by People’s Daily, the BRNN is currently composed of 40 mainstream media organizations from 25 BRI countries. As of October 2019, there are no PIC members in the BRNN; however, according to the BRNN charter, media outlets from the PICs with “certain influence in the country and region where they are located” are eligible to join. Similarly, the extent to which participation in the BRI creates opportunities for other forms of Chinese assistance in the media, including investments in related infrastructure, is an issue that requires continued monitoring.

### Nauru’s Partnership with Chinese Telecommunications Company

Former Nauru president Baron Waqa once described the ties between Nauru and Taiwan as those “not just of friends, but of a family.” During his administration, the government notably entered a partnership with a Chinese telecommunications company. In early 2017, the government signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Chinese company Acclinks (Shenzhen Shili Hua Xin Jishu Youxian Gongs; 深圳市立华信技术有限公司) to act as a second telecommunications service provider for the island. The Nauruan government holds a 60 percent stake in Acclinks, which operates under Cenpac, the island’s internet service provider. Registered in the British Virgin Islands, there are reports that Acclinks’ operations in the Pacific may be funded by Chinese telecom company ZTE.

### The PICs may also decide to partner with international organizations—including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), UN, and World Bank—to support development in media and other related sectors.

The ADB and World Bank have provided critical developmental assistance, typically in the form of concessional ordinary capital resources (OCR) loans, for the construction of submarine cables. The Cook Islands, FSM, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, and Tonga have all received financing from the ADB or World Bank for the construction of submarine cables.

The United Nations has also provided training and capacity building initiatives in the region:

- The UN has invited journalists in Papua New Guinea to participate in training conducted by Thomson Reuters and members of regional media organizations.

- In 2018, the Government of India partnered with the UN Development Program (UNDP) to offer training focused on improving media coverage of climate change issues.

- In April 2019, UNDP and PACMAS, a media project funded by the Australian government and managed by ABC International Development, partnered to offer a two-day training for journalists on how to enhance coverage of parliamentary issues.
Chapter 5. Issues to Watch and Recommendations

The principal trends identified throughout this report—the role of disruptors, deficits, and decisions—can be expected to contribute to continued dynamism in the information environment of the PICs. This dynamism will be characterized by continued flux and competition in the regional media environment. In this chapter, we identify several issues that warrant further observation. These issues contribute to the resilience or vulnerability of the regional media landscape to unwanted or unsanctioned external interference and provide a basis for our recommendations for regional media actors and governments.

Issues to watch: flux and competition

The regional information environment is simultaneously characterized by continuity and competition. As traditional partners for many of the PICs, Australia and New Zealand occupy positions of privilege in the regional media. However, their positions are less secure than they once were. Higher levels of connectivity enjoyed by people across the PICs have brought countless new sources of news and information via satellite TV, smartphone, and the internet. China’s growing presence in the region has similarly challenged the presence of traditional partners. If Beijing continues to deepen its engagement with the PICs, the competition for influence in the information space is likely to intensify. This competition is likely to be most acute as actors seek to mitigate deficits in the regional media, including deficits in media content, ICT infrastructure, and training.

Competition to provide media content

The availability of media content from a greater number of sources—due in no small part to the increased connectivity of the PICs—has created a competition between traditional and emerging actors. Both types of actors are competing not only to fill content deficits in the PICs media landscape, but to provide content broadcast in local languages. Observers should watch:

- The extent to which traditional actors continue to provide the region with media content in the local vernacular; and
- Whether China is able to tailor its media content and broadcast languages for the PICs, as it has done elsewhere.
As traditional regional partners, both Australia and New Zealand have introduced plans to provide enhanced media content to the PICs. As part of Australia's "Step-up" in the Pacific, Canberra unveiled a three-year $AU17.1 million initiative to provide the PICs with 1,000 hours of Australian TV programming annually. FreeTV, which represents commercial Australian channels, expects that the first shows to air in the Pacific under the deal will be available in 2020. It is not clear whether the Australian programming will include any in local languages—or be particularly relevant to viewers in the PICs. New Zealand similarly enhanced media cooperation with the PICs as part of the government's "Pacific Reset." In September 2018, the government allocated $NZ6.6 million to expand the Pacific Cooperation Broadcasting Service, including the production of short-form stories to showcase New Zealand's connections to the Pacific.

As Australia and New Zealand strengthen their roles as providers of media content, they face competition from a growing Chinese media footprint. Several elements of this competition are already manifest, including:

- China Radio International began to broadcast on shortwave radio frequencies vacated by ABC (Australia) in 2017;
- CCTV has started to provide content for regional television broadcasters, such as in Papua New Guinea; and
- Content from Chinese state-owned news agencies is republished in local media outlets in several PICs, including Fiji and Tonga.

While the evolving competition between traditional and emerging partners to provide media content is noteworthy, the critical variable in this competition is whether the content is relevant to the Pacific Islander peoples. The people of the PICs are more interested in local and regional programming than international news. Media from Australia and New Zealand regularly provide such content and in regional languages (see Chapter 3).

China has yet to provide programming tailored to local interests or in the local vernacular. As Chinese universities teach more Pacific Islander languages, there is also the potential for Chinese state-owned media to become more adept at providing media content in local languages—a capability that would mirror, and possibly seek to compete with, the reach and effects of existing Australian and New Zealand programming.

