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Approved for distribution: July 2006

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Summary

At this moment in history, Iraq is hanging in a balance that now may stretch out for years—as long as ten years, per General McCaffrey. The defense community will hardly be able to see the future until the forces come home from Iraq and are reset. Then the community will be able to once more search for a role for U.S. forces in the broader world and into the future. But that world itself would be changing during the time they were conducting this search. However, it is important to remember that U.S. political leadership lies between the world and U.S. forces. The leadership may be inclined to be reactive or inclined to be preemptive, whether in constructing the architectural of the world economy or for security. The major observation is that the three factors—world, U.S. policy and actions, and U.S. forces—are only loosely connected. That there is no rigid fit among these three factors is a good thing, for it enforces flexibility and adaptability. The defense community looks for some fit (or maybe it doesn’t, preferring instead to conjure up abstract future threats), but it is always difficult to find that fit and thus they are left in some bewilderment as to how they may be called upon by the political leadership. In turn, this may lead them to try to plan to be called upon for everything they imagine might happen.

The role of the United States in maintaining its own security on one hand and security in the world on the other hand, changed on 9/11. Before 9/11, the world system was settling into globalization, and the problems of security were a few bad apples—the rogues—and some bothersome internal conflicts that were not of strategic, i.e., global, significance. After 9/11, the global war on terror seized the center of the security stage, with its mixture of homeland defense here and pursuit of terrorists around the globe (or at least “in The Gap,” that is, the Muslim world that stretches from Morocco to Pakistan). However, since March 2003 (and earlier in the deliberations of U.S. leadership), the U.S. has gotten bogged down in Iraq and, because of this, it has become difficult to see both (a) how to change the continuing
U.S. security approaches to the world and (b) what effect terror and the response to it has had on overall security in that world.¹

Under these dilemmas, the role and definition of transformation—that is, of transformation of U.S. forces over time and for the future—have themselves been in transformation. Until Iraq is resolved, if it is, and however it may be resolved, and U.S. forces come home, it will be difficult to set courses for the future—both the course of restructur-ing U.S. forces back home and the course of the U.S. nudging things around the world for greater security.

This does not mean that the U.S. is supposed to be managing everything in the world, much less the Defense Department (DOD) trying to manage it all. Most of life going on in the world proceeds without threat of war. Most of it is a matter of economics. The economic complications of the world are not particularly security concerns (in the defense sense). The plain fact is that conflict is diminishing around the world—what we are left with at the moment is Iraq, the war between Israel and Hezbollah, and terrorism.² We are also left with the Taiwan scenario—a present confrontation, but only a potential conflict, the context of which is worth a discussion later. We are left as well with the nuclear weapons aspirations of North Korea and Iran. That issue must also be seen in proportion—that is, the possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily confer much strategic advantage to those countries (unless their neighbors were to follow them in proliferation).³

¹. The terrorists have not disrupted the global economy, except for minor inconveniences for about two weeks after 9/11 and to the tourist industry in Bali, maybe Kenya.


Tom Barnett and this author participated in a number of studies that tried to gauge the future of U.S. forces as the 1990s evolved. They included alternative U.S. navies for alternative worlds, the evolution of U.S. deterrence and influence, the future of national security, the patterns of U.S. forces' responses to situations, globalization and the Navy, the American Way of War and Its Transformation, applying transformation to the global war on terror, and the changing nature of warfare (for the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2020 project). These studies showed that the U.S. had both a relatively manageable force in terms of security and a good deal of flexibility in the choices to be made in modernizing and deploying its forces. The security environment across the 1990s and even up to 2003 was a permissive one—so permissive as to make a war on Iraq a choice, not a necessity. The insurgency in Iraq now has made the continued operations of U.S. forces there a necessity, not a choice; that is, U.S. forces are now bogged down and it is hard for many of us to see beyond Iraq.

The terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the drastic changes in U.S. strategy declared by the Bush 43 Administration (notably summed up as “pre-emption”) have tended to shock many of us who have long been professionally involved with the U.S. defense community. We have been shocked out of a lot of prior assumptions made during the 1990s about the direction and transformation of U.S. forces that were addressed in those previous studies and experienced in reality. We live in dread of the next terrorist incident in the U.S. Insurgency has been rediscovered after having been driven out of American minds upon the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

In particular, the insurgency in Iraq has opened a window of speculation as to how U.S. forces might be transformed for “stability, reconstruction, and nation-building” in the face of irregular warfare. And yet there has apparently been a powerful push in QDR-06 to look beyond Iraq (the QDR is after all, a contribution to Washington political discussion) and to return to the comfort of “two major combat operations” so as to preserve legacy forces, i.e., the legacy of the Cold War and the two successful quick battles with Iraq. In short, the QDR has preserved legacy forces while inserting wedges for cultural and personnel changes in anticipation of some future stabilization and
reconstruction operations—but that means legacy forces are still taking the lion’s share.

This author has also been doing some recent work and has been engaged in dialogues on irregular warfare (including terrorism), cooperation among Special Forces around the world, the relation of globalization and proliferation, and DOD’s prospective changes in the global posture of U.S. forces. I have also analyzed the trajectory of the greatest threat to overall security lying across the seam of the world—the Islamic world, and particularly the Arab world and its deficient connections to globalization—though I still don’t know what the solutions may be (a simple-minded promotion of democracy is not the solution). These topics fit almost neatly onto OSD’s new environmental challenges quadrant chart that covers traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive warfare. But they do not add up to a cohesive whole—there is no continuum in that quadrant chart, despite Service assertions that their forces apply in every quadrant—and so they haven’t provided much guidance for the changes in the structure of U.S. forces or the way the U.S. is to cope with these challenges overall. This author addressed that problem in a paper he did on the prospective QDR for the Office of Force Transformation.

