


# Command, Control, and Coordination: A Quick-Look Analysis of the Tampa Police Department's Operations During the 2012 Republican National Convention



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Approved for distribution:

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Monica Giovachino". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

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# Executive Summary

National Special Security Events (NSSEs), especially national political conventions, pose unique planning and operational challenges. Due to their high-profile nature (i.e., political, economic, social, or religious nature) and the large number of attendees, national conventions have the potential to adversely impact public safety and security. Though many conventions have occurred, detailed documentation to guide local law enforcement on planning and operational best practices is sparse.

In order to address this gap and in response to requests from law enforcement leaders, the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) worked in partnership with CNA to provide technical assistance and support to local law enforcement security operations prior to and during the 2012 national conventions. The primary goal of the technical assistance was to develop an after-action report (AAR) that documents key findings of the overall security planning and operations. CNA analysts deployed to Tampa, Florida to support the Tampa Police Department's (TPD) public safety and security operations for the 2012 Republican National Convention (RNC) from Sunday, August 26 through Friday, August 31, 2012.

In addition to this Tampa Quick Look Analysis report, the lessons learned and best practices from this event will serve as a blueprint for future law enforcement agencies in charge of maintaining security. BJA, with the support of CNA, will document key findings from the 2012 Democratic National Convention and the 2012 Republican National Convention in a comprehensive AAR, titled, *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*.

TPD understood the magnitude of the event and the potential for violent clashes between the police and demonstrators, and the high risk to officer safety. In reviewing the law enforcement response in previous similar large-scale events, it became clear to the Chief and her Assistant Chiefs that a different philosophy had to be used to ensure the safety of attendees, demonstrators, and officers assisting in the response. This philosophy stressed an adherence to community policing strategies that are focused and based on protecting the constitutional rights of demonstrators while ensuring officers' safety.

In preparation for the event, TPD developed and distributed a standard operating procedure, produced specifically for this event. This standard operating procedure outlined the department's missions and general policing philosophy. Specific to their mission, during the 2012 RNC, TPD sought to:

- Protect the First Amendment rights of all persons;
- Conduct all operations in a safe and efficient manner; and

- Ensure that public safety services remain in full effect in the non-event spaces for all affected jurisdictions.

To maintain uniformity and consistency of practices and protocols across the multiple agencies, TPD employed several strategies. It conducted training across the participating jurisdictions, provided officers with a pocket guide that referenced the department's use-of-force policy, held a training session for 1,900 crowd control officers, and provided the crowd control officers with the same uniforms as each other.

These actions ensured that the officers supporting TPD operated as one unit, following the same procedures as one another and acting under one mission. Such a strategy is imperative in large-scale events, where multiple agencies are involved and response levels are unpredictable.

## Major Observations

During the event, CNA analysts observed discussions and noted key decisions, actions and field operations as they related to critical functional areas, such as communications; intelligence; public information and media relations; and training.

From these observations, CNA identified a number of best practices and lessons learned. **Best practices** reflect activities and actions that aided in the success of the event. **Lessons learned** reflect areas for improvement and detail some activities or actions that would have improved operations and planning.

Below is a summary of the major observations, which are described in detail in this Quick-Look Report.

## Best Practices

- **Pre-event Planning:** Rigorous and robust planning prior to the event facilitated TPD's operations for several functional areas (e.g., training, tactical operations, logistics, communications, and traffic). Twenty-four subcommittees, an Executive Steering Committee, and a core planning team established effective operational plans, policies, and collaborative partnerships during the 28 months prior to the event that formed the basis for the successful execution of security operations. The Tampa Police Department often cited the planning process and the operational plans that were developed as part of this multi-jurisdictional collaborative process as critical factors in ensuring the success of this event. Below we highlight the key best practices that most influenced event-related security operations.
- **Pre-Event Training:** Training was disseminated in a number of different formats (e.g. scenario based, presentations, E-learning, training videos) to ensure that officers clearly

understood their roles and responsibilities. Training personnel was critical for ensuring that law enforcement officers accomplished their tasks while preserving the TPD's mission and policing philosophy. One example of the benefit that training provided was crowd control officers understanding their roles and expected behaviors in response to demonstrators exercising their freedom of speech. Examples of the training materials used in both the RNC and DNC will be made available as part of the Appendix in *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*.

- **Personnel Recruitment:** TPD recognized early in the planning process that event security would require a significant number of additional law enforcement personnel. As such, TPD recruited more than 5,500 state and local law enforcement officers from across the State of Florida to effectively provide security to over 80 venues, 60 critical infrastructure sites, hundreds of delegates and VIPs, and thousands of event attendees. These additional law enforcement officers enabled TPD to provide for the safety and security needs of this large-scale event, by providing TPD with the force reserve and flexibility to meet potential/unanticipated challenges.
- **Communications and Situational Awareness:** The effective use of communications equipment and technology provided greater situational awareness for TPD Commanders. Extensive criminal intelligence capabilities and video surveillance technologies (e.g., fixed cameras, mobile cameras on sources in the field) allowed TPD Commanders to make strategic response and resource-allocation decisions based on real-time information. These enhanced video capabilities allowed TPD Commanders to have “eyes on the ground” directly from the command center.
- **Legal Affairs:** Training provided to improve officers' understanding of the unique legal and civil rights issues involved in this type of event (e.g. First Amendment rights and privileges) helped to ensure that officers understood that their mission included protecting the rights and civil liberties of the demonstrators as well as the ticket-holding attendees (e.g., delegates and invited guests). Though the number of demonstrators was far less than expected, TPD still responded to a number of demonstrations throughout the event to ensure public order. Senior command staff and officials worked directly with the demonstrator groups, and this tactic appeared highly effective in quickly reducing tensions by allowing protestors “to be heard.” In addition, the accessibility of senior officers in the field smoothed crowd control issues and allowed for rapid adjustments of strategy.
- **Command and Control:** TPD and the supporting law enforcement agencies effectively coordinated command and control of the event through a number of operations centers, daily meetings, and a common communication radio network. The implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS) allowed for multiple jurisdictions to perform their

duties in operational synchronicity, and ensured that communications and situational awareness were maintained from the field through the chain-of-command to the Chief of the Department. ICS and the interagency partnerships between TPD, neighboring local jurisdictions, federal agencies, local businesses, and community organizations played a significant role in the operational success of the event as evidenced by the minimal arrests and the perceptions of both the public and the department.

- **Crowd Management:** The use of bicycles to quickly manage and cordon off crowds was particularly beneficial. Officers on bicycles were used to quickly respond to demonstrators and provided a soft barrier along the demonstration routes. Officers on bicycles often rode to the front of the demonstrator marches and blocked traffic providing safe routes for these demonstrators to exercise their constitutional rights. Using bicycles to manage the crowds proved more efficient than having officers mounted on horses, while still providing a strong police presence.
- **Intelligence/ Counterterrorism/ Counter Surveillance:** The 2012 RNC was the first time the 700-megahertz Long Term Evolution (LTE), a National Public Safety Broadband Network, was used by local law enforcement. This network provided officers with interoperable voice, video, and data communications allowing sources in the field to use iPhones, operated under this LTE network, to send, via a secure network, live video of demonstrations and other intelligence information.

## Lessons Learned

The following bullets highlight the key lessons learned:

- **Resource Allocation:** Obtaining and allocating the appropriate personnel were issues that became apparent in both the planning and operational stages of the event. One issue that arose in planning for the event was that law enforcement planners and operators had an unclear understanding of the role of the Florida National Guard in security operations. Confusion existed about the number of guardsmen the Department of Defense would provide and the tasks these guardsmen could fulfill. In addition to this, during the event it quickly became apparent that not all venue security personnel were familiar with their assignments or their surroundings and as a result, there were inconsistencies in the security measures used at each checkpoint into the venue.
- **Personnel Tracking:** Although the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) equipment experienced technical difficulties in tracking and logging of personnel throughout the event, these difficulties were minimally disruptive to the overall operation. After the event, however, these technical difficulties and the lack of personnel tracking caused inefficiencies in processing payroll. Personnel processing payroll resorted to using sign-in sheets, which were often incomplete, to track the hours logged.

- Financial/Grant Management: Substantial time is needed to apply for federal funds, clear budgets, and obtain approval to begin to obligate and expend funds. This process should be considered carefully as part of the planning process. More details on grant management processes and procedures are outlined in *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*.
- Credentialing: The credentialing application process and instructions provided were unclear and undefined. In addition, rather than distributing credentials at one central location, each agency was individually provided credentials. While this method was intended to be more efficient, it delayed the credentialing process due to the large volume of credentials needed. In retrospect, TPD recognized that a central location would have likely cut down on inconsistencies within the credential process, and would likely have been a more efficient approach.

## Conclusion

Overall, the TPD's operational response throughout the RNC was effective and aligned with its mission and planning objectives. Officers were prepared to deal with the incidents that arose and were able to maintain positive interactions with the demonstrators throughout the event.

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# Section 1: Event overview

Due to the size and high-profile nature of the 2012 Republican National Convention (RNC), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) classified the RNC as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). NSSEs are events of national significance (due to their political, economic, social, or religious nature) that may be targets of terrorism or criminal activity.

The following section provides an overview of event planning and response operations during the RNC, with special attention given to the efforts of the Tampa Police Department (TPD).

## Background

Planning for the RNC began in May of 2010, immediately after Tampa, Florida was awarded the convention bid. NSSE planning was primarily coordinated through an Executive Steering Committee, consisting of command-level representatives from the USSS, local public safety agencies (TPD, the Tampa Fire Department, and the local and state emergency management agencies), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and other public safety agencies. Under the Executive Steering Committee, 24 subcommittees (see Appendix A) were tasked with developing specific operational plans for their functional area. TPD played an important role in identifying two additional subcommittees (Technology and Patrol Operations) that were needed throughout the planning process.

In the initial planning stages, the NSSE subcommittees met on a monthly basis to discuss and refine operational plans; as the event drew near, many of these planning meetings were held biweekly. In addition to the subcommittee meetings, the NSSE also held monthly Executive Steering Committee meetings, each time highlighting the updates from five to seven different subcommittees. These updates were presented to executive members of each of the NSSE subcommittees.

TPD also held internal planning meetings to discuss and resolve planning issues. These meetings were initially held monthly and then biweekly as the event neared. Weekly breakfast meetings with federal stakeholders were also held as the event neared and proved valuable in cementing and de-conflicting information.

## Authorities

Authority for the planning and operations of local security for an NSSE can vary by jurisdiction and is often reflective of the size and capabilities of the local departments and agencies. In many cases, such as that in Tampa, local law enforcement will take the lead due to the security focus of the mission. TPD served as the lead liaison between local response partners and the USSS and coordinated activities such as mobile field operations, traffic, logistics, and prisoner processing, communication, fire/emergency medical services/public health response, hazardous materials/explosive ordnance disposal support, infrastructure protection, public works, and consequence management. Planning and operations related to

consequence and emergency management were coordinated between the local and state emergency management agencies and their federal partners.

Other outside partners played a significant role in the event planning and operations, including the USSS, who served as the lead federal agency with the primary responsibility for the design and implementation of the operational security of the event (at designated venues), and the DNC Executive Steering Committee (DNCC), who served as the lead organization coordinating the actual event.

## Supporting Agencies and Organizations

### *Law enforcement agencies*

Over 73 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies from across the State of Florida<sup>1</sup> supported TPD operations throughout the 2012 RNC (listed in Appendix B). This support resulted in over 5,500 officers assisting in various public safety operations. In addition, a number of agencies, such as the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department,<sup>2</sup> provided personnel to observe police operations throughout the event.

### *Local businesses, media, and community organizations*

Over 116 local businesses and community organizations, such as Walgreens, Brighthouse Networks, and Bank of America, made donations or donated their building space during the event response. This assistance proved essential in supporting the response operations by providing TPD crowd control units with food, water, and comfort stations<sup>3</sup> throughout the event. Additional donations from the community included cash, water, food, and first aid supplies. Appendix C provides a complete list of local businesses and community organizations that supported TPD's operational response throughout the RNC.

## RNC Operations

Although TPD conducts public safety operations in other large-scale events throughout the year, the RNC was a particularly large operation, requiring the partnership and support from law enforcement agencies across the state. The RNC received an estimated 30,000 attendees from August 27 through August 30, in addition to the 500 demonstrators and 5,500 supporting law enforcement personnel.

Below is information on specific law enforcement operations related to event venues, emergency operations centers, secure zones, critical infrastructure, and demonstrations.

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<sup>1</sup> State law required that all assets within the state be acquired before resources from outside of the state could be obtained.

<sup>2</sup> Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department was the local law enforcement responsible for the DNC.

<sup>3</sup> Comfort stations were located inside buildings/local businesses throughout the downtown area. These relief stations provided a location where officers could retreat for snacks, water, restrooms, and rest.

