Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in Selected Countries:
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe

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CRM D0017988.A4/1REV
July 2008
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Approved for distribution: July 2008

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Executive Summary

In FY06, Congress gave the Department of Defense [DoD] the authority to redirect a portion of the Department’s operating budget to provide training and equipment to partner governments. Commonly referred to as “Global Train and Equip” or simply 1206, this authority allowed DoD to provide equipment, supplies, and training to foreign countries in order to enhance partners’ capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in combined stability operations with U.S. military forces.

This CNA “Quick Response Study” provides an assessment of the operational impacts of 1206 funding in Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen and São Tome and Principe, and evaluates the alignment of 1206 programs in specific countries to U.S. government war on terrorism objectives. While FY06 1206 projects have largely been completed, most FY07 projects are in the early stages of implementation and FY08 projects generally are still in the planning phase. Even so, the CNA study team was able to identify and assess many operational effects of 1206 programs to date.

For Lebanon, the operational effects of 1206 are primarily in the areas of operational mobility, air operations, communications, and ammunition supplies. 1206 funding has contributed directly to enhancing the country-wide mobility to the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF]. The rapid delivery of 200 Excess Defense Articles [EDA] 2.5 ton trucks and spare parts for LAF armored vehicles helped sustain the deployment of the LAF to both southern and northern border regions. For more than two decades, the LAF had essentially been a garrison army. But now with the 2.5 ton trucks, the LAF can deploy, reinforce and reposition units throughout the country. Spare parts for the LAF’s 23 UH-1 Huey utility helicopters have increased readiness and availability. Aircraft availability reportedly has increased 30-50 percent with the arrival of 1206-funded spares. The LAF used this increased availability to conduct ground attacks, surveillance, medical evacuations [MEDEVAC], and logistics support.
during the three-month battle of Nahr al-Barid against the Al-Qaeda affiliated movement [AQAM] militants from the Fatah al-Islam organization. 1206 has provided LAF units in the Combined Border Force with its first secure communications system. Finally, 1206 funding rapidly resupplied small arms and artillery ammunition to the LAF to restock its arsenal after the huge expenditure of ammunition during the Nahr al-Barid battle. This support has allowed the LAF to supply ground units with basic ammunition loads sufficient for several days fighting in case another battle against Al-Qaeda associated militants occurs.

In Pakistan, FY06 1206 funding focused on increasing operational capabilities of the Pakistani Army’s 21st Quick Reaction Force [QRF], the primary rotary wing support element for special operations forces conducting counterterrorism operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 1206 programs included spare parts for Mi-17 and AB-412 utility helicopters, and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, aviation body armor for helicopter pilots, night vision goggles for helicopter pilots and crews, and night targeting systems for the AH-1 Cobras helicopters. The 1206 projects increased the 21st QRF’s aircraft availability, increased both training and operational flying hours and has allowed the 21st QRF to begin night flight training for a variety of missions including airborne assault, air to ground support and MEDEVAC. Anecdotal reporting from Pakistani Army personnel indicated that the greater protection provided to aircrews and ground forces by nighttime operations, night targeting systems, increased MEDEVAC availability and aircrew body armor has increased troop morale. The FY07 1206 program is focusing on improving the day and night fighting capabilities of the Pakistani Special Services Group (SSG), specifically focusing on company-sized airborne assault operations to combat terrorists in the FATA. The SSG relies heavily on the 21st QRF for mobility, logistics and fire support, and will increasingly do so as it builds the capacity to conduct nighttime airborne assault operations. Therefore, the FY06 and FY07 1206 programs have the opportunity to provide synergistic operational effects as the 21st QRF and SSG improve their capabilities to conduct integrated nighttime operations in the FATA.

The FY06 1206 program for Yemen focused on vehicles, vehicle spares, radios and small arms for Yemen Armed Forces units con-
ducting border security operations to disrupt the flow of terrorists and weapons across Yemen’s northern border. The data available on the operational effects of 1206 in Yemen is extremely limited due to the security situation in the country. The CNA study team was unable to visit operational units in Yemen and therefore had to rely on secondary source reporting regarding the 1206 program. This secondary reporting indicates that the Yemeni Armed Forces are employing 1206-funded equipment in the northern border region, and have integrated this equipment in ways that extended the operational reach of the Yemen armed forces and improved coordination between the limited number of forces engaged in this mission area.

In the island nation of São Tome and Principe [STP], FY06 1206 funding supported the acquisition, installation and personnel training for a Regional Maritime Awareness Capability [RMAC]. The RMAC consists of a series of radars, automated identification system [AIS] receivers, and an electro-optical sensor arrayed around the country to capture location, vector, identification, and other data about ships present in STP’s territorial waters [TTW] and exclusive economic zone [EEZ]. RMAC also includes communications equipment that enables these sensors to transmit information to a command center for analysis. The operational impact of RMAC is clear: the STP Coast Guard [STPCG] has an integrated picture of maritime activity in its TTW and EEZ. The STPCG currently does not have the capability to dispatch units to further investigate contacts identified through RMAC sensors. Instead, it relies on 1206-funded communications equipment to request support from partner countries or private shipping. Yet, it is apparent that now that the STP government is aware of the licit and illicit maritime traffic in its waters, it is considering further investment in the STPCG in order to enable that service to enforce laws and bring enhanced safety and security to what has long been ungoverned maritime space.

Overall, 1206 programs in these four countries align well with the U.S. government’s priorities for building partner capacity and countering terrorism. In Lebanon, the 1206 program has directly supported the LAF’s combat capabilities in operations against AQAM forces, and has facilitated the deployment and sustainment of the LAF in areas that were previously the domain of Hizbullah, Syrian forces, and other non-state actors. The LAF has invested some of its
limited funding to support and sustain the capabilities provided under the 1206 program. In Pakistan, the U.S. government sponsored Security Development Plan [SDP] for Western Pakistan for supporting the employment of Pakistani military forces in the FATA explicitly calls for the development of a company-sized, nighttime, air assault capability between the SSG and the 21st QRF. 1206-funded training and equipment supplied to date specifically supports this objective. In Yemen, the U.S. government seeks to increase the capacity and capability of the Yemeni Armed Forces to control Yemen’s border and reduce the flow of arms and terrorists into and out of Yemen. The limited data available confirms that the Yemeni government has deployed 1206-funded equipment to Yemeni units conducting patrols and interdiction operations along Yemen’s Northern border. In STP, the 1206 program was combined with other funding streams to support development and sustainment of RMAC. While the STPCG has been unable to identify or take action against any known or suspected terrorists due to the 1206 program, the vastly expanded situational awareness that RMAC has provided the foundation for reducing STP’s ungoverned maritime space, is leading to greater information sharing and cooperation with partner maritime forces.
Introduction

The Office of Global Security Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD-GSA] is responsible for overseeing Department of Defense-sponsored partner capacity building efforts. In late February 2008, OSD-GSA requested “quick response” analytic support from CNA for the assessment of partner capacity building programs funded under the 1206 authority. Specifically, OSD-GSA requested an assessment of the operational impact of 1206 funded projects on selected countries and an evaluation of the alignment between 1206 programs and broader national goals.

In order to execute the data collection for this assessment, the CNA team conducted background research leveraging government, academic, and media sources, and consulted military and civilian subject matter experts in the Washington, D.C. area. The study team traveled to three of the four countries covered in this study (Lebanon, Pakistan, and São Tome and Principe); a research trip to Yemen was canceled due to the mortar attack on the Embassy on March 18, 2008.\(^1\)

While it was not possible for the CNA study team to embed with the armed forces of any of countries covered in this study to capture data on the operational impact of 1206 projects, the study team was able to:

- Visit operational units and interview commanders and other personnel in units that have been supplied with 1206 equipment and training
- Visually observe the condition of some of the equipment provided by 1206 projects

\(^1\) In the case of Yemen, the study team had to rely on secondary reporting from personnel from the Office of Military Cooperation [OMC] at the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa.
• View maintenance and training activities of units that received 1206 spare parts and equipment

• Interview U.S. military officers stationed in country that have participated in training forces, observed operations, and monitored the progress of the 1206 program

• Draw from secondary source materials available from the partner countries, the U.S. government, and other sources
Overview of 1206 Authorization

Origin of 1206

According to the Department of State, traditional security assistance programs such as Foreign Military Sales [FMS], Foreign Military Funding [FMF] and the International Military Education and Training program have not kept up with U.S. strategic needs. Current gaps in U.S. security assistance programs have weakened U.S. ability to enable partners to confront terrorist threats, promote international security, and advance U.S. interests. According to the DoD, planning and implementation processes for traditional programs are too slow and cumbersome, taking three to four years from concept to execution. Moreover, the additional funds necessary to train and equip foreign militaries in the post 9-11 world are not available from the over-extended foreign affairs budget.

