The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?

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CAB D0022262.A3/1REV
March 2010
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Outline

• Project Description
• Executive Summary and BLUF
• Current Dilemma
• What is a “Global Navy”
• USN Deployment Strategy
• Future Global Environment for USN Operations
• External and Internal Drivers on USN Options
• Five Means for a “Global Navy” to Achieve Dominance and Influence
• Conclusion
Project Description and Background

- Sponsor: OPNAV N00X
- OPNAV N00X issues for analysis
  - Evaluation of the characteristics of a “globally influential navy”
  - At what point might the USN cease to be globally influential?
  - Impacts of fiscally constrained force structure?
    - Changes to capacity and capability
    - Changes to operational practices
- CNA tasks
  - Describe what constitutes “global influence”
  - Develop a set of characteristics for a globally influential navy
    - Deter, reassure, “create effects on a global scale”
  - Determine whether various force structures can meet required levels of capacity and capability to provide influence on a global scale
  - Provide options for force deployment strategies to maintain global influence
Key Findings

• Current strategies based on combat-credible forward presence are unsustainable
  – Constant high demand signals v. stagnant, shrinking resources
  – Increasing costs for modernization, people, infrastructure
• The Navy is currently dominant, ready, and influential around the globe, but it is under stress
  – Inheritor of Global Power role
  – Must be able to:
    • Lead cooperatively
    • Dominate challengers
    • Defeat chaotic/disruptive threats
• Five futures for “the Global Navy”
  – 2-hub option
  – 1+ Hub option
  – Shaping option
  – Surge option
  – Shrinking status quo option
• Remaining the global maritime power
  – Balancing presence and combat credibility
  – Without presence or credibility, dominance and influence lost
For the past 60 years, since roughly the outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. response to that war, the Navy has had a consistent strategy for the structure, deployment, and posturing of the fleet. American maritime dominance has been based on forces that were deployed forward and always ready to respond quickly to emerging situations in areas of vital interest to American foreign policy. Because of the perceived need to be able to respond at the highest levels of warfare throughout the Cold War, those forces were built, trained, and equipped to be “combat credible” against capable challengers. “Combat credible” meant the ability to project power against advanced air defenses, conduct and enable littoral/amphibious operations in opposed environments, and establish blue-water dominance against highly capable surface, sub-surface, and air threats.

In the post-Cold War environment, and since 9/11, evidence illustrates that the demand signal for naval forces has not waned. In fact, the Navy continues to be tasked with a range of operations, from disaster response to peacetime engagement and shows of force, and from counter-piracy and maritime interdiction to participation in major combat operations by TACAIR and other power-projection forces. This demand signal did not go down during the 1990s (“reaping the peace dividend”) as the Navy took on persistent operations in the Balkans, the Caribbean, and the Arabian Gulf after Desert Storm, continued its role in Asia, and expanded its peacetime engagement as COCOMs increased “shaping” activities.

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Current Dilemma

- USN Strategy for past 60 years: Forward Deployed and Combat Credible
- Issue: Increasing gap between demand signal for naval responses and resources available to fulfill mission sets
  - Overcoming 2 “myths”: Reducing the demand signal and “getting well” in future budgets
  - Force structure trend lines: Facing the period from 2025 and out with fleet of 230-240 ships
  - Where we are now: Current USN efforts to address gap have exposed stresses on the force
- Can a smaller Navy deter, reassure, and influence as “the Global Navy”?

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After 9/11, the Navy shed its role in the Balkans and the Caribbean but increased its homeland defense role and its ballistic missile defense missions, and it has played a major part in strike operations for OIF and OEF for the past decade. The Navy also picked up significant roles in humanitarian assistance, maritime partnership building, littoral combat, and special operational forces (SOF), and routinely had over 10,000 sailors ashore in CENTCOM to support operations there. *If the Navy hoped that reductions in the demand signal would give it breathing room to reset the force and invest in platforms and assets at the expense of operations, its hopes have proved to be false.*

The Navy battle force has shrunk by 20 percent in the last decade, while the number of ships on deployment has remained relatively steady. In a period of constant demand, resources to meet those demands, pay for needed future structure, and meet growing demands for spending on people and health care have shrunk. They will not grow in the future. There is a gap that must be addressed.
We defined the “global navy” as one that is dominant, ready, and influential. We accept these characteristics as proposed by the CNO and others throughout history as the appropriate language. We base our definitions on these terms and then compare them with attributes of past “global navies,” to see whether they are adequate. Our list of such navies includes Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, at the heights of their power.

A dominant naval force must be compared to its potential adversaries and challengers. For centuries, this meant the capability to exert sea control when and where needed, to sustain operations in these areas indefinitely, to support and influence operations on land, and to ensure freedom of movement for a nation’s forces. To these long-standing definitions of dominance, the U.S. Navy has added the capability to do high-performance TACAIR, high-tempo submarine operations, large-scale amphibious operations, power projection from the sea with precision strike (TACAIR, TLAMs), and joint and combined operations.

These numbers of assets reveal dominance in capacity, but they do not paint the whole picture. The Navy’s dominance has been cemented by its continuing operations and training in a range of capabilities that are unmatched by any potential challengers. The Navy has been able to translate this capacity into credible maritime combat power that has the following characteristics: strategic and tactical mobility; kinetic and non-kinetic options for the use of forces to influence events ashore and at sea; tailorable packages of forces that are sustainable at sea for long periods of time, support and enable amphibious operations; assured access and protection for maritime and joint forces; and command and control of international maritime coalitions across a spectrum of operations [1].
The global navy is deployed as a present force. The issue recently has been the ability of the Navy to maintain its ready posture in the face of declining numbers. Despite an 18-percent decrease in the size of the total battle force over the last 10 years, the percentage of the fleet deployed and the number of ships deployed have remained stable. Is this sustainable into the future?

The Navy has maintained this deployment rate with a smaller fleet by changing the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) and the PERSTEMPO regulations, which has allowed for longer, more frequent deployments and doubling the percentage of the fleet assigned to the Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) since 1998. We also note that over this time period, the number of ships training and exercising outside of CONUS has decreased from around 70 ships in 1998 to around 20 ships today. The number of ships forward is remaining constant, but the number of ships training is decreasing.

