China’s Response to Terrorism

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Executive Summary

This report was prepared in response to a request from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission for a study on China's efforts to combat terrorism. It analyzes (1) China's evolving definition and perception of its terrorist threat, (2) China's strategy and policies for combating terrorism, (3) the institutional infrastructure that executes China's counterterrorism policies, (4) China's evolving approach to international cooperation in counterterrorism, and (5) the opportunities for, and challenges of, U.S.-China cooperation on countering terrorism.

The following are the key findings.

It is difficult to determine the nature and magnitude of China's terrorism problem.

An absence of detailed information released by the Chinese government on violence in China, and the lack of reliable alternative means for independent corroboration, make it difficult to identify, assess, or measure acts of terrorism occurring on Chinese soil. In some cases, acts of violence that Chinese officials and state media have labeled as terrorism do not meet the definitions of the term that are widely accepted outside of China. Concurrently, other cases of violent crimes that observers would describe as terrorism using these definitions are sometimes not described as terrorism by Chinese authorities. Key questions are left largely unaddressed in Chinese official statements and authoritative media reporting, and adequate independent sources concerning the details of reported incidents are often also lacking.

That said, China does have a terrorism problem, and has suffered multiple terrorist attacks in recent decades. High-profile cases include:

- A March 7, 1997 bus bombing in the Xidan section of Beijing
- An October 28, 2013 car bomb explosion in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square
- A March 1, 2014 mass knifing attack at the Kunming, Yunnan railway station
- A May 22, 2014 car bomb attack at an outdoor market in Urumqi, Xinjiang
- The August 17, 2015 bomb attack on Bangkok, Thailand’s Erawan Shrine, which killed 20 people, including seven Chinese citizens
- The September 30, 2015 explosion of 17 package bombs in Guangxi Province
- The November 2015 killing by Islamic State militants of former Chinese teacher Fan Jinghui and another hostage
• The November 20, 2015 attack on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, which resulted in 27 deaths, including three Chinese citizens.

**From 2012 through 2014, domestic attacks in China apparently became more frequent, more geographically dispersed, and more indiscriminately targeted. Chinese citizens have also faced increasing numbers of attacks abroad.**

Chinese media reports on terrorist incidents appear to have risen significantly during this period. While most of these incidents occurred in Xinjiang, major cities Beijing, Kunming, and Guangzhou have also suffered mass attacks in the past three years. Relatedly, Chinese police analysts have noted a rising trend of mass knifings and bombings in high-traffic public areas since 2012.

**At present, China sees its terrorist threats as primarily domestic.**

China’s counterterrorism efforts currently focus predominantly on its mostly Muslim ethnic Uighur population concentrated in its western Xinjiang region. To date, when discussing events within the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China’s official use of the term “terrorist” appears to be reserved almost exclusively for describing people and groups tied to Xinjiang. However, uprisings and riots among China’s ethnic Tibetans have also been characterized as terrorism by some Chinese law enforcement experts. The Falun Gong spiritual movement is usually described as an “evil cult” by Chinese officials, but government-affiliated security experts sometimes refer to it as part of China’s terrorist threat.

**However, recent terrorist attacks victimizing Chinese citizens overseas—notably the Erawan Shrine bombing, the Bamako shootings, and IS’s murder of Fan Jinghui—are forcing China to pay greater attention to international terrorism.**

China’s rapidly expanding overseas interests and expatriate labor force in countries with major terrorism problems are increasing China’s sense of vulnerability to terrorism outside of China and amplifying the need to improve its means of protecting citizens overseas. China is also concerned that some international terrorist groups beyond its borders could affect the situation in Xinjiang.

**China has yet to issue a publicly available, comprehensive counterterrorism strategy document that is similar to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which was first released by the United States in 2003. However, evidence that China is strengthening its policies and legislation toward countering terrorism is evident in several recent party and government documents, including:**

• President Xi Jinping’s April 25, 2014 speech to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo, “Safeguard National Security and Social Stability,” which describes the threat that terrorism poses to China’s security; demands “decisive measures” against terrorism; and calls for mobilizing the public, ethnic groups, and state-sanctioned religious figures to fight terror.

• China’s January 2015 *National Security Strategic Guidelines*, which are thought to include strategic guidance on counterterrorism. (The document is not available in the public domain.)
The May 2014 decisions of the National Counterterrorism Leading Group and the Ministry of Public Security, which launched a nationwide, one-year crackdown on “terrorist elements” that focused on Xinjiang.

President Xi’s and Premier Li Keqiang’s May 28, 2014 speeches at the Central Work Conference on Xinjiang, which called for reinforcing ethnic unity, strengthening CCP leadership over religious activity, and promoting growth and employment.

China’s June 2015 National Security Law, which codifies a comprehensive set of national security policies and principles, many of which are related to fighting terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.

China’s August 2015 Ninth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, passed by the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee in part to accompany the Counterterrorism Law, which sets legal definitions and punishments for many terrorism-related offenses, and which explicates terrorist offenses in some ways that differ from the Counterterrorism Law.

In addition, the PRC State Council Information Office released a white paper on Xinjiang in October 2015 that describes Beijing's policies aimed at enhancing ethnic unity and promoting more equitable economic growth. It also credits the recent counterterrorism campaign with pre-empting attacks by many terrorist groups. China’s December 2015 Counterterrorism Law, passed by the NPC Standing Committee, partially codifies China's most detailed definition of terrorism and criminalizes terrorist “behavior” and “advocacy.”

For more than 15 years, China has sought to manage its domestic terrorism problem through a strategy that rests on three pillars: (1) enhanced regional economic growth, (2) stronger internal security capabilities; and (3) deepened controls over ethnic and religious activities. Specifically, this has included:

- **Developing a conceptual framework.** In the late 1990s, China decided that in order to deal comprehensively with key challenges to social stability, it would treat separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism as interrelated problems, and sought a common strategy to address them. It called these challenges “the three evils.” Chinese authorities subsequently rebranded many acts as terrorism that they once labelled crime, counterrevolution, or separatism.

- **Continuing a stability and growth strategy for Xinjiang.** Since the 1990s, party leaders have sought to curb upheaval among most Uighurs by: (1) promoting economic growth and investment in Xinjiang, and foreign trade with the region; (2) endorsing religious tolerance, while at the same time proscribing and controlling many religious activities; (3) pursuing ethnic unity through assimilation and in-migration of ethnic Han Chinese to Xinjiang.

- **Expanding the counterterrorism institutional infrastructure.** China has added: counterterrorism leadership organs at the national level, a host of offices within its ministries and local governments, and many elite police and paramilitary quick response forces.

- **Strengthening counterterrorism legislation.** Since 2003, China has drafted or revised many laws and regulations regarding terrorism and related activities (e.g., the 2006 Anti-Money
Laundering Law), most notably the 2015 Counterterrorism Law and the amended PRC Criminal Law.

- **Intensifying law enforcement operations.** China launched its most recent counterterrorism law enforcement campaign on May 25, 2014, soon after a car bomb attack in Xinjiang. Reports by China's Supreme Court and other PRC media sources indicate that nationwide operations were focused in Xinjiang, and included increased numbers of arrests and convictions on terrorism-related charges. The official Xinhua news agency has reported on executions of some people convicted on terrorism charges.

*China's leaders see terrorism—as well as separatism and extremism—as posing significant potential threats to a wide range of China's national security interests.*

These interests include almost every one of China's “core” interests such as social stability, national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and sustained economic growth. However, it also includes several of China's emerging interests like protecting its citizens abroad, energy security, maritime security, and China's ability to shape an international environment that is conducive to pursuing China's national interests.

*Historically, Beijing's concern about global Islamic jihad has generally been focused on how it affects Xinjiang. To some extent, these views appear to be changing.*

As the late 2015 Thailand, Mali, and IS incidents underscore, many Chinese citizens now work and travel in countries that face significant challenges from terrorism and violent extremism. These include countries in Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

*Because of this, China's evolving security interests and perceptions of the threat it faces from global terrorism are creating some converging areas of interest as well as new opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation on strategic issues related to terrorism and extremism.*

Recently, two areas of growing dialogue or cooperation between the United States and China are exchanges of information about the Islamic State (IS), and dialogue with Pakistan and the Afghan government to promote stability in Afghanistan.

*China pursues a broad range of bilateral and multilateral efforts in support of its counterterrorism objectives.*

This includes the strengthening of cooperation through multilateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure. China also cooperates, including with the United States, on issues such as port security, trafficking in international materials, and money-laundering to help support the development of conditions in the international environment that make it difficult for terrorism to thrive. This cooperation supports the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

China is also pursuing wide-ranging bilateral security cooperation. This includes meetings of law enforcement and intelligence leaders, military exercises, security force training, border security agreements, and agreements for some Chinese partners to remove anti-PRC terrorist groups from their soil.
Another effort in support of countering terrorism, which has been controversial, is to press regional security partners to deport PRC citizens and former citizens that China regards as potential threats back to China. China also seeks cooperation against on-line extremism, overseas recruitment, trafficking into China, and political cooperation with Uighur activist groups.

Finally, China seeks increased international recognition of how it assesses its terrorism challenges. This includes the addition of organizations that China has designated as terrorist groups to international and national terrorist watch lists.

**Implications for United States Interests and U.S.-China Counterterror Cooperation**

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been complex, presenting challenges as well as opportunities for cooperation.

For example, at the September 2015 summit between President Obama and President Xi Jinping, the two sides agreed to continue building cooperation on the type of technical issues they have often pursued since 2001, such as port and container security. The two countries also agreed to continue dialogues and cooperation on sharing information about transiting extremists, terrorist financial networks, and controlling precursors for improvised explosive devices (IED).

U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been, and is likely to remain, affected by the interplay of differences in legal and ideological values and security interests.

The first is the divergences in the American and Chinese legal systems and ideological values between the two countries. These differences have created areas of disagreement, such as the nature and causes of terrorism and social violence in China. Also, concerns for human rights issues and religious freedom have led to frequent U.S. criticism of certain aspects of China’s counterterrorism policies. Chinese officials complain that the U.S. does not acknowledge the extent of China’s terrorism problem, and PRC security specialists have often voiced suspicions that U.S. terrorism policies are motivated at least in part by opposition to CCP rule and China’s rising power. Finally, China often makes requests for assistance on issues related to counterterrorism cooperation that U.S. officials deem inappropriate or unconstitutional.

The second factor affecting U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation is the convergence and divergence of the two countries’ security interests, including the highly interconnected economies of the two countries, and the evolving global and domestic terrorist threats both face.

Beginning shortly after September 11, 2001, the United States and China began an ongoing process of identifying areas in which their interconnected economies helped define potential areas of technical cooperation. Highlights of this cooperation include:

- The U.S. Container Security Initiative
- Airline passenger screening cooperation
• The “Megaports” project to detect potential nuclear or radioactive materials in many of the world’s largest ports.

One likely reason for progress on port security, container security, and similar areas of technical cooperation is that they do not appear to have clear links to major issues of legal or ideological disagreement between the United States and China.

These areas have included cooperation on U.S.-China dialogue and training regarding IEDs and trafficking in their precursors and components, and have also included shipping and container security. Even so, cooperation on these issues can be challenging when the United States seeks access to Chinese territory, asks China to reform control systems for dangerous chemicals and dual-use technology, or asks China to crack down on specific businesses that are marketing dual-use goods.

By contrast, other areas of current or proposed technical cooperation do have links to the areas where their legal systems and ideologies diverge, and some U.S. officials have found that this can lead to limitations, uncertainties, and disagreements with China regarding cooperation on these issues.

One example is enhanced cooperation on terrorism and the internet. This area of cooperation offers Chinese officials a chance to request that the U.S. shut down U.S.-based sites whose content China finds politically objectionable, but that is legal in the U.S.

Another is increased intelligence and information-sharing on reported transiting terrorists. This area of cooperation offers China an opportunity to request information on current and former Chinese citizens abroad engaged in activities that China considers terrorist and/or illegal, but that the United States does not.

A third is Chinese requests for deportation of people in the United States. This area raises challenges if China is unable or unwilling to produce verifiable evidence that alleged fugitives in the United States have engaged in crimes in China, and are not, for example, appropriately seeking political asylum.

Conclusions

For the United States, an important objective will be distinguishing between more- and less-promising areas for deeper counterterrorism cooperation with China.

U.S. policymakers should plan for the likelihood that China’s pursuit of cooperation with the United States is likely to remain situational rather than broad and deep, and adjust expectations accordingly.

Absent a catalyzing overseas event that places large numbers of Chinese citizens at risk, it is unlikely that the emphasis China places on preventing international terrorism will approach its concern about managing its own domestic terrorist threat. The United States should therefore expect cooperation on technical issues relating to the two countries’ interlinked economies and transport
systems, but less support on more politically sensitive topics, such as cracking down on factories manufacturing dual-use technologies that might be used by terrorists.

Even as the United States and China pursue effective channels of counterterrorism cooperation, our research indicates that the United States should plan for the likelihood that China will continue pressing for U.S. acceptance of China’s view of terrorism, and rejecting any suggestion that China’s ethnic and religious policies are contributing to its terrorist concerns.

*The U.S. should emphasize four principles that are likely to be helpful in identifying the most promising future areas of technical cooperation to pursue.*

The first is to focus on areas that would provide concrete technical benefits to U.S. security interests. Second are areas where cooperation would help to create an international environment that is inhospitable to terrorism. The third is to promote legal, policy, and institutional changes in China that also contribute to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Finally, the U.S. should minimize or control links to topics where there are U.S.-China disagreements over human rights policies.

*The U.S. should continue or expand U.S.-China training regarding IEDs and terrorist financing, which may provide another opportunity for enhanced U.S.-China technical cooperation.*

Chinese security experts have expressed interest in expanding these and other areas of training.

*The United States should consider expanding U.S.-China exchange and joint research about international terrorism theory and global terrorist movements.*

Converging U.S. and Chinese concerns about global terrorist threats have created a need for deeper understanding on both sides. Chinese security experts have also expressed interest in expanding research exchanges on this topic.
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>APG</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association for Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASS</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICIR</td>
<td>China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations</td>
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<td>CIIRC</td>
<td>China Internet Illegal Information Reporting Center</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPLC</td>
<td>CCP Central Political-Legal Affairs Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>ETIC</td>
<td>East Turkistan Information Center</td>
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<td>ETIM</td>
<td>East Turkistan Islamic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETIP</td>
<td>East Turkistan Islamic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETLO</td>
<td>East Turkistan Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial intelligence unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<td>ISI</td>
<td>Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>PRC Ministry of Public Security</td>
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<td>MSS</td>
<td>PRC Ministry of State Security</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>NCTLSG</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group</td>
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<td>NEOs</td>
<td>Non-combatant evacuation operations</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People's Congress</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Commission</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>People's Armed Police</td>
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<td>PAPF</td>
<td>People's Armed Police Force</td>
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<td>PBOC</td>
<td>People's Bank of China</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PLAAF</td>
<td>PLA Airforce</td>
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<td>PLAN</td>
<td>PLA Navy</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<td>PSB</td>
<td>Public Security Bureau</td>
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<td>QCG</td>
<td>Quadrilateral Coordination Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMB</td>
<td>Renminbi</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAFE</td>
<td>State Administration of Foreign Exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>The Supreme People's Court</td>
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<td>SPP</td>
<td>Supreme People's Procuratorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>WUC</td>
<td>World Uighur Congress</td>
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<td>XPCC</td>
<td>Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>XUAR</td>
<td>Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region</td>
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Introduction: An Overview of China and Terrorism

This report was prepared in response to a request from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission for a study on China’s efforts to combat terrorism. It analyzes (1) China’s evolving definition and perception of its terrorist threat; (2) China’s strategy and policies for combating terrorism; (3) the institutional infrastructure that executes China’s counterterrorism policies; (4) China’s evolving approach to international cooperation in counterterrorism; and (5) the opportunities for, and challenges of, U.S.-China cooperation on countering terrorism.

The first challenge—identifying terrorist activity

When considering the nature of China’s terrorist threat, the first challenge has to do with labeling. It is very difficult to distinguish between violent demonstrations of social unrest and acts of terrorism.

This report uses a working definition of terrorism that draws on widely used U.S. and European law and legal scholarship. For purposes of this report, an act may be considered terrorism if it possesses the following characteristics:

- A criminal act that is intentionally violent, or is dangerous to human life, and that is recognized as a crime by laws that are separate from antiterrorism legislation.
- Credible evidence indicates that the act has been committed with one or more of the following intentions:
  - Coercing or intimidating the government into altering foreign or domestic policy.\(^1\)

\(^1\) For example, Norway’s General Civil Penal Code spells out this coercion of government as “unlawfully compelling public authorities or an intergovernmental organization to perform, tolerate or abstain from performing any act of substantial importance for the country or the
Terrifying, coercing, or intimidating a country’s civilian population

- Dangerously disrupting functions of vital importance to society, such as power supply or safe food and water supplies
- Affecting the conduct of government by means of mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.²

Using the definition above as a guide, it is difficult for observers to determine the nature and magnitude of China’s terrorism problem. There are three key reasons for this difficulty:

- Not all of the cases of violence that Chinese officials and state media label as terrorism meet definitions of that term as it is widely used outside of China as described above
- At the same time, some violent crimes in China that outside observers would probably label terrorism are not called terrorism by Chinese authorities
- China’s lack of transparency on the details of domestic violence makes it difficult to make an independent assessment.³

Consequently, the first challenge in understanding China’s terrorist threat is the Chinese government’s and media’s application of the term terrorism to incidents that do not meet the kind of criteria noted in our definition above. In recent years, several organizations, or for another country or another intergovernmental organization” (Ch. 14, Section 147a).

² These criteria for identifying terrorist acts draw upon a number of international and U.S. sources, including the General Civil Penal Code (Norway), amended as of December 21, 2005, “Chapter 14: Felonies Against Public Safety” [Sections 147a to 162c], unofficial English translation, Norwegian Ministry of Justice, Legislation Department, 2006; U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code,” which draws upon 18 U.S.C. Section 2331’s definition of ‘international terrorism” and “domestic terrorism” for purposes of Chapter 113B of the Code. See U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d., accessed March 7, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition. Specific actions included in these definitions of “international terrorism,” “domestic terrorism,” and the “federal crime of terrorism” also include, but are not limited to: retaliating against government conduct and violations of one of several listed statutes including those related to killing or attempting to kill during an attack on a federal facility with a dangerous weapon or killing or attempting to kill officers or employees of the United States.

Western scholars have reviewed Chinese reporting and other evidence regarding many incidents labeled as terrorism in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) media and identified cases that they conclude do not meet the legal definition of the term. For examples of this debate, see Appendix E.

A second challenge stems from the lack of adequate sources of data concerning the details of reported terrorist attacks. Beijing’s public discourse on the subject of terrorism tends to lack details and context. When discussing acts of alleged terrorism, there is a lack of clarity regarding important issues. Key questions that are left largely unaddressed in Chinese official statements and authoritative media reporting on terrorist incidents in China include:

- Were the attacks premeditated?
- Who were the specific individuals and the groups behind them?
- How were the attacks organized, funded, and carried out?
- Where were the attacks plotted and the assailants trained?
- To what extent were the perpetrators in collusion with organizations associated with recognized transnational terrorist groups?

As the U.S. State Department has noted in its 2014 counterterrorism report, China has not provided this evidence to support many reported terrorist attacks, and it also prevents international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), independent journalists, and scholars from gathering data on these incidents. Chinese Community Party (CCP) leaders regard terrorism, ethno-religious protest, and all other manifestations of social discontent and violent crime as some of the most sensitive issues in their political system. Data on what China officially considers to be violent crimes is less freely available for Xinjiang and Tibet than for many other Chinese provinces.

Therefore, carrying out effective research requires surveying a wide range of information sources. This report has sought to maximize a breadth of sources in order to overcome the data limitations of this topic, and draws on a range of Chinese and English language documentary, statistical, interview, and other data sources to include:

- Chinese- and English-language secondary sources

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5 Official statistical yearbooks on these two regions, for example, typically contain less data on crime and social order trends than those of many other provinces.
• Publicly available top leadership speeches and documents of the CCP and government
• Chinese government analyses—law enforcement; think tanks; government-run trade unions and religious/ethnic associations
• Chinese government statistical data
• U.S. and other non-Chinese academic analyses
• Human rights monitoring organizations
• Interviews with U.S., Chinese, and third-country subject matter experts.
• Reports and summaries of Chinese social media trends.

China’s terrorism situation

While tracking the nature and magnitude of China’s terrorist challenges is difficult, it is clear that China faces some level of domestic terrorist threat, and that its citizens have been victims of terrorist attacks both at home and abroad.6

Between 2012 and 2015, China suffered multiple domestic terrorist attacks. Reported incidents became more frequent during this period, and they also became more dispersed geographically, with major incidents occurring in Beijing and other eastern cities, in addition to China’s mostly Muslim western regions. Several of these incidents were also targeted at high-traffic urban areas, resulting in indiscriminate injury or death to civilians. Some of the most widely reported and well-documented cases in recent years include the following:7

• On March 1, 2014, eight Uighur men and women used knives to attack passengers at the railway station in the southern Chinese city of Kunming. The knifing attack resulted in the deaths of 29 people and injuries to another 141 people. Four of the attackers were also killed at the scene.8

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7 In addition to Chinese media reports, the first three of these cases have been analyzed by the U.S. government. The State Department noted in its Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 that it had analyzed these cases and identified sufficient evidence to consider them to be terrorist attacks. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014.

• On April 30, 2014, an explosion occurred in the South Train Station in Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in China’s far west. The explosion reportedly killed one civilian as well as two of the attackers.9

• On May 22, 2014, an outdoor market in Urumqi was attacked by four men with a car bomb. The attack resulted in the deaths of 39 people as well as the four attackers. More than 90 other people were reportedly wounded.10

• On September 30, 2015, 17 letter bombs exploded in locations throughout the city of Liucheng in the southern Chinese province of Guangxi. At least 10 people were reportedly killed and more than 50 others were injured.11 The attacks were reportedly the work of one man who was also killed in one of the explosions, according to PRC media.12

During this same period of time, Chinese officials have also confronted the terrorism challenge abroad. As the number of expatriate Chinese workers, businesspersons, tourists, and students has expanded, some have become the victims of terrorist attacks and kidnappings reportedly instigated by such terrorist groups as Islamic State, al Shabaab, and Al Qaeda affiliates, as well as criminal gangs. In the second half of 2015 alone, at least 12 Chinese citizens abroad were killed and at least three others wounded in four separate terrorist attacks in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.


On July 26, 2015, a car bomb was used to attack the Jazeera Palace Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia, which is popular among local officials, and also houses the Chinese and Egyptian embassies and their staff. The attack killed at least 13 people and injured more than 40 others. Among those killed was a PRC embassy security officer, and three other embassy staff were injured. Al Shabaab reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack, and said it had targeted the hotel in retaliation for recent attacks by African Union and Somali government forces against its fighters.13

On August 17, 2015 the Buddhist-Hindu Erawan Shrine in Bangkok, Thailand—a popular attraction for Chinese tourists—was the target of a bombing which killed 20 people, including seven Chinese citizens. Thai law enforcement officials charged two men, reportedly ethnic Uighur, with the crime. Senior Thai law enforcement officials have attributed the bombing primarily to retribution by human traffickers after police broke up a network that helped move Uighurs and others from China to Malaysia and Turkey. Some Western terrorism specialists and journalists have speculated that the attack may also have been motivated by resentment over Thailand’s July 9 deportation to China of 109 Uighurs, despite international calls and protests that they be allowed to go to Turkey.14 China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, speaking in September 2015, did not describe the case as an act of terrorism or attribute it to Uighur-related issues. The Erawan Shrine bombing illustrated the growing exposure of Chinese citizens abroad.15


In November 2015, Islamic State militants reported killing two hostages, including Chinese citizen Fan Jinghui, a 50 year-old former teacher who had been held captive for several months. Chinese officials, including President Xi Jinping, expressed outrage at the killing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei reported that since Fan’s abduction was reported, China had spared no effort in trying to arrange his safe release. Hong vowed China would bring the culprits to justice, although he provided no details on this. According to media reports, Chinese social media were initially divided over whether or not China should get more involved in the struggle against IS, and if so, how.16

On November 20, 2015, a group of gunmen attacked the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, causing the deaths of at least 21 civilians. Among those slain were three Chinese executives of the state-owned China Railway Construction Corporation. Victims also included citizens of Mali, Belgium, Russia, Israel, and the United States. According to the BBC, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and one of its affiliated organizations, al-Murabitoun, claimed responsibility for the attack.17 Xinhua reported that in response to the Mali attack, President Xi pledged that “China will strengthen cooperation with the international community and resolutely crack down on terrorist activities that kill innocents, and safeguard peace and stability of the world.” Premier Li Keqiang reportedly “demanded a

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China’s changing assessments of its terrorist vulnerabilities

China’s assessments of the threat it faces from terrorism have evolved over the past thirty years. Outside observers might easily conclude that China has been encountering terrorist incidents since as early as 1983, when a group of six Chinese defectors hijacked a Chinese airliner to Seoul, South Korea. However, at this time, the Chinese government did not characterize this case as an act of terrorism, and referred to the hijackers instead as “criminals.” It was not until about 1999 that Chinese officials and state media began speaking regularly of a terrorist threat. Since then, Beijing’s concerns have focused on the activities of China’s mostly Muslim ethnic Uighur minority, concentrated in northwest China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

Historically, China appears to have focused far more on the domestic dimensions of its terrorism challenge, and Chinese authorities and media have paid far less attention to global terrorist groups than has the United States. Although China’s security community does monitor international terrorism trends, its primary emphasis has been the impact that jihadists and separatists outside China’s borders might have on extremism in Xinjiang. For more than a decade, this concern has focused on the possibility of a formal link between the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). China’s security community has also grown increasingly concerned about the impact of recent IS successes and its ideological appeal might have on young Uighurs, especially those who have an opportunity to study Islam in the Middle East.

However, Beijing’s perceptions of international terrorist threats appear to be evolving. This evolution is in part driven by the great expansion of China’s overseas investments and the rise of expatriate citizen communities abroad, which increasingly find themselves in regions of the world torn by terrorism. The rise in

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18 “China Condemns Mali Hotel Attack, Pledges Improved Cooperation to Fight Terrorism.”
20 Interviews.
21 Interviews.
these overseas incidents raises the possibility of China expanding consultation or cooperation with other countries confronting these challenges, including the United States.

**Addressing terrorist challenges**

The remainder of this report discusses China’s efforts to address its terrorist challenges through domestic policy and international cooperation. The study examines China as a regional and global actor as well as U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation efforts. First, it explores Beijing’s perceptions of its evolving terrorist threats, then it examines and evaluates the domestic polices China has put in place to address terrorist challenges. Next, the study examines China’s counterterrorism bureaucracy and various institutional actors with a role in combating terrorism. The study concludes by examining China’s role in international counterterrorism efforts.
Chapter 2: Beijing’s Perceptions of an Evolving Terrorist Threat

Overview of this chapter

This chapter examines Beijing’s evolving perceptions of the terrorist threats facing China. Although Chinese officials and analysts occasionally blame ethnic Tibetans or others for terrorist attacks, since about 1999 they have overwhelmingly attributed acts of terror to China’s Uighur minority, which is concentrated in western China’s Xinjiang region. This chapter reviews the turbulent history of this region and examines the sources of tension between the Uighurs and the ethnic Han Chinese majority. It analyzes how Beijing’s perceptions of the situation in Xinjiang, as well as its vulnerabilities to terrorism more broadly, have evolved over time.