## Event venues

RNC-related activities occurred at more than 80 venues across the Tampa area. Table 1 lists the three primary event venues.

**Table 1. Primary event venues**

Venue	Address	Dates of Operation
Tampa Bay Times Forum (RNC)	401 Channelside Drive Tampa, FL 33602	August 27-30, 2012
Tampa Convention Center (Media)	333 South Franklin Street Tampa, FL 33602	August 27-30, 2012
Tropicana Field (RNC Welcome Event)	1 Tropicana Dr. St. Petersburg, FL 33705	August 26, 2012

## Event operations centers

TPD and the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office (HCSO) used a unified command structure, guided by federal doctrine,<sup>4</sup> to establish command and control throughout the event.

In addition to the unified command, 17 command centers were activated throughout the event. Through these command centers, organizations established and maintained internal and external situational awareness. Table 2 lists the command centers activated during the 2012 RNC.

**Table 2. Event command centers**

Command Center	Dates of Operation
Air Security Operations Center	Aug. 18-31
Bomb Management Center	Aug. 18-31
City of Clearwater Emergency Operations Center	Aug. 26-31
City of St. Petersburg Emergency Operations Center	Aug. 25-31
City of Tampa Emergency Operations Center	Aug. 23-31
Consequence Management Operations Center	Aug. 23-31
Fire, Life Saving, and Hazmat Operations Center	Aug. 18-31
Hillsborough County Emergency Operations Center	Aug. 23-31
Intelligence Operations Center	Aug. 18-31
Joint Operations Center	Aug. 18-31
Maritime Operations Center	Aug. 18-31

<sup>4</sup> The National Incident Management System is a comprehensive, nationwide approach to incident management that provides agencies with standardized resource-management procedures for coordination among different jurisdictions and organizations.

Command Center	Dates of Operation
Multi-Agency Communications Center	Aug. 18-31
Pinellas County Emergency Management Emergency Operations Center	Aug. 25-31
Protective Intelligence Coordination Center	Aug. 25-31
Tactical Security Room	Aug. 18-31
Transportation Management Center	Aug. 23-31
U.S. Secret Service - Tampa Field Office	Aug. 25-31

### *Secure zones*

The USSS established three secure zones (Inner, Middle, Outer) before the event as a means to limit access to the venue during the event. The Inner secure zone was established and active beginning August 24, and the Middle and Outer secure zones beginning August 25. All three zones covered roughly 40 blocks of downtown Tampa.

Law enforcement officers and the Florida National Guard were positioned throughout these three secure zones. USSS personnel were assigned to the interior of the convention center.

In the Outer secure zone, vehicles were restricted and searched. People entering the Middle and Inner secure zones required a special access pass, and vehicles required special placards and an additional search. Some of the vehicles permitted to enter the Middle secure zone were let through, while others could park in one of the designated surface-level parking lots. Finally, individuals entering the Inner secure zone received an additional screening.

### *Critical infrastructure*

In preparation for the convention, TPD—with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security—conducted a comprehensive risk assessment and secured over 60 critical sites, such as utilities, waterways, and hotels. TPD then leveraged its relationships with local businesses and critical infrastructure stakeholders to manage the risk-information gathered in a Digital Sandbox software database. This software database was also used during the event to categorize and track incidents according to risk. No threats to critical infrastructure occurred during the 2012 RNC.

### *Demonstrations*

TPD planners anticipated 5,000 to 10,000 demonstrators at the RNC; however, a forecasted hurricane and the potential for severe weather may have contributed to the significantly lower numbers of demonstrators that did turn out (fewer than 500 demonstrators participated in events). Major protest groups included Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Tampa, Code Pink, Westboro Baptist Church, and Earth First.

In anticipation of protest activity, the City of Charlotte passed new ordinances, including the Extraordinary Event Ordinance, allowing the city to create designated areas for large gatherings and restricting the possession and use of particular items.

### *Financial management*

Approximately \$50 million in federal funds for the RNC were awarded to Tampa in April 2012 (please see the Appendix for more information on the federal funding process, including a timeline and one-page overview). Beginning in December 2011, BJA convened monthly conference calls with the host site to coordinate grant management activities and to quickly identify concerns as they arose. During the planning process, BJA also dedicated staff to expediently meet the needs and requests of the host city and conducted fraud prevention training to help ensure all expenditures were adequately documented and approved in accordance with regulations. The federal budget was passed in November 2011, and following an application and budget clearance process, Tampa began receiving funds in April 2012. Afterwards, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted an audit on the funds used.

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## Section 2: Operational Assessment

This section of the report reviews the efficacy of local law enforcement operations for the 2012 RNC.

Observations are organized by functional areas, which were identified using the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services' *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, as well as by the NSSE subcommittees established for the 2012 RNC.

The observations are listed in alphabetical order and are not ranked in order of importance. Observations are also categorized as a best practice (BP) and/or lesson learned (LL). A **best practice** reflects activities and actions that aided in the success of the event, and a **lesson learned** reflects areas for improvement, detailing activities or actions that could have improved the operations.

The observations and discussions presented in this Quick-Look Report will be expanded upon in a comprehensive after-action report titled *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies* presenting best practices and lessons learned from both the 2012 Republican National Convention and the 2012 Democratic National Convention.

### 2.1 Access Control: Screening and Physical Security

*This functional area is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the lives and property as well as to the protection of civil liberties—of all patrons, citizens, VIPs, and USSS protectees during the RNC.*

*Observation 2.1.1 (BP): Organized coordination and communication among RNC, state, and local law enforcement organizations helped ease challenges associated with access control to the event venue.*

During the RNC, state and local law enforcement organizations effectively coordinated and communicated with the Tampa International Airport Police Department (TIAPD). The TIAPD provided radios to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), which does not normally monitor (or have the equipment available to monitor) airport radio activity. This allowed the FDLE to coordinate with and provide situational updates to TIAPD on the arrival of governors and other VIPs or dignitaries (DIGs), and allowed the TIAPD to successfully monitor FDLE communications and track protection details as they moved throughout the airport.

In addition, daily 10:00 a.m. briefings occurred between the TIAPD, the Transportation Security Administration, and the FDLE. These briefings allowed agencies to coordinate and exchange dignitary/VIP arrival and departure itineraries and to allocate resources in support of these activities.

***Observation 2.1.2 (BP): Motorcades waiting to transport dignitaries and VIPs to and from the airport were staged in a nearby airport cellphone lot.***

Federal, local, and state law enforcement agencies staged motorcades, which were waiting to transport dignitaries and VIPs from the airport, in a nearby airport cellphone lot. This staging area prevented nearly 90 motorcades from slowing or impeding general public traffic in the arrival/departure airport lanes.

***Observation 2.1.3 (LL): Multiple field commanders working the same incident and contacting the Aviation Supervisor/Air Boss directly rather than communicating via the Multi-agency Coordination Center (MACC) or Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) caused a duplication of efforts.***

The Aviation Security subcommittee was responsible for maintaining airspace security and providing in-air observation throughout the event. In order to do this, the Aviation Security subcommittee divided the aviation support missions into four categories (Footprint, Traffic, Dignitary, and Patrol) with the intent of avoiding duplicative operational activities. Pilots met daily to share information and discuss challenges, which proved invaluable in deconflicting information and resolving problems. However, multiple field commanders, working the same incident, contacting the Aviation Supervisor/Air Boss directly rather than contacting the MACC or ASOC resulted in a duplication of operations. A single point of contact (POC) at the MACC should have been the only person to contact the Aviation Unit where assets would then be dispatched. In addition, although plans stated that only one aircraft would occupy a secure zone at a time, the division allowed for the possibility that multiple aircraft would occupy the same airspace. Law enforcement officials recommended that in similar future operations, a single individual who is situated at the MACC should handle the dispatch of air missions and resource requests.

***Observation 2.1.4 (LL): Communications modes between maritime security units could have been better integrated.***

Maritime communications and communications in other areas (such as the downtown secure zones) were on different channels and/or talk groups. As a result, personnel found it difficult to simultaneously maintain situational awareness of both maritime security issues and the rest of the law enforcement response.

*TPD's Marine Patrol had a unique perspective of the activities while keeping the waterways safe. Eighteen different law enforcement marine units from across Florida patrolled the water on a 24-hour basis.*

*-TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2*

***Observation 2.1.5 (LL): Maritime Security's Heavy Weather Plan was not compatible with the RNC Maritime Security Operational Plan.***

As Hurricane Isaac approached, maritime security personnel discovered that the Maritime Security Heavy Weather Plan did not account for an adequate number of vessels to continuously secure area bridges, as designated in the RNC Maritime Security Operational Plan. Executing the hurricane response plan would have required that personnel assigned to the RNC operation leave their posts

and respond to the hurricane, leaving a gap in convention personnel. A gap in personnel to continuously secure and monitor the bridges would require periodic security sweeps of the bridges to maintain security.

*Observation 2.1.6 (LL): Not all venue security personnel were familiar with their assignments or their surroundings.*



Venue Security Plans did not permanently assign law enforcement personnel to a particular location for the duration of the RNC. As a result, for each day of the event, new personnel struggled to familiarize themselves with their assignments and their surroundings. This created several issues:

- Officers had to be trained and oriented on the job.
- Officers who were not part of TPD often found it difficult to direct delegates/VIPs who needed assistance in locating the venue and its entrance(s).
- Security checks were inconsistent at checkpoints into the venue. While some personnel made extensive checks (reviewing credentials and searching vehicles), others quickly reviewed credentials and waved vehicles in.

While no unlawful entries were made into the secure zones, this situation could have resulted in a serious security breach.

## 2.2 Administrative and Logistics Support

*This functional area is responsible for acquiring, staging, and tracking all available and obtainable resources for the regional public safety agencies affiliated with the RNC during normal and emergency operations.*

*Observation 2.2.1 (BP): Support from local business and community partners was essential to providing resources and logistical support throughout the event.*

One hundred and sixteen local business and community organizations, such as Walgreens, Brighthouse Networks, and the Bank of America (see Appendix C for a complete list), made contributions during the event response. These donations and provision of building spaces proved essential in supporting the response operations of the TPD throughout the event. Donations from the community included cash, water, food, and



first aid supplies. The building spaces housed comfort stations and areas to establish and operate a command center for the law enforcement officers who were supporting the event.

*Observation 2.2.2 (LL): Accurately determining staffing levels will ensure that subsequent operational and support decisions are more exact, efficient and accurate.*

Staffing is often the single most important element of a large-scale operation. The budget for an event is often based on the staffing levels needed. Staffing levels also effect logistical operations like feeding, lodging, uniforms, equipment, and transportation. The staffing levels for a medium-sized city to host an event of this scale are significant. TPD broke the staffing levels down by function, giving staffing allocations for venue security and crowd management priority. In spite of its attempt to organize and obtain the personnel needed ahead of time, TPD was still trying to recruit personnel two weeks before the start of the convention.

TPD notes that sites planning for large-scale events should consider staffing as one of the most important pre-event tasks. TPD also recommends that commitments of personnel by other agencies should be cemented and the event completely staffed for every function before any hotel reservation is made, equipment purchased or food vendors solicited. A recruiting committee should personally contact and visit any agency being considered. TPD notes that agencies should not rely upon any other staffing process that was previously used for large-crowd events like sporting events or parades.

*Observation 2.2.3 (LL): TPD used a travel agency to acquire hotel rooms for supporting law enforcement personnel, which proved costly and inefficient.*

TPD used a travel agency to acquire hotel rooms for the 3,000 law enforcement personnel from across the state that would be supporting the event. Rather than being cost efficient, using the travel agency raised costs and locked the reservations into contracts. This made it difficult to cancel or change reservations.

TPD recommends that the lead organization require the Committee of Arrangements (COA) to reserve a set number of rooms for incoming law enforcement and first responder personnel at various hotels in the jurisdiction where the event is occurring or within a reasonable distance (for rapid response if needed). It was the experience of the 2012 RNC Logistics Committee that well established hotels with good reputations were not releasing rooms for law enforcement/first responders because the COA had secured 90% of the property at event pricing, thus driving up the costs for public safety.

*Observation 2.2.4 (LL): The personnel lists provided by law enforcement agencies supporting the event were inaccurate.*

The personnel lists that TPD used to acquire hotel rooms were out of date and had an inaccurate number of personnel assigned to each operational group (e.g., crowd management, Florida National Guard). As a result, individuals from the same groups were often broken up and divided across multiple hotels, making it difficult for personnel to logistically coordinate shifts be transported to and from their assignments.