A global navy is a ready navy. Both its deployed and surge forces are trained, manned, and equipped adequately. They are deployed globally so they can be ready to quickly respond to crises. They also have the capacity to flex forces from other global deployments to areas of instability and to serve as a “home fleet” that can surge for major operations. CNA’s study of the Navy as a flexible force and ready responder is well documented in previous CNA publications [2]. The trends toward more joint and combined responses have not diminished since 9/11. Responses have become routine for “shows of force” to deter and reassure or to “express U.S. interest and resolve.” Naval forces have also become routine humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) responders because they are already deployed and ready.
A global navy is influential. It exerts coalition leadership in peacetime and in war. It provides a framework for allied operations. It is a visible force for reassuring allies and partners that the government at home is committed to them and that it has resolved to place its military forces in harm’s way in support of those allies. It is a force flexible enough to provide that influence at any point in the range of operations, from a show of force to deter a regional threat to the imposition of a blockade, or the use of naval power to project force and dominate an adversary.

It is influential because it can deter and reassure [3]. Maritime forces are uniquely qualified as hybrid forces. They are trained, equipped, and deployed as multi-mission platforms, capable of high-end war fighting performance. They know that when they deploy they are not likely to engage in major combat operations, but they are trained and equipped to that level. This means they can flex to that level, control escalation to that level, and be a ready force to deter potential aggression to that level. In reality, they will likely perform a range of lower-end operations and shows of force or maritime security operations and engagement activities that can be performed by the same assets. In addition, they are manned and led by personnel who have a wealth of experience and “training by doing” for these lower-end missions.
The Navy performs these missions routinely, to reassure allies, engage new partners, and serve as tangible expressions of American interests and ongoing relationships in creating maritime security on a global level. Maritime forces have advantages over land and air forces in these areas because of their inherent flexibility, their visibility without heavy footprints on land, their self-sustainability, and their routine interactions with other maritime forces. (Being at sea and interacting with other nations in port visits, merchant interactions, and diplomacy is what navies have been doing for centuries.)

This capacity is important because of the global commitments of the government. A global navy is a tool of a global power interested in political stability and economic activity across the globe. Its political and economic commitments are expressed in treaties and partnerships with other governments on several continents, and the navy is a visible sign of the government’s willingness to maintain a global presence.
Global Seapowers in History

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Does a study of past navies alter or add to our definition of the “global navy”? Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom all developed naval forces that had “global reach” over challengers. Their challengers were focused on land conquests and regional power, while these nations built forces with global capabilities (long-range ships with sustainment and access). Their forces led the way in innovation of new platforms, materials, weapons, and operational thinking (caravels, fluyts, dreadnoughts). They also commanded more than 50 percent of the capital ships of their time (CVNs, big deck amphibs, TLAM shooters, SSNs, and SSBNs). These were dominant navies, capable of winning battles from the West Indies to the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. The forces flexed from one theater to the next, were supported by sophisticated logistics networks and access agreements, and controlled the ladders of escalation from gunboat diplomacy to blockades, up to major naval actions that influenced the outcome of global wars involving land and sea forces [4].

These forces, in times of peace, secured the global commons and ensured freedom of movement of goods and people across the globe. They supported global trading systems from the age of mercantilism to the industrial revolution and into the modern era of capitalism. They were a gold standard for international exchange. These forces supported national governments that had specific global agendas for liberal trade, the rule of law at sea, and the protection of maritime commerce from illicit activities such as piracy and smuggling.
Global Seapowers in History

All of these global navies supported their governments’ diplomacy and reinforced global partnerships and coalition leadership. In peacetime they engaged with local powers in India and the Far East. Their officers conducted trade talks from the North and Baltic seas to the Middle East. They carried ambassadors and merchants to weave political and economic networks that sustained global empires.
U.S. naval forces have been postured globally as combat credible and forward present for the past 60 years. It has operated from the premise that forward presence and combat credibility provide maritime dominance.

Forward presence makes the Navy the ready responder to emerging situations and crises. The Navy, with 30 to 40 percent of its ships deployed on a routine basis, is already at sea as part of its normal operations. Presence is visibility: it means that U.S. interests are already signaled and that allies and other interested nations are aware of U.S. interests and commitments. Without presence, the ability to influence events and situations is greatly reduced. The options and range of responses available to the U.S. government are enhanced by the operational capabilities of naval forces.

The combat credibility of U.S. naval forces has been a consistent factor of U.S. naval strategy for this period as well. Combat-credible forces are capable of a range of operations from shows of force to humanitarian assistance, up to the use of tactical air forces and missiles for precision attacks or as part of a large joint operation. Combat credibility for this entire period has been defined by the presence of carrier strike groups (carriers and their highly capable escorts of cruisers and destroyers), by amphibious forces able to influence events ashore, and by the ability to concentrate submarine forces for a range of missions from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to sea control. All of these forces have been supported by afloat logistics ships and a network of overseas bases and access.

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agreements that have allowed such forces to be sustained indefinitely, as responses have turned into persistent missions.

This global naval power has been exercised on the same scale as that practiced by previous naval powers (relative to historical time and means available). The Navy has defined its global presence as sustaining combat credibility in two hubs (WESTPAC and the Mediterranean throughout the Cold War and WESTPAC and the North Arabian Sea/Arabian Gulf since Desert Storm). The Navy has maintained this presence in response to the consistent demands of many administrations for U.S. military presence by joint forces. Forces in these areas reflect long-standing U.S. political and economic interests, reassurance of allies, and deterrence of threats to regional stability.

In addition, the Navy has maintained the capacity and flexibility to surge additional forces from CONUS and other parts of the globe for emerging conflicts and crises. It also had the capacity for short-term surges and engagement activities by independent deployers in other parts of the world. These independent deployers took part in routine exercises with partners and allies from Latin America to Europe and Asia. They accompanied hospital
USN Strategies and Operating Concepts

- Since the 1950s, forward presence and combat credibility = maritime dominance
  - Presence
    - The ready responder ("Where are the carriers?") and Joint enabler
    - Can’t influence unless you are there (the Coalition and Partnership Leader)
  - Combat Credibility
    - Power projection and blue water dominance
    - Enable amphibious operations
    - Robust submarine and ISR presence
    - Access and afloat sustainment

- Capacity = 2 + Hubs, engagement, responses, and short term surges
  - A hub = 1.0 CSG + 1.0 ARG/MEU + other combat credible forces
  - Hubs used to have 3-4 CV/CVN, 6-8 Amphibs, many escorts
  - Increased capabilities of platforms enable reductions in platforms
  - 2 hubs in Cold War (MED and WESTPAC) and beyond (WESTPAC and Arabian Gulf/NAS)
    - Hubs reflect USN support of USG foreign policy
    - Independent deployers do engagement, crisis response, and short term surges
    - If there are ongoing combat operations, the USN plays a role

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ships on humanitarian assistance missions and responded themselves to natural disasters. They went on engagement and training missions such as the African Partnership Station or Southern Partnership Station.