Beijing, Xinjiang, and the Uighurs

Beijing’s counterterrorism concerns are primarily domestic and centered on the activities of China’s ethnic Uighur minority. The Uighurs are ethnically Turkic and many follow a form of Sunni Islam. The group also has extensive diaspora links throughout Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkey. Many Uighurs identify more closely with the languages, cultures, and religion of Central Asia and Turkey than with those of China, and many have resisted Beijing’s attempts at assimilation.23

According to scholars, many Uighurs regard the region of Xinjiang in northwest China as their spiritual homeland of “East Turkistan” or even “Uighurstan.”24
accordance with China's official administrative system for ethnic minority areas, Xinjiang is an “autonomous region,” equivalent in rank to a province (such as Guangdong or Fujian). Xinjiang is sparsely populated, with one-sixth of China’s land territory, but just 1.5 percent of its population. Xinjiang nonetheless has significant strategic importance for China, due to its rich energy and mineral resources—it has about one-fifth of China’s domestic petroleum supply, and about 40 percent of China’s accessible, good-quality coal supply. The region also serves as a major transit hub for Russia and Central Asian oil and gas. Chinese security officials view Xinjiang as one of the country’s greatest internal security challenges. Xinjiang has been plagued by a history of ethnic violence, and many of the acts of terrorism that have occurred on Chinese soil over the past two decades have been in the autonomous region. The CCP has characterized the Xinjiang as the “main battleground” in China’s counterterrorism efforts, while President Xi Jinping has described it as the “frontline” of China’s struggle against terrorist threats. 


### China’s Muslim minority groups

The Uighurs are one of ten predominantly Muslim minority nationalities that reside in China and are the second largest in terms of population. Other Muslim minority nationalities that reside in China include the Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, Tartar, Dongxiang, Salar, and Bonan. According to the Chinese government’s 2010 census, over 10 million Uighurs currently live in China, although Uighur exile groups insist that the true number is much higher. This makes the Uighurs the fourth largest ethnic minority group in the PRC and second largest Muslim minority group in terms of population behind the Hui. Of note, some members of China’s other Muslim minority nationalities are largely unsympathetic to the Uighurs. Speaking in 2006, Dr. Dru Gladney, a leading scholar on Chinese Muslims, contended that many members of China’s ethnic Hui minority—a Muslim nationality that is considerably more assimilated than the others—regard the Uighurs as unpatriotic separatists that “give other Chinese Muslims a bad name.”


But the Uighur population within China is not easily characterized as a monolithic bloc in pursuit of a common agenda. And until such time as high-quality public opinion surveys of the local population become available, it is impossible to state reliably how many of the Uighurs have become supporters of independence from Beijing, how many advocate greater autonomy within the PRC, how many others are in favor of more extensive integration within Chinese society, and what forms of integration they embrace or oppose. In a 2006 estimate of support for ETIM, the U.S. government estimated that of the roughly 10 million ethnic Uighurs who reside in China, “only a small minority of ethnic Uighurs supports the Xinjiang independence movement or the formation of an independent Eastern Turkistan.”

Some foreign observers who have visited Xinjiang have concluded that much of the local Uighur discontent is in reaction to grievances over Beijing’s rule. According to observers, many Uighurs regard the Chinese state, and the Han Chinese population that has emigrated to Xinjiang in large numbers, to be occupiers. Many Uighurs reportedly also resent what they regard as Beijing’s sustained repression of the

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27 This statement, which appeared in the State Department’s annual *Country Reports on Terrorism* from 2003 to 2006, is part of an estimate of the potential strength of ETIM. No sourcing for the estimate is provided. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006*, April 2007, 288 - 289, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83383.pdf. A search of the State Department website indicates that this characterization was used for the last time in this report.
Uighurs’ rights, culture, national sentiment, and religious expression. Uighurs have often identified certain key sources of discontent. These are discussed in the following subsections.

**Han migration into Xinjiang**

Over the past two decades, Beijing has funneled billions of its currency, the renminbi (RMB) into Xinjiang in an effort to develop the economy, exploit the region’s rich mineral resources, and close the wealth gap between the region and China’s more affluent eastern cities. The resulting economic boom has increased the number of Han Chinese migrating to Xinjiang. At present, the Han are currently estimated to constitute 40 percent of Xinjiang’s population, roughly equivalent to the number of Uighurs in the autonomous region. According to one specialist, the growing number of Han Chinese migrants into Xinjiang has served to reinforce perceptions among some Uighurs that they are becoming second-class citizens in their own homeland.

**Income inequality and limited prospects for upward mobility**

Although Xinjiang’s economy has undoubtedly improved as a result of Beijing’s substantial economic investment, many of Xinjiang’s Uighur residents have been left out of the economic boom. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many PRC firms operating in the region prefer to employ Han Chinese, as they generally are more educated, are more skilled, and speak better Mandarin than their Uighur counterparts. Unequal distribution of the economic benefits of Xinjiang’s growth is another issue of concern. Much of the industry in Xinjiang—China’s largest region—is concentrated in the northern part of the region, near the capital of Urumqi, where the region’s Han Chinese and other non-Uighur minorities are concentrated. In contrast, the predominantly Uighur regions of southern Xinjiang are largely arid and devoid of natural resources.

**Restrictions on Uighur religious and cultural practices**

U.S. State Department Country Reports on countering terrorism note human rights groups’ accusations that leaders in Beijing have used concerns about terrorism as an


excuse for suppressing its Uighur Muslim population. Uighur exile groups and human rights activists have frequently expressed concern that Uighur religious and cultural practices are heavily restricted in Xinjiang. Since 2011, officials have mounted an official campaign to discourage women from wearing veils, burqas, and related traditional Uighur and Islamic garments. In 2014 officials in Urumqi prohibited the wearing of burqas and related full-body veils in public squares. Human rights monitors and journalists have reported official efforts to prosecute or restrict a range of activities, including unauthorized preaching by religious figures, observance of Ramadan by government employees who are Muslim, religious education and mosque attendance by students, as well as efforts to promote the sale of alcohol and tobacco in Muslim areas. In a 2013 report, Amnesty International


stated that Chinese authorities have criminalized perceived “illegal religious” and “separatist” activities in the region and clamped down on “peaceful expressions of cultural identity.” Some of these restrictions are described by Chinese officials as an effort to enhance vigilance against terrorist threats. Human Rights Watch further accuses the PRC government of directing a “crushing campaign of religious expression” against the Uighurs in the name of countering terrorism and separatism. The 2006 State Department *Country Report on Terrorism* noted this rising concern, stating, “human rights organizations have accused China of using counterterrorism as a pretext to continue efforts to suppress Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group that comprises the majority of the population of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.”

**Chinese security presence in Xinjiang**

There are no official figures available on the numbers of security forces stationed in Xinjiang or participating in these campaigns. Such forces would include the PLA, the People's Armed Police (PAP), and other public security personnel. However, U.S. State Department reports frequently note their presence and provide high-level discussion about their activities. In both 2005 and 2007, these reports commented that the numbers of security forces had increased. Given that Beijing considers Xinjiang to be the epicenter of China's terrorist problem, the security presence is therefore assumed to be substantial. In addition, Beijing has launched periodic “strike hard” campaigns in Xinjiang, as well as in neighboring Tibet, that are designed to crack
down on terrorism, separatism, and criminal behavior, as well as to confiscate illicit weapons and explosives.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{Origins of violence in Xinjiang}

Tensions between the Uighurs and the majority Han Chinese predate the founding of the PRC in 1949. China’s historical control over Xinjiang has been tenuous, and the region did not fully come under Chinese control until the Qing Dynasty in the eighteenth century. The region was also briefly home to two “East Turkistan Republics”—one in the early 1930s and the other from 1944 to 1949. Han–Uighur relations have been tense since the establishment of the PRC. Many Uighurs viewed Chinese officials’ criticism, restrictions on religious practice, and promotion of atheism during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), as major affronts to their religious and cultural identity.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{1980s: Relaxation}

According to Carol Lee Hamrin and Jason Kindropp, following Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, a wave of political reforms was initiated under his successor, Deng Xiaoping. These reforms included some easing of the state-sponsored promotion of atheism, religious suppression, and an end to physical attacks on religious leaders and facilities that were widespread during the Cultural Revolution.\textsuperscript{41} Reforms to Beijing’s


\textsuperscript{40} Chinese authorities stepped up criticism of religion and restrictions on its practice during the period of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and especially during the Cultural Revolution and the last years of Mao’s life. Symbolizing this trend, China’s second State Constitution, promulgated in 1975, replaced the 1954 Constitution’s statement that “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief” (Article 88), with the Article 28, which stated that “Citizens enjoy...freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to propagate atheism.” Millward notes widespread reports of Qur’an burnings, desecration of Mosques and Madrassas, persecution of religious elders and other attacks on religion during this period. James A. Millward, \textit{Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang}, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 261, 274 - 278.

\textsuperscript{41} “Deng and his protégé, Party leader Hu Yaobang formulated a new religious policy in 1982...Class struggle against religious groups and other ‘enemies’ of communist goals was to give way to peaceful coexistence between the Party and all social groups in the name of patriotic cooperation in pursuit of economic development and other nationalistic goals.” Jason
policies on ethnic minorities—in particular, the reforms that were ushered in under the leadership of CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang (1981–1987)—included relaxing some past assimilation policies, undertaking repairs to damaged mosques and other religious facilities, and appointing some minority representation to key party and government positions in Xinjiang. Basic legal policies requiring state certification of religious leaders (including Muslim clerics) and governing religious facilities and practices, have continued since this period, however. Some Uighurs took the opportunity of this more tolerant era to air pent-up grievances. A demonstration in late 1985 involving roughly 2,000 Uighurs and other minority students from seven universities in Urumqi featured calls for Beijing to restrict Han migration, relax its controversial one-child policy, and stop nuclear testing in Xinjiang.42

An important response to these reforms was a revival of both legally sanctioned and unsanctioned religious and ethnic traditions, activities, and organizations. The decade of the 1980s was particularly notable for a reopening of contacts between China’s Uighur population and Muslims in Central Asia and the Middle East. Interestingly, both Chinese analysts of counterterrorism and some Western Uighur scholars share the view that this period of liberalization provided an opportunity for a rising tide of social protest and violence in Xinjiang during the 1990s. Some Chinese analysts, for instance, emphasize incitement and support from foreign-based radical organizations and schools of thought as a cause of Uighur social violence, and some now see the relatively relaxed 1980s as a window in which Xinjiang became susceptible to the impact of these forces.43

Xinjiang was also affected by major geopolitical events in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These include the withdrawal of the Soviet army in neighboring Afghanistan in 1988 and, later, the formation of five newly independent Muslim-majority Central Asian states on Xinjiang’s western frontier. Recently, some Chinese counterterrorism experts have begun to note that some Chinese Uighurs fought in the resistance against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and were later able to reintegrate into Xinjiang society.44 Chinese scholars point to these as examples of destabilizing events in the region. Pan Zhiping, former director of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences’ Central Asia Research Institute, told the pro-Beijing Hong Kong daily Ta Kung Pao that the “three forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism began


43 Interviews; Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang.

44 Interviews.
“running wild” in Central Asia at the end of the Cold War and posed a threat to the security and stability of Xinjiang.45

1990s: Increased tensions

The roots of the modern-day violence in Xinjiang that China classifies as acts of terrorism can be traced back to the 1990s, when the region witnessed a growing number of large-scale Uighur protests, riots, bombings, and killings of Chinese officials. Some of the most significant of these events in Xinjiang in the 1990s were:46

- **April 5, 1990**: An uprising in Baren County that was allegedly perpetrated by the Islamic Party of East Turkistan.

- **February 5, 1992**: An incident in which two buses in Xinjiang's provincial capital Urumqi exploded, killing three and injuring over twenty.

- **Summer 1993**: A series of bombings in Xinjiang's second largest city, Kashgar, which killed two and injured six. Targets included a hotel and an agricultural equipment firm.

- **July 1995**: A riot in the city of Hotan in July sparked by the detention of two imams.

- **February 1997**: Widespread rioting in Yining City, sparked by the detention of two Uighur religious students. Protests, which involved several hundred people, turned violent and continued for several days, forcing PRC authorities to seal off the city. In China's first official public statement on the incident, a spokeswoman for the Xinjiang regional government described the “disturbance” as a “serious case of beating, looting, and destruction” carried out by “a small number of hostile elements.”47

- **February 27, 1997**: An incident in which three buses in Urumqi exploded, killing nine people and injuring nearly seventy. The explosions occurred just hours after the funeral for the late patriarch Deng Xiaoping, who had passed away the previous week.48 A statement released by the Xinjiang regional

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45 Bao Lisheng, “Three Evil Forces Threatening Xinjiang's Stability, Interviewing Pan Zhiping, Director of the Central Asia Research Institute of Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences,” Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), August 10, 2001.

46 Millward, “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment.” All data in these bullets come from this source, unless otherwise indicated.


government described the bus bombings as a “premeditated act of violence carried out by a terrorist organization.”

- **February-April 1998:** A series of bombings aimed at economic targets and local public security officials in Kargilik County. Eight people were injured.

Research for this report indicates that few of these incidents were publicly acknowledged by Chinese officials at the time or were reported in state-run media. For example, the 1993 Kashgar bombing, the 1995 Hotan riot, and the 1998 Kargilik bombing do not appear to have been reported in Chinese media when they took place. This is likely a reflection of Beijing's sensitivities toward the perception of social unrest and ethnic conflict within its borders.

Incidents of ethnic violence in the 1990s that generated public comments were rarely described as acts of terrorism (the 1997 bus bombing is an exception). Available information for this period indicates that at least through the end of 1996, Chinese officials referred to them as examples of large-scale or violent social unrest, motivated by religion or ethnic separatism. The 1990 Baren uprising, for instance, was described in Chinese documents as a “counterrevolutionary riot,” a label that also had been given to the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstration just ten months earlier. As the decade wore on and instances of ethnic and religious violence increased, Chinese officials and authoritative media increasingly began to classify these incidents as acts of “separatism.” For example, Amudun Niyaz, president of Xinjiang’s regional parliament, blamed a string of attacks on police and their families in Xinjiang on “separatist militants.”

Despite these characterizations, Chinese officials, particularly in Xinjiang, largely downplayed the severity of the threat at this time. Speaking in 1995, the chairman of the Xinjiang Regional Government, Abdulahat Abdurixit, stated that there had never been any large-scale unrest instigated by minority nationalities in Xinjiang and that the “isolated” incidents that had occurred were all dealt with promptly. In 1997, Chairman Abdurixit described the threat as miniscule, easily contained by the

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49 “Xinjiang Releases Statement 5 Mar on Recent Bombings,” AFP, March 5, 1997.


government, and incapable of turning into a significant force. His deputy, Zhang Zhou, reportedly also downplayed ethnic unrest in the region and accused foreign media of exaggerating the problem, according to Hong Kong's *South China Morning Post*. These official efforts to downplay the violence continued right up until September 11. Speaking just ten days before September 11, Chairman Abdurixit told an audience in Urumqi that Xinjiang was "by no means a place where violence and terrorist accidents take place very often."

### 2000s: Beijing confronts its vulnerabilities

Between the late 1990s and the end of 2001, China substantially reassessed its policy toward and public descriptions of its terrorism problem. This reassessment was triggered by three developments:

- An uptick in violence in Xinjiang
- The International Olympic Committee’s July 2001 decision to award the 2008 Summer Olympics to Beijing
- The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

The impact of each of these events will be discussed in turn.

#### Violence in Xinjiang

While outside observers often cite 9/11 as the primary catalyst for altering Beijing’s approach to counterterrorism, it was not the only factor that caused Beijing to rethink its approach to the issue. Despite the efforts of Chinese officials and authoritative media to downplay the violence in Xinjiang in the 1990s, there is some evidence to suggest that Chinese officials began to reassess China’s vulnerabilities to terrorist threats as a result. The February 1997 bus bombings, for instance, appear to mark one of the first times that Chinese officials publicly described a violent incident in Xinjiang as a “premeditated act of violence carried out by a terrorist organization.” The 2000 PRC defense white paper also contains several references

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53 "Xinjiang 'Separatists' Said Not Behind Beijing Bombing," AFP, May 11, 1997. AFP reports that when asked about the size of the fundamentalist movement, the governor said it included "less than one in 10,000 of Xinjiang’s 16 million residents." He added that such groups "would never be able to turn themselves into an important force, and the government can control them easily."

54 Mark O'Neill, "Xinjiang Official: 'Terrorists' Still Active in Region," *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), May 15, 1998.


56 “Xinjiang Releases Statement 5 Mar on Recent Bombings.”
to the shared challenges of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism in discussing multilateral security cooperation with the Shanghai Five. In a January 2000 speech to the governing Politburo, CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin also referred to “violent terrorist incidents” carried out by “ethno-nationalist separatist elements” in China and abroad. Jiang further asserted that these forces were responsible for creating “many incidents of chaos, violent rioting, and violent terror.  

The 2001 decision on the Olympics

A second factor that contributed to a shift in China’s approach to dealing with terrorism was the July 2001 decision by the International Olympic Committee to award the 2008 Summer Olympics to Beijing. The committee’s decision forced Chinese security planners to confront the prospect of providing security for the world’s most high-profile athletic competition. Chinese security officials recognized at this time that Beijing could become a potential target for terrorist activity during the Games. Qiang Wei, former Beijing CCP secretary and former director of the Olympic Security Coordinating Group, noted that the city would become the “focal point of the world” during the Games and thus the “practical threat [of a terrorist attack] cannot be ignored.” Li Wei, deputy director of the National Leading Small Group for Counterterrorism Coordination, added that because the eyes of the world would be on Beijing during the Games, “several extremist organizations that hate the present international order may try to stir up trouble.”

The impact of September 11, 2001

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington further altered China’s perception of its own vulnerability to acts of international terror. The attacks convinced PRC security planners that China could no longer be considered an  

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"island of tranquility," seemingly immune to terrorism. The attacks of 9/11 were particularly significant in shifting China's approach toward its domestic terrorism problem. As Lu Qichang, a researcher at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the official think tank of China's Ministry of State Security, has observed, China “grasped the opportunity” in the wake of 9/11 both to improve its ties with the United States by increasing cooperation in the field of counterterrorism and to “weed out and contain terrorism at home” in the name of the global war on terror. Chinese media also began to point to the death of Chinese citizens working or traveling abroad as further evidence of the country's victimization at the hands of "increasingly rampant terrorism."

September 11 also triggered the realization that the country was largely unprepared to cope with an act of terrorism—a deficiency that the PRC government would seek to remedy through an extensive buildup of counterterrorism capabilities over the next seven years, discussed in greater detail later in this report.

Additional threats that highlighted the country’s sense of vulnerability to terrorism were the attacks on “soft targets” in Bali in 2002 and in Jakarta in 2003. The proximity of these places to China, coupled with the terrorists’ apparent focus on the tourism industry, including economic and cultural targets frequented by Westerners, raised concerns of terrorist attacks on foreign interests in China. Jin Xinxin, a professor at Shanghai University’s Institute of Legal Affairs, added that “as the number of Westerners and their interests in China continue to increase, we cannot underestimate the possibility of acts of terrorism occurring within our borders.” A mail bomb sent to the Myanmar Embassy in Beijing on November 1, 2002, demonstrated that international terrorist actions could indeed occur on Chinese soil.


65 Ibid. The bomb was defused before it went off.
Rebranding separatists as “terrorists”

Within weeks of 9/11, the public discourse on terrorism in China changed. First, the PRC government and media began to speak more openly about the violence in Xinjiang. Second, China began to portray itself as also having suffered from terrorism “just like the United States.” Third, previous violent incidents in Xinjiang from the 1990s were rebranded as acts of terrorism.66 In early 2002, for example, the Chinese military’s official newspaper, PLA Daily, cited the previous decade’s events in Xinjiang as evidence that China had “also suffered from the harm of terrorist activities.”67

Chinese officials also began to describe the perpetrators of the 1990s violence in Xinjiang as “terrorists.” There were three key milestones in this rebranding effort:

- The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) news conference on the one-month anniversary of September 11, which according to this research, appears to be the first time in which the phrase “East Turkistan terrorist” was used publicly by Chinese officials.68

- A comprehensive account of “terrorist” violence in Xinjiang released by the PRC State Council Information Office in January 2002, which marked the first time that Beijing provided detailed information about the ethnic and religious violence that has occurred in the autonomous region.69

- The PRC Ministry of Public Security’s (MPS) release of China’s first official list of terrorist organizations and suspects, in December 2003.70

October 2001: MFA news conference

At the PRC MFA daily press briefing on October 11, 2001, spokesman Sun Yuxi spoke at length to reporters on the activities of “East Turkistan terrorists” within China’s

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borders. This marked the first time that a Chinese official or the PRC government used this phrase in connection with the violence in Xinjiang. Prior to 2001, the phrase “East Turkistan terrorists” rarely, if ever, appeared in Chinese state-controlled media. Sun asserted that Beijing had evidence that “East Turkistan terrorists” have acted in collusion with international terrorist forces to carry out “violent terrorist activities,” including bombings, assassinations, poisonings, abductions, and robberies. He further characterized the activities of “East Turkistan terrorists” as a “global problem” and portrayed Beijing’s efforts to counter them as “part and parcel” of international counterterrorism efforts. Sun also expressed Beijing’s hope that China’s efforts to combat their activities would receive international “support and understanding.”

January 2002: State Council document

The 2002 document issued by the PRC State Council Information Office is also significant as it provided China’s first comprehensive published account of violence in Xinjiang allegedly perpetrated by “East Turkistan terrorists.” The document, “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” contends that “East Turkistan terrorists” had carried out a “campaign of bombings and assassinations” consisting of over 200 incidents in the 1990s, resulting in 162 fatalities. Specifically, it describes 31 such incidents in detail, all of which either are characterized as acts of “terrorism” or are blamed on “terrorists.”

The publication of this document marked the first time that many of these incidents were publicly acknowledged by the PRC government or appeared in authoritative media reporting. The document is also significant in that some of the incidents that it labelled “acts of terrorism” were not previously classified as such by Chinese officials or authoritative media when they first occurred. Two examples of this change in labeling are listed in Table 1.

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71 “PRC FM Spokesman: Int’l Community Should Help China Combat Separatists in Xinjiang.”
72 Ibid.
73 PRC State Council Information Office, 'East Turkistan' Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity.
Table 1. Changes in PRC Verbiage Used to Describe 1990s Violence in Xinjiang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Original 1990s Classification</th>
<th>2002 PRC State Council Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990 Baren Uprising</td>
<td>Counterrevolutionary riot</td>
<td>A group of terrorists, aided and abetted by the “East Turkistan Islamic Party,” created a grave terrorist incident. They brazenly preached a “holy war,” the “elimination of pagans,” and the setting up of an “East Turkistan Republic.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 Yining Riot</td>
<td>A case of “beating, smashing, and looting” carried out by “a small number of ruffians”</td>
<td>The “East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah” and some other terrorist organizations perpetrated…a serious riot during which the terrorists shouted slogans calling for the establishment of an “Islamic Kingdom.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


December 2003: MPS official list of terrorist organizations

In December 2003, the MPS released for the first time a list of four officially recognized terrorist organizations—all of which are based overseas and affiliated with the Uighur independence movement. The four named organizations are as follows:24

- The East Turkistan Islamic Movement
- The East Turkistan Liberation Organization
- The World Uighur Congress (WUC)25
- The East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC).

The MPS also identified eleven Uighurs who were being sought on terrorism-related charges.26 In announcing the list, Zhao Yongchen, deputy director of the MPS


25 The WUC was known as the World Uighur Youth Congress in 2003 when the MPS list was released.

Counterterrorism Department, reported that at least two of the organizations—the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO)—had received support, funding, training, and/or personnel from Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Zhao also told reporters that all four organizations were “confirmed” to have been involved in “plotting, organizing, and executing bombings, assassinations, arsons, poison attacks, and other violent terrorist activities in Xinjiang, the rest of China, and neighboring countries since the 1990s.” Chinese officials were less clear in their assessment of how well organized these groups were within China’s territory, however. As recently as 2014, leading Chinese academic terrorism specialists continued to maintain that well-organized “mature terrorist organizations” do not yet operate within the PRC, according to Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post.

East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

ETIM is generally regarded as the most active and violent of the four organizations listed above. MPS officials have described ETIM as the “most direct and real safety threat” facing the PRC and have asserted that the group has received funding, training, support, and personnel from Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In addition to attacks in China, Beijing has also accused ETIM of masterminding “many bloody incidents of terror and violence” abroad, specifically Central and South Asia. Of the four organizations that Beijing’s considers to be terrorist organizations, ETIM is the only one that the U.S. government has placed on its Terrorist Exclusion List. The Department of State’s Terrorist Exclusion List permits U.S. authorities to exclude persons affiliated with a group from the United States or, under certain


77 “China Issues List of Terrorists and Organizations.”

78 “Terror List with Links to al-Qaeda Unveiled.”

79 Mandy Zuo, “37 Civilians and 59 'Terrorists' Died in Xinjiang Attack, China Says,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 3, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1565431/37-civilians-59-terrorists-killed-earlier-china-attack-xinhua?page=all. Interviews with terrorism scholars Li Wei (China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations [CICIR]), Pan Zhiping (Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences), and Li Jianhe (Chinese People’s Public Security University). It is worth noting that there are two different Chinese individuals named “Li Wei” who both speak from time to time on terrorism. One is the CICIR analyst noted here. The other Li Wei has served as a Vice Minister of Public Security.


circumstances, to deport them if they are already in the U.S. In a 2002 press release lauding the addition of ETIM to the United Nations (UN) terrorist list, the U.S. Department of the Treasury alleged that ETIM had financial links to Al Qaeda and had cooperated with other terrorist groups in Central Asia.

Nevertheless, much about this group remains unknown. Substantial debate exists, for instance, over its size, location, ideological influences, and the sources and amounts of foreign funding it receives. Some outside observers have argued that ETIM is best understood as an umbrella designation that covers a broad array of terrorist and separatist activities carried out by ethnic Uighurs. ETIM is thought to have been weakened since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, with several of its officials reportedly killed in combat, although corroboration is difficult. Some Chinese officials, along with Chinese and foreign analysts, claim that ETIM has evolved into a new organization—the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP)—which has claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks that occurred in the PRC. Although the ETIP undoubtedly exists, its relationship to ETIM has yet to be fully confirmed.

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East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO)

Less is known about the ETLO. Beijing has accused the organization of committing a wide range of atrocities, including arsons, bombings, and bank robberies in Xinjiang as well as neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In 1999, for instance, Turkish police detained 10 individuals said to be affiliated with ETLO in connection with a series of assaults on PRC nationals in Turkey. Beijing also holds ETLO responsible for the murder of PRC diplomat Wang Jianping, who was killed in Bishkek in 2002. According to the PRC Ministry of Public Security (MPS), ETLO has received “gift money” from Al Qaeda and sent recruits from Xinjiang to training camps in Afghanistan with Taliban assistance. In contrast to ETIM, however, the U.S. State Department has yet to formally place ETLO on its Terrorist Exclusion List.

World Uighur Congress and East Turkistan Information Center

The inclusion of the other two organizations on Beijing’s list—the World Uighur Congress (WUC) and the East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC)—has been particularly controversial. Both are NGOs based in Germany and are engaged in the publication of news and information in support of the Uighur independence movement. The WUC is the better known of the two, as it claims to represent the political interests of the global Uighur community (ETIC is primarily concerned with documenting abuses against Uighurs). This umbrella organization, made up of several smaller groups, claims to “promote the right of the Uyghur people to use peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic means to determine the political future of East Turkestan.” The WUC also receives funding from the National Endowment for Democracy, which receives financial support from the U.S. Congress.