Relating all this to where DOD goes in the future, beyond Iraq, and considering how the horizontal scenario of the global war on terrorism may unfold were supposed to be addressed in QDR-05. But the QDR (which turned out to be QDR-06 upon its delivery to Congress in February 2006) is disappointing. That is, it appears that the solutions emerging in the QDR may be quite in the traditional vein, even to the point of letting the Services revert to their own strategies in their own worlds. This is not bad: the forces would still be the best in the world, for years to come, without competition. Whether they would be appropriate for the emerging world is another matter, and not simply because of the neglect of jointness that seemed to characterize the QDR. It is said that capabilities-based planning is the way to


5. See H. H. Gaffney, QDR-05: Using the GWOT to (hopefully) avoid the coming DOD Train Wreck, June 2005.
make the forces adaptable for anything, but then we hear that such planning is still freighted with scenarios, i.e., is threat-based; moreover, the threats invented to test U.S. forces in analyses and games rarely relate to the real world.6

If there is any picture for the future, it arose for this author from the framework Art Cebrowski set forth for fleet architectures in the paper he requested from me on that subject. It was in turn based on Tom Barnett’s view of the world.7 Basically, that framework has DOD concentrating on “The Gap,” that is, the seam of the world, the arc of crisis, mainly the Islamic world, and within that, the portion of the Islamic world that stretches from Morocco to Pakistan (thus to include Iran as well). Stabilizing that region would enable the more advanced world—the Core as Barnett calls it—to help the region to join the flow of globalization. The focus for DOD in The Gap thus becomes the global war on terror, both to track down terrorists and to dry up their breeding grounds. To do so requires greater cooperation among the advanced countries, which for the most part turn out to be our old allies. The third element of the Cebrowski approach was to “hedge on China,” i.e., keeping our military technology so advanced as to dissuade China from trying to match it, while using diplomacy to make sure the Taiwan situation doesn’t turn into war, and working to ensure the smooth integration of China into the global economy.


What does this set of general tasks mean for the specific configuration of DOD? Again, we can’t know until Iraq settles down and the troops come home. But we can venture some predictions:

- **We can predict that the U.S. will be reluctant to invade another country for a long time to come.** While the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq are that U.S. forces, that is, ground forces, should be reorganized for stability and reconstruction, i.e., nation-building functions, it is very hard for us Americans to envisage occasions for actually exercising such new capabilities—but we may be too close to the Iraq situation and too worried about the current exhaustion of U.S. ground forces, not to speak of the monetary costs, to consider another case. But it would be a capability to develop for an as yet unknown circumstance in the future—the U.S. military is good at those kind of preparations.

- **In the meantime, the global war on terror will continue,** particularly as it may be punctuated by incidents like those in Madrid, London, Bali, and Mumbai. This will entail endless patrolling in collaboration with allies, though the major contribution in rounding up terrorists will be by coordination among police forces in the countries where they may be lodged, like Pakistan and, increasingly in Europe itself.

- **If there is another massive terrorist incident in the U.S., or even one on the scale of London or Madrid, there will be much more reorientation of U.S. forces to U.S. homeland defense,** including much less mental concern and attention to events overseas; i.e., the U.S. might be tempted to take a more isolationist approach.

- **In the meantime, the hedge on China will be used to preserve the American technological hedge,** much of which still lies in the legacy forces, including their C^4ISR—unless the hedge is used as an excuse to replace the legacy forces at such a great cost that squeezes force structure further and also restricts any shift of resources to expanded “stabilization and reconstruction” capabilities.
Otherwise, the technological demands on U.S. forces from the world security scene in the future would be less, while the demand for what Tom Barnett calls the “system administration” forces would be greater, with more emphasis on what people can do than on what technology can do.

But can it be said that these directions for U.S. forces are a fit for the evolving world, characterized as the further evolution of globalization? How much should they either nudge the world, or simply stand by for unforeseen developments? I have the general suspicion that U.S. forces are less relevant and less crucial on the general world scene than they certainly were during the Cold War and perhaps they were even in the 1990s. Their operations in Afghanistan and Iraq obscure the picture for the moment (and even for at least another several years).

Most of the life of globalization in the rest of the world goes on without military interventions or implications. I have noted, as recently confirmed by the Human Security Report 2005, that state-on-state conflicts have just about disappeared and that the number of internal conflicts in countries continue to drop. Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, at least for the United States, it is the global extremist Islamic terrorists who seem to be the longest-range problem. They are thinly dispersed and their incidents spaced in time, but we all live in fear of their next strike. We are greatly concerned about Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs, but both countries can be contained—unless they were to give a weapon or two to the terrorists—that would be an extremely remote, if dire, possibility. The “rise of China” seems to have suddenly seized us; what would it look like if there were not the aggravation of the Taiwan situation?

I suspect that the restoration of the U.S. forces after Iraq and their incremental improvement over time, on a pure capabilities-based planning basis (not freighted with too-imaginative scenarios or a proliferation of scenarios) would still leave U.S. forces the most capable in the world, available when situations or leadership calls for them. This suspicion is reinforced by the strong weight defense has in U.S. internal politics. But I also suspect that U.S. leadership will revert to “last resort” consideration of their actual use in combat while turning
back to more measured management of the process of economic globalization and its cooperative aspects. That may be a better way to nudge the world.

In this paper, I also address how the U.S. Navy fits—in both the current world (nudging the world day-to-day) and for the various ways the world in globalization evolves. Again, it is hard to foresee what the world looks like and what opportunities may exist for U.S. Administrations out in that world until Iraq is over, and what “over” looks like in terms of the strategic situation in the immediate Middle East. In the interim, the U.S. Navy continues to support operations in Iraq and to tidy up on the fringes of the world—mostly through endless patrols in several areas. But the global extremist Islamic terrorists have not gone to sea yet, so the Navy’s role in GWOT may seem marginal. The Navy is, however, the great dissuasive hedge on China attacking Taiwan. Its continuing technological improvements may enhance that capability.