The size of the Navy has ranged from fewer than 300 ships to more than 1,000 ships,¹ but the forward presence and combat credibility parts of the Navy’s strategy for global preeminence have never changed. To be forward is to be ready, and to be combat credible is to be dominant and able to control escalation and de-escalation at any level of confrontation. The global reach and ambitions of the Navy also have never changed; to be absent is to forgo influence.

The world system in which the USN will operate is evolving along three dimensions at once.

First, the system is seeing the emergence of some strong states that can and intend to challenge the traditional global order on certain economic issues and regional security issues. In Asia, China asserts more influence over regional issues from Korea around to the South China Sea. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, Iran is an opportunistic regional power threatening Western-aligned states and Western interests. Russia, humiliated for a decade, has a more nationalistic and defensive foreign policy in the territory of the former Soviet Union. In this environment, the coordination of Western allied responses has been more difficult.

Second, there are elements of a chaotic future in the area loosely defined by Tom Barnett’s “Gap” as outlined in his book, *The Pentagon’s New Map* (from Indonesia to South Asia and the Middle East, and on through most of Africa) [5], especially in the region from Morocco to Pakistan, where terrorism and Islamic radicalism continue to threaten U.S. interests and global stability. The “long war” against Islamic radical terror looks like it will continue for years. Poorly governed areas and weak states will continue to allow groups that threaten local and regional security to survive. As long as there are groups that equate globalization and modern life with the triumph of the U.S., the threat of chaos from these groups will continue as they seek to turn back the tide.

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At the same time, part of the world is creating greater cooperative solutions to problems. This is characterized by the extension and strengthening of the democratic community of states, the continued management of the global economy without major crises by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states through legitimized multilateral organizations, the absence of major regional conflicts between states, the limitation of third-world conflicts with minimal impact on regional stability, and the continued role of the U.S. as a global military power without parallel.

In this evolving world, the U.S. government expects the U.S. Navy to exert maritime dominance on demand. USN responses to the competitive world will involve shows of force by combat-credible forces to deter regional challengers, participate in ballistic missile defense (BMD) deterrence missions and exercises with allies and partners for reassurance, maintain a constant visible presence in WESTPAC and the Arabian Gulf/North Arabian Sea, and react to threats to maritime commerce. The chaotic parts of the world will require responses, ranging from non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) to littoral operations (from counter-piracy to SOF and ISR), and from maritime interdictions for the prevention of proliferation to limited strikes with power projection forces on proliferators. All of these will have to be part of the Navy’s capabilities, in addition to continuing engagement with

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allies and partners who expect USN leadership of coalition maritime operations. The Navy will be the framework provider for regional coordination and partnerships, and naval cooperation will be part of integrated engagement processes involving whole-of-government approaches.

Within these broad global objectives, the Navy’s responses will be constrained by a set of external and internal factors, which we turn to now. The gap between the demands to respond to everything and the maritime resources to meet those demands is created by these external and internal factors.
Within the United States, the Navy’s options are framed by a number of issues that will remain constant throughout the foreseeable future. These constraints stem from political and economic realities, from the level of the federal budget, and from previous force structure decisions that have created the legacy fleet of today.

The first and largest constraint is the future of the federal budget, highlighted by expanding social spending, high deficits, and the need to rein in all discretionary spending (military spending included, especially as Iraq winds down and Afghanistan continues). This means that Navy budgets will not experience growth above the rates of inflation. Within that broad limit, the Navy will find that the downward pressure on ship numbers will be serious, as the top number must encompass ongoing operations, rising service costs for health care and personnel, and increasing demands for ships with multiple mission capabilities (as numbers decrease, each ship must be expected to do more). The result is a future Navy that will reflect past investment decisions on CVNs, Virginia-class SSNs, LPD-17s, Aegis platforms, and littoral combat ships (LCSs). The ability to rapidly create a force structure is also hampered because the lower budgets mean a shrinking industrial base to support a larger fleet.

Within the DoD budget, the Service shares will remain unchanged. Since Vietnam, these shares have been consistent. They have not varied more than 1 percent, except for times of major combat operations. At those times, more money has been channeled to the land forces engaged and for their reset after the fight. We assume that those shares will continue into the future and that the Navy cannot increase its force structure or operating budgets by prevailing over the other Services in the annual budget battles or the

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USG and DoD Influences on USN Options

- Budgetary constraints with significant impacts
  - Reliance on legacy fleet / low shipbuilding numbers
  - Assume 20% drop in ship numbers over next 15-20 years
- Continuation of a “balanced force” between the services
- USN operations embedded in strong Joint DoD environment
- USG foreign policies to preserve/assert US global leadership
  - Leadership of coalitions and military responses to situations
  - Preserve US leadership of global economy
  - US as ultimate guarantor against nation-nation threats
  - USG demand for active peacetime engagement

AVG Budget Shares since 1979

- Navy/Marines: 32%
- Air Force: 28%
- Army: 27%
- Other: 13%


Quadrennial Defense Review/Quadrennial Roles and Missions (QDR/QRM) processes.

The fleet will be called on to respond to situations, and its responses will be increasingly joint and combined. Navy TACAIR will be intricately linked with USAF access, tanking, and support. Joint ISR processes and space assets will be a part of maritime operations. The Navy will enable amphibious operations and SOF operations on a range of contingencies, and Navy strike and BMD operations will take place as part of coordinated campaigns involving all of the Services. At the other end of the spectrum, the Navy will conduct low-end and peacetime operations with partners who exhibit a range of capabilities that the Navy must adapt to, and it will have to be interoperable with non-DoD organizations to have maximum effect for these operations.

In the future, the demand for the Navy will continue to be part of an activist US foreign policy. There is no end in sight for coalition leadership, counter-terrorism on a global scale, or the use of U.S. forces to demonstrate commitment and resolve in areas of interest. The importance of access secured by continuous Department of Defense and Department of State efforts with partners will support this global presence. U.S. interests in securing the global commons (sea, air, space, cyber) will remain in place, and the U.S. will remain the guarantor of security for democratic nations through its near monopoly on high-end military power and defensive systems. Continued demand for active peacetime engagement by the U.S. military will be met by maritime diplomacy to support administration priorities and to support security cooperation activities by COCOMs.
The Navy’s future options face a number of external constraints. These will shape the choices the Navy makes with regard to force structure, deployment patterns, operational priorities, and posture.

First, there will be a continued demand for a safe and secure global maritime environment. Advantages to having an open world economy and trade for all major powers are growing, and for the first time in the era of modern nation-states, no major power seeks to disrupt the open world economic system. All of the states want access to the global maritime commons for shipping. Increasingly, nations are trying to formulate a set of maritime rules to support local/regional development and maritime policing of illicit activities.