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88 “Chinese Leader to Discuss Muslim Separatists During Turkey Trip,” AFP, April 18 2000.
89 “China Seeks Co-op Worldwide to Fight 'East Turkistan' Terrorists.”
90 “Terror List with Links to al-Qaeda Unveiled.”
91 U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Exclusion List. This site does not offer information as to why certain groups are not included on the list.
Beijing, however, appears to regard both organizations as fronts for overseas support of terrorist activities. MPS officials have accused the WUC of conducting a series of bombings in Xinjiang, and the ETIC of attacks on PRC oil and natural gas pipelines, railways, and other civilian infrastructure facilities.94

**Terrorism, Tibet, and Falun Gong**

Although not listed as one of China’s officially designated terrorist organizations, PRC officials and state-run media have occasionally used the word “terrorism” to describe the activities of other political opposition groups and ethnic independence movements. Examples include the Falun Gong spiritual movement and Tibetan independence advocates. Li Wei, director of CICIR’s Counterterrorism Research Center, described both groups, along with “East Turkistan terrorists,” as the primary “terrorist threats” to the 2009 celebration marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. In 2011, a PRC MFA spokeswoman characterized prayer sessions organized by the Dalai Lama in 2011 for Tibetan self-immolators as “terrorism in disguise.”


**An evolving threat**

In terms of actual terrorist activities in China, the period from 2001 to 2007 was relatively calm, with few known terrorist attacks reported in the PRC. Since 2012, however, instances of terrorism as well as ethno-religious violence appear to be increasing in the PRC, particularly in Xinjiang. Some of the most noteworthy developments since 2012 are as follows:

- **June 29, 2012 (Xinjiang):** Six Uighurs reportedly attempted to hijack a Tianjin Airlines flight from Hotan to Urumqi.95

WUC, “To enhance the ability of Uyghur prodemocracy groups and leaders to implement effective human rights and democracy campaigns.”

94 “China Seeks Co-op Worldwide to Fight ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorists.”

• **June 26, 2013 (Xinjiang):** 35 people were reportedly killed in an altercation between Uighurs and police in the town of Lukqun. The Xinjiang regional government blamed the incident on a 17-member “terrorist cell.”

• **October 28, 2013 (Beijing):** An SUV plowed into a group of tourists and burst into flames at Beijing’s historic Tiananmen Square, killing the three occupants as well as two pedestrians. The Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau described the incident as a “rigorously planned, organized, premeditated, violent terrorist attack.” ETIP claimed responsibility.

• **March 1, 2014 (Yunnan):** Eight individuals armed with knives attacked passengers at the Kunming train station, killing 29 and injuring 140. PRC authorities described the incident as an "organized, premeditated, serious and violent terrorist attack."

• **April 30, 2014 (Xinjiang):** Two assailants attacked bystanders with knives and detonated explosives at Urumqi’s train station. The attack occurred just hours after the conclusion of President Xi Jinping’s inspection tour of Xinjiang.

• **May 22, 2014 (Xinjiang):** Five assailants reportedly threw up to a dozen explosives into a crowded street market in Urumqi, killing 43 and wounding another 90.

• **July 28, 2014 (Xinjiang):** Xinhua reported that nearly 100 people were killed and over 200 arrested following a “premeditated terrorist attack” on a police station in Shache County.

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98 Wen, “Turkestan Islamic Party Islamist Group Warns of More Attacks such as Tiananmen.”


100 “Deadly China Blast at Xinjiang Railway Station.”


March 6, 2015 (Guangdong): Two assailants armed with knives wounded 10 individuals at Guangzhou’s main train station.\(^{103}\)

September 18, 2015 (Xinjiang): At least 50 people, most Han Chinese, were killed in an attack on a coal mine in Aksu County by knife-wielding assailants. Local officials described the assailants as “separatists.”\(^{104}\)

September 30, 2015 (Guangxi): At least ten people were killed and over 50 injured by seventeen letter bombs that exploded in locations throughout the city of Liucheng.\(^{105}\) PRC media named only a single suspect who was reportedly killed in one of the explosions.\(^{106}\)

Chinese officials have different interpretations of the significance of these incidents. The 2015 PRC government white paper on Xinjiang, *Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang*, largely downplays the severity of the threat and states that most “terrorist groups” in Xinjiang have been eradicated in the embryonic stage.\(^{107}\)

Chinese security officials and subject matter experts closely affiliated with the PRC security establishment, however, have begun to argue that the nature of terrorist attacks in China is evolving. As evidence of this evolution, they point to four trends in the nature of the terrorist activities carried out in the country:

- Expanding geographic reach of activities
- Maximizing casualties
- Increasing frequency of attacks
- Increasing sophistication

**Expanding geographic reach of terrorist activities**

In contrast to past incidents, some of the more recent high-profile terrorist attacks have been carried out or attempted in major cities outside of Xinjiang. Examples

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\(^{105}\) “Guangxi Parcel Bombs: China Investigates Fresh Blast.”


include prolonged assaults by knife-wielding assailants at the main train station in Kunming and Guangzhou, and a vehicle explosion in Beijing’s historic Tiananmen Square that Chinese police labeled a “terrorist suicide attack.”\textsuperscript{108} The August 2015 Bangkok Erawan Shrine bombing, noted above, may be another example.\textsuperscript{109}

**Maximizing casualties**

Terrorist attacks in China have traditionally been directed at the security forces or other government targets. According to the 2013 “blue book” on national security published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), seven out of ten terrorist attacks in China were aimed at political organs, to include police stations, government buildings, and Tiananmen Square.\textsuperscript{110} Several of the recent high-profile terrorist attacks, however, have been staged in crowded public places, such as public squares, markets, and railway stations. At least five such attacks since 2012 have resulted in significant loss of life. By comparison, few instances of terrorism or ethno-religious violence prior to 2012 resulted in more than a handful of casualties.

This has led some Chinese security officials to express concern that the focus of terrorist activities in the country is shifting away from police and military facilities and becoming more indiscriminate. Commenting on an attempted suicide bombing at the main railway station in Urumqi, Pan Zhiping, formerly a researcher at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, contended that the use of explosives that could have killed bystanders suggested that the assailants were becoming more indiscriminate in their targeting of civilians.\textsuperscript{111}

**Increasing frequency of attacks**

Chinese security experts contend that there has been a significant increase in both the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks in the past three-four years. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{108} Wan, "Chinese Police Say Tiananmen Square Crash Was 'Premeditated, Violent, Terrorist Attack'."
\item \textsuperscript{111} Michael Martina, "China Blames Religious Extremists for Station Bombing," \textit{Reuters}, May 1, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/01/china-xinjiang-blast-idUSL3N0NN0W120140501.
\end{itemize}
2013 CASS blue book on national security concludes that the risk of terrorism in the
country has intensified.\textsuperscript{112} A senior counterterrorism specialist from China’s Public
Security University, writing the following year in the CASS blue book, stressed this
increase and listed several incidents of terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{113} Although it does not
provide specific figures, the report finds that the frequency and severity of terror
attacks in China have increased over time and concludes that the terrorism situation
in the country is “grave.”\textsuperscript{114} Commenting on the report, CICIR vice president Feng
Zhongping told the state-run broadcaster CRI that terrorism had become one of
China’s “biggest security threats.”\textsuperscript{115}

**Increasing sophistication**

Chinese officials have also highlighted what they perceive as a growing level of
sophistication surrounding the more recent terrorist attacks, as evidenced by their
timing and coordination. The timing of some attacks suggests that the dates and
locations were carefully chosen to maximize political impact. The attack on the
Urumqi train station noted above, for instance, was carried out just hours after
President Xi Jinping departed Xinjiang on a trip designed to highlight Beijing’s
counterterrorism efforts. Other attacks appear to have been timed to coincide with
major political events, such as the opening of annual CCP congresses or the National
People's Congress (NPC) legislative sessions. This has given rise to Chinese concerns
that terrorists in the country are seeking greater attention both domestically and
internationally for their cause, as well as demonstrating their ability to seemingly
attack at will.

Although rarely discussed in PRC media, there is some evidence that points to
increasing coordination between terrorist groups both inside and outside the PRC. In
its report on a particularly violent July 2014 attack in Kashgar, for instance, Xinhua
asserted, possibly for the first time, that “domestic and foreign terrorist
organizations” had cooperated in planning and executing the attack.\textsuperscript{116} This
represents a deviation from standard PRC talking points on terrorist attacks in the

\textsuperscript{112} “China Releases 1st National Security Blue Paper”; “China Releases 1st National Security Blue
Book.”

\textsuperscript{113} Wu Shaozhong, “Characteristics and Countermeasures of Terrorism Attacks within China,”
Studies}, (\textit{Guojia Anquan Lanpishu: Zhongguo Guojia Anquan Yanjiu Baogao}; 国家安全蓝皮书: 中

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid; “China Releases 1st National Security Blue Book.”

\textsuperscript{116} “37 Civilians Killed, 13 Injured in Xinjiang Terror Attack,” Xinhua, August 3, 2014,
country that routinely emphasize the role of vague, amorphous external forces in organizing, financing, and executing them. This has led some Chinese security officials and academics to question whether China now has its own domestic terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{117}

Chinese subject matter experts, however, dismissed speculation that homegrown terrorist organizations were operating domestically. In June 2014, Li Jianhe, vice president of the China People's Public Security University, asserted that although China does not have any “mature terrorist organizations,” this would change in the future.\textsuperscript{118} Li Wei, a prominent counterterrorism expert at the CICIR, contended in an August 2014 article in the \textit{South China Morning Post} (Hong Kong) that although China was home to some “violent groups,” the country did not have any “mature terrorist organizations.” Li did not elaborate on the differences between the two groups.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117} Zuo, "37 Civilians and 59 'Terrorists' Died in Xinjiang Attack, China Says."

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
Chapter 3: China’s Policies toward Counterterrorism

Overview of this chapter

This chapter provides an overview of Beijing’s policies toward counterterrorism. It examines the wide range of measures that Beijing has adopted nationally, and in Xinjiang, to combat terrorist activities and reduce the country’s vulnerabilities to terrorist threats. This chapter does not address the international dimensions of China’s counterterrorism policies. That subject will be discussed at length in Chapter 5.

Beijing’s domestic counterterrorism policies

At present, Beijing has yet to publicly release a comprehensive document that outlines China’s counterterrorism strategy, similar to the *U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. However, one can surmise Beijing’s overall policies toward the subject through an examination of key CCP and PRC government documents that have been made available in the public domain. Examining these materials suggests that Beijing’s overall approach to counterterrorism is largely a three-pronged effort to promote economic development in Xinjiang, strengthen internal security capabilities, and restrict unauthorized religious activities. Key components of this effort include:

- Strengthening counterterrorism legislation
- Expanding the counterterrorism bureaucracy
- Increasing law enforcement operations in Xinjiang
- Promoting economic growth and other development initiatives in Xinjiang
- Promoting ethnic unity and combating religious extremism.
Many of these actions, particularly in the security realm, have their origins in the post-9/11 reassessment by Beijing of its vulnerabilities to terrorist threats. As noted in the previous chapter, the rising tide of violence in Xinjiang, the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the awarding of the 2008 Summer Olympics to Beijing forced the PRC leadership and the country’s security planners to confront the realization that the country was not adequately equipped to respond to an act of terror.

Prior to 2001, China had no police forces that were dedicated to combating terrorism, no laws governing how to deal with it, and no organization dedicated to coordinating the efforts of the institutions charged with preventing and responding to terrorist incidents. Moreover, given the largely domestic sources of its perceived vulnerabilities to terrorism, the PRC had carried out only minimal international cooperation in the field of counterterrorism prior to 2001.

**Strengthening counterterrorism legislation**

After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, one of China’s first actions was to begin strengthening its domestic laws and regulations dealing with the issue of terrorism. In December 2001, for example, the country amended its existing Criminal Law to incorporate ten additional terrorist crimes, such as the funding of terrorist activities, and increase their associated penalties.\(^{120}\) Chinese media reported that legislators at the 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC were told that these changes were necessary in order to “deal more harshly with the criminal acts of terrorists for the protection of national security and social order, and to safeguard the safety of people’s lives and property.”\(^{121}\) China also ratified the “UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism” in 2006, and passed a new law governing money laundering in an effort to restrict access to funds available to terrorists.\(^{122}\)

Although the origins of modern-day terrorism in China can be traced back to the early 1980s, the country lacked an official definition of what types of activities constitute terrorism until the August 2015 Ninth Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law and the December 2015 Counterterrorism Law were passed. The PRC amended its Criminal Law shortly after September 11 to address terrorist-related crimes, but

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\(^{121}\) “China to Amend Criminal Law to Combat Terrorism,” Xinhua, December 17, 2001.

the revised law did not contain a precise legal definition of terrorism.123 Moreover, existing MPS guidelines for determining what types of individuals and organizations should be considered “terrorists” also failed to define the term.124

Article 3 of the new 2015 Counterterrorism Law defines terrorism as follows:

The term 'terrorism,' as it is used in this law, refers to advocacy or behavior (zhuzhang he xingwei 主张和行为) which is aimed at realizing political or ideological objectives through means of violence, destruction, intimidation, or other methods or creating social panic, endangering public safety, violating persons or infringing property, or coercing state organs or international organizations.125

One area of the law that has attracted attention and criticism is its criminalization of “advocacy,” a broad term that may spill over into areas of speech that do not involve actual incitement to action, or even areas of thought.126

The Ninth Amendment to the Criminal Law, which was passed before the Counterterrorism Law was finalized, defines the legal application and punishments for many terrorist and extremist actions. The amended Criminal Law now potentially punishes many activities including educational and social activities, possession of books and audio-visual material, and even clothing, as noted in the following excerpts:

Article 120-3: Advocating terrorism or extremism through methods such as producing or distributing items such as books or audio-visual materials advocating terrorism; or advocating terrorism or extremism by giving instruction or releasing information; or inciting the perpetration of terrorist activity; is sentenced to up to five years imprisonment, short-term detention, controlled release or deprivation of political rights and a concurrent fine; where circumstances are


124 Li Xiaobo, Practical Compendium of Laws and Regulations on Emergency Response and Counterterrorism.


serious, the sentence is five or more years imprisonment and a concurrent fine or confiscation of property.

Article 120-4: Using extremism to incite or coerce the masses to undermine the implementation of legally established systems such as for marriage, justice, education or social management is sentenced to up to three years imprisonment, short-term detention or controlled release and a concurrent fine; where circumstances are serious, the sentence is between three and seven years imprisonment and a concurrent fine; where circumstances are especially serious, the sentence is seven or more years imprisonment and a concurrent fine or confiscation of property.

Article 120-5: Where methods such as violence or coercion are used to compel others to wear or adorn themselves with apparel or emblems promoting terrorism or extremism, it is punished by up to three years imprisonment, short-term detention or controlled release, and a concurrent fine.

Article 120-6: Illegally possessing books, audio-visual materials or other materials the one clearly knows advocate terrorism or extremism, where the circumstances are serious, is punished by up to three years imprisonment, short-term detention or controlled release and/or a fine.127

Expanding the counterterrorism bureaucracy

China formed two national-level organizations shortly after September 11 to direct the country’s efforts against terrorism. These organizations are the National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group, which coordinates China’s counterterrorism policy,128 and the MPS Counterterrorism Bureau, which aims to improve coordination and intelligence collection efforts within the ministry in the fight against terrorism.129

129 Josephine Ma, “SCMP Cites China Public Security Official on PRC Expanding Anti-Terrorism Network,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), September 23, 2002.
Both organizations are primarily charged with institutional coordination and ensuring that the different elements of the bureaucracy responsible for combating terrorism work together. Both organizations are profiled in greater detail in chapter 5, which examines the organizations, roles, and missions that constitute China's counterterrorism bureaucracy.

**Special police units**

China's security services also formed two new special police units after 2001 to combat terrorism. One of these was in the People's Armed Police force (PAP)—a component of the PRC armed forces under the dual command of the Central Military Commission and the MPS that is responsible for domestic security missions. Although the PAP has had special police since its founding in 1982–1983, these units inherited new responsibilities after September 11 to address other forms of terrorism. (The original PAP special police force was charged with combating hijackings.)

In 2002, the PAP began to set up new special counterterrorism forces within its special police units in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Fuzhou, and Changsha. Press reports suggest that each of China's 31 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions now has at least one such armed police force.

The MPS has also begun to establish its own special police units in response to both the growing threat of terrorism and the increase in instances of social unrest in the country. The March 2005 “Opinion of the Ministry of Public Security on Truly Strengthening the Development of the Public Security Special Police” called for the formation of


special police units in 36 “key cities” throughout the country. In addition to combating terrorism, MPS special police also respond to riots, protests, and other disturbances to public order, and provide security for large-scale gatherings.

**Increasing law enforcement operations in Xinjiang**

Chinese security officials view Xinjiang as one of the country’s greatest security challenges. The CCP has characterized Xinjiang as the “main battleground” in China’s counterterrorism efforts, while President Xi Jinping has described it as the “frontline” of China’s struggle against terrorist threats.

Beijing has responded to the terrorism and ethno-religious violence in Xinjiang by enhancing its security presence in the autonomous region. As stated earlier, the Chinese government has not disclosed specific figures on the number of PLA, PAP, and public security personnel deployed to Xinjiang. The PRC State Council Information Office’s 2009 white paper, *Development and Progress in Xinjiang*, for instance, notes that “plenty of human, material, and financial resources” have had to be allocated to combat crimes of terror and violence and ensure social stability in Xinjiang. The numbers of PAP forces, at least, are thought to be above average compared to those in other Chinese provinces. Xinjiang is one of only three provinces to which Chinese Central authorities have deployed two of the mobile PAP divisions (jidong shi; 机动师). These units were created for rapid response to major incidents of unrest when these forces were transferred from the regular PLA in 1997 (Division 8660 in Yining, and Division 8680 which was at least for a time deployed to Kashgar, Xinjiang). These units, although they were distributed to numerous locations around China, remain directly subordinate to the central PAP Headquarters in Beijing. The U.S. Department of Defense has also noted in its annual survey of

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137 PRC State Council Information Office, *Development and Progress in Xinjiang*.

Chinese military power that Chinese officials in June 2013 deployed at least 1,000 armed police to take control in parts of Urumqi in response to unrest which caused 35 deaths. The same report notes that PAP units, especially their mobile divisions, continue to receive equipment upgrades.139

According to a 2010 article in *China Daily*, spending on security in the autonomous region has also increased. In 2010, the Xinjiang regional government spent 2.89 billion RMB (USD 455 million) on security, an increase of nearly 88 percent from the previous year. The increase was in response to deadly rioting in July 2009, which claimed 197 lives and “severely damaged social stability,” in the words of Xinjiang governor Nur Bekri. Commenting on the increase, Wan Haichuan, director of Xinjiang Regional Government’s Finance Department, stated that the increased spending on public security was designed to enhance social stability in Xinjiang.140

Additionally, Beijing has launched periodic “strike hard” campaigns in Xinjiang (and in neighboring Tibet), which are designed to crack down on terrorism, separatism, and criminal behavior as well as to confiscate illicit weapons and explosives. The first “strike hard” campaign in Xinjiang was launched in 1996 and specifically targeted “separatism and illegal religious activities” according to Human Rights Watch.141 The most recent began on May 25, 2014, three days after a deadly attack in Urumqi which killed 32 and injured 90. Minister of Public Security Guo Shengkun described the 2014 “strike hard” campaign as a one-year effort to crack down on “terrorist elements” and would be concentrated in Xinjiang.142

Arrests and convictions on terrorism-related charges rose during the campaign, according to China’s Supreme People’s Court. Chinese courts nationwide handled 14.8 percent more cases of terrorism and separatism charges in 2014 than in 2013, and sentenced 13 percent more people on these charges than the year before.143 Chinese authorities also made use of executions as part of the campaign, although data on the total number of executions for these or other charges in China are

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unknown. Xinhua did, however, report on cases involving at least 21 executions on terrorism-related charges in Xinjiang during 2014.\textsuperscript{144}

The PRC government credits the operations of its security forces in Xinjiang for significantly reducing the level of violence in the autonomous region. Referenced in an article by \textit{China Daily}, \textit{Xinjiang Daily} reported that in the first six months of the 2014 “strike hard” campaign, over one hundred “terrorist cells” had been eliminated in Xinjiang, ensuring that most terrorist attacks in Xinjiang were prevented before they could be carried out.\textsuperscript{145} The 2015 PRC State Council Information Office white paper on Xinjiang states that most of the terrorist groups in Xinjiang have been “knocked out in the planning stage,” and that the trend of “frequent eruptions of violent and terrorist attacks in Xinjiang” has been “somewhat checked.” It credits this to the work of China's public security forces, which remain on “high alert for signs of violent attacks and terrorism, and respond with the utmost severity.”\textsuperscript{146}

\section*{Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps}

One key player in Beijing’s effort to stabilize the region is the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). This paramilitary force—formed in 1954 through the demobilization of one hundred thousand active-duty PLA soldiers—is described in PRC government documents as playing a key role in the stability of Xinjiang. According to the official PRC government white paper on the XPCC, the force played a “crucial role” in responding to acts of terrorism in Xinjiang, to include the April 1990 Baren uprising and the February 1997 Yining riot. The white paper states that XPCC “emergency battalions” that were located in close proximity to these disturbances were able to “strike swiftly” against these “terrorist crimes” in cooperation with PAP forces and local residents.\textsuperscript{147}

Chinese officials have called on the XPCC to play a lead role in countering terrorist threats. During his April 2014 visit to Xinjiang, President Xi stated that more effort was needed to develop the XPCC into a stabilizing force for the country’s border areas.\textsuperscript{148} Noting that the XPCC has performed an “important and irreplaceable role” in


\textsuperscript{146} PRC State Council Information Office, \textit{Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang}.

\textsuperscript{147} PRC State Council Information Office, \textit{The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps}.

safeguarding Xinjiang’s stability, Vice Premier Liu Yandong described the force as being on the “frontlines of battle against separatism and terrorism.”

Chinese media reports have focused specifically on the role of the XPCC’s emergency militia battalions. China’s official English-language newspaper, *China Daily*, opined that these battalions could be mobilized in response to activities that threaten stability in Xinjiang, to include terrorist attacks. He Jinsong, director of the XPCC office in charge of maintaining stability, told *China Daily* that the corps is working on a mechanism to integrate its own forces and those from other parts of Xinjiang to deal with emergencies, such as terrorist attacks. Chen Jiazhu, deputy commander of the XPCC, told the paper that although the corps is not an army, it “certainly has power to maintain social stability in Xinjiang.”

**Enlisting the help of the general public**

Chinese officials have also enlisted the help of the public in countering suspected terrorist threats. Four days after the May 22, 2014, attack in Urumqi, Xinjiang CCP secretary Zhang Chunxian called for a “people’s war” on terrorism encompassing both heightened security measures and a campaign to regulate religious activities in the region. Zhang’s “people’s war” also involved the mobilization of local residents to assist the authorities by passing on tips about terrorist suspects. During an inspection tour of Xinjiang’s Shache County—one week after a deadly attack claimed 37 lives—MPS Minister Guo Shengkun called for the mobilization of “people in every village and every household” to assist in the ongoing effort to prevent and combat terrorism.

To elicit the cooperation of the local populace, MPS Minister Guo announced that rewards would be offered to “whistleblowers” who provided information concerning acts of terrorism and other forms of violence. The Xinjiang regional government

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150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.

152 Gao Bo and Cui Jia, “From Soldiers to Farmers.”


has also offered cash rewards in exchange for information that leads to the arrest of suspected terrorists as part of the latest “strike hard” campaign.\textsuperscript{156}

One instance in which a reward was apparently paid out was in August 2014 in Xinjiang Hotan city. Following a deadly July 2014 terrorist attack in Shache County, authorities in the nearby Hotan reportedly mobilized 30,000 volunteers across five villages to conduct large-scale searches for “terrorists” who were allegedly planning an attack on a nearby kindergarten.\textsuperscript{157} China Daily reported that villagers armed with sticks surrounded a group of “terrorists” hiding in a cornfield. The Xinjiang government announced that it would give a cash reward totaling 300 million RMB (USD 47 million) to all who participated in the manhunt.\textsuperscript{158}

In order to heighten the situational awareness of the general public to the threat of terrorism, the MPS produced a \textit{Citizen’s Counterterrorism Handbook}, distributed in Beijing, Shanghai, Liaoning, Henan, Guangdong, and Xinjiang (Figure 1). It provides a list of seven indicators for identifying possible terrorist suspects. Such signs include having a panicked expression, dressing in a way that is incompatible with the seasons or situation, being unwilling to submit to a security inspection, frequently coming in and out of large public activities, and loitering too close to police cordons.\textsuperscript{159}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{156} U.S. Department of State, \textit{Country Reports on Terrorism 2014}.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Promoting economic growth

Over the past two decades, Beijing has funneled billions of RMB into Xinjiang in an effort to develop the economy and close the wealth gap between China’s poorer western areas and its more affluent eastern cities. Beijing has attempted to promote economic development in Xinjiang by investing heavily in the development of the region’s infrastructure and tourism industries and to attract foreign investment. Successive editions of the PRC’s official white paper on Xinjiang describe economic development as the top priority of the autonomous region and trumpet the improvement in living standards over the past three decades. Although not directly stated, Beijing’s hope is that the elevation of living standards throughout the autonomous region will decrease separatist tendencies and diminish support and sympathy for ethnic and religious violence.

Beijing has also enacted several development initiatives in Xinjiang in order to combat the perceived economic and social sources of discontent in the autonomous region. These initiatives include efforts to foster job skills, create employment opportunities, improve living standards, and further integrate Xinjiang into the rest of the PRC. China’s 2013 Silk Road Economic Belt is one such effort, designed to foster development in both Xinjiang and Central Asia by broadening trade, developing infrastructure, and increasing cultural ties.

Although Xinjiang’s economy has undoubtedly improved as a result, with gross domestic product (GDP) growth since 2003 surpassing the national average, many of Xinjiang’s Uighur residents have been left out of the boom. As of 2010, roughly 83 percent of Uighurs in Xinjiang were classified as “farmers,” up from 80 percent in 2000. As stated in chapter 2, anecdotal evidence suggests that many PRC firms operating in the region prefer to employ Han Chinese, who are generally more educated, are more skilled, and speak better Mandarin than their Uighur counterparts.

Another concern is that the economic benefits have not been spread evenly throughout the province. Much of the industry in Xinjiang is concentrated in the north, near Urumqi, where the region’s Han Chinese and other non-Uighur minorities are concentrated. In contrast, the predominantly Uighur regions of southern Xinjiang are largely arid and devoid of natural resources. Jiang Zhaoyong, a PRC expert on ethnic issues, expressed skepticism over the Chinese government’s effort to develop southern Xinjiang. Citing the absence of natural resources, Jiang reportedly told Hong Kong’s *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong) that “I don’t know what kinds of industries could be developed in Kashgar (southern Xinjiang’s most populous city) and other remote counties in the south.”

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Bilingual education

Since 2001, Beijing has promoted a “bilingual education” campaign in an effort to promote ethnonational unity, improve Mandarin literacy, enhance the upward mobility of minority groups in Xinjiang, and decrease the use of local languages in education. Uighurs, particularly those from rural areas, have only a limited proficiency in Mandarin Chinese. Some schools in the predominantly Uighur southern parts of Xinjiang reportedly do not teach it. A report in the popular, non-authoritative daily Global Times observed that most secondary school graduates in one Xinjiang county were unable to write their names in Mandarin. The paper contended that this language barrier, coupled with poverty and “enthusiasm for religion,” made this particular county a “terrorist hotbed.”

During an April 2014 visit to Xinjiang, President Xi reportedly stated that bilingual education was important for minority children because proficiency would improve their job prospects and “more importantly, contribute more to national unity.” The campaign appears to have met with some degree of skepticism by many Uighurs, some of whom allegedly view “bilingual education” as a CCP ploy to marginalize their language, culture, and identity.

