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China-Russia Relations in the Early 21st Century
Conference Report

I. Background
On 22-23 February 2007, The CNA Corporation’s Project Asia hosted a two-day conference exploring the state of relations between China and Russia, their future prospects, and the implications for U.S. interests. The conference was organized around six panels that examined Sino-Russian relations on a number of fronts including political, economic, regional, defense, and security issues. Each topic was addressed by specialists of Russian and Chinese affairs in order to capture the unique perspectives of Moscow and Beijing. In this regard we were extremely fortunate to have as our guest speakers a group of highly respected and accomplished scholars speaking before a remarkably well-informed audience. (Agenda and speaker biographies attached). This report provides a synopsis of the conference, highlights from the papers that were delivered, and the major lines of discussion that took place.

Conference Panelists at the Close of the Two-Day Session

From left to right: Byungki Kim, Erica Downs, Elizabeth Wishnick, Andrew Kuchins, Gilbert Rozman, Richard Lotspeich, Kevin Ryan, Charles Ziegler, Jeanne Wilson, Shelley Rigger, Jing-Dong Yuan

II. Conference Leitmotif
The conference underscored that Sino-Russian relations today are characterized by both centripetal and centrifugal forces which simultaneously push the two nations together yet also pull them apart.
The forces that unite the two nations are numerous, vocally heralded by each, and usually garner the most attention abroad. Among them are:

- A shared wariness of the United States as an international actor and suspicions about Washington’s intentions towards both Beijing and Moscow
- Mutual dissatisfaction with the initial shape of the international order in the immediate wake of the end of the Cold War
- Common views about the benefits of a “multi-polar world order” and the importance that should be accorded both Beijing and Moscow in that order
- Shared interests in many regional security issues and a willingness to often provide political support to each other’s most pressing interests, such as Taiwan for China or Chechnya for Russia
- Complementary defense needs: Russia as an arms and military technologies supplier and China as Russia’s premier customer for military materiel
- Complementary energy diversification strategies: Russia wants to diversify its customer base away from Europe, while China hopes to reduce its dependency on the Persian Gulf and the volatile sea lanes of the Malacca Strait.

Yet, there are also tensions in the Sino-Russian relationship that limit how close the two are likely to become and which preclude the possibility that the relationship can ever replicate the halcyon days of the early 1950s. Prominent among these are:

- Lingering legacies of mutual distrust between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
- Mutual wariness of the other’s ultimate objectives in Central Asia in terms of both political and economic influence, and especially energy resources
- Russian concerns about China’s mercantilist economic policies and, most notably in the Russian Far East, resentment by Russians over perceived economic exploitation by the Chinese
- Different optimal desired outcomes on some regional issues, such as on the Korean Peninsula, with China inclined to preserve the status quo of a divided Korea while Russia would see some benefit from a united Korea
- Uncertainty in Russia over what the so-called “rise of China” will mean for its own future national security; especially as China’s growing economic clout continues to generate political traction around the world and Beijing overshadows Moscow in more and more areas.

Overall, the Sino-Russian relationship will likely continue to be characterized by these opposing forces of cooperation and contention. The “Strategic Partnership” Moscow and Beijing have heralded will be conditioned by a calculus in each capitol that is first and
foremost pragmatically based on maximizing selfish national interests, not on identical interests or objectives across-the-board.

III. Panel Summaries

Panel 1 – The Making of a Strategic Partnership

The opening panel of the conference addressed the international and domestic imperatives that currently serve as the foundation for Sino-Russian relations. Panelists provided a holistic view of the relationship, examining both the common interests that draw the two countries together and the limitations to greater cooperation.

The Evolution and Current State of Sino-Russian Relations

Dr. Gilbert Rozman, Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, opened his presentation on the overall state of bilateral ties by remarking that the relationship was one that had been “repeatedly misjudged” and therefore needed to be re-examined. Taking snapshots of the state of bilateral ties from each of the last three decades, Rozman noted a “sustained upward trend” in relations since Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, albeit with a few “bumps along the road.” Rozman added that, in order to restore the bilateral relationship, the two sides needed to overcome several challenges including their lingering border dispute. Rozman also did not discount the possibility that differences between the two nations could complicate relations in the future, but added that the two countries have agreed to see past their differences for now in an effort to advance the overall strategic partnership.

Rozman took a holistic view of China-Russia relations, characterizing the relationship as “terribly uneven,” with certain aspects in better shape than others. Rozman argued that bilateral political ties are fairly strong while economic ties have improved considerably since the normalization of relations. He also argued that cultural ties remain the most uncertain aspect of the relationship, characterizing Russia as “xenophobic” towards China, and the Chinese as “apathetic” towards their neighbor to the north. Rozman assessed that any existing disparities are unlikely to cause a downturn in relations.

Rozman concluded his remarks by stating that we could expect a “stronger relationship” between China and Russia over the next decade. Among the factors that have served to solidify the relationship are joint views of a multi-polar world as well as shared criticisms of U.S. ambitions. He cautioned against attempts to use Russia to contain China, arguing that such efforts would likely have the opposite effect of bringing them closer together. Rozman called instead for the United

Gilbert Rozman
States to work with others in the region to manage China’s rise and gradually orient Moscow away from Beijing’s embrace.

Why a Strategic Partnership? — The View From Russia

In his presentation on Russia’s views of the strategic partnership, Dr. Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), asserted that despite commonalities, most Russians are “profoundly ambivalent” towards China. One area where this ambivalence manifests itself is in Russia’s perceptions of the SCO. Although it is a participant, Russia feels the SCO is essentially a Chinese project. Kuchins argued that Russia would prefer to have the CSTO, which excludes China, as the main multilateral organization with security responsibilities in Central Asia.

Kuchins picked up on Rozman’s theme of the American factor in bilateral relations, dismissing statements by Chinese and Russian leaders insisting that the bilateral relationship is not directed at any third country. Kuchins described the bilateral relationship as “still contingent upon U.S. actions,” with the Russian leadership, in particular, taking a positive view of its close ties with China as a strategic counterweight to the United States.