Second, no other country (or combination of countries) will create the forces required for a navy with global influence. America’s European allies, and its Asian allies as well, have created navies that are capable of sustained regional operations, or routine “cruising” by small squadrons of surface ships that show the flag, conduct engagement and exercises, and demonstrate national interest in economic ties with the visited nations and regions. These navies can also conduct short-term surges for uses of force against low end threats or act as supporters to USN-led naval operations; however persistent out-of-area operations (even by a low number of assets) would quickly deplete their resources and political support at home.

Third, China’s economic growth will continue to underwrite military/naval modernization and increases in capacity. China is behaving exactly as every growing nation has behaved since the dawn of the Maritime Age in the 1400s. Countries with growing economies and greater political power have translated this into larger and more modern navies as a sign of their power and intent to play a prominent role in global politics.

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China’s current aspirations in the first island chain will very likely expand to include all of WESTPAC and greater involvement along its maritime trade and energy routes from the Arabian Gulf to the Indian Ocean and back through the South China Sea.

Fourth, the stability of WESTPAC and the area around the Arabian Gulf will continue to be cornerstones of global stability and of vital interest to the security of the United States. Economic activity in WESTPAC (trade statistics, shipping, largest ports, economic growth, export-oriented economies, need for job creation, dependence on resource flows) now accounts for most of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). The United States remains the guarantor of regional stability for its allies (Japan, South Korea, and Australia) and is engaged in developing relationships with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries eager to balance a growing Chinese power. On the other side of the Straits of Malacca, the U.S. and India are engaged in greater cooperation and coordination on economic, political, and military aspects of the relationship. In the Arabian Gulf AOR, the U.S. interests will remain paramount for years. It is still the source of global oil and natural gas resources and reserves for America, its allies, and its adversaries. It is at the geographic center for radical Islamic terrorists and state sponsors who aim to attack the U.S. and its allies. It is the potential ground for WMD proliferation if Iran continues its nuclear program and Arab regional actors reply. In this environment, U.S. allies will continue to demand visible and credible signs of U.S. commitment to regional stability. In both areas, there will likely be an increasing ballistic missile threat, which will best be addressed by robust naval BMD assets.
Wildcards: Changing USN Role?

1. Maritime 9/11 (Nuclear/"Dirty" Bomb) increases USN Homeland Defense mission
2. Piracy and at-sea criminal threats grow dramatically
3. Loss of cyber defense, increase in SATCOM vulnerability
4. Changes in USG foreign policy (off-shore balancer, restrained power in multinational organizations, neo-isolationist)

Four wildcards may alter the constraints on the Navy’s future options that we discussed on previous slides.

1. The best known is an emerging Homeland Defense mission in the event of a maritime attack of a 9/11 nature. This would re-orient the Navy’s mission to coastal protection with the Coast Guard and lead to new spending on homeland security and less on overseas operations. Another possibility is the breakdown of maritime security on an unprecedented level.

2. Without effective partners for the USN, piracy and at-sea criminal threats could grow dramatically and lawlessness in the littorals could increase. This would lead to more calls for the Navy to engage in maritime policing, with budgets for those activities going up.

3. A catastrophic loss of cyber defense and an increase in SATCOM vulnerability could vastly increase resource allocations to fleet defenses and attacks in this new battle space. As fleet numbers shrink, the importance of networked ISR, situational awareness, and the capabilities for effective coordinated global operations grows. If this network could be disabled or destroyed, a significant shift of resources and attention could take place. This could result in reductions across the board to meet the new demand or in changes in specific parts of the fleet to find money to preserve cyber capabilities.

4. Lastly, the government could change foreign policy. If it were to adopt a posture as an “off-shore balancer” or a policy of working only through multinational organizations, the result would be fewer calls for maritime power and presence overseas, with adverse impacts on the budget, operations, and naval culture.
5 Options for the Future Global Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2 Hubs</th>
<th>1+ Hub</th>
<th>Shaping</th>
<th>Surge</th>
<th>Status quo shrinks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain combat-credible hubs (CSGs) in CENTCOM and PACOM</td>
<td>Maintain a single combat-credible hub (CSG) in either CENTCOM or PACOM</td>
<td>Focus on engagement activities</td>
<td>Bring ships home, discontinue regular presence missions</td>
<td>Try to maintain combat-credible hubs (CSGs) in CENTCOM and PACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drastically reduce engagement</td>
<td>Continue to perform engagement missions</td>
<td>Maintain/Grow BMD stations</td>
<td>Surge to conflict when needed</td>
<td>Continue to perform engagement missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD missions at expense of combatants in CSG</td>
<td>Maintain only the smallest of combat fleets</td>
<td>Maintain/Grow BMD stations</td>
<td>CONUS Training</td>
<td>Maintain/Grow BMD stations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Impacts**

- **2 Hubs**
  - Reduce ships used for engagement ops (Amphibs, LCS, JHSV, etc.)
  - Maintain CSGs, SSNs, SCs

- **1+ Hub**
  - Reduce CSGs, SSNs
  - Maintain SC and engagement options (Amphibs, LCS, JHSV, etc.)

- **Shaping**
  - Severely reduce logistics, CSGs, combatants, SSNs
  - Maintain amphibs, LCS, JHSV, NECC

- **Surge**
  - Reduce logistics and support ships, CSGs (to a degree), engagement options
  - Maintain a required base force for combat

- **Status quo shrinks**
  - “Salami slice” the fleet as budget pressure increases

We discuss these five options in the following slides:

- 2 hubs
- 1+ hub
- Shaping
- Surge
- Status quo shrinks
There are two potential avenues for maintaining forward combat-credible presence and exerting influence on a global scale. However, both require difficult trade-offs from long-held Navy positions. They require choosing between (1) meeting the demands of maritime security operations and emerging missions below the level of major combat or deterring potential adversaries and (2) unbalancing the fleet and meeting two potential adversaries with two very different types of combat credible forces for “tailored deterrence.” This is the first of those two navies: a navy built on two hubs, with similar forces and postures in each hub.

1. What does this navy look like? This navy would be centered on robust forces forward based and deployed (1.0 presence and FDNF) in WESTPAC and the Arabian Gulf in the two major areas of global instability, where the need for American reassurance of allies is the strongest. The emphasis would be on high-end combat credible forces centered on carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other power projection and strike assets (TLAM shooters, SSNs/SSGNs, Aegis, logistics ships). These forces would be maintained and deployed by reducing the emphasis and force structure for amphibious forces and low-end, tailored mission presence ships, such as the LCS. The emerging BMD mission in EUCOM and continued BMD missions in the two hubs would be supported over independent operations by Aegis platforms elsewhere, for maritime security operations, engagement missions, and exercises with allies. Maintaining presence would negatively affect surge capacity in CONUS, as the fleet gives priority to visible presence in the hubs and prompt denial. This fleet would maintain the flexibility of naval forces to move between the hubs.
with similar forces and perform similar mission sets. It would also preserve the unity of training to one standard and the ability to deploy to and operate in either hub.