In Washington terms, however, the DOD budget is very likely to be straitened in the near future, both if erstwhile supplementals for Iraq are incorporated in the regular presidential budget submissions and because of the deep and deepening federal budget deficit. The current Administration has been resistant to adding ground forces personnel for the future, though this could change with a new Administration. Without increases in ground forces, the Navy is likely to keep its share of the budget—there do not seem to be other compelling strategic reasons for an Administration to change those shares. But because of the rising costs of new ships and a stagnant budget, the Navy is likely to shrink even more from the 281 combat ships it has today (July, 2006). That is not necessarily bad, because the overall capabilities of the Navy, especially within the overall Joint system, would still be rising over time and because every other advanced navy in the world is shrinking as well (except maybe the Chinese navy—depending also on whether it “advances” as it adds numbers, if that’s what it’s doing).
Approach

Figure 1 below summarizes the logic flow for this annotated briefing.

Figure 1. Prospectus: The Fit Between U.S. Naval Forces and the World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CNA</th>
<th>PROSPECTUS: THE FIT BETWEEN U.S. NAVAL FORCES &amp; THE WORLD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The global security environment in the future will lie within the evolution of globalization – a mostly economic phenomenon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Both globalization and possible disruptions of it can take various paths, which need to be anticipated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>It is going to be hard for the U.S. Government to visualize these paths until Iraq is over – it is unsure when that may be and what “over” may look like.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The tasks of maintaining security around the world will be adjusted appropriately after that, including recovery for U.S. forces and re-pursuit of the global war on terrorism (GWOT)– which won’t take much resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Within these evolutions, it is worth examining the roles of maritime forces and their functioning within joint and international cooperation systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Aim of this paper: gain a broad perspective on both the global situation and the vectors of U.S. policy so as to better judge the roles and utility of U.S. naval forces in and for the future. That may or may not help in making choices in the program…</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The structural approach taken in this paper is shown in Figure 2 below.
We look at the three tiers of activity: globalization, conflict around the globe, and U.S. defense in those two contexts. In each case, we look at where the activity came from—the historical background that set the conditions prevailing today (mid-2006).

Note the intermediaries for the United States in the progress from one activity to the next. The first is the U.S. involvement in the world. For a long time in the past, the U.S. acted relatively detached from the world—intervening from across its two safe oceans only as it became necessary (i.e., in World Wars I and II). Of course, it intervened in the Caribbean and Central American area whenever it wanted—even its intervention in the Philippines in the early 1900s was an extension of its war with Spain over Cuba.

But after World War II, the U.S. found itself drawn strongly into Europe and Northeast Asia—both through the occupations of Germany and Japan, then for recovery of economies, and then to counter the Soviets and Communism. Even then, its imports and exports together for most of the Cold War were only 16 percent of GDP. But then there was the big take-off of globalization with the reentry of China into the world economy and the collapse of the Soviet Union—
whereupon the U.S. economic involvement in the world jumped to 25 percent.

The U.S. retained a gross stabilizing role in security after World War II, in the Cold War, and even after the end of the Cold War. That's why it has been concerned with conflict —especially as it might disrupt the global economy, but also for humanitarian reasons.

But the connection between conflict around the globe (not “global conflict”) and U.S. defense—in the past, today, and into the future—does not mean some inevitable U.S. military interventions, but depends on U.S. foreign policy, i.e. the disposition of the Administration in office to intervene, to form alliances, to contain, or take other actions in the event of conflict. Thus, we shall investigate the patterns of U.S. foreign-policy making before looking at the uses of U.S. forces.

Finally, there a cautionary note at the bottom: the evolution, use, and future of U.S. forces is not to be tied exactly to a progression of world-security-conflict-conflict resolution. There are stabilizing, deterrent, and containment functions that U.S. forces also serve.
The world of globalization today and its evolution

There are always dangers in the world. Altogether, though, as we shall show later in this paper, the dangers of conflict are much less than they were in the past. There is a tendency in DOD documents to exaggerate the threats. This is understandable: DOD must be ready for conflicts—it is what they prepare for. They must assume the worst, for if they don’t they could get killed. There is another dimension: the Services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Special Forces) fear that if they don’t portray a dire situation and a dire future, they will either lose in some kind of competition with each other or that Congress will cut their budgets. Thus, they repeat endlessly that it is “a dangerous and uncertain world,” and even recall with nostalgia the stability of the world of the Cold War—which those of us who participated in it do not actually remember; the tensions were great. Figure 3 below makes a brief joke about this.

Figure 3. It is not a “dangerous and uncertain world”

In fact, Congress hardly changes the President’s budget submission. The long-term track record (at least since the end of the Cold War) is that Congress changes the President’s budget submission by only
around one percent. There are lots of puts-and-takes within the total, especially in R&D accounts, but the net outcome has been only around one percent. Iraq (and Afghanistan) has been funded by supplementals—though as those situations drag on, the Appropriations Committees of Congress are sending signals (in 2006) that the costs must be accommodated in the regular budget submission. Since the supplementals mostly cover the costs of ground forces, this could put more of a squeeze on the Air Force and Navy. Otherwise, Service shares have hardly been changed across the years by successive Administrations.

The main point in this paper is that exaggerations of the threat may impede careful balancing out of capabilities—both for operations in the present and for hedging on the future—across U.S. forces within likely restricted budgets (given the rising Federal budget deficit). The fit between U.S. forces and the world is never perfect—and in this fact lies the flexibility and adaptability of the forces—but there has to be some transformation of the forces as the world situation transforms across time. Creating or exaggerating threats does not help that transformation.

At the end of July 2006, the fact that several situations have reached a crisis point have caused some (e.g., Newt Gingrich) to say that World War III is at hand. These crises are shown on Figure 4.

Figure 4. Immediate Troubles in the World, July 2006
Afghanistan has been a reoccupation of the United States since 9/11 and the retaliation that began on October 7, 2001. The Taliban has been resurging in the southern, Pashtun provinces of the country and some bitter battles are taking place. The country is still fragile.

The U.S. has occupied Iraq since April 2003, and it almost seems as if the situation is worsening in July 2006 with the daily slaughter of Sunnis by Shias and Shias by Sunnis.