Kuchins also said there is evidence that shared ideological views may be returning to the relationship. He pointed to “striking similarities” between Russia’s notion of “sovereign democracy,” a label often used to describe Vladimir Putin’s governing ideology, and some of the key tenets of China’s domestic and foreign policy. Both countries encourage the shift towards a multi-polar world order, believe in the absence of any single “correct path” to development, and view as important the non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign states. Kuchins noted that Beijing and Moscow harbor similar suspicions of U.S. involvement in the color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. Kuchins added that there is evidence that Sino-Russian rhetorical support for multi-polarity is now starting to take on greater substance—whether for bilateral cooperation within the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on a range of issues, or SCO pressure on the United States to withdraw from its military bases in the region.

Kuchins concluded that despite improving ties with China, Russia remains a nation that “leans west” in terms of demographics, culture, economy, and history, adding that Russia’s preferred option is to maintain this orientation.
Why a Strategic Partnership? — The View From China

In her presentation on China’s perceptions of the strategic partnership, Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Montclair State University, characterized the overall relationship as presently in its “best ever” state but added that there have been some missed opportunities along the way. Wishnick argued that Beijing’s relations with Moscow represent the “prototype” of a new model for Chinese bilateral relations in the aftermath of the Cold War, based on Chinese conceptions of “win-win” diplomacy, mutual support, and consensus on matters of foreign policy. She added, however, that disagreements with Moscow persist on each of these three issues.

Wishnick pointed to the resolution of the border dispute and the promotion of cross-border economic development as manifestations of this “win-win” diplomacy, where agreement on a given issue is beneficial to both sides. She added that despite plaudits to the contrary, the Sino-Russian border remains a sensitive issue for both sides. The Chinese side of the border, for example, is far more prosperous and the PRC is pushing for greater economic integration, prompting Russian concerns that China is benefiting at its expense. Moreover, she asserted that the “win-win” border agreement is apparently such a sensitive issue that its terms have yet to be published in the PRC.

Wishnick also noted that China’s partnership with Russia is beneficial to Beijing in that it has provided mutual support on key domestic concerns—Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang—that are often subject to international condemnation. In return for such backing, Beijing has pledged to offer rhetorical support for Moscow’s position on its own areas of sensitivity, such as the northern Caucuses. Wishnick pointed out, however, that such support masks disagreement between the two sides. As an example, she cited media reports of Russia’s refusal to go along with China’s suggestion that the 2005 Peace Mission military exercises be held directly opposite Taiwan.

Wishnick then highlighted professed statements of a foreign policy consensus in the Sino-Russian joint declaration, and characterized Chinese and Russian interests in many key parts of the world as “overlapping but not necessarily identical.” She cited their interests in North Korea as one example: despite common ground on the desirability of a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, condemnation of Pyongyang’s nuclear test, and hopes for a peaceful resolution of the standoff, the two countries don’t always see eye to eye. China has a much greater stake in preserving the status quo on the peninsula than Russia, which would find greater integration between the two Koreas beneficial in terms of energy pipelines and transportation networks. Wishnick also pointed to Iran as another area where differences between the two countries’ respective positions on energy have led to interests that are not entirely in line. She argued that whereas Russia is one of the world’s largest petroleum exporters, China is a net oil importer; thus, Beijing’s stake in maintaining the balance of power in the Persian Gulf is much greater than Moscow’s. She
cited evidence that the PRC is actively working to improve its ties with Saudi Arabia and other partners in the region.

**Discussion**

**Trust and National Identity**

In the discussion session, panelists debated issues of trust and national identity, contrasting Russia’s pessimism towards the future with China’s “quiet confidence.” Russia was seen as the more “troubled” of the two, and panelists asserted that it is impossible to underestimate Russia’s insecurity complex. Panelists disagreed on whether China considers Russia an unreliable partner, but concurred that Beijing is frustrated with Moscow on a host of issues, including the shifting direction of the oil pipeline, lack of cooperation in the economic sector, and frayed regional and cultural ties.

**China, Russia, and the United States**

The panel session concluded with some thoughts about the impact of the United States on the Sino-Russian partnership. One panelist contended that Sino-Russian relations have evolved beyond simply countering the United States, stating that relations between Moscow and Beijing over the last decade would have improved regardless of U.S. actions. Another panelist agreed but pointed out that the speed and tone of this improvement was a direct result of U.S. policies under the Bush administration. The panelist added that Washington missed opportunities to open discussions with both countries concerning ways to handle rising violent extremism in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks.

**Panel 2 – Economic Relations and the Energy Factor**

The second panel of the conference addressed the various dimensions of the Sino-Russian economic relationship and examined the role that the critical issue of energy plays in bilateral relations.

**The Economic Dimensions of the Russia-China Relationship**

Dr. Richard Lotspeich, an associate professor of economics at Indiana State University, opened the second panel with an examination of the extent of economic integration between China and Russia. Lotspeich began his presentation by analyzing bilateral trade statistics, concluding that China is far more important to Russia than Russia is to China. Lotspeich noted that trade growth was flat in the early years of the new Russian Federation but has risen steadily since 1999, as illustrated in figure 1. Although the two countries are clearly becoming more integrated economically, Lotspeich pointed out that trade statistics show that the pace of this integration has been no quicker than the speed with which China is becoming more integrated with the rest of the world.
Lotspeich also addressed the trade in armaments between the two countries. As shown in figure 2, this trade has averaged around $2 billion per year since 2000 and accounts for approximately 17 percent of Chinese imports from Russia. Lotspeich concluded his examination of trade with a look at future prospects. He predicted a continued expansion of bilateral trade, particularly in the realm of Russian energy exports.
Lotspeich also discussed economic integration through bilateral investment and labor flows. Lotspeich argued that although the potential is quite significant, integration through bilateral investment and the flow of labor from China into Russia is far less developed than bilateral trade. What potential that does exist for Chinese labor migration is driven primarily by economic opportunities in Russia, the low population density of the Russian Far East, and the limited availability of arable land in northeast China. To illustrate the motivations for emigrating and potential for success, Lotspeich used the example of a laborer from the Chinese city of Harbin who migrated to Russia where she now runs an agricultural business. He concluded that despite the potential, an increase in labor migration from China coupled with the declining population and reduction of farming activity in the region presents a unique challenge to Russian authorities. Lotspeich suggested that if managed properly, Chinese labor migration into the Russian Far East could benefit both sides. He concluded, however, that the prospects for such effective management are “not particularly auspicious,” given the complex social environment of the region.

