Assessment of the Navy Strategic Enterprise: Integrating, Coordinating, and Aligning Navy Stakeholders to Develop, Communicate, and Assess Navy Strategy

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N51, the Director of Strategy and Policy on the Navy Staff, asked CNA to assess the Navy Strategic Enterprise.

By way of background, the Director of Navy Staff (DNS) established the Navy Strategic Enterprise by charter on 30 April 2014 for the purpose of “integration, coordination, and alignment of the numerous diverse stakeholders that are involved in developing, communicating, and assessing Navy strategy.” The Navy leadership’s concern was that no single Navy staff or command was responsible for developing, engaging, and assessing Navy strategy. Numerous Navy staffs and organizations are responsible for strategy, but their work is not always mutually supportive. The Navy Strategic Enterprise was established in order to communicate Navy strategy efforts across the staffs and organizations responsible for strategy functions and to coordinate their actions.

The strategic enterprise is organized into regular meetings among leaders of member Navy staffs and organizations. Members include OPNAV staff sections (N1, N2/N6, N3/N5, N8, N9, N00Z, OLA, CHINFO), the Navy academic establishment (Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Academy), and the fleets (Fleet Forces Command and Pacific Fleet). The Senior Executive Group (SEG), chaired by the Director of Navy Staff (DNS), leads the Navy Strategic Enterprise. The President of the Naval War College (NWC) and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5B) are deputy co-chairs of the SEG. Under the SEG, the Strategy Oversight Group (SOG) consists of one-star and senior executive service (SES) civilians appointed by SEG principles. N51 and the Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) at NWC co-chair the SOG.
N51 asked CNA to determine whether the Navy Strategic Enterprise, as it is established in its charter, is fulfilling its mission to integrate, coordinate, and align Navy stakeholders that develop, communicate, and assess Navy strategy. Based on the findings of this study, N51 asked CNA to make recommendations to improve the Navy Strategic Enterprise.

Accordantly, this briefing assesses whether the Navy Strategic Enterprise is achieving the missions outlined in its charter. Where it is not achieving its missions, this study identifies what obstacles are hindering it and what actions and activities the Navy Strategic Enterprise and its member organizations can take to overcome these obstacles. Based on our findings, we have developed two courses of action that the Navy Strategic Enterprise and its member staffs and organizations can follow to improve Navy strategy development, engagement, and assessment.
The Navy established the strategic enterprise because there are multiple staff sections and Navy organizations which are responsible for pieces of strategy, but no single entity coordinates these disconnected efforts. As a result, Navy strategy development, engagement, and assessment is characterized by disjointedness and overlapping efforts. The Navy Strategic Enterprise is intended to address this problem. According to the strategic enterprise charter, the consequence of multiple, disconnected strategy efforts is “at times the CNO is not receiving Navy strategy that reflects a consistent set of strategy principles, concepts, and tenants.”

The Navy Strategic Enterprise is limited in its structure, authorities, and scope to provide a solution to the identified problem of multiple entities supporting Navy strategy in a sub-optimal way. It provides a recurring venue for collaboration among staffs and organizations with strategy responsibilities. The regular SEG and SOG meetings, however, occur too infrequently to allow for the coordination necessary to realize the vision outlined in strategic enterprise charter. To be sure, Navy Strategic Enterprise members address strategy-related issues at SEG and SOG meetings, however, contact between meetings is also necessary. The strategic enterprise is also limited in its authority to direct activities necessary to achieve the missions outlined in its charter. It has the authority to “ensure that the CNO is supported by a coherent, contemporary, authoritative body of U.S. strategic thinking.” The strategic enterprise does not, for instance, have the authority to task its members to support the CNO in any specific ways. The strategic enterprise also has a large scope, which the charter describes as comprehensive. The combination of a large scope and limited authorities present a significant challenge in aligning the entities that develop, engage, and assess Navy strategy.
The Navy Strategic Enterprise did not alter the responsibilities for strategy development, engagement, and assessment among Navy staffs and organizations. Instead, it highlighted the problem of lack of alignment and created venues where leaders of member staffs and organizations meet to discuss strategy-related efforts. Strategy functions are still largely conducted by separate organizations that do not necessarily collaborate with one another. That being said, there has been some change in how strategic enterprise member organizations and staffs work together on strategy-related efforts. Notably, strategic enterprise members are discussing their coordinated strategy efforts at SEG and SOG meetings to a greater degree now than they were one year ago. For example, N51 and N81 briefed their efforts to revitalize the Global wargame series in conjunction with CNWS at a recent SOG meeting. Despite the progress that the Navy Strategic Enterprise has made, it has not yet realized the vision outlined in its charter.

Based on our analysis, it is unclear whether the Navy Strategic Enterprise can fully achieve its missions with its current organization, authorities, and scope. The Navy Strategic Enterprise has made progress toward achieving all of its missions, as outlined in its charter, but significant obstacles remain to fully achieving each mission. Navy leadership support for the strategic enterprise will be critical to implement the necessary changes to fulfill strategic enterprise missions. With the recent turn-over of the CNO, DNS, and N3/N5 it is unclear whether the new Navy leadership’s commitment to the Navy Strategic Enterprise will continue.
This annotated briefing proceeds in five parts. We begin with the results of our assessment of the Navy Strategic Enterprise. This section answers the question: Is the Navy Strategic Enterprise achieving its missions as outlined in the Navy Strategic Enterprise charter? We then present the results of our comparative analysis of Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps strategy development and assessment. This section includes recommendations for the Navy, based on the experiences of the other services, as it seeks to improve the Navy Strategic Enterprise. Next, we present the study findings, including the conditions necessary for its success going forward. We then present two possible courses of action (COAs) that the Navy Strategic Enterprise can follow in order to improve strategy development, engagement, and assessment. Both COAs are designed to improve the Navy Strategic Enterprise, but they offer different approaches that the Navy can choose, based on such factors as ongoing interest by Navy leadership in strategy and demand for strategy products. Finally, the appendix describes the study methodology including the overall objective and six missions of the Navy Strategic Enterprise, the analytic approach we followed to assess the strategic enterprise, and our assumptions for this study.
This section lays out the Navy Strategic Enterprise’s progress in achieving the overall objective and six missions outlined in its charter.
The overall objective of the Navy Strategic Enterprise has three components:

- Align priorities of the Navy organizations that develop, engage, and assess Navy strategy.
- Leverage the capabilities of these organizations.
- Do both (align and leverage) without compromising innovation and independent thinking.

The intended end state of this overall objective is greater fidelity, harmony, and synergistic effects among the Navy staffs and organizations that develop, engage, and assess strategy.

The Navy Strategic Enterprise has only existed for a year, so it may be too soon for its member staffs and organizations to align their priorities. At the same time, our interviews revealed that the organizations that make up the Navy Strategic Enterprise place a different priority on strategy. We observed only one effort to align priorities: the internal review being undertaken by the Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS). CNWS is conducting an internal review intended to align its capabilities with the demands of OPNAV and the fleets. Thus, we assess the Navy Strategic Enterprise as moving toward achieving this component.

The Navy Strategic Enterprise members we interviewed reported a limited demand signal from N3/N5 to leverage their capabilities for strategy development, engagement, and assessment. Also, NWC and NPS have made their capabilities in strategy development and assessment available to N51, and these organizations are working to achieve synergistic effects, as described in the charter.