Three years ago, the DoD asked Congress for authority to create its own “Global Train and Equip” program to supplement DoS efforts. This program would aim to rapidly fill longstanding gaps in security assistance, take advantage of emerging opportunities, respond to emerging threats, and ultimately reduce the necessity for U.S. troop deployments. In response, Congress granted the requested authority in the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The

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5 Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, A report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.
Global Train and Equip program, or Section 1206, is the first major DoD authority to be used expressly for the purpose of training foreign military forces. For some countries, Section 1206 assistance already represents a significant dollar increase over U.S. security assistance provided through traditional Department of State-funded programs.

Section 1206 Authorization

Section 1206 of the NDAA of 2006 authorized the DoD to draw funds appropriated for operations and maintenance to provide equipment, supplies, or training to a foreign country in order to build its capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations, or participate in or support stability operations in which the U.S. military also participates.

The NDAA of 2007 increased the annual funding authority from $200 million to $300 million and extended the program for an additional year until the end of FY2008. It also delegated program approval authority from the President to the Secretary of Defense, with Secretary of State concurrence. Section 1206 obligations totaled some $106 million in FY2006 and $289 million in FY2007. Obligations for FY2008 are still in progress.

Requirements and Limitations

The law requires that the Section 1206, like all other security assistance programs, include elements that promote the observance and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The funding authority may not be used to provide any type of assistance that is otherwise prohibited by any provision of law and it may not be used

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6 GAO-07-416R, Section 1206 Security Assistance Program.
7 PUBLIC LAW 109–163—JAN. 6, 2006 119 STAT. 3457.
8 GAO-07-416R, Section 1206 Security Assistance Program.
to provide assistance to any country that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law. The legislation also requires a 15-day advance notification to the congressional defense, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees before initiating each program.

Formulation and Implementation

1206 legislation requires that the Secretaries of Defense and State “jointly formulate” any program and that it be “coordinated” with the Secretary of State in implementation. Once project proposals are received from combatant commands and embassies, several DoS and DoD offices or bureaus examine all proposals and then meet to jointly decide which ones they recommend for funding. A final list of projects is presented to the Secretaries of Defense and State for their approval. OSD Partnership Strategy is the lead DoD office for Section 1206 assistance and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency [DSCA] implements 1206 projects using the same processes established for other traditional State-funded security assistance programs.

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14 GAO-07-416R, Section 1206 Security Assistance Program.
Assessment of Operational Impacts of 1206-Funded Projects in Lebanon

Overview

The 1206 projects for Lebanon in FY06 and FY07 have focused on providing trucks, vehicle spare parts, aircraft spare parts, small arms, and body armor to the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF], secure communications to LAF units contributing to the Combined Border Force, and for resupplying ammunition expended in combat against Al-Qaeda associated enemies in the Nahr Al-Barid refugee camp.

Background

Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005 turning over responsibility for the security of much of Lebanon to the LAF, but the LAF was ill prepared to take over this mission. The LAF was essentially a garrison army, unable to deploy and sustain forces across the country. The LAF had aging equipment, having been isolated from much of the international community for many years (the U.S. had not provided security assistance since 1989), because of the Syrian domination of the Lebanese government and the presence of Syrian forces on the streets.

Moreover, there were several other armed groups in the country, some friendly to the LAF, some less so. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon [UNIFL] operated in southern Lebanon, monitoring the activities of Israeli forces to the south and Hizbullah forces in Lebanon. Hizbullah itself had thousands of armed fighters in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. In the many Palestinian Refugee camps inside Lebanon armed Palestinian groups had free reign to train and recruit fighters and these areas were essentially
off limits to the LAF. Several smaller organizations with suspected links to terrorism also existed in Lebanon.

In July 2006, Israel began a 33-day air and ground campaign against Hizbullah and suspected Hizbullah infrastructure in Lebanon. After a month of conflict, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSCR 1701 which called for the end of the conflict and the deployment of Lebanese forces into southern Lebanon to assure Lebanese sovereignty, ensure Israeli security, and to assert control over areas previously held by Hizbullah, and to the north to disrupt smuggling across the Syrian border. Within weeks, LAF units began to deploy to the south, and subsequently to the northern border region under the auspices of the newly formed Combined Border Force [CBF], comprised of LAF, Internal Security Forces, General Security Directorate, and the Customs Administration. The CBF’s mission is to secure the border region to prevent the flow of weapons to non-state actors, which include Hizbullah and other terrorist organizations.

In May 2007, Fatah al-Islam, an Islamist terrorist organization that had taken root in the Nahr Al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp in Northern Lebanon, attacked a Lebanese Army unit guarding the entrance to the refugee camp, killing several LAF soldiers. The LAF responded by attacking the camp in order to root out the Al-Qaeda linked organization. The fighting raged for nearly three months, killing 167 LAF soldiers and wounding up to 2,000.

The LAF has an extremely limited budget. The political turmoil, conflict, and terrorist attacks have combined to squelch foreign investment and tax revenues. Moreover, due to legacy commitments and regulations (some of which ensure the sectarian balance in the military), an estimated 90-95 percent of the LAF budget goes to wages and benefits for active duty and retired soldiers. There is very little money available for acquisition, training, operations and maintenance.

**1206 Program**

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, the
Lebanese government redefined the missions set of the LAF. The LAF now has counterterrorism, border control and counter smuggling (which in the LAF view are closely linked) as primary mission areas. The LAF views Al-Qaeda associated terrorists as the country’s primary security threat. As one Lebanese general commented: “Something got pregnant in Afghanistan and gave birth in Lebanon.” The LAF conducted an internal review of its capabilities to support its post-9/11 missions, and determined that it had critical shortfalls in firepower, command and control [C2], and mobility. These critical shortfalls largely overlap with the focus of the 1206 funding requested by the Ambassador and Central Command in FY06 and FY07.

**FY06**

Lebanon’s 1206 program began in FY06. The FY06 projects focused on providing mobility support to the LAF as it undertook its UNSCR 1701 responsibilities and prepared to begin its counterterrorism mission. The approximately $10 million of FY06 1206 projects included parts for the LAF’s Vietnam era 2.5 ton trucks, spares for M113 armored personnel carriers, parts for Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles (CUCVs), and spare parts for UH-1H helicopters.

Figure 1. FY06 Lebanon 1206 cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY06 1206</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Case Value</th>
<th>Program Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Vehicle spares for 5-ton trucks</td>
<td>$3,360,000</td>
<td>$10,489,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M113 APC spare parts</td>
<td>$2,304,960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUCV spare parts</td>
<td>$2,363,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H spare parts</td>
<td>$1,129,787</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H spare parts</td>
<td>$1,331,443</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FY07**

In FY07, Lebanon received additional 1206 funding, this time reaching approximately $30 million. The FY07 projects included small arms ammunition, weapons, night vision devices, and body armor for the LAF, additional vehicle spares, transportation for U.S. EDA

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15 Interview with the director of Operations, LAF headquarters, March 10, 2008.
2.5 ton trucks (from Germany to Lebanon), secure communications equipment for LAF units participating in the Combined Border Force, and a training program site survey to evaluate training needs and capacity for LAF units.

Figure 2. FY07 Lebanon 1206 cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY07 1206</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Case Value</th>
<th>Program Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Small arms ammunition</td>
<td>$6,939,107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDA transportation</td>
<td>$1,029,879</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H spare parts</td>
<td>$5,500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M4 and M16 spare parts</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training Program site survey</td>
<td>$399,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wheeled vehicle spares</td>
<td>$4,440,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual soldier equipment OCIE</td>
<td>$3,070,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOS LAN communications equipment</td>
<td>$204,437</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure comms equipment, NVGs</td>
<td>$6,427,884</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SAPI body armor</td>
<td>$1,887,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational Impact**

**M113 Spare Parts**

FY06 1206 funding provided spare parts for LAF armored personnel carriers. The LAF has approximately 1,000 M113 APCs. Many of these APCs are used as fixed fighting positions for lack of spare parts and the absence of track pads. The LAF has had M113s in its inventory for many years, and the logistics brigade is able to repair and maintain the vehicles, including level III and Level IV (depot level) service. The LAF logistics brigade is also able to fashion many spare parts in its own machine shops. However, there are some highly

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16 Without track pads, the M113 treads damage pavement, and wear out quickly when used on roads.

specialized parts, such as electronic sensors, that the LAF is simply unable to make. Given their experience and skills, and the large inventory of aging M113s, the logistics brigade is able to make immediate use of almost any spare part. According to the commander of the LAF logistics brigade, all of the 1206 funded track pads were immediately put into use by deployed units to allow those vehicles to maneuver, conduct patrols, and support deployed forces. According to one LAF officer, “The M113s are the skeleton of the Army. Without them, we could not function”.