The ethnic war in Darfur has been going on for some time, and had been almost the main concern of the international community for some time until now—not that they have done much about it.

In Somalia, the Union of Islamic Courts finally took over Mogadishu and is challenging the feeble government in Baidoa that had been put together by international negotiators. The Islamists promise a government under the Sharia. Whether they provide haven to al Qaeda terrorists remains to be seen.

Negotiations over North Korean nuclear weapons had stalled, and then they tested missiles because Iran had drawn world attention instead.

Iran is supposed to respond to a UN Security Council offer by August 22, 2006, but seem to remain determined to continue with their uranium enrichment program.

Israel had withdrawn from the Gaza Strip, but had to reinvade it after the Hamas gangs kidnapped an Israeli soldier. And then Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and dragged them off to Lebanon, whereupon Israel responded with an horrendous bombing campaign.

Does all of this mean that the world is falling apart? Does it mean that Syria and Iran are about to take over the Middle East, driving the Shia wedge into Sunni countries, as the Sunnis have feared? Practically none of the situations has become manageable as yet. But neither is it clear that any would escalate to a wider war. The rest of the world remains largely at peace.
Pictures of globalization

To sum up the patterns of globalization in the world, we present the map in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5. Countries’ relation to globalization

Note that the colors to the left in the legend might be described as positive, while those on the right are negative.

The assignment of countries to each category is admittedly somewhat arbitrary by this author and easily subject to change as economies go up and down. It is a snapshot of a dynamic process. For instance, Argentina might have been described as “close to the core” a couple of years ago, then seemed to be descending into third-world status, but has since recovered it (mid-2006).

The rogues identified are Cuba, Syria, Iran, and North Korea. Others put Sudan in the category, but its ambiguous behavior does not seem to warrant it at this point. Libya might now be colored orange.
(Islamic orientation), and Iraq deep purple (severe internal conflict).

The “countries of Islamic orientation” are quite diverse, and the author has not even put Indonesia or Malaysia in that category, even though their populations may be largely Muslim (55 percent in Malaysia).

A salient point about this map is that the mostly negative colors are clumped across the center of the world. The global security focus at this juncture of history stretches from Israel to Pakistan.

A more abstract chart of globalization is shown in Figure 6 below. Basically, this chart is a summary of the NDU volumes on globalization.8

Figure 6. Globalization

The chart is to be read in layers:

- There is **the core** of globalization.

- But it can also be looked at by **regions** as they tend to form trade blocs: NAFTA, MERCOSUR, EU, ASEAN.

- Globalization expands as business, corporations, search for new efficiencies in their production and provision of services.

- The governments of the advanced countries try to catch up with the spread of multinational business in order to perform their roles as regulators. Thus, they formed the WTO (World Trade Organization).

- The NDU volumes concentrated on **“The Dark Underside of Globalization.”** There is an enormous literature on whether globalization plunges the poor countries (2 billion people out of 6 billion) deeper into poverty. The consensus is that it does not. The Dark Underside as shown here stops short of being “part of globalization.” But there are connections: many organizations and militaries venture into the Underside, and immigrants and other troubles (including al Qaeda) cross into the advanced side.

- There are many **alliances and international organizations**, private and governmental, that also function to keep the world together (the blue sphere).

- Globalization **came from somewhere** (mostly the Free World system set up by the U.S. after World War II) and **will change over time** as emerging economies are progressively integrated. Right now the focus of that global integration is developing Asia, where roughly one-half of the global population is to be found.

Another view of globalization, in the post-9/11 era, highlighting the Islamic world, is shown below, in Figure 7.
Figure 7. The levels of globalization: three worlds after 9/11/2001

Mapping the global future: National Intelligence Council

These two charts that follow are offered as the summary of the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) “Mapping the Global Future” report, issued late in 2004. (Some wordings have been changed.)

One statement in their summary, below, that has been controversial is that energy supplies may be sufficient to meet global demand, “at least through 2020.” This is actually not a bad prediction until then: most predictions of the world reaching “peak oil” (the time when half the reserves have been pumped out) seem to be in the 20-30 year spread. It could be shorter if demand were higher than predicted, longer if alternative sources are developed.

This author has highlighted below the problem of U.S. unpopularity in the final point. This may be a temporary phenomenon associated with the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the nature of the current U.S. Administration.
Figure 9. Summary of Mapping the Global Future (continued)

### SUMMARY OF “MAPPING THE GLOBAL FUTURE”
Report of the NIC 2020 Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Certainties</th>
<th>Key Uncertainties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy supplies <strong>sufficient to meet global demand – at least through 2020.</strong></td>
<td>Political instability in commodity producing countries pose threat of supply disruptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing power of non-state actors.</td>
<td>Willingness and ability of states and international institutions to deal with private organizations and individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Islam remains a potent threat.</strong></td>
<td>Impact of religiosity on unity of states and its potential for conflict; growth of jihadism’s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved WMD capabilities of some states</td>
<td>More nuclear countries? Ability of terrorists to acquire WMD?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arc of instability persists</strong></td>
<td>Precipitating events leading to overthrow of regimes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental, energy, and ethical issues more to fore.</td>
<td>Extent to which new technologies create or help resolve the issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US remains single most powerful country</strong></td>
<td>Whether growing U.S. unpopularity can be overcome; whether U.S. loses S&amp;T edge.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The military in globalization**

With regard to militaries in globalization, figure 10 below represents the three levels of activity originally set out by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and War. (This chart was provided by Tom Barnett.)
The interesting aspect of military establishments is that they are still state-centered. A case in point is Europe and the European Union (EU), where the member countries seem to be taking forever to forge common foreign and defense policies, but where the military establishments remain resolutely state-centered. It is a prime characteristic of sovereignty, and perhaps the last to be given up to a broader political grouping. Even in NATO the forces always belonged to member states, not to the collectivity—unless there were a war. But there wasn’t until it was NATO forces that were sent to keep peace in Kosovo. A NATO force is now operating in Afghanistan.