Though this objective cautions against compromising innovation and independent thinking, we found neither evidence of nor concern about this among enterprise members.
An obstacle to aligning the priorities of Navy Strategic Enterprise is the lack of a common understanding of what those priorities should be. We found in our interviews that the Navy staffs and organizations that make up the strategic enterprise assign different priorities to strategy. For example, strategy is a top priority for N51. By contrast, N4 views its role as contributing to Navy strategy in the area of logistics and readiness, but views service strategy development as a relatively lower priority for its staff section. The end state of the overall objective of the Navy Strategic Enterprise is alignment of priorities, yet its charter does not specifically define this end state by stating what these priorities should be. We found some limited efforts among Navy Strategic Enterprise leadership to articulate priorities. Namely, the Strategic Continuum, developed by N3/N5B displays ongoing efforts of the Navy Strategic Enterprise, although it does not articulate priorities per se.

Our interview data revealed that Navy Strategic Enterprise member organizations do not always leverage each others’ capabilities for strategy development. Some of the officers on the OPNAV staff that we interviewed stated that their staff sections have a role in strategy development but that N3/N5 does not request their participation. Similarly, the N51 staff repeatedly communicated to the study team that other OPNAV staff sections do not leverage their strategy development and assessment capabilities. For example, OSD and PACOM tend to coordinate first with N00Z and then with its Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group (NAPAG), which later asks for N51 input on new strategy products. This and other similar instances reveal that OPNAV staff coordination practices can be an obstacle to leveraging the capabilities of Navy strategy staffs and organizations.
N51 can leverage the capabilities of strategic enterprise member organizations and staffs, and work to ensure that its own capabilities are likewise leveraged. During strategy development efforts, such as future classified annexes to the maritime strategy, N51 can coordinate with Navy Strategic Enterprise members on the OPNAV staff in order to leverage their capabilities. Coordination of this type can be informal, such as review of drafts of forthcoming strategy documents to ensure that they are informed by the full range of Navy capabilities, including, for example, logistics, intelligence, and programming. N51 can also regularly communicate with N00Z to ensure that it remains abreast of new and ongoing review requests of external strategy products which may have gone to N00Z for coordination. Regular communication should ensure that the N51 staff has sufficient time to provide input to the external organizations’ strategy documents that have maritime equities. N51 input to these strategy documents would leverage its strategy development capabilities. N51 can leverage NWC, NPS, and CNA capabilities by working with each organization to determine a research agenda that best supports strategy development and assessment.

To achieve the overall mission of the Navy Strategic Enterprise, the priorities of its member staffs and organizations must be aligned. Before this can happen, Navy Strategic Enterprise priorities must be determined. The SEG, as the Navy Strategic Enterprise’s top governing body, is the natural organization to set its priorities.
While the title of this strategic enterprise mission refers to strategy development, the mission narrative focuses on how research, analysis, and gaming support strategy development. Thus, this mission centers on the groundwork necessary prior to drafting. According to this mission, research, analysis, and gaming should do three things in support of Navy strategy development:

1. Anticipate future strategic challenges.
2. Develop and assess strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges.
3. Provide analytical support products that inform Navy leadership decisions regarding strategy development.

We found that Navy research, analysis, and gaming has not optimally supported Navy strategy development, but that new initiatives are making progress toward achieving parts of this mission. N51 and other strategic enterprise members have found that past gaming efforts have neither supported decisions they have needed to make nor produced results that fed into strategy documents. N3/N5 and N51, however, are working with N81 and NWC to redesign the annual Global War Game series so that games occur more frequently and consist of shorter vignettes in which players will address narrower issues, and so that the outputs of war games will be used for budgeting decisions and to write concepts of operations (CONOPS) for the fleets.

The study team did not find evidence that the Navy Strategic Enterprise members are developing operational concepts to overcome future strategic challenges. Rather, the operational concepts that strategic enterprise members—most notably NWDC—produce appear primarily designed to assist in making procurement decisions.

Finally, the N51 staff expressed concern to us that the analytic products written by Navy Strategic Enterprise members have not informed Navy leadership decisions on strategy development.
Since the inception of the Navy Strategic Enterprise, N51 has yet to draw on the full range of Navy Strategic Enterprise members’ research, analysis, and gaming capabilities. Instead, it has tended to work with only limited parts of the Navy academic establishment. As such this has meant that N51 has not regularly accessed strategy-relevant work being conducted elsewhere within the Navy academic establishment. For example, N51 has worked closely with the CNWS Wargaming Department and the Strategic Research Division (SRD) at NWC, but not with the Gravely, Mahan, and Halsey Groups (though it is working to establish relationships with them). In the past, N51 did not draw upon NPS as a source of research and analysis in support of strategy development. This recently changed, when N51 consulted with NPS on an annual research agenda including a recently completed paper on the Navy strategy development process.

An impetus to create the Navy Strategic Enterprise was the disconnected nature of the efforts of Navy Strategic Enterprise members. This is the case not only between OPNAV and other Navy organizations responsible for strategy but also within the OPNAV staff. Notably, N51-sponsored war games do not feed into N81’s operational analysis process, which is an input to the annual POM process. The reform efforts underway in gaming at NWC are intended to have the effect of connecting N51’s gaming efforts with N81’s operational analyses, thereby connecting war gaming to strategic decisions about the Navy’s future.

NWDC’s operational concept development process takes about a year. Its purpose is to support acquisition decisions, not strategy development. The Navy Strategic Enterprise charter, however, states that operational concepts should be developed to overcome future strategic challenges. Depending on the timeline for completion of future strategy documents, the timeliness of the Navy concept development could be an obstacle.
N51 can work with strategic enterprise member organizations that have research, analysis and gaming capabilities to develop a plan to support Navy strategy development. The Navy has a robust research, analysis, and gaming establishment that has the experience and willingness to support strategy development. N51 can anticipate the research, analysis, and gaming efforts that will necessary to support strategy development efforts. Accordingly, N51 can develop individual plans with NWC, NPS, and CNA that complement each other and best use the capabilities of each organization to achieve this Navy Strategic Enterprise mission through relevant research, analysis, and gaming. For example, N51 can request analysis of future strategic challenges. Depending on the exact nature of the research question, N51 can determine, in consultation with the relevant organization, whether NWC, NPS, or CNA would be best positioned to take on the challenge and how the output would support strategy development.

To make progress in the focused development of Navy strategy, N51 can request that NWDC make changes to the concept development process so that the operational concepts it develops can become an input to Navy strategy. Similar to the effort by N51, N81, and NWC to improve the relevance of the global wargame series, N51 can work with NWDC to change the concept development process so that operational concepts support strategy development, as the Navy Strategic Enterprise charter states they should.

### Actions and activities

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<td>– Leverage capabilities of Navy research, analysis, and gaming organizations in strategy development and assessment</td>
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<td>▪ Anticipate the research, analysis, and gaming necessary to support Navy strategy development efforts</td>
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<td>▪ Develop plans for research and analysis that supports strategy development</td>
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<td>• Request</td>
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<td>– NWC, NPS, and CNA support strategy development and assessment in consultation with N51 through research, analysis, and gaming</td>
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<td>– NWDC produce operational concepts that support strategy development</td>
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<td>▪ Review operational concept development process to better support strategy development</td>
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Aligning the development of strategic documents is inherently a future-oriented mission because it will apply to new strategic documents in production. Prior to chartering the Navy Strategic Enterprise at the end of May 2014, the Navy did not have an explicitly stated objective of aligning its strategic documents. This objective thus reasonably applies to Navy strategy documents in development from May 2014 forward and includes the new maritime strategy, its forthcoming classified annex, POM submissions, the CNO posture statement, and volume I of the Navy budget. The other documents that the Navy Strategic Enterprise charter seeks to align were developed prior to the objective. N3/N5 plans for the forthcoming classified annex to the maritime strategy to be in alignment with the maritime strategy itself. How these two documents will be aligned with each other remains to be seen.