*Observation 2.2.5 (LL): TPD experienced technical difficulties in the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tracking and logging of personnel and equipment throughout the event.*

TPD used RFIDs to tag and track personnel in the field and the distribution of equipment. The RFID equipment would scan the barcode on personnel credentials or require personnel to scan their badge and use a computer terminal to sign in. A number of these checkpoints were positioned throughout the secure zones, at meal locations, and at command centers in an effort to track and tag personnel and their equipment as they entered/departed these locations. Ideally, the RFID-tracking information would then be collected into a database and posted into the incident management system (IMS). However, the technology was sporadic; the RFID checkpoints failed to work properly and, as a result, were often overlooked by personnel. Although the inconsistent tagging was not a major issue during the event, it created problems in tracking electronically personnel hours, payroll distribution, and radio assignments (see observation 2.7.2 for more detail). The technology also required reliance on a less efficient manual paper system to track these items.

*Observation 2.2.6 (LL): Planners were unaware of the capabilities that the Florida National Guard could provide.*

Until the last six months of preparation before the event, subcommittees were planning operations around an incorrect understanding of how the Florida National Guard could support the event and the level of capability that they could provide. This changed when representatives from the National Guard participated in the remaining subcommittee meetings and the Executive Steering Committee meetings. This allowed them to deconflict requests and better identify areas where the National Guard could assist and provide support.

*Observation 2.2.7 (LL): Minimal funding from the DOD impacted TPD's ability to obtain the number of Florida National Guardsmen needed to support the event.*

TPD originally planned on the support from around 1,200 National Guardsmen with funding assistance from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD); however, as planning progressed, it was determined that funding from DOD would be limited. TPD used funding from the Department of Justice grant to employ 700 National Guardsmen to assist with the event security. Although the gap in Na-

tional Guardsmen presented a problem in the initial planning, TPD addressed this gap by reallocating or hiring additional personnel to assist.

## 2.3 Command and Control

*This functional area is responsible for command and control operations employed during the RNC.*

**Observation 2.3.1 (BP):** *The presence of TPD and HCSO Commanders in the field proved valuable to operations.*

*When protestors halted their march to lie down in an intersection a patient wall of officers waited them out. And when necessary, Chief John Bennett crouched down to negotiate a resolution with the crowd's leaders.*

*-TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2*

Rather than establishing a fixed command post off-site, TPD and HCSO kept Commanders mobile and in the field. They maintained communications with the varying units via cell-phone, email, and radio communications. If other agencies needed to communicate with TPD, they would contact the TPD representatives at the MACC, who would then relay this information out to the necessary TPD Commanders/supervisors.

Remaining in the field proved effective in supporting operations and mitigating undesirable behaviors. For example, during a two-hour standoff between demonstrators and law enforcement at a busy intersection downtown, Police Chief Castor and Assistant Chief Bennett diffused the situation by personally negotiating with protestors to determine routes that allowed them to exercise their First Amendment rights without entering secure zones. This presence of leadership in the field enabled crowd control operations to quickly respond and may have prevented potentially violent incidents.



**Observation 2.3.2 (LL):** *Operational command of crowd management units should remain static to avoid potential delays in response.*



TPD organized their crowd management units according to sectors. Operational plans defining who would take command and control if demonstrators crossed sectors were unclear. When issues arose, crowd control supervisors decided ad hoc that command would be transferred to crowd control units in the neighboring sector. However, this decision caused further problems as commanders in the transferring sector did not always uphold the agreements that commanders

in the originating sector made with demonstrators. The transferring of command also caused delay in response operations because the transferred command had to reestablish relationships and renegotiate agreements with the demonstrators. Crowd Control units should have retained com-

mand as they moved into neighboring sectors or more clearly defined how a transfer of command would occur to ensure that the agreements made between commanders and demonstrators were kept units crossed sectors.

Figure 1 illustrates the sectors in which crowd management units were organized. Each color (green, purple, orange, red) represents a different crowd management sector.

**Figure 1. Crowd management sectors**



## 2.4 Credentialing

*This functional area is responsible for assisting with the application for and distribution of credentials for all law enforcement officers supporting the convention.*

**Observation 2.4.1 (LL): Supporting law enforcement agencies had difficulty with online credentialing requirements.**

Agencies requesting credentials were asked to submit an application online. Personnel would then receive an email notification from the USSS stating whether their application had been approved or denied.

A number of law enforcement agencies found the online application process to be unclear, which often resulted in incomplete entries. In addition, it was also unclear to agencies which of their employees required credentials. TPD had anticipated printing 4,000 credentials; however, by the end of the event, 8,800 credentials had been entered into the system. Many of these were duplicate en-

tries and/or the result of agencies entering all departmental personnel rather than just those individuals who would be supporting the event. As a result, credential lists were out of order, duplicate credentials were printed, and some individuals had no credentials at all. Credentials were later issued to those individuals who did not receive credentials due to these technical difficulties.

*Observation 2.4.2 (LL): Distributing credentials to each agency, rather than at one central location, did not achieve the anticipated level of efficiency.*

During the planning process, the credentialing subcommittee decided that credentials would be distributed to each agency in an effort to reduce congestion at one central location. Credentials for each agency were issued to that agency's primary POC. Although this worked well for smaller agencies, it caused confusion in larger agencies that had hundreds of personnel and multiple points of contact. Only one of the points of contact was given the credentials for each agency; this created a problem for larger agencies where one POC had to internally coordinate with another POC. When credentials were not correct, it became confusing and inefficient for the agency POC to track which people were still missing credentials and then relay that information back to TPD.

## 2.5 Crowd Management

*This functional area is responsible for managing crowds while maintaining officer and public safety.*

**1,686 Mobile Field Force Team**

200 Bike Cops

50 Mounted Patrol

133 Hours of Training

-TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2

*Observation 2.5.1 (BP): Equipment such as bikes and uniforms influenced positive public perception and allowed crowd control units to respond uniformly and rapidly.*

To ensure that officers supporting crowd control operations operated in a uniform manner, TPD provided each officer with tactical uniforms. These uniforms were light in color in order to keep the officers cool in the hot weather. Arm patches allowed the officers to distinguish their affiliated police department. Officers were also provided with necessary riot gear to respond to a potentially unruly crowd. The specific equipment provided to each officer depended on his or her task assignments.

*Even though they came from 25 local and state law enforcement agencies across Florida, they were all on the same team for the big event.*

-TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2

*The bike patrols steered the protesters through Tampa streets to keep them safe as they exercised their First Amendment rights.*

-TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2

Of the 1,686 officers, 200 were assigned to bike units and 50 to mounted horse units. The bike units allowed the officers to quickly cordon and manage the crowds. Officers on bicycles were used to quickly respond to demonstrators and provided a soft barrier along the demonstration routes. Officers on bicycles often rode to the front of the demonstrator marches and blocked traffic, providing safe routes for these demonstrators

to exercise their constitutional rights. Using bicycles to manage the crowds proved more efficient

than having officers mounted on horses, while still providing a strong police presence. A live presentation of officers employing these tactics was provided to the public a week before the event. Observation 14.1 provides additional detail on how the public was informed of police operations and what to expect during the event.

***Observation 2.5.2 (BP): Police interacted with demonstrators in a cooperative and nonviolent manner.***



Public safety officials were expecting more than 10,000 demonstrators at the 2012 RNC. However, a hurricane was forecast to strike the Tampa region, and the number of demonstrators who participated in the event dwindled to 400-500. TPD made

*The front line officers never responded to the taunts and baiting of would be troublemakers. They exercised great restraint and quickly diffused potential tipping points.*

*- TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2*

an active effort to accommodate the demonstrators and allow them the space and ability to demonstrate, as long as there were no compromises to the safety of demonstrators and officers. At the end of the event, TPD made only two arrests related to the RNC.

***Observation 2.5.3 (BP): Crowd Management officers scanned and secured the downtown area days before the event.***

Two days before the RNC started, the Crowd Management officers policed the area downtown for objects that demonstrators could use to throw at the officers or damage property. These officers collected numerous piles of bricks, bottles, and pipes as a result of these proactive efforts.

***Observation 2.5.4 (LL): Transportation plans adversely impacted deployment plans for crowd control units.***

Planners realized that the public transit system had few buses available for the use by crowd control units, and school buses could not adequately hold the officer's gear. This resulted in the need to hire buses in an area where no buses were available for hire (due to the 450 buses already procured by the RNC). At the last minute an agreement was reached between TPD and the RNC COA that the crowd control units could use a proportion of RNC buses to assist in their operations. During the event, it turned out that the limited amount of buses to transport officers to their meal locations resulted in a delay for officers ending and beginning their shifts.

The limited resources for transportation also affected the ability for units to maintain a 24/7 quick response. Although the need for a quick response did not present itself during the event, if the need had arisen and buses were not available, this would have caused delays in response to potentially violent demonstrations and increased the risk to officer safety. This issue was eventually resolved by reallocating buses and/or using other methods of transportation, such as utility vehicles.

## 2.6 Dignitary/VIP protection

*This functional area covers establishing security procedures and plans for protective details, as well as coordinating the use of multi-agency resources to assist visitors of the 2012 RNC.*

*Observation 2.6.1 (BP): Plain-clothes officers used lapel pins as a way to identify themselves to other law enforcement officers.*

Lapel pins were used by most agencies working plain-clothes assignments to give quick references for law enforcement officers identifying other law enforcement officers, which sped up most encounters. The pins were easily recognizable, more so than the small “E” on the USSS identification cards hanging around officers’ necks. Designing a hard lapel pin to be used for all local and state personnel during any event regardless of plain clothes or uniform assignments would make it easier for outside agencies to recognize local and state officers involved in providing security operations during the event. Because there were several different lapel pins, personnel working at each post/check point was provided with a small printed book that contained pictures of each lapel pin and the agency name it represented.

*Observation 2.6.2 (LL): Staffing non-NSSE events with local law enforcement is dependent upon good communication with the dignitary/VIP protection detail teams.*

TPD established a reserve force of uniform officers, or “Jump Teams” to support the protective details that attend events outside of the NSSE venues. These units needed to be mobile, flexible, and ready to deploy on short notice. The teams were made up of local law enforcement officers and provided a police presence at non-NSSE sites and took on duties such as providing traffic control, crowd control, and exterior and interior security posts. The primary challenge with these teams was the unwillingness by some out of state VIP/DIG protection details to communicate basic scheduled movements of their VIP/DIG causing the Jump Teams to choose which non NSSE event they would assist with, as there were multiple events occurring simultaneously throughout the Tampa Bay area. Jump Teams needed to consider many factors quickly, such as type of event, number and type of attendee, and location and size of venue, to determine the best use of their limited assets.

*Observation 2.6.3 (LL): Logistical planning should account for officer lodging in relation to post assignments.*

Officers assigned to protection/movement teams were often housed in hotels up to two hours away from where the dignitaries were staying. This travel time was in addition to an officer’s average 19-hour shift. The time spent travelling to and from the dignitaries caused extreme fatigue among the officers after multiple shifts. This issue not only created concern about the ability of officers to provide protection to dignitaries but also raised concerns about officer safety.

*Observation 2.6.4 (LL): Providing meals for officers who have mobile assignments and outlying hotels should be given special consideration.*

Protection details and motorcade officers often worked long hours and were required to assist in the movements of the DIG/VIPs throughout Tampa Bay area, to include movements on a moment's notice, during the RNC. This was accomplished with limited consideration of an officer's basic needs. The predetermined and established locations for DIG/VIP officer's feeding stations were not conducive to those who were continuously on the move or those assigned to hotels. Special considerations to feed these officers should include per diems/stipend and/or the ability to eat at any feeding location they can physically reach during their hours of operation.

## **2.7 Financial/Grant management**

*This functional area was responsible for the distribution, management, and review of the funds used to support public safety efforts during the 2012 RNC.*

*Observation 2.7.1 (LL): The use of federal funding will be a significant factor in pre-event planning efforts.*

BJA provided a timeline which outlines the grant award process and an overview of the federal funding process for such events (see *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*). This timeline notes that there is a mandatory budget review and clearance process that is often the lengthiest segment of the grant award timeline. In Charlotte's experience, several budget revisions and follow-up phone calls with the funding agency (BJA) were necessary prior to receiving grant funds. The 2012 convention grants involved a stringent review process due to the size of the grant award, to strengthen internal controls, and to provide prudent stewardship of grant funds.

Special conditions imposed on these nominating convention grant awards included specific requirements related to drawing down funds and a limit on amounts of cash-on-hand. Major equipment purchases required pre-approval and a written justification.

*Observation 2.7.2 (LL): The technologies and back-up procedures put in place to track personnel during the event failed and/or were inconsistent and have caused difficulties for TPD in processing payroll.*

The IMS and RFID were set up prior to the event to track hours worked for each officer. In addition to these systems, TPD had supervisors keep sign-in sheets. The RFID tracking system experienced a number of technical difficulties in logging personnel in and out and therefore inconsistently reported into the IMS (see Observation 2.2.4). Without these mechanisms, the sign-in sheets became imperative.