**Competition to provide ICT infrastructure and services**

Competition for influence in the Pacific's information environment has already extended to the development of the region's ICT infrastructure—particularly, mobile internet networks and submarine cables. External actors, including governments and international organizations, are competing to provide infrastructure enabling connectivity and access to information in the PICs. In some cases, as noted in previous chapters, the opacity of this competition has triggered
security concerns for both PICs governments and external actors with interests in the region. Observers should monitor:

- How the PICs manage relations with actors providing ICT infrastructure and services, ensuring their national interests and mitigating against new forms of risk; and
- The evolving effects of social media platforms on the information environment.

The growing number of actors offering to provide ICT infrastructure and services creates new types of risk for the governments of the PICs. Traditional actors and processes, including the Asian Development Bank and World Bank, seek to ensure that their projects are transparent and financially sustainable. Chinese assistance for infrastructure projects in the Pacific—such as Huawei’s attempted cable construction in the Solomon Islands—has not always been transparent.342

**China’s Digital Silk Road in the Pacific**

The Chinese government introduced a Digital Silk Road Initiative (*Shuzi Sichou zhi Lu*; 数字丝绸之路) as one component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).343 The initiative aims to finance and construct advanced ICT platforms around the world, particularly in “frontier areas” and “developing countries.” 344 To support the government’s directive, Chinese companies have sought opportunities to support ICT development around the world, including the Pacific.345 Experts at the Council on Foreign Relations, a US-based think tank, have suggested that these ICT development efforts further allow China to influence the willingness or ability of other countries to regulate and/or censor their domestic media.346

The effects of the continued growth of social media platforms, particularly the relationship between regional governments and these platforms, warrants continued observation. Regional mobile and internet service providers, such as Digicel, have enabled the growth of social media—especially Facebook—by offering social media data plans and other discounts to consumers. Given Facebook’s footprint in the region, a potentially pivotal issue is whether the platform will become a tool for malign activity, including coordinated disinformation campaigns.347

**Competition to provide training and education**

Competition to fill training and education deficits for media professionals from the PICs can be expected to continue. Observers should watch:

- The ability of Chinese training programs to address training deficits in core media competencies of media professionals from the PICs; and
- Shifts in study-abroad trends.
Australia and New Zealand have traditionally led a variety of training programs for media professionals from the Pacific; the US offers similar opportunities for the region’s media actors. All three countries are popular destinations for students seeking to study journalism, communications, or related fields abroad. The United States has traditionally been the principal destination of students in Micronesia, while Australia and New Zealand have been major destinations for students in Melanesia and Polynesia.  

China is also offering more opportunities for students and media professionals from the PICs to receive training and other forms of professional education in China. Unlike the training and education offered by traditional partners, many of these programs appear to prioritize exposure over education (see Chapter 3). The fact that some of these trips are not meeting the media training needs of the PICs means that external actors have ample opportunity to aid in training and education for regional media professionals.  

Effects of evolving bilateral partnerships  

As this report has noted, the decisions PIC governments make about external partners and foreign relations are likely to continue to have an effect upon the information environment. Observers should continue to track:  

- China’s deepening political ties in the PICs; and  
- The effect of China’s expanded ties on the information environment, including the competition to provide content, ICT infrastructure, and training.  

China’s political ties to countries in the region provide a basis for closer involvement or cooperation in the media. Whether the Marshall Islands, Nauru, and Tuvalu maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, or switch to recognition of the PRC, may also have an impact on their domestic media landscapes.  

As with any bilateral relationship, however, familiarity can also breed contempt, particularly if benefits are perceived to be unbalanced. Since 2006, at least two PICs—the Solomon Islands and Tonga—have experienced anti-Chinese riots. According to findings from AidData, a research lab at William and Mary College, public hostility or skepticism in Pacific Island states is not uncommon where China has a large presence. While China may seek to expand its presence in the region and shape the media in a favorable manner, its ability to do so will be conditioned by the perceptions and actions of the local populace.  

Evolving regulatory environment  

The continued changes in the information environment of the PICs will likely yield continued adaptation and evolution in the regulatory environment that guides the operations of domestic and foreign media. The decisions countries make about balancing autonomy and external
involvement in the media sector have direct implications for how citizens access information, as well as how the competition between foreign media actors unfolds. Observers should track:

- Overt efforts by foreign media actors to influence, shape, or circumvent regulations in the media or telecommunications sectors;
- Restrictions placed by governments on freedoms of speech or press that limit the availability of diverse media voices; and
- Covert efforts to coopt media and narratives.

External media actors may seek to circumvent regulations in the information environment where it is in their interest to do so. Regulations on radio licensing, for instance, can be circumvented through shortwave radio broadcasts that, given the geographic range of the radio waves, typically do not require the support from the target country. Additionally, regional governments have previously turned to censorship and media bans to curb foreign voices (see Chapter 4). States may continue this practice in the future, blocking content from foreign sources that is seen to be too sensitive or critical or selectively allowing favorable narratives into the media.

An additional point of tension between internal autonomy and external influence is the effect that China’s United Front work may have upon the information environment of the PICs. United Front work can be used to persuade, coerce, or coopt political officials and decision-makers. Although United Front work can target anyone, Chinese speakers are a major target of the CCP’s United Front work in the information space. Chinese-language media—or media that may have institutional ties to China—may potentially become a mechanism for “[rallying] as many allies as possible in order to achieve a common cause.” Elsewhere in the world, United Front work has “harmonized” Chinese-language media with the Chinese Communist Party line. As scholar James Jiann Hua To has noted, the ease of Chinese immigration to the PICs has contributed to the growth of the overseas Chinese population in the region. The role of United Front actors in the regional media environment and discrete efforts to build alliances among overseas Chinese communities in the PICs merit continued monitoring.