This mission also states both that strategic documents will be tailored to their particular purposes and will remain under the responsibility and authority of their respective organizations. These components of the objective do not change the status quo and thus were achieved prior to the strategic enterprise charter. Both of these mission components describe how future strategic documents should be aligned to each other.

Finally, this mission states that it is imperative that these strategic documents be part of a powerful, coherent, and consistent strategic and policy whole. Yet, neither the strategic enterprise leadership nor any of its members has defined what that means in practice.
There are a variety of obstacles to aligning Navy strategic documents, not the least of which is members limited interest in doing so. The strategic enterprise members we interviewed consistently cited other missions articulated in the strategic enterprise charter as being higher priority. If strategic enterprise leaders should decide that aligning strategy documents is a priority mission, they will have to determine what to align them to. The new maritime strategy is a logical choice.

Each strategy document is written for a different purpose at a different time, which makes aligning them problematic. POM submissions and volume I of the Navy Budget, for instance, are written to outline Navy programming plans and budgetary priorities for a given year. The U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, by contrast, is a future-oriented document about a specific geographic region. It may not be practically possible to align all identified Navy documents.

This strategic enterprise mission states that “it is imperative that [strategy documents] are part of a powerful, coherent, and consistent strategic and policy whole.” The characteristics of this strategic and policy whole have not been defined. This lack of definition is therefore an obstacle to aligning strategic documents.

Finally, strategy document development typically takes significant staff time and involves multiple reviews and revisions. According to the strategy professionals we interviewed, alignment with other strategy documents has not been part of the drafting process. This may be changing with the decision to align the classified annex to the new maritime strategy. It remains to be seen whether the forthcoming classified annex is aligned to other Navy strategy documents and, if so, how.
To further this mission, N51 can recommend to the SEG ways to align Navy strategic documents so they are part of a powerful, coherent, and consistent strategic and policy whole. One way to do this is to determine which document or documents other Navy strategies should align to. The new maritime strategy would be a good candidate because it is the most recent, and it bears the signatures of not only the CNO but also the Commandants of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard. As the OPNAV division responsible for strategy, N51 can develop a methodology for aligning future strategy documents to develop a consistent message. Such a methodology should include identifying key themes in the maritime strategy (or other documents) that forthcoming strategy documents need to include, and guidance on how to incorporate key themes into forthcoming documents.

N51 can request the assistance of Navy Strategic Enterprise leadership to align Navy strategic documents. First, N51 can request that either N3/N5 or the CNO define the strategic and policy whole of which Navy strategic documents should be a part. This vision need not be complicated, but it would become the benchmark against which strategy documents would be judged. DNS, as the chair of the SEG, can grant N51 the authority to align future Navy strategy documents to this vision. Notably, the drafters of some Navy capstone strategy documents, such as its POM submissions, include the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as guidance, but not Navy strategy documents such as the maritime strategy. They said one reason for this is the timing of the maritime strategy. There was a seven-year interval between the most recent version and the previous one. Aligning Navy strategy documents means developing guidance for the OPNAV staff sections that produce them on how to align their forthcoming documents to other Navy strategic documents.
The Navy Strategic Enterprise has made limited progress toward ensuring the coordination and synchronization of the Navy’s messaging and engagement to achieve a single, unified voice. As it is written, this mission does not specify the audience for Navy strategic messaging and engagement. Consequently, strategic messaging and engagement could be for internal Navy audiences, external audiences, or both.

So far, the progress toward this objective with audiences external to the Navy has been in conjunction with the release of the new maritime strategy. The CNO has participated in release events, but it is mainly the N3/N5 flag officers who, by design, have been presenting it to key audiences. Although these presentations are different, they cover the same themes in the maritime strategy. In support of these events, CHINFO, in coordination with N51, created a plan for the new maritime strategy’s release, including talking points. The plan was designed to ensure that Navy leaders would present the new maritime strategy with a single, unified voice.

The Navy is attempting to leverage the engagement opportunities of enterprise organizations by using a new strategic synchronization calendar managed by N3/N5B. The calendar includes events that are both internal and external to the Navy, such as strategic fora and legislative affairs. It is a shared awareness tool to coordinate common goals among strategic enterprise organizations. Currently, it has some shortcomings. It does not include travel of Navy Strategic Enterprise members. Also, at this point, it only lists events. It doesn’t not include any information about them, such as how they contribute to the strategic messaging and engagement mission. If this information were included it would help strategic enterprise members prioritize engagement events so as to amplify particular appropriate strategic themes.

### Coordinate strategic messaging and engagement

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<th>Mission: Ensure the coordination and synchronization of the Navy’s messaging and engagement</th>
<th>Assessment: Navy strategic enterprise progress toward objective component</th>
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<td>Achieve a single, unified voice</td>
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<td>• Maritime strategy roll-out coordinated across strategic enterprise</td>
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<td>• Achieving a single, unified voice may inhibit delivery of Navy messaging and engagement</td>
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<td>Identify engagement opportunities for CNO, VCNO, and Enterprise principals to articulate Navy priorities</td>
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<td>• Prior to the release of the updated maritime strategy, Navy Strategic Enterprise members were not conducting strategic engagement outreach</td>
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<td>Leverage engagement opportunities of the Enterprise organizations so as to amplify particular appropriate strategic themes</td>
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<td>• N3/N5B strategic synchronization calendar provides shared awareness of strategic activity</td>
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<td>Moving toward</td>
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<td>Reflect the CNO’s current strategic priorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Updated maritime strategy roll-out is a CNO priority</td>
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The SEG and SOG members we interviewed asserted that the Navy has been reluctant to conduct strategic messaging and engagement. They attributed this reluctance to two main issues: the lack of a Navy strategic message; and practical considerations, including difficulty scheduling flag officers for engagement opportunities. The Navy has partially addressed the lack of a strategic message with its roll-out campaign for the new maritime strategy. Lack of a strategic message could, however, become an obstacle again if the Navy does not update its strategic message with new strategic developments.

Coordinating and synchronizing strategic messaging and engagement will require scheduling trade-offs. Using the strategic synchronization calendar is a first step to coordinating the engagement activities of Navy leaders in order to communicate strategic themes. The calendar, though, does not yet include events planned by strategic enterprise members, such as OLA’s plans to increase its utilization of the Naval Academy for congressional outreach. Increasing engagement opportunities for the purpose of promulgating the Navy’s strategic message creates schedule demands on Navy leaders whose schedules are already full. Furthermore, engagement opportunities can occur with short notice, which makes it difficult to anticipate them and assign Navy leaders to support them. Prioritizing short-notice engagement opportunities requires Navy leaders to be flexible and to be willing to delay and defer their other priorities when necessary. They can have difficult choices, because individual engagement events have uncertain pay-offs whereas other events on their calendars may have obvious and immediate pay-offs.
N51 can take steps to increase the utility of the strategic synchronization calendar as a tool for coordinating strategic messaging and engagement. In a recent SOG meeting, the N51 staff requested that strategic enterprise member organizations include their engagement events on it in order to create shared awareness. N51 can maintain the strategic synchronization calendar and keep it up to date so that strategic enterprise leaders can identify those engagement opportunities which would most benefit from participation of the CNO, VCNO, or other enterprise principals.