Promoting ethnic unity and combating religious extremism

A cornerstone of the CCP’s domestic counterterrorism approach has been promoting the rhetoric of ethnic unity and combating what the party sees as the sources of ethnic separatism and religious extremism in Xinjiang. The rhetoric used by China’s leaders indicates they have sought a strategy that would

- suppress and isolate those whom CCP leaders see as extremists and separatists;
• win over moderate religious believers with appeals to “ethnic unity” and “religious tolerance,” and;
• reaffirm and strengthen the CCP’s basic principles and systems for governing religion and adapting it to China’s CCP-led society.

Strict ethnic and religious policies promoted by Xinjiang regional and local officials for several years, however, are believed to be a source of major popular resentment.

The PRC government white paper on the XPCC describes ethnic unity as “fundamental” to the preservation of long-term national unification and social stability in the region. At a May 2014 two-day Central Work Conference on Xinjiang, President Xi Jinping reportedly described ethnic unity as the most important long-term issue for the autonomous region. According to the readout of the conference from China’s official Xinhua News Agency, President Xi encouraged all of Xinjiang’s ethnic groups to demonstrate “mutual understanding, respect, tolerance and appreciation among themselves, and to help each other,” in order to unite them “like seeds of a pomegranate.” Commenting specifically on the issue of separatism, he told delegates that “the more separatists attempt to sabotage our ethnic unity, the more we should try to reinforce it.” Xi also called on all residents of Xinjiang, regardless of ethnicity, to identify themselves with China and its culture.

Party and state documents have also stressed the danger posed by extremist religious views and activities. The 2015 white paper on Xinjiang issued by the State Council Information Office describes religious extremism as a “real risk” to national and ethnic unity, social stability, and personal safety. It states that suppressing religious extremism in accordance with the law is a “just move” that protects the fundamental interests of the state and its people, including Muslims, as well as an important part of the larger international response to religious extremism.

One key element of the CCP response is to reassert its basic religion policies, as enshrined in China’s laws and its Constitution (Article 36), which grants citizens freedom of “religious belief,” but extends state protection only to what it refers to as “normal religious activities.” State regulations require religious groups and their

172 PRC State Council Information Office, Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang.
173 “Article 36. Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of
clerical personnel to obtain government approval and registration. Regulations also limit the contents of religious publications, including prohibiting content that “propagates religious extremism” or “jeopardizes the harmony between different religions.” 174 The Constitution also bars foreign control (“domination”) of any religious group, and prohibits persons from using religion in ways that disrupt public order, impair citizens’ health, or interfere with the state educational system.

In spring 2014, during the height of terrorist attacks and social violence, Xi Jinping gave at least two major speeches emphasizing the relationship between terrorism and threats rooted in religion. In addition to stepping up law enforcement measures, Xi called for making stronger use of the party’s system for managing religion. Xi pushed for strengthening links with China’s official (called “patriotic”) religious community and helping “patriotic religious personages” provide stronger “positive religious guidance” for religious believers. They should do this by simultaneously meeting what China deemed their “normal religious needs” while effectively resisting the “infiltration of religious extremism.” 175

Xi reiterated these themes a month later at the CCP’s Central Work Conference on Xinjiang—held just days after a car bombing killed 39 in an Urumqi market. 176 According to the Xinhua News Agency, Xi called for doing “meticulous” work regarding religion and “helping religion adapt to a socialist society.” To strengthen Party leadership, he called for fostering a “team of patriotic clergy” so that the nation’s religious organizations remained “firmly in the hands of people who love the country as well as religion.” And he stressed that the key to easing religious tensions is to “protect legal religious activities, deter illegal and extreme ones, guard against infiltration and crack down on crimes.”

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174 Regulations on Religious Affairs, PRC State Council, (July 7, 2004), accessed December 9, 2015, http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/regulations-on-religious-affairs. See especially Articles 6 and 7. Article 7 forbids religious publications “(1) which jeopardize the harmonious co-existence between religious and non-religious citizens; (2) which jeopardize the harmony between different religions or within a religion; (3) which discriminate against or insult religious or non-religious citizens; (4) which propagate religious extremism; or (5) which contravene the principle of independence and self-governance in respect of religions.”


In June 2015, Xinjiang’s Communist Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian amplified Xi’s message, calling for religious leaders to “root out the harmful influence of religious extremism” and express their strong opposition to “acts of violence in the name of Islam.” Zhang especially echoed Xi’s words about helping religion adapt to socialist society and emphasized the “patriotic” aspects of CCP religion policy. Zhang called for religions to be “Sinicized” and “immersed into Chinese culture” in order for them to develop in a “normal and healthy manner.” Toward these goals, Xinjiang government officials have reportedly required imams to take political education classes that encourage them to denounce extremism and condemn violence.

Some on-the-ground ethnic and religious policies carried out by regional and local officials in Xinjiang continue to spark major popular resentment. In 2011 Xinjiang officials issued a list of 26 “illegal religious activities” that restricted, among other activities, religious instruction for young people. Detentions of unregistered Muslim clerics, or the shuttering of officially unsanctioned religious schools have reportedly caused uprisings in some areas. Other causes of resentment have reportedly included actions seen as offending Uighur women’s dignity, such as preventing them from wearing veils, or restricting students or CCP members from fasting during Ramadan or attending mosques, or the use of violence against Uighurs protesting ethnic and religious issues. One Western observer who has visited Xinjiang often over 10 years believes that repressive ethnic and religious policies


179 Twenty-Six Manifestations of Illegal Religious Activity [Xinjiang CCP United Front Work Department (2011) Document No. 1] (Feifa Zongjiao Huodong Ershiliu Zhong Biaoshi Xingshi [Xin Dang Liu Fa [2011] Yi Hao] De Wenjian); 非法宗教活动二十六种表现形式 [新党统发[2011] 1 号的文件], Karamay (Xinjiang) Educational Website, accessed May 2015, http://d3z.klmyedu.cn/dzgt/xxcl/Documents/%E9%9D%9E%E6%B3%95%E5%AE%97%E6%95%99%E6%B4%BB%E5%8A%A8%E4%BA%8C%E5%8D%81%E5%85%AD%E7%8D%E8%A1%A8%E7%8E%B0%E5%BD%A2%E5%8C%8F.doc.


181 In 2013, following an alleged terrorist attack in eastern Xinjiang’s Shanshan County, several localities in Xinjiang reportedly prohibited women from wearing burqas. An opinion piece in the Xinjiang Daily, official newspaper of the autonomous region’s CCP committee, said that wearing the burqa ran counter to Uighur traditional practice. Aini Naermaiti, “Have a Clear Understanding of the Malicious Nature of Religious Extremism,” Xinjiang Daily, September 30, 2013, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2013_09/30/30003189_0.shtml.

182 “Six Women among Uyghurs Shot Dead in Xinjiang Violence.”; “Over 100 Detained After Xinjiang Police Open Fire on Protesters.”
have now replaced economic inequality toward Uighurs as the number-one source of social resentment and violence in Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{183} Statements by Chinese officials and experts, moreover, provide little evidence that CCP officials feel a need to reconsider these policies.\textsuperscript{184}

A few policy actions in the past year, however, may indicate that some officials see a need to appear more tolerant and inclusive. In September 2014, during Xinjiang’s 2014–2015 law enforcement crackdown on terrorism, China’s MPS, Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued a set of guidelines on law enforcement actions, which instructed local officials how to distinguish between ordinary religious activities and “illegal acts of religious extremism,” and how to avoid discriminating against religious or ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{185} In July 2015, Xinjiang CCP Secretary Zhang Chunxian reportedly became the first CCP secretary to join a group of Muslims for the feast, which celebrates the end of Ramadan.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{183} Interviews.

\textsuperscript{184} Xi Jinping, “Safeguard National Security and Social Stability (April 25, 2014).”


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Chapter 4: China’s Counterterrorism Bureaucracy

Overview of this chapter

This chapter takes an institutional view of the terrorism challenge, examining the leading organizations that develop and enforce counterterrorism policy in China; hence the chapter focuses overwhelmingly on the bureaucratic organizations of the system. Yet because President Xi Jinping has played an important role in the organizational leadership and policy guidance of counterterrorism work, the chapter begins with an examination of Xi’s role since his accession to power. It then focuses on the roles played by leading organs of the Communist Party, the judiciary (the courts and procuracy), China’s government departments, and military organizations in policymaking and enforcement.

This chapter, however, can provide only a snapshot of the current counterterrorism roles and missions of these organizations. The system is not static. Recent documents and speeches—notably, the 2013 Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress documents and the 2015 Counterterrorism Law—indicate that the Xi leadership envisions future changes in counterterrorism aimed at making the system stronger, more centralized, and reflective of Xi Jinping’s system-wide “overall” strategy for fighting terrorism.\(^\text{187}\)

Atop the system: Xi Jinping’s role in counterterrorism policy

An analysis of China’s counterterrorism policy system must begin by noting that Xi Jinping has demonstrated a high level of personal interest in internal security affairs, including the fight against terrorism. The available evidence appears to indicate that, in organizational terms, no CCP General Secretary since the PRC's founding has taken

\(^{187}\) Xi Jinping, "Explanatory Notes to the 'Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform,' (November 9, 2013)."; PRC Counterterrorism Law, December 27, 2015.
a more hands-on approach to internal security policy than Xi Jinping (see Appendix D).

Some of Xi’s first major speeches and meetings focused on internal security affairs, and he created and took personal charge of the new National Security Commission (NSC) and the Central Cyber Security Leading Group. Xi has given important policy speeches on national security affairs, including counterterrorism. Along with other central party-state leaders, Xi, has issued “important directives” (zhongyang zhishi; 重要指示) on strengthening counterterrorism work that were issued as guidance for the counterterrorism campaign launched in May 2014.

Evidence of Xi’s hands-on role is his choice to take personal leadership of internal security-related party leadership bodies (notably the National Security Commission and the Central Cyber Security Leading Group) in a way none of his predecessors did, with the possible exception of Mao Zedong’s direct successor, Hua Guofeng. Neither Mao, nor Deng Xiaoping, nor any of the three CCP General Secretaries who served under Deng (Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin) took personal charge of the party’s leading body for internal security policy, which was the Central Political-Legal Committee during most of this period. All of these party leaders left the chairmanship of the top internal security bodies to a series of senior party leaders, many of whom had a security, intelligence, or jurisdiction specialty—namely, Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Kang Sheng, Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Chen Pixiang, Peng Chong, Qiao Shi, Ren Jiamin, Luo Gan, and, most recently, Zhou Yongkang and Meng Jianzhu. The possible exception is Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, who served as minister of public security prior to assuming the posts of premier and party chairman in 1976, and whose ongoing role in security affairs cannot be judged from the available historical evidence. In addition, under Xi, the chairman of the Central Political-Legal Committee, Meng Jianzhu, is not a member of the Politburo’s ruling Standing Committee, as was the case in the previous decade and under part of Deng’s rule in the late 1980s (e.g., Qiao Shi), meaning no security specialist statutorily joins Xi on the party’s leading decision-making body. Third, Xi Jinping’s published speeches since taking office include several policy addresses on various internal aspects of national security such as “social stability,” “rule of law,” “law enforcement,” “terrorism,” “public security organs,” as well as cyber security; see Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014). Hu Jintao, by contrast, gave his 2005 major address on building a “harmonious society,” but few other available speeches. Deng’s speeches reflect involvement during crises (the 1983 anticrime campaign and Tiananmen in 1989), but very little else on these topics. See, in particular: Deng Xiaoping, The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volumes II (1975-1982), III (1982-1992), Edited by People’s Daily Online (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2006), www.people.com.cn/english/dengxp/home.html. For useful statistical data on the CCP’s political-legal leadership under Xi and before, see Carl Minzner, Prepared Statement of Mr. Carl Minzner, Hearing for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Stability in China: Lessons Learned from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, 113th Congress, Second Session, May 15, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/Hearing%20Transcript_May%2015%202014.pdf.


“The Ministry of Public Security Calls a Video Conference to Make Arrangements for Concentrated Program Operations to Strike Hard at Violent Terrorist Activities in Interior Regions,” (Gonganbu Zhaokai Yanli Daji Baoli Kongbu Huodong Zhanxian Zongdi Neidi Bushu Shipinhui, 公安部召开严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项整治行动内地部署视频会), People’s Public Security

188 Evidence of Xi’s hands-on role is his choice to take personal leadership of internal security-related party leadership bodies (notably the National Security Commission and the Central Cyber Security Leading Group) in a way none of his predecessors did, with the possible exception of Mao Zedong’s direct successor, Hua Guofeng. Neither Mao, nor Deng Xiaoping, nor any of the three CCP General Secretaries who served under Deng (Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin) took personal charge of the party’s leading body for internal security policy, which was the Central Political-Legal Committee during most of this period. All of these party leaders left the chairmanship of the top internal security bodies to a series of senior party leaders, many of whom had a security, intelligence, or jurisdiction specialty—namely, Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Kang Sheng, Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Chen Pixiang, Peng Chong, Qiao Shi, Ren Jiamin, Luo Gan, and, most recently, Zhou Yongkang and Meng Jianzhu. The possible exception is Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, who served as minister of public security prior to assuming the posts of premier and party chairman in 1976, and whose ongoing role in security affairs cannot be judged from the available historical evidence. In addition, under Xi, the chairman of the Central Political-Legal Committee, Meng Jianzhu, is not a member of the Politburo’s ruling Standing Committee, as was the case in the previous decade and under part of Deng’s rule in the late 1980s (e.g., Qiao Shi), meaning no security specialist statutorily joins Xi on the party’s leading decision-making body. Third, Xi Jinping’s published speeches since taking office include several policy addresses on various internal aspects of national security such as “social stability,” “rule of law,” “law enforcement,” “terrorism,” “public security organs,” as well as cyber security; see Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014). Hu Jintao, by contrast, gave his 2005 major address on building a “harmonious society,” but few other available speeches. Deng’s speeches reflect involvement during crises (the 1983 anticrime campaign and Tiananmen in 1989), but very little else on these topics. See, in particular: Deng Xiaoping, The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volumes II (1975-1982), III (1982-1992), Edited by People’s Daily Online (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2006), www.people.com.cn/english/dengxp/home.html. For useful statistical data on the CCP’s political-legal leadership under Xi and before, see Carl Minzner, Prepared Statement of Mr. Carl Minzner, Hearing for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Stability in China: Lessons Learned from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, 113th Congress, Second Session, May 15, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/Hearing%20Transcript_May%2015%202014.pdf.


190 “The Ministry of Public Security Calls a Video Conference to Make Arrangements for Concentrated Program Operations to Strike Hard at Violent Terrorist Activities in Interior Regions,” (Gonganbu Zhaokai Yanli Daji Baoli Kongbu Huodong Zhanxian Zongdi Neidi Bushu Shipinhui, 公安部召开严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项整治行动内地部署视频会), People’s Public Security
On April 25, 2014, Xi convened a study session of the CCP Politburo that focused on national security issues, during which he further elaborated on his “holistic” view of security laid out to the NSC ten days earlier. Xi’s remarks not only focused on—more than any other issue—his concerns regarding “terrorism,” “separatism,” and “religious extremism,” but also set the overall tone for counterterrorism policy and the campaign launched the following month. Xi’s speech doubled down on the party’s established two-pronged strategy of tough enforcement and the promotion of regional economic growth.

Key organizations in China’s counterterrorism bureaucracy

China’s security system includes many law enforcement, intelligence, paramilitary, military, and nontraditional security organs that are engaged in overlapping parts of the country’s overall counterterrorism mission. One of the most vexing challenges confronting this bureaucracy concerns the evolution of its high-level leadership. The establishment of the NSC a year ago, with Xi as its chairman, creates new questions about which of several bodies listed in Appendix B exercise command, and to what extent that command resides personally in the hands of Xi and a few security leaders around him (e.g., Li Zhanshu, Meng Jianzhu), or is actually institutionalized.

National Security Commission

Xi Jinping’s most prominent organizational innovation in the security sector has been the establishment of the NSC, with Xi as chairman. Beginning in late 2012, Xi’s speeches and other party documents have clearly suggested that the NSC ultimately would play a strong, centralizing role in national security decision making, in


191 Xi Jinping, “Safeguard National Security and Social Stability (April 25, 2014).” Of the eight paragraphs in this speech, three are devoted to terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—more than any other topic.

192 Ibid. Xi also appeared to reject any serious, critical reflection on the impact that the party’s existing religion and ethnicity policy might be having on social violence, including terrorism. On page 224, while discussing China’s terrorism problem, Xi rejected these problems as having to do with issues of ethnicity or religion. His language also reaffirmed the call for stepping up the use of the party’s traditional system for managing religion—including increasing the role of government-selected religious leaders (“patriotic religious personages”), encouraging the state’s “positive guidance for religious believers,” and meeting what the party considers to be their “normal” religious needs—to effectively resist religious extremism.
drafting China’s first National Security Strategic Guidelines, and in key areas of policy implementation, including counterterrorism policy:

- In a speech to the November 2013 Third Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Central Committee, Xi stated that the NSC’s main responsibilities would include formulating and implementing China’s national security strategy, promoting national security legislation, designing national security principles and policies, and discussing and resolving key national security issues. These issues would include both external and internal challenges to national security.

- Speaking at the NSC’s first meeting on April 15, 2014, Xi stated that one aim of establishing the Commission was to “build a national security system which is centralized, integrated, highly efficient, and authoritative, so as to improve leadership over the work of national security.” He also assigned it the task of “vigorously implementing” China’s overall national security strategy.

- China’s 2015 National Security Law noted the existence of a “central national security authority” responsible for “decision-making, ... coordination,” and formulating and directing the “national security strategy” and related policies. But the law leaves unclear whether this “central authority” refers to the Politburo Standing Committee, the NSC, or possibly some other party-state organ.

- China’s 2015 Counterterrorism Law stipulates that the country’s counterterrorism methods must be incorporated into the National Security Strategy.

Eighteen months after the NSC’s establishment, its exact role in counterterrorism policy—and, indeed, to what extent it is fully functioning—remain unclear from the available documentation in the public domain. Chinese security experts appear

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193 For Xi’s security proposals, see Xi Jinping, “Explanatory Notes to the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform,’ (November 9, 2013).”

194 Ibid.

195 Xi Jinping, “A Holistic View of National Security (April 15, 2014).” Xi also discussed internal arrangements for the commission, telling the meeting that “the NSC should abide by the principle of centralized leadership, scientific planning, exercising power in both centralized and separated ways, coordinated actions, and high performance and efficiency.”


197 PRC Counterterrorism Law, December 27, 2015.
uncertain, for example, whether it exercises formal “leadership” and/or “coordination,” or just “professional guidance” over some of the other key bodies discussed here. Non-authoritative lists of all its members have been published, but not official ones. Critically (for this report), it is still unclear how the NSC’s decision-making role compares with the party leadership’s traditional venue for internal security policy issues—the Central Political-Legal Commission—which has played a leading role in past law enforcement campaigns, and with the apparently more focused operational role of the National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group (NCTLSG). Xi’s speeches before the NSC indicate that at a minimum, the NSC is emerging as an important venue for discussion and consideration of security policy, including counterterrorism policy.

National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group

The National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group (Guojia fankong lingdao xiaozu; 国家反恐领导小组, which we refer to here as “NCTLSG”) is a national-level government organization first created after September 11 to coordinate China’s counterterrorism policy. The present Leading Small Group is the institutional successor to the National Counterterrorism Work Coordination Small Group (Guojia fankongbu gongzuo xietiao xiaozu; 国家反恐怖工作协调小组), which was established in 2001. The current NCTLSG was established in 2013 and held its first meeting on August 27 of that year. The first two group chiefs were then-State Councilors and Ministers of Public Security Zhou Yongkang and Meng Jianzhu. State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Guo Shengkun has been the group leader (zuzhang; 组长) since the Group’s promotion in rank in 2013. Under the Coordination Group as it existed in

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2011, there was a deputy group chief (fuzuzhang, 副组长) who was concurrently a deputy secretary general of the State Council, Wang Yongqing (汪永清).201

Party media report that the new NCTLSG serves the State Council as a policy “discussion and coordination” body.202 These reports indicate that (as the change in name from "coordination" to “leading” group implies) the group’s bureaucratic rank and its decision-making functions were both strengthened when it was transformed in 2013.203

Like other “leading small groups” in the Chinese system, a critical role of the NCTLSG is to bring together the many PRC institutions that have important responsibilities for counterterrorism policy, and provide a venue that can help overcome bureaucratic barriers and coordinate and guide their activities in preventing, investigating, and combating terrorism.204 As of 2014, there were reportedly a total of 16 ministries and departments that take part in the Leading Small Group. Some are statutory members, and the level of each participant's involvement varies with the type of case concerned.205 The research for this report has identified only 13 of these


202 The Chinese for this function is Guowuyuan de yishi xietiao jigou; 国务院的议事协调机构.

203 “Lifting the Lid on the 'Counterterrorism Work Leading Small Group'.”; “National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group Established, Guo Shengkun Serves Concurrently as Group Leader.”


205 Interviews.
16. Statutory members include the following departments or their specialized counterterrorism departments:

- Ministry of Public Security
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of State Security
- People’s Armed Police
- People's Liberation Army (PLA)

The following are also represented, although it is unclear which, if any, are also statutory members:

- Ministry of Finance
- State Religious Affairs Bureau
- Border Management Bureau (under joint PLA/MPS leadership)
- Customs General Administration
- Ministry of Commerce
- Ministry of Transportation
- Ministry of Civil Affairs
- Ministry of Public Health

The NCTLSG has multiple, apparently overlapping offices to handle its bureaucratic work. The Leading Group itself has a General Office (bangongshi; 办公室), an Operations Planning Office (zuozhan jihua chu; 作战计划处), and other departments not yet identified. In addition, China also established a National Counterterrorism Office (Guojia fankong ban; 国家反恐办), whose director (zhuren; 主任) as of 2011 was

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206 Although we can only speculate, other likely bureaucratic candidates for participation in the NCTLSG's activities might include the People's Bank of China, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, or the Ministry of Culture.

207 "Lifting the Lid on the 'Counterterrorism Work Leading Small Group'."); “National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group Established, Guo Shengkun Serves Concurrently as Group Leader."
Vice Minister of Public Security Meng Hongwei (孟宏伟). It is not clear from the available source materials whether or not this office is subordinate to the NCTLSG. Meng Hongwei was still identified as the National Counterterrorism Office Director as recently as May 2014, but it is unclear whether he would have continued holding this post after being placed in charge of the newly reorganized China Coast Guard. In addition to this National Counterterrorism Office, the MPS in 2002 established its own Counterterrorism Bureau and assigned it the duty of researching, planning, directing, coordinating, and promoting counterterrorism work for the entire country. The MPS Counterterrorism Bureau also became the location for the administrative office of the Counterterrorism Coordination Group, and this report’s authors have seen no information indicating that this role has changed with respect to the newer Leading Small Group.

The NCTLSG reportedly oversees a growing network of leadership groups with similar functions that have been established in many of China’s provinces. Following the NCTLSG’s establishment, these provinces followed suit, establishing provincial-level counterterrorism leading groups, including Jiangxi, Shanxi, Guangdong, Yunnan, Anhui, Guizhou, and Shaanxi as of February 2014. Shandong retained a “coordinating” group. In all or nearly all of these, the party provincial secretaries in charge of political-legal work were placed in charge of these leading groups.

The NCTLSG appears to have played an important strategic and operational leadership role in China’s 2014–2015 counterterrorism campaign, subject to approval from top party leaders. In May 2014, about a month after Xi’s address to the Politburo, the NCTLSG reached a “decision,” endorsed by the party center, on the arrangements for a year-long “concentrated program of operations” to strike hard against “violent terrorist activities.” Unified leadership of the operations was to be exercised by the NCTLSG and by the CCP committees and governments at all levels of the system. The NCTLSG’s plan focused on Xinjiang as the “principal battlefield,” with security organizations in other provinces, cities, and autonomous regions assisting in the campaign. The MPS and the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, in turn,

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208 “National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group Established, Guo Shengkun Serves Concurrently as Group Leader.”
209 “Lifting the Lid on the 'Counterterrorism Work Leading Small Group'.”
210 “National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group Established, Guo Shengkun Serves Concurrently as Group Leader.”
211 Ibid.
212 “Lifting the Lid on the 'Counterterrorism Work Leading Small Group'."
213 “The Ministry of Public Security Calls a Video Conference.”
made organizational arrangements for these campaign operations in China's interior and in Xinjiang.214

**CCP Central Political-Legal Affairs Commission**

The CCP Central Political-Legal Affairs Commission (CPLC) historically has served as the leading CCP organization responsible for the formulation and coordination of party policies on internal security matters, such as the maintenance of public order, riot control, counterterrorism, and crime prevention.215 The commission's secretary is a member of the party's Central Committee, and usually has also been a member of either the Politburo or the ruling Politburo Standing Committee.216 Other commission members are usually drawn from the leadership of MPS, Ministry of State Security, the Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Justice, and the PLA. Members are tasked with implementing party policies on counterterrorism within their respective institutions. Since 2012, the head of the commission has been Meng Jianzhu.

The party leadership relies on the CPLC and the corresponding provincial-level party political-legal groups to play a strong leadership role in counterterrorism work, and to mobilize party organizations at all levels to make counterterrorism a priority. The party's National Political-Legal Work meetings have been important venues for the propagation of counterterrorism policy priorities. And as noted above, the government “counterterrorism leading small groups” in provinces that have established them are simultaneously led by CCP political-legal secretaries.217 Still, the leadership relationship between the CPLC and the new NSC remains unclear, and may still be in the process of being worked out.

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214 Ibid.


216 Minzner, *Stability in China: Lessons Learned from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States*.

217 “Lifting the Lid on the 'Counterterrorism Work Leading Small Group'.”
Ministry of Public Security (MPS)

As the discussion of the NCTLSG makes clear, the MPS is the leading security organization in the PRC’s counterterrorism bureaucracy. The MPS is China’s principal domestic security and policing agency and reports directly to China’s State Council. It is responsible for overseeing China’s security and law enforcement efforts, and for maintaining social and political stability. MPS is headed by Guo Shengkun.

The MPS commands most of China’s national police force, including the operations of the PAP during peacetime. MPS also oversees subordinate public security organizations at the provincial, city, and county levels of government. The MPS is organized into bureaus that reflect the range of its responsibilities, including a counterterrorism bureau. The MPS is also the head of a network of public security organizations that operate at the provincial, city, and county levels.

In 2003, the MPS released what appear to be China’s first national legal standards on defining what constitutes a “terrorist element” and “terrorist organization.” In addition, it is the responsibility of MPS to maintain an official list of terrorist organizations and individuals involved in terrorist activities.

MPS Domestic Security Protection units

The MPS Domestic Security Protection organs are the primary public security units tasked with political security and state security investigations. The heirs to the MPS’s former Political Security Bureau before the late 1990s, these departments have long had a major role in policing political dissent, ethnic separatism, unapproved religious activities, and espionage. Within the MPS, it is unclear whether these organs are headed by a single Domestic Security Protection Bureau, as has been the case in the past, or whether they operate within the MPS’s Criminal Investigation Bureau. In some local public security departments, the Domestic Security Protection departments are co-located with counterterrorism units. While the NCTLSG is superior to the MPS Counterterrorism Bureau, it does not directly oversee the MPS’s Domestic Security Protection forces. The domestic security departments are also

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219 Li Xiaobo, Practical Compendium of Laws and Regulations on Emergency Response and Counterterrorism.

220 Ibid.

responsible for much of the police's secret investigation work, as well as some of the public security system's overseas investigation work (called “investigation and research outside the border,” or jingwai diaoyan [境外调研]).

**MPS Counterterrorism Bureau**

The MPS Counterterrorism Bureau, established in early 2002, is responsible for intelligence and research on counterterrorism issues, and coordinates the counterterrorism efforts of the ministry's subordinate public security organizations throughout China, according to Hong Kong's South China Morning Post. Subordinate to the NCTLSG, the bureau is divided into two parts: counterterrorism intelligence and counterterrorism operations.