Resilience and vulnerability in the information environment

Based on our findings in this study, there are categories of factors in the information environment of each of the PICs that are likely to affect the overall resilience of a country’s media sector to unwanted or unsanctioned external influence or interference. The presence (or absence) of these factors will shape how vulnerable a country is to activities or efforts by foreign actors to manipulate the information environment or influence the narratives disseminated by the media in a given country. These factors are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6. Factors affecting resilience and vulnerability in the information environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Sources of Vulnerability</th>
<th>Sources of Resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulations on press and individual freedoms of speech</td>
<td>State exercises control over freedoms of speech or press</td>
<td>Freedom of speech supported by media transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media controls operate based on politics, not law</td>
<td>Media controls used only in accordance with legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State is the dominant voice in the media</td>
<td>Plurality of media voices and actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulations on foreign actors in the domestic information environment</td>
<td>Process for licensing or operating media or telecommunications does not regulate or restrict foreign actors</td>
<td>Process for licensing or operating media or telecommunications regulates or restricts foreign actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Content quotas are non-existent or not enforced</td>
<td>Content quotas ensure balance between foreign-sourced and domestic content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of process or quota to limit foreign investments in the media or telecommunications sectors</td>
<td>Foreign investments in the media or telecommunications sectors are limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign media presence and access to foreign media</td>
<td>Dependence on foreign providers for media content</td>
<td>Adequate domestic resources to meet media content demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependence on foreign actors to provide media training</td>
<td>Some content sourced from foreign providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High attrition among media professionals</td>
<td>Domestic programs to recruit and train media professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Existing infrastructure cannot sustain daily media operations</td>
<td>Infrastructure capable of supporting daily media operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owned or operated by foreign actors</td>
<td>Locally owned and operated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign partners and allies</td>
<td>Government is dependent on a single bilateral relationship to meet deficits in the information environment</td>
<td>Multiple partners or allies provide assistance to fill deficits in the information environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deep bilateral relationship with a single partner country</td>
<td>Strong bilateral relationships with multiple partner countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNA.

Based on these factors, several trends indicating areas of resilience and vulnerability in the information environment of the PICs are noteworthy:

- **Transparency promotes resilience.** The regulatory environment in which media actors operate has an important role to play in promoting resilience. Regulations or processes that require media actors to disclose ownership, or quotas on foreign content, provide a basic mechanism for overseeing who is involved in the information environment and what types of media the populace can access.
A state-controlled or state-centric media does not necessarily indicate resilience against unwanted or unsanctioned external media actors. Where the national government is the dominant voice or actor in the media, this may denote that a country lacks adequate resources to support greater diversity of local media actors.

Foreign dependencies are likely to have an effect on the information environment. Strong political partnerships are likely to have an effect on a country’s choice of partners for filling deficits in the information environment and related sectors. A country that is heavily dependent on a single partner may be more inclined to portray this relationship favorably in the media.

A summary of overall resilience and vulnerability in the information environment of the PICs is shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17. Resilience and vulnerability of the information environment in the PICs

![Figure 17](image)

Source: CNA.

**Recommendations**

This report has identified key trends and factors that are shaping the unique information environment in the PICs. Based on these findings, we offer the following recommendations:

**Bolster and revitalize traditional partnerships.** Traditional partner countries—especially Australia, New Zealand, and the United States—maintain a privileged role in shaping the information environment in the PICs. This is due to well-established partnerships based on mutual respect and decades of extensive social, cultural, economic, and historical ties. The best way to maintain this position of privilege is to make the most of these traditional ties, leveraging a history of partnership to provide support for the media sector of the PICs. Shifting focus to competition with rising actors, such as China, risks undermining existing partnerships with the PICs by ignoring the agency of these countries to choose their own partners and underestimating the value of existing partnerships that took decades to establish.
Strengthen and diversify broadcast content tailored to local audiences. The PICs will naturally seek to fill deficits with content that is attractive, relevant, and useful to local audiences. Traditional regional media actors in Australia and New Zealand already broadcast some content tailored to the PICs—including local news, sports, and entertainment—in English and local languages. Efforts by regional media actors to provide appealing and locally applicable media content, including in local languages, should be maximized.

Provide on-site media training tailored to local needs. Partner governments and/or non-government actors should tailor media training to the needs of each country, taking into consideration local challenges and opportunities. Effective training is likely to be “long-term, repetitious” and in tune to the “cultural needs of a country.” Priority should be given to training that could help to strengthen the resilience and sustainability of the media within the PICs, such as training on analysis and content production. Training programs that bring media experts from abroad into the newsrooms of the PICs to facilitate real-time, on-the-ground training may have greater value than hosting training in foreign countries.

Provide greater access to raw news feeds. The US Department of State’s Global Engagement Center provides PIC media outlets free access to Associated Press wires. Other traditional partners, particularly those in Australia and New Zealand, could pursue similar measures to provide free or low-cost access to national news wires. This access would continue to support the ability of local journalists in the PICs—particularly those that are resource-strapped—to provide timely and accurate coverage.

Provide greater access to public broadcasting. Partners should provide funding for public broadcasters, ensuring that they have the equipment and personnel necessary for their content to reach all citizens in their country.