**Sino-Russian Energy Relations**

In her presentation on the energy factor in bilateral relations, Dr. Erica Downs, the China Energy fellow at the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center, argued that there was enormous potential for cooperation between China and Russia. She cited the complementarity between Russian supply and Chinese demand as well as several proposed infrastructure development projects. Downs also noted that both countries were pursuing complementary energy diversification strategies, with China seeking to wean itself away from its present dependence on transshipments through volatile sea-lanes and Russia hoping to reduce its dependency on exports to Western Europe.

Downs then identified the following four reasons why the bilateral energy relationship has so far failed to live up to its potential:

- The rise and fall of world oil prices
- Russia’s corporate infighting
- Russia’s use of energy as a tool in its foreign policy
- Mutual mistrust between the two countries.
Downs also noted that China has yet to fundamentally understand the Russian energy sector; many state-run oil companies fail to grasp the political environment in which they are investing. As an example, she cited the attempts of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to acquire a controlling stake in Russian oil company Slavneft in 2002. The company was forced to withdraw from the bidding process, due to strong opposition from Russian politicians who were uneasy over the possibility of Russian oil reserves falling into the hands of a state-owned company of a strategic rival. Downs also highlighted Chinese officials’ frustrations in deciphering the opaqueness of Russia’s decisions on energy policy. She pointed to one official’s lament that it was unclear whether the oil companies or the government policymakers ultimately made such decisions.

Downs concluded her presentation by pointing out a handful of “wild cards” that have the potential to impact the future energy relationship. These include:

- The 2008 Russian presidential election – New leadership could pave the way for final decisions to be made on several key cross-border pipelines.
- An agreement by the Chinese to pay higher prices for natural gas – This could pave the way for bringing the Kovykta pipeline online.
- Changes in global oil prices – Lower prices would likely bring the two closer together, while higher prices would likely foster a continuation of the status quo.
- A greater willingness on the part of the Chinese to play by Russia’s “rules of the game” – These include taking minority stakes in projects on highly unfavorable terms in order to advance the relationship.

Discussion

East Asian Pipelines

With the floor open for questions, the discussion soon shifted to the two proposed Russian pipelines to East Asia—one to China and the other to the Pacific. Panelists made the following observations:

- A pipeline to the Pacific is the most likely outcome, as this would have a greater impact on development in the Russian Far East.
- China’s enthusiasm for the pipeline project has remained constant, although PRC analysts disagree in assessing what Russia will ultimately decide.
- It is unclear whether East Siberia has enough oil to supply the 1.6 million barrels per day required to make a Pacific pipeline with a spur to northeast China commercially viable.
- Doubts over Russia’s ability to fulfill gas export commitments to Europe suggest that Russia is unlikely to divert gas from its western region to China. East Siberia is therefore the most likely source of any gas sent to the PRC.
Panel 3 – The Bilateral Defense Relationship

The final panel on the first day addressed Sino-Russian defense relations, including the sale of arms and defense technology, technical assistance, military exchange, and combined exercises. Panelists also assessed the prospects and limitations of future military cooperation between the two nations and the implications of such collaboration for the United States.

Russo-Chinese Defense Relations: The View From Moscow

Examining Russia’s views of bilateral defense ties, Kevin Ryan, a Senior Fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, noted that the Russia-China relationship is no longer confined to arms sales. Ryan stated that there are three components to a military-to-military relationship: technical, practical, and political. Ryan assessed that China and Russia had made progress on all three fronts in their military relationship.

The technical dimension of cooperation refers to the sale of armaments from Russia to China. Ryan pointed out that arms sales to China, which total 40 percent of all Russian arms exports, helped make the Russian military industrial complex one of Moscow’s strongest economic sectors. As a result, Moscow views military exports as essential, not only to the survival of its defense industry but also to its long-term economic development. Ryan also pointed out that some Russian strategists had advocated the idea of taking advantage of these arms sales to “redefine” the Sino-Russian strategic relationship by building up China as a “more capable opponent” of U.S. military power in Asia.

Ryan then addressed practical cooperation in the Russia-China military relationship, characterizing joint military exercises such as Peace Mission 2005 as a “new dimension” in bilateral ties. He spoke at length about the exercises and how they advanced the Sino-Russian relationship through developing joint counterterrorism capabilities. Ryan added that they also provided a venue to showcase strategic bombers, transport aircraft, and other military hardware for possible purchase by the PLA.

Ryan also addressed the political dimensions of defense cooperation, noting how the two nations were cooperating in matters of global security, regional security, and in counterterrorism. Significantly, Ryan discounted as “dubious” Russia’s claims that it would only sell to China armaments that were already in use in the Russian army, as very few of the weapons Russia has sold to China had been fielded to its own troops.

Ryan concluded with projections for future weapons sales and an assessment of opportunities for further cooperation. In particular, he noted the following:
• Russia’s military leadership will soon be under pressure from both the Russian military industrial complex and the Chinese to sell more advanced aircraft and submarines to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

• Russia will likely expand sales of nuclear and space technologies to China.

• As energy cooperation improves, new opportunities may be created for sharing power-projection capabilities to defend the flow and transport of energy assets between the two countries.

Ryan also addressed developments that could negatively impact the relationship. A decision by Beijing to reduce its purchases of arms from Russia, whether motivated by a lifting of the EU weapons ban or other factors, would likely cause a significant loss of income from arms sales and thus alter the calculus of Russian strategists in weighing the pros and cons of military cooperation with China.

Sino-Russian Defense Ties: The View From Beijing

Dr. Jing-Dong Yuan, Director of the Education Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Associate Professor of International Policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, concurred with Ryan’s assessment that the relationship has matured beyond simply the sale of weaponry. Presenting Beijing’s perspective on bilateral defense ties, Yuan argued that an increase in functional exchanges coupled with greater cooperation in multilateral arenas such as the SCO is redefining the China-Russia relationship.