Table 3. 1206 impact on M113 availability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall M113 Inventory</th>
<th>Mobility limited M113 inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of M113s in LAF inventory</td>
<td>Reported number of M113s made mission capable by 1206 funded parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~1200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of M113s NMC for track and suspension problems (prior to 1206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reported number of M113s made mission capable by 1206 track and suspension parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5 Ton Truck Delivery

Perhaps the most visible impact of the 1206 program in Lebanon was the transport of 200 EDA 2.5 ton trucks from Germany to Beirut. The trucks were much more modern versions of the 2.5 ton trucks in the LAF inventory. 1206 funding was used to rapidly pack and transport the EDA vehicles. The trucks arrived in Lebanon in December 2006 and January 2007. Those trucks that were in operating condition were immediately put into service deploying, repositioning, and providing logistics support and supplies to units around the country.

The 2.5 ton trucks were used to transport units to join the battle against Fatah Al-Islam in Nahr Al Barid, to transport ammunition.

18 The ODC reports that approximately 100 LAFs M113 have been outfitted with the track shoes under 1206 funding.

19 Interview with LAF officer at Logistics Brigade HQ, March 28, 2003.
from bunkers to forward deployed forces, and to transport emergency resupply munitions provided by the United States (not 1206 funded) from Beirut International Airport to forces engaged in combat in Nahr Al Barid.20

The study team was able to witness the EDA 2.5 ton trucks in service with LAF units in Beirut and in Northern Lebanon. Discussions with the logistics brigade commander also indicate that the 2.5 ton trucks have been used to provide critical supplies, such as water and meals, to LAF forces deployed in austere conditions in southern Lebanon.

The LAF indicated that of the 200 EDA trucks, the LAF had 169 actively in service. Thirty-one of the vehicles were non-mission capable due to maintenance/repair/parts problems. Of note, the LAF reported that it did not receive technical manuals with the trucks, so it was difficult for them to trouble-shoot modern equipment, such as the automatic tire pressure control system and the automatic transmission. 21

**Helicopter Repair and Maintenance**

The LAF Air Force has 23 UH-1 helicopters in its fleet. Prior to the arrival of 1206 funded spare parts, the LAF Air Force commander reported that he was able to provide 5-6 UH-1 aircraft available for operations on any given day. After the arrival of the 1206 spares, the operational readiness has been raised to approximately 10-11 aircraft per day. 22

20 Interview with ODC and DAO, U.S. Embassy, Beirut.

21 All of the LAF’s Vietnam era 2.5 ton trucks have manual transmissions, which the LAF logistics brigade generally is able to maintain and repair.

22 Interview with LAF Air Force Commander, March 10, 2008.
The LAF Air Force helicopters played a prominent role in the Nahr Al Barid battle. The LAF Air Force provided:

- MEDEVAC services to troops wounded in the battle
- Surveillance and reconnaissance to forces on the ground
- Support to command and control of dispersed forces. Targeting information to LAF artillery
- Ground attack capability. The LAF modified the UH-1s to carry 250 pound bombs which they dropped on Fatah Al Islam positions in Nahr Al Barid

![Figure 4. 1206 impact on helicopter missions for Nahr Al Barid](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>LAF use of UH-1s in Nahr Al Barid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions Flown</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the commander of the LAF Air Force, “without 1206, there would have been a lot less availability for helos at Nahr Al Barid.” The LAF commander also noted that the UH-1s are useful contributors to counterterrorism operations in a surveillance role, especially for border control and patrol over water, the latter case being of particular concern because the LAF believes that Fatah Al Islam may have used maritime supply routes to bring weapons into Nahr Al Barid.

**Small Arms Ammunition**

Just following the conclusion of the Nahr Al Barid battle, 1206 funded ammunition arrived in Lebanon to replace depleted small arms ammunition stocks. According to a U.S. official, the LAF expended millions of rounds of small arms ammunition during the three month battle. The battle for Nahr Al Barid ended on September 2, and by September 30, the United States had delivered just over five million rounds of pistol and M16 ammunition to the

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23 Interview with LAF Air Force Commander, March 10, 2008.
While this amount of ammunition may seem large, it provides fewer than four Ammunition Basic Loads [ABLs] for LAF M16s and approximately nine ABLs for LAF pistols. In other words, the LAF has not yet been replenished to pre-Nahr Al Barid levels. As the LAF director of operations noted, “When we are in urgent need, we will need things quickly; if we have another Nahr Al Barid, we’ll need a lot of ammunition.”

Communications Equipment

For LAF units participating in the Combined Border Force, FY07 1206 funding was used to purchase Datron secure, frequency-hopping digital radios. These radios included handheld models, backpack models and radio sets for vehicles (yet to be installed). The handheld radios have already been fielded in units patrolling the northern border region. While problems still exist with these radios (the Lebanese report noise problems with some, there are insufficient repeaters to cover all of the operating area, and the power converters that will allow the radios to be used in commercial vehicles are just arriving), the operations director of the Combined Border Force noted that he already has good connectivity with many of his mobile units.

The biggest immediate impact of the 1206 funded radios is that they provide the first secure communications capability for the LAF. Until the arrival of the radios, the LAF units used non-secure VHF radios or cell phones to pass operational information including intelligence, unit locations, planned areas of patrol, and

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24 ODC data.
25 Interview with LAF Director of Operations, March 10, 2008.
26 Interview with LAF Director of Operations, March 10, 2008.
the status of units. The LAF assumed that virtually anyone—including other countries, criminals and terrorists—could intercept these communications. The LAF reported that they are now able to pass sensitive information over secure channels to headquarters. This information can then be analyzed and shared with other units securely.

Other Benefits

While the Datron radios was the only 1206-funded project specifically designed to support LAF units in the Combined Border Force, other 1206 projects have provided additional benefits to units patrolling the northern border. For example, under the Standing Operating Procedures for the Combined Border Force, the LAF provides, prepares and distributes food to deployed CBF forces. The LAF units responsible for supplying food to deployed units rely in part on LAF vehicles provided by (such as the EDA 2.5 ton trucks), or supported by (in the case of CUCVs) 1206 spare parts.

The LAF has also supplied M113 APCs to units assigned to the CBF. The commander of the CBF noted that originally he did not see the need for APCs, but after CBF units came under fire, he recognized the requirement for armored vehicles. While the study team was unable to determine definitively whether the M113s supplied to the CBF had 1206-supplied parts in them, there is a good chance that they do. Similarly, the CBF commander noted that the LAF forces assigned to the CBF currently had an adequate basic load of ammunition for their pistols and M16s. It was impossible to determine if the ammunition provided to the CBF was 1206-funded, but given that 1206 provided over five million rounds of small arms weapons in 2007, the chances are reasonably good. The CBF may one day
benefit from air support, such as surveillance, command and control, and resupply from LAF helicopters, but current political sensitivities prevent the use of aircraft close to the Syrian border.  

Broader Effects of 1206 in Lebanon

It appears that the LAF understands the 1206 authority. The LAF has invested national funds and other security assistance to complement, and at times complete, the 1206-funded projects. The LAF has followed up 1206 programs with FMF/FMS investments to make the 1206 funded capabilities sustainable over the long term.

One example is the case of 1206-funded Datron radios for LAF units in the Combined Border Force. 1206 funded the purchase of the radios. The LAF turned to Germany to supply vehicles for the units. When it became clear that the 1206 funded tactical radios were not compatible with the commercial vehicles’ 12 volt electrical system, the LAF convinced the Lebanese Government to invest $120,000 in converters that would allow the LAF to immediately employ the 1206 funded radios in the donated commercial vehicles.