Provide support, and related training, for infrastructure projects. Disseminating information requires technology and modern infrastructure. Traditional partners should continue to support the reach of the information environment, including support for infrastructure or development projects. Partner governments may also seek to provide more local technical training so that the PICs can independently secure and operate infrastructure. This could, for instance, include support for submarine cables, radio transmitters or repeaters, and cell phone towers.

Provide additional resources and support for regulatory bodies and/or professional media councils. Regulatory mechanisms and professional media organizations fill a critical role in managing the daily operations of the media environment. Traditional partners can engage with these organizations directly, sharing best practices on effective oversight mechanisms and media operations. Dialogues on best practices can also focus on developing effective legal mechanisms for regulating the media, thereby encouraging regional governments to avoid reliance on ad hoc political controls of the media.
Develop local language public education programs to support media literacy. Given the dynamism of the information environment in the PICs, regional governments are likely to face the challenges of disinformation and misinformation on new media platforms. As the growth of ICT infrastructure—and social media in particular—connects more people in the PICs, governments and nongovernmental actors alike should seek to promote media literacy. This includes efforts to teach users how to identify credible sources of information.
Appendix A: Submarine cables in the PICs

Table 7 captures data on submarine cables that were either in operation or planned for the Pacific Island Countries as of September 2019. This data also includes information on cable funding, cable owner(s), and installation.

Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu did not host submarine cable landing points at the time of writing. It should be noted, however, that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) signed an agreement in May 2018 to help deliver submarine cables to Kiribati and Nauru.356

Table 7. Submarine cables in the PICs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cable name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Year of operation</th>
<th>Funding source</th>
<th>Cable owner(s)</th>
<th>Installed by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>Manatua</td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
<td>Expected by mid-2020</td>
<td>ADB loan and funding via New Zealand government</td>
<td>OPT (French Polynesia), Telecom Niue, Samoa Submarine Cable Company, Avaroa Cable Ltd. (Cook Islands)</td>
<td>Subcom, Avaroa Cable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia</td>
<td>Southeast Asia-US (SEA-US)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Private and public investment</td>
<td>RTI (US), Globe Telecom (Philippines), Hawaiian Telecom, GTA (Guam), TeleGuam, and Telin (Indonesia)</td>
<td>NEC Corporation, Belau Submarine Cable Corporation, Government of FSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chuuk-Pohnpei</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>FSM government and World Bank</td>
<td>FSMT Cable Corporation</td>
<td>NEC Corporation, FSMT Cable Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Cable name</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Year of operation</td>
<td>Funding source</td>
<td>Cable owner(s)</td>
<td>Installed by</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiji</strong></td>
<td>Tui-Samoan Cable</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Private and public investment</td>
<td>Samoa Submarine Cable Company</td>
<td>Samoa Submarine Cable Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tonga Cable</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>ADB, World Bank, and Tonga Cable Ltd.</td>
<td>Tonga Communication Corp., Government of Tonga, Digicel Tonga</td>
<td>Alcatel-Lucent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interchange Cable Network 1 (ICN1)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>ANZ (Australia), loan from Vanuatu National Provident Fund, and Vanuatu private investor (unknown)</td>
<td>Interchange (Vanuatu), Government of Vanuatu</td>
<td>Alcatel-Lucent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Private and public investment</td>
<td>SingTel Optus (40%), Spark NZ (37.5%), Telstra (25%), Verizon (10%)</td>
<td>Alcatel-Lucent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Cross NEXT</td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
<td>Expected late 2021</td>
<td>Private and public investment</td>
<td>SingTel Optus (40%), Spark NZ (37.5%), Telstra (25%), Verizon (10%)</td>
<td>Alcatel Submarine Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>French Polynesia</strong></td>
<td>NATITUA</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Public and private investment</td>
<td>OPT (French Polynesia)</td>
<td>Alcatel Submarine Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honotua</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>French Polynesia government</td>
<td>OPT (French Polynesia)</td>
<td>Alcatel Submarine Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wallis and Futuna</strong></td>
<td>Tui-Samoan Cable</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Private and public investment</td>
<td>Samoa Submarine Cable Company</td>
<td>Alcatel Submarine Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Caledonia</strong></td>
<td>Picot-1</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>New Caledonia government</td>
<td>OPT (New Caledonia)</td>
<td>Alcatel Submarine Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gondwana-1</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>New Caledonia government</td>
<td>OPT (New Caledonia)</td>
<td>Alcatel Submarine Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kiribati</strong></td>
<td>Southern Cross NEXT</td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
<td>Expected late 2021</td>
<td>ADB and World Bank grants; private and public investment</td>
<td>SingTel Optus (40%), Spark NZ (37.5%), Telstra (25%), Verizon (10%)</td>
<td>Alcatel Submarine Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Cable name</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Year of operation</td>
<td>Funding source</td>
<td>Cable owner(s)</td>
<td>Installed by</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Planning</td>
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<td>Grants from ADB and World Bank (part of East Micronesia Cable System)</td>
<td>To be determined</td>
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<td>Niue</td>
<td>Manatua</td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
<td>Expected by mid-2020</td>
<td>ADB loan and funding via New Zealand government</td>
<td>OPT (French Polynesia), Telecom Niue, Samoa Submarine Cable Company, Avaroa Cable Ltd. (Cook Islands)</td>
<td>Subcom, Avaroa Cable</td>
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<td>Palau</td>
<td>Southeast Asia-US (SEA-US)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>ADB loan for Palau portion, private and public investment</td>
<td>RTI (US), Globe Telecom (Philippines), Hawaiian Telecom, GTA (Guam), TeleGuam, and Telin (Indonesia)</td>
<td>NEC Corporation, Belau Submarine Cable Corporation, Government of FSM</td>
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<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>PNG LNG</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>PNG government, Esso Highlands, Oil Search, Southern Highlands government</td>
<td>Telikom PNG</td>
<td>Global Marine</td>
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<td>Australia-Papua New Guinea (APNG-2)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Private and public investment</td>
<td>Telikom PNG and Tesltra</td>
<td>Built from a repurposed section of PacRim West cable</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Private investment</td>
<td>Total Peripherals Group (Australia)</td>
<td>Tyco Electronics Subsea Comms.</td>
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<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cable name</strong></td>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td><strong>Year of operation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Funding source</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cable owner(s)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Installed by</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Coral Sea Cable System (CSCS)</strong></td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
<td>Expected late 2019</td>
<td>Public-private investment (DFAT Australia, PNG DataCo, Solomon Submarine Cable, Vocus, and Alcatel Submarine Networks)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alcatel Submarine Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kumul Domestic Submarine Cable System</strong></td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
<td>Expected 2019</td>
<td>ExIm Bank of China</td>
<td>PNG DataCo Ltd.</td>
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<td>Huawei Marine (China)</td>
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<td>2018</td>
<td>Private and public investment</td>
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<td><strong>Manatua</strong></td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
<td>Expected mid-2020</td>
<td>ADB loan and funding via New Zealand government</td>
<td>OPT (French Polynesia), Telecom Niue, Samoa Submarine Cable Company, Avaroa Cable Ltd. (Cook Islands)</td>
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<td>Subcom, Avaroa Cable</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Cross NEXT</strong></td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
<td>Expected late 2021</td>
<td>ADB and World Bank grants (Samoa portion), private and public portion</td>
<td>SingTel Optus (40%), Spark NZ (37.5%), Telstra (25%), Verizon (10%)</td>
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<td>Alcatel Submarine Networks</td>
</tr>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Cable name</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Year of operation</td>
<td>Funding source</td>
<td>Cable owner(s)</td>
<td>Installed by</td>
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<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Interchange Cable Network 2 (ICN2)</td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Private investment</td>
<td>Interchange (Vanuatu)</td>
<td>Alcatel-Lucent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Tonga Cable</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Public and private investment, ADB and World Bank grants</td>
<td>Government of Tonga (majority), Tonga Communication Corporation (16.6%), Digicel Tonga (16.6%)</td>
<td>Alcatel-Lucent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Tonga Domestic Cable Extension</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Public and private investment; ADB and World Bank grants</td>
<td>Government of Tonga (majority), Tonga Communications Corporation (16.6%), Digicel Tonga (16.6%)</td>
<td>Alcatel Submarine Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Interchange Cable Network 1 (ICN1)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>ANZ (Australia), loan from Vanuatu National Provident Fund, and Vanuatu private investor (unknown)</td>
<td>Interchange (Vanuatu), Government of Vanuatu</td>
<td>Alcatel-Lucent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Interchange Cable Network 2 (ICN2)</td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Private investment</td>
<td>Interchange (Vanuatu)</td>
<td>Alcatel-Lucent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B: Country Overviews