**MPS and local Public Security Special Police units**

Governments at each of China's three major administrative levels—the province (including autonomous regions and several major cities), the municipality, and the county—have public security departments that fall primarily under the leadership of the party and government leaders at their same level. Most localities—based on their individual security requirements and resource capacity—have established a wide array of offices and teams responsible for various aspects of the mission to defeat terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.

During the 2000s, the MPS established its own special police units in response to the growing challenge of social unrest and terrorism across the country. The MPS also encouraged many important provincial and municipal public security departments to establish their own special police units. As mentioned previously, the March 2005 “Opinion of the Ministry of Public Security on Truly Strengthening the Development of the Public Security Special Police” called for the formation of special police units in 36 “key cities” throughout the country. Xinjiang's Regional Public Security Bureau, for example, has a counterterrorism squad (zizhiqu gonganting fankong zongdui; 自治区公安厅反恐总队).

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222 Ma, "SCMP Cites China Public Security Official on PRC Expanding Anti-Terrorism Network."

223 Yu Lingyun and Hong Yanqing, "Research on the Construction of Public Security Counterterrorism Intelligence Organizations," (Gong'an Fankong Qingbao Jigou Jianshe Chutan; 公安反恐情报机构建设初探), China Public Security (Zhongguo Gonggong Anquan; 中国公共安全), no. 2 (August 2005).

224 "China Sets Up New Special Police Forces in 36 Cities to Combat Terrorism."

225 Xiao Yong, "The Practice of Strengthening the Development of Regularization among the Public Security Special Police and Some Thoughts."

226 Xinjiang Postal Administration, "Postal Bureau, Ministry of State Security, National Counterterrorism Office Come to Xinjiang to Direct the Fourth China - Asia - Europe Exhibition on Postal Channels Security Guarantee Work," (Guojia Youzheng Ju, Anquan Bu, Fankong Ban Fei)
Ministry of State Security (MSS)

The MSS, established in 1983, is a civilian intelligence agency that collects and analyzes intelligence on both domestic and foreign security issues. It also has a counterintelligence mission. The MSS reports to the State Council; its minister of state security, since 2007, is Geng Huichang (耿惠昌). The MSS commands a force of state security police who are engaged in a variety of domestic activities to prevent violations of state security.

Established in 1983, the MSS's fundamental responsibilities include gathering intelligence related to China’s national security and interests; preventing, stopping and punishing illegal activities that harm national security; protecting China’s reform and economic development; and “protecting the socialist people's democratic dictatorship.” Chinese law assigns to China's state security organs several responsibilities that are part of the party-state's strategy for fighting terrorism,
separatism, and extremism. Those include carrying out investigations of people or groups that organize, plan, or carry out terrorist activities that harm national security, as well as those accused of using religion to harm national security or create ethnic tension or incite ethnic separatism.230

While the political security missions and tasks of the public security and state security departments overlap, there are important distinctions—the state security departments’ heavier reliance on clandestine work, and their stronger emphasis on intelligence gathering, according to one city State Security Bureau chief.231 State security departments, according to this official and related materials, are also more focused on, and responsible for, security cases and issues “linked to foreign factors” or “foreign organizations,” including those operating inside China, or those trying to enter China.232 This does not mean that State Security organs have a monopoly on overseas investigative work, as noted in the MPS section above.

Since 2000, the State Security organs have had a leadership system that is more “vertical” than other public security departments (called chuizhi lingdao; 垂直领导). This means that State Security bureaus and offices at the municipal and local levels are primarily led by the MSS and their provincial-level State Security Bureau, and by the central-level party and government leadership. Municipal and local party and government officials at the same level as these State Security offices exercise secondary leadership over these offices, and serving the needs of these local party and state officials is a secondary focus of the State Security offices’ work.233 State media indicate that among provincial- and municipal-level state security offices


231 "Interview with City Government Deputy Secretary General and State Security Bureau Chief Feng Jinliang."

232 Ibid. See also Regulations for the Detailed Implementation of the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Anquan Fa Shishi Xize; 中华人民共和国国家安全法实施细则).

233 For a sophisticated description of this relationship, see the state security official interviewed in "Interview with City Government Deputy Secretary General and State Security Bureau Chief Feng Jinliang." As for the relationship between provincial and municipal or local levels, the regulations for the Chengdu City State Security Bureau describe it as a “vertically managed organ of the province” (e.g. of Sichuan). See “Chengdu City State Security Bureau.”
nationwide, the Xinjiang Regional State Security Bureau (Zizhiqu Guojia Anquan Ting; 自治区国家安全厅) is particularly focuses on counterterrorism work.234

China's Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao; 环球时报) has reported that the MSS has a Counterterrorism Bureau (Fankong Ju; 反恐局),235 which is reportedly also known as “The 18th Bureau.” As of June 2014, its director was Li Wei (李伟).236 In June 2014 and January 2015, Vice Minister of State Security Dong Haichuan (董海泉) accompanied Politburo member and Central Political-Legal Commission Secretary Meng Jianzhu to an international counterterrorism conference in Russia and to a meeting with Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Bureau Chief, suggesting that among MSS vice ministers, Dong may have special responsibility for this work.237

The MSS also has an affiliated research institute, the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, which has a center focused on counterterrorism studies.

Judicial Organs: The Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate

The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) is China’s top judicial organization. The SPC reports to the Standing Committee of the NPC and oversees a system of subordinate courts at the provincial, city, and county levels. The current president of the SPC is Zhou Qiang. The SPC’s primary function is adjudication. It renders verdicts in criminal, civil, and administrative cases brought by the procuratorate, and hears appeals on verdicts issued by lower-level courts.

The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) represents the Chinese government in carrying out prosecutions. Although police forces such as the public security and state security organs have the power to detain suspected terrorists, it is the SPP and

234 "Postal Security Exhibition."
236 Ibid. Li Wei is identified in this interview with the Global Times.
local procurators that have the authority to place suspects under formal arrest and
indict them. Like the SPC, the SPP also reports its work annually to the NPC Standing
Committee. The SPP issues directives and policy guidance, and also supervises the
performance of procuratorates at provincial, city, and county levels. The current SPP
procurator-general is Cao Jianming.

China’s judicial institutions, especially those in Xinjiang, have played an especially
prominent role in the campaign against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.
Xinjiang procurators and courts have prosecuted large numbers of suspects and have
handed out harsh sentences. For example, in response to the large July 28, 2014 riot
in the Xinjiang city of Yarkand (Shache), which party officials have judged to be a
“terrorist attack,” the Kashgar Prefectural Intermediate People’s Court sentenced 12
defendants to death, 15 to death (with a two-year reprieve), 9 to life imprisonment,
and 20 to prison terms of between 4 and 20 years.238 The Xinjiang procurators and
courts were also used as the venue for the trial of outspoken Uighur scholar Ilham
Tohti on charges of separatism, even though Tohti had lived, worked, and carried out
most of the activities for which he was prosecuted in Beijing.239 When adjudicating
these cases, the Xinjiang courts emphasized what they regarded as the procedural
protections they afforded the accused, including providing them with defense
attorneys, conducting trials in their minority languages, and sentencing them at
hearings that were “public”—though it is not clear if the trials were actually open to
the public.240

People’s Armed Police (PAP)

The PAP is a paramilitary police force responsible primarily for maintaining internal
security in China.241 Leadership of the PAP is divided between military and civilian
control, which makes it unique among internal security institutions. The Central
Military Commission (CMC) is responsible for the command, training, ideological

238 Yu Tao, “(Legal System) First-Instant Judgment Delivered for Xinjiang’s Shache County ‘7.28’
Gravely Violent Terrorist Attacks Case,” (法制新疆莎车县‘7-28’严重暴力恐怖袭击案一审宣判), Xinhua,
October 13, 2014.
239 Detained Uyghur Scholar Tohti to Stand Trial in Urumqi for ‘Separatism’, “ Radio Free Asia,
240 Yu Tao, “(Legal System) First-Instant Judgment Delivered for Xinjiang’s Shache County ‘7.28’
Gravely Violent Terrorist Attacks Case.”
241 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2006, 2006,
Office, China’s National Defense in 2002, 2002,
education, conscription, and personnel management of the PAP. All members of the PAP are considered active-duty military personnel, given military ranks, put under military regulations, and entitled to the same military benefits. During peacetime security operations, however, the PAP operates under civilian command, under the Ministry of Public Security. The PRC State Council assigns missions to the PAP, determines the number of its personnel, and provides funding. The current commander of the PAP is the PLA Lieutenant General Wang Ning.

More so than for the PLA, counterterrorism is a prime PAP mission, as identified in China’s 2015 Military Strategy and previous national defense white papers. The PAP has been defined as the “state’s backbone and shock force in handling public emergencies and maintaining social stability.”

As the 2012 State Council Information Office white paper, *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces*, notes:

The People’s Armed Police Force has established a force structure for stability maintenance and emergency response. In addition, a counterterrorism force structure has been set up, which consists of a counterterrorism contingent, special-duty squadrons, special-duty Platoons and emergency-response squads at state, province, municipality and county levels, respectively. Solid steps have been taken to implement strict security measures for major events, including guard duties, security checks, security of important facilities and areas, checkpoints on major roads, and armed urban patrols. From 2011 to 2012, the PAPF effectively responded to and handled various emergencies, coordinated with public security organs to successfully handle some violent and terrorist attacks, and participated in handling 68 incidents of serious violence, and rescuing 62 hostages. Altogether contributing more than 1.6 million persons, the PAPF has provided security for such important events as the 26th Summer Universiade (Shenzhen, 2011), China-Eurasia Expo 2013.

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243 “People’s Armed Police,” (Renmin Wuzhuang Jingcha; 人民武装警察), in *Chinese Public Security Encyclopedia*, (Zhongguo Gong’an Da Baike Quanshu; 中国公安大百科全书), ed. Song Zhansheng (Changchun: Jilin People’s Press, 2000), 2485.

244 PRC State Council Information Office, *Decision of the State Council and the Central Military Commission on Reorganizing the Leadership and Management Structure of the Chinese People’s Armed Police*. 

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(Urumqi, 2011) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Beijing Summit (2012).245

After September 11, the special police units of the PAP were gradually given counterterrorism responsibilities.246 In 2002, the PAP established new special counterterrorism forces within its special police units in the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Fuzhou, and Changsha.247 By October 2003, Hong Kong media dispatches suggested that PAP divisions in every province had established a special operations force focused on counterterrorism.248 By June 2004, state-run PRC media reported that the PAP had built a counterterrorism “network” covering the entire country, from the provincial level to the city and county levels as well.249

People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) consists of active duty and reserve military forces whose primary mission, in addition to securing the rule of the CCP, is to defend China from external threats.250 Major elements of the PLA are the PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, PLA Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, and other military organizations.

Counterterrorism is not a principal mission for the PLA as it is for the paramilitary PAP and civilian security organizations, such as the MPS. However, counterterrorism operations are certainly an important element of the PLA’s portfolio of non-traditional security missions. Indeed, one of the eight “strategic tasks” of the PLA listed in the May 2015 publication China’s Military Strategy is, “To strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China’s political security and social stability.”251 In this regard, as noted earlier, the PLA has representation on the National Counterterrorism Leading Small Group (NCLSG).


246 Zhao Wei and Yan Shan, “They Are the Sword in the General’s Hand.”


248 “All Provinces Establish Armed Police Special Operations Units to Fight Terrorism.”


While keeping its main focus on conventional warfighting, nontraditional security missions, such as counterterrorism, have nevertheless risen in importance for the PLA since the early 2000s. To a great extent, the rising attention by the PLA to “Military Operations Other Than War” has been a function of the need to secure China’s expanding national interests, investments, and nationals overseas. This demand signal from the party-state was codified by former CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao, who issued to the PLA what is known as the “Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the New Period of the New Century” at an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission in December 2004. The “New Historic Missions” have provided the domestic political justification for the PLA to conduct various first-time non-traditional security operations abroad, such as the PLA Navy’s anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden (ongoing since 2008), and two noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) of Chinese nationals from Libya in 2011 and Yemen in 2015.

Not surprisingly, the PLA Ground Forces have the largest and best defined mission regarding counterterrorism or social stability maintenance. This role also includes supporting Public Security and PAP forces in providing security at major events. Ground Force roles at these events include item checks for potential explosives and for potential nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Ground Forces also supply medical aid. The border and coastal defense forces’ responsibilities include “assisting in cracking down on terrorist sabotage and cross-border crimes” in addition to a variety of defensive and administrative tasks on the borders.

The PLA Navy (PLAN) also has official counterterrorism responsibilities, including organizing naval and other maritime security forces to train against potential terrorist threats, apparently including live force-on-force training. “The PLAN is mainly responsible for guarding against potential maritime threats and terrorist attacks.”

The PLA Air Force plays a counterterrorism security role by providing air security around the venues of major events such as the Beijing Olympics, the Asian Games (when they were held in Guangzhou), and the events celebrating the 60th anniversary.

254 Ibid., 50 - 51.
255 Ibid., 22.
256 Ibid., 37.
257 Ibid., 51.
of the PRC’s founding.\textsuperscript{258} China’s 2012 white paper notes that over several years before 2013, China’s armed forces had provided 365 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters for counterterrorism and related security.\textsuperscript{259}

The PLA Army, PLA Navy, and PLA Rocket Force each have special operations forces (SOF) that can engage in counterterrorism operations. PLA expert Dennis Blasko has speculated that, were PLA SOF to engage in counterterrorism operations, it would be outside China, not domestically.\textsuperscript{260}

While no element of the PLA has yet to conduct a real-world counterterrorism operation abroad (at least any documented in the public domain), the domestic legal groundwork has now been laid for that possibility in the future. Of potentially great significance, in December 2015, the PRC National People’s Congress passed the Counterterrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China. Article 71 of the law states in part that, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Chinese People’s Armed Police forces may assign people to leave the country on counterterrorism missions as approved by the Central Military Commission.”\textsuperscript{261}

Finally, counterterrorism operations have served as the organizing scenario for multiple PLA bilateral and multilateral combined exercises throughout the region since the early 2000s, especially with the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In fact, the PLA’s combined counterterrorism exercise with the Kyrgyz army in 2002 marked the first time in PLA history that Chinese ground forces had exercised with a foreign army in peacetime outside of China.\textsuperscript{262} Table 2 in the next chapter provides a listing of PLA counterterrorism exercises with foreign partners.

The PLA also plays a role in counterterrorism operations. The PRC National Defense Law states that the PLA can also “assist with maintaining social order when necessary in accordance with the law.”\textsuperscript{263}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{258} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{259} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{260} Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Special Operations Forces: Organizations, Missions and Training,” \textit{China Brief} 15, no. 9 (May 1, 2015), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43867.
\item \textsuperscript{261} \textit{PRC Counterterrorism Law}, December 27, 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{262} Interviews.
\item \textsuperscript{263} \textit{Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defence}, National People's Congress of the People’s Republic of China, (March 14, 1997), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383547.htm. According to PLA specialist Dennis J. Blasko, the phrase “in accordance with law” suggests that the PLA does not have unilateral authority to decide to engage in internal security operations, and the decision is made by the relevant civilian authorities.
\end{itemize}
The PLA also includes research institutions, some of which have responsibility for studying counterterrorism work. The PLA’s primary doctrinal research institute, the Academy of Military Sciences, now has a Center for Research on Military Operations Other than War, which is regarded by some senior experts as a leading PLA think tank for counterterrorism studies.264

Available evidence indicates that since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, the PLA has been used in domestic security operations on only a limited number of occasions. Some of these instances of PLA involvement have occurred in Xinjiang, when PLA units, together with the PAP, responded to violence that Beijing judged to be separatist activities aimed at splitting Xinjiang from China (see below).265

On occasions when public security and PAP forces have been unable to restore order following a major uprising, PLA forces have sometimes played a critical role. A 2009 PLA volume on military operations other than war reports four incidents in two regions of China’s northwest with large Muslim populations—Xinjiang and Ningxia—in which the PLA ground forces played what it calls the “main force role” (zhulijun;主力)266 in suppressing such uprisings—a term that presumably means it was the PLA, not just the PAP, that used armed force to put down the riot or attack. These incidents include:

- The 1989 Baren, Xinjiang “armed rebellion”
- The 1992 Xiji, Ningxia “armed attack”
- The 1993 Xining, Xinjiang “turmoil”
- The 1997 Yining, Xinjiang riot.267


264 Interviews.


267 Ibid.
There has been some research and discussion over the nature of the role played by PLA forces subsequently in large riots in Lhasa in 2008 and the aforementioned Urumqi riots in 2009. Chinese security experts indicate that the PLA has not played the main role in suppressing unrest in recent years. They characterize the army’s activity in those two crises as sealing off the perimeter of these cities and providing transport and logistics support while public security and PAP forces put down the uprisings.

**Border defense: PAP and PLA responsibilities and coordination**

PLA and PAP responsibilities for border defense overlap. The PAP border defense forces, operating under MPS, perform routine tasks of guarding China’s borders and ports of entry and exit. Their tasks include maintaining stability in border regions and combating smuggling, human trafficking, and narcotics smuggling across China’s borders. The PLA has its own border defense forces whose primary mission is to defend against external threats by patrolling China’s physical boundaries and monitoring its airspace and maritime territory.

The PAP and PLA appear to coordinate with each other regarding border security. The PLA appears to act as a second line of defense for the PAP in peacetime and is called in by civilian authorities when needed. In 2003, for example, the PLA took over security responsibilities for China’s borders with North Korea and Myanmar in an effort to stem the flow of refugees and narcotics. Moreover, in the example of separatist violence noted earlier, PLA units may have been called in to assist the PAP in its efforts to maintain stability in the border region of Xinjiang. The PAP can also

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269 Interviews.


271 Li Xing, Border Defense Studies, (Bianfang Xue; 边防学) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2004), 251.

272 Ibid., 248.
assist the PLA in wartime by supplying additional forces to defend the country's border and coastal regions.273

Financial organizations

China has a bureaucratic infrastructure to counter money laundering and terrorist finance. The roles and responsibilities of each organization are laid out in the 2006 Anti-Money Laundering Law of the People's Republic of China.274 Key institutions are the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the Ministry of Public Security, and the State Council's State Administration of Foreign Exchange. The PBOC serves as the lead agency for all anti-money laundering activities in China, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is responsible for criminal investigations, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is the lead agency for countering illicit foreign exchange transactions.275

People’s Bank of China

The People’s Bank of China serves as the central bank for the PRC. As such, it has the power to control China’s monetary policy and regulate PRC financial institutions. It also has the responsibility for planning for and carrying out efforts to counter money laundering.276 Under the PBOC are three organizations that play a role in countering money laundering and terrorist finance.

The first organization under the People’s Bank of China that plays a role in countering terrorist finance is the PBOC Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). It was established in 2004 to track suspicion transactions and works with the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Center.277 The FIU functions


have been divided between two PBOC units: the Anti–Money Laundering Bureau and the China Anti–Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center.278

The PBOC Anti-Money Laundering Bureau. This bureau, and its terrorist finance investigative unit, was established in 2004.279 It is charged with organizing and coordinates China’s anti-money laundering efforts, to include carrying out administrative investigations into suspicious transactions. The Anti–Money Laundering Bureau carries out its activities directly through its regional and local PBOC branches.280

The China Anti–Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center also plays a role. Little information is available about this organization. According to a regional international organization on countering money laundering and terrorist finance of which China is a member, the China Anti–Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center specializes in data collection, processing, and analysis of suspicious and large-value transactions. The China Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center also serves as the central point of contact for foreign Financial Intelligence Units.281

Ministry of Public Security

The Ministry of Public Security is responsible for criminal investigations in China—including those related to money laundering and terrorist finance. The MPS has an Anti–Money Laundering Division and a Counterterrorism Bureau that are responsible for carrying out terrorist finance investigations.282 According to U.S. State Department reports, coordination between the MPS and the People’s Bank of China has sometimes been spotty.283

State Administration of Foreign Exchange

The State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is a deputy-ministerial level state administration tasked with managing PRC foreign exchange reserves. It drafts

280 “People’s Republic of China,” Eurasian Group homepage.
281 “People’s Republic of China,” Eurasian Group Homepage.
policies and regulations and to supervise foreign exchange transactions. Among its many duties, SAFE is responsible for countering illicit foreign exchange transactions. SAFE’s supervision and inspection department is responsible for coordinating all anti-money laundering work related to foreign exchanges and ensuring that China’s domestic laws and regulations related to countering money laundering and terrorism financing are observed in foreign exchange transactions. This work is done in coordination with the People’s Bank of China.

Looking forward: pending efforts to strengthen China’s counterterrorism bureaucracy

This chapter has provided a snapshot of the roles and missions of the organizations in China’s counterterrorism bureaucracy. In closing, it is important to stress here that China’s counterterrorism system is a work in progress, and the Xi leadership appears to still be trying to reshape the structure of the system to reflect its “overall,” comprehensive approach to security, and to establish a more centralized national counterterrorism network.

Even before some of the most prominent terrorist incidents occurred in early 2014, Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership had made clear their discontent with the overall structure of China’s national security policymaking system, and promised important restructuring. As Xi noted at the CCP Central Committee’s November 2013 Third Plenum, the party leadership did not feel the system was prepared to confront the interplay of domestic and international security challenges that China was facing: “All kinds of foreseeable and unforeseeable risks are increasing significantly, but our security system is not good enough to meet the demands of ensuring national security.”

As noted earlier, even though Xi in 2013 described as “urgent” the need to structure a new national security system—with the NSC playing a strong role—the available evidence does not yet indicate that such a system has emerged. Xi called for the NSC

286 Ibid. Also see “Major Functions,” SAFE homepage.
287 Xi Jinping, “Explanatory Notes to the 'Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform,' (November 9, 2013)."
to become a “strong platform to coordinate our national security work” that would “strengthen unified leadership of national security at the central level.” It is also unclear what role the NSC played in drafting China’s first-ever “national security strategy” issued in January.

The Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, passed in December 2015, also envisions a strong, centralized system for guiding counterterrorism work. The law stipulates the creation of a “counterterrorism work leadership structure” (fankongbuzhuyi gongzuo lingdao jigou, 反恐怖主义工作领导机构), with a national counterterrorism leadership institution, which would exercise “unified leadership and command” over the nation's vast counterterrorism network. Provincial and municipal authorities would organize their own counterterrorism work leadership structures, which would take charge of counterterrorism work in their jurisdictions under the leadership of the national counterterrorism system. County-level governments would also establish corresponding counterterrorism organs to cooperate with this structure. To further strengthen strategic leadership, the law also requires that counterterrorism be incorporated into China’s national security strategy guidelines.

The counterterrorism bureaucracy envisioned in the Counterterrorism Law clearly seems to reflect Xi Jinping's “overall” comprehensive approach to security and counterterrorism. The Counterterrorism Law designates a wide array of organizations that would be expected to play a role in counterterrorism work, and they would not be limited to traditional security organizations such as the public security, PLA, armed police, courts, procurators, and justice departments. The draft law underscores the leadership's view that terrorism is also a social, ethnic, religious, media, informational, educational and financial challenge, and it calls for state ethnic affairs departments, religious affairs departments, educational institutions, departments charged with telecommunications, news and publications, broadcasting, film, television, and cultural affairs, and for telecommunications operators and internet service providers all to play a role (Article 17). Article 14 also stipulates the role for financial institutions in freezing assets and other counterterrorism duties.

The apparently unrealized goals for China’s new NSC, and the bureaucratic structure envisioned in the new Counterterrorism Law, indicate that we should continue to

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288 PRC Counterterrorism Law, December 27, 2015. For an English translation, see “Counter-Terrorism Law (2015) (English translation),” China Law Translate, 2015, accessed December 27, 2015, http://chinalawtranslate.com/%E5%8F%8D%E6%81%90%E6%80%96%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E6%B3%95-%E5%BC%882015%E6%8C%89/?lang=en.

289 PRC Counterterrorism Law, December 27, 2015, Articles 7, 8.

290 Ibid., Article 4.
expect bureaucratic reforms on counterterrorism from the Xi Jinping leadership. These reforms are likely to aim at strengthening the counterterrorism bureaucracy, and trying to forge a system that strengthens centralized leadership, while taking a wide-ranging “overall” approach to fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism.
Chapter 5: International Cooperation

Overview of this chapter

This chapter examines the international dimensions of China’s counterterrorism efforts. It focuses on how China has cooperated with other countries to address what it sees as the linked challenges of terrorism and extremism. The chapter does not discuss bilateral counterterrorism cooperation between Beijing and Washington—this subject will be addressed in detail in chapter 6.

An overview of PRC international counterterrorism cooperation

Beijing has stepped up international cooperation in counterterrorism over the past two decades in an effort to strengthen political and law enforcement ties abroad and constrain the activities of its homegrown threats. These efforts are a result of Beijing’s 2001 reassessment of its vulnerabilities to terrorist threats and the challenges in countering them. Efforts to enhance international counterterrorism cooperation also reflect Beijing’s recognition of terrorism as a transnational threat and the fact that many of the emerging terrorism challenges that Beijing faces today have their roots beyond its borders.

Much of China’s international counterterrorism cooperation is carried out in a bilateral capacity. Chinese officials consider neighboring countries in South Asia, Central Asia and Southeast Asia as “key partners” in the China’s counterterrorism fight. Since 2001, China has signed numerous agreements with other nations on law enforcement cooperation, including police training, intelligence sharing, and

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291 Miao Dingrong, “Thoughts on Improving Public Security Capability to Handle Large Sudden Incidents,” (Guanyu Tisheng Gong'an Jiguan Yingdui Chuzhi Zhongda Tufa Shijian Nengli De Sikao; 关于提升公安机关应对处置重大突发事件能力的思考), Public Security Research (Gong'an Yanjiu; 公安研究), no. 1 (2014). Liu Xinhua, a spokesman for the annual session of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, told reporters in March 2015 that, “China regards its neighboring countries in South Asia, Central Asia and Southeast Asia as its key partners in the global fight against terrorism.” Liu did not name any specific countries.
extradition. Beijing also regularly participates in bilateral counterterrorism dialogues and consultations with its neighbors as well as some Western countries. According to the U.S. State Department's *Country Reports on Terrorism*, China held 12 such dialogues in 2014, with countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, South Korea, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan.292

Although Beijing prioritizes bilateral exchanges in its counterterrorism diplomacy, some multilateral cooperation does occur: China participates in the Financial Action Task Force, the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, all of which seek to combat the financing of terrorist activities.293 China is also a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which works to support the implementation of the United Nation's counterterrorism strategy. In September 2013, Beijing announced its intention to increase its involvement in the forum's working groups on the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.294 Beijing is also increasingly involved in the Istanbul Process, which seeks to create conditions for a more politically stable Afghanistan.

Much of China's efforts at multilateral counterterrorism cooperation has been with its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, established in June 2001), comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and its predecessor, the “Shanghai Five” (established in 1996).295

Counterterrorism is not the only objective of the SCO, though the issue has played a major role in the organization's growth. The Shanghai Treaty concluded in 1996 was sought by Beijing as a means to enlist the support of its Western neighbors in deterring their Uighur minority populations from supporting separatism in Xinjiang.296 In 1999, the organization adopted Beijing's preferred verbiage of combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism when discussing the threats posed to SCO member states.297 Beijing has also been instrumental in establishing the SCO Regional Anti-terrorism Structure, the organization's main counterterrorism center.298 SCO member states have also


296 Xu Beina, Fletcher, and Bajoria, *The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)*.


conducted a number of bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism exercises under the SCO framework.