However, after the event, TPD discovered inconsistencies in the completion of these sign-in sheets. Some supervisors were consistent, while others did not have their officers sign in and/or out. This caused issues in processing payroll. To track personnel hours, TPD has had to cross-reference agency-specific schedules with original deployment sheets. If information was missing or discrepancies existed, TPD had to contact the officer's commander or supervisor to confirm hours worked and complete reimbursements to the officers.

## **2.8 Fire/Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT)/Emergency Medical Services (EMS)/Hospitals/Public Health**

*This functional area was responsible for providing Fire/ HAZMAT/ Life Safety response in support of all events and/or incidents surrounding the 2012 RNC, while maintaining current response requirements for the citizens of the City of Tampa.*

***Observation 2.8.1 (BP): Established relationships with medical partners across the region aided in the planning and response operations for local fire and EMS officials.***

To prepare for an event of this magnitude, the Health and Medical subcommittee relied on established relationships with regional medical partners. For example, the Tampa Fire Department and EMS worked together in the past on emergency exercises and drills, lending each agency to develop a complete understanding of what level of response the partner could provide and how to allocate medical resources accordingly. These established relationships enabled these organizations to work with each other seamlessly.

***Observation 2.8.2 (LL): Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) were not aware of the established communications procedures or resource-request processes.***

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services provided 99 DMAT personnel to support health and medical operations throughout the event. DMAT units arrived a day before the event to prepare and address any issues, but DMAT supervisors realized that they were unsure as to how the Tampa Fire Department and EMS would request their assistance. However, once the DMAT supervisors communicated directly with one of the Assistant Fire Chiefs, this communication issue was resolved prior to the event. DMAT made sure that the Tampa Fire Department and EMS personnel at the MACC were aware of the DMAT capability and instructed that these agencies were to notify the DMAT supervisor if support was needed.



*Observation 2.8.3 (LL): The JHERT and JHAT concepts should be re-evaluated as many of the job functions are overlapping and redundant.*

Having both the Joint Hazardous Explosive Response Team (JHERT) and the Joint Hazard Assessment Team (JHAT) response to incidents was often redundant and unnecessary. One cross-trained bomb technician/hazardous materials specialist is capable of assessing incidents for “All Hazards” and can request specialized assets as needed.

*Observation 2.8.4 (LL): The All Hazards Center (AHC) should be more streamlined to only include operational personnel and have fewer “liaison”-type personnel assigned.*

There were too many personnel in the AHC dispatching Render Safe Teams or explosive detection teams. The additional personnel created confusion when they answered the phone calls requesting bomb assets response. The AHC should have been co-located with the Bomb Operations Center. There should be a separate daily brief for bomb and Weapons of Mass Destruction issues. In addition to this there should only be one central number for the All Hazards Desk. There was some confusion regarding the number of the All Hazards Desk.

## **2.9 Intelligence/Counterterrorism/Counter Surveillance**

*This functional area was responsible for obtaining, assessing, and disseminating information about individuals and groups who might pose a threat to protectees and designated venues associated with the 2012 RNC.*

*Observation 2.9.1 (BP): Intelligence and counterterrorism operations were critical to the success of crowd-management operations.*

The Intelligence and Counterterrorism subcommittee deployed a number of sources, also known as Intelligence Team (I-Team) members, into the field throughout the event. These sources used smart phones to survey suspicious persons and to receive and relay reports of suspicious activity.<sup>5</sup> Personnel in the Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) vetted intelligence reports received from I-Teams and/or social media sources. Once vetted, this information was released to supervisory officers in the field using the IMS and Digital Sandbox software. These software systems also allowed supervisors in the field and at the MACC to maintain situational awareness of intelligence information by tracking I-Team members on maps and displaying intelligence and informational reports and activity. An Intelligence agent was also sent into the field to stand by each field commander to deliver the information and intelligence verbally in order to ensure that field commanders understood and were able to keep up with the intelligence information relevant to their operations.

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<sup>5</sup> It is important to note that all officers received training regarding privacy and civil liberties prior to the event.

*Observation 2.9.2 (BP): Both the Tampa and St. Petersburg Police Departments used Long Term Evolution cellular network technology to successfully maintain situational awareness for crowd control and intelligence operations.*

The 700-megahertz Long Term Evolution (LTE) network used during the RNC by the Tampa and St. Petersburg Police Departments “was a demonstration project for the proposed National Public Safety Broadband Network,” providing officers with “interoperable voice, video, and data communications.”<sup>6</sup> The Intelligence and Counterterrorism subcommittee issued iPhones that operated under this LTE network to its sources in the field. This network allowed sources in the field (also known as I-Teams) to deliver “video from the streets to command centers and from one officer to another, and to track the location of individual officers by Global Positioning System” all over a secure network.<sup>7</sup> Not using a commercial cellphone service provider also ensured that the relay of intelligence information would be secure and not be affected by network congestion.

Although this technology allowed for TPD and the St. Petersburg Police Department to maintain situational awareness among crowd control and intelligence operations, officers’ unfamiliarity with these technologies initially resulted in slow communications between the IOC and the I-Teams. Personnel found the systems easier to work with as the event progressed. Although training on these systems was provided prior to the event, it was not adequate. (Additional observations on technology can be found in 2.10 Interagency communications and technology.)

*Observation 2.9.3 (LL): Co-locating the IOC and the Joint Operations Center (JOC) can cause inefficiencies in processing intelligence information.*

The co-location of the JOC and IOC, made the flow of information extremely confusing. Whenever the All Hazards Desk requested items to be handled by personnel in the IOC, they were sent to three or four different entities to make it happen. The All Hazards Desk personnel hesitated to provide information or make any requests because there always seemed to be confusion on the floor of the JOC and IOC about what operation center was processing what information.

## **2.10 Interagency Communications and Technology**

*This functional area was responsible for establishing primary and backup communications capabilities that allow local, state, federal, and other agencies to effectively communicate with necessary individuals as required throughout the event.*

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<sup>6</sup> Jackson, W. “Public safety network put to the test at RNC in Tampa.” *Government Computer News- Police One.com*. September 18, 2012. <http://www.policeone.com/police-products/communications/articles/5984134-Public-safety-network-put-to-the-test-at-RNC-in-Tampa>.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

*Observation 2.10.1 (BP): Use of talk-groups (channels) reduced radio congestion and ensured that radio communications could not be scanned by non-law enforcement officials.*

As planned, the communications subcommittee established new radio talk-groups for both the Tampa RNC event and the St. Petersburg Welcome event. These talk-groups limited congestion and unwanted interference and used digital technology that prevented individuals from scanning the radio channels. This limited the potential for outsiders to access sensitive information.

*Observation 2.10.2 (BP): Communications personnel established call signs for each squad, which minimized confusion and miscommunications during the event.*

As part of the Communications plan, officers and supervisors were instructed that only supervisors and designated personnel were to talk on the radio during the RNC in order to keep the radio traffic to a minimum. This worked very effectively which enabled the Crowd Management supervisors to communicate on the radio. Communications personnel added five new dispatch positions to handle RNC traffic and five backup positions if needed. The communications system never surpassed 30 percent usage; thus, there were no queuing issues, and the backup systems were minimally utilized.

*Observation 2.10.3 (BP): Tampa Police Communications had a list of the numbers and names of the officer/sheriff for each radio assigned.*

Having this list helped when a microphone became stuck or the panic button on the radio was pushed accidentally. Communications was able to contact the person via phone or by one of the other officers near him or her. The Communications group unit leader was also able to turn off the radio if contact could not be made to clear up the channel.

*Observation 2.10.4 (BP/LL): Public safety officials used several technologies to maintain situational awareness throughout the event.*

Each technology provided different capabilities; for example, one software enabled officers to send mass emails and/or text messages, and a different system tracked and prioritized each incident and mapped nearby critical infrastructures. Although each of these tools provided differing capabilities, the IMS served as the primary source for incident information for public safety officers. It provided officers with a comprehensive format to view both planned and unplanned events, to track incidents as reported, and to view schedules for demonstrations and other RNC-related events.



*Communications set up a robust system with nine additional radio channels, four dedicated phone lines and an RNC supervisor. The information they gathered was then relayed to the numerous command centers...*

incidents as reported, and to view schedules for demonstrations and other RNC-related events.

Although the combination of these technologies provided a complete method for maintaining situational awareness throughout the

event, training on how to use the various situational awareness technologies was limited. Officers were often unfamiliar with the capabilities of each technology due to a limited amount of training. Many officers found that as the event progressed they were able to more easily access and use the technologies to maintain situational awareness of the event.

*Observation 2.10.5 (BP): The Tampa Police Communications Center established its own internal webpage to store and share communications information during the RNC.*

Rosters, phone numbers, radio numbers, schedules, RNC information, and other similar types of information were stored on this internal website. The internal webpage allowed the dispatchers to quickly access information and provide essential information to the officers and supervisors working the event.

*Observation 2.10.6 (BP): Personnel with expertise in the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) program were positioned in the Communication Center throughout the event in an effort to resolve any technological issues.*

The City of Tampa's Technology and Innovations Computer Security personnel and the Program Analyst who oversees the CAD program were both stationed within the TPD Police Communications Center during the week of the RNC. This allows technological and security issues and compromises to the CAD system to be easily and quickly addressed.

*Observation 2.10.7 (BP/LL): Law Enforcement personnel successfully managed, maintained, and demobilized radio communications equipment.*

Although the Communications subcommittee had not formally established a demobilization plan, TPD was able to retrieve all but four radios a week after the event. The missing radios were returned within a month. In addition to manual sign-out sheets, each radio had a RFID attached to track who received the radios. However, the RFID system was unable to merge the multiple spreadsheets, thus delaying the creation of a master radio assignment list, which took TPD a day and a half to produce utilizing the paper sign-out sheets. The Communications subcommittee shared this lesson with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department prior to its efforts with the Democratic National Convention.

*Observation 2.10.8 (LL): The CAD system could only log a limited number of personnel as responding to the event.*

The CAD system could only handle about 800 personnel; when 752 personnel were logged, the system slowed down. Officers were logged out of the system in order to ensure that the CAD did not fail.

*Observation 2.10.9 (LL): The RNC Commission provided radios to each of the bus drivers assigned to transport delegates and VIPs. However, these radios were not tested before the event and were not operational.*

Because the radios assigned to bus drivers and the communication plans were not tested before the event, the bus driver's ability to send an administrative message (e.g., location, status, ETA) was hampered which slowed the transportation process. On occasion, the bus drivers resorted to using the law enforcement officer assigned to their bus to relay bus specific communications to the Transportation Management Center and to other bus drivers. This caused congestion and non-essential communications to interfere with law enforcement/public safety radio communications.

## **2.11 Legal**

*This functional area was responsible for providing legal support to the other subcommittees and responding to the legal questions that arose, including questions of public disclosure and attempting to minimize risk in civil liberties litigation.*

*Observation 2.11.1 (BP): Coordinated planning prevented litigation challenges prior to the RNC.*

The lack of litigation challenges prior to the event was due in part to the subcommittee's pre-event engagement with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The Legal subcommittee was comprised of representation from all major planning agencies and met on a monthly basis during the entire planning effort. The Legal subcommittee provided a breadth of legal knowledge and experience among members that allowed them to respond to ad hoc questions on legal issues during both the planning process and operational phase. In addition, the subcommittee met extensively with the ACLU in advance of the event. This outreach and relationship-building ensured that the subcommittee addressed the ACLU's questions and concerns prior to the event.

*Observation 2.11.2 (BP): An Event Zone Ordinance provided officers the necessary tools to intervene in mass demonstration situations having the potential to become riots or instances of damage to public or private property.*

Details of the ordinance, which outlined the designated locations where protestors were allowed to demonstrate were discussed in advance with groups like the ACLU and made available to the media. Although the ordinance produced only one arrest (a mask violation) the mere existence of the ordinance and the dialog surrounding its passage sent a general message that TPD was not going to lose control of the streets to the demonstrators.

*Observation 2.11.3 (BP): A mutual aid agreement was established to ensure that the officers from the assisting agencies had legal jurisdiction in the entire Tampa Bay area.*

Legal members were responsible for ensuring that all officers from the assisting agencies had legal jurisdiction in the entire Tampa Bay area and that all were covered by a broad inter-local agreement that dealt with critical topics such as compensation, insurance, and compliance with grant conditions and a variety of others. Without the mutual aid agreement, assistance from agencies outside of Hillsborough County would not have been possible. Legal members also prepared or reviewed many contracts by which the city obtained necessary goods and services including hotel accommodations, food, office space, etc.

*Observation 2.11.4 (BP): The Legal group provided guidance in the handling of hundreds of public records requests received before, during and after the RNC.*

In some cases, Legal subcommittee members provided the redaction of confidential information from otherwise public documents to ensure the safety of dignitaries and officers. No legal action challenging the city on public records grounds was instituted.