Despite improvements in these areas, however, the foundation of China-Russia military relations remains arms sales, which have benefited China through enhancing important air and naval capabilities for offshore military operations, such as those employed in a possible Taiwan contingency. These arms sales have filled key gaps in the PLA’s existing inventories of equipment, and supported Chinese efforts to renovate existing facilities. Yuan also noted that closer, more tangible, bilateral defense ties have advanced the nations’ shared objective of strengthening their strategic partnership to counter global U.S. dominance of the post-Cold War world.

Although China is content with the current system of arms purchases from Russia, Yuan pointed out that it is not “ideal” for Beijing, citing the disappointment of unrealized expectations. Yuan said that China is particularly concerned that, because of the EU weapons ban, it has become overly reliant on Moscow as its only source of armaments. As China’s only big weapons supplier, Russia has considerable leverage in dictating the terms of these exports. He argued that despite rhetoric to the contrary, Russia is less willing to sell certain types of weapons and equipment to the PRC than it has been to sell these same items to India. Yuan also touched on the
potential “bottlenecks” of after-sale services, repairs, and spare parts deliveries that could hamper Beijing’s efforts to fully integrate some of its purchases into the PLA.

**Discussion**

2005 Peace Mission Joint Military Exercises

The discussion session centered on different views of the significance and ramifications of the 2005 Peace Mission military exercises. Although panelists roundly dismissed the stated purpose of the “counterterrorism exercise,” there was some disagreement as to its true objective. Many felt the exercises were likely directed at Taiwan, and cited press reports that Beijing had originally hoped to convene them in southeastern Zhejiang Province directly opposite Taiwan. The two countries, according to these reports, eventually settled on Shandong Province further north, because the Russians believed that the Zhejiang location, so close to Taiwan, would be viewed as too provocative. China was assessed as the main driver of the exercises: it volunteered to host them and cover all expenses. One panelist noted that Russia actually gained quite a bit as the exercises provided a platform to showcase its more modern array of weaponry.

Russian Weapons Sales to India

Panelists asserted that there was some merit in the perception that Russia gives preferential treatment to India over China in terms of weapons sales. One panelist noted that the Russian General Staff, which signs off on all foreign weapons sales, views China as a potential threat and thus has limited the range of armaments available to the PLA. Moreover, whereas Chinese arms purchases are curtailed by the European Union weapons ban, there are no restrictions on Indian arms purchases. In essence, Russia competes with several potential suppliers for arms sales to India. Therefore, it has been forced to sell a greater array of hardware in order to remain competitive.

**Panel 4 – China, Russia, and Regional Issues**

The second day of the conference featured two panels focusing on key regional security issues. The first of these panels addressed Chinese and Russian interests in two critical regions—Central Asia and the Korean Peninsula.

**Russia and China in Central Asia**

Dr. Charles Ziegler, Professor and Chair of the Political Science Department at the University of Louisville, offered a presentation on Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia. Ziegler argued that neither country was particularly engaged with the region when the Central Asian states first became independent: the Yeltsin administration viewed them as an unnecessary economic and political burden on Moscow; and China’s foreign policy concerns were more focused on the East Asian region. In recent years, however, both China and Russia have come to attach greater importance to Central Asia.

Ziegler noted that China and Russia have similar security interests in Central Asia, including:
- Counterterrorism and a desire to minimize opportunities for instability
- Concerns over the spread of color revolutions
- Limiting U.S. and NATO influence in the region.

Ziegler also discussed Russian and Chinese views of the two main multilateral organizations in Central Asia: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). He echoed Kuchins’ view that Russia views the SCO largely as a Chinese operation but added that Moscow is happy to participate. For its part, China values the SCO as it gives the PRC formal entry into the region and can further China’s goals of advancing the role of multilateral organizations.

Ziegler also addressed the SCO’s and CSTO’s respective cooperation with NATO. He noted that although there is not much in the way of cooperation among the organizations as a whole, there is cooperation between NATO and some individual members, such as Kazakhstan. He added that although Moscow values cooperation with NATO in certain areas, such as terrorism and counter-narcotics, the CSTO recently decreed that no member would allow foreign troops on its soil without the agreement of every other member; a situation that effectively allows Russia to veto any proposed deployments. The SCO attempted to push through a similar measure in the past; during its annual summit in July 2005, it called on the United States to vacate its Central Asian military bases. However, the organization made no similar statements at its June 2006 gathering.

Ziegler also addressed energy competition between the two countries in the region, characterizing this as the area of the “greatest disagreement between China and Russia.” Russia hopes to monopolize the region’s export routes for oil and gas and to use energy diplomacy to restore its lost political influence in Central Asia. China, meanwhile, has made Central Asia a “vital part” of its long-term energy strategy. Although Central Asian oil would not solve China’s energy supply and security problems, Ziegler noted, it would help the Chinese diversify. Moreover, he argued, Beijing feels that greater reliance on Central Asian energy has the added benefit of helping develop the region economically and tie it into China’s sphere of influence.

Ziegler devoted the remainder of his presentation to the Russian and Chinese diasporas residing in Central Asia. He described the Russian presence in the region as a “minor yet increasingly important” component of Moscow’s ties to Central Asia, pointing out that as nationalist sentiment has continued to strengthen, the Putin administration has voiced increasing concern about these populations. Specifically, Ziegler pointed to the large Russian population in northern Kazakhstan and did not discount the possibility of friction stemming from their perceived poor treatment. Ziegler also noted the growing Chinese
commercial presence in the region, adding that even a modest influx of Chinese could rapidly become a controlling economic force and have a significant impact on the ethnic balance in these relatively under-populated nations.

**China, Russia, and Northeast Asia**

Dr. Byungki Kim, Vice Dean and Professor of International Relations at Korea University’s Graduate School of International Studies, addressed Sino-Russian relations in another region of concern for the United States—the Korean Peninsula. Kim discussed the areas where Moscow and Beijing have common interests vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula, including:

- Stabilizing Pyongyang through enhanced economic and trade relations
- Facilitating denuclearization of the Korean peninsula
- Regulating both legal and illegal migration across borders
- Maintaining modest sales of defensive arms to the DPRK.