Maintaining this deterrence/reassurance force would likely require longer deployments as fleet numbers shrink, surge forces take longer to get ready between deployments, and funding goes to deployed forces over those in the training cycle. It would require maintaining logistics assets AND continuing access to in-theater bases and support. It might also push the navy toward another FDNF structure to maximize presence and reassure allies.

2. **How does it create a “global effect”?** This navy preserves the role of the USN as the dominant naval force in two hubs where threats to U.S. interests and global stability are likely to exist for the foreseeable future. In these hubs, the navy would be able to decisively establish sea control, defeat challengers, project power and strike as part of joint forces (air/sea priority). It would be able to respond to peacetime contingencies/engagement on a limited basis, giving priority to activities in both hubs. It would be a visible deterrent force with potential for prompt denial of aggressors and flexibility for missions ranging from low-end to high-end combat. Also, it would offer visible reassurance to allies/partners in high threat areas. It would preserve flexibility for the Navy to move assets between theaters with the same capabilities, depending on operational needs.

3. **What assumptions are made in creating this force?** This option assumes that the navy can overcome the domestic restraints against significant cuts in amphibious forces.
and low-end ships to meet the spending and operational requirements of the two-hub fleet. It also assumes that there will be a continued demand for combat credible forward forces in the Arabian Gulf region and WESTPAC for contingencies and OPLAN execution based on the foreign and economic policies of the U.S. and its allies.

Those demands are based on a persistent threat from Iran or a similar regional challenger in the Gulf and the continuation of the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Western Pacific. The fleet would also require support for joint operations with USAF basing and infrastructure available and access to bases and support in the two hubs for sustainability. As the fleet sheds low-end operations to concentrate on the two main challengers, it is preferable to create agreements with capable allies/partners to split global naval roles into high end and low end, with the allies picking up the main effort for the low end of the spectrum.

4. What risks are involved in creating this force? By focusing on high-end challengers in two distinct and contained “hubs,” this navy risks losing its relevance to “current low-end fights.” This is a serious risk for domestic support because the demand for reactions to current situations remains high as the navy cuts back on its surge capacity to maintain presence. A reduced amphibious capacity risks losing escalation and rapid response of amphibious operations on quick notice for OPLANS. At the low end of the spectrum: this force would not respond as quickly or massively to HA/DR missions or NEOs; it would not routinely take part in operations outside the hubs; presence and engagement that could shape and lead interoperability of coalition naval activities would be at risk; and integration of low-end navies for maritime security operations (e.g., piracy) would be placed at risk.
A one-hub navy would be centered on the Western Pacific, while maintaining some degree of combat credibility in CENTCOM and some engagement capacity and capability in other high-priority areas. This is a fleet that could emerge after the U.S. leaves Iraq as a navy that plays a reduced and supporting role in Afghanistan and one that does not have more than 10,000 personnel deployed ashore in that region.

1. What does this navy look like? This navy concentrates combat-credible visible forward presence in WESTPAC. These forces are based on a CSG and other power-projection and strike assets (TLAM shooters, SSNs/SSGNs, Aegis, logistics ships). This force will provide deterrence, prompt denial, and reassurance to regional allies in the face of the PRC’s increasing capabilities and operations, as well as potential disruption of the North Korean regime. It would be the coalition leader for complementary naval forces from South Korea, Japan, Australia, and other partners. On the other side of the world, this navy would reduce CSG presence in CENTCOM as Iraq winds down and Afghanistan continues at a sustainable level of counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism (CT) operations. Emphasis in this region would be on low-end presence forces and such multi-mission amphibious ships as afloat-forward staging bases (AFSBs), Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), and Navy Special Warfare (NSW) for quick responses to emerging instability from non-traditional threats. BMD missions would be prioritized as WESTPAC, CENTCOM, and EUCOM, in that order.

This navy would have a reduced surge capacity in CONUS to maintain presence in WESTPAC and a deeper and longer “bathtub” for the smaller number of high-end forces.
1+ Hub Navy: WESTPAC Dominates

- Combat credible forces in WESTPAC - An Unbalanced Fleet
  - Dominant naval force in emerging Asia power center
- “Tailored” forces for specific AORs (different threats and different effects)
  - Reduced CSG presence in CENTCOM + some engagement elsewhere
  - Reduced demand for combat credible forward forces in Arabian Gulf region
  - Loss of visible and combat credible presence to deter IR or Islamic terrorists
- Less high-end surge capacity for OPLANs, less flexibility globally

(CNVs, Aegis). This fleet would be unbalanced. The Pacific would be preferred for CVNs and other power-projection assets, and Norfolk and the east coast would be the home for most deployers headed for engagement and presence missions in other regions. This would reduce flexibility across the fleet and between theaters.

2. How does it create a “global effect”? This navy would be the dominant naval force in the emerging center of global political, economic, and military power (WESTPAC). It would have the capacity and capability to decisively establish sea control, defeat challengers, project power and strike as part of joint forces (air/sea priority), respond to peacetime contingencies engagement in WESTPAC, and be a visible deterrent force with potential for prompt denial and flexibility for missions ranging from low-end to high-end combat. It would also be a visible reassurance to allies/partners in WESTPAC. In the CENTCOM AOR, this navy would be a partner with allies and their navies to provide presence and reassurance for dealing with any “rogue nation” and a multitude of non-traditional threats (piracy, terror). It would be able to use low-end forces for engagement and shaping, with many smaller navies in other areas on routine deployments, if not a constant presence force in those AORs.

3. What assumptions are made in creating this force? First, this navy assumes that different forces are needed for different AORs to face different threats and create different effects where needed. It assumes that domestic restraints can be overcome and that no cuts in high-end ships and air wings will be made to meet budget requirements. It also assumes that the internal Navy culture can be overcome and that the Navy can create two separate

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fleets with different emphases and objectives and training and manning and equipping for their missions. It is based on a reduced demand for combat-credible forward forces in the Arabian Gulf region for contingency and OPLAN execution, with a lower threat from Iran or a similar rogue and Islamic terrorists and piracy. In the Western Pacific, the continued growth of PRC capabilities and operations forms the basis for naval presence and force structure. The United States would probably not have support for high-end WESTPAC operations, but there would be close agreement with capable allies/partners to share global naval roles at the low end of the spectrum, with the U.S. forces relying on allies and access for sustainment outside WESTPAC. This would mean reduced logistics needs for CENTCOM and a concentrated support network in WESTPAC.