N51 can request improvements to the strategic synchronization calendar and SEG support to improve Navy strategic messaging and engagement. Strategic enterprise member organizations can include information about the intended outcomes of engagement events on the calendar so that enterprise leadership can use it to prioritize those events. N51 can also request SEG assistance in building an advocacy culture for the Navy’s strategic message. The SEG can encourage fleet and echelon II commands to promulgate the Navy’s strategic message. A key organization to partner with will be the CHINFO Director of Strategic Messaging, who N51 can work with to develop strategic messaging themes that reflect the CNO’s current strategic priorities. The SEG can also encourage strategic enterprise members to identify opportunities for the Navy to discuss its strategic message before audiences in Washington, including on Capitol Hill, at think tanks, and within the broader community of interest. The broader community for Navy strategy includes the monthly Navy Strategy Discussion Group (SDG), which brings together those in Washington with an ongoing interest in Navy strategy, including people from think tanks, industry, and government agencies whose portfolios include the Navy and Navy strategy.
Strategic enterprise member organizations have made progress toward achieving this mission, but more will be necessary to establish informed linkages between Navy strategy and budget. This mission is central to the raison d’etre of the Navy Strategic Enterprise because the yardstick against which Navy strategy is measured is whether it influences the budget.

This objective calls for assessing key national, DOD, joint, and Navy documents in order to determine whether they have been translated into programming plans. The new maritime strategy is notably absent from this list. We found that some Navy Strategic Enterprise members have assessed some of the documents included in this mission. N81 assesses the QDR, for example, and uses its assessment to inform programming plans. N51 similarly assesses Navy inputs to key documents such as the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). But, there is no broader effort to systematically assess all 12 of the key documents mentioned in this Navy Strategic Enterprise mission to determine whether their strategy principles have been translated into programming plans.

N3/N5 is undertaking an effort to track 90 separate elements of the new maritime strategy as action items as a first step in linking Navy strategy and budget. The plan is for N3/N5 to use the results of this tracking effort to work with N81 to ensure that Navy strategy principles are incorporated into programming plans.

Navy force planning is not yet clearly aligned with strategies and operating concepts. The N3/N5 effort to track elements of the new maritime strategy may reveal areas where strategy and force planning are not aligned. Whether this effort influences the Navy’s force planning process remains to be seen.
There are numerous obstacles to establishing linkages between Navy strategy and budget. Foremost among them is the timing of the annual budget process, which proceeds according to a regular schedule dictated by congressional timelines. Navy strategies, by contrast, are issued at irregular intervals. For instance, prior to the most recent maritime strategy, published in March 2015, the previous maritime strategy was issued in 2007.

The long lead times necessary to make changes to the fleet is another obstacle to tying Navy strategy to budget. The notional lifetime of a Navy ship is 30 years, and, in fact, can be much longer. A new strategy is not likely to change the composition of the fleet, due to the long research and development timelines and the significant capital outlays required for Navy capital assets.

Unclassified strategy documents tend to be written so generally that they do not contain the detail Navy programmers need in order to base programming decisions on them. The level of detail necessary for programmatic decisions is invariably classified. Thus, maritime strategies usually have companion classified volumes intended to provide guidance to programmers, such as the forthcoming classified annex to the maritime strategy.

Since programmers already follow multiple sources of guidance, including the classified DSG and the unclassified QDR, they prefer not to add Navy strategy as additional guidance.

The size and dynamic nature of the budgeting process are two additional obstacles to linking Navy strategy and budget. After the Navy budget is approved by the CNO, it must be approved by the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of Management and Budget. They can easily make changes that deviate from Navy strategy.
Despite the obstacles, there are actions that N51 can take to link Navy strategy to the budget. N51 can work with N81 as they produce the classified annex to the maritime strategy, in order to ensure that it has the level of detail necessary for N81 to make programmatic decisions. To establish the ground rules, processes, and cycle for Navy strategy development, N51 could write an OPNAV instruction for the Navy strategy planning process. This instruction would list Navy strategy documents, their purpose, audience, and connections to one another. The strategic enterprise members we interviewed did not view it as necessary to issue a new maritime strategy every year, because the security environment does not change sufficiently; however, they argued that it should be reviewed on an annual basis. Finally, the instruction should outline the conditions in the international security environment that would necessitate the issuance of a new maritime strategy.

N51 can request changes in how the Navy issues and uses its strategy documents that more closely links them to the budget. For example, N3/N5 can request that the CNO sign important strategy documents. This would make each new document relevant to the entire Navy. Like the new maritime strategy, the CNO will sign the forthcoming classified annex. N51 can also request that N8 include the Navy strategy documents, such as the forthcoming classified annex to the maritime strategy, as programming guidance.

While these changes don’t address the long lead-times necessary to make changes to fleet composition, the dynamic nature of the budgeting process, or the size of the Navy budget, they will establish closer strategy-to-budget linkages within the Navy staff. The Navy can only indirectly influence the other three obstacles. It should therefore focus on the strategy development and budget process that it can directly influence.
Developing a cadre of Navy strategists is the most concrete of the Navy Strategic Enterprise missions. Its sub-components are within the purview of the assigned organizations. Consequently, the Navy Strategic Enterprise is achieving its mission to develop a cadre of Navy strategists in all areas.

The Navy established a cadre of strategists through a NAVADMIN message in January 2015. This message outlined the sub-specialty, identified the locations of strategist billets, and identified officers with the strategist sub-specialty. The NAVADMIN identifies the strategy curriculum at NPS and the Advanced Studies in Naval Strategy (ASNS) curriculum at NWC as prerequisites for being granted the sub-specialty code.

N3/N5 has mapped procedures for career progression and mentorship of unrestricted line (URL) officers with the strategist sub-specialty. N3/N5 has solicited mentors for newly designated strategists. It is too early to judge either the viability of the career progression models created by N51 or the success of the mentoring relationships.

The final component of developmental experience culminating in expert strategist billets for post-major-command O-6 strategists has made de facto progress based on how the Navy established the strategist sub-specialty. When the Navy established the strategist sub-specialty, it awarded the code to officers currently occupying strategy billets based on their on-the-job training in the billet. Some of the officers occupying O-6 strategist billets are, in fact, post-major-command O-6s, although not all of them have had the strategist career progression outlined by N51.
Further development of the Navy strategy sub-specialty calls for the Navy Strategic Enterprise to continue dedicating of resources to it. The major obstacle to maintaining the strategist sub-specialty is competing requirements from the warfare communities. For example, an officer’s career milestones in his designator may not be optimally timed with requirements of the strategist sub-specialty. Meeting these career milestones within the warfare community will largely determine whether an officer is competitive for promotion.

The Navy’s overall management of sub-specialties is also an obstacle because it inhibits a formal agreement on management of the strategist sub-specialty. The Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) is in the process of changing the Navy Military Personnel Manual (MILPERSMAN) and other documents governing sub-specialty management in the Navy. BUPERS’ preference is to complete these changes prior to making a formal agreement with N3/N5 and N13, through a memorandum of agreement (MOA) for the management of the strategist sub-specialty.

The number of billets currently coded for strategist sub-specialists is another obstacle. Currently 25 billets are coded as required skill for officers with the strategy sub-specialty and 50 more billets have been designated by N515, the strategist community manager, as desired fill by strategists. While coding billets in this way gives detailers more flexibility in filling them, it risks strategist billets being filled by officers without the necessary education and experience.