Kim noted that the recent DPRK nuclear test has caused a shift in the Chinese position on North Korea. Previously, Beijing valued Pyongyang’s “anti-Japan, anti-U.S. direction,” but now it is concerned that the tests may prompt Japan to engage in its own nuclear program.

Kim suggested that Russia’s influence over the DPRK has waned over time, particularly since the breakdown of an attempt by Moscow and the two Koreas to jumpstart talks in 2000. Kim also reviewed the recent agreement between the DPRK and the United States, noting that North Korea remained an “uncertain factor” in the region.

Kim argued that Moscow is becoming concerned about China’s growing influence on the peninsula at the expense of Russia. This would be a particular issue if a pro-Beijing regime should emerge in Pyongyang. Although Russia is content with the present six-party talks, Kim noted that if negotiations become institutionalized as a permanent security framework for Northeast Asia, Moscow will almost certainly seek greater control.

Kim highlighted some out-of-the-box concerns that might be plaguing leaders in Moscow and Beijing, such as:

- China’s concerns that Pyongyang could become pro-U.S. once diplomatic normalization occurs
- Both countries’ fears of a reunified Korea allied with the United States and Japan
• Wariness in both countries over a reunified Korean peninsula with possible irredentist claims on Russian and Chinese territory.

Looking to the future, Kim concluded that regardless of whether the DPRK destabilizes or becomes successful it will have a significant impact on the evolution of the military balance of power in the region.

Discussion

Afghanistan

In the discussion session, participants began to explore regional views of the situation in Afghanistan, specifically the ongoing U.S. involvement in that country. Although most countries were happy to see the fall of the Taliban regime, panelists asserted that China, Russia, and the Central Asian states remain conflicted over the U.S. presence and concerned that America will push for a permanent military base in the country. Panelists argued that Russia, in particular, feels increasingly surrounded with the U.S. presence in Afghanistan coupled with its base in Kyrgyzstan, NATO’s eastward expansion, and close U.S. ties with Georgia and Mongolia.

Panel 5 – China, Russia, and Taiwan

The second panel on regional issues looked at Russia’s role in cross-strait relations and the ties between Moscow and Taipei. It examined both Russian and Chinese interests and policies on the Taiwan issue. Panelists also addressed the extent of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, and explored the implications of their interactions vis-à-vis Taiwan for U.S. national interests and policies in the region.

China, Russia, and the Taiwan Issue: The View From Moscow

Addressing Moscow’s views toward the China-Taiwan issue, Dr. Jeanne Wilson, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Wheaton College, began by recounting Moscow’s brief flirtation with Taipei during the early years of the Yeltsin administration. In 1992, the two sides signed an agreement to exchange representative offices and expand bilateral contacts. Strong opposition from Beijing eventually forced Russia to cancel this agreement and sign a subsequent decree setting the parameters for all future contact with Taiwan. In that decree, it acknowledged that Taiwan was an “inalienable part of China,” and declared that any interactions between Russia with Taiwan would be of an informal and non-political nature.

Wilson argued that the present situation of cross-strait tension is actually beneficial to Russia in several respects. China has made significant weapons purchases from Russia in preparation for a possible military confrontation over Taiwan, reviving the Russian military industrial complex at a time of lagging domestic orders. Moreover, Wilson argued that the pattern of PLA arms purchases from Russia (mostly advanced naval, aviation, and missile systems) has led the Russian General Staff to conclude that China’s military focus is on Taiwan rather than a land-based conflict along China’s border with
Russia. This has likely increased Moscow’s level of comfort with a rapidly modernizing military in its neighbor to the south.

However, cross-strait tensions are not without costs to Russia. A potential escalation in hostilities, Wilson argued, would not be in Russia’s interests; nor does Moscow want to be cajoled into demonstrating more tangible support for China’s objectives. Wilson addressed the Peace Mission 2005 exercise, arguing that it was more of a showcase to demonstrate Russian military technology and weaponry than a counterterrorism endeavor.

Wilson concluded by discounting the likelihood of Russia’s involvement in a possible China-Taiwan contingency. She called it “improbable,” and added that a rational assessment of Russian interests suggests that Russia has no stake in cross-strait relations.

China, Russia, and the Taiwan Issue: The View From Beijing

In examining China’s views of the role that Russia plays in cross-straits relations, Dr. Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College, began by outlining the PRC’s policy objectives vis-à-vis Taiwan. She then highlighted four areas where Russia’s actions can serve these goals:

- Adopting a correct political and rhetorical approach to the Taiwan issue
- Refraining from establishing diplomatic ties with Taiwan
- Supporting China’s global strategic orientation
- Cooperating with the PRC militarily.

Rigger then evaluated Russia’s performance on each of these areas from a Chinese perspective. Rigger noted that Russia had “gone beyond” the minimally accepted rhetoric on Taiwan, and described Moscow as a “passive supporter” of Beijing’s position. From Beijing’s perspective, Moscow’s relations with Taipei are “acceptable” although “not ideal.”

Russia also scores well with Beijing in its support of the PRC’s overall strategic outlook, which views the United States as a “negative force” in international relations. Rigger also noted that Beijing was pleased with Moscow’s indirect support for its Taiwan policies.
through aiding China’s military modernization, including the sale of weapons and equipment as well as its participation in joint military exercises that have rattled Taipei.

**Discussion**

**Logistical Tail**

The discussion session featured a lively debate on the importance of the Russian “logistical tail,” i.e., its spare parts sales to China. Panelists noted that these sales are a large component of Russian arms sales to China and that Moscow would likely resist any outside pressure to cut them off. Other participants argued that China lacks confidence in Russia’s ability to serve as a reliable supplier of weaponry and that such doubts have led China to try to acquire the technology to develop the armaments themselves.

Several participants also floated the possibility that Russia could transfer production to China as a way to avoid becoming entangled in a conflict over Taiwan. One individual observed that this is already occurring in some areas—for example, Russia has licensed production of the Su-27, which the Chinese are using as the basis for the J-10 fighter. However, because most estimates suggest that a war over Taiwan would be over in a couple of days, such concerns may be unnecessary.