Beijing has also pledged to improve counterterrorism cooperation with Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Speaking at the 13th ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional (May 2015) in Guangxi, Hu Binchen, deputy director of the MPS International Cooperation Bureau, told regional representatives that the activities of terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia were becoming more frequent and called for the establishment of a new sustainable regional security cooperation system to crack down on terrorism and transnational crime.299

China is a permanent member of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee and has signed, ratified, or acceded to many of the protocols and international conventions on terrorism, including300

- Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents
- International Convention against the Taking of Hostages
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
- International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings

300 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 44.
Beijing’s objectives for international counterterrorism cooperation

There is no single document in which Beijing outlines its objectives for international counterterrorism cooperation. However, one can surmise its motivations based on an examination of Beijing’s stated national interests, as well as its public statements, actions, and requests with regard to counterterrorism. These objectives for international counterterrorism cooperation likely include:

- Reducing the instability in neighboring states that allows terrorism to flourish
- Preventing its citizens from joining international terrorist groups
- Repatriating individuals suspected of terrorism
- Enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of its security services
- Protecting the security of its growing expatriate population.

The following section explores each of these objectives in detail in an effort to document how Beijing’s international counterterrorism cooperation is carried out in practice. For each of the five objectives listed, this section analyzes both the source of Beijing’s concern as well as steps it has taken to address the issue.

Reducing instability along its western periphery

For much of the past two decades, Beijing has harbored concerns over the security of its western border. The 2015 PRC defense white paper assesses that “rampant... terrorism, separatism and extremism” are having a detrimental effect on the security and stability along China’s periphery. Of the eight countries that border Xinjiang, four have weak central governments and are plagued by insecurity and instability.

Afghanistan is particularly unstable and extremist groups are active throughout the country.

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Pakistan is home to numerous violent extremist organizations, including the ETIP, which has claimed responsibility for some of the terrorist attacks that have occurred on Chinese soil.

Kyrgyzstan is home to the third largest number of ethnic Uighurs outside of China. The U.S. State Department has warned that its border disputes with neighboring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, coupled with Bishkek’s limited ability to police its southern border, could facilitate the establishment of terrorist safe havens.

Tajikistan, the poorest of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, is plagued by unemployment, corruption, narcotics trafficking, weak central institutions, and a porous border with Afghanistan.

China’s primary concern is likely that the instability and lawlessness that plagues these areas could create conditions that allow terrorism to flourish. Moreover, the proximity of these locations to the PRC, particularly Xinjiang, has given rise to Chinese concerns that Uighur militants could use these areas as staging grounds for attacks against the PRC or link up with Islamic militants already operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Complicating matters for Beijing is the fact that China’s western border with these nations is remote, mountainous, sparsely populated, and extremely difficult to secure. In 2007, for instance, the Chinese and Kyrgyz governments agreed to strengthen controls over their shared border in response to Beijing’s concern that suspected terrorists were infiltrating the area with the aim of launching attacks. Senior Colonel Meng Xiangqing of the PLA National Defense University has described China as a “major victim” of cross-border terrorist attacks.

Pakistan and Afghanistan are the primary focus of Beijing’s efforts in this regard. Beijing has leaned heavily on Islamabad to do more to combat the activities of the ETIM and the ETIP, both of which are thought to be operating in Pakistan’s lawless North Waziristan Province. Former Pakistani foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri was quoted in the PRC media as saying it was “no secret” that “Xinjiang


306 Xu Beina, Fletcher, and Bajoria, The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
extremists” are living in Pakistan's tribal areas. Beijing was full of praise for Pakistani airstrikes against ETIM targets in June 2014, which the Pakistani military described as a massive blow to the terrorists. In response to the operation, a spokeswoman for the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) praised Pakistan’s sacrifices and “positive contributions” in the fight against international terrorism, telling reporters that Beijing supports Islamabad’s counterterrorism efforts.

There are also signs that Beijing is becoming more involved in efforts to reduce instability in Afghanistan. Beijing appears to be playing a more active role in Afghan affairs in recent years, particularly in response to the drawdown of NATO forces. Beijing hosted a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Istanbul Process in October 2014, and has offered to mediate in talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. China also played host to two days of talks in Urumqi between the Afghan government and the Taliban, which were apparently brokered by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Finally, China—along with the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—is also a member of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) for Afghan Peace and Reconciliation, attending the group’s inaugural meeting in Islamabad on January 11, 2016.

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309 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying, “Regular Press Conference on June 17, 2014.”
Preventing its citizens from joining international terrorist groups

Beijing has become increasingly concerned about the growing influence of the Islamic State (IS) and its potential effect on China’s disaffected Muslim population, especially in Xinjiang. Beijing’s principal concern is that some of these people may travel to the Middle East and become radicalized, and then return to China to conduct acts of terrorism. Yang Shaowen, deputy director of the MPS International Cooperation Bureau, asserted that “many young Xinjiang extremists” have “joined extreme Islamic forces” in Syria and Iraq. He added that some of these individuals have subsequently returned to China to “plan more brutal terrorist activities.” According to a Hong Kong newspaper, Xinjiang CCP Secretary Zhang Chunxian has confirmed that PRC security services have arrested Uighurs who have returned to the autonomous region after fighting alongside IS. Wu Sike, China’s special envoy to the Middle East, asserted in July 2014 that Iraq and Syria had become a “training ground” for terrorists from Xinjiang. He added that once exposed to extremist ideologies, these individuals will pose a “severe challenge and security risk” when they return home.

Although reliable estimates are impossible to obtain, there is growing evidence to suggest that some Chinese nationals have indeed traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight alongside the IS. Most estimates put the number of Chinese, predominantly Uighurs, who have traveled to IS-controlled territory in the hundreds. Many appear to be using Southeast Asia as a transit point. The Malaysian government, for instance, reportedly estimates that 300 PRC nationals transited through the country en route to IS-controlled areas in the Middle East.

Rohan Gunaratna, head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, puts the figure

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316 “Uygur Extremists ’Training In Middle East’, Envoy Says.”

at 600 Uighurs and contends that most have illegally departed China through Hong Kong or Guangdong, and transited through Indonesia, Malaysia, or Thailand.318

While the PRC government has not released its own data on the number of Chinese nationals thought to have left the country to join the IS, it has released figures on those it has apprehended trying to leave the country. According to the MPS, as of mid-January 2015, more than 1,200 Chinese nationals had been detained along China’s southwest border as part of the ministry’s campaign against “jihadi migration.” The detained individuals were accused of attempting to flee abroad or organize illegal emigration.319

Chinese reports also suggest that Southeast Asia is the preferred passage out of the country. MPS statistics reveal that Chinese border authorities intercepted more than 800 people trying to illegally cross the border into Vietnam. The Ministry claimed that most of those detained were hoping to travel to the Middle East to “receive training in jihad.”320

Not all of the Chinese nationals who have left the country to engage in terrorist activities have traveled to the Middle East to do so. Media reports suggest that some have remained in Southeast Asia and have linked up with indigenous terrorist groups in the region. In two separate raids in 2014 and 2015, Indonesian police on the island of Sulawesi arrested several Uighurs who had apparently joined the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, the East Indonesian mujahidin group that has pledged its allegiance to IS.321 The four Uighurs arrested in the February 2015 raid were apparently implicated in the March 2014 Kunming train station attack.322

PRC officials are also concerned about the efforts of the IS and other terrorist organizations to recruit or radicalize disaffected Uighurs within China. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi, for instance, expressed the concern that social media was

320 Ibid.
322 “RI, China Hunting Down Xinjiang Terrorism Suspects in Poso."
becoming a platform for groups to “incite terrorist concepts, plan attacks, and recruit terrorists.”

According to the China Internet Illegal Information Reporting Center (CIIIRC), foreign websites in languages such as Uighur, Arabic, and Russian have attempted to recruit Chinese nationals to receive terrorist training abroad in order to carry out attacks at home. Consequently, PRC law enforcement agencies have made efforts to crack down on the proliferation of online materials related to terrorism and punish those responsible.

Hong Kong’s *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong) has also reported on alleged attempts to recruit Uighurs in person on the campuses of Chinese universities in cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, and Xi’an. Uighur students in Guangzhou, for instance, have reportedly been warned to stay away from strangers who are not associated with the university.

## Repatriating individuals suspected of terrorism

Beijing has also sought international cooperation in detaining individuals that it considers to be engaged in terrorist activities. This is largely a reflection of Beijing’s belief that many of the terrorist activities that occur in China are planned overseas, and that further international cooperation is needed for Beijing to actively combat the terrorist threat against it. The MPS has occasionally published lists of its most wanted terrorist suspects thought to have fled the country in the hopes that they would be arrested abroad and handed over to the Chinese authorities.

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326 “China Publishes Names of Six Terrorists.” A 2012 list published by MPS concludes by stating, “The ministry hopes that foreign governments and their law enforcing departments would help to arrest the six and hand them over to Chinese authorities.”
for China’s MFA have described the issue of repatriation as an “international counterterrorism obligation” shared by all nations. 327 State-run media has also characterized Beijing’s policy of repatriating suspected terrorists as an “effective deterrent” to other prospective terrorists.328

According to a Hong Kong newspaper, the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has reported that Beijing has signed a total of 39 extradition agreements to facilitate the transfer of suspected terrorists back to China.329 Two of the more recent extradition treaties were signed with Iran and Afghanistan, and Kabul has already extradited back to China several Uighurs who were suspected of having undergone training at camps in neighboring Pakistan.330

Kazakhstan has consistently extradited Uighurs back to the PRC per Beijing’s request, as has Kyrgyzstan. In May 2002, for instance, two ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan for reportedly planning to attack the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek.331 ASEAN nations have also extradited Uighurs back to the PRC, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand. Notable countries that do not appear to have extradition treaties with the PRC include the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, and Turkey.332


332 Tibet Autonomous Region Regional CPC Committee, “Innovate Social Governance Structure, Promote Lasting Peace and Order in Tibet,” (Chuangxin Shehui Zhili Tizhi Tujiin Xizang Changshijiu’an; 创新社会治理体制 推进西藏长治久安), Seeking Truth (Qiu Shi 求是), no. 8 (April 16, 2014), http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2014/201408/201404/t20140414_339728.htm. The list of countries that China has signed an extradition treaty with include Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Philippines, Mongolia, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Laos, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, Uzbekistan, Lithuania, Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Algeria, Tunisia, France, Spain, Ukraine, Portugal, Lesotho, South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, Afghanistan, and Iran.
Many of the individuals repatriated to the PRC in recent years have been ethnic Uighurs that Beijing has accused of attempting to travel to the Middle East to fight with or receive training alongside the IS. The practice of extraditing these individuals back to the PRC has been controversial abroad due to human rights concerns. In response, the PRC MPS has publicly announced its intention to “carefully screen those people who have been repatriated to China.” An English-language commentary from China’s official Xinhua News Agency on the issue of repatriating suspected terrorists stated that “for those who have committed terrorist crimes, they will be brought to justice; and for those Chinese who have been coerced or cajoled to cross the national border, they will be educated and resettled.”

Some of the more controversial cases have included:

- The Thai government’s July 2015 decision to deport back to the PRC more than 100 Uighurs who emigrated from China. Bangkok’s decision resulted in widespread international condemnation, particularly in Turkey, where angry demonstrators stormed the Thai Consulate in Istanbul.

- Kazakhstan’s May 2011 decision to repatriate a Uighur refugee who fled China during the 2009 Xinjiang riots. Although this individual had already been granted refugee status by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Beijing argued that under SCO rules, any individual suspected of terrorism, separatism or extremism in an SCO member state who flees to another member country must be extradited.

- Cambodia’s December 2009 decision to return 20 Uighurs to the PRC. The U.S. government protested the decision, on the grounds that the Uighurs were seeking asylum and had fled China following an outbreak of deadly rioting in Urumqi in July. The PRC MPS, however, asserted that it had evidence that three of the suspects had engaged in terrorist activities and attempted to make contact with ETIM.

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333 “Commentary: Thailand’s Repatriation of Illegal Immigrants Just a Legal Issue.”
334 Ibid.
Beijing has also called on Washington to return the 22 Uighurs who were captured during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and who were detained at Guantanamo Bay. At one point in 2006, Chinese Uighurs were the fourth largest group held in detention, behind citizens of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

The U.S. government has consistently refused to repatriate the Uighurs to the PRC due to fears that they will be persecuted upon returning to China. This has created some friction in Sino-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation, a topic that will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. As of 2015, all 22 of the Uighurs held in Guantanamo have now been resettled in seven different countries and territories—Albania, Bermuda, El Salvador, Palau, Slovakia, Switzerland, and the United States.

Enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of China’s security services

As documented earlier in this report, Beijing’s 2001 reassessment of its vulnerabilities to terrorist threats forced China’s security officials to confront the fact that China’s internal security services were not adequately equipped to respond to an act of terror. Prior to 2001, the country had no police forces dedicated to combating terrorism, no laws governing how to deal with it, and no organization dedicated to coordinating the efforts of the different institutions charged with preventing and responding to terrorist incidents. Moreover, given the largely domestic sources of its perceived vulnerabilities to terrorism, the PRC had engaged in only minimal international cooperation in the field of counterterrorism prior to 2001.

As a result, China has also increased the extent of its international law enforcement cooperation on counterterrorism with nations along its periphery, as well as with Western countries. This section focuses on three aspects of this cooperation:

- Sharing information on terrorist threats
- Training Chinese security personnel
- Conducting bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism exercises.


Sharing information on terrorist threats

Information sharing on terrorist threats appears to be a major priority for Beijing, given the extent to which the issue is raised by PRC officials. Speaking to the United Nations Security Council in 2014, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for greater information sharing among United Nations member states in order to combat the latest developments in terrorism.\textsuperscript{340}

In November 2014, MPS Vice Minister Meng Hongwei told a ministerial meeting of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in Monaco that Beijing is willing to “exchange counterterrorism intelligence” with other nations. He added that China’s goals in this regard were to strengthen international cooperation against “violent terrorism” from ETIM and others, crack down on cyberterrorism, and cut off the flow of personnel and financial resources to terrorists.\textsuperscript{341}

Since 2001, China has signed numerous agreements on law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing with dozens of countries.\textsuperscript{342} Given the sensitivity of the subject matter, however, there is little public information available as to how such agreements work in practice.

Training Chinese security personnel

Chinese security services have also looked to other nations to help with counterterrorism training. PRC security officials have been sent abroad to receive counterterrorism training on a number of occasions. The PAP, for instance, has sent delegations to more than 30 countries to participate in counterterrorism exchanges, including Germany, France, Spain, Israel, Australia, Russia, and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{343}

PAP personnel have also attended counterterrorism courses or received related training in a variety of locations, including Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, France, Israel, and Hungary.\textsuperscript{344} According to one of China’s leading counterterrorism experts, Beijing has found such training to be fruitful. Li Wei, a prominent counterterrorism expert at CICIR, reportedly told Hong Kong’s \textit{South China Morning Post} (Hong Kong) that “China has learned a lot of counterterrorism training skills from Western


\textsuperscript{342} U.S. Department of State, \textit{Country Reports on Terrorism} 2014.


\textsuperscript{344} Ibid.
countries,” and that such training was essential in order to professionalize Chinese security services and enable them to cope with potential terrorist threats.345

One subject that Chinese law enforcement agencies have been particularly eager to learn about is the need to provide security for large international events such as the 2007 FIFA Women's World Cup, the 2008 Summer Olympics, and the 2010 World Expo, all of which were hosted by China. Chinese security officials actively sought assistance from outside consultants to help with security preparations. In the words of Beijing Public Security Bureau Director Ma Zhenchuan, Beijing sought “extensive international cooperation on Olympic security.”346

Beijing sent delegations to several cities that had hosted the Olympics or other major athletic competitions. In 2003, for example, the Beijing City Public Security Bureau sent more than 100 officers to the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Germany for training in international police cooperation and event security.347 Chinese police also observed their German counterparts providing security for the 2006 FIFA World Cup.348

The purpose of such visits was reportedly to learn from past efforts to secure the Olympics and to study experiences in areas such as explosives detection, transportation security, and secure access to the competition venues. Interpol also assisted PRC security services in the run-up to the Games by dispatching an Interpol task force to Beijing to train PRC personnel in event security and crisis management.349

Conducting bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism exercises

PRC security forces have been conducting counterterrorism exercises with some neighboring countries since 2002. The first such exercise was between the PLA and


348 Ibid.

the Kyrgyz military, described by China's official Xinhua News Agency as the “first time for the PLA to hold a military maneuver with a foreign army.”

China's most frequent partner in these combined exercises has been Russia, which has participated in 11 of the 35 exercises conducted by Chinese security services between 2002 and 2014. PLA and PAP units have also conducted counterterrorism exercises with military and police units from Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. These exercises are often staged under the auspices of the SCO.

PLA and PAP units have also exercised with their ASEAN counterparts, particularly Thailand and Indonesia. The Chinese and Thai armed forces have carried out six counterterrorism exercises since 2007. China and Indonesia have also begun conducting an annual counterterrorism drill (named “Sharp Knife”) since 2011. Singapore has also conducted some small-scale counterterrorism drills with the PRC—albeit less frequently, and none since 2010.

Other nations that have participated in counterterrorism training with the Chinese armed forces include Pakistan, India, Colombia, and Jordan. Table 2 lists the Chinese counterterrorism exercises conducted with foreign militaries and security services since 2002.

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352 Ibid.
Table 2. PRC Counterterrorism Exercises with Other Nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Bilateral/Multilateral</th>
<th>Other Nations</th>
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<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Tian Shan</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>Multilateral</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Hand-in-Hand</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Hand-in-Hand</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Country-Gate Sharp Sword</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Peace Mission</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Blue Strike</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>Friendship</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
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<td>Frontier Defense Joint Determination</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Falcon</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
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</table>
Protecting the security of its growing expatriate population

As China’s global economic footprint expands, Beijing is finding that it now has national interests in parts of the world where it once paid scant attention. According to the Ministry of Commerce, the number of Chinese workers employed abroad has risen from 57,000 in 1990, to 425,000 in 2000, to nearly 800,000 in 2009.353 In 2013 alone, nearly 100 million Chinese nationals traveled abroad, according to figures from the PRC National Tourism Administration.354

The influx of Chinese workers to parts of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America has meant that Beijing now finds itself providing a wide array of consular services, not least of which is the need to ensure the security of its citizens overseas. Many parts of the world where China does business are rife with insecurity and instability, and Chinese nationals working abroad have been victims of terrorist attacks. Vice Foreign Minister Wu Hongbo explicitly cited terrorism, along with ethnic conflict and natural disasters, as the main threats to Chinese nationals abroad.355 Jin Canrong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, observed that as Beijing’s overseas interests expand, more and more Chinese expatriates are increasingly coming under the threat of terrorist attack.356 Scholar Andrew Small reports that “Pakistan has developed a reputation as the most dangerous country to be an overseas Chinese” owing to the large number of kidnappings and killings there.357 Prominent incidents in other countries include:

- **Afghanistan:** Eleven Chinese road construction workers were murdered by members of the Taliban in June 2004 as they slept in their tents.358 Repeated terrorist attacks on a Chinese copper mine project in Aynak—Beijing’s largest

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356 Zhang Yunbi, “China, U.S. Hold Talks on Terror Fight.”


investment project in the country—prompted the state-run China Metallurgical Group Corporation to remove its workers from the site.\textsuperscript{359}

- **Ethiopia:** Nine Chinese oil workers were killed in April 2007, when militants associated with the Ogaden National Liberation Front carried out a raid on a PRC oil rig.\textsuperscript{360} The PRC's official English-language newspaper *China Daily* described the attack as a “reminder” to the PRC government that the “protection and safety of overseas Chinese is a constant concern.”\textsuperscript{361}

- **Nigeria:** Five Chinese telecommunications workers were kidnapped in January 2007 by insurgents suspected of links to the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta.\textsuperscript{362}

- **Somalia:** A July 2015 suicide bomb attack on the hotel housing the PRC Embassy to Mogadishu killed one and injured four embassy staff.\textsuperscript{363}

- **Sudan:** Nine Chinese employees of the state-run China National Petroleum Corporation were kidnapped in October 2008. Five were ultimately killed in a failed rescue attempt.\textsuperscript{364}

These and other similar attacks in other parts of the world have prompted the Chinese government to focus on improving security for its nationals overseas. In 2007, for instance, the PRC MFA set up a consular protection center to better protect its citizens traveling or living abroad. The ministry also disseminates security information online and via text messaging to Chinese nationals upon their arrival in a foreign country.\textsuperscript{365}

As part of this effort, Beijing has encouraged countries that host large numbers of Chinese workers to do more to ensure their safety. One country that Beijing has


\textsuperscript{361} “Protect Our Compatriots,” *China Daily*, April 26, 2007.


\textsuperscript{363} Zhang Yunbi, “China, U.S. Hold Talks on Terror Fight.”


\textsuperscript{365} Li Xiang, “Chinese To Get Better Protection Overseas.”
focused on is Pakistan, which hosts a large population of Chinese expatriate workers, some of whom have been the victims of terrorist attacks in the country. In 2011, a PRC mining company cancelled a $19 billion deal in southern Pakistan, citing security concerns.366

During a 2009 meeting with visiting Pakistani interior minister Rehman Malik in Beijing, China’s top internal security official at the time, Zhou Yongkang, called on Islamabad to do more to combat terrorism and “ensure the safety of Chinese citizens in Pakistan.”367

PRC Ambassador Sun Weidong reportedly told Pakistan’s Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar that Chinese workers constructing a port in Gwadar were “not satisfied” with their security arrangements. Sun called on Islamabad to take “solid steps” to ensure the safety of Chinese workers.368

Pakistan appears to be complying with these requests. In April 2015, the Pakistan Army created a special security division to protect Chinese nationals working in the country. Pakistani media reported that this step was taken in the wake of a meeting between PRC president Xi Jinping and Pakistani president Mamnoon Hussain, in which Xi reportedly raised the issue of security for Chinese citizens working in the country.369

**Counterterrorism cooperation and Beijing’s principle of “non-interference”**

One factor that has limited the extent of China’s counterterrorism cooperation with other nations is Beijing’s long-standing principle of noninterference in the affairs of other sovereign nations. Beijing’s preference is for the UN Security Council to play the lead role in the global effort to combat terrorism. Addressing the UN in 2014, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi described UN leadership as the “only way to maintain


unity, achieve effective coordination, and take concerted actions” against terrorist threats.\footnote{“FM Calls for UN’s Leading Role in Global War on Terrorism,” Xinhua, September 25, 2014, http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2014/09/25/content_281474989287531.htm.}

Yet, the new PRC Counterterrorism Law (December 2015) suggests that Beijing is considering a more expeditionary approach to countering terrorist threats in the future. Article 71 of the law provides an explicit legal basis for Chinese public security and state security forces to engage in counterterrorism operations overseas, with permission of the host governments and after reporting to the State Council. Article 71 also states that “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Chinese People’s Armed Police forces may assign people to leave the country on counter-terrorism missions as approved by the Central Military Commission.” It is noteworthy that the portion of Article 71 which addresses PLA and PAP missions abroad does not include a specific clause about first obtaining the agreement of the other countries involved.\footnote{PRC Counterterrorism Law, December 27, 2015.} Earlier press reporting on the draft law indicated that the draft stipulated that PLA and PAP counterterrorism operations abroad would require the consent of the host country.\footnote{Andrea Chen, “New Law May Authorise Chinese Military to Fight Terrorists Abroad,” \textit{South China Morning Post} (Hong Kong), November 25, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1647945/pla-could-be-used-fight-terror-abroad.} Analyst Li Wei of CICIR, writing in May 2015 about an earlier draft, contended that the draft law was designed to conform to Xi Jinping’s new approach to national security to include enhanced security cooperation with other countries.\footnote{Verna Yu, “China Offers First Glimpse of Sweeping National Security Law,” \textit{South China Morning Post} (Hong Kong), May 7, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1788339/release-chinas-draft-security-law-sparks-fears-further.}

More broadly, there is some evidence to suggest that the noninterference policy is starting to be questioned in both academic and policy circles, particularly as it relates to counterterrorism. Wang Junsheng, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, contends that there is presently a “heated debate” as to whether Beijing’s principle of nonintervention is outdated.\footnote{Teddy Ng, “Getting Into the Game,” \textit{South China Morning Post} (Hong Kong), March 7, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/article/994663/getting-game.} Chinese scholars have acknowledged that Beijing has felt pressure to be more engaged in global affairs and to play a more active role in conflict resolution. Jin Canrong, deputy dean of the School of International Studies at the Renmin University of China, noted that many of China’s neighbors have called on Beijing to help with counterterrorism training and fighting the IS. He further contended that China could be more proactive in the future in the face of “escalating domestic terrorism threats, which have been proven to be connected to training and other terror activities

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\footnote{PRC Counterterrorism Law, December 27, 2015.}
\footnote{Teddy Ng, “Getting Into the Game,” \textit{South China Morning Post} (Hong Kong), March 7, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/article/994663/getting-game.}
abroad." Moreover, given the fact that Chinese nationals abroad have been the victims of multiple terrorist attacks, Beijing is aware that the Chinese populace may demand a more active posture from their government in dealing with future attacks.

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375 Chen, "New Law May Authorise Chinese Military to Fight Terrorists Abroad."
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Chapter 6: U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation

Overview of this chapter

The chapter analyzes the opportunities and the challenges that the United States and China face as they consider cooperation issues related to counterterrorism.

It begins by providing a general overview of the current state of cooperation.

It then discusses areas where converging interest have the potential to create opportunities for increased counterterrorism cooperation. Topics discussed include Afghanistan, IS, and growing numbers of Chinese citizens abroad.

The chapter concludes by discussing factors that will serve to limit cooperation, such as differences in national priorities, legal systems, and political values.

Current state of cooperation

Shifting assessments and unmet potential

In the aftermath of the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center in 2001, the U.S. sought to build the political will and operational skills of foreign governments in order to combat terror. In many ways, capacity building was viewed as an end in itself.

For this reason, early U.S. State Department reports on international counterterrorism cooperation spoke highly of China’s efforts. For example, in one of the State Department’s first post-9/11 reports on global terrorism, U.S.-China terrorism cooperation was summed as follows, “China, which also has been a victim of terrorism, provided valuable diplomatic support to our efforts against terrorism, both at the United Nations and in the South and Central Asian regions, including financial and material support for the Afghan Interim Authority. Beijing has agreed
to all of our requests for assistance, and we have established a counterterrorism dialogue at both senior and operational levels.”376

This early goodwill, however has not always translated into meaningful cooperation. The current state of U.S. and Chinese cooperation on counterterrorism is characterized by unmet potential. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. and China have made great progress in putting into place a framework of structures, policies, and relationships to allow for greater cooperation in addressing terrorist threats. However, these achievements have not led to the tangible benefits it was intended to provide. Over time, this shifting assessment of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation can be clearly seen through a close read of U.S. State Department country reports on terrorism. Table 3 below contains summary statements from each report from 2001 through 2014.