In another example, in the 2007 DoD supplemental appropriation, the LAF was allocated additional FMF support. The LAF chose to sustain and expand the benefits of the 1206 funded M113 parts by adding $2 million to an existing FMF case to expand the purchase of M113 parts. Similarly, following the 1206 Funded Comprehensive Training Plan [CTP] assessment, the LAF set aside $25

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27 Interview with LAF officer at the CBF headquarters, March 29, 2008.
28 Interview with CBF commander, March 29, 2008.
million of FMF funding for execution of the CTP recommendations.

\[2^9\] Interview with ODC, March 10, 2008.
Assessment of Operational Impacts of 1206-Funded Projects in Pakistan

Overview

The focus of 1206 projects in Pakistan has been on three distinct, but inter-related sets of capabilities. The goal is to rapidly increase the capacity of Pakistan to confront terrorists operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] in Eastern Pakistan. Specifically, the goal is to provide the capability for Pakistani special operations forces to conduct airborne night strike operations against terrorists in the FATA.

FY06 1206 projects in Pakistan focused on increasing the capacity and capability of the Pakistani Army's rotary wing aviation units. FY07 projects are currently focusing on improving the equipment and training available to the Pakistani Army's special operations force [SOF], known as the Special Services Group [SSG].

Background

With expanding violence in the FATA, the recent occurrence of terrorist attacks against military and civilian targets in such cities as Swat, Islamabad, and Lahore, and sustained coalition counterterrorist operations applying pressure on extremists in neighboring Afghanistan, Pakistan is facing a credible counterterrorism challenge. As one U.S. Security Assistance Officer noted, “The FATA is the epicenter of the Global War on Terrorism.”

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The Pakistani military has very limited capability to operate in the FATA. Units that travel by road reportedly are subject to frequent ambushes, sniper attacks, and improvised explosive devices. Units that are engaged in combat with enemies in the FATA often find that their adversary has superior knowledge of the territory and is able to use this knowledge to provide tactical advantages. With that advantage, the adversary reportedly takes advantage of the night to conduct surveillance, reinforcement, withdrawal and even attacks against Pakistani forces.

Even Pakistan’s elite Special Services Group [SSG] has had trouble operating in the FATA. According to the SSG Commander, between 2003 and 2008, the SSG conducted 122 separate counterterrorist operations in the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province [NWFP]. While SSG operations resulted in 178 terrorist dead and 211 captured, the SSG suffered 42 killed and 90 wounded. Additionally, the SSG suffered 16 killed and 29 injured in a terrorist attack at the Tarbela SSG base.

According to the Pakistani Director of Military Operations, “The FATA is non-permissible for road movement [of our forces]. We’ve suffered a lot of casualties due to road movement operations.”

1206 Program

The Office of the Defense Representative [ODRP] at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad is the Ambassador’s and DoD’s lead agent for security assistance to the Pakistani military. When 1206 funding authorization was passed, the ODRP recognized an opportunity to

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31 Interview with Pakistani company commander, March 14, 2008.
32 Interview with Pakistani company commander, March 14, 2008.
33 Briefing by SSG Deputy Commander, Tarbela SSG Base, March 13, 2008.
34 Briefing by SSG Deputy Commander, Tarbela SSG Base, March 13, 2008.
rapidly address critical capability and capacity shortfalls in the Pakistani military. The first area of focus was aviation capabilities.

While the Pakistanis had long complained about shortages in aircraft availability to support ground forces, the 2005 Pakistani earthquake provided U.S. and other coalition military forces a clear view of the extremely limited Pakistani Army helicopter availability. Despite the impressive inventory of helicopters (including Mi-17s, AH-1s, B-412s, Alouette IIIIs, UH-1s) the Pakistani military could make very few aircraft operationally available. The primary reason for this shortcoming was lack of spare parts.

**FY06**

For FY06 Pakistan 1206 projects, ODRP—in coordination with the Ambassador and U.S. Central Command—requested support for spare parts, aviation body armor, night vision goggles [NVGs], a night targeting system for Cobra helicopters, and limited visibility training for pilots.

![Figure 5. FY06 Pakistan 1206 cases](image-url)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY06 1206</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Case Value</th>
<th>Program Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Aviation NVGs, helmet mounts</td>
<td>$648,299</td>
<td>$23,315,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cobra, B412 spares and accesso-</td>
<td>$13,410,880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-17 spare parts</td>
<td>$6,400,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aviation body armor</td>
<td>$168,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Site survey for C-NITE</td>
<td>$99,157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited visibility pilot training</td>
<td>$2,589,120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aircraft addressed in the FY06 1206-funded spare parts are the Mi-17 hip transport helicopters, Bell 412 transport helicopters, and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters.

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36 GAO report on Section 1206 Security Assistance Program, GAO-07-416R Section 1206 Assistance, Enclosure I, slide 13.
While much of the FY07 1206 funded equipment for Pakistan has arrived in Doha, Qatar (home of U.S. Central Command’s Special Operations Component Command [SOCCENT]), it has not been distributed to the SSG. Instead, distribution of the equipment to Pakistani units is being paired with specialized training by U.S. special operations forces under the Joint Combined Exchange Training [JCET]. The goal for the FY07 1206 program, according to the ODRP, is to rapidly develop the capability of the SSG to conduct vertical insertion night time company-sized attack helicopter supported raids against terrorist targets in the FATA.37

To support the SSG, the FY07 projects included body armor, weapons and ammunition, weapons modification, radios, and additional modifications to Mi-17 helicopters, including door mounted machine guns.

**Figure 6. FY07 Pakistan 1206 cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY07 1206</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Case Value</th>
<th>Program Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Mi-17 modifications</td>
<td>$6,721,776</td>
<td>$13,753,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radios, soldier equipment, Ak-47 accessories, 9mm pistols, ammo</td>
<td>$1,339,979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comms system, infantry target system, Ak-47 accessories</td>
<td>$5,172,948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GPS, body armor, non-lethal weapons suite</td>
<td>$518,840</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational Impact**

The FY06 1206 projects for Pakistan focused on the 21" QRF, which is an aviation squadron dedicated to providing air mobility to the Pakistani SSG. As noted above, the FY06 1206 projects focused on night vision equipment for pilots, spare parts for helicopters, and aviation body armor for pilots and helicopter crew members.

37 Pakistan “Strategic Development Plan”, provided by ODRP, March 13, 2008.
Night Helicopter Operations

According to Pakistani officers in the SSG and the 21st QRF, limited visibility training and NVG equipment and training has had an operational impact on forces conducting counterterrorist operations. The commander of the 21st QRF noted that the training and operational profile of the 21st QRF has changed as a result of the arrival of this equipment. He also indicated that, with the arrival of the 1206 NVGs, the 21st QRF has completed 1,200 nighttime flying hours using the 1206-funded equipment. The following chart depicts the shift in training and operations since the arrival of the NVG equipment reported by the 21st QRF commander.38

Figure 7. 1206 impact on night helicopter operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Day</td>
<td>Night</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1206</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1206</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the commander of the SSG Special Operations Task Force, the pilot training has allowed SOF to be “extricated from some dangerous situations.”39 The SSG deputy commander also noted that, as the capacity for night operations expands, “night vision in aviation will reduce casualties and improve chances of success of SSG operations in the FATA.”40

The commander of the 21st QRF reported that with the 1206-provided night vision capability, the Pakistani Army has been able to conduct nighttime MEDEVAC of casualties. While this capability

38 Interview with 21st QRF Commander, Qasim Air Base, March 14, 2008.
reportedly is used only occasionally, it represents a change from previous daytime-only operating patterns prior to the arrival of the 1206 equipment. Those aircraft that do not have NVG capabilities still wait until morning to evacuate casualties from forward operating locations.

During the study team’s discussions with members of the 21st QRF, a pilot in the Pakistani Army depicted the impact of this 1206 project on Pakistani forces by recounting the first time that he flew a MEDEVAC mission with NVGs. He reported that he had just returned to a helicopter staging location after a sunset ammunition resupply delivery to forward deployed SSG troops. A forward deployed unit reported that they had many casualties from combat, including one in very serious condition that was unlikely to survive the night. Using the newly fielded NVGs, and the limited training he had received so far, the pilot flew to the unit’s location, picked up 20 injured soldiers and brought them out of the combat zone. The pilot noted that in addition to saving the life of the seriously injured soldier, the execution of a night time MEDEVAC operation provided “a big morale boost for troops on the ground.” According to the 21st QRF commander, “night vision in aviation will reduce casualties and improve chances of success of SSG operations in the FATA.”