## **2.12 Non-event Patrol**

*This functional area was responsible for maintaining current public safety response requirements for the citizens of the City of Tampa during the 2012 RNC.*

*Observation 2.12.1 (BP): TPD effectively implemented and executed the deployment of its patrol officers for calls for service unrelated to the RNC.*

Regular TPD patrol operations were not affected by RNC operations. TPD's priority in planning for the event was to ensure that non-RNC patrol operations would remain adequately staffed. In addition to responding to normal day-to-day operations, regular patrol officers also supported the RNC crowd control units when demonstrations ventured into areas outside of the designated march routes. To maintain situational awareness with event incidents, patrol supervisors provided patrol officers with daily roll calls and briefings between relief shifts.

Because there was a potential for non-event patrol officers to come into contact with demonstrators, in each shift briefing, TPD reiterated the department's clear and concise expectation of demonstrator rights and the need for officers to show tolerance and patience.

*Observation 2.12.2 (LL): Although the communications between teams was good overall, communication modes between patrol and crowd control teams were lacking.*


Each of the four RNC zones had a patrol element of four officers assigned to it within the Crowd Management Group to answer normal calls for service so that patrol officers from outside the downtown area did not have to respond. Patrol officers were often the first units to respond to unplanned demonstrations outside the RNC area, and, as a result, they often had to communicate with crowd management units about the demonstrators' activities. Crowd management operations were on a different radio channel than patrol operations but both patrol and crowd management officers had each other's channels programmed in their radios so they could talk to one another. If patrol officers had a crowd control situation, the patrol Lieutenant would contact the Major of patrol operations, who would then contact the crowd control supervisor on duty. Although the Major of patrol operations had access to the communications software and could contact key crowd control personnel, she was the only one with access.<sup>8</sup> Additional points of access should be provided to multiple supervisors on duty during these large scale events. (Additional observations on communications can be found in 2.10 Interagency Communications and Technology).

## 2.13 Prisoner Processing

*This functional area was responsible for supporting mobile processing and booking capabilities for all law enforcement and the USSS during the 2012 RNC.*

*Observation 2.13.1:9 (BP) Law enforcement personnel assigned to prisoner processing were logistically prepared to deal with a large number of prisoners.*

The prisoner processing and transportation plan and operation were designed to provide movement for up to 300 arrestees at any given time. However, because the expected number of demonstrators did not attend the event, the combination of a low number of demonstrators and the cooperative relationship between these demonstrators and the police ultimately led to a low number of arrests. TPD



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<sup>8</sup> Communications had access to a software system that could connect any patrol supervisors with Crowd Management Leaders by phone.

<sup>9</sup> Although the plans and procedures for processing prisoners was not tested because the number of arrests were so low (TPD made only two arrests), officials were logistically prepared to deal with a larger number of prisoners.

made two arrests during the event, and as a result, the prisoner-processing facility was never fully staffed or operational. Court appearances for those charged with RNC-related offenses were conducted as part of the normal court docket.

## 2.14 Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities

*This functional area was responsible for developing and coordinating a critical infrastructure plan that would monitor and safeguard all computer systems, communications systems, energy systems, pipelines, railroads, and utility services.*

**Observation 2.14.1 (BP):** *TPD used risk assessments and other critical infrastructure survey tools to identify and protect critical infrastructure.*

In preparing for the convention, TPD, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, assessed the risk of over 60 critical sites, such as utilities, waterways, and hotels. To accomplish this, TPD used risk management software and a survey tool developed for a previous national presidential convention. This risk management software was also used during the event to categorize and track incidents according to levels of risk. In addition to TPD, this software tool was also made available to the sources in the field so that they could track their positions in relation to critical infrastructures. This access gave the sources in the field context to their surveillance and allowed them to prioritize suspicious activity if it was near critical infrastructures.

## 2.15 Public Information and Media Relations

*This functional area was responsible for developing and coordinating operational strategies that enable law enforcement media representatives to speak with one voice to the media and stakeholders concerning the design and implementation of the security plan for the 2012 RNC.*

**Observation 2.15.1 (BP):** *Through its planning and operational strategies, the Public Affairs subcommittee was successful in achieving a positive public perception throughout the event.*



TPD determined that it must reach four critical audiences in order to have a successful political convention in its city: media, law enforcement, demonstrators, the media, and the community at large. In the year leading up to the event, all Public Information Officer (PIO) activities were designed to influence one of these four groups. In an effort to assist other agencies in developing similar strategies, TPD developed suggested guidelines for public infor-



be given, etc.). During the event, TPD provided a secure lot to representatives from the media where they could park their satellite trucks and run their operations.

During the event, TPD, HCSO, and the Mayor also held three press briefings a day, at 10:30 a.m., 4:00 p.m., and 8:00 p.m.

**Community.** The Public Affairs subcommittee provided the local community with information on law enforcement operations prior to and during the event. Prior to the event, the subcommittee held town hall meetings for the public, which were facilitated by the leaders of the city (e.g., the Mayor, the Police Chief, the Head of Transportation) and were designed to inform the public on what to expect prior to and during the event. In addition, a week before the event, TPD provided a live demonstration to the public of their equipment and planned operations.



The subcommittee also deployed an “Alert Tampa” campaign to get local community members to sign up to receive alerts on traffic and public safety to their mobile phones during the event. Prior to the event, just fewer than 8,000 people subscribed to Alert Tampa; at the beginning of the event, the number of subscribers more than doubled to 16,548. In addition to Alert Tampa, the subcommittee developed Business Alerts for local businesses that were affected by the event. Thirty-nine local businesses and 95 individuals signed up for these alerts.

During the event, TPD provided the public with access to the IMS. This allowed members of the community interested in the event and law enforcement response to view and track incidents as they were logged into the system.

***Observation 2.15.2 (BP/LL): TPD used social media platforms to build a positive public perception.***

Engaging the public via social media often takes time, and staff members are not always available. Prior to the RNC, TPD’s presence on Twitter and Facebook was minimal.

*Tampa Police rewrote the book on policing the RNC and it was obvious in the images generated in the local, national, and social media.*


*-TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2*

To boost its social media presence and assist with building a positive public perception in real time, the TPD Public Information Office brought in assistance from law enforcement agencies across the country. PIOs/social media experts from these agencies assisted TPD with posting pictures of their officers responding to demonstrations, assisting visitors, providing water to the public, and providing updates on weather and traffic on both their Facebook and Twitter accounts throughout


the event. In the week of the event, the number of TPD Twitter followers increased 319 percent, and the number of “likes” on Facebook increased 26 percent.

After the event, the PIOs/social media experts from agencies who assisted TPD during the event suggested that the TPD PIO staff continue to engage their social media communities by posting daily updates regarding regular operations. TPD has continued its social media efforts and, as a result, the number of Twitter followers has grown from 361 to 676; the number of Facebook “likes” has increased from 3,100 to 3,954 since the event.

**Figure 2. Twitter followers**



**Figure 3. Facebook likes**



*Observation 2.15.3 (LL): Establishing a local Joint Information Center (JIC) can ensure that the local community is well informed about public safety activities throughout the event.*

The JIC established by the USSS operated under a different set of goals and objectives, and did not align with the priorities of the local public information officers. While the local priority is in informing the public about the convention events and public safety related issues, the USSS JIC is focused on communications directly related to the security of event venue and dignitary/VIP related

issues. TPD was designated one seat within the USSS JIC. TPD felt this arrangement would not meet the objectives of its public information office and as a result formed a local JIC. This local JIC was staffed by PIOs from law enforcement agencies in neighboring jurisdictions. The responsibility of the local JIC was to report incidents (e.g., street closures, disturbances, unscheduled demonstrations and marches) that affected, both positively and negatively, local communities.

## 2.16 Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response

*This functional area was responsible for discussions about responding to, assessing, and rendering safe any suspicious items or improvised explosive devices in such a way as to safeguard life and property and restore the situation to normal as soon as possible after an incident.*

*Observation 2.16.1 (BP): The operational response of the explosive device response teams during the event was successful.*

*The Tampa Police K-9 unit hosted 45 explosive detection dog teams from around the state and the nation.*

*-TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2*

The Explosive Device Response subcommittee brought in 45 local and state K-9s, as well as several federal K-9 units. In total, explosive device response units responded to a number of calls for unattended packages and for suspicious packages/vehicles. These operations successfully aligned with the plans established prior to the event, and any requests for assistance during the event were responded to quickly with adequate personnel and equipment. By deploying four-person render safe teams, with canines, across the Tampa Bay region, responses to unknown and suspicious incidents were rapid and effective. The average time to resolve unknown and suspicious incidents in Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties from dispatch to resolution was 24 minutes. During the deployment period, the Regional Bomb Teams responded to Hillsborough, Pinellas, Sarasota, and Polk Counties. Four of the Explosive Device Response units were assigned to work solely with the crowd management subcommittee.

*Observation 2.16.2 (BP): The use of local bomb technicians and bomb canines ensured that TPD would have an adequate number of personnel and allowed for the majority of participants to train together prior to the event.*

Partnerships with regional bomb technicians and bomb canines have developed over the past decade and were used in other events like Super Bowl XL. As a result, several state/local bomb technicians and explosive detection canines supported the 2012 RNC. These resources were supplemented by federal resources. The use of regional resources strengthened regional working relationships for future events and incidents.

*Observation 2.16.3 (BP): The bomb technicians and canine handlers worked well together.*

Numerous training evolutions were held to enhance this integration for both the bomb techs and the canine handlers. There were no incidents in which either the bomb technicians or the canine handler felt uncomfortable with the manner in which the incident was resolved. The bomb dogs helped to expedite the resolution of unattended packages. Continued training is important for the continued success of this concept.

*Observation 2.16.4 (BP): The established protocols for responding to unattended and suspicious packages ensured the effective and rapid resolution of incidents.*

Establishing differing protocols for responding to unattended and suspicious packages turned out to be a truly outstanding concept. Of the 63 bomb responses during the deployment period, 34 were for unattended packages/vehicles and 23 were for suspicious packages/vehicles. Bomb technicians and canine handlers worked in tandem to resolve all of the unattended package calls and all but one of the suspicious package calls were handled in the same manner. The training and exercises presented to the bomb technicians and canine handlers allowed them to conduct their own threat assessment of the suspicious package calls and where practical they reassessed the calls as unattended packages. A review of all of these calls initially labeled as suspicious shows that the judgment of the bomb techs and canine handlers was sound. The effective and rapid resolution of these incidents results in minimal to no disruptions to the public, while still adhering to our mission of public safety.

## **2.17 Training**

*This functional area was responsible for providing and coordinating training requests in preparation for the 2012 RNC.*

Examples of the training materials used in both the RNC and DNC will be made available as part of the Appendix in *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*.

*Observation 2.17.1 (BP): Intermediate training provided by TPD was successful in setting officers' expectations and preparing officers assigned to crowd control operations.*

One thousand six hundred and eighty six officers from across the state of Florida made up the crowd control force during the RNC. In order for officers to qualify to support event operations, they had to complete an E-Learning course. This course provided officers with a review of the

*Together [the RNC Bike Patrol Field Force] trained uphill, down steps, on paved roads and gravel parking lots for two weeks on specially outfitted patrol bikes.*

*-TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2*

TPD departmental policies and procedures related to the use of force and response to a large-scale event.

*The intense training started more than a year before the event; preparing the teams mentally and physically for the arduous task of providing a safe environment for those wishing to express their constitutionally protected opinions.*

*-TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2*

TPD provided extensive training to all officers supporting the event, as well as bicycles to 200 of the officers. All officers received training regarding privacy and civil liberties prior to the event. In addition, two weeks before the event, TPD held a three-day Field Force Training for the nearly 1,900 officers. They were presented with a message from the Chief and Sheriff, as well as a public perception Microsoft® PowerPoint presentation that reviewed both appropriate and inappropriate police actions in managing a

crowd. This training, entitled “Don’t be that guy,” reinforced the appropriate actions police should take in enforcing public safety. It also reinforced TPD’s departmental policies on the use of force and provided officers with additional insight on how an adverse reaction or a lapse in judgment can easily play into an overall negative public perception of the department. The training also included presentations by the ACLU and prepared officers for the event, ensuring that they appropriately respond to potentially violent demonstrators as a single unit rather than in multiple units from multiple agencies. Supervisors and commanders were provided with an additional two days of supervisory training. In total, officers received 10 days of training.

In addition, during the event TPD gave officers pocket guides that provided brief references on TPD’s use of force policy and arrest procedures, as well as information on medical illnesses, hazardous materials, and maps depicting the event zone, comfort stations, the public viewing area, and a list of items prohibited citywide. Examples of the pocket guides used in both the RNC and DNC will be made available as part of the Appendix in *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*.