376 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, vi, 16.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>U.S. Dept of State Report</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>China…provided valuable diplomatic support to our efforts against terrorism, both at the United Nations and in the South and Central Asian regions, including financial and material support for the Afghan Interim Authority. Beijing has agreed to all our requests for assistance, and we have established a counterterrorism dialogue at both senior and operational levels.</td>
<td>Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, p. 16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>…China continued to cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism. China regularly denounced terrorism, both in public statements and in international fora, and China regularly participated in UN Security Council discussions on terrorism and served as a permanent member of the UN Counterterrorism Committee.</td>
<td>Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>China continues to take a clear stand against international terrorism and is broadly supportive of the global war on terror. Beijing displays a general willingness to cooperate with international terrorism investigations and continues to assert that terrorists—primarily based in Xinjiang Province—operate on Chinese territory.</td>
<td>Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, p. 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>China continues to take a clear stand against international terrorism and is broadly supportive of the global war on terror. China holds regular counterterrorism consultations with the United States, and is supportive of international efforts to block and freeze terrorist assets. [China] treats designations of terrorists under US Executive Order 13224 on an equal basis with those imposed by the United Nations UNSC R 1267 Sanctions Committee.</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, p. 36.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>China supported several operational and logistical aspects of the global war on terror. Beijing also played an instrumental role in getting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to issue a joint statement in 2005 on increasing regional cooperation to fight terrorism. China increased its efforts to build its domestic counterterrorism capabilities with a focus on improving security for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Beijing continued to express concern that terrorists operate on Chinese territory, and has said that some members of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang Province pose a threat to China’s domestic stability.</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, p. 60.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>China supported several operational and logistical aspects of the War on Terror. …China increased its efforts to build its domestic counterterrorism capabilities with a focus on improving security for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Beijing continued to express concern that terrorists operate on Chinese territory and has asserted that some members of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang Province pose a threat to China’s domestic stability.</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, p. 28.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>China increased its efforts to build its domestic counterterrorism capabilities to improve security for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In 2007, Beijing expressed concern that terrorists operated on Chinese territory and asserted that some members of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang Province posed a threat to…domestic stability.</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, p. 28.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>China increased counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and other nations both leading up to and following the August Olympic Games in Beijing.</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, p. 37.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>China continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and other nations throughout the year.</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, p. 40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>China does not always distinguish between legitimate political dissent and the advocacy of violence to overthrow the government, and has used counterterrorism as a pretext to suppress Uighurs…</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, p. 33.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>China’s cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism issues was marginal with little reciprocity in information exchanges…China does not always distinguish between legitimate political dissent and the advocacy of violence to overthrow the government, and it has used counterterrorism as a pretext to suppress Uighurs…. China’s government characterized Uighur discontent, peaceful political activism, and some forms of religious observance as terrorist activity.</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, p. 37.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>China’s cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism issues remained marginal with little reciprocity in information exchanges. China continued to expand cooperation with countries in the region and conducted joint counterterrorism training exercises with Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Thailand…Human rights organizations continued to maintain that China used counterterrorism as a pretext to suppress Uighurs…</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, p. 40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>China’s cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism issues remained marginal, with little reciprocity in information exchanges…China has criticized the U.S. response to acts of terrorism, arguing that U.S. expressions of concern over the treatment of China’s ethnic minorities and deficiencies in rule of law represent a “double standard” on terrorism. China frequently refers to Uighur activists abroad…as complicit in supporting “terrorist” activity, but it has not provided credible evidence to support those claims.</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, p. 55.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>China’s attention to counterterrorism is increasing, both domestically and abroad. China experienced several terrorist and other violent incidents in 2014…Counterterrorism cooperation activities between the United States and China remained limited, though the two countries continued to discuss ways to enhance cooperation. These included efforts aimed at stemming the transnational flow of foreign terrorist fighters, countering terrorist funding networks, increasing information sharing on terrorist threats, and assisting…Iraq in its rebuilding efforts.</td>
<td>Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, p. 57.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation efforts

China’s international counterterrorism efforts can be divided into five broad categories:

- Regional and international participation
- Law enforcement
- Container and port security
- Countering terrorist finances
- Exercises and support to military operations.

Regional and international cooperation

China has been an active participant in regional and international efforts to address terrorist concerns. As mentioned in the previous chapter, China is a permanent member of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee and has signed, ratified, or acceded to many of the protocols and international conventions protocols on terrorism. China’s participation in international efforts to counter terrorism is frequently commented upon in U.S. State Department reports. Regional forums where Chinese officials have signed statements with counter terrorism components include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus 3, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

One challenge to expanding China’s cooperation in international arena, however, has been the issue of Taiwan. China has sought to limit Taiwan's international space at the expense of advancing counterterrorism cooperation. Two examples that have been cited in U.S. State Department reports are:

- China has raised objections about Taiwan's participation in APEC civilian airport inspections. According to the State Department report, “China’s

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objections to Taiwan’s participation have impeded broader cooperation on APEC counterterrorism and nonproliferation initiatives.378

- On the issue of international cooperation to counter-terrorist finance, China has refused to join the Egmont Group, an umbrella body coordinating the activities of over 100 financial intelligence units (FIUs) worldwide, because the group includes an FIU from Taiwan. U.S. Department of State reports consistently assess that international coordination to counter terrorist finance operations would be enhanced if China were to join this body.379

**Law enforcement**

**Dialogue and diplomacy**

In the area of counterterrorism and law enforcement, much has been done to build capacity and institutionalize dialogue between Washington and Beijing. Even prior to September 11, the U.S. and China had a Joint Liaison Law Enforcement Cooperation aimed at increasing policy dialogue and improving cooperation writ large between U.S. and Chinese law enforcement agencies.380 In the wake of 9/11, the government of China agreed to create a U.S.-China counterterrorism working group and approved establishment of an U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) legal attaché in Beijing.381 This attaché position was given permanent status in 2004.382 In 2006, China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to allow U.S. federal air marshals (FAMs) to fly to China, and Chinese air marshals to fly into the United States. Equally important, in 2006 the U.S. Coast Guard Liaison Office was established in Beijing as a focal point for United States–China exchanges on port security.383 Throughout the 2000s, there are multiple examples of training sessions and professional exchanges between U.S. and Chinese law enforcement. This was especially true in the run-up to the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing.384

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In November 2014, President Obama and President Xi announced that U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson’s anticipated visit to China in 2015 would offer the two countries additional proposals for cooperation. During Johnson’s April 2015 visit, China’s Xinhua News Agency reported that Secretary Johnson and Politburo member Meng Jianzhu agreed to “enhance law-enforcement and security cooperation between the two countries.” The two countries also agreed to expand important areas of law enforcement cooperation, which included international flows of IED precursors and dual-use equipment, and the repatriation of fugitives.

**Investigations and information sharing**

It is difficult to evaluate the degree to which the U.S. and China have been able to move from dialogue and exchange of expertise to joint investigations and information exchange. Based on unclassified U.S. State Department reports, it appears that enthusiasm for joint investigation has diminished over time. In 2003, the country report stated, “China displays a general willingness to cooperate with international terrorism investigations.” During this year, China reportedly contributed to an investigation of the “Portland Seven,” a group of American citizens from the Portland area who were arrested for attempting to join Al Qaeda. In 2004, the assessment had shifted slightly: “Although U.S. authorities have sought more timely Chinese responses to terrorist investigation requests, substantive intelligence has been exchanged in some cases.”

This general sense of cooperation appears largely absent from more recent comments on law enforcement cooperation. In 2012, the State Department reported that, “U.S. law enforcement agencies sought assistance from Chinese counterparts on several cases affecting U.S. citizens, but the Chinese government generally did not respond to those requests.” By 2013, this assessment had changed to: “China’s cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism issues remained marginal, with little reciprocity in information exchanges…. Chinese law enforcement agencies remained reluctant to conduct joint investigations with U.S. law enforcement agencies.”

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387 White House, “Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Visit to China.”


agencies or provide assistance in cases involving terrorist suspects.” And, in 2014, the State Department report commented, “China continued to stress the importance of counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, but Chinese law enforcement agencies generally remained reluctant to conduct joint investigations or share specific threat information with U.S. law enforcement partners…. Overall, China’s counterterrorism cooperation with the United States remained limited.”

**IED-related training**

Cooperation over stopping or controlling the flows of precursor chemicals and dual-use technology employed in IEDs has been a prominent topic in U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation in the past year. During the 2015 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, U.S. officials invited Chinese government officials and experts from Chinese industry to meet with U.S. officials and confer on “best practices” for how to decrease the international flows of dual-use bomb components and chemical precursors that terrorists use to create IEDs. In January 2015, the FBI and China’s MPS conducted IED-related training at the MPS’s top university, the Chinese People’s Public Security University in the Muxidi section of Beijing. At the August 4, 2015 U.S.-China Counterterrorism Dialogue, the two countries “committed to meet soon” to further discuss IED-related best practices. The dialogue continued in the “Counter-IED Workshop,” which was held in Washington, DC on September 14. A follow-on workshop in China is planned.

**Repatriation of fugitives**

Through cooperation between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the MPS, the United States and China report having enhanced their coordination and cooperation on the repatriating of Chinese fugitives and illegal immigrants through a system of charter flights. In April 2015, the United States and China reportedly agreed to “a more streamlined process to repatriate Chinese nationals with final orders of removal.” Issues regarding protection of legal rights were discussed as part of the agreement as well, and the DHS statement noted that in the event these cases involved “applications for protection” in the United States by the individuals

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394 Interviews.


396 “Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Visit to China.”
concerned, these applications would “continue to be handled in accordance with U.S. law and American values.”

Chinese calls for increased cooperation on terrorism and the Internet

Chinese experts indicate that one area in which their government hopes to expand cooperation with the United States is in combating the use of the internet and social media to propagate information and promote activities that contribute to terrorism, separatism, and extremism. For China, one key element of this proposal is persuading or mandating internet providers and technology companies to exercise “self-restraint” on content that China sees as threatening, and to keep their software and equipment accessible or “controllable.”

In November 2014, Yang Shaowen, deputy director of the MPS's International Cooperation Office, complimented U.S. judicial authorities for “adopting an active attitude to support our requests” and assisting in removing “many” internet files of concern to China “from the websites based in the U.S.” Yang noted that U.S. and Chinese authorities had held multiple rounds of talks on investigating websites and getting rid of illegal “violent and terrorist” video and audio content. China reports that this content incites terrorists and extremists to commit violent acts at home, or to leave China to join extremist groups in Iraq and Syria.

Container and port security

China has been a longtime member of the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a U.S. Department of Homeland Security program that is designed to mitigate terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland and to maritime trade in general through inspection of container cargo at major ports around the world. The CSI was established in 2002 and China became a member in 2003.

China is also a party to the Megaports Initiative, a U.S. Department of Energy program designed to detect radiological materials on materials transported around the globe. China has been party to this initiative since 2005. In 2006, China allowed

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398 Interviews.

399 Liu Kun and Zhang Yan, “China, U.S. Targeting Terror Online.”

400 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 17.

401 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 60.
the installation of equipment at its ports to detect hidden shipments of nuclear and other radioactive materials and selected the Yangshang Deepwater port as the site for its pilot program.402

Countering terrorist financing

U.S. efforts to encourage China to join in international efforts to stem the flow of terrorist financing has had mixed success.

From one perspective, Beijing has been an enthusiastic partner in countering terrorism financing. Beijing has worked to develop an institutional and legal infrastructure to address the challenges of terrorist financing.

Since 2002, Beijing has treated individuals and entities designated under U.S. Executive Order 13224 on the same basis as it treats individuals and entities identified under UN Security Council Resolution 1267 Sanctions Committee, whose assets UN member states are required to freeze pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.403

In 2004, the People's Bank of China established a financial intelligence unit and began working with U.S. counterparts to build capacity and exchange expertise.404 China then passed the Anti-Money Laundering Law in 2006, broadening the scope of existing anti-money laundering regulations to hold a greater range of financial institutions liable and to expand the powers of the People's Bank of China (PBOC).405 This law clearly defined the roles of several PRC stakeholders. Specifically, it established that the PBOC is the lead agency for all anti-money laundering activities in China, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Anti-Money Laundering Division and Anti-Terrorism Bureau is responsible for criminal investigations, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is the primary agency for countering illicit foreign exchange transactions. Over the years, these institutions have put in place administrative regulations that have improved banks' abilities to track transactions and freeze assets.406

In the realm of broader international cooperation, China has ratified the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. China has also joined some regional and international anti-money laundering groups such

402 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, 32.
as the Eurasia Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, the Asia-Pacific
Group on Money Laundering (APG), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 407

Challenges and missed opportunities

On the other hand, not all comments about Beijing’s efforts to combat terrorist
financing have been positive.

The establishment of the People’s Bank of China’s Financial Intelligence Unit has
been a welcome development. However, State Department reports indicate that the
organization has been hesitant to share information with foreign counterpart
organizations. 408

Changes to China’s domestic laws have increased China’s capacity to track
suspicious transitions. However, it has also been noted that anti-money laundering
efforts are hampered by the prevalence of counterfeit identity documents and cash
transactions conducted by underground banks as well as turf battles between PRC
financial and law enforcement institutions. 409

Finally, as with law enforcement issues more generally, Beijing has occasionally
allowed the Taiwan issue to hamper cooperation on issues of global concern. China’s
refusal to join the Egmont Group because it includes an FIU from Taiwan is an
obstacle to increased cooperation, according to State Department reports. 410

Exercises and support to military operations

There is little information available in the public domain that discusses China’s
support to military components of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. State Department
reports have occasionally contained a statement that China has supported
operational and logistical aspects of the Global War on Terror, but no details have
been provided. 411

China has participated in many counterterrorism exercises with countries in the
region—both in regional forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and

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410 U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism* 2005, 67; U.S. Department of State,
*Country Reports on Terrorism* 2006, 33; U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism*
Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism* 2009, 40 - 41.
411 U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism* 2005, 60; U.S. Department of State,
*Country Reports on Terrorism* 2006, 28.
through bilateral and multilateral engagements. Table 3 in the previous chapter discusses this in more detail.

**Expanding opportunities for counterterrorism cooperation**

**Evolving security interests**

China's expanding national security interests and its evolving perceptions about global terrorism threats appear to be creating some potential opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation. In particular, the threat faced by China’s growing numbers of expatriate citizens is likely to create some converging areas of interest with the United States.

China’s swelling numbers of expatriate citizens—now believed to number several million—present Beijing with a new and potentially formidable terrorism challenge. An analysis of data on China’s investment patterns indicates that large percentages of these expatriate citizens now work in countries that suffer major challenges from poor governance, instability, terrorism, and violent extremism in the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America.412

For policymakers, promising third-country venues to explore U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation may include regions where an established American community has recently been joined by a growing Chinese expatriate community, and where the local security situation offers no obvious link to areas of disagreement on U.S.-China counterterrorism issues. The recent attacks in Somalia and Mali suggest Africa may be one such venue for cooperation.

**Islamic State and flows of foreign terrorist fighters**

At the November 2014 Xi-Obama summit, the two presidents discussed the Islamic State, the flow of transnational fighters to the Middle East and Iraq, and agreed to strengthen cooperation toward four goals:413

- Stem the transnational flow of foreign terrorist fighters

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412 For data on expatriate workers and the political character of the countries they live in, see Tanner and Mackenzie, *China's Emerging National Security Interests and Their Impact on the People's Liberation Army.*

413 “Fact Sheet: President Obama's Visit to China.”
• Crack down on funding networks for terrorists
• Increase information exchange regarding terrorist threats
• Assist the Iraqi government’s rebuilding efforts.

The documents from the September 2015 Xi-Obama summit do not indicate that the Islamic State, Syria, and Iraq received the same attention from the two presidents this year that they did in the previous year. But, incremental progress was made. 414

• In April 2015, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson and Minister of Public Security Guo Shengkun committed to sharing information on foreign terrorist fighters.415

• The June 2015 Strategic and Economic Dialogue, in turn, decided that the United States and China should hold a second round of their Counterterrorism Dialogue in August of that year, which they did. Strengthening information exchanges on terrorism, attacking terrorists’ financial networks, and limiting international streams of terrorist fighters were on the agenda.416

• The September 2015 summit announced that the financial intelligence units (FIUs) of both countries would sign a memorandum on cooperation regarding exchange of information on money laundering and terrorist financing.417

Moreover, the November 2015 terrorist attack on Paris sparked strong rhetorical expressions of support from Chinese leaders for the international community to form a “united front” and “joint forces” to combat terrorism.418 But it is unclear whether or how China might expand its support for efforts to defeat the Islamic State and stabilize Syria and Iraq.419

416 U.S. Department of State, “Media Note: U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue, Outcomes of the Strategic Track.”
417 “Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States.”; “Full Text: Outcome list of President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United States.”
419 As noted in chapter one, numerous press reports indicate that many participants on social media in China expressed outrage at the slaying of a Chinese citizen by IS, but also strong reservations about China using force against IS lest China itself become a major target. It is unclear whether or not such views are reflected in China’s policy elite.
Afghanistan

In 2014, President Obama and President Xi committed to work toward a “shared vision” for Afghanistan, which they described as a “democratic, sovereign, unified, and secure” nation that could no longer be used as a terrorist safe haven. At the 2015 Strategic and Economic Dialogue, U.S. and Chinese officials reaffirmed the need to strengthen their communication and coordination to promote peaceful reconstruction and economic development in Afghanistan. U.S. officials also publicly expressed appreciation for China’s engagement. Specific steps toward these goals in Afghanistan included:

- Convening a trilateral dialogue between the United States, China, and Afghanistan
- Working together to support Afghanistan’s national unity government, security forces, and economic development
- Supporting the Afghan process of peace and reconciliation
- Helping build Afghanistan’s government capacity and foster its regional integration.

As the United States considers China’s role in Afghanistan and its implications for U.S. interests, an important question will be China’s willingness to deeply support and help broker reconciliation and rebuilding. The United States will have to monitor how deeply China is committed to rebuilding Afghanistan and working with the new government and the Taliban, and determine whether China’s interests are aimed at more limited objectives. More limited objectives may include developing sufficiently good relations with both the government and the Taliban so that, regardless of which side gains power, China can continue to rely on either one to help maintain stability, fight the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terror groups, and to assist China by securing repatriation of Uighurs in Afghanistan.

420 “Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Visit to China.”
421 Ibid.
Chinese preferences for increased cooperation on global terrorism

Chinese security experts have pointed to several areas in which they believe that their government would like to see additional cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism. Most of these proposals echo recommendations for enhanced global counterterrorism cooperation that have been made by senior Chinese diplomats at the UN during the past two years. The impact of China's emerging security interests and its expanding global presence is evident in these Chinese specialists' desire for better knowledge of global terrorism. Several of the proposals reflect China's focus on dealing with stability problems in its Uighur regions. Consequently, the proposals range from relatively non-controversial and concrete, to more politicized issues on which American and Chinese officials have tended to disagree.

**Increased analytic exchanges**

As China's global presence grows, some Chinese security experts want to expand China's cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism analysts—both government and private sectors—in order to broaden China's command of basic theory about terrorism, global terrorism trends, and major terrorist groups outside of China and East Asia. The goal of such exchanges would be to move beyond the study of terrorist trends within their own country and focus on strengthening their understanding of international terrorism law and criminal procedure in countries such as the United States, Germany, and Turkey. A stronger understanding of global terrorism trends and terrorism-related law would assist China in confronting the new terrorism challenges it is facing as rising numbers of its citizens live and work in unstable countries.

**Increased information sharing**

Chinese security analysts indicate that China would also like the United States and other countries (including Germany and Turkey) to share more information and

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423 Wang Yi, "Working Together to Address the New Threat of Terrorism."; Li Yongsheng, "Measures to Eradicate International Terrorism," (70th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, October 15, 2015), http://www.china-un.org/eng/czthd/t1306315.htm. Wang and Li portrayed the world as being in a terrorist revival of which recent trends in China are a part. Among the proposals they emphasized were strengthening information gathering and sharing, fighting terrorism on the internet and social media, blocking the international channels for movement of terrorists and their financing, and promoting deradicalization while protecting “normal” religious activities.

424 Interviews.

425 Interviews.
intelligence with China, especially regarding Chinese nationals traveling overseas. They particularly wanted information on people who might be joining extremist, terrorist, or separatist groups, especially Islamic State or Al Qaeda.

**Factors shaping future cooperation**

**Legal systems, values, and evolving national interests**

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has remained complex, offering both challenges and opportunities for cooperation. Looking back to the early to mid-2000s, a former Bush administration official described this complexity, characterizing China as “hardly a leading player in the Global War on Terror,” but also saying that “the PRC did not stand in the way of U.S.-led efforts in its backyard of South and Central Asia.” The complexity was evident again during the September 2015 summit between President Obama and President Xi Jinping. On the eve of the summit, the U.S. raised the issue of China’s policies toward ethnic and religious minorities as a potential cause of the tensions in Chinese society. During the summit, the two sides agreed to continue developing their counterterrorism dialogues and building on the type of technical counterterrorism cooperation they have often pursued since 2001, including sharing information about transiting extremists and terrorist financial networks, and controlling the flows of precursors to improvised explosive devices (IED).

U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been, and is likely to remain, affected by the interplay of two major factors noted above: the divergences in the U.S. and China’s legal systems and their ideological values; and the two countries’ evolving national security interests. Two aspects of U.S. and China’s security interests are especially important regarding prospects for counterterrorism cooperation:

- The manner in which the highly interconnected economies of the United States and China create and define many potential areas of technical cooperation.

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428 “Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States.”; Christensen, *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power*. 

117
• The U.S. and Chinese perceptions of the evolving global and domestic terrorist threats which each one faces. Some of these perceptions may create new opportunities for cooperation in counterterrorism.

These two factors have interacted in complex ways that continue to shape and structure the patterns of counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and China. As a result, the two countries have been able to maintain multiple patterns of cooperation, operating at the same time on different issues—some of these patterns show promise, while others reveal tension:

• Where cooperative endeavors relate to China’s counterterrorism policies and reported terrorism in Chinese society, and some other issues, the United States and China have significant areas of disagreement.

• On a wide array of technical, economic, trade, and other issues, the two countries have been able to engage in extensive, largely unpoliticized cooperation.

• The U.S. and especially China’s evolving national security interests and perceptions of the terrorism threat are creating new opportunities for strategic cooperation—though it remains to be seen how China’s evolving interests will shape its pursuit of these opportunities.

• Finally, on some technical and strategic issues, the United States and China confront a mixture of cooperation and disagreement. Naturally, observers may well disagree over how best to characterize the pattern of counterterrorism cooperation on a particular topic.

This chapter will now address the areas of disagreement, and the areas of cooperation, in the U.S.-China counterterrorism relationship.

Areas of disagreement

As discussed earlier in this chapter, over the past several years, U.S. government counterterrorism officials have noted the challenges and limitations in U.S.-China cooperation on counterterror, especially on issues related to China’s counterterrorism policies, and bilateral law enforcement cooperation. The State Department’s 2013 and 2014 Country Reports on Terrorism (its most recent), for example, described China's cooperation with the United States as “limited” and “marginal ...with little reciprocity on information exchange.”429 The 2013 report also expressed disappointment that Chinese law enforcement authorities were “reluctant to conduct joint investigations with U.S. law enforcement or provide assistance in

cases involving suspected terrorists. These assessments were not entirely negative, and did note continued Chinese efforts to strengthen terrorist finance legislation. U.S. Counterterrorism Coordinator Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow, speaking in January 2015, evaluated different categories of U.S. partners in counterterrorism work, and described Russia and China as belonging to one of the less positive categories “where cooperation has been inconsistent in the past, but where there is, I believe, potential for further development of our CT dialogue.”

- Many of the areas of U.S.-Chinese disagreement about terrorism are rooted in divergences in the two countries’ legal systems and ideological values:
  - The United States and China hold very different views on the nature and causes of terrorism and social violence in China.
  - U.S. concerns regarding human rights and rule of law in China, legal protection for U.S. citizens and businesses in China, and legal implications of cooperation with China, have led to criticisms of certain aspects of China’s counterterrorism polices.

- China often requests assistance on issues related to counterterrorism cooperation that the United States judges to be inappropriate or even unconstitutional.

- The Chinese call for stronger U.S. acceptance of China’s views regarding terrorism, and some PRC security specialists have voiced suspicions that U.S. terrorism policies may be motivated in part by opposition to CCP rule or China's rising power.

Differences between China and the United States’ legal systems and ideological values have caused some U.S. officials to approach counterterrorism cooperation with China with caution. In speeches and published reports, U.S. officials have raised questions about the nature and causes of terrorism and social violence in China, and whether some cases of violence that China calls terrorism can be confirmed as

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430 U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013*.


432 See, for example, Academy of Military Sciences, Military Strategy Department, *The Science of Military Strategy* (Zhanlue Xue, 战略学), 2013 ed. (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2013), 78. This point is discussed above in chapter four.
terrorism. The U.S. State Department’s recent counterterrorism reports have stated that China has, indeed, suffered terrorist attacks. These reports, moreover, have stated that available evidence for cases such as the 2014 Kunming mass knifing and the Urumqi market car bombing indicates that these were cases of terrorism. U.S. officials have also noted, however, that there have been occasions when China did not make available to the world what might be considered credible evidence of these terrorism reports. U.S. officials have also noted China’s efforts to restrict or prevent NGOs and other independent observers from independently verifying these incidents.

The United States has also publicly and privately raised questions about the impact that China’s policies on religion, ethnicity, and law enforcement may be having on grievances among these groups, violent extremism, and on the effectiveness of China’s approach to counterterrorism. The United States has suggested that instead of helping fight terrorism, these policies may in some cases offer extremists an issue they can use to radicalize people. In the August 2015 U.S. China Counterterrorism Dialogue, for example, the U.S. side recommended that China consider a more comprehensive approach to counterterrorism:

433 “...we see China as an important partner for us in many ways on counterterrorism....They have their concerns about the activities of groups within China that have carried out attacks. We condemn terrorism in any form as long as we have enough evidence to say that indeed something is a terrorist attack. Oftentimes, though, we see governments characterize something as a terrorist attack; we either don't have enough evidence to make that assessment, or, again, we would characterize the effort that they're making against it as perhaps counterproductive in and of itself because it may encourage extremism.” Tina S. Kaidanow, “Special Briefing: Country Reports on Terrorism 2014,” (U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, June 19, 2015), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244030.htm. Ambassador Kaidanow is Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. Department of State. See also U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014.


437 Interviews. See also U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, "Media Note: U.S.-China Counterterrorism Dialogue," (Washington, DC, August 6, 2015), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/08/245782.htm. Speaking at Washington, DC’s George Washington University on September 21, 2015 shortly before President Xi’s visit, National Security Advisor Susan Rice alluded to the impact religious policies can have on grievances among religious groups: “Denying ethnic minorities like Tibetans and Uighurs their fundamental freedoms, or closing churches and removing crosses, or placing restrictions on who can enter a mosque—these actions only fuel grievances and raise serious questions about China’s commitment to protecting freedom of religion.” Rice, "Remarks on U.S.-China Relationship, George Washington University."
The U.S. delegation stressed the need for China to take a comprehensive approach to countering violent extremism (CVE) that protects individuals' freedoms of expression and religion; addresses local grievances that violent extremists can exploit to radicalize and recruit individuals; and ensures educational and economic opportunities for marginalized communities.438

U.S. officials have made clear in public speeches and documents, that any U.S. cooperation on issues such as repatriating Chinese nationals and illegal immigrants or exchange of information to counter the transnational flow of foreign terrorist fighters needs to be undertaken in a manner consistent with U.S. constitutional and political principles, legal procedures, and appropriate respect for civil rights. Chinese officials have also reportedly made repeated requests for the United States to assist them by removing internet content that would be considered legal in the United States. U.S. officials have had to respond on multiple occasions by explaining these constitutional issues to their counterparts.439

For their part, Chinese government officials and policy analysts have criticized the United States for its hesitancy to accept China’s decision to label certain acts of violence as terrorism. They have charged that the United States was engaging in a “double standard” by labeling some international cases of violence “terrorism,” while raising questions of human rights with regard to cases of violence in China. Speaking at the UN in 2014, a senior Chinese diplomat urged the United States to show “courage” and to “abandon” what China calls the U.S. “double standard” so as not to undermine counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries.440

438 U.S. Department of State, “Media Note: U.S.-China Counterterrorism Dialogue.” For a much more subtle version of this message, see the excerpt from Secretary Johnson’s speech to the Chinese People’s Public Security University, in U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Readout of Secretary Johnson’s Trip to China.”

439 For example: “Secretary Johnson and Minister Guo agreed to a more streamlined process to repatriate Chinese nationals with final orders of removal, while applications for protection will continue to be handled in accordance with U.S. law and American values.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Readout of Secretary Johnson’s Trip to China.” See also the DHS statement noting the importance of developing a cooperative framework on fighting global terrorism that “provides appropriate protection for civil rights and civil liberties” and requires "sufficient evidence" regarding fugitive cases. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Meeting between U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson and China's Minister of Public Security Guo Shengkun,” April 12, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/04/12/fact-sheet-meeting-between-us-secretary-homeland-security-jeh-johnson-and-chinas. The divergent views over the constitutionality of some internet-based materials were raised in interviews, 2015.