**Economic Dimensions of Russo-Taiwan Relations**

Panelists also examined the economic dimensions of Russo-Taiwan relations, agreeing that these interactions are relatively limited. There are few indications that Russia has any interest in investing in Taiwan, while many Taiwan-based companies have found Russia to be an “inhospitable” environment for the small businesses opportunities they hope to engage in. One panelist added that efforts by the Taiwan government to influence where Taiwanese businesses invest have been largely unsuccessful. The panelist noted that it makes far more commercial sense for Taiwan companies to invest on the mainland or in neighboring Vietnam, where it is easier to turn a profit.

**Thoughts for the Future**

For the last panel of the conference, all 11 panelists gathered at the front of the room to offer some final comments and concluding observations. Much of the session was devoted to the question, “What are the most important issues facing the United States in the next few years in the context of Sino-Russian relations?” Most discounted the possibility of China or Russia challenging the United States directly as a superpower anytime in the next decade. Participants instead pointed to dealing with Iran, the possible breakdown of the six-party talks, and domestic issues in both countries as likely to be of greatest concern to Washington in the future.

**Iran**

Several panelists singled out Iran as an area where Chinese and Russian interests and actions are likely to become more important to the United States in the coming years. Specific points of concern include:
• The impact of protracted negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program on Sino-Russian relations.

• Divisions within the U.N. Security Council regarding Teheran’s nuclear program.
  — One panelist pointed out that if Russia were to switch sides and back the U.S. position, China would probably fall into line as well.

• The balance between China’s economic interests in Iran and its relationship with Washington.

• Beijing’s willingness to support Teheran in the face of opposition from others in the region, such as the Saudis or Egyptians.

• The possibility of Iranian membership on the SCO
  — One panelist noted that there did not seem to be much enthusiasm within the SCO for Iran to become a member.

Six-Party Talks
Continuing the theme of issues that the United States should pay attention to in the coming years, panelists also pointed to the possible breakdown of the six-party talks. The key issue in the context of Sino-Russian relations would be how China and Russia would respond. With the United States apparently lacking the clout to effectively pressure the DPRK, one participant asked to what extent and under what conditions would China pressure North Korea? One panelist postulated that we could expect “quite a bit” of Sino-Russian cooperation on the issue of Korean nuclear weapons should the talks collapse.

Domestic Issues
Panelists also addressed Russian and Chinese domestic issues that ought to be of concern to the United States.

In Russia these include:

• The 2008 presidential elections in Russia, which has the potential to create political instability should the transition of political power be managed poorly.

• The impact of fluctuation in energy prices and their effect on domestic politics, economic policy, and foreign policy.

• The possibility of large-scale terrorist attacks. One panelist reminded the audience that instability in the Northern Caucuses played a major role in elevating Putin’s political career.

Turning to domestic issues in China, panelists pointed to the PRC’s internal problems, and highlighted their possible spillover effect. China’s mounting social problems, including a widening wealth gap, rising unemployment, systemic corruption, and environmental degradation, has given rise to an increase in social unrest on the mainland.
in recent years. The Chinese government has become increasingly concerned that the growing number of these incidents threatens the country’s social stability. One panelist cautioned that although policymakers tended to focus on the ramifications of a strong China, it is important not to lose sight of what problems such a weak or divided China would pose for the United States.
China-Russia Relations in the Early 21st Century
22-23 February 2007

Day 1 – Thursday, 22 Feb 2007

0800 – 0845: Registration at The CNA Corporation

0845 – 0900: Welcoming Remarks & Administrative Instructions

Panel 1: The Making of a Strategic Partnership
Moderator: Celeste Wallander, Georgetown University

0900 – 0930: The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: How Close? Where To?
Gilbert Rozman, Princeton University

0930 – 1000: Why a Strategic Partnership? — The View From Russia
Andrew Kuchins, Center for Strategic and International Studies

1000 – 1030: Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: The View from China
Elizabeth Wishnick, Montclair State University; Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University

1030 – 1045: Break

1045 – 1200: Q & A, Discussion

1200 – 1245: Lunch at The CNA Corporation

Panel 2: Economic Relations and the Energy Factor
Moderator: Hank Gaffney, CNAC

1245 – 1315: Economic Integration of China and Russia in the Post-Soviet Era
Richard Lotspeich, Indiana State University

1315 – 1345: Sino-Russian Energy Relations: An Uncertain Courtship
Erica Downs, The Brookings Institution

1345 – 1430: Q & A, Discussion

1430 – 1445: Break
Panel 3: The Bilateral Defense Relationship  
*Moderator: Catherine Kelleher, CNAC Senior Fellow*

1445 – 1515: Russo-Chinese Defense Relations: The View From Moscow  
*Kevin Ryan, Harvard University*

1515 – 1545: Sino-Russian Defense Ties: The View from Beijing  
*Jing-Dong Yuan, Center for Nonproliferation Studies*

1545 – 1600: Break

1600 – 1700: Q & A, Discussion

Day 2 – Friday, 23 Feb 2007

Panel 4: China, Russia, and Regional Issues  
*Moderator: Frederick Starr, Johns Hopkins University SAIS*

0830 – 0900: Russia and China in Central Asia  
*Charles Ziegler, University of Louisville*

0900 – 0930: Russia, China and Northeast Asia: Focus on Japan and the Two Koreas  
*Kim Byungki, Korea University; Visiting Scholar, Georgetown University*

0930 – 1015: Q & A, Discussion

1015 – 1030: Break

Panel 5: China, Russia, and Regional Issues – Taiwan  
*Moderated by James Bellacqua, CNA Project Asia*

1030 – 1100: China, Russia, and the Taiwan Issue: The View From Moscow  
*Jeanne Wilson, Wheaton College*

1100 – 1130: The Taiwan Issue and the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: The View from Beijing  
*Shelley Rigger, Davidson College*

1130 – 1215: Q & A, Discussion

1215 – 1300: Lunch at The CNA Corporation

1300 – 1400: Panel 6: Wrap Up Round Table  
*Moderator: Dean Cheng, CNA Project Asia*

1400: Conference Adjourns
Gilbert Rozman is Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, where he studied in the junior-year Critical Languages Program, received his Ph.D., and has taught since 1970. After a series of comparative historical projects, he turned in the 1980s to studies of Soviet debates on China, Chinese debates on the Soviet Union, and Japanese debates on the Soviet Union. In the following decade, he examined prospects for regionalism in Northeast Asia, covering cross-border ties, mutual perceptions, great-power relations, and strategies toward regional cooperation. In addition to using Chinese, Japanese, and Russian sources, he began to read Korean sources in order to incorporate South Korean views into his analysis. Recently he has worked on a series of books on strategic thought on Asia, including Russian, Japanese, and Korean strategic thought toward Asia and strategic thinking toward the Korean nuclear crisis. A book on China will follow.