41 The study team heard conflicting accounts of how often night MEDEVAC missions occur, but there was consensus across Pakistani and American officers that some missions have occurred since the arrival of the 1206 equipment and that there was no reporting of such missions prior to the arrival of this equipment.

42 Interview with 21st QRF Commander, Qasim Air Base, March 14, 2008.

43 Interview with pilot from 21st QRF squadron, Qasim air base, March 14, 2008.

44 Interview with 21st QRF Commander, Qasim Air Base, March 14, 2008.
Body Armor

The aviation body armor supplied to the 21st QRF also has had an impact on Pakistani operations in the FATA. According to the executive officer of the 21st QRF, pilots in the squadron wear the aviation body armor “every time we go far west [into the FATA].” He noted that the body armor has an impact on the morale of the pilots and crew of the unarmored Mi-17s, and he also reported that the 21st QRF has expanded its operations area since the introduction of the body armor. Another 21st QRF pilot noted that the body armor is particularly welcomed as there is no cockpit protection in the Mi-17 and “we’ve all been hit” by enemy ground fire. According to General Amjad, the director of Pakistani Military Operations (G-3) “The impact of more body armor is that the troops feel more confident. This translates to better results against miscreants [terrorists].”

Maintenance and Repair

The operational availability of the Mi-17, Bell 412, and Cobra helicopters has a direct impact on the operations that Pakistani

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45 Interview with executive officer of the 21st QRF squadron, Qasim air base, March 14, 2008.

46 Interview with pilot from 21st QRF squadron, Qasim air base, March 14, 2008.

SOF can execute in the FATA. According to a senior ODRP officer, the number of combat operations by Pakistani military forces against terrorists has increased dramatically since the Red Mosque siege in July 2007. This increased operational tempo [OPTEMPO] has compounded the strain on the Pakistani Army’s capabilities, especially aviation. According to an ODRP officer, “The Pakistani military has dramatically increased its OPTEMPO and mission rates. They could have not done this without the spare parts provided by 1206 FY06.”

According to the Director of Military Operations, the Pakistani Army was able to meet the aviation requirement of the prevailing OPTEMPO prior to the Red Mosque siege. However, because, the OPTEMPO for Pakistani forces has increased dramatically since then, the available Pakistani Army helicopters could not have supplied the expanded requirement for aviation support. He reported that, due to the increased aircraft availability resulting from the influx of 1206 parts, “flying hours over the last 8-9 months have really expanded.”

According to the 21st QRF maintenance officer, in 2006, available flying hours for helicopters in the 21st QRF were approximately 225 hours per month. With the arrival of 1206 funded spare parts, available flying hours have increased to an average of 375 hours a month, an increase in operational availability of over 65 percent. As one U.S. officer noted, “the Pakistani military is very sophisti-

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48 Interview with ODRP deputy, March 14, 2008.
49 Interview with Pakistani Operations Director and Pakistani Logistics Director, Military Operations Directorate, Rawalpindi, March 14, 2008.
50 Interview with Maintenance officer, Qasim Air Base.
cated; they have nuclear weapons and F-16s. They’ve had helicopters for decades and they know how to fix helicopters. The real constraint is on operational availability has been access to spare parts.”

**Gunship Support**

The commander of the SSG special operations task force reported that there is both an operational and psychological impact of having Cobra helicopters available to support special operations forces engaged with terrorists in NWFP and FATA. Operationally, the Cobras provide suppressive and covering fire for the infiltration and exfiltration of SOF personnel via Mi-17. This is particularly important, as the Mi-17 has a much slower takeoff and landing profile than fully assault capable aircraft such as the U.S. UH-60 Blackhawk. The impact is also psychological for the units engaged in combat operations. According to the commander of the 21st QRF, “all of our air assault missions require protection for lift [Mi-17] assets; without the Cobras, we still go but we expose ourselves to danger.”

The Cobras also provide direct strike capabilities against enemy targets. According to the Pakistani director of Military Operations, the Cobra is the mainstay of their missions in the FATA. It protects logistics, it provides reconnaissance, and it allows raids on emergent targets. In addition, the Pakistani Special Forces have noticed changes of behavior in the enemy when Cobras are part of the mis-

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51 Interview with SOCCENT LNO to ODRP March 15, 2008.
52 Interview with Commanding General Officer Commanding and Commanding Pakistan Special Operations Task Force, March 13, 2008.
53 Interview with SOCCENT LNO to ODRP, March 15, 2008.
54 Interview with 21st QRF Commander, Qasim Air Base, March 14, 2008.
55 Interview with Pakistani Operations Director and Pakistani Logistics Director, Military Operations Directorate, Rawalpindi, March 14, 2008.
sion package. Namely, the enemy is less willing to maneuver and fight if Cobras are flying in support of SOF.

According a Pakistani Army officer that had just completed a tour as a company commander in the FATA, the increased availability of aviation has a broader effect on the battle space. While only the SSG regularly use rotary wing support for vertical insertion and airborne assault operations, ground forces get three additional benefits from increased helicopter operations in the FATA. These are:

1. Logistics and support (resupply and MEDEVAC).
2. Fire support. The FATA is very difficult terrain to operate in and the only fire support available to ground units comes from mid-range towed artillery and helicopters. Surveillance and reconnaissance are difficult, but helicopters provide the combined capabilities of surveillance, quick reaction and fire support.
3. Deterrent Effect. Perhaps the most important contribution, from the perspective of the former company commander, is the deterrent effect that helicopters have on the enemy. According to the former company commander, when the enemy hears Cobras coming, they disappear. Actual casualties inflicted on the enemy by the helicopters are less important than the deterrent effect of having them nearby to support ground forces.

56 Interview with Commanding General Officer Commanding and Commander Pakistan Special Operations Task Force, March 13, 2008.
57 Interview with Pakistani Operations Director and Pakistani Logistics Director, Military Operations Directorate, Rawalpindi, March 14, 2008.
58 Interview with Pakistani company commander, March 14, 2008.
Broader Effects of 1206 in Pakistan

In the study team’s discussions with American military personnel in Pakistan, U.S. officers were able to articulate the distinction between the effects of training and equipment supplied via 1206 projects, and training and equipment provided by conventional FMF/FMS.

According to a senior ODRP officer, the current FMF/FMS timeline does not meet the requirements of war time OPTEMPO for Pakistani forces. Given the rapid changes on the battlefield, and the immediate need to deploy security forces into the FATA, it would not be possible to develop these capacities via the FMF/FMS process. \(^{59}\) According to a senior security assistance officer at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, 1206 has highlighted the fact that prevailing security assistance processes are “not appropriate for building war fighting capability.”\(^{60}\) He also noted that “1206 funding is the only thing that can produce effects within a fiscal year.”\(^{61}\)

According to an officer from DSCA, the most attractive aspect of 1206 is that all that is needed to generate an effect is to have a receptive partner. \(^{62}\) As long as there are units that can absorb the training and equipment, and as long as there is leadership/headquarters acceptance, the United States can rapidly plan and execute a 1206 project. “1206 helps us fill known gaps in capability that the Pakistanis have not made a priority.”\(^{63}\) The United States can work the funding and delivery entirely within its own processes, rules, and regulation, therein promoting more rapid delivery.

\(^{59}\) Interview with Deputy Director of ODRP, March 14, 2008.  
\(^{60}\) Interview with SAO officer, U.S. Embassy, Islamabad.  
\(^{61}\) Interview with SAO officer, U.S. Embassy, Islamabad.  
\(^{62}\) Interview with DSCA officer, Islamabad.  
\(^{63}\) Interview with DSCA officer, Islamabad.
Assessment of Operational Impacts of 1206-Funded Projects in Yemen

Overview

In Yemen, FY06 and FY07 1206 projects have focused on enhancing the capabilities and capacity of the Yemeni Armed Forces to prevent cross-border arms trafficking and to suppress terrorist activity. The primary recipients of the 1206 support are the Yemeni Special Operations Forces [YSOF], the Yemeni Army 11th Brigade, and the Yemeni Ministry of Defense’s primary logistics support command known as the Central Repair Base [CRB].

Background

Yemen faces significant security challenges from the presence of terrorists and terrorist organizations. Yemen is the ancestral home of Osama Bin Laden. Its waters were the venue for the USS Cole and M/V Limburg attacks. Rural areas in Yemen have served as a refuge for extremists leaving Afghanistan. The northern portion of Yemen is home to an expanse of ungoverned/undergoverned space that extremists have used to launch attacks across the border into Saudi Arabia and beyond. The capital, Sanaa, is experiencing regular violence.