In the research for this report, there was no terrorism-related issue about which Chinese specialists expressed stronger negative feeling than the matter of the United States not publicly endorsing China's characterization of terrorist incidents in the PRC. Some explicitly rejected the idea that the United States should wait to obtain independent confirming evidence before joining China in condemning these incidents as terrorism.

Other factors shaping cooperation

On some technical and strategic issues, the U.S. and China must confront a mixture of cooperation and disagreement. For some areas of cooperation, one likely reason for progress is that these issues do not appear to have clear links to the major issues of legal or ideological disagreement between the United States and China. These areas include cooperation on:

- U.S.-China dialogue and training regarding improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and trafficking in their precursors and components
- Shipping and container security, including the U.S. Container Security Initiative
- Port security, including the U.S. Megaports Initiative to detect potential nuclear or radioactive materials.

By contrast, our research indicates that some areas of current or proposed cooperation do have clear links to the areas of legal system and ideological disagreement. Some U.S. officials have found that this can lead to limitations, uncertainties, or disagreements with China regarding cooperation on these issues. These areas include cooperation on:

- Enhanced cooperation on terrorism and the internet
- Increased intelligence and information-sharing on reported transiting terrorists
- Chinese requests for deportation of people in the United States.

The internet is an arena in which these issues are prominent. As noted above, some of the requests Chinese officials have made for assistance with removing U.S.-based

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442 Interviews.

443 Interviews.
internet materials are considered improper or unconstitutional by U.S. authorities. Although China has publicly complimented U.S. cooperation in helping to remove “violent and terrorist” videos and other files from U.S. websites, some Chinese experts have noted China’s disappointment that substantive bilateral cooperation on issues of terrorism and the internet has still been less than China hoped for or expected.

In addition, the quality and fairness of the deportation decisions ultimately depends upon the source and quality of the evidence on which the decision is made, and on whether U.S. officials can induce Chinese officials to provide satisfactory evidence. Some U.S. officials indicate that, with regard to information provided by China in information-sharing or deportation cases, they have difficulty being certain whether the information provided is on people who should be considered “fugitives” or “refugees.”

Cooperation can also be challenging for other reasons. These include when a specific area of cooperation requires the United States to: (1) seek access to Chinese territory, (2) ask China to reform administrative control systems, such as those for dangerous chemicals and dual-use technology, or (3) ask China to crack down on specific businesses marketing dual-use goods. All of these can be difficult or controversial issues in the Chinese system.

Certainly, China’s emerging national security interests will not only create new opportunities for U.S.-China strategic cooperation; some may create new challenges as well. For example, as China has become more powerful, it has also become more assertive in trying to shape its security environment to make it more conducive to pursuing China’s national interests. In recent years, one aspect of this trend has been China’s efforts to try to confront its domestic security challenges overseas. Following the 2009 riots in Urumqi, for example, China exerted pressure on its diplomatic partners such as Japan and Australia, warning them that if they allowed Uighur activists to operate or hold rallies on their soil, it would harm relations, and China actually cancelled an important diplomatic visit to Australia. Another example of

444 Interviews.
446 Interviews.
447 Interviews.
448 Interviews.
this effort to confront domestic security threats abroad, China’s efforts to secure deportation of Uighurs to China from third countries, was discussed earlier in Chapter 5.

**Conclusion: Identifying promising areas for future cooperation**

For the United States, an important objective will be distinguishing between more and less promising areas for deeper counterterrorism cooperation with China. The analysis in this chapter suggests several broad principles which we hope can assist U.S. policymakers in identifying promising areas for U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation, while also assisting them in dealing with areas on which cooperation is likely to remain difficult or limited.

Overall, U.S. policymakers should anticipate that China’s pursuit of cooperation with the United States is likely to remain situational rather than broad and deep, and adjust expectations accordingly.
Absent a major catalyzing overseas event that places large numbers of Chinese citizens at risk, it is unlikely that the emphasis China places on preventing international terrorism will approach its concern about managing its own domestic concerns.

**United States View on Terrorism and Cooperation with China**

“...we see China as an important partner for us in many ways on counterterrorism.... They have their concerns about the activities of groups within China that have carried out attacks. We condemn terrorism in any form as long as we have enough evidence to say that indeed something is a terrorist attack. Oftentimes, though, we see governments characterize something as a terrorist attack; we either don't have enough evidence to make that assessment or, again, we would characterize the effort that they're making against it as perhaps counterproductive in and of itself because it may encourage extremism.”


The United States should expect cooperation on technical issues relating to U.S.-Chinese interlinked economies and transport systems, but probably less support on more politically sensitive topics such as cracking down on manufacturers of dual-use technologies, who may enjoy protection from local government officials.

United States officials should be prepared for their Chinese counterparts to continue pressing for U.S. acceptance of China's views of terrorism, even when the two countries are pursuing effective cooperation.

Although some historic Party leaders have recognized the potential shortcomings in restrictive ethnic and religious policies, research for this report indicates very little likelihood that current officials and security experts assess that China’s policies are part of the cause of their terrorism concerns.

Several principles may be helpful in identifying the most promising future issues of strategic and technical cooperation to pursue. Cooperation in these areas will most likely be promising to pursue when it:

- Focuses on concrete technical benefit to U.S. security interests
- Helps create an international environment that is inhospitable to terrorism
- Promotes broader systemic legal, policy, and institutional improvements in China that contribute to U.S. security. Cooperation on IED precursors presents an excellent example because it will require institutional and legal reforms,
which, if successful, are likely to strengthen China's control over the export or transit of many other dangerous goods.

- Has minimal or controllable linkage to topics of U.S.-China disagreements over rule of law or human rights policies.

- Can be linked to existing trends or upcoming events that are likely to create natural opportunities for U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation. An example is the recent awarding to China of the 2022 Winter Olympic Games. The 2008 Summer Games established a precedent of cooperation, and the United States may wish to start with a “lessons learned” review of cooperation in 2008.

At the same time, U.S. officials should try to keep realistic expectations when involved in issues which require China to reform or strengthen its own internal bureaucracies or enforcement mechanisms.

- Regarding IED precursors, China is likely to find many U.S. requests for China to undertake institutional reforms or take enforcement actions against Chinese export companies bureaucratically challenging

U.S. policymakers should consider expanding U.S.-China exchange and joint research about international terrorism theory and global terrorist movements.

- Converging U.S. and Chinese concerns about some global terrorist threats have created a need for deeper understanding on both sides. Chinese security experts have expressed interest in expanding research exchange on this topic.
Appendix A: Prospects and Challenges for U.S.-China Cooperation: A Structured Analysis

To assist policy analysts in thinking explicitly about the prospects and challenges that the United States should expect to face in discussing cooperation with China over counterterrorism, this section draws on our research to carry out a structured analysis of the United States’ relative position in cooperation.

We examine the U.S. strengths (and relative advantages), its weaknesses (and relative disadvantages), the potential opportunities that cooperation presents the United States, and the potential threats (or risks) that cooperation presents—i.e., we do what is known as a “SWOT” analysis.

The purpose of this analysis is not to forecast the likely outcome of counterterrorism cooperation dialogue with China, or to offer policymakers a preferred bargaining position—although SWOT analyses can be adapted to these purposes. Rather, this analysis is aimed at helping policy analysts clarify their thinking and assumptions about the U.S. position in the cooperative relationship, and thereby help them engage in structured, disciplined thinking about the relative strengths and needs of the U.S. position and some of the opportunities and challenges it is likely to encounter.

Relative strengths or advantages of the U.S. position

The United States approaches counterterrorism cooperation with China with particular expertise and skills, and China appears to be increasingly interested in gaining access to that. U.S. technical expertise comes largely from 14 years of fighting terrorism and extremism abroad, and protecting homeland security in the United States. This includes:

- Expertise in dealing with IEDs and other terrorist technology

- Expertise in monitoring nuclear and radioactive material, monitoring in-port and container security, and monitoring and controlling dangerous chemicals and dual-use technologies
• Training in best practices for security personnel across a wide variety of counterterrorism and homeland security issues

• Broad international expertise in dealing with the world's terrorist groups, and with terror threats in many regions

• Experience in protecting U.S. embassies and citizens abroad, and working with local governments all over the world.

China’s interest in many of these areas of expertise is likely to grow along with its need to find ways of protecting not only its citizens at home but also its rapidly growing number of expatriate citizens in high-risk countries abroad.

The United States also gains leverage from controlling the level of cooperation it offers China regarding Uighur extremist groups and their activities outside of China. This includes cooperation on the detection and removal of online materials on U.S. servers, and exchange of information on the transit of personnel China is concerned about to sensitive regions in the Middle East and elsewhere.

**Relative weaknesses, vulnerabilities, disadvantages or needs of the U.S. position**

The flow of goods, containers, and ships from China to the United States is vast, and the United States needs assistance from countries of origin to adequately monitor and inspect all inbound ships, containers, cargo, and personnel. The United States has an important, long-run stake in gaining Beijing’s cooperation in enhancing China’s level of diligence, expertise, and technical skill in carrying out this work.

As the IED precursor dialogue indicates, U.S. interests in fighting terrorist activities in countries adjacent to China, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, also rely on active Chinese cooperation to step up domestic controls and governance over the export and transit of precursors through its jurisdictions.

The United States must also rely on Chinese cooperation for the protection of U.S. personnel, assets, and facilities in China and Hong Kong, and in countries in Central Asia and elsewhere, where Chinese security cooperative relationships may complement or possibly exceed our U.S. relationships, including with Pakistan or the Central Asian republics, or in the future in Afghanistan.

**Opportunities for the United States**

China’s recent rising interest in diplomatic involvement with Afghanistan appears to offer the United States an opportunity to gain important help in promoting political stability and growth there. The magnitude of this opportunity for the United States
will depend on whether China proves to be committed to encouraging reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban, or whether its diplomatic involvement is motivated more by “defensive” interests, such as a desire to maintain its good economic and investment relations and cooperation in repatriating Uighur extremists with both of Afghanistan’s major political forces.

**Threats, risks, or challenges for the United States**

Some of the most fundamental risks of U.S. counterterrorism cooperation with China, long recognized by specialists on the topic, are related to the shortage of independent, confirmable, open-source information that U.S. analysts have on social violence in China generally, and in Xinjiang in particular.

The U.S. State Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism* have noted China’s deliberate restriction of access to the region for independent monitoring groups, journalists, officials, and others. This creates a strong temptation to default to accepting either official Chinese descriptions of events in the regions, or those of outside Uighur activist groups. The weakness of U.S. access to information creates the risk of U.S. analysts committing one of two opposite types of information and policy analysis errors:

- Mistakenly concluding that some reported act of social violence is a terrorist act, when in fact it is not; or
- Mistakenly concluding that some reported act of violence may not be a terrorist act, when it was.

How U.S. analysts deal with this information uncertainty has a number of policy-related consequences, including how we assess the Uighur-related terrorism threat from the region, and the willingness of the United States to accept Chinese assessments. This uncertainty also affects the evaluation we place on Chinese counterterrorism cooperation, especially information-sharing from China about terrorist threats, and the importance of monitoring flows of Chinese citizens into regions where extremist groups are active. Information shortages create a risk of passivity in several aspects of U.S. approaches to cooperation.

**Conclusions**

This structured analysis of the U.S. position indicates that counterterrorism cooperation with the PRC offers some value for both countries. The United States appears to be in a somewhat stronger position than China, in that it does not always need to rely so heavily upon China in order to advance counterterrorism goals that it considers critical to its interests. The United States cannot advance all of its interests
without Chinese cooperation; however, it does not have to approach future cooperation with China from a position of extreme dependence or vulnerability.

This analysis does underscore the value of the U.S. efforts to strengthen its access to independent sources of information concerning the nature of social violence and terrorism in Xinjiang, and in parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan that are suspected of housing Uighur extremists. An improved understanding of these trends would ease U.S. reliance on Chinese or Uighur activist views of these potential threats.

Table 4. U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: SWOT Analysis from the U.S. Perspective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Strengths/Advantages</strong></th>
<th><strong>Opportunities</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Counterterror technical skills and expertise</td>
<td>• Chinese assistance in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Expertise in global terrorism, protecting U.S. overseas interests</td>
<td>• Cooperation on IEDs, other technical counterterror programs</td>
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<td>• Control over level of U.S. cooperation on human rights related issues</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Weaknesses/Vulnerabilities</strong></th>
<th><strong>Threats or Risks</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>• Reliance on China for security of inbound goods, ships</td>
<td>• Need for independent reliable information on terrorism/violence in China, esp. Xinjiang</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reliance on China to control its domestic IED precursor networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reliance on China for protection of U.S. citizens, interests in China</td>
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Appendix B: China’s Counterterrorism Bureaucracy
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Appendix C: Selected Cases of Uighur Deportations to China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Deportation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Uzbek authorities extradited Canadian citizen Huseyin Celil from Uzbekistan to China. In 2007, a Chinese court sentenced Celil to life imprisonment for &quot;terrorist activities&quot; and &quot;plotting to split the country.&quot; Celil left China and was granted political asylum in Canada in 2001 and became a naturalized citizen. Source: Congressional Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2007 Annual Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistani authorities in April and June 2009 reportedly turned over a total of 19 people (in two groups) to the Chinese government. The first group was described as “militants,” and the second as members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Pakistani authorities returned them to China under bilateral agreements to fight “militancy and extremism.” Source: CECC 2009 Annual Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>After reportedly receiving a diplomatic note from the Chinese government, Cambodian authorities deported 20 Uighur asylum seekers (including two infants) to China in December. A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson alleged that they were &quot;involved in crimes.&quot; The following June, Chinese authorities reported that three of the 20 people returned to China were suspected of terrorist crimes, and that the remaining 17 were members of a terrorist group. Western media later reported that 16 of them had been sentenced to prison terms ranging from 16 years to life in prison. Source: CECC 2010, 2011, and 2012 Annual Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>A Uighur asylum seeker who had earlier escaped being returned from Cambodia was later deported from Laos to China in March 2010. Source: Uyghur Prisoner Denied Medical Care,&quot; Radio Free Asia, 8 March 2011; &quot;Laos Deports Seven Uyghurs,&quot; Radio Free Asia, 15 December 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>In May, Chinese security officials forcibly returned Uighur Ersidin Israil to China from Kazakhstan with the cooperation of Kazakhstani</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Deportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>In August, authorities in Thailand detained Nur Muhammed, a Uighur, and turned him over to Chinese authorities on grounds of illegal entry. Source: CECC 2011 Annual Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Following the arrests of 16 Uighurs in early August, Malaysian authorities deported 11 Uighur men from Malaysia to China later that month. The men were later reported to have been charged with terrorism and separatism, and sentenced to prison terms of up to 15 years. Source: CECC 2011 and 2013 Annual Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>In December, Malaysian authorities deported to China six Uighurs who were seeking asylum through the UN. Malaysian authorities had detained them for allegedly attempting to leave Malaysia on forged passports. Source: CECC 2013 Annual Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>In July, Thailand reported that it had forcibly repatriated nearly 100 Uighurs, including children, to China and had received guarantees from Beijing that they would “be given access to fair justice” and treated fairly. Source: “Thailand Expels Nearly 100 Uyghurs to Uncertain Fate in China,” Radio Free Asia, 9 July 2015, <a href="http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/thailand-uyghurs-07092015085045.html">http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/thailand-uyghurs-07092015085045.html</a></td>
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### Appendix D: China’s Counterterror Intelligence and Law Enforcement Diplomacy, November 2012–July 2015

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<tr>
<td>June 24, 2015, Moscow</td>
<td>Russia Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>Cooperation in the field of information security and law and order in addition to countering terrorism and “color revolutions.”</td>
<td>None. “Russia, China hold consultations on countering terrorism, color revolutions—Russian Security Council,” Interfax, June 24, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 15, 2015, Beijing</td>
<td>Uzbekistan First Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Azimov</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To expand trade and economic cooperation under the framework of the “Belt and Road Initiative.”</td>
<td>A memorandum and signed pact to boost economic cooperation between the two countries’ commerce ministries. “China, Uzbekistan to Strengthen Cooperation under the Silk Road Initiative,” Xinhua, June 15, 2015.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 8, 2015. Beijing</td>
<td>Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean</td>
<td>Guo Shengkun</td>
<td>To discuss ways to tackle transnational threats such as terrorism and cybercrime.</td>
<td>None. “Chinese Vice Premier Says Bilateral Cooperation in Phase of ‘Rapid Ascendancy’,” Straits Times Online, April 9, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 8, 2015. Beijing</td>
<td>Belarus Security Council Secretary Alexander Mezhuev</td>
<td>Xu Qiliang, Guo Shengkun</td>
<td>To jointly fight against the &quot;three evil forces&quot; of terrorism, separatism and extremism as well as drug crime, so as to safeguard security and stability in the two countries and in the region.</td>
<td>None. “China, Belarus Eye Closer Military, Public Security Cooperation,” Xinhua, April 8, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 25, 2015. Beijing</td>
<td>Thailand President of National Legislative Assembly Pornpetch Wichitchol-chai</td>
<td>Li Yuanchao, Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To work more closely with Thailand on fight against drugs, cracking down on cross-border organized crime, and stepping up cybersecurity.</td>
<td>None.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date / Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 9, 2015. Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>Malaysia Prime Minister Najib Razak</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To promote mutual political trust, to expand substantial cooperation, to steadily boost economic cooperation, and to support each other in matters concerning interests of both sides.</td>
<td>None. “Malaysian PM Meets with Meng Jianzhu,” Xinhua, February 9, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date / Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 17, 2014. Moscow</td>
<td>Russia Counter-narcotic Agency (FSKN) Head Viktor Ivanov</td>
<td>Guo Shengkun</td>
<td>To discuss joint actions to combat drug production in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Agreed to consolidate approaches and conduct joint strategic operations to fight the trafficking of drugs. “Russia, China Agree on 'Joint Actions To Combat Drug Production' in Afghanistan,” Interfax, December 17, 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2, 2014. Tashkent</td>
<td>Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov</td>
<td>Guo Shengkun</td>
<td>To boost law-enforcement and security cooperation.</td>
<td>President Karimov said Uzbekistan will join hands with China to fight the ETIM. “China, Uzbekistan Vow To Strengthen Anti-Terror Cooperation,” Xinhua, December 2, 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 23, 2014. Cairo</td>
<td>Egypt President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi and Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To further facilitate the exchange of visits of law enforcement personnel between the two countries, with an aim to enhance their professional capabilities.</td>
<td>None. “China Hopes to Boost Security Cooperation with Egypt: Senior Official,” Xinhua, November 23, 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>November 19, 2014. Ankara</td>
<td>Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To strengthen political and mutual trust with Turkey, cooperate in anti-terrorism and boost economic and trade ties.</td>
<td>None. “Turkey Backs China’s Initiative for Building Silk Road Economic Belt,” Xinhua, November 19, 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date / Location</td>
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</table>
| October 17, 2014. Beijing | Nepal Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister Bam Dev Gautam | Meng Jianzhu | To improve their coordination mechanism and expand cooperation in a bid to jointly safeguard security and stability in the region. | None. 
| October 14, 2014. Beijing | Uzbekistan Chief of Security Rustam Inoyatov | Meng Jianzhu, Guo Shengkun | To increase security cooperation between the countries. | None. 
| September 15, 2014. Beijing | Uzbekistan Minister of Internal Affairs Akhmedbaev Adkham | Meng Jianzhu, Guo Shengkun | To promote closer security cooperation between both countries. | None. 
| September 11, 2014. Beijing | Laos Chief of General Staff of the Lao People’s Army Souvone Leuang-bounmy | Guo Shengkun | To enhance law enforcement cooperation along the Mekong River. | None. 
| September 5, 2014. Beijing | Tajikistan First Deputy Chief of the National Security Committee Radzhabali Pakhmonali | Meng Jianzhu | To boost security and law enforcement with the two neighbors, to jointly fight against terrorism and cross-border crime, and safeguard regional peace and stability. | None. Part of Join China-Tajikistan-Afghanistan meeting. 
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<tr>
<td>September 4, 2014. Beijing</td>
<td>Belarus Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Tozik</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To discuss cooperation in economic affairs, technology, security, and culture.</td>
<td>None. This was the first meeting of the two countries' Intergovernmental Committee of Cooperation. “China, Belarus Discuss Cooperation,” Xinhua, September 4, 2014.</td>
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<td><strong>July 28, 2014. Beijing</strong></td>
<td>Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To open the Singapore-China Forum on Social Governance focusing on the rule of law.</td>
<td>Meng said that he would like to use Singapore as a model for law-based governance. “Singapore Wants to Join China-led Regional Bank to Finance Infrastructure Projects in Asia,” Singapore Channel NewsAsia Online, July 29, 2014.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date / Location</td>
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<td>June 10, 2014. Beijing</td>
<td>Tanzania Minister for Home Affairs Mathias Chikwe</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To further enhance security cooperation, and take effective measures to ensure safety of each other’s citizens and institutions, to offer a sound environment for the development of China-Tanzania all-round cooperation partnership.</td>
<td>None. “China, Tanzania Pledge Closer Security Cooperation,” Xinhua, June 10, 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5, 2014. Beijing</td>
<td>Russia Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To strengthen cooperation in law enforcement and security, and jointly fight the “three forces” of terrorism, extremism, and separatism to maintain the peace and stability of the two countries and the region as a whole.</td>
<td>None. Part of the first China-Russia meeting of institutionalized cooperation in law enforcement and security. Xi Jinping met with Patrushev on the 6th. “Chinese President Meets Russian Security Council Secretary,” Xinhua, June 6, 2014.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 21, 2014. Shanghai</td>
<td>Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To enhance cooperation on security and law enforcement and to safeguard the national security and stability of each country.</td>
<td>None. These talks, however, referenced a consensus that Xi Jinping signed with PM Sen on May 18. “Senior Chinese Security Official Meets Cambodian PM,” Xinhua, May 21, 2014.</td>
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<td>December 17, 2013, Beijing</td>
<td>Russia Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Kolokoltsev</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu, Guo Shengkun</td>
<td>To set up a communication channel and cooperate more to combat the “three evil forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” as well as economic and drug-related crime.</td>
<td>None. Two sides did, however, speak favorably of a bilateral law enforcement cooperation agreement signed in July 2013. “Chinese Security Chief Meets Senior Russian Official,” Xinhua, December 17, 2013.</td>
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<td>Date / Location</td>
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<td>Beijing</td>
<td>Commissioner Nguyen Ba Thanh</td>
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<td>October 22, 2013.</td>
<td>Macedonia Minister of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>Guo Shengkun</td>
<td>To step up substantial cooperation in such areas as fighting drug crime, terrorism and</td>
<td>None. “China, Macedonia to Strengthen Crime Fighting Cooperation,” Xinhua, October 22, 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>Gordana Jankulovska</td>
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<td>illegal immigration to jointly safeguard national security and social stability, and</td>
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<td>offer a sound environment for bilateral cooperation in various fields.</td>
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<td>Security Bui Quang Ben</td>
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<td>trafficking so as to maintain safety and stability in the cross-border region.</td>
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<td>July 5, 2013. Beijing</td>
<td>Iran Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar</td>
<td>Meng Jianzhu</td>
<td>To work with Iran to seriously implement the important consensus reached by both leaders and further augment political mutual trust, so as to benefit their people.</td>
<td>The two countries signed a cooperative document on jointly cracking down on transnational crimes. “CPC Official Vows Cooperation with Iran on Counterterrorism, Drug Control Issues,” Xinhua, July 5, 2013.</td>
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Appendix E: The Difficulty in Corroborating Facts and Competing Narratives

As mentioned in the body of this report, it is very difficult to corroborate the facts on the ground in China when it comes to acts of domestic violence. Researchers trying to understand the magnitude of the terrorism threat faced by the Chinese government, especially in Xinjiang, are dependent on information they cannot easily verify from sources that may have their own agendas. This is compounded by Beijing’s choices to ascribe, or not, the label of terrorism to certain acts of domestic violence. As a result, there are sometimes competing narratives associated with incidents. Below are some examples of such competing narratives.

- Professor James Millward (Georgetown University) examined Chinese reports of more than a dozen “prominent, large-scale incidents of violence and unrest” which occurred between 1990 and 2003. Millward’s research suggests that several of these incidents which China attributes to terrorism were not terrorist attacks but rather mass protests against government actions which turned violent.

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450 Millward, “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment." We say “more than a dozen” incidents because some of the twelve domestic cases Millward discusses involve multiple reported incidents. See pp. 14-19. In a 2007 book, Millward says of the incidents called “terrorism” in the 2002 State Council document that "there were a series of incidents and attacks through the decade [e.g., 1990-2001], a few of them clearly terrorist in the sense that they hit random people, irrespective of status, job, or ethnicity; others not random, but rather carefully targeted political murders; and still others more in the nature of protests that turned violent rather than planned attacks." Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, 340 - 341.

451 These include the July 7, 1995, demonstration in Khotan (Hetian), the February 5-8, 1997, Ghuljia (Yining) incident. They may also include an April 1997 crowd effort to free jailed prisoners, and 1999 incidents in Khotan, though Millward’s report does not indicate whether China officially labelled these “terrorist acts.” Millward documents his point on the 1997 Ghuljia incident with a detailed multi-source analysis in Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, 329 - 334. Millward correctly notes that the 1995 Khotan incident is not mentioned in the State Council’s well-known 2002 document listing alleged terrorist acts. This
• Professor Gardner Bovingdon (Indiana University) performed an analysis of political violence in Xinjiang from 1949 to 2005. His analysis of the largest such incident in recent years, the July 5, 2009, protests and riot that occurred in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, questions China’s allegation that this incident was an intentional act of violence sparked by domestic or overseas terrorists. He notes that “even official Chinese sources acknowledge that for some three hours, the protests were peaceful.”

• Professor Sean Roberts (The George Washington University) analyzed reporting on 45 alleged Uighur terrorist acts that took place between 1990 and 2011. He concluded that one incident was most likely an act of terrorism. He concluded that twenty-two incidents were either not or probably not cases of terrorism, including three which began as incidents of civil unrest or conflict with authorities.

A review of reporting on other incidents raises questions as to whether they meet the definition of a terrorist action as defined in this report. In some cases, one reason for raising questions about whether an incident was a terrorist attack is that some of the reporting on a case indicates that the incident may have begun as a peaceful protest.

• The June 26, 2013, incident in Lukchun in which at least 35 people were killed. Xinhua has described this as an attack on a police station and other government buildings by a “knife-wielding mob.” The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) and reports by Radio Free Asia (RFA) and others raise questions as to the facts of how the violence occurred.


452 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in their Own Land. See chapter four and the epilogue, “Urumqi’s ‘Hot Summer’ of 2009.” He cites a statement by Nur Bakri, Chairman of the Xinjiang government that the protests began around 5:00 p.m., but the violence began at around 8:18 p.m. His source is “Xinjiang reveals how the episode of criminal beating, smashing, looting, burning, and killing unfolded on that day,” China News Network, July 6, 2009 [cited July 12, 2009].

453 Roberts, Imaginary Terrorism? The Global War on Terror and the Narrative of the Uyghur Terrorist Threat.

454 This was a 1998 attack on housing for Chinese consulate employees in Istanbul.

The June 28, 2014, incident in Yarkand (Shache). Chinese state media report that the violence began as an unprovoked attack by a group of terrorists on a police station and other government buildings, and that the attackers killed 37 people while the police shot dead 59 people and arrested the attackers. The CECC and RFA cite alternative sources indicating that this incident may have begun as a protest against restrictions of the celebration of Ramadan, which had just concluded.456


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Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang. “Remarks on the Casualty of Chinese Staff 
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“Xinjiang Releases Statement 5 Mar on Recent Bombings.” AFP. March 5, 1997.


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