Cook Islands

Quick Country Facts
- Literacy rate (2016): 95%
- Internet penetration (2018): 65.5%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2016): 105
- Total population (2018): 9,038
- Official languages: English, Cook Islands Maori

Sources of Vulnerability
- Decentralized, privatized media sector with few restrictions on foreign involvement in the media
- Unknown effects on its information environment of its MOU with China for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- Socioeconomic changes precipitated by submarine cables and tourism

Sources of Resilience
- Self-governing country in free association with New Zealand
- Media environment has in many ways sought to emulate New Zealand
- Foreign media primarily comes from other outlets and actors in Oceania, including American Samoa, Fiji, New Zealand, and Australia
- Non-local media actors must register with the Business Trade and Investment Board
- Audio and/or video production is defined by national law as a “reserved investment area” for Cook Islanders only
- Government is not hostile towards diverse voices in the information environment

Federated States of Micronesia

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2016): 95.7%
- Internet penetration (2018): 35.3%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2016): 21.9
- Total population (2018): 103,643
- Official languages: English
- Lower-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- Regulatory environment characterized by few barriers to entry for foreign media
- Non-local investors may easily enter the media and telecommunications markets
- Heavy dependence on foreign providers for media content, particularly TV programs
- Secessionist movement in Chuuk State could affect foreign actors in the domestic information environment
- Expanding cooperation with China

Sources of Resilience

- As a result of the Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States, media environment emulates the diversity of US media
- News media operate freely, and government respects freedoms of speech and press
- Independent regulatory authority promotes competition and manages telecommunications sector
- Foreign media content sourced from a wide variety of actors; no apparent dependence on a single source or actor

Fiji

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2011): 94.4%
- Internet penetration (2018): 49.97%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 117.83
- Total population (2018): 926,276
- Official languages: English, Fijian, Hindustani
- Upper-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- Political pressures on media and press freedoms creates culture of self-censorship
- Low-barrier path to Fijian citizenship may enable foreigners to skirt restrictions on foreign ownership of local media
- The government of Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama has made exceptions for Chinese media actors, despite legislative and regulatory frameworks that seek to limit the role of foreign actors in the media
- Two primary newspapers have content agreements with the Chinese state-run media outlets Xinhua and People's Daily; both papers also republish content from Western media
- Bainimarama’s government has limited the access and reach of Fiji’s traditional regional partners, Australia and New Zealand, in the media