While the terrorist threat that faces Yemen is multifaceted, there are two areas of concern. First is the porousness of Yemen’s borders. The government of Yemen has never had full control over border regions, and in fact, some of Yemen’s borders remained undefined.
until very recently. The mountainous terrain in the northwestern and southeastern borders, and the vast open desert in the northern border area are difficult regions to control under the best of circumstances.

Uncontrolled borders in Yemen work to the advantage of terrorist organizations, providing opportunities for terrorists, weapons, and other material to enter Yemen and/or to spill out of Yemen into other areas. On several occasions, Saudi officials have complained that smugglers from Yemen have brought in explosives and weapons which militants have used in recent terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia.

The second area of concern is the presence of terrorists in undergoverned areas of Yemeni territory. The lack of central control over sizable swaths of Yemeni territory by the government in Sanaa and the prevailing climate of lawlessness in much of Yemen have provided opportunities for terrorist groups to establish and maintain a presence in outlying areas of the country. Tribesmen, who control parts of the country not under the firm authority of the central government, sometimes provide shelter to terrorists. While it is difficult to determine the precise motivation of why certain tribes or regions have become hosts to terrorists, there is a long history of the Yemeni hinterlands resisting central control. The tribes around Ma’rib near the border with Saudi Arabia, for example, have a long history of accepting support from outsiders to bolster their resistance to the central government, including at times Marxist South Yemen, Ba’ath Iraq, conservative Saudi Arabia, and recently radical elements linked to Al-Qaeda.

Given limited resources of the government in Sanaa and the overall weakness in central control, the challenge of securing Yemen’s borders and rooting out terrorists has proven to be too much for Yemeni government to take on alone.

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64 In the summer of 2000, Yemen and Saudi Arabia signed an International Border Treaty settling a fifty year-old dispute over the location of the border between the two countries.
1206 Program

The overarching focus of FY06 and FY07 1206 projects in Yemen has been on countering cross-border terrorist activities.

FY06

In FY06, 1206 projects focused on the Yemeni Army’s 11th Brigade, which as the mission of patrolling the Yemeni border, and the Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF). The 11th Brigade units received light tactical vehicles (Ford Ranger pickup trucks) and Harris tactical radios. The YSOF received weapons, ammunition, night vision devices, tactical radios, and computer equipment for a SOF command center.

Figure 8. FY06 Yemen 1206 cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY06 1206</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Case Value</th>
<th>Program Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>M4A1 carbines, ammo, spares</td>
<td>$209,544</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M24 sniper rifles, ammo, spares</td>
<td>$187,628</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M240B machine guns, ammo, spares</td>
<td>$292,575</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>$195,020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vehicular radios, spares, installation</td>
<td>$381,395</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light tactical vehicles (Ford Rangers), spares</td>
<td>$1,875,820</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CT operations center computers</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YSOF operations center</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HF/VHF radios, spares, training</td>
<td>$949,392</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FY07

The focus of FY07 projects is logistics and mobility support to the YSOF.
Figure 9. FY07 Yemen 1206 cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY07 1206</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Case Value</th>
<th>Program Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Maintenance training</td>
<td>$36,556</td>
<td>$25,999,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M115A1 UAHs and spares</td>
<td>$7,030,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-ton cargo trucks and spares</td>
<td>$7,292,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry light armored vehicles and spares</td>
<td>$9,629,866</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M113 and M35 spares</td>
<td>$1,750,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint visual inspection</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operational Impact

Due to security restrictions following the March 18 mortar attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, the study team was unable to conduct field research in Yemen. The operational impacts discussed in this session were provided by U.S. Embassy personnel.

Equipment for Border Forces

The Office of Military Cooperation [OMC] at the U.S. Embassy reports that the Yemeni military has deployed 1206 funded weapons, night vision goggles, radios and trucks to Yemeni 11th Brigade units conducting border security operations. OMC personnel were able to visit the border region in 2008 and observe the operations of Yemeni Army units in the border region. The OMC reports that the 1206 equipment is in wide use, but that the Yemenis do not yet have enough manpower and equipment in the area to establish control over the entire border.

The OMC also reports that the Yemeni military has made additional modifications to some of the 1206 funded light tactical vehicles. These modifications include adding bench seats and mounting .50 caliber machine guns. These modifications suggest that the Yemeni military expects to engage well-armed smugglers and other potentially hostile adversaries in the border region and that the 1206-funded trucks will be used to bring mobile forces and firepower to bear.

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65 Phone conversation with COL Molinari, Office of Military Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, Sanaa, March 26, 2008.
The OMC notes that the 60 light trucks supplied under 1206 are insufficient on their own to provide enough mobility to a large enough force to completely secure Yemen’s borders. However, the Yemeni military has integrated these vehicles, along with a number of commercially available Toyota pickup trucks, into its border patrol forces to expand its area of operations and to support regular desert patrols in the northern border region.

The 1206-funded vehicle spares have been particularly important in supporting the short term operational capabilities to the Yemeni armed forces. OMC reports that currently, the Yemeni military simply cannot maintain its recently acquired vehicles without 1206 funding.66

The Yemeni Armed Forces are also using 1206 supplied Harris radios to coordinate patrols along the northern border. These tactical radios allow the Yemeni to pass information and coordinate the operations of a widely dispersed force.

**Maintenance Support**

The OMC reports that the arrival of 1206-funded equipment and spares has driven the Yemenis to improve their inventory storage, tracking, and control program for U.S.-supplied equipment. They have improved warehouses and developed computerized inventory control systems. In the case of the 1206 supplied light tactical vehicles and spares, since the vehicles used in border patrol operations are essentially commercially available civilian Ford trucks, there is a considerable black market for these parts. Accordingly, the Yemeni logistics command has had to “lock down” these parts and has a very extensive end-use control and accountability process for tracking them.67

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Broader Effects of 1206 in Yemen

The FY07 1206 funded equipment for the Yemeni Special Operations Forces is just beginning to arrive in Yemen. The FY07 cases focus on providing enhanced mobility and protection to YSOF. There is a direct link between these cases and Yemeni counterterrorism operations, as the YSOF have begun to take on an expanded counterterrorism role. Specifically, the YSOF have reportedly begun to back up the newly formed Yemeni Counter Terrorism Unit [CTU] in operations where additional capabilities and capacity are needed.

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68 Phone conversation with COL Molinari, Office of Military Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, Sanaa, March 26, 2008.
Assessment of Operational Impacts of 1206-Funded Projects in São Tome and Principe

Overview

The FY06 1206 projects for São Tome and Principe [STP] supported the development of a regional maritime awareness capability [RMAC]. Specifically, 1206 FY06 funded radars, a long range surveillance camera, Automated Information System [AIS] receivers and towers, computers, and communications equipment to enable the STP Coast Guard [STPCG] to begin to monitor licit and illicit traffic in the country’s territorial waters [TTW] and the economic exclusion zone [EEZ].

Background

The waters of the Gulf of Guinea [GoG] support commercial trade, fishing, petroleum export, and other maritime industries. STP and many other GoG countries have long suffered from poor maritime domain awareness and limited maritime security forces. As a result, smugglers, human traffickers, and pirates operate freely in these waters. In recent years, the discovery of off-shore oil deposits in STP

69 According to a World Bank estimate, oil smuggling costs the region between two to three billion USD a year. At least 25 attempted piracy and or robberies at sea were reported in 2005.
and Nigerian waters has brought added attention to the need to improve maritime safety and security in the GoG.  

In the 1980s, STP had a large Soviet surface search radar on its territory that STP officials could use to locate contacts at sea. This Soviet radar stopped working in 1991. Until the mid-1990s, the STPCG also had two 75ft Soviet-made Patrol Boats armed with crew served weapons. Today the STPCG has six non-functional rigid hulled inflatable boats [RHIBs] and one Boston Whaler that does not operate due to a lack of spare parts and money for fuel.

The STPCG has the lead in providing security in STP territorial waters, EEZ, as well as maritime safety in what the STP Government call the “STP search and rescue” area of responsibility (between STP TTW and Nigerian TTW). The STPCG’s past inability to monitor any water space left the island nation vulnerable and unable to contribute to regional maritime safety and security. Until the arrival of RMAC in February 2007, the STPCG had no idea of the type and quantity of illicit activities occurring in STP waters (or arriving/departing from its coasts). STP borders continue to be extremely porous and there is little in the way of security for its only major commercial port, or two minor oil and fishing ports.