Economic globalization has proceeded without a designated military arm, as it were. The global institutions—UN, WTO, IMF, World Bank, for instance—do not have a military character. The UN organizes only peace-keeping pick-up teams. There is a general sense after the Cold War (which was when the recognition of globalization grew) that “the remaining superpower”—the United States—has provided general security. That is not too clear at the moment as the U.S. has gotten bogged down in Iraq.

At the lower level, that of individuals, we have noted that is where most of the violence and threats in the post-Cold War world have resided. Here again, we see those situations as breakdowns or failures of states.
In turn, it has been hard for outside states to intervene in such places. The biggest problem of violence and conflict in the current world is what Tom Friedman has called “super-empowered individuals” (“SEIs”). After 9/11, we saw that a limited number of these SEIs leaped over the nation-state to reach globally, and across the ocean, to the U.S. The U.S. struck back at the state that had harbored them and in which they had been trained by al Qaeda, whose base was there—the Taliban’s Afghanistan (even though the 19 hijackers had been floating around the world before their final and fatal trip to the United States). After al Qaeda had been ousted from Afghanistan (and their leaders had retreated to caves in the mountains on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan), the terrorists who had been training there scattered to many other countries, or new cells were formed among Muslims elsewhere, as among the Moroccans in Spain. The US finds it hard to strike back militarily, that is, at a nation-state level, against these cells.

The situation of globalization today (mid-2006)

Figure 10 below is a spatial depiction of globalization as it may look today, mid-2006 (blowing up the inner circle called “globalization today” shown in an earlier chart).
We show the core as being the older core—Europe, U.S., Japan—on the left and China and India as the newcomers on the right (SEA—Southeast Asia—plus South Korea, led the original expansion of the Core. We see the strong connections of these two parts of the core through trade and finance. The core in turn has been trying to bring the “countries left behind” globalization in through the WTO and the Doha Round of the old GATT negotiations (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). In July 2006 these talks have stalled once more.

Russia has had some difficulty fitting into the core as yet.

In the meantime, one aspect of globalization is the northward flow of people from the places left behind. In North America, it involves Hispanic people. In Europe, it involves people mostly from the Islamic south—thus presenting different complications from those in North America. (In China, the flow is from the villages to the cities—a huge urban expansion. India is following.)
In the middle of it all is the Islamic world, the generator of the present global terrorists—with their proximity, oil, and thus awkward connections to the core.

All is connected by the internet.

Looming behind all the real current activity of globalization are the four big deep environmental issues: the coming energy crunch as peak oil is reached and oil declines, the aging and immigration of people, the fear of global pandemics, and global pollution and warming.

**Where globalization came from and where it may be going**

We have described globalization in the previous charts. However, in order to project it in some manner, it is useful to review where globalization came from, where in gross terms it stands today—both the good and the bad—and then to provide some illustrative projections into the future. Figure 12 is an attempt to portray this.

Figure 12. The evolution of globalization
This way of depiction seems to be my own invention: the future is one of widening possibilities (the individual layers are a selection of possibilities). As the system advances into the future, a generally dependent path tends to be created, which in turn opens up new possibilities. I have displayed two unspecified “surprises” on the chart—a surprise might be a 9/11, or a global financial crisis, or some other “system-perturbing” event, as Tom Barnett would call it. It may jolt the whole system onto a new path-dependency, or the perturbations might be damped out over time as the system returns to a new normal.

Note the original competition after World War between the Soviet and Western system. The Soviet system disappeared, a failure. Some say that al Qaeda poses a threat even more serious than Communism, but they are clearly not aware of the enormous tensions of the Cold War, especially in the 1950s. But al Qaeda becomes a depiction of an extreme for the unfolding of globalization in the future. It is an extreme because they simply do not have the capabilities to create a global system of their own, whatever their rhetoric.
Conflict in the world

Conflicts around the world have dropped drastically since 1989-1990, as shown in Figure 13 below. This includes both state-on-state conflicts and internal conflicts.

Figure 13. Trends by Armed Conflict Type, 1946-2003

This chart was prepared by Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) program at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. As noted, the update they prepared in 2005 shows the same trends.10

The report of the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia shows the same trend.11
This is probably the best illustration of how it is not necessarily “a dangerous and uncertain world.” An assertion accompanying that cliché is that the Soviet Union was a stabilizing influence and with the removal of that influence, more conflict arose. Certainly, those of us who worked “The Rest of the World,” as this author did in the Middle East and then for the U.S. global security assistance program, the Soviets were either the fomenter of revolutions or poured military equipment (that’s all the Soviets produced) into client countries.

But it is only coincidence that the number of conflicts dropped with the end of the Soviet Union and its bloc. As the Human Security Centre report revealed, it has also been effective UN intervention that pacified many countries that had been suffering internal war.

As for state-on-state war, the world is left with Ethiopia-Eritrea—aside from the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which will be discussed later, and the outbreak of war in July 2006 between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

This author has tracked internal conflicts as well. In the middle of the 1990s, among 41 countries that suffered internal conflicts across the period 1990-2005, I counted a maximum in the middle of the decade of 15 actual shooting situations, but only 7 in which conflict had disappeared (with various shades of color in different countries in between). At the beginning of 2006 it was down to 8 shooting situations, but 14 in which the country had become quite peaceful.

Some conflicts persist all across the period—they are chronic. This is especially true in South Asia: Nepal, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Northeast India, and Sri Lanka. The war in Colombia goes on forever. Chechnya at the moment may be relatively quiet, but that insurgency has rippled across the North Caucasus. Sudan had fighting in the south for a long time; peace was achieved; but by that time the conflict had


shifted to Darfur. Somalia has been in anarchy since 1991, though now (July 2006), an Islamic government is emerging in Mogadishu.

One of the most interesting aspects of all these internal conflicts is that, across the 1990s, while the author’s own count of countries suffering from internal conflict was 37, the United States intervened militarily in only four well-known cases: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Of course, the nature of internal conflicts has always been that war could break out again.