A decrease in demand for educated and experienced strategists from Navy and joint organizations could become an obstacle to maintaining the cadre of Navy strategists and could negatively influence N3/N5 advocacy on behalf of the strategist community. Were N3/N5 to become reluctant to advocate with the warfare communities on behalf of Navy strategists for their educational and experience requirements, it would also be an obstacle to the long-term health of the community.
The actions and activities that N51 can take to maintain the cadre of educated and experienced strategists relate to managing the strategist community and employing strategists so that they can use their skills to the greatest effect on behalf of the Navy. The Navy Strategic Enterprise can bring PERS-4 detailers into the process of maintaining a cadre of Navy strategists by establishing an action officers group (AOG) for the strategist sub-specialty. This AOG should address the most pressing issues facing the strategist community, such as coding billets for strategists and monitoring revisions to the MILPERSMAN and other documents governing sub-specialties in the Navy. N51 can also increase the flexibility of the requirements to obtain the strategist sub-specialty by allowing alternative paths to grant it. These alternative paths should include credit for on-the-job training for officers assigned to N51 in addition to distance education provided by NPS. The Operations Analyst (OA) community in N81 uses this approach effectively. It provides N81 with a larger pipeline than necessary to fill OA billets, which gives individual officers the flexibility to skip pay-back tours when they have career-enhancing opportunities, such as serving as a flag aide. Finally, it will be critically important for N51 to track strategists’ career progression in order to determine whether they remain viable candidates for promotion within their respective warfare communities. This, in turn, will determine the health of the strategist sub-specialty community.

N51 can request help from N13 in ensuring that the Navy personnel system is structured to support the strategist sub-specialty community. Namely, it will be important to review billets to ensure that those billets that require experienced strategists are coded for them. N51 can also request N13’s assistance in writing promotion board precepts that include language encouraging voting members to look favorably upon strategists’ education and experience. When necessary, N51 can request assistance from N3/N5 in select strategist community management issues such as detailing and administration of the strategist community.

### Actions and activities

- **Take**
  - Establish strategist sub-specialty AOG that includes N51, N13, and PERS-4
  - Build flexibility into sub-specialty accessions
    - Develop distance education option through NPS or NWC for officers assigned to N51
    - Open sub-specialty to RL and staff corps
  - Continue efforts to maintain the cadre of Navy strategists
    - Revisions to MILPERSMAN and other documents governing sub-specialties in the Navy
    - Naval Strategy fellowships, graduate education programs, and sub-specialty management instruction
  - Track sub-specialists’ career progression to monitor health of community

- **Request**
  - Partner with N13 to code necessary billets for the strategist sub-specialty
  - Work with N13 to write promotion board precepts that value strategist education and experience
  - N3/N5 assistance in select strategist community management issues
  - Work with NPS and NWC to that ensure strategist curricula meet N51 demand for educated strategists
    - Regularly review curricula
The Navy Strategic Enterprise mission of fostering a culture of strategic thinking in the Navy centers around the Navy Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL), though the KSIL is only one component of such a culture. Fostering a culture of strategic thinking also involves service efforts such as strategist community management, Navy strategy education programs and fellowships, and annual strategy fora.

The KSIL, modeled on the Army KSIL, contains a series of questions that N51 intends for students at NPS and NWC, Federal Executive Fellows (FEFs), and other students in Navy-funded education programs to answer in their academic research. It is a relatively new product that NWC developed first for the 2014-2015 academic year and again for 2015-2016. NPS has been tasked with creating a repository of theses that address KSIL questions.

Despite the parallel that this Navy Strategic Enterprise mission draws, there is no clear linkage between the KSIL and the CNO’s strategic priorities. The KSIL is sponsored by N51 and written by NWC, but it does not contain an endorsement by the CNO. The 2016-2017 KSIL will be issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RD&A). This new KSIL’s connections to CNO priorities has not been established.

This mission also includes encouraging the broader community of interest to comment on CNO priorities. This aspect of the mission is made more difficult because the KSIL is not connected to CNO priorities. Nevertheless, N51 has not encouraged comment on the KSIL by Navy commands, researchers interested in maritime strategy, and others who make up the community of interest.
The KSIL is new and its distribution has been limited to strategy students and the Navy Strategic Enterprise; therefore, its contributions to fostering a culture of strategic thinking within the Navy have likewise been limited. Even if future KSILs achieve the aim of shaping Navy-funded student research, that will not necessarily lead to a culture of strategic thinking in the Navy. Rather, it will also take the encouragement of Navy leadership at all levels to foster the kind of culture this Navy Strategic Enterprise mission envisions. Furthermore, the KSIL is not connected the CNO’s priority strategic issues, because it does not include a CNO endorsement. The obstacle to connecting the KSIL to the CNO’s priorities is that the latter change rapidly; thus, they are not necessarily appropriate as research topics, which by nature are longer term.

It is not certain how many students in Navy-funded education programs and their academic advisors will use the KSIL to select their research topics. Faculty members at academic institutions, including NWC and NPS, may be unwilling to permit their students to conduct research on KSIL topics. NPS leadership, however, has indicated that they will encourage their teaching faculty to allow students to write their theses on KSIL topics. The KSIL may be most helpful for Federal Executive Fellows (FEFs), who have broader latitude to choose their research topics. Also, students may have academic interests different from the questions laid out in the KSIL but no less important to the Navy. For instance, a student may be interested in writing his or her thesis on an emerging technology with strategic implications for the Navy, but which is not reflected in the KSIL.
The KSIL need not be the only vehicle to foster a culture of strategic thinking within the Navy. The strategist cadre ultimately may be more important in achieving this mission, because they represent the tangible and ongoing investment by the Navy in strategy. It is this cadre who can foster a culture of strategic thinking in the Navy by, for instance, introducing others within their respective warfare communities to strategies and the connections between strategy and operations. Recognizing the importance of the strategist community, participants at the June 2015 SEG meeting discussed how it encourages strategic thinking in the Navy. N51 can also encourage strategists to participate in the Strategy Discussion Group (SDG) and similar events focused on maritime and defense strategy as part of their professional development. Finally, N51 can design the three annual strategy fora that it co-sponsors (the Current Strategy Forum, Future Strategy Forum, and Cooperative Strategy Forum) to feature panels and speakers that address the most pressing strategy issues facing the Navy.

So long as the KSIL is one avenue of fostering a culture of strategic thinking in the Navy, N51 can request assistance from NWC and NPS in maximizing its utility. N51 can request that NWC and NPS encourage their faculties to allow students, especially those in strategy Masters’ Degree programs, to conduct research on KSIL topics. N51 can also request that the Naval War College Review consider publishing papers that address topics in the KSIL. Finally, NPS can create a repository of papers written on KSIL topics and publicize it to the Navy strategist community and the broader community of interest so that it becomes a resource for strategy development and assessment.
The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps produce service strategies, designate and train strategists, and attempt to link their strategies with their budgetary, capital investment, and research and development (R&D) resources. To get a better understanding of how the other services develop and assess their strategies, we conducted a comparative analysis of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps’ strategy organizations and processes. Understanding the other services’ approaches to strategy development and the challenges they face provided a useful basis for comparison with the Navy Strategic Enterprise. This comparative analysis provides context for the Navy as it seeks to improve the strategic enterprise.
In our discussions with Air Force strategists, we found that the service has a decentralized organizational culture that favors short-term tactical operations over more strategic, long-range efforts. The Air Staff reorganized in 2014 by combining their strategy (A5) and requirements (A8) sections in order to centralize and better align strategy functions, activities and products with resource allocation processes and products. The Air Force strategy, *A Call to the Future* [5] provides guidance for the *Strategic Master Plan* [6], which will include classified annexes addressing human capital, science and technology, posture, and capabilities; a 20-year resource allocation plan; and a 10-year budget plan. Air Force senior leaders also meet periodically for strategic choices events. The aim of these events is to better align service decisions about strategy, operational planning, and resource allocation.