Andrew C. Kuchins is Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Previously, Kuchins was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) in Washington, DC, directing its Russian & Eurasian Program. Kuchins also directed the Carnegie Moscow Center in Russia during his time at CEIP. He conducts research and writes widely on Russian foreign and security policy and is working on a book entitled China and Russia: Strategic Partners, Allies, or Competitors? Kuchins is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Prior to his time at the Endowment, Kuchins served from 1997 to 2000 as Associate Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. From 1993 to 1997, he was a senior program officer at the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, where he developed and managed a grant-making program to support scientists and researchers in the former Soviet Union. From 1989 to 1993, he was Executive Director of the Berkeley-Stanford Program on Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies.

Elizabeth Wishnick is an assistant professor of political science at Montclair State University and a research associate at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. She was a Fulbright fellow at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, and a research fellow at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica, the Hoover Institution, and the Davis Center at Harvard University. Her current book project, China as a Risk Society, examines how transnational problems originating in China (environment, resource scarcity, public health, migration) shape Chinese foreign relations with neighboring states and involve Chinese civil society in foreign policy. In the summer of 2007 she will spend a month in residence at Beijing University and Keio University (Tokyo) to pursue related research on environmental and energy issues in Sino-Japanese relations, thanks to a fellowship
from the East Asian Institute in Seoul, South Korea. Dr. Wishnick is the author of *Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin* (University of Washington Press, 2001) and has contributed numerous articles on great-power relations and regional development in Asia. She received a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, an M.A. in Russian and East European studies from Yale University, and a B.A. from Barnard College. She speaks Chinese, Russian, and French fluently.

Celeste A. Wallander is Visiting Associate Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. From 2001-2006, she was Director and Senior Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and she remains a Senior Associate of CSIS. Previously, she was Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC (2000-2001), and an Associate Professor of Government at Harvard University (1989-2000). She is the founder and executive director of the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security. Her recent projects include work on U.S.-Russian security cooperation, the history of Russia and globalization, HIV/AIDS in Russia, and Ukrainian security relations. She is the author of over 70 scholarly and public interest publications. She is currently writing *Global Russia: Economics, Politics, and Security* and *The Geopolitics of Energy in Eurasia*. She often testifies before Congress and serves as a media analyst on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Eurasian security issues. She has received fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Richard Lotspeich is an associate professor of economics at Indiana State University. He holds an undergraduate degree in economics with a minor in Russian from Georgetown University (Washington, DC) and a Ph.D. in natural resource economics from the University of New Mexico (Albuquerque). He began his working career in the Systems Analysis Group at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and later engaged in post-doctoral studies on the Soviet economy at Indiana University. He has twice been awarded Fulbright lecturing fellowships for Russian universities in St. Petersburg, and was a visiting scholar at the Kennan Institute for Russian Studies (part of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC) in 1995 and again in 2005. His research interests focus on environmental policy, transitional economies, the economics of conflict, and the interface between criminality and economics.

Erica S. Downs is the China Energy fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. She previously worked as an energy analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, a political analyst at the Rand Corporation, and a lecturer at the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing, China. She earned a Ph.D. and an M.A. from Princeton University and a B.S. from Georgetown University. Her current research and writing focuses on the Sino-Russian energy relationship, institutional change in China’s energy bureaucracy, and the relationship between the Chinese party-state and China’s national oil companies.
Henry H. Gaffney Jr. is the Director of the Strategy and Concepts Team in the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). He has been at CNA since 1990, specializing in broad studies of the evolving world security environment. Prior to joining The CNA Corporation, Dr. Gaffney served for 28 years in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (19 of those years at the SES level). He spent more than 12 years working on NATO matters, particularly NATO nuclear weapons matters, including 3 years (1967-1970) at the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. Gaffney also served as an officer in the U.S. Navy from 1956 to 1959, on destroyers in the Pacific. He was the recipient of two Defense Distinguished Service medals and the Defense Meritorious Service medal. Dr. Gaffney received his undergraduate degree from Harvard College in 1956 and his doctorate from Columbia University in 1967, where he specialized in the politics of the developing areas. Dr. Gaffney teaches a course each spring on globalization and national security at the Elliott School for International Affairs at George Washington University.

Brigadier General (retired) Kevin Ryan is a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. A career military officer, he has extensive experience in political-military policy, air and missile defense, and intelligence. He is a trained foreign-area specialist for Eurasia and speaks fluent Russian. He has served as Senior Regional Director for Slavic States in the Office of Secretary of Defense, as Chief of the U.S. POW/MIA Office in Moscow, and as Defense Attaché to Russia. He has also served as Chief of Staff for the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command and as Assistant Professor of Russian Language, United States Military Academy. In his last active-duty assignment, General Ryan was Deputy Director of the Army’s Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, managing War Plans, Policy, and International Affairs. General Ryan holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and master’s degrees from Syracuse University and the National War College.

Jing-dong Yuan is Director of the Education Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and an associate professor of international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Dr. Yuan's research focuses on Asia-Pacific security, global and regional arms control, and nonproliferation issues; U.S. policy toward Asia; and China's defense and foreign policy. He is the co-author of China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) and has published in Asian Survey, Far Eastern Economic Review, International Herald Tribune, Jane's Intelligence Review, Los Angeles Times, and The Nonproliferation Review, among others. He is currently working on a book manuscript on post-Cold War Chinese security policy. A graduate of the Xi'an Foreign Language University, People's Republic of China (1982), he received his Ph.D. in political science from Queen's University in 1995 and has had research and teaching appointments at Queen's University, York University, the University of Toronto, and the University of British Columbia, where he was a recipient of the prestigious Iaazk Killam Postdoctoral Research Fellowship. He was also a visiting research scholar at the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories before he joined the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in the summer of 1999.