So conflict around the world—both state-on-state and internal—has dropped off drastically. The U.S. is now involved in Afghanistan and Iraq, where, in both cases, “state-on-state” has now turned into “U.S. vs. insurgencies.” The last other state-on-state war was Ethiopia-Eritrea, and it threatens to break out again too.

Global terror

In terms of conflict (as opposed to, say, confrontations, of which the major ones for the U.S. are China-Taiwan, and the confrontations with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear weapons program), the main concern now is the global extremist Islamic terror movement and their occasional strikes. It a way, that is what the U.S. would be left to cope with, if were not for the fact that it is bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The global terror is radical extremist Islamic terror. The next chart—Figure 14—shows the Islamic world—which is what we think of as “The Gap” world, per Tom Barnett—though the “gap” is probably better expressed geographically by the dividing waters of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the various straits of Southeast Asia. The more important “gap” is between the advancing civilization of the north versus the stalled and practically medieval Islamic world, “corrupted” though it is by access to the cash and technology of the north.

Within the Islamic world, this map shows the major regional problems and the major terrorist incidents from 9/11 on. The terrorist incidents are an interesting scattering. They are both infrequent and unpredictable.
Note that the global terrorists extend into the U.S., Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and China (the restless Uighurs—though it is unfair to label them terrorists). The extent of penetration of terrorists into the Sahel remains to be seen. It is an under-populated region for very good reasons.

Also shown are the current outlying U.S. security problems: North Korea and its nuclear program, Taiwan, and the northern Andes area with its guerrillas and drug trade.

**Future Conflicts**

We can look at a range of conflict possibilities out into the future, in a schematic shown in the next chart.
As shown in the chart, confrontations among nations are at one end of the spectrum—with their attendant arms races and infrequent and often hostile communications.\textsuperscript{12}

Conflicts—actually shooting in all its variations, through state-on-state war—constitute the other end of the range. We have not analyzed the confrontation between the Soviet Union and its bloc and the West in this paper—that’s part of past history, and it has now been gone since 1989. We see the decline of other state-on-state wars (e.g., India-Pakistan, Arab-Israeli)—however skirmishes may persist, though the current war between Israel on one side and Hamas and Hezbollah

\textsuperscript{12} Should we have extended the chart to somehow show confrontations among civilizations? I think not, since, despite Huntington, there are no coherent civilizations—even “the West,” a concept that took new shape during the Cold War, faded after the end of the Cold War, and which is now back in supposed confrontation with “Islam,” is hardly coherent. As for Islam, there are those among the Muslims who dream of “the ummah,” the community of all Islamic countries, but they haven’t gotten very far after the 1300 years of their existence (since 632 CE).
on the others has turned into far more than a “skirmish”—and North Korea has not attacked south for 56 years). Aside from the U.S. invasion of Iraq, we are left with Ethiopia-Eritrea as the last state-on-state war. As noted earlier, internal conflicts are declining. Finally, we have seen the evolution of modern terror through the PLO (and Red Army Faction and Red Army Brigade active at the same time in Europe) through its localization and now back to the global pretensions of al Qaeda.

Iran and Afghanistan are the dominant conflicts today—though the conflict between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 might escalate still further before a cease-fire is effected.

A sampling of what the future might bring is shown on the right side. These are illustrations, again on the range from confrontations to conflicts.

We would also be ready for surprises along the way, like another World Trade Center attack.

The problem of weapons of mass destruction

At this point, it is worth reflecting on whether the dangers of conflict, which are otherwise diminishing (aside from the threat of terrorists and the current troubles between the Israelis, Hamas, and Hezbollah) are otherwise aggravated by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological, and nuclear (nuclear being the most dangerous of all).

As a general observation, chemical weapons have been around since World War I, attempts at biological weapons date from time immemorial, but nuclear weapons emerged in 1945. Shortly thereafter, the process of globalization as we know it now began in the aftermath of World War II. Globalization also got a new boost upon the former Soviet bloc countries joining the rest of the world. So how come, across the period from 1945, globalization has been so rich and nuclear proliferation so scanty, at least in the number of countries developing the capability?13
The answer is, of course, that globalization makes countries prosperous and thus makes their populations happy, whereas nuclear weapons scare the bejeezus out of people and turn out to be not useful in war. Besides, the U.S. and USSR built such huge and awesome arsenals that they discouraged others from following. India and Pakistan got into their own race. Then it was the pariahs and rogues that got into the business—Israel, South Africa, Iraq (now removed from the list), North Korea, and Iran—those tending to be disconnected from globalization. Almost all speak of their deterrent value, not of their military utility.

The world has become accustomed to the Big 5 (U.S., UK, France, Russia, China), India and Pakistan, and Israel having nuclear weapons. But it is now negotiating hard over Iran and North Korea obtaining both nuclear weapons and acquiring the missiles on which to mount them. There are fears that Iran obtaining nuclear weapons would lead to further proliferation in the Middle East. But that is not clear. The next figure puts the evolution of at least nuclear proliferation into the same kind of past-present-future chart that has been used before in this paper.

13. For further discussion of this point, see H. H. Gaffney, Globalization and Proliferation: A presentation to a Workshop on Proliferation Networks at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 29 June-1 July 2005 (CNA: CIM D0012837.A1/Final, June 2005).
Now the global extremist Islamic terrorists aspire to get WMD, and some crude attempts were discovered in the al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan after the Taliban collapsed and Osama and Zawahiri were driven into their caves. And the fear is that they would use them—since they are stateless and deterrence through the fear of retaliation on populations or value in a country would not seem to apply.

But it is not so easy for the terrorists to obtain nuclear weapons, or chemical or biological weapons. Both nuclear and chemical weapons require industrial capabilities—which would have to be in states and would be easily identified. Otherwise, the terrorists would have to buy, be given, or steal such weapons. Some fear that North Korea (for which the price would be high) or Pakistan might make them available. Or that “loose nukes” in Russia might be stolen. So far, there is no evidence that this has happened, even though A. Q. Khan of Pakistan was selling centrifuges, centrifuge technology, and other technologies to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Then there is the question of delivery means—such weapons are heavy and difficult to assemble and trigger.
So it is a fear, and surveillance and interception must be maintained (e.g., through the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI), but it must not be exaggerated.