In addition to strategic choices events, the Air Force Chief of Staff convenes four-star officers quarterly for strategy roundtables. These roundtables are a facilitated venue for Air Force leaders to discuss the strategic issues facing the service.

As the Air Force seeks to develop the next generation of strategy professionals, the strategists we interviewed reported that the service aims to educate all of its officers in strategy rather than to create a strategy specialty or sub-specialty.
The Army strategists we interviewed stated that the Army’s approach to improving its strategy is to improve the quality of its strategists. It is the only one of the four armed services that has a strategist career track. The FY15 Army Strategy Branch force structure has 335 officers: 57 at the O-6 level; 124 at the O-5 level, and 154 at the O-4 level. Some of the Army strategists we interviewed questioned the wisdom of taking Army officers out of their warfare career paths to become strategists. They suggested that the Navy approach of creating a sub-specialty is a wiser course of action because it keeps officers current in their warfighting knowledge while growing their expertise in strategy. Army strategists’ community of practice is open to all strategy professionals, extending across the military services and civilian national security organizations. They maintain strong connections to one another and share information and new strategic developments with one another.

Despite its well-developed strategy specialty, the Army’s strategy activities are spread across numerous organizations, including the Army Chief of Staff’s strategy cell, Training and Doctrine Command, and Forces Command. Although the Army’s operating concept, *Win in a Complex World* [7] provides strategic guidance, the strategists we interviewed indicated that the Army is struggling to define its value proposition. With respect to its organizational culture, the Army sees itself as a “learning organization,” and it values and reinforces after-action reviews, continual learning, collaboration, playing “by the rules,” and conforming with stated values and commanders’ guidance.

Finally, the strategists we interviewed did not find their KSIL particularly useful as a guide for strategic inquiry.
The Marine Corps’ plan to improve its strategy is through empowering Marines as strategic thinkers. The Marine strategists we interviewed claimed that this is a core competency for all Marines that begins during basic training. Marine Corps strategy functions fall under the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) Futures Directorate (FD). The FD integrates activities such as futures assessment; plans, strategy, and concepts; war gaming; science and technology; and experiments.

The Ellis Group played the lead role in developing the Marine Corps strategy, *Expeditionary Force 21* (EF21) [8]. The purpose of EF21 is to guide the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan, its force development system, and its planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) and POM submissions. However, we were not able to identify the structures or processes intended to align the strategy with these planning activities. In our interviews, Marine strategists reported that the service has historical and ongoing need to justify its value to joint warfighting, especially as the country draws down from two extended land wars. Therefore, in their view, adaption and innovation are of paramount importance for everything the Marine Corps does including strategy development.

In support of the Commandant, the strategic initiatives group (SIG) functions as his “think tank.” Its purpose is to shape strategic decision-making and respond to demands for strategy inputs. Regular SIG products include the Scouting Report, the SIG Note, and SIG Tech Insights. It also coordinates the Common Strategic Engagement Picture.
In comparing strategy development across the four armed services, we considered four major areas: strategist career management, strategy organization within the service, and linkages to service processes. Our analysis looks at these areas because together they show each service’s approach and commitment to strategy.

All four services recognize the value of strategy, but use different models to develop strategists. The Army has a strategist career track; the Marine Corps and Air Force do not. The Navy is the only service with a strategist sub-specialty wherein officers retain their warfare designators.

Most of the services either have recently made changes to their strategy organizations or view their current strategy organization as sub-optimal. The Army and Navy have a more fragmented approach to strategy, with many independent centers of decision-making and control. The Air Force and Marine Corps have recently restructured their strategy activities within fewer organizations, in order to align their strategy to resource allocation processes.

The services have created linkages between their strategy organizations and critical processes such as budgeting. The Air Force uses organizational tools, including the integration of the A5 and A8 on the Air Staff, as a way to link its budget and strategy processes. The Army views development of better strategists as the best way to link strategy with processes that affect it. The Marine Corps, due to its small size and existing relationships between strategists, can make organizational changes that ensure strategy is linked to other service processes. Like the Army, the Navy links strategy to other service processes through personal relationships. The Navy Strategic Enterprise, though, seeks to move the Navy toward an organizational structure that links strategy to budget.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Navy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career</td>
<td>No strategy specialty or sub-specialty</td>
<td>Strategist career path since 2000</td>
<td>No strategy specialty or sub-specialty, but claim that strategic thinking is a core competency for Marines</td>
<td>Strategist sub-specialty established in 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Strategy staff reorganized in fall 2014 to an A5/A6 structure</td>
<td>Strategy functions fragmented among multiple, disconnected organizations (Army staff FORSCOM, TRADOC, CASCOM, etc.)</td>
<td>Strategy staff reorganized as a Future Directorate at MCCDC in 2010; Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG) supports service leadership</td>
<td>Attempting to consolidate with the Navy Strategic Enterprise, but fragmented among multiple organizations and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkages to service processes</td>
<td>Using organizational change to create better staff structures and processes</td>
<td>Educating and developing better strategists</td>
<td>Small service size allows improvements to organizational structure, and strategy processes, and leveraging existing relationships</td>
<td>Personal relationships link strategy to other service processes</td>
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We found that the armed services have common challenges related to strategy development. The services—especially the Army and the Marine Corps—are wrestling with their future value proposition to joint warfighting after the drawdown from two decade-long ground wars. All four services are trying to sustain their warfighting capabilities in the current era of tightly constrained budgets. Finally, the armed services are determining how to integrate rapid advances in science and technology into their warfighting plans and how to address the emerging capabilities of potential strategic adversaries.

With these challenges in mind, comparing the other services’ approaches to strategy provides insights for the Navy as it seeks to improve strategy development, engagement, and assessment. These insights relate to ongoing service chief involvement in strategy processes. A key function of strategy is to support leadership decision-making. In particular, Air Force and Marine Corps strategy organizations and processes support their leadership in strategy decision-making. For example, the Air Force Chief of Staff’s quarterly strategy roundtable provides the service’s top leaders with a regular opportunity to address strategic issues the service is facing. This event also signals the importance that the service chief places on strategy. Moreover, support to leadership decision-making is the explicit authority that the Navy Strategic Enterprise has in its charter. Air Force and Marine Corps strategy organizations also anticipate demand for service strategy. Members of the SIG, for instance, provide the Commandant of the Marine Corps with information on emerging strategic issues. This proactive function shapes strategy decision-making within the Marine Corps. A closer connection between the Navy Strategic Enterprise and the CNO could serve to anticipate demand for service strategy.
This section presents our findings in light of our assessment of the Navy Strategic Enterprise and cross-service comparative analysis. We discuss not only our findings but also the conditions necessary for the Navy Strategic Enterprise to succeed in the future.
The Navy Strategic Enterprise has made progress toward achieving its overall objective and all six of its missions in its first year of existence. The mission to develop a cadre of Navy strategists has largely been achieved, though much work remains to be done managing the community. Navy Strategic Enterprise missions will likely take years to fully achieve and require ongoing investments in terms of staff time, leadership attention, and financial investment.