***Observation 2.17.2 (BP): TPD adequately prepared the public and community stakeholders for the event by conducting an RNC-specific Citizen’s Academy.***

TPD held an RNC-specific Citizen’s Academy for community leaders two weeks before the event. This Academy provided community leaders with scenarios of incidents that have occurred in past protests, and the law enforcement response to these different types of incidents, including the escalating levels of violence. This training was tailored to a public audience, providing them with the information they needed to build a positive perception of the department’s efforts to ensure public safety.

*Observation 2.17.3 (BP): TPD provided officers with adequate reference material on how to use radios.*

The communications subcommittee provided the crowd management and traffic units with reference brochures and cards that listed the profiles of radio channels. This reference material served as a quick guide and on-the-job training for using the radio, identifying call signs, and using additional radio equipment provided (earpiece and microphone).

## **2.18 Transportation and Traffic**

*This functional area was responsible for coordinating motorcade and waterway route security for the safe transportation of delegates, governmental protectees, congressional members, and event participants as well as developing a plan for the control and diversion/rerouting of pedestrian and commercial traffic.*

*Observation 2.18.1 (BP): Despite road closures and geographic displacements downtown, daily traffic in Tampa remained unaffected.*

Despite a number of road closures and traffic detours, there were no reports of significant traffic congestion and/or major delays. Approximately two weeks before the event, TPD released the Transportation Plan to the public, which provided the local community, media, and visitors with information on road closures, parking restrictions, pedestrian restrictions, alternate routes, air-space restrictions, and available public transit. The plan also included maps of all of the affected roads and pedestrian walkways. The decision to release this plan to the public ensured that the local community knew what to expect during the event and what detours to use if trying to access areas in or around the city.

*The Transportation Information Command Center did such a terrific job minimizing the impact on downtown commuters and residents that the transportation plan earned an “A” from the Tampa Tribune.*

*-TPD Signal 14 Vol. 7 Issue 2*

In addition to the plan, TPD also used its website to push out the information with “user friendly” maps and answers to frequently asked questions. This proved extremely beneficial. TPD also pushed out this information via town hall meetings. TPD requested that the USSS release the transportation plan earlier than was planned; this early release was instrumental in educating the public about the transportation activities.

*Observation 2.18.2 (BP): Traffic Command Center involved the right stakeholders in the early stages of planning for the event.*

The Transportation subcommittee identified the key stakeholders early on in the planning, which included both sworn and civilian entities. The local and state transportation departments were instrumental to the success of this operation. During the event, the Florida Department of Transportation provided its camera room as a command post, which had access to all local, county, and region

traffic cameras. This command post had all the assets and personnel to support the operation during the event.

*Observation 2.18.3 (LL): The bus transportation plan for transporting dignitaries and VIPs to and from the venue was complicated and inefficient.*

A majority of the personnel designated to transportation activities were assigned a week before the event. This limited the ability of personnel assigned to the buses to adequately review and practice bus plans. In addition, the bus plan was complex. In the planning stages, the RNC Commission had decided not to purchase bus lots close to the venue. As a result, some buses were forced to park far from the venue, increasing chances of bus drivers—who were not familiar with the geography and/or road closures/detours—of getting lost. In various instances, bus drivers got lost and/or dropped delegates off at the wrong location, causing delegates to be late to convention events.

*Observation 2.18.4 (LL): Increases in the number of delegate buses and the intelligence on security risks to the transportation system, placed strain on the number of traffic control officers in and around the downtown area.*

As a result of this shortage, not all intersections had traffic officers and key locations had to be identified to triage the deployment of traffic officers. Despite no real complaints and receiving an “A” on the traffic plan by the local newspaper, several key traffic back-ups were challenging for the number of officers working the intersections. Additionally, two thirds of the delegates were in hotels over 45 minutes outside the downtown core, which required more route security officers than were initially planned for.

*Observation 2.18.5 (LL): Varying transportation operational plans and responsibilities within and outside the venue perimeter caused inefficiencies in traffic control.*

The traffic and transportation subcommittee’s primary responsibility was to coordinate and control transportation outside of the venue perimeter security line. The venue security subcommittee handled all matters inside the venue perimeter. Variances in operational plans relating to traffic control between both subcommittees proved challenging for transportation. There were different philosophies on traffic and transportation between the subcommittees and having all traffic and transportation under one subcommittee may have resulted in overall enhanced proficiency.

# Conclusion

Intense planning, flexibility, and long-standing or well-established (either/or) relationships with other local and state public safety agencies proved to be critical to TPD's success in maintaining security and public safety throughout the 2012 Republican National Convention. Subcommittees and core planning teams established effective operational plans, policies, and collaborative partnerships during the 28 months prior to the event.

TPD understood the magnitude of the event and the potential for violent demonstrations, clashes between the police and demonstrators, and the high risk to officer safety. In reviewing the law enforcement response in previous similar large-scale events, it became clear to the Chief and her Assistant Chiefs that different tactics, strategies, and an overall philosophy had to be used to ensure the safety of attendees, demonstrators, and officers assisting in the response.

In preparation for the event, TPD was able to recruit more than 5,500 state and local law enforcement officers from across the State of Florida to provide safety to over 80 venues, 60 critical infrastructure sites, hundreds of delegates and VIPs, and thousands of event attendees.

In order to maintain uniformity and consistency among these officers from multiple agencies, TPD employed several strategies to ensure that officers from other agencies followed TPD's practices and protocols throughout the event. TPD also conducted training that emphasized the need to protect the constitutional rights of demonstrators and the importance for law enforcement personnel to avoid behavior that could result in civil litigation; provided officers with a pocket guide that detailed operations, legal issues, and logistical information; and gave radios to crowd control officers to maintain a single form of communication. Crowd control operations proved effective with the management of hundreds of demonstrators and the arrest of only two individuals. In addition, command and control of the event was effectively coordinated through a number of operations centers, daily meetings, and a common communication radio network.

Overall, TPD operational response throughout the RNC aligned with its mission and planning objectives and proved a success as there were no compromises to officer safety and only two arrests were made. Officers were prepared to deal with the incidents that arose and were able to maintain positive interactions with the demonstrators throughout the event.

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# Appendix A. Republican National Committee Planning Subcommittees

The list below identifies the 24 planning subcommittees (in alphabetical order) that were established for the 2012 Republican National Convention.

1. Airport
2. Airspace Security
3. Civil Disturbance
4. Consequence Management
5. Counter Surveillance
6. Credentialing
7. Crisis Management
8. Critical Infrastructure Protection
9. Crowd Management
10. Dignitary/VIP Protection
11. Explosive Device Response
12. Fire/Life Safety/Hazardous Materials
13. Health/Medical
14. Intelligence/Counterterrorism
15. Interagency Communications
16. Legal/Civil Liberties
17. Logistics/ Asset Identification
18. Public Affairs
19. Staffing and Housing
20. Tactical
21. Technology
22. Training
23. Transportation/Traffic
24. Venue Security

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# Appendix B. Supporting Law Enforcement Agencies

Table 3 lists the law enforcement agencies that supported the Tampa Police Department in its response operations during the 2012 Republican National Convention.

**Table 3. Supporting law enforcement agencies**

Law Enforcement Agencies	
Alachua County Sheriff's Office	Lakeland Police Department
Bradenton Police Department	Lee County Sheriff's Office
Brevard County Sheriff's Office	Leesburg Police Department
Broward County Sheriff's Office	Manatee County Sheriff's Office
Charlotte County Sheriff's Office	Marion County Sheriff's Office
Citrus County Sheriff's Office	Melbourne County Sheriff's Office
City of St. Petersburg Parks and Recreation	Monroe County Sheriff's Office
Clearwater Police Department	New Port Richey Police Department
Collier County Sheriff's Office	North Port Police Department
Communications Center	Ocala Police Department
Cook County Sheriff's Police Department	Orange County Sheriff's Office
Daytona Police Department	Orlando Police Department
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Osceola County Sheriff's Office
Florida Department of Corrections	Palm Bay Police Department
Florida Department of Law Enforcement	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Florida Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco	Pasco County Sheriff's Office
Florida Division of Insurance Fraud	Pinellas County Jail
Florida Division of State Fire Marshal-Bureau of Fire and Arson Investigations	Pinellas County Public Safety Services
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission	Pinellas County Sheriff's Office
Florida Highway Patrol	Plant City Police Department
Florida National Guard	Polk County Sheriff's Office

Law Enforcement Agencies	
Florida Office of Agriculture Law Enforcement	Port St. Lucie Police Department
Florida Police Benevolent Association	Sarasota County Sheriff's Office
Fort Pierce Police Department	Sarasota Police Department
Gainesville Police Department	St. Pete Fire and Rescue
Gulf Port Police Department	St. Petersburg Police Department
Hernando County Sheriff's Office	Stuart Police Department
Hialeah Reserve	Tampa Fire Department
Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office	Tampa Police Air Service
Key West Police Department	Tampa Police Benevolent Association
Kissimmee Police Department	Tampa Police Department
Lake City Police Department	Tarpon Springs Police Department
Lake County Sheriff's Office	Temple Terrace Police Department
U.S. Army INSCOM	Winter Haven Police Department
University of South Florida Police Department	Winter Park Police Department
Volusia County Sheriff's Office	Winter Springs Police Department
West Palm Beach Police Department	

## Appendix C. Support from the Community

Table 4 lists the community organizations that made donations in an effort to support the Tampa Police Department in its response operations during the 2012 Republican National Convention (RNC).

**Table 4. Supporting community organizations**

Community Organizations	
5 Hour Sample	ABDON Transportation System Inc.
Brighthouse Networks	Busch Gardens
Captain Wes Burns	Caspers Company - McDonald's
City of Tampa Contract Administration	City of Tampa Water Department
Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate	Columbia Restaurant
Creative Loafing	Crisis Center
Datz Deli	Dr. Geoffrey Weihe
DuPont Registry Auto Magazine	Florida Department of Transportation
Florida Museum of Photographic Arts	Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce
Healthy Start Coalition of Hillsborough County	Henry B. Plant Museum
Hershey Chocolate	Highwoods Properties
Hillsborough Area Regional Transit	Hillsborough County
Hilton Garden Inn Tampa Ybor Historic District	Hooters
Idelwild Baptist Church	Indigo Coffee
Inkwood Books	Temple Crest Civic Association
The Florida Aquarium	The Wine Exchange
Timpano Chophouse	Toffee to Go
Towanda-Hampton Inn Suites	Jason R. Logsdon, LCAM
Judy & George Levy	Laser Spine Institute
Lasik Eye Laser	MilanDery Whole Florist
Nick Greek's Restaurant	North Tampa Photography
Operation Home Front	Patrick's Uniforms

Community Organizations	
Pizza Fusion	Publix Bayshore
Salvation Army	Sam's Club
Second Line Café	Seminole Heights United Methodist Church
South Tampa Fit	Southeast Seminole Heights Neighborhood Association
Spain Restaurant & Toma Bar	St. Leo University
Support the Troops	Tampa Bay & Company
Tampa Bay CoPack, South Pacific Trading Company	Tampa Downtown Partnership
Tampa General Hospital	Tampa Independent Business Alliance
Tampa Metropolitan Area YMCA	Tampa Port Authority
Tampa Print Services	Tampa Water Taxi Company
Tower Radiology	Versaterm Inc.
VM Ybor Neighborhood Associations	Walgreens
Wives Behind the Badge	Ybor City Visitors Bureau

Table 5 lists the local businesses that donated their building space for the local law enforcement to use during the 2012 RNC.

**Table 5. Supporting local businesses**

Local Businesses	
Allegra Imaging	Park Tower
Bank of America	Rampello Downtown School
Cap Trust	Rivergate Tower (Sykes)
Carlton Academy	Robert Watkins & Company P.A.
The Centre	Slade Condos
First Baptist Church of Tampa	TBPAC
Florian Palace Hotel	Sacred Heart Church
The Franklin Exchange	SLH Properties
Grand Central at Kennedy	St. Andrews Church
GulfShore Bank	St. Pete Times Building
Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Center	SunTrust Financial Center
Hillsborough County Health Dept.	Tampa City Center

Local Businesses	
Holy Trinity Presbyterian Church	Tampa Preparatory School
Hyde Park Plaza	TECO Plaza
J.H. Williams Oil Company	Towers of Channelside
Kress Building	Traffic Management
M & I Bank	University of South Florida Center for Advanced Medical Learning and Simulation
The Meridian	Verizon
Metro 510	Victory Lofts
Museum Towers	Villa Developers
Oceanwide Univ. Marine Medical	Wells Fargo
One Laurel Place	

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# Appendix D. Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers

*Developed by the TPD Public Information Office*

## Public Affairs

The Tampa Police Department determined that it must reach four critical audiences in order to have a successful political convention in its city. Those were media, law enforcement, demonstrators, and the community at large. In the year leading up to the event, all PIO activities were designed to influence one of these four groups. This is a suggested guideline for a public information office that is preparing for a political convention or any other large-scale event in its city. Most of the concepts listed below can be tailored to different cities depending on the unique circumstances, geography and demographics of each venue.