Biological weapons have not been successfully weaponized for long-range delivery—anthrax in envelopes and ricin on umbrella points are the main threat.

The United States is keeping its retaliatory force for deterrence—right now it is good to the 2030s. Along with the EU 3, Russia, and China, the U.S. is engaged in negotiating with North Korea and Iran—though the chances of success are not good. At the same time, the price North Korea and Iran would pay is continued disconnection from the global economy, at a great cost to their populations. The U.S. needs to keep up its Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program with Russia and to stay engaged with Pakistan. And it may be that a new Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) should be negotiated.

Paths of globalization and their security implications

Before closing out this “state of the world and its conflicts” section, we can look at alternative paths of globalization and their security implications, as shown in Figure 17 below.
Four models of the progress of globalization are laid out here, accompanied on the right by their implications for global security and thus the need for defense establishments—noting that the correlation between conflicts and the evolution of defense establishments is not clear, or is at best very rough. At least in the advanced countries of the Core, defenses are maintained both as a matter of tradition (they cannot be reinvented easily) or against contingencies still imagined.

**On the first track,** globalization ideally continues on a smooth path, with steady overall worldwide economic growth and increasing trade among nations, disrupted rarely if at all by conflict. After all, the trends right now are the diminution of state-on-state conflict to near-zero, the decline in the numbers of internal conflicts, and the fact that incidents cause by the global terrorists, while horrendous, are rare. In this case, the trend toward the reduction of formerly large defense establishments would continue.

**The second track** is more characteristic of the situation today (mid-2006). With the U.S. bogged down in Iraq (and Afghanistan), the
question of terror not yet managed, the difficulties of reconciling the trade policies of north and south (the Doha Round just stalled again), and the confrontations with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear weapons programs, there is a good deal of uncertainty. This has put emphasis, especially for the U.S., on current operations, in the present, to stabilize the conflict situations and rest of the world.

The third model is a future speculation—mostly because of the distortions that now appear in the course of globalization, especially what the role and impact of China on the whole global trading and energy situation might turn out to be. In turn, that might lead to different alignments of nations, especially in East and South Asia, with consequent adjustments in defense establishments.

The fourth model says that the global trading system breaks down, especially into regional blocs (though how the distribution of energy supplies would take place is not clear since it is really a global market). But the security model could be one of these blocs becoming defense blocs.
U.S. Policy and Action in the World

The United States looms over the world, especially since the Soviet Union disappeared from the scene in 1991. The U.S. has something like 5 percent of the world’s population, but has been generating up to 30 percent of the world’s GDP (at market exchange rates). It uses 25 percent of the energy the world generates, including nearly 24 percent of the world’s oil, including importing around 15 percent of the world’s oil. It vies with Germany as the world’s largest exporter (Germany is a little ahead now)—the U.S. even exports more manufactured products than China. But it is also the world’s largest importer, importing more than $700 billion last year (2005) than it exported—to support the high consumption of its rich population. It has also become the world’s largest debtor, as foreigners hold 43 percent of U.S. federal debt, which debt is growing.

Figure 18. U.S. World Footprint

- U.S. generates around 30% of global wealth...
- But incurs a huge trade deficit: we trade pieces of paper for goods
- Global stability as a collective good for which we pay the most, because we enjoy that security the most...
It has been somehow the United States’ world after the Cold War. Most call it “the world’s last and only superpower,” but that term is irrelevant in the interconnected, interdependent, non-zero-sum global economy. Globalization has obsolesced the traditional (European-history-based, including the Soviet Union, since disappeared) calculations of military power—practically none of the extant conflicts revolve around calculations of the balances among ICBMs, bombers, battleships, tanks, fighter aircraft, etc. The U.S. thinks of itself somehow as a model of democracy, advocates elections to throw out tyrants all across the Islamic world, but then itself reverts to a unitary presidency unconstrained by law and practicing torture.

The U.S. has been practically the only country in the advanced world to maintain a substantial military. Even if it has been reduced by around a third overall (and the number of platforms has shrunk as their more expensive replacements arrive in smaller numbers), others have reduced more and devoting far less to military research and development than the United States. China, with new-found wealth, may be an exception, but even they are reducing their ground forces in favor of more aircraft and ships. At the same time, it should be remembered that China’s new-found wealth in no way compares to U.S. wealth. They just have a lot of loose dollars soaked from their people’s savings to prevent inflation and stay competitive. The U.S. has the bulk of expeditionary forces in the world—those that can roam about the world. And its military involvements around the world (until Iraq) have had a stabilizing and reassuring effect. The U.S. exports security, and the world gets richer.

Issues for the United States

It is important to show the interrelations and overlaps among the big issues the United States is struggling with at this juncture in history—aside from its great war in Iraq. Sometimes, people in Defense think theirs is the only issue that Americans should really worry about—that’s natural, since the people in Defense are responsible for finding out what the threats and preparing to respond to them if the President and Secretary of Defense order them to do so (although we may see a greater role for Congress in such orders in the future). The issues are shown in the chart on the next page.
First, always, is the U.S. economy. It is what Defense is defending, essentially. And a strong economy (growth, low inflation, high employment) generates the revenues that support Defense. Within this economy, and to ensure its long-term growth, U.S. society supports health, schools, and the advancement of science (technological advance has also characterized a creative economy). But these latter functions are also supported by the tax revenues collected by the U.S. government. Defense is in something of a competition with them.

The U.S. is interacting with the world more than it used to—as noted earlier, trade is now 25 percent of the economy vice the long-term 16 percent. And this involvement in the world—globalization—also brings threats. But the real residual threat after a long period (since World War II) of U.S. interaction with the world is the global extremist Islamic terrorism. Since 9/11, this has put new attention on homeland defense—always a first priority.