4. **What risks are involved in creating this force?** The first risk is that instability will increase in the CENTCOM AOR and that the demand signal for naval forces will increase and remain persistent over a matter of years. This could provide less reassurance to our allies, and the absence of naval forces could be seen as reducing the visibility of deterrence, demonstrating a weaker U.S. commitment to regional stability. In this AOR, this navy would look like other allied navies most of the time, with some cruises of high-end assets as scheduled. This navy also risks having less high-end surge capacity for major combat OPLANs and less flexibility for forces moving between AORs. It risks having different forces trained for different missions and getting the mix right, especially if CENTCOM missions become persistent.
The Navy could move toward an “engagement” model. In response to the budget restraints; shipbuilding trends for high-end, multi-mission platforms; and the continued demand for global naval presence, the Navy could opt to maintain the largest number of ships in the fleet (albeit ships that are smaller and cheaper to build). It could concentrate its efforts on maximizing engagement and interoperability with other maritime forces, creating a fleet that is busy with many maritime security operations and low-end contingencies for a chaotic, messy world.

1. **What does the “shaping” navy look like?** This navy would maintain a relatively high number of amphibious platforms, using them as afloat staging bases for a range of operations ashore and as large assets to carry personnel, bringing training and expertise to many parts of the world. This navy would have significant quantities of LCS, JHSV, and corvette-type ships netted together (within a robust ISR network) for maximum effect in the littorals and would be able to work closely with like platforms from allied and partner navies. SSGNs would also play a role in supporting littoral operations, along with a large role for NECC and NSW. The FDNF and BMD forces would be somewhat smaller but not structurally different, and in addition, the Navy overall would have fewer CSGs, Aegis platforms, and SSNs and less logistics support. The “shaping” force would be visible and interoperable; thus it could use logistics support to reach its areas of operation and then rely on local resources (bases and access) for sustainment. To finance this force, the capacity for surge forces would need to be cut, as in the previous example, with similar impacts on readiness and escalation capabilities.

2. **How does this navy create a “global effect”?** The primary objective of the “shaping” navy is to create stability through multilateral engagement with many
Shaping Navy: Engage and Stabilize

- Presence and engagement create influence
  - Routine “cruises” with high-end assets while littoral/amphibious forces project power
  - Reduced demand for forces in Arabian Gulf and WESTPAC (less robust FDNF)
  - Allies and partners reassured by presence
- Maintain amphibs, LCS, JHSV, PLUS large role for NECC, NSW
- Loss of combat credibility and deterrence
  - Less flexibility to escalate for major combat operations
  - Less ability for prompt denial against aggression

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maritime partners. The United States and these partners have common interests in creating maritime security in areas where illicit activities (illegal fisheries, piracy, and smuggling) now flourish.

The Navy would also use its littoral forces to influence ungoverned spaces ashore that sustain these activities, as well as enable terrorism and local civil conflicts. The Navy would be able to exert its influence on a global scale in conflict avoidance, containment, and de-escalation by effectively engaging with local and regional maritime forces. Navy forces would contribute to counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency “from the sea.” At the other end of the spectrum, it would conduct routine “cruises” of limited duration with high-end assets to work with allies/partners to demonstrate commitment and reassurance. At other times, amphibious and littoral forces would be able to project adequate power ashore for low-end contingencies.

3. What assumptions are made in creating this force? The assumptions made about internal restraints are different from those in the earlier example. At home, the Navy would be able to “unbalance” the fleet. It would be able to create and sustain a constituency for large numbers of littoral-focused assets and ISR support. It would be able to find the money for these assets by making reductions to larger platforms. Political support would be based on an assessment that the greatest threats to U.S. and global stability could come from any number of low-level conflicts and terrorist activities taking place from Latin America to Africa, and from Southwest Asia to Indonesia or the Philippines, and that partnership with local and regional naval forces is the best way to contain the threat. Looking overseas, the Navy would have to assume a reduced demand for combat credible forward forces in the (continued on next page)
Arabian Gulf region for contingencies and OPLAN execution, based on reduced threats from a capable rogue nation and its naval forces. It would also assume that WESTPAC demands and BMD demands could be addressed by a less robust FDNF, with backfill when necessary, because PRC capabilities were developing more slowly than anticipated. On joint and combined matters, the Navy would be counting on continued USAF forward basing and access, as well as greater coordination with allies/partners. Sustainment of littoral forces overseas would require bases and access.

4. **What risks are involved in creating this force?** First, the Navy would sacrifice some of its high-end combat credibility. This part of the force would be reduced, with the loss of escalation capabilities at the high end of warfare. This could have the effect of providing less reassurance to allies in WESTPAC and the Arabian Gulf over time. The Navy would have decided that visibility and presence were reassuring in themselves (that their mere existence equals reassurance). But, as shown in [3], there is evidence that local nations bent on coercion or aggression pay attention to the local state of military forces and the combat credibility of forces that are present in theater and can deter or defeat at high levels of escalation. As a shaping navy, the USN would look like other navies most of the time, and that might not deter an adversary. This navy would also have the problem of sustaining high-tempo operations if they become persistent missions. The navy would put at risk prompt denial of adversary gains in a regional conflict. It would risk escalation dominance and control in favor of trying to achieve regional stability and security through engagement and de-escalation.
At the other end of the spectrum from the shaping navy, is a navy based on a powerful “home fleet,” and ready to surge forward with combat-credible power to defeat potential adversaries. This fleet is not forward deployed, with a few exceptions, and it relies on having the time and opportunity to prepare for and conduct major campaigns to create its effects on challengers to U.S. maritime power. This navy meets budget requirements by drastically cutting forward presence and operations, reducing low-end forces, and concentrating its resources on surge forces ready for decisive engagements.

1. **What does this navy look like?** A “surge” navy would be able to get by with lower numbers of CVNs and other high-end, multi-mission-capable platforms because it would give up the presence mission. It would build a powerful home fleet around a group of combat-credible, ready-for-surge CSGs, with Aegis escorts, and SSNs, capable of dominating and defeating any potential challenger. It would spend its time and resources training as part of a joint force for a future maritime challenger. This navy would retain the FDNF, but it would be less robust and would not have constant backfill from CSGs when it is unable to deploy. There would be minimal low-end forces available for maritime security operations and engagement with partners. Such activities would be carried out on routine schedules by squadrons deploying from CONUS, but not by forward-deployed forces based in hubs. This force could cut back on organic logistics capabilities, husbanding those resources for decisive conflicts. The navy would also maintain BMD missions with minimal forward presence.