The SEG and SOG meetings that are the process by which the Navy Strategic Enterprise works, have largely consisted of presentations on N51 products such as the new maritime strategy and the forthcoming classified annex to the maritime strategy. Although the Navy Strategic Enterprise was established to align and coordinate Navy actions with regard to strategy, N3/N5 is the strategic enterprise member that has made the most concerted effort to coordinate its work with other enterprise members in SEG and SOG meetings. While N51 products are central to achieving Navy Strategic Enterprise missions, it has neither the authorities nor the capabilities to develop, engage, and assess Navy strategy without assistance from other strategic enterprise members. Including strategy-related efforts by strategic enterprise members in addition to N51 in future SEG and SOG meetings is an area for improvement, so that those meetings become venues for alignment and coordination.

One limiting factor to the Navy Strategic Enterprise process we found during our interviews is that enterprise leaders and members expressed a desire that the Navy Strategic Enterprise not be used to generate additional tasking for them.
In the Navy Strategic Enterprise’s first year, SEG and SOG meetings have enjoyed robust participation by member organizations. This may have been due to the personal interest of the DNS—who chairs the SEG—in the strategic enterprise. Since the DNS that established it has turned over and a new CNO will shortly take office, the interest of these two officers in Navy strategy and in continuing the Navy Strategic Enterprise will largely determine its future. In order for the Navy Strategic Enterprise to achieve its missions, it must enjoy unambiguous backing from and periodic engagement with the incoming CNO.

The Navy Strategic Enterprise itself should provide value to its member staffs and organizations through SEG and SOG meetings. Recent topics on SEG and SOG agendas have been important and relevant; however, future meetings would benefit from wider participation by strategic enterprise members, in addition to N51, as described in the strategic enterprise charter problem statement. For instance, N8 representatives could present information about the front-end assessment (FEA) to the program objective memorandum (POM) at future SEG and SOG meetings.

Between regularly scheduled SEG and SOG meetings, collaboration among strategic enterprise members contributes to future strategic enterprise success. For example, N51, N81, and NWC collaboration on wargaming has occurred outside SEG and SOG meetings and is designed to create games that anticipate future strategic challenges in support of Navy strategy development. Shared awareness of ongoing strategy-related efforts among strategic enterprise members allows organizations to bring their expertise and relationships to bear in order to create the best possible strategy products.
The courses of action (COAs) to improve the Navy Strategic Enterprise fall into two broad categories: incremental improvements toward mission accomplishment, and bolder steps to raise the profile of the Navy Strategic Enterprise by involving more of its membership in its mission accomplishment. The former approach incorporates mostly those actions that N51 can either take on its own or initiate with the assistance of other strategic enterprise members. The latter approach includes actions either initiated by or requiring substantial participation from other strategic enterprise members.

The distinction between the two COAs is whether N51, as the nexus of the Navy Strategic Enterprise, focuses its efforts on internally improving its processes and products, or externally on requesting support from other enterprise members. This section lays out two COAs that illustrate each approach. It is also possible for N51, in cooperation with Navy Strategic Enterprise members, to take both approaches simultaneously.
This course of action is an incremental approach to achieving Navy Strategic Enterprise missions that focuses on N51 initiated actions. N51 should increase its consultation and coordination with other strategic enterprise members. For example, N51 should coordinate with N81 in drafting the classified annex to the maritime strategy to ensure that it contains the necessary level of detail to make programmatic decisions, thus linking the strategy to budget. Also N51 should request NWC, NPS, and CNA support now for forthcoming strategy documents and to assess the relevance, influence, and sufficiency of the maritime strategy and its classified annex.

N51 should take the lead in defining the relationship between future Navy strategic documents and how they should be aligned to one another. This could, for example, be done by writing an OPNAV instruction outlining the Navy strategy planning process that includes strategy products, their purpose, their connections to other documents, and their periodicity.

The SDG is a natural forum for strategic enterprise member staffs and commands to present their ongoing strategy efforts and get outside feedback. Members of the Navy strategy specialist community should be invited to future SDG meetings as part of their professional development, which in turn would help them expand their networks.

To improve the management of strategy sub-specialists, N51 should request that Navy Strategic Enterprise leadership establish an AOG for the strategy sub-specialty. This AOG would include N13 and N515, at a minimum, for the purpose of monitoring the health of the sub-specialist community including, for example career progression and accessions.

In order align and coordinate Navy strategy actions, future SEG and SOG meetings should include presentations by Navy Strategic Enterprise members in addition to N3/N5.
This second course of action seeks to involve a broader spectrum of Navy Strategic Enterprise members in achieving strategic enterprise missions and raising the profile of Navy strategy. To do so, SEG leaders would need to establish enterprise priorities, whether in development, engagement, assessment, or more narrowly focused on specific issues such as strategy to budget linkage.

Navy Strategic Enterprise leadership should take steps to make Navy strategic messaging and engagement a shared responsibility among enterprise members. This includes further development of the strategic synchronization calendar as a tool for shared awareness and encouraging SEG and SOG members to identify opportunities and venues to communicate Navy strategic themes.

To establish links between strategy and budget, as outlined in the strategic enterprise charter, N8 should include service strategy documents, such as the forthcoming classified annex to the maritime strategy, as programming guidance.

Under this COA, establishing two AOGs, including a strategist sub-specialty AOG and a strategy assessment AOG, would serve to create entities that are mission-focused on advancing progress in two important areas. A strategy assessment AOG should draw on a broad range of strategic enterprise members to assess the new maritime strategy and its classified annex.

SEG and SOG meeting agendas should also be broadened to include strategy-related efforts of member organizations in addition to N51. This could include, for example, N8-led discussion of the FEA and the POM or N9-led discussion of future fleet architecture.
This appendix contains the study methodology, a chart of leadership transitions over the next five years, and our references. The methodology begins with the overall objective and six missions of the Navy Strategic Enterprise, which form the foundation for our assessment. Next, we discuss our overall analytic approach and study assumptions. We then present the methodologies for our assessment of the Navy Strategic Enterprise and our cross-service analysis. We include the interviews the study team conducted in support of this study and the data we used. At the sponsor’s request, we lay out upcoming leadership transitions because they present opportunities for the Navy to release new maritime strategies on behalf of the new CNO or in support of new national leadership. Finally, this appendix lists our references.
The Navy Strategic Enterprise charter lists one overall objective and six supporting missions. These missions vary considerably: some are concrete, and others are far more nebulous. The overall mission of aligning enterprise capabilities, for instance, states that its purpose is “greater fidelity, harmony, and synergistic effects.” An increase in fidelity, harmony, and synergistic effects can only be determined subjectively, but it can be assessed with the informed judgements of stakeholders. By contrast, mission 5, developing a cadre of Navy strategists, is more concrete and there are ample data available to determine whether the Navy Strategic Enterprise is achieving this mission. Due to the variation in the types of missions included in the Navy Strategic Enterprise charter, we used both objective and subjective data to assess the Navy Strategic Enterprise’s accomplishment of its missions.