14. An increase of 9 percent may not seem large, but when one considers the growth of the U.S. economy in the interim, the increase may be as much as a quadrupling in absolute terms.
The U.S. Government is at the center of all these functions – even if U.S. business is really responsible for the expansion of U.S. involvement around the globe. It must balance out all with regulation and the judicious allocation of tax revenues.

We have asserted that the world is in pretty good shape: conflicts receding in number, competitions in military numbers way down, more and more people in the world emerging from poverty, etc. But we note that globalization brings global terror, and in turn leads to the global historic concern now with bringing the Islamic world into closer and comfortable association with the advanced world.

Beyond that, we show a couple of looming big problems for the future: the aging of the populations in the advanced countries, and the world passing from the era of fossil fuels, particularly oil and gas.

**U.S. Approaches to Foreign Policy**

This author has followed U.S. foreign policy and actions in the world closely since entering the government in 1962—with particularly deep involvement in NATO matters, and especially in NATO theater nuclear forces, followed by two intensive years on Middle East matters (including a trip to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), and then a deep involvement in the U.S. security assistance and sales program across the 1980s. While at CNA, my colleagues and I have been tracking the responses of U.S. forces to situations that arose and the small set of those responses involving actual combat—for which a brief analysis of the American Way of War follows in this report.

The continuities of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in matters of security, had been strong after World War II, since the 1940s and 1950s. In addition to deep involvement in world economic management, the U.S. Government formed alliances, supported countries on the front line defending against Soviet-supported states or Communist insurgencies, had active security dialogues and sales with the Middle Eastern countries “on both sides” (Arab and Israeli—and Iran through 1979), and engaged in negotiations for arms control treaties with the Soviets and Warsaw Pact. The U.S. opened relations with just about every country in the world. It took the lead role for most of the time in reconciling Arabs and Israelis.
With the end of the Cold War and in the following 1990s, the U.S. was friendly with practically every country in the world—with the exception of the rogues (the four main ones: Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, plus the two weak ones, Cuba and Syria; Milosevic in the Former Yugoslavia was also a rogue with regard to Bosnia and Kosovo; he cooperated on Bosnia eventually, but lost big on Kosovo, lost his next election in Serbia, and died in prison in The Hague.

It has thus been a major shock to take account of the changes with the Bush 43 Administration. These changes are summarized below.

Figure 20. The Shocks of Bush Foreign Policy

Many of these changes came about after 9/11, as the U.S. engaged in the war on global terrorism, the U.S. sanctuary against their attacks having been penetrated. The world was heavily supportive and helpful in the U.S. retaliation against al Qaeda and their host Taliban in Afghanistan. But the ill-planned, ill-fated U.S. adventure in Iraq has now contributed to the unilateralist, negative picture that has emerged.

In the second Bush 43 term, however, there has been a considerable softening of the truculent, go-it-alone approach of the first term.
Being bogged down in Iraq contributes much to this softening—the U.S. Government has always had trouble managing more than one major situation at a time. Some of the changes are shown next.

Figure 21. What is Changing Right Now in U.S. Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is changing right now in U.S. foreign policy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• New team at State Department – more in mainstream</td>
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<tr>
<td>• But Cheney and Rumsfeld still the drivers of the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Middle East peace back in turmoil with Hamas elected, Sharon gone and the new two-front war of Hamas and Hezbollah, both backed by Iran, against Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rapprochement with Europe – who else are old friends of the U.S.? (Japan and Australia – India as new friend…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Administration promoting democracy – But not going well..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The response to the tsunami, Katrina, Pakistani earthquake opened new perspectives for cooperation and humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Missile defense fading as the answer to all problems</td>
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The most significant change has been the replacement of Colin Powell at the State Department with Condoleeza Rice. Rice in turn has staffed her front office with foreign policy professionals (who have been in and out of government), and has been extraordinarily active around the world. The result has been some restoration of U.S. reputation and collaboration with many countries. Especially important has been restoration of relations with the European countries—always the most long-lasting and well-tested U.S. allies, with whom the U.S. has led the process of globalization. Relations with India have also emerged as India itself joins globalization. For the first time, the U.S. seems to have balanced relations between India and Pakistan—helped by the efforts of the leadership of both India and Pakistan to achieve rapprochement between their two countries, under the shadow of nuclear weapons on both sides.

The collaboration among police and financial institutions around the world against the global terrorists also seems solid.
The Administration’s promotion of democracy in the Middle East—
with its threats for “regime change”—have stalled out in Iraq and with
the election of Hamas in Palestine. This may not be a bad thing—but
changing the culture, economies, and political systems of the Middle
East will be a very long process, as will be discussed later in this paper.

Finally, the reputation of the U.S. has also benefited from its
responses to natural disasters—the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, par-
ticularly in Sumatra, and the earthquake in Pakistan. Hoping for
disasters to respond to is not exactly a foreign policy, though.

There was confidence among some in the Bush 43 Administration’s
first term that a strong missile defense would allow the U.S. to throw
its weight around in the world. In the first place, they have not been
able so far to make that defense work. In the second place, it is not
really a substitute for patient relations with other countries in the
world.

Thus, the changes that already seem to be occurring in the Bush 43
Administration’s approaches to foreign policy in the second term can
be shown in the next chart. These would seem to represent a return
to the continuities that have characterized U.S. foreign policy since
World War II.

Figure 22. Bush Administration Softens its Approach
In mid-2006, a significant help in this regard may be the regularizing of the situations in Guantanamo and the prisons in Iraq, returning to existing international law that the U.S. had ostensibly adopted as its own laws upon treaty ratification, per the U.S. Constitution. Hopefully, this will have turned out to be an unfortunate aberration in American history.

The U.S., as Tom Barnett has pointed out, has practically taken the only major security role in the globalized world—but it is a nebulous, unmeasurable role. The U.S. maintained a large military (though reduced in numbers 33-40 percent from its Cold War levels, though not in capabilities, e.g., for dropping bombs precisely). The continuation of relatively large forces and budget, certainly as compared to