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Surge Navy: Power from CONUS

- A large powerful home fleet, routine scheduled cruises
  - FDNF stays but is not as robust, BMD reassures
  - Able to decisively meet and defeat any maritime challenger (“Virtual Presence”)
  - Achievable at reduced ship numbers, with plenty of warning time
- Risk of deterrence and reassurance failures due to lack of presence
  - Loss of USN relevance to “current low-end fight”
- Reduced demand for USN presence or “Off Shore Balancer” in U.S. foreign policy

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2. How does it create a “global effect”? The effects would come from the existence of a “fleet in being.” It would be created by the knowledge among allies and potential adversaries that the United States could mobilize its fleet and be able to exercise maritime dominance at any place on the globe. It would be a dominant naval force with “virtual presence.”

It would give clear demonstrations and knowledge of its combat credibility through exercises and strategic communications of its capability for sustained air power operations, power projection ashore, and sea control.

3. What assumptions are made in creating this force? The surge fleet would have to be sized to meet budget restrictions and thus would be smaller than the one today. It would also have to be an unbalanced fleet, but in the opposite way of the shaping navy. It would have to overcome opposition from advocates of more engagement, more littoral forces, and greater interoperability with mid-range navies, and from those who would argue for greater investment in the delivery of amphibious forces for land engagements. This navy would have an adequate training budget and readiness budget to keep the fleet postured for crisis response. The fleet would need to have adequate warning time for major actions and be able to quickly integrate into a joint force for decisive engagements. These forces would also have access to in-theater support and bases for major operations, and those operations would be short-lived enough not to stress organic logistic capabilities.

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On a global scale, the security environment would have to be conducive to a reduced demand for the constant presence of naval forces by allies, partners, and U.S. overseas commands. Local and regional navies would need to be capable of handling low-end maritime security operations, and the potential high-end threats would materialize only along expected timelines. The security environment in WESTPAC and CENTCOM would be largely stable, without U.S. presence, and local aggressors could be deterred by the fear of U.S. reaction from afar. Potential aggressors would also have to be deterred by a belief that U.S. forces could overturn any first gains they might make and that U.S. security guarantees would be supported without U.S. forces at risk forward in any first engagements. Most important, this option assumes that the foreign policy of the United States becomes less activist, and more like that of an “off-shore balancer,” with greater attention to domestic issues and reliance on deterrence.

4. What risks are involved in creating this force? The surge navy gives up forward presence and puts at risk the ability to promptly deny a potential aggressor any gains. The risk is to the visible presence for deterrence of foes and reassurance of allies. It risking losing influence with those allies as a coalition leader, and it risks losing influence with potential partners at the low end for maritime security operations. If the maxim is “No presence = no influence,” the navy risks losing its capability for leading the world in

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Surge Navy: Power from CONUS

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  - FDNF stays but is not as robust, BMD reassures
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maritime security operations against local and regional threats that might grow into more serious disruptions of the global commons at a later time.

The navy would maintain its readiness budget for the potential “future fight,” at the expense of the “current fight.” This means that the navy would risk its relevance to ongoing operations, much the same way that the Air Force lost its relevance to current operations in the pursuit of the “future force.” Internally, there is a serious risk to a culture that has been based for generations on regular deployments around the world, on personnel accustomed to operations at many levels on a routine basis anywhere in the world, with the influence, power, and prestige that go along with it. A navy that stays at home and prepares for the future is a navy that America last saw in the isolationist days between the world wars. Domestically, the surge navy risks funding for a significant capacity of combat-credible forces. If forces are not “used” for long stretches of time, they could become prey to budget cutting as their relevance is further questioned in each budget cycle.
Shrinking the Status Quo Navy

- Proportional cuts for “balanced fleet” and meeting budget constraints
- Visible and forward presence less than 1.0 in 2 hubs
  - Coordinated operations with low-end partners and high-end allies/partners
  - Reduced demand in CENTCOM and WESTPAC
  - Access to sustainment, reduced reliance on organic logistics
- Erosion of combat credibility and forward presence
  - Reduced flexibility to escalate for major combat operations
- Reduced surge capacity (deeper and longer “bathtub”)

If the Navy continues on the current shipbuilding course of about six or seven ships per year, if the answer to the budget pressures of the future is to make proportional cuts among all the arms of the fleet, and if it tries to make incremental changes to operations and maintenance funding across the board, it will continue to leak capabilities and capacity throughout the next two decades.

1. **What does this navy look like?** This navy would be based on proportional cuts in CVNs, LCSs, amphibs, Aegis platforms, and SSNs as the service strives to maintain the “balanced fleet.” An FDNF would be retained in WESTPAC because of the vast legacy costs already spent there, but the FDNF would not be as robust as it is now, with a CSG at its core and a number of BMD assets, but with reduced numbers of other strike and power projection forces. As the fleet shrinks, the capacity to cover the Arabian Gulf and its environs with constant CSG presence will be lost. In addition, there would be reduced capacity for surging forces from CONUS because reductions in operations and maintenance would impact readiness. The “bathtub” for returning deployers would get longer and deeper for a smaller number of high end forces. The navy would rely more on war games and simulations for the training of its forces as budget constraints cut into steaming days and flying hours.

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2. How does this navy create a “global effect”? A global navy of 230 ships would retain some level of visible forward presence force in WESTPAC to maintain influence with regional allies (Japan, Korea, Australia). In other areas of the globe, the navy could conduct routine “cruises” with low-end assets to engage low end navies for maritime security operations (MSO) and demonstrate commitment to regional stability. It could also conduct routine “cruises” of limited duration with high-end assets to work with allies/partners to demonstrate commitment and reassurance in the CENTCOM AOR, or other emerging threat areas.

Reduced amphibious forces would be able to project adequate power ashore for the most probable range of low-end contingencies. It is likely that the Navy would still be the largest and most technologically advanced fleet, but it would be relatively less dominant as a unilateral force, with less capability to influence events ashore at multiple points around the world at any time.