Currently the United States receives 15 percent of its petroleum imports from the GoG and it is expected this number could rise to 25 percent by 2015. U.S. oil companies involved in petroleum exploration in the GOG have insisted that if extraction becomes feasible, STP and Nigeria will have to improve safety and security in the shared water space known as the “Joint Development Zone”, April 9.

Discussions with STPCG, STP Port Authority, and STP Customs, April 6-9.

According to Capt Pedro Baros of the STP Port Authority, 15 Port Authority Police patrol the entirety of the STP coastline for illegal entries and other illicit activities, April 9. According to the Operations Director of Enaport, a private company responsible for operating the commercial port in São Tome Town, only a handful of police and private security guards monitor the port. In addition, a lack of x-ray and other detection equipment means that STP can’t properly inspect all incoming cargo, April 7.
1206 Program

RMAC was an initiative identified by Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander US SIXTHFLEET [CNE/C6F], as a means to quickly develop STP capabilities to monitor, and eventually address illicit maritime activities in what had long been an ungoverned area. Lack of sufficient funding had delayed the start of the program, but when 1206 authority came in to being, CNE/C6F requested 1206 funding through U.S. European Command [USEUCOM] to support RMAC. As such, 1206 funding in FY06 allowed the immediate initiation of the RMAC program in order to bring maritime domain awareness [MDA] capabilities to STP. 1206 funding accounted for approximately one third of the total cost of the RMAC program. 74

The FY06 program for São Tome amounted to $6.8 million and funded the acquisition of commercially available maritime surface search radar, electro-optical/infra-red (EO/IR) sensors (i.e., cameras), computer systems and communications equipment and training for STPCG personnel.

Figure 10. FY06 São Tome and Principe 1206 cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>Case Value</th>
<th>Program Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>São Tome and Principe</td>
<td>RMAC technology insertion</td>
<td>$512,000</td>
<td>$6,800,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hardware</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shipping</td>
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<tr>
<td>Site surveys and equipment instal-</td>
<td>$1,053,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>lation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Testing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transition/sustainment package</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS admin charge</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74 According to CNE/C6F.
1206-funded equipment has been installed in four locations, three on the island of São Tome and one on Principe. These sites and their respective status, are:

- São Tome Town – Operational
- Macrambrara – Operational
- Moro Sumerio – Operational
- Alto Nazare – Non-operational

At the National Operations Center in São Tome Town, 1206 provided RMAC servers, two work stations, plasma displays, a new tower, X-band radar, an AIS receiver, VHF communications equipment, and a camera. The components have been installed and work is completed at this site. While the radar and AIS systems have been integrated, work is still underway to include the camera feed. Systems integration and personnel training for RMAC is ongoing at the operations center.

At Moro Sumiero, X-band radar and AIS have been installed on an existing telecommunications tower. On the peak of Mount Macrambrara, the RMAC project installed a new tower, an S-band radar and an AIS receiver. At Alto Nazare on the minor island of Principe, work is still being done to install a new tower, S-band radar and an AIS receiver. The equipment at Moro Sumiero and São Tome Town was inspected by CNA, and appeared to be in very good condition.

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75 Will be integrated in 2-3 months approximately. Currently awaiting software necessary for camera feed integration. - Discussion with Lt Butler April 5.
Operational Impact

According to discussions with U.S. Naval personnel assisting in RMAC training, although the program is still in its testing and integration phase, it has brought new capabilities to the STPCG and has already had an operational impact.

Ability to Observe

AIS receivers are operational on three of the four RMAC sites, and are integrated into the Maritime Safety and Security Information System, a global database to track ships all across the world. The X-band and S-band line of site radars are detecting vessels out to 50 miles under normal conditions, and approximately 25 miles in adverse weather. There will be a gap in radar coverage in the southwest portion of the main island as the area is too rugged to install and maintain radars. When radars are all fully operational, STP will have the capability to develop a radar picture covering large portions of its territorial waters. Radar coverage is mainly used to track vessels identified by AIS that are coming in and out of STP territorial waters.

Ability to Identify

RMAC has allowed the STPCG to begin to monitor vessels in its water space and identify suspicious activities. AIS receivers allow the STPCG to receive position, ship name, cargo, last port of call and next port of call information from any ship carrying an AIS transponder (a requirement of the International Maritime Organization for ships over 300 gross tons). The STPCG is currently collecting the following information at the National Operations Center:

- Latitude and longitude
- Ship course and speed
- Name of vessel
- Type of vessel (cargo, gas, fishing etc.)
• Destination (if known)
• MMSI # (changes)
• IMO # (permanent)
• Country of registry
• How many times inspected

According to the STPCG, RMAC has allowed them to identify suspicious activity such as vessels stopped in STP waters, or those vessels that are traveling at extremely slow transit speeds of 1-2 miles per. The STPCG is now compiling AIS and radar data on traffic within territorial waters and EEZ and with additional training hopes to be able to establish patterns of suspected illicit activity.

**Ability to React**

1206 funding also provided the STPCG with VHF communications equipment. CNA was able to inspect the West Marine VHF 600 DSC, line of sight, short distance radio that has given the STPCG the ability to hail ships, coordinate search and rescue efforts, and ask nearby vessels to report on suspicious ships. When the radar picks up a vessel entering territorial waters with its AIS transponder turned off, the STPCG attempts to hail it or call on other ships to take a closer look. The radios reportedly have a range of approximately ten nautical miles.

**Broader Effects of 1206 in São Tome and Príncipe**

According to U.S. Naval personnel interviewed, the RMAC equipment that 1206 funded has provided additional benefits. RMAC is assisting in the creation of STP maritime regulations by giving it the ability to refuse entry, grounds for refusal if not transmitting AIS data. RMAC will assist in putting STP’s three major ports in com-

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76 Discussions with Lt Butler, U.S. Navy MPP in STP
77 Defense Institute of Legal Studies has worked with the STPCG in this regard, discussion with Lt Butler, U.S. Navy MPP in STP
pliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security ("ISPS") Code.

In addition, RMAC has given the STPCG a mission to train for and is causing the MoD to make the STPCG a higher priority. The STPCG Commander, Colonel Lima, noted that when RMAC was initiated, his service had a very limited concept of maritime terrorism and there was no cooperation among regional states on the issue of maritime security. Recently, the STPCG has begun discussions with Gabon, Cameroon, and other neighbors for future maritime security cooperation. These countries have agreed to begin providing information about maritime traffic.\(^{78}\)

According to the STPCG commander, when the STPCG is capable enough, he plans on partnering with other coastal African nations to stop the threat of maritime terrorism in the GoG.\(^{79}\) The arrival of RMAC has provided a lift in morale for STPCG personnel, which was reportedly poor prior to the RMAC project, as the STPCG had no maritime domain awareness and no operational boats.\(^{80}\)

The RMAC program appears to generating more interagency cooperation among STP agencies responsible for maritime issues (these include the Coast Guard, the Port Authority, and Immigration). In addition, the Maritime Institute under the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Fishing.\(^{81}\) According to the agencies interviewed, illegal fishing, smuggling, and illegal immigration are the

\(^{78}\) Interview with STPCG Commander, São Tome, April 2008.

\(^{79}\) Interview with 1st Lt. and acting STPCG XO Hamilton Neto Nascimento de Sousa.

\(^{80}\) Discussions with Lt Butler, U.S. Navy MPP in STP.

\(^{81}\) Maritime Institute [IMAP] – Responsible for registering vessels, flags. Coordinates search and rescue efforts with the STPCG. Discussion with STPCG, April 8.
security priorities that need to be addressed. In addition, much attention is being given to safety at sea and developing a search and rescue capability. They see “fiscalization”—the reduction of illegal smuggling and fishing in order to bring more revenue into STP—as the primary benefit of increased maritime domain awareness in STP territorial waters and the EEZ.

82 Discussions with the STPCG, the Port Authority, and Customs reveal there is a vast but unquantifiable amount of smuggling, as well as illegal immigration occurring in STP territorial waters. The Port Authority noted several drugs seizures in recent months and estimates the percentage of unlicensed fishing vessels in STP waters to be in the order of 20-30 percent of approximately 10,000 canoes and other vessels. In addition, a February 2008 report issued by the U.K. Treasury’s Financial Action Task Force (FATF), singled out STP as one of the countries most susceptible to money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF is concerned with deficiencies in the AML/CFT regime of STP.