## Media Outreach

***Hold Regional PIO Meetings***—Hold the first regional PIO meeting approximately 18 months before the event. This will help engage all agencies that will be affected by the convention. In addition to public safety, this should include hospitals, school districts, public transportation, the airport, visitor’s bureau and any other agencies that will receive media calls about the event. This sets a tone of regional cooperation and information sharing. It is also a step toward ensuring the public is getting a consistent message about issues related to the event that will impact the larger region. Some of these issues include traffic, school closures or an adjustment of school hours, access to public buildings and services, changes to public transportation routes, hotel availability and more. The release of information on these issues can adversely impact the security plan, so it is prudent to have good relationships and information sharing in place for consistent messaging. It’s recommended to hold another regional meeting six to nine months before the event and then again just before the convention.

***Establish a Public Affairs Subcommittee***—Begin holding monthly meetings one year before the event. There should be a PIO representing each agency that is part of the Executive Steering Committee that oversees all security planning for a political convention. This subcommittee creates the media plan for the convention. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) PIO and the PIO from the lead local law enforcement agency co-chair this subcommittee. While there are certain public affairs guidelines established by the USSS, the lead local agencies will also need to create a plan for generating proactive positive coverage and how to respond to inquiries. The agencies on the subcommittee will staff the Joint Information Center during the event. However in Tampa, we found it productive to have a limited number of the agencies involved that may not actually staff the JIC

such as the airport, hospitals, etc. Each member must be approved by the Executive Steering Committee.

**Review the Federal Budget**—Since a series of convention related expenditures would require city council approval, it would be advantageous to work with your chief, legal department, and the purchasing department to bundle these expenses allowing a large number to go before council simultaneously. It is also critically important to establish a system for releasing public records related to these expenditures to all media at the same time. If a system is not established, the high volume of requests will keep the PIO in a reactive mode which is disruptive to the daily workload. These budget requests will begin 18 months to a year before the event.

**Establish a City Joint Information Center**—The federal JIC template for political conventions only allows one seat for local law enforcement so it may be necessary to set up a city JIC to work jointly with the federal one. It would be ideal if they were located in the same building. Another option would be expanding the number of seats for local law enforcement to work inside the federal JIC.

**Conduct “Show and Tell” News Events**—Hold one proactive media event each month to establish the regional partnership and to give the community a sense of safety and security. These should start at least six months before the event. Select visual topics that set a positive tone for the event versus a heavy handed law enforcement image. This could be based on a training class for a specialized area that is part of the security force. Bike or Mounted Patrols are options for a softer public safety image. K-9 and Marine (if applicable) are options that can give federal agencies an opportunity to showcase their involvement. All topics and talking points should be preapproved by the Executive Steering Committee through the Public Affairs Subcommittee.

**Hold a Media Round Table(s)**—This meeting with top law enforcement leaders is an opportunity for the media to share its concerns and logistical challenges of covering the event. This is NOT for the department to release information or even answer questions. Newsroom decision makers should be invited; news directors, assistant news directors, assignment editors, executive producers, beat reporters, editors. This meeting allows the media to have its voice heard and be part of the process. Once you get this media feedback, the PIO and subcommittee members can fold the new information into the media plan. This meeting also creates a spirit of cooperation between law enforcement and media that can only benefit the department. It establishes that the department is interested in the best possible coverage that is balanced, factual and based on substance.

**Establish a Media Lot**—Create an area for members of the media to write, edit and broadcast live. It must be in line of sight of the event and close to the \*\*speaker’s stage and protest area. During Tampa’s roundtable discussion with the media, the department learned the media was fearful of being targeted by protestors and requested a safe place to work near the event. This task was logistically difficult and very time consuming. The following list includes some of the logistics in-

volved. It would be ideal to start this project four to six months before the event. We asked for a news director to volunteer to act as the point person for coordinating some of the logistics with the other stations. This helped save time and simplified the process.

In the end, the media lot became a source of information for law enforcement. PIOs assigned to the lot would have informal interaction with reporters and photographers and then shared the story angles and issues of concern. This information was used to help prep the chief on what issues may come up at the next daily briefing.

1. Identify location; may have to lease space from a private owner or the political party hosting the event.
2. Provide fencing, flatbed trucks for live shots, private security for controlling access, set up electricity and bathrooms on the site. The department collected checks from the media outlets and paid the vendors for these services with a bundle of media checks. Media covered all infrastructure costs.
3. Determine access routes and times. This lot was on the edge of the vehicle exclusion zone. We established a window between 2:00 a.m. to 5:00a.m. that vehicles could leave to gas up or new trucks could arrive.
4. Issue media lot credentials to all media outlets that paid for the infrastructure of the lot.
5. Hold a lottery with local and national media to establish where each media outlet would park its live truck and where they would broadcast live from on the flatbed trucks.
6. Have media outlets sign a legal waiver that releases the city of any liability at the media lot.

\*\* Speaker's Platform: a stage and audio system provided for groups to voice their opinions. In Tampa, the groups applied for permits through City Hall to schedule their time on the stage.

**Conduct Chief Media Visits**—In the six weeks before the event, the chief should visit all major local media outlets for “OFF the RECORD” presentations and question and answer sessions. This is the follow up to the media roundtable held at the department. The PIO should ask larger media outlets to host smaller radio stations, weekly papers, news web services. This ensures the chief speaks directly to every media outlet. Tampa's Police Chief presented a compelling photo and video driven Power Point on the department's philosophy of policing the event. It also contained visuals of violence and destruction that occurred at prior conventions. These meetings were extremely beneficial because for the first time the media understood the law enforcement perspective. The opportunity to ask the chief candid questions in a relaxed environment showed the media that the department was transparent and earnest in its efforts to do the right thing with demonstrators and members of the media.

***Establish Chief's Daily Briefing Schedule***—It is very important that the media has access to the top law enforcement officer during the event to maintain public confidence and transparency. It is ideal to have at least two briefings daily. If possible release the time and location of these briefings during the Chief's media visits. This will give the media time to plan for live shot logistics, assigning crews and other challenges. In Tampa, the department set up a live satellite window with CNN during our daily chief briefings. This resolved a limited parking issue because any station in the country could down link the news conference from the satellite free of charge. The PIO office set up a pool camera rotation with the local stations to provide a live feed of the news conferences. The department worked with the local 24-hour news station to provide a locked down live truck to uplink the news conferences live daily. These efforts ensured the department's perspective was well represented in the news coverage. The demonstrators were readily available and Tampa felt the department's point of view should be as well. These regular briefings also significantly reduced the number of media calls to the JIC since the media knew it could get its questions answered at a pre-determined time.

***Establish a Social Media Presence***—Establish a social media team that will proactively post police photographs and videos on the department's Facebook and Twitter accounts during the event. Having a strong plan in place for the mainstream media is only half of the equation. It is imperative to have an experienced social media team since this is a dominant form of communication for the public. The Tampa Police Department recruited outside LEO PIOs to handle social media posts during the event. One was assigned to riding with the chief and other commanders during the protests. This PIO took pictures and videos of police actions that were eventually picked up by the mainstream media. A second PIO was stationed in the JIC to oversee the department's social media accounts and monitor demonstrators' posts. This PIO would respond with the facts of a situation when erroneous rumors began circulate. A third PIO monitored the department's closed circuit television system and downloaded photos and videos to post on social media. If troublemakers posted any negative videos of law enforcement, this PIO was prepared to search the CCTV system for a more complete video of the incident for possible release to the media and on social media. This team captured countless acts of kindness by officers. Images of officers giving overheated protestors water, pumping air into a demonstrator's baby jogger, helping a protestor back into her wheelchair went viral or were picked up by the mainstream media. It is also important the team goes through training so they are familiar with the department's social media guidelines and objectives.

***Hire Event Photographer***—This is imperative for documenting the event. It is also another source of photographs and videos to release to the mainstream media and post on social media.

***Acquire a Media Truck for Protests***—Setting up a truck for media covering protests provides reporters and photographers with a good vantage point. TPD used a flatbed truck and allowed the media to get on and off the truck during the largest march. This truck followed the lead law enforcement car and ensured the media could videotape and take photographs of the long line of pro-

testors involved in the march. This goodwill gesture was very popular with the local media and some national outlets as well.

***Establish a Reporters' Committee for Freedom on Information***—Set up a conference call with this group involving your chief, police attorney, and field force commander. This committee sets up a hotline for the media to call if they are arrested while covering large-scale political events in the United States. A local media firm is retained to answer these calls. It will be very important to meet with this firm several times leading up to the event and to include them on this conference call. The meetings and conference call gives law enforcement an opportunity to share its progressive approach to policing the event. It is also a chance to learn about media challenges at past conventions or political events.

***Establish a Media Arrest Notification System***—Establish a media arrest notification system. In Tampa, if a member of the media was detained or arrested, a text would be sent to the department's command staff. This would allow the appropriate supervisor to vet the arrest. They would determine if the member of the media violated the law and should go to booking or if he or she was detained with a large group and should be released to return to work. No members of the media were arrested in Tampa.

***Conduct Joint Information Center Training***—The city's JIC will have numerous personnel who are not familiar with the National Incident Management System utilized by law enforcement. They will need to be trained to assist during the event. Many jurisdictions have certified JIC trainers in their fire department or emergency management department. In Tampa, two trainers were recruited from neighboring jurisdictions.

***Establish News Release, Photograph, and Video Approval System***—Work with the Mayor's Office, Chief's Office and Legal to set up a streamline system for releasing material to the media in a timely fashion. Tampa utilized a live web portal through NC4 called ESponder for this process. All approved talking points and news releases were posted on this system for call takers to utilize as well.

***Include News Release Dissemination as Part of the Operational Plan***—Part of the department's plan for sending alerts to the local and national media, included the use of a software called Collabria. Two months before the event, the PIO sent an email to all of its media contacts encouraging them and their colleagues to sign up for the notification system. The PIO used the web-based two-way communication tool to push out news releases and updates via email and text. It proved to be an effective resource for building a media distribution list and providing time-sensitive information directly to reporters in the field.

***Establish Media Monitoring System***—Set up an automated system in the months prior to the event. Assign the task of downloading the coverage daily to support staff in the JIC. In Tampa,

this coverage was uploaded into NC4's ESponder software so it was available for commanders to view.

***Develop a Media Blitz and One Voice Policy***—Two weeks before the event, the chief should become the single voice for the department. This establishes a strong, consistent image for the department. TPD set up a series of one-on-one interviews with the chief during this time period. This ensured the community was aware of the department's year of planning, preparing and training to have a smooth and safe event. Many of the interviews were saved to run during the event since the chief was too busy for one-on-one interviews during the operational period.

## Law Enforcement Outreach

***Create a Training Video***—Create a video of top law enforcement officers such as the chief and/or sheriff, to play before the Field Force training. This should contain the department's philosophy and sets the tone for policing the event.

***Create Training Curriculum***—The PIO should contribute to the training curriculum for the supervisors overseeing the day-to-day operations of the RNC. This is an opportunity to reinforce the importance of relying on their supervisory discretion if media is facing arrest. Unless the activity threatens another person's safety or could result in property damage, the arrest may do more harm than good. The PIO can utilize videos or photographs of past cases that demonstrate this point. Unless the PIO is sworn with rank, this training should be presented by a commander. By utilizing visuals from past conventions and political events, the PIO segment of the training can highlight how demonstrators attempt to bait law enforcement into overreacting to create an iconic YouTube moment. This training should focus on how one single image or video of an officer's actions can mar the city's image on a global scale.

## Community Outreach

***Release a Transportation Plan***—Although the USSS releases the transportation plan, this is an opportunity for the city to show the public all the measures or services it is putting in place to help its citizens during the event. In Tampa, the plan was released five weeks before the event. Tampa Police attempted to create a mobile app that people could check before leaving their house to learn if there was a temporary road closure due to the event; however, it was unsuccessful. Instead, we established transportation web page along with a frequently asked questions page to keep citizens up to date. This was very effective for dealing with any last minute transportation adjustments during the event.

***Conduct a Police Citizen's Academy***—From after action reports, Tampa Police learned citizens in other cities often complained that they had no idea what to expect before a convention and were alarmed by the strong police presence. Two weeks before Tampa's event, TPD loaded 70 business and community leaders onto a coach bus and transported them to the police academy for a

one day RNC Citizen's Academy. This reviewed the extensive training involved in preparing for the event and the department's unique approach of tolerant but ready. Video from past conventions were played so the community would understand why a swift police response may be necessary to keep the city safe. Officers dressed in the RNC uniform with hard gear and put on a demonstration that utilized many of the newly purchased assets, showcased the training and highlighted the different levels of policing the event. In addition to the field force team, it involved bike patrols, mounted patrols, the regional bomb team and the marine patrol. Media was invited to cover the RNC Academy and social media was utilized to show the rest of the community what to expect during the event.