Catherine Kelleher is a senior fellow at The CNA Corporation and a distinguished scholar and teacher in the field of international security studies, with a particular interest
in American-Russian-European security cooperation. Her publication record includes more than 60 books and articles in English and in German. Her government service has spanned periods on the National Security Council and in the Department of Defense, as well as on panels at the National Academies of Sciences. She is the founder of Women in International Security and has served on advisory and research boards of institutes and NGOs in both the United States and Germany. She has been decorated for her public service by both the American and German governments and received a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a D.Litt from Mt. Holyoke College.

**Charles E. Ziegler** is Professor and Chair of the Political Science Department at the University of Louisville, founder and Director of the Institute for Democracy and Development, and founder of the Center for Asian Democracy. A specialist on Russia and Eurasia, Ziegler is co-editor (with Judith Thornton) of *The Russian Far East: A Region at Risk* (University of Washington Press, 2002), and author of *The History of Russia* (Greenwood Press, 1999), *Foreign Policy and East Asia* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), and *Environmental Policy in the USSR* (University of Massachusetts Press, 1987). In addition, he has written more than 50 book chapters and articles for such professional journals as *Comparative Politics*, *Political Science Quarterly*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *Problems of Post-Communism*, *Asian Survey*, *International Politics*, *Policy Studies Journal*, and *Pacific Review*. Ziegler has held an International Research and Exchanges Board Advanced Individual Research Opportunity grant, a Senior Fulbright Fellowship to Korea, a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship, and the Hoover Institution National Fellowship. He currently serves as Executive Director of the Louisville Committee on Foreign Relations.

**Byungki Kim** is Vice Dean and Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International Studies, Deputy Director of the Global Research Institute, and Executive Director of the International Security Policy Studies Forum at Korea University, and is concurrently a visiting researcher at Georgetown University (2005-08). He has written extensively on U.S. and Russian interests in Northeast Asia with particular emphasis on the Korean Peninsula, including two edited monographs and 60 articles. Kim is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and serves on the Executive Boards of the Far Eastern Broadcasting Corporation—Korea branch, the Asia Economic News Corporation, the Korean Association of International Studies, the Asia-Europe Perspectives Forum, the Korean Association of Ukrainian Studies, the Korean Association of Cyber/Information Warfare Studies, the Korean Association of Credit Card Analysis, the Korean Association of Political and Diplomatic History, and the Korean Society for European Affairs. He has also served on numerous executive and government advisory committees, including the Policy Expert Committee of the South Korean National Security Council, the Policy Advisory Council at the Ministry of National Defense, the Policy Advisory Council at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, the Presidential Advisory Council on Peaceful and Democratic Reunification, Emergency Planning Commission in the Office of the Prime Minister, and the Senior Advisory Council to the Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and the United Nations Command in Korea.
S. Frederick Starr is the founding chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Starr began his work in the Turkic world as an archaeologist in Turkey and went on to found the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, which opened U.S. research contact with Central Asia. He also served as Vice President of Tulane University and President of Oberlin College and the Aspen Institute. Starr has advised three U.S. presidents on Russian/Eurasian affairs and chaired an external advisory panel on U.S. government-sponsored research on the region. Starr organized and co-authored the first comprehensive strategic assessment of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1999 and has been closely involved in the drafting of recent U.S. legislation affecting the region.

Jeanne Wilson is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Wheaton College in Norton, MA, and a research associate at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Research at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Her research interests include the politics of transition in Russia and China, and Russian-Chinese relations. Recent publications include “Emerging Capitalism in Russia and China: Implications for Europe” (with Sheila M. Puffer and Daniel J. McCarthy), European Journal of International Management (No. 1, May 2007); “China’s Economic Transformation: Toward the Liberal Market Economy,” in David Lane and Martin Myant, eds., Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Socialist Countries (Palgrave, 2006); and Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era (ME Sharpe, 2004). Currently, she is working on a research project examining the impact of internationalization on domestic policy in Russia and China. She has a B.A. from the University of Michigan and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Indiana University.

Shelley Rigger is the Brown Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College in Davidson, North Carolina. She has a Ph.D. in government from Harvard University and a B.A. in public and international affairs from Princeton University. She has been a visiting researcher at National Chengchi University in Taiwan (2005) and a visiting professor at Fudan University in Shanghai (2006). Rigger is the author of two books on Taiwan’s domestic politics—Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (Routledge, 1999) and From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). She has published articles on Taiwan’s domestic politics, the national identity issue in Taiwan-China relations, and related topics. Her current research studies the effects of cross-strait economic interactions on the Taiwan people’s perceptions of Mainland China. Her monograph, “Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics and ‘Taiwan Nationalism’” was published by the East West Center in Washington, DC, in November 2006.

James Bellacqua is an Asia Security Analyst at The CNA Corporation. He holds a B.A. in East Asian studies from Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon and is currently pursuing his MBA at American University. Prior to joining The CNA Corporation, Bellacqua served as a senior Chinese media analyst and linguist for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, examining PRC media treatment of Chinese domestic politics and legal affairs. He has also worked for CNN’s bureau in Beijing. Having lived, worked, studied, and traveled extensively throughout the People's Republic of China for
several years, he speaks, reads, and writes Mandarin Chinese fluently. Bellacqua is also a graduate of the Johns Hopkins-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies and has studied Mandarin Chinese in Guangxi and Heilongjiang provinces. His numerous research interests include Chinese internal security, media reform, and PRC foreign policy.

**Dean Cheng** is an Asia Security Analyst at The CNA Corporation and a respected specialist in Chinese security affairs—especially technology issues—with over a decade of continuous experience in government, academe, and research institutes. He is widely recognized as one of the few specialists in the United States on the Chinese space program. He received his undergraduate degree in politics from Princeton University and did graduate work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Formerly a senior analyst at SAIC, he supported the U.S. Army's Quadrennial Defense Review process by developing database and analytic models. As a senior analyst of China at the U.S. Congress's Office of Technology Assessment, Cheng developed deep expertise about the Chinese defense industrial complex. Fluent in Mandarin and conversant with high-end technologies as well as political-military issues, he is widely published in various professional journals and edited volumes on Chinese security affairs.