Sources of Resilience

- Media Industry Development Decree (2010) gives the government significant authority in determining the local media landscape
  - Media Industry Development Authority (MIDA) was established in 2010 as an independent statutory body to oversee media operations and development
  - Media Decree stipulates that foreign media ownership of local media be restricted to ≤10 percent; foreign media are required to register with MIDA
- Strong domestic media environment, characterized by diverse domestic media voices
- Sufficient domestic resources to provide infrastructure and content
- Local media exports media content to other PICs
- Foreign content is readily available in local media, especially radio and TV

## French Territories

### Quick Country Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Combined literacy rate, for all 3 territories (2015): 96.90%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
<td>• Internet penetration (2018): 72.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 101.71</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Total population (2018): 290,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High income economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>• Internet penetration (2018): 82.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Total population (2018): 282,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High income economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallis and Futuna</td>
<td>• Internet penetration (2018): 33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Total population (2018): 15,763</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Official languages: French and Polynesian

### Sources of Vulnerability

- Resource constraints have forced local media to close; the limited number of remaining local media are owned by a small number of individuals
- Heavily dependent upon foreign content in domestic media
- Brief historical experiences in French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna of politically imposed media restrictions
- No restrictions on foreign ownership or investment in the media

### Sources of Resilience

- Media environment characterized by a blend of local ownership and providers broadcasting directly from France
- Diversity of media providers; no apparent reliance on a single foreign provider for content
- Local governments uphold freedoms of press according to the French Constitution
- Decisions about foreign investment in the Territories are reviewed by the government in Paris and in accordance with French laws

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Kiribati

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate: Not available
- Internet penetration (2018): 27.4%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 39.63
- Total population (2018): 109,367
- Official languages: I-Kiribati and English
- Lower-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- Government is prominent in the media, as both a media actor and regulator
- Legislative efforts to grant further freedoms to the press have failed to pass Parliament
- Political controls of the media environment—including foreign media actors—are used to stymie critical narratives
- Government control of media content, including by imposing penalties on actors who use media platforms to transmit false or offensive content
- No restrictions on foreign investment in media, telecommunications, or other related sectors
- One of the least developed PICs; extreme dependence on foreign actors to mitigate resource deficits in information environment

Sources of Resilience

- Decentralization of media since 1993 has created space for new media bodies to enter and operate “without the control of censure”
- Foreign and domestic media actors required to obtain government licensing
- No apparent dependence on a single foreign source to mitigate extreme deficits in the information environment

Marshall Islands

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2011): 98.30%
- Internet penetration (2017): 38.7%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 30.12
- Total population (2018): 75,684
- Official language: English
- Upper-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- No restrictions on media content or ownership; investment from “all countries is equally welcome and unrestricted”
- Media sector heavily dependent upon inputs from foreign actors, including providers in the region and beyond

Sources of Resilience

- As a result of the Compact of Free Association with the United States, media environment emulates the diversity of US media
- State-affiliated media present, but not dominant
- No apparent dependence on a singular source for media content
- Government policies mandate registration and licensing for radio and TV station owners
- National Telecommunications Authority has monopoly on building, installation, maintenance, and operation of all domestic telecommunications services
- Investments from non-citizens require a foreign investment license from the government

Nauru

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2017): 95.30%
- Internet penetration (2018): 57.0%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 94.58
- Total population (2018): 9,692
- Official languages: Nauruan, English
- Upper-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- Small information environment with state-run outlets as dominant voices
- Significant resource and infrastructure challenges
- Heavy dependence on external providers for media content, particularly television and radio, including ABC’s Radio Australia and Jamaica-based Loop news
- History of politically motivated and heavy-handed state management of the media, including bans on both media actors and access
- Self-censorship among media actors in response to pressure from the Nauruan government

Sources of Resilience

- Extremely high barriers for foreign media seeking entry to Nauru, including non-refundable US$5,765 visa fee
- No foreign media presence in Nauru, but foreign content available through a limited number of domestic state-run media outlets

Niue

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2016): 99.0%
- Internet penetration (2016): 91.6%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2004): 37.9
- Total population (2017): 1,618
- Official languages: Niuean, English

Sources of Vulnerability

- Small domestic information space characterized by a dominant state actor
- No restrictions on foreign investment or operations in the media
- Small domestic information space with few privately owned media outlets
- Heavy dependence on foreign providers for media content
- Increasingly close political and economic ties to China

Sources of Resilience

- State media re-broadcasts range of foreign voices, including Australia and New Zealand
- Foreign companies required to register with the government prior to investing or starting operations
- Highly favorable policies to support public access to advanced information and communication technology (ICT)

Palau

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2016): 96.6
- Internet penetration (2016): 36%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2016): 112
- Total population (2018): 21,516
- Official languages: Palauan; English; and Sonsoralese, Tobian, Angaur, and Japanese on several islands
- High income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- Domestic media outlets face significant financial difficulties and are heavily reliant upon external actors for content, infrastructure, and training
- Foreign actors not restricted from owning or operating media or telecommunications services