In discussing these missions with strategic enterprise members, it quickly became apparent that some missions are more important to them than others. The mission that they usually cited as the most important was number 4—establishing informed links between strategy and budget. Other missions that enterprise members consistently described as more important included the overall objective and mission numbers 1, 5, and 6.
This slide depicts our overall methodology. We began with an approach based on assessment questions. This was a modified version of CNA-developed operational assessments that we have applied at CENTCOM and PACFLT [1, 2]. Using this approach, we sought to determine progress toward strategic enterprise missions through interview questions in a logical hierarchy which increasingly focused on individual elements of Navy Strategic Enterprise missions. The goal was to understand whether the Navy Strategic Enterprise is making progress toward achieving its missions vice simply using its activities as a proxy for progress. We interviewed Navy Strategic Enterprise principals using these assessment questions. Additional details on who we interviewed and which organizations they represent are in the appendix. In addition to interview data, we also consulted secondary sources, including strategy documents, OPNAV instructions, and POM and event schedules. A more complete description of our data sources is in the appendix. We used both quantitative and qualitative data. The qualitative data, which came mainly from interviews, were useful in understanding Navy Strategic Enterprise members’ judgment of strategic enterprise progress. Where available, we compared quantitative data with interview data to develop a more complete picture of strategic enterprise progress.

We also conducted a comparative analysis of how the other three armed services develop their strategies. The purpose of this analysis was to compare the other services’ experiences with strategy development to that of the Navy Strategic Enterprise.

Based on our findings, we developed two courses of action (COAs). These COAs include actions that the Navy can pursue through the strategic enterprise.
In this study we assume that Navy Strategic Enterprise leadership and membership are working to achieve the missions in its charter, as written. While some member staffs and organizations may not wholly agree with every mission, we assume that strategic enterprise members plan to achieve strategic enterprise missions.

As the office charged with coordinating and convening SEG and SOG meetings, N51 is the nexus of the Navy Strategic Enterprise. Yet it cannot achieve the Navy Strategic Enterprise missions, as outlined in its charter, without support from other members. For example, N51 requires assistance from the Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, and CNA to assess service strategy.

Improving strategy development, engagement, and assessment is not a challenge that the Navy staff can “grow its way out of.” That is, the Navy cannot increase their staff sizes to ensure that there are sufficient personnel to fulfill the missions of the Navy Strategic Enterprise as outlined in its charter. Rather, Navy leaders must prioritize Navy Strategic Enterprise missions over other tasking. If anything, there is ongoing pressure to reduce the size of the Navy staff. The Department of the Navy (DON) Transformation Plan, [3] for instance, includes a staff reduction of 20 percent as a goal for the department.
To find out whether the strategic enterprise is accomplishing its missions, we developed a series of assessment questions in a logical hierarchy. We developed a series of broad assessment questions and nested supporting questions that required more specific information. Where interviewees said that the Navy Strategic Enterprise was not achieving a specific mission, we asked them why not, what the obstacles were to mission accomplishment, and what actions and activities the strategic enterprise can take or request to overcome these obstacles. We used open-ended questions to encourage respondents to discuss why an issue was important to the overall strategic enterprise.

These assessment questions required a mix of qualitative and quantitative information to answer, and focused on assessing progress toward mission accomplishment. Individual interviews provided subjective judgments of progress, but the answers to our assessment questions combined across multiple interviews to reveal where the strategic enterprise is making progress and where it is not.

We assessed progress as being at one of four levels:

- Not achieving: No progress toward the mission observed to date.
- Moving toward: Limited progress or plans to fulfill the mission.
- Partially achieving: Some aspects of the mission achieved.
- Achieved: Mission end-state achieved.

This method allows a broad characterization of mission accomplishment that takes into account partial progress. These descriptors evaluate only the amount, not the quality, of that progress.
We used four points of comparison in our cross-service analysis:

• Strategist career management
• Strategy organization within the service
• Linkages between the strategy organizations and other key parts of the service
• Organizational culture.

In examining strategists’ careers, we analyzed the nature of a strategy career in each service including how the service selects strategists, how strategists are educated and trained; what knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) strategists need in order to achieve their missions; and what kinds of tasks a strategist performs.

By analyzing the strategy organization in each of the services, we aimed to understand how strategy activities are organized and managed, where they are located in the service, and how they are integrated into decision-making.

Next, we analyzed the nature of the linkages, or relationships, between service strategy organizations and the service’s processes for implementing strategy. These processes include budgeting, capital investments, research and development, and doctrine and concepts.

Our analysis of the organizational culture of each of the services seeks to understand why each service approaches strategy the way it does and whether aspects of its strategy organization and processes are relevant for the Navy. We examined each service’s decision-making style, the way it delegates authority in strategy development and assessment, how it coordinates internally and externally on strategy matters, and issues related to core values and performance.
We interviewed over 100 strategy and defense professionals in order to understand both the Navy Strategic Enterprise and the larger context of uniformed service and military strategy. Within the Navy Strategic Enterprise, we focused on the officers who regularly participate in SEG and SOG meetings. Over the year that the Navy Strategic Enterprise has existed, uniformed members have turned over as part of regularly scheduled rotations. We have interviewed roughly half of the SOG members, including DNS VADM Scott Swift, who was instrumental in starting the Navy Strategic Enterprise. We have also interviewed most of the SOG members, with the major exception being those outside the Washington, DC, area. We interviewed both Col. William Wesley, USMC (ret.), the PACFLT N5, and Dean Thomas Culora, of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College and co-chair of the SOG, during trips to Washington. We also interviewed former Navy officials with substantial experience in Navy strategy and programming. These officials provided the study team with invaluable insights on Navy strategy development and future prospects for the Navy Strategic Enterprise.

To understand how the Navy Strategic Enterprise compares to the experiences of the other uniformed services, we interviewed uniformed and civilian strategy professionals in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The Army assigns its strategists to billets throughout the joint forces and the interagency, which enriched the conversation on service strategy due to the perspective they added. We also interviewed civilian officials in the Joint Staff J-7 and OSD Offices of Policy and Net Assessment, due to their responsibilities for strategy and future force development.
This slide shows the broad categories of data that the CNA study team used to conduct this analysis. We reviewed national, military, and service-level strategy documents in order to understand the current state and direction of strategy in the armed services. Joint and service doctrines and concepts revealed military thinking about how to overcome future challenges. We also reviewed analyses and studies on strategy-relevant issues, including, for example, professional military education (PME), strategy development, and wargaming.

We examined internal documentation in which Navy Strategic Enterprise members laid out their plans, schedules, and internal processes. This aided our understanding of how strategic enterprise members plan to achieve specific missions. We incorporated data from timelines, synchronization schedules, document development processes, draft document outlines, draft OPNAV instructions, draft MOAs, Navy message traffic, and strategy curricula into our analysis.

We attended strategy-relevant events in the Washington, DC, area. These included Navy Strategy Discussion Group (SDG) meetings. Study team members also attended the 2014 Defense Forum Washington; ONR’s Science and Technology Expo; New America Foundation and Arizona State University Future of War conference; Cyber Talks (a joint event hosted by NDU and sponsored by the Army Cyber Institute); and the Military Cyber Professionals Association meetings. We also attended Army strategy networking events and spent a day at the Army Strategy seminar at the Army War College, talking with current faculty and students, and reviewing the Army strategist curriculum.

Finally, we reviewed case studies of successful strategy development, including the *Maritime Strategy* of the 1980s and the Air Force’s, *Global Reach, Global Power* strategy.
In support of upcoming leadership transitions, the Navy has at least three opportunities to develop and release new maritime strategies over the next five years. Although a new CNO will be sworn in this year, the new maritime strategy was released just four months ago. The pending CNO turnover therefore will not likely be an opportunity to begin drafting a new maritime strategy. When a new President takes office in 2017, the Navy will have the opportunity to craft a new strategic document in accordance with the new administration’s vision. The new administration’s QDR in 2018 will be another opportunity to develop a new service strategy. Finally, when the CNO turns over again in 2019, the Navy will have the opportunity to draft a new maritime strategy.
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