3. What assumptions are made in creating this force? For the Navy to proceed down this path, it must make a set of assumptions about internal politics inside DoD and the government. It must also make another set of assumptions about the evolving world political system. The first is that maintaining a balanced fleet is a top priority and that symmetric cuts across the board can keep such a fleet and meet budget constraints. This

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Shrinking the Status Quo Navy

- Proportional cuts for “balanced fleet” and meeting budget constraints
- Visible and forward presence less than 1.0 in 2 hubs
  - Coordinated operations with low-end partners and high-end allies/partners
  - Reduced demand in CENTCOM and WESTPAC
  - Access to sustainment, reduced reliance on organic logistics
- Erosion of combat credibility and forward presence
  - Reduced flexibility to escalate for major combat operations
- Reduced surge capacity (deeper and longer “bathtub”)

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would be founded on an assessment of the politics within DoD and the Congress, and the executive order that the Navy is politically constrained from making large changes in fleet direction and structure and strategy. Second, in the aftermath of Iraq, the government would be reluctant to carry out large-scale military operations in the CENTCOM AOR. This would lead to a reduced demand for combat-credible forward forces in the Arabian Gulf region for contingency and OPLAN execution. The U.S. would rely on its reputation in past uses of force to deter future regional aggression. This reduced demand is predicated on the assessment that there would be a lower threat from Iran, or a similar rogue nation, and Islamic terrorist activity. Maritime security operations (e.g., piracy) would continue to be handled by coalition actions involving a modest level of U.S. forces. On the other side of the world, WESTPAC demands could be addressed by the FDNF, with a regular backfill when necessary to maintain a 1.0 presence. This would be based on an assumption that PRC maritime capabilities and operations advance slowly, with more resources directed to internal developments and social programs than to an increasing military presence financed by double-digit military budget increases. The navy would be able to continue its global posture with the support of USAF forward basing and access.

In addition, BMD demand would be limited to meeting a threat from only two rogue nations, with a limited capability that could be addressed by planned Aegis-fleet numbers. The navy would require greater strategic and operational coordination with allies and partners on cruises for training and engagement with low-end navies to maximize shared

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interests and effectiveness. It would also require continued access to sustainment for cruising in-theater, with less reliance on organic logistics assets as the fleet shrinks and such assets are concentrated on the vast reaches of the Western Pacific.

4. What risks are involved in creating this force? The inevitable conclusion of this process is that the shrinking status quo Navy will do all things, but none of them very well (“managing” at 2/3 speed and hoping there are no shocks to the system). The steady slide down the slope could easily erode combat credibility (“hollowing out of the fleet”) and lead to less reassurance of allies in WESTPAC and other places around the world, over time. The allies outside of WESTPAC would lose the visible and combat-credible presence to deter threats in CENTCOM. In addition, the Navy runs the risk of looking just like other navies in that region, and elsewhere, most of the time. Except for scheduled cruises of CSGs for specific times and missions, the forces of the United States would be indistinguishable from other navies. Is that enough to deter? The answer to that question is subject to debate, and the navy would have to team with other navies while waiting for the arrival of dominant forces from CONUS. Reduced operations for returning deployers and surge forces risk reducing surge responsiveness, as well as the capability to conduct high-end operations at the levels of safety and effectiveness that have characterized current naval operations. If the missions were to become persistent, reductions in organic logistics could reduce sustainability, especially if local access and support were tenuous. At the end of the day, the risk is that a Navy 20 percent smaller than today’s will lose its flexibility to have escalation dominance in major combat operations to decisively influence events ashore.
Is there a logical “tipping point” that can be numerically assigned? Is a 285 ship-Navy the tipping point, or is it at 250, or 230? At what number, does the Navy reach a point where it is no longer able to project combat credibility with constant forward presence? Is the Navy able to deter and reassure at 230 ships? It depends.

We have defined a “global navy.” We have assessed what it is asked to do by the political leadership and what it will be asked to do in an evolving world of rising powers, rogue nations, and threats from non-state actors. We conclude that there is not a specific number at which the navy ceases to be “the global navy.” It depends on how one defines the threat environment, the demand signal, and the objectives of naval forces within the foreign policy.

The Navy can remain the global maritime power with either the 2 hub or 1+ hub-WESTPAC option. Both preserve a global presence for the Navy and allow it to be a force for reassuring allies, deterring the major maritime challenger, and working within joint and combined environments to address the security threats in the two top priority areas of global politics for the foreseeable future. The Shaping and Surge options sacrifice either presence or combat credibility to an extent that threatens the Navy’s ability to maintain its status. They could be chosen only within the context of major changes in U.S. foreign policies; an acceptance of a much diminished role for the United States as a leader willing to act only in concert with other nations in protecting the global system from low-end threats, or a neo-isolationist America willing to go it alone on high-end threats and letting other issues resolve themselves at the local and regional levels. If the Navy refuses to choose an
Conclusions: Where is the Tipping Point?

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Tipping Point for “global”
- No longer “forward present” or combat credible
- Most dangerous COA = Slide without plan to Shrinking Status Quo
- Royal Navy and other “global navies” historically always able to stay above line
- USN Today = Royal Navy in 1905

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option, it faces the prospect of a long, slow glide into the Shrinking Status Quo. This would be a navy 20 percent smaller than the one we have now, with the same balance of forces. It will fall through the capacity and capability necessary for either a 2-hub or 1+ hub navy to be constantly present overseas or to be dominant up and down the escalation ladder, without making the strategic choices to be either a shaping or surge force.

Our most relevant example of a navy that faced this choice in the past was the Royal Navy in the early part of the 20th Century. It had maintained a policy of meeting two challengers and carrying out what we would call maritime security operations throughout the empire since the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. It was the undisputed “global navy,” but it faced rising powers in Germany and the United States, domestic spending pressures, and new alignments on the continent in Europe. The British Government (with the Royal Navy as an active participant in the decision process) chose to re-orient its foreign and security policies to meet the German threat, leave the Western Atlantic and Eastern Pacific to the United States, and assume what we would call a 1+ hub strategy. It was able to meet the threat of Germany, contribute to the Triple Entente with France and Russia, forge a treaty with Japan that lasted through World War I, and meet all of its empire maritime policing needs. It was not these decisions that drained the treasury, but four years of war in Europe and its toll on the British Army and nation.

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Without an empire to police, might the United States be able to carry out the 2-hub strategy? It does not have the luxury of the British who faced only one potential threat. It faces a current fight (Islamic terror, Afghanistan, Iranian adventurism) in CENTCOM and a potential future fight requiring deterrence and reassurance to meet a traditional rising national challenger. Both situations require a combat-credible, visible presence by naval forces for prompt denial, escalation and de-escalation dominance, deterrence by denial (missile defense), and assured access. On the other hand, the maritime security operations in other areas of the world can be addressed in large part by local and regional efforts, with the U.S. playing a supporting role.

The inherent flexibility of naval people and platforms and assets has been proven again and again. The ability of high-end assets to flex for a number of missions along the spectrum of operations has been a staple of deployments by carrier strike groups and their escorts and their air assets. What has not been proven is the ability of a global navy to use forces that are not dominant or not present overseas to deter challengers, deny regional aggressors, or reassure partners. When you are no longer present in one or two areas of vital national interest with dominant maritime forces, you are at the “tipping point.”
References


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