Sources of Resilience

- Speech and press freedoms are respected
- Telecommunications networks and services operators must receive a government license to operate
- Foreign content is sourced from a variety of actors, rather than a single source or country
- As a result of the Compact of Free Association with the United States, media environment emulates the diversity of US media

Papua New Guinea

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2015): 64.2%
- Internet penetration (2016): 9.6%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 48.7
- Total population (2018): 7,027,332
- Official languages: Tok Pisin, English, Hiri Motu, and some 839 indigenous languages
- Lower-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- State-owned or state-affiliated media actors are the primary media voices and sources of information
- Politically motivated decisions to control the media, including bans and blackouts
- Government-led efforts to regulate, censor, or block critical media content or voices
- Violence against journalists and restrictions that limit access to local and foreign media
- Foreigners can receive media licenses through joint ventures with local partners or citizenship-by-investment schemes
- Heavy reliance on external providers for infrastructure, media content, and training
- Media content in decline; state media willing to accept content from any provider
- Two primary newspapers both owned by foreign actors
- Deepening bilateral ties with China, including construction of domestic submarine cable system by Huawei Marine
- High national debt; government efforts to refinance with support from Australia, China, or whoever is “cheapest” and “best”

Sources of Resilience

- Government has developed a regulatory framework to guide functions of information environment
- National interest test to screen foreign investment
- Media licensing preferential to Papua New Guinea (PNG) citizens
- Foreign journalists traveling in PNG must receive government approval
- Australia as most important foreign partner

Samoa

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2016): 99%
- Internet penetration (2017): 33.6%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 63.58
- Total population (2018): 201,316
- Official languages: Samoan (Polynesian), English
- Upper-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- Politically motivated efforts to crack down on media and social media voices critical of the government
- Media Council, established by Parliament, has been used to exercise government control over the media rather than investigate complaints as intended
- No restrictions on foreign investment in the media; citizenship-by-investment scheme open to all unless the Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Labor imposes restrictions
- Close relationship with China

Sources of Resilience

- Foreign investors must obtain government certification
- Domestic media is capable of generating its own print, radio, and television content
- Foreign media content is available primarily to supplement domestically produced content; no apparent over-reliance on a single source of foreign content
- Limited amount of foreign media content—from New Zealand and Chinese media—available on free-to-air TV; most foreign TV content available via subscription services

Solomon Islands

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2009): 84.10%
- Internet penetration (2018): 11.92%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 76.12%
- Total population (2018): 660,121
- Official languages: Melanesian Pidgin and English
- Lower-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- State control of the media has focused on reshaping the public image of government
- No regulations or restrictions on foreign ownership or investment in broadcasting industry; no regulations on content
- Significant deficits in providing content and ensuring accessibility of media
- Foreign media readily available and widely used to meet content deficits
- Regulations on offensive content have led to some self-censorship in the media

Sources of Resilience

- Government seeks to facilitate production of local content for media
- Primary newspapers are privately owned; primary radio and free-to-air TV stations are tied to the government
- No apparent dependence on a single foreign actor for media content or infrastructure
- Electrification projects are expanding the ability of Solomon Islands peoples to access modern communications and media platforms

Timor-Leste

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2015): 67.5%
- Internet penetration (2018): 27.49%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2018): 103.24
- Total population (2018): 1,321,929
- Official languages: Tetun and Portuguese; Indonesian and English are working languages; 32 indigenous languages
- Lower-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- Domestic media is susceptible to government pressure due to the small size of the media market and reliance on the government for resources and support
- Government has sought to control, ban, or restrict media voices that cover politically sensitive stories
- Multiple cases of police or Timorese Defense Force threats or violence toward domestic media actors
- Challenges building and sustaining ICT infrastructure
- Significant gaps in training, including in operation of ICT infrastructure and core media capacities

Sources of Resilience

- Media ownership must be disclosed to the government; foreign media actors not allowed to hold more than 30 percent total ownership
- Constitution mandates existence of public radio and TV stations that are impartial and host to diverse opinions
- Media Act (2014) sets out clear functions for the media industry and the state as a media actor to ensure free flow of information, plurality of voices, and freedom of access
- Media Act established an independent Press Council to grant, renew, suspend, and/or revoke credentials of all in-country media actors
- Foreign media content readily available, particularly in Portuguese and Indonesian
- Majority of radio stations are domestically owned and transmit locally produced content; BBC and Radio Australia available in Dili

# Tonga

## Quick Country Facts
- Literacy rate (2016): 99.4%
- Internet penetration (2017): 41.25
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 105.82
- Total population (2018): 106,398
- Official languages: Tongan and English
- Upper-middle income economy

### Sources of Vulnerability
- History of friction between government and media
- Government officials have brought, and won, defamation lawsuits against critical media voices and outlets
- Tonga Media Operators Act (2003) prohibits issuance of media licenses to foreigners; however, this regulation can be circumvented through passport and citizenship sales
- Media outlets are heavily dependent upon foreign content.
- Popular news website, Matangi Tonga, publishes content from Chinese embassy and Chinese government as “sponsored” posts
- Over 50 percent of existing government debt is owed to China

### Sources of Resilience
- Diverse range of foreign voices readily available across media platforms—including media from Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, the US, and the UK
- Tongan media not dependent on a single foreign provider or partner to fill deficits in the information environment

Tuvalu

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2011): 93%
- Internet penetration (2017): 49.32%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 71.48
- Total population (2018): 11,147
- Official languages: Tuvaluan and English
- Upper-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- Extremely small media environment with no local TV and extremely limited support for independent domestic outlets
- Dependence on foreign providers for media content
- High-cost and limited internet service
- No significant restrictions on foreign investors seeking to expand in local media