83 The STPCG is in ongoing discussion with the Ministry of Fishing regarding money to install radios in fishing villages for search and rescue purposes.

84 Discussion with 1st Lt. and acting STPCG XO Hamilton Neto Nascimento de Sousa, Discussion with Capt Pedro, STP Port Authority
Alignment with National Objectives

In this section, we describe the degree to which section 1206 objectives, program effects, and U.S. national and military strategic objectives align. This assessment is by its nature subjective, and is based on a review of the prevailing unclassified guidance and U.S. government plans regarding the War on Terrorism and the data collected by the study team.

Evaluating Alignment

We have chosen three avenues to assess alignment.

1. We examine alignment between the stated DoD objectives for each 1206 country program and the six strategic approaches identified in the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism [NMSPWOT].

2. We examine alignment between the operational effects of 1206 country programs identified in this study and the six strategic approaches identified in the NMSPWOT.

3. We examine the alignment between each 1206 country program and the broader intent of 1206 as a unique and supplemental authority.

U.S. National and Military Strategic Objectives

Our assessment framework for U.S. national and military strategic objectives is derived from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism [NSCT] plan and the NMSPWOT.

The NSCT describes the overall approach of the U.S. government to the War on Terror, and based on this, the NMSPWOT provides the strategic guidelines for DoD efforts to combat terrorism. The
NMSPWOT identifies six military strategic approaches to fight the War on Terror. These are:

1. Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive
2. Enable partner nations to counterterrorism
3. Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and increase capacity for consequence management
4. Defeat terrorists and their organizations
5. Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other US government agencies and partner nations
6. Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism

**Intent of 1206 Program as a Unique Security Assistance Authority**

Our assessment framework for the broader intent of the 1206 program is based upon DoD’s objectives when the authority was proposed. According to the Secretary of Defense [SECDEF], 1206 authority was designed as a way to supplement tradition security assistance programs by:

1. Filling in longstanding gaps in the effort to help other nations build and sustain capable military forces
2. Allowing DoD and DoS to act in months rather than years
3. Responding to emerging threats and opportunities
**Lebanon**

1206 FY06 objective: *Help the Lebanese Armed Forces bolster the government of Lebanon’s ability to exert control over its territory and reduce the operational space of militias such as Hezbollah.*

The intent of the 1206 program for Lebanon directly aligns with NMSPWOT strategic approach of “denying terrorists what they need to operate and survive.” In the recent past, large swaths of Lebanese territory have been outside the control of the LAF and have provided “operational space” for Hezbollah and other militias to organize, recruit, train, and plan and execute operations. By focusing on mobility, command and control, and providing weapons and ammunition, the 1206 program in Lebanon was designed to enable the LAF to deploy into areas that were previously under the control of militias and other non-state actors. By deploying to these areas, the LAF should be able to increasingly deny militias and terrorist organizations the ungoverned space they need to operate.

The expansion of mobility, enhanced aircraft availability, the introduction of secure communications, and the replenishment of ammunition expended in combat against terrorists are operational effects that enhance the ability of the LAF to deny operational space to terrorists and militias. Moreover, the LAF has employed these new capabilities in order to directly combat Fatah Al-Islam in Nahr al-Barid and the Jund al-Sham in Ain al-Hilwa, which expands the reach of the 1206 program to supporting another NMSPWOT strategic approach; “enabling partner nations to counterterrorism.” The deployment of trained and equipped forces for presence, surveillance, patrols, and—where needed—combat operations serves to undermine the ability of terrorists groups and militias to operate with impunity.

More broadly, the 1206 program in Lebanon appears to align with the SECDEF priorities in that the LAF have immediately employed forces that have been trained and equipped by 1206 in combat operations to meet emerging threats, and the LAF has contributed its own resources in order to bolster and sustain programs initiated by 1206 and has longer-term plans to use FMF/FMS funding to develop and grow the capabilities that were jump started by 1206 funding.
Pakistan

1206 FY06 Objective: “Help develop integrated rotary wing assets capable of expediting the receipt, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. Facilitates the rapid planning and execution of Pakistani counterterrorist special operations raids in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and border region to fight terrorists and anti-coalition militants.”

For Pakistan, the intent of the 1206 program objective was well aligned with the NMSPWOT strategic approach of “enabling partner nations to counterterrorism.” By focusing on building the Pakistani military’s rotary wing capabilities, the 1206 program was designed to build operational capabilities in the Pakistani Army and Special Forces to locate terrorists in the FATA and then conduct raids against terrorist targets. While the broader struggle against terrorism requires a “whole of government approach”, a significant contribution of military forces is to capture and kill terrorists when needed. The 1206 program for Pakistan directly addresses this element of the War on Terror.

The operational effects of the 1206 program in Pakistan can be seen in greater aircraft availability, increased training, the introduction of night flying and night targeting systems into helicopter operations, and the expansion of cooperation between the 21st QRF and the SSG. The Pakistani Army appears to be pursuing additional FMF/FMS programs to support the capabilities that were introduced through 1206. In addition, the FY07 1206 program directly addresses SSG nighttime air assault operations, further enhancing the capability of the Pakistani military to combat terrorism in the FATA.

For Pakistan, the immediate need for greater aircraft availability and night flight capabilities is clear. Forces that operate in daytime and those that used land transportation for movement in the FATA experience high casualty rates. The need to undertake night operations in the FATA is the type of urgent need that reflects the SECDEF priority for 1206 programs of “responding to emerging threats and opportunities.”
Yemen

1206 FY06 Objective: “Help increase the capability of the Yemeni Armed Forces to prevent cross-border arms trafficking and helps suppress terrorist activity.”

The intent of the 1206 program in Yemen is in direct accordance with the NMSPWOT strategic approach of “denying terrorists what they need to operate and survive.” Terrorists in Yemen have long taken advantage of Yemen’s ungoverned spaces, and the easy transit of people and materiel across the country’s porous border. The provision of high mobility vehicles, communications equipment, arms, and ammunition was designed to allow the Yemen Armed Forces to deploy to the northern border region, and more effectively identify and disrupt arms smuggling and the illegal movement of people across this largely uncontrolled border.

The limited data available suggests that the operational effects of the 1206 program are directly in line with the intent of this program. Yemeni Armed Forces are deployed in the northern border area and are frequently patrolling in order to identify and disrupt illegal movement of men and materiel. Given the known presence of Al-Qaeda associated terrorists and other terrorist organizations in Yemen, and the limited capabilities and capacities of the Yemeni Armed forces, the 1206 program in Yemen appears to directly reflect the SECDEF priority of addressing a longstanding gap in counterterrorism capabilities of a partner country.

São Tome and Principe

1206 FY06 Objective: “Establish a Regional Maritime Awareness Capability through the use of commercially available equipment; promote stability and enhance counterterrorism capabilities.”

The intent of the STP 1206 program aligns directly with NMSPWOT strategic approach of “denying terrorists what they need to operate and survive.” The waters off of STP have long been ungoverned space. Since the mid-1990s, the STPCG has had no radar coverage to locate maritime traffic off shore. Prior to 1206, the STPCG had no cameras or night vision equipment with which to visually identify vessels in STP’s TTW and EEZ. As such, all of STP’s TTW and EEZ
were a potential safe haven and unconstrained operating space for terrorists, smugglers, pirates, and others that threaten the economic well being of São Tome and Principe and the security of the region.

The operational effect of the 1206 in São Tome has been to generate new awareness of maritime activities in STP waters. The STPCG now has the ability to monitor the activities of a wide variety of licit and illicit vessels operating off of STP. The STPCG is conducting, queries, pattern analysis, and pier side inspections in an effort to bring greater control to this long ungoverned maritime space. While the STPCG does not currently have the capability to dispatch units to board suspect vessels, it appears that the availability of this new regional maritime awareness may prompt additional investments in expanding the ability of the STPCG to bring safety and security to STP’s maritime environment. Given the long absence of any situational awareness of STP’s maritime space, the STP 1206 program directly aligns with the SECDEF priority of addressing long standing gaps and in helping nations build and sustain capable military forces.

According to the NMSPWOT, military-to-military relationships expand access to foreign military leaders and influence the way those leaders think about the War on Terror. As a result, the NMSPWOT suggests that military-to-military contacts support the strategic approach of establishing conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism. As such, all activities under the 1206 security assistance authority contribute to, and are aligned with, U.S. efforts to combat terrorist organizations.