***Hold Town Hall Meetings***—Help the mayor's office set up these public meetings in the areas of town that will be most dramatically impacted by the event. In Tampa, the speakers included the mayor, police chief, fire chief, and transportation director. This allows the public to get their questions answered and express their concerns before the event.

***Establish a Citizen Notification System***—Tampa Police launched a campaign to sign up citizens for its Alert Tampa system that replaced Reverse 911 several years ago. This system allows commanders to send email or text messages to citizens about RNC activities that may impact their commute, etc. The department doubled the number of users in the months before the RNC from 8,000 to 16,000.

***Establish a Business Community Notification System***—TPD set up a notification system for property and security managers of downtown high rises. NC4 amended its program to establish two-way communication with the users. TPD also signed up business and community organizations for a total of 104. The community embraced the program so well that it has continued after the event.

***Establish a "See Something, Say Something" Campaign***—Work with the Department of Homeland Security to utilize its campaign material connected to your event.

## **Demonstrators Outreach**

***Hold ACLU Forums***—Arrange for the chief, field force commanders and police attorney to take part in the ACLU forums either via WebEx or in person. These take place several times in the year leading up to a political convention. This is an opportunity for the leaders to set a tone of tolerance and patience with demonstrators' theatrics as long as it doesn't cross over into criminal activity. These may help law enforcement leaders establish a rapport with protest leaders prior to the event.

***Develop a Demonstrator's Pamphlet***—Create a user-friendly map that highlights the parade route and services available along it such as bathrooms, water stations and shaded covered areas. Tampa's pamphlet provided ACLU tips for dealing with law enforcement during a protest. It also gave an overview of the city's event ordinance that established rules and regulations for

demonstrations outside of the event. Finally, it provided tips for avoiding heat stroke in Florida's August weather.

***Provide Weather Reports for Protestors***—A goodwill gesture for reaching out to demonstrators is providing weather reports on the department's long range acoustic device known as ELRAD. Tampa Police set up a plan in advance to obtain a weather report daily from one of the local station's meteorologist. This was broadcast during the marches. All but one of the five local stations provided weather reports. The stations appreciated the promotional opportunity while the department reached out to demonstrators with the service.

# Appendix E. Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Table 6 presented below is a comprehensive list of the best practices (shaded in green) and lessons learned (shaded in yellow) noted in the report. These observations are organized by functional area.

**Table 6. Observations**

Functional Area	Lessons Learned/ Best Practice(s)
2.1. Access control: screening and physical security	Observation 2.1.1 (BP): Organized coordination and communication among RNC, state and local law enforcement organizations helped ease challenges associated with access control to the event venue.
	Observation 2.1.2 (BP): Motorcades waiting to transport dignitaries and VIPs to and from the airport were staged in a nearby airport cellphone lot.
	Observation 2.1.3 (LL): Multiple field commanders working the same incident and contacting the Aviation Supervisor/Air Boss directly rather than communicating via the MACC or ASOC caused a duplication of efforts.
	Observation 2.1.4 (LL): Communications modes between maritime security units could have been better integrated.
	Observation 2.1.5 (LL): Maritime Security's <i>Heavy Weather Plan</i> was not compatible with the RNC <i>Maritime Security Operational Plan</i> .
	Observation 2.1.6 (LL): Not all venue security personnel were familiar with their assignments or their surroundings.
2.2. Administrative and logistics support	Observation 2.2.1 (BP): Support from local business and community partners was essential to providing resources and logistical support throughout the event.
	Observation 2.2.2 (LL): Accurately determining staffing levels will ensure that subsequent operational and support decisions are more exact, efficient and accurate.
	Observation 2.2.3 (LL): TPD used a travel agency to acquire hotel rooms for supporting law enforcement personnel, which proved costly and inefficient.
	Observation 2.2.4 (LL): The personnel lists provided by law enforcement agencies supporting the event were inaccurate.
	Observation 2.2.5 (LL): TPD experienced technical difficulties in the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)-tracking and -logging of personnel and equipment throughout the event.
	Observation 2.2.6 (LL): Planners often misunderstood or were unaware of the capabilities that the Florida National Guard could provide.

Functional Area	Lessons Learned/ Best Practice(s)
	Observation 2.2.7 (LL): Minimal funding from the DOD resulted in TPD's inability to obtain the number of Florida National Guardsmen needed to support the event.
2.3.Command and Control	Observation 2.3.1 (BP): The presence of TPD and HCSO Commanders in the field proved valuable to operations.
	Observation 2.3.2 (LL): Operational command of crowd management units should remain static to avoid potential delays in response.
2.4.Credentialing	Observation 2.4.1 (LL): Supporting law enforcement agencies had difficulty with online credentialing requirements.
	Observation 2.4.2 (LL): Distributing credentials to each agency, rather than at one central location, did not achieve the anticipated level of efficiency.
2.5.Crowd management	Observation 2.5.1 (BP): Equipment such as bikes and uniforms influenced positive public perception and allowed crowd control units to respond uniformly and rapidly.
	Observation 2.5.2 (BP): Police interacted with demonstrators in a cooperative and nonviolent manner.
	Observation 2.5.3 (BP): Crowd Management officers scanned and secured the downtown area days before the event.
	Observation 2.5.4 (LL): Transportation plans adversely impacted deployment plans for crowd control units.
2.6.Dignitary/VIP Protection	Observation 2.6.1 (BP): Plain-clothes officers used lapel pins as a way to identify themselves to other law enforcement officers.
	Observation 2.6.2 (LL): Staffing non-NSSE events with local law enforcement is dependent upon good communication with the dignitary/VIP protection detail teams.
	Observation 2.6.3 (LL): Logistical planning did not account for officer lodging in relation to post assignments.
	Observation 2.6.4 (LL): Providing meals for officers who have mobile assignments and outlying hotels should be given special consideration.
2.7.Financial/grant management	Observation 2.7.1 (LL): The use of federal funding will be a significant factor in pre-event planning efforts.
	Observation 2.7.2 (LL): The technologies and back up procedures put in place to track personnel during the event were failed and/or were inconsistent and have caused difficulties for TPD in processing payroll.
2.8.Fire/HAZMAT/EMS/ Hospitals/Public Health	Observation 2.8.1 (BP): Established relationships with medical partners across the region aided in the planning and response operations for local Fire and EMS officials.
	Observation 2.8.2 (LL): Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) were not aware of the established communications procedures or

Functional Area	Lessons Learned/ Best Practice(s)
	resource-request processes.
	Observation 2.8.3 (LL): The JHERT and JHAT concepts should be re-evaluated as many of the job functions are overlapping and redundant.
	Observation 2.8.4 (LL): The All Hazards Center (AHC) should be more streamlined to only include operational personnel and have fewer 'liaison' type personnel assigned.
2.9.Intelligence/ Counterterrorism/ Counter surveillance	Observation 2.9.1 (BP): Intelligence and counterterrorism operations were critical to the success of crowd-management operations.
	Observation 2.9.2 (BP): Both the Tampa and St. Petersburg Police Departments used Long Term Evolution cellular network technology to successfully maintain situational awareness for crowd control and intelligence operations.
	Observation 2.9.3 (LL): Co-locating the IOC and the JOC can cause inefficiencies in processing intelligence information.
2.10.Interagency communications and technology	Observation 2.10.1 (BP): Use of talk-groups (channels) reduced radio congestion and ensured that radio communications could not be scanned by non-law enforcement officials.
	Observation 2.10.2 (BP): Communications personnel established call signs for each squad, which minimized confusion and miscommunications during the event.
	Observation 2.10.3 (BP): Tampa Police Communications had a list of the numbers and names of the officer/sheriff for each radio assigned.
	Observation 2.10.4 (BP/LL): Public safety officials used several technologies to maintain situational awareness throughout the event.
	Observation 2.10.5 (BP): The Tampa Police Communications Center established its own internal webpage to store and share communications information during the RNC.
	Observation 2.10.6 (BP): Personnel with expertise in the CAD program were positioned in the Communication Center throughout the event in an effort to re-solve any technological issues.
	Observation 2.10.7 (BP/LL): Law Enforcement personnel successfully managed, maintained, and demobilized radio communications equipment.
	Observation 2.10.8 (LL): The Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system could only log a limited number of personnel as responding to the event.
	Observation 2.10.9 (LL): The RNC Commission provided radios to each of the bus drivers assigned to transport delegates and VIPs. However, these radios were not tested before the event and were not operational.
2.11.Legal	Observation 2.11.1 (BP): Coordinated planning prevented litigation

Functional Area	Lessons Learned/ Best Practice(s)
	<p>challenges prior to the RNC.</p> <p>Observation 2.11.2 (BP): An Event Zone Ordinance provided officers with the necessary tools to intervene in mass demonstration situations having the potential to become riots or instances of damage to public or private property.</p> <p>Observation 2.11.3 (BP): A mutual aid agreement was established to ensure that the officers from the assisting agencies had legal jurisdiction in the entire Tampa Bay area.</p> <p>Observation 2.11.4 (BP): The Legal group provided guidance in the handling of hundreds of public records requests received before, during and after the RNC.</p>
2.12.Non-event patrol	<p>Observation 2.12.1 (BP): TPD effectively implemented and executed the deployment of its patrol officers for calls for service unrelated to the RNC.</p> <p>Observation 2.12.2 (LL): Although the communications between teams was good overall, communication modes between patrol and crowd control teams were lacking.</p>
2.13.Prisoner processing	<p>Observation 2.13.1: (BP) Law enforcement personnel assigned to prisoner processing were logistically prepared to deal with a large number of prisoners.</p>
2.14.Protecting critical infrastructure and utilities	<p>Observation 2.14.1 (BP): TPD used risk assessments and other critical infrastructure survey tools to identify and protect critical infrastructure.</p>
2.15.Public information and media relations	<p>Observation 2.15.1 (BP): Through its planning and operational strategies, the Public Affairs subcommittee was successful in achieving a positive public perception throughout the event.</p> <p>Observation 2.15.2 (BP/LL): TPD used social media platforms to build a positive public perception.</p> <p>Observation 2.15.3 (LL): Establishing a local Joint Information Center can ensure that the local community is well informed about public safety activities throughout the event.</p>
2.16.Tactical support and explosive device response	<p>Observation 2.16.1 (BP): The operational response of the explosive device response teams during the event was successful.</p> <p>Observation 2.16.2 (BP): The use of local bomb technicians and bomb canines ensured that TPD would have an adequate number of personnel and allowed for the majority of participants to train together prior to the event.</p> <p>Observation 2.16.3 (BP): The bomb technicians and canine handlers worked well together.</p> <p>Observation 2.16.4 (BP): The established protocols for responding to unattended and suspicious packages ensured the effective and rapid resolution of incidents.</p>

Functional Area	Lessons Learned/ Best Practice(s)
2.17.Training	Observation 2.17.1 (BP): Intermediate training provided by TPD was successful in setting officer's expectations and preparing officers assigned to crowd control operations.
	Observation 2.17.2 (BP): TPD adequately prepared the public and community stakeholders for the event by conducting an RNC-specific Citizen's Academy.
	Observation 2.17.3 (BP): TPD provided officers with adequate reference material on how to use radios.
2.18.Transportation and traffic	Observation 2.18.1 (BP): Despite road closures and geographic displacements downtown, daily traffic in Tampa remained unaffected.
	Observation 2.18.2 (BP): Traffic Command Center involved the right stakeholders in the early stages of planning for the event.
	Observation 2.18.3 (LL): The bus transportation plan for transporting dignitaries and VIPs to and from the venue was complicated and inefficient.
	Observation 2.18.4 (LL): Increases in the number of delegate buses and the intelligence on security risks to the transportation system, placed strain on the number of traffic control officers in and around the downtown area.
	Observation 2.18.5 (LL): Varying transportation operational plans and responsibilities within and outside the venue perimeter caused inefficiencies in traffic control.

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# Appendix F. Acronyms

AAR	After-Action Report
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
BJA	Bureau of Justice Assistance
BP	Best Practice
CAD	Computer Aided Dispatch
COA	Committee of Arrangements
DMAT	Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
FDLE	Florida Department of Law Enforcement
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HCSO	Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department
I-Team	Intelligence Team
IMS	Incident Management Software
IOC	Intelligence Operations Center
JHAT	Joint Hazard Assessment Team
JHERT	Joint Hazardous Explosive Response Team
JIC	Joint Information Center
LL	Lesson Learned
LTE	Long Term Evolution
MACC	Multi-Agency Communications Center
NSSE	National Special Security Event
PIO	Public Information Officer
POC	Point of Contact
RFID	Radio Frequency Identification
RNC	Republican National Convention
TPD	Tampa Police Department
USSS	U.S. Secret Service

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