Sources of Resilience

- Government ownership of a single radio station, which broadcasts local content and BBC Pacific stream
- World Bank grant awarded in January 2019 will develop the nation’s internet access network, supporting investments in submarine cables and other ICT infrastructure

Vanuatu

Quick Country Facts

- Literacy rate (2015): 85.20%
- Internet penetration (2017): 25.72%
- Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people in 2017): 82.54%
- Total population (2018): 288,037
- Official languages: Bislama, English, and French; over 100 unofficial local languages
- Lower-middle income economy

Sources of Vulnerability

- Laws that restrict foreign ownership in the media may be circumvented through passport sales
- Only one daily newspaper, Vanuatu Daily Post, is privately owned and operated
- Vanuatu Daily Post prints the Vila Times, a weekly Chinese-English newspaper with ties to Chinese company Shanpu Group
- Only two foreign TV broadcasters present: ABC (Australia) and CCTV (China); other foreign media is available through local pay-TV providers
- Public service broadcaster, Vanuatu Broadcasting and Television Corporation, signed content exchange agreement with CCTV in 2018

Sources of Resilience

- Media’s independence is protected under the constitution
- Diverse media landscape, with domestic and foreign content readily available via TV and radio
- Independent, transparent regulatory system under Telecommunications, Radiocommunications, and Broadcasting Regulator (TRBR)
- Broadcasting guidelines require a majority of shareholders (70 percent) of a broadcasting entity to be Vanuatu citizens
- Non-citizens and foreign corporations are prohibited from owning and publishing newspapers without government approval
- Strong partnership with Australia, including as a primary source of foreign aid and international tourism

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<td>State-owned media outlets in the PICs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Table 3.</td>
<td>Selected regulations on foreign actors in PIC media</td>
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## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Australian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRI</td>
<td>Belt and Road Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>CCTV</td>
<td>China Central Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGTN</td>
<td>China Global Television Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>China Radio International</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
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<td>PACMAS</td>
<td>Pacific Media Assistance Scheme</td>
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<td>PIC</td>
<td>Pacific Island Country</td>
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<td>RNZ</td>
<td>Radio New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNZI</td>
<td>Radio New Zealand International</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization</td>
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References

5 This process of deregulation began in the 2000s after deregulation was identified as a development priority by the World Trade Organization and World Bank. Rieko Hayakawa, “Possibility of Telecommunication Universal Service in the Pacific Islands; Case studies of Vanuatu, PEACESAT and USPNet,” (PhD diss., University of Otago, Dunedin, 2017), 117-130.


26 “Share, Surf and Stream with your Prepaid Data Bundles.”


29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.


33 “Prepaid Voice & SMS,” Digical Tonga.


35 This includes Southern Cross NEXT, Coral Sea Cable System (CSCS); Interchange Cable Network 2 (ICN2); Kumul Domestic Submarine Cable System; Manatua, connecting the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, and French Polynesia. Nauru, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu are the only countries in Oceania that do not have cables—or, as of November 2019, clear plans to install/connect to other cables.


Ibid., p. 4.


“Economic and Social Impact of ICT in the Pacific.”


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“Tonga Director Can’t Rule Out Sabotage in Internet Outage,” Stuff, Feb. 5, 2019, https://www.stuff.co.nz/world/south-pacific/110374040/tonga-director-cant-rule-out-sabotage-in-internet-outage. At first, the theory was that it was inadvertently cut: a ship had apparently cut the cable in multiple places by dragging an anchor along the seabed. See Victor, “Could You Last 11 Days Without the Internet? Tonga Finds Out the Hard Way.”


“Economic and Social Impact of ICT in the Pacific.”

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192 David Wroe, “Australia refuses to connect to undersea cable built by Chinese company,”


201 Ibid.


Author interview, Jan. 25, 2019.


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These citizenship by naturalization processes have varying requirements. In both Fiji and Kiribati, a period of residency is required; Papua New Guinea does not require a period of residency prior to application.


The government owns Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation; private actors own SATSOL, Solomon Star, and Island Sun.


Solomon Islands Government, Ministry of Communications, Aviation and Information Technology, 2015.


292 Kate Lyons and Amanda Meade, “60 Minutes reporter.”


294 Evan Wasuka, “60 Minutes crew flies out of Kiribati.”


296 This fee was reportedly waived in 2018 when Nauru hosted the Pacific Islands Forum. Liam Fox, “Pacific Islands Forum: Nauru President indicates $8,000 visa fee for journalists will be waived next year,” ABC News, Sept. 4, 2017, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-04/pacific-island-forum-could-wave-journalist-visa-fee/8870532.


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339 Although this is a point that has been made by a number of our interviewees, the government of the Solomon Islands is explicit: “While a very large amount of broadcasting content is available internationally, local people are very much interested in local content. People are interested to hear the news in their own town, to enjoy coverage of their local sporting teams, to watch drama and music performed locally, and to learn information and skills relevant to their local agriculture or other occupations.” Ministry of Communications, Aviation and Information Technology, “National Broadcasting Plan,” Solomon Islands Government (2015), 16.


342 “Huawei Contracted to Install Fibre Optic Cable”; Amy Remeikis, “Australia supplants China to build undersea cable for Solomon Islands.”


348 FSM Embassy Interview, Mar. 5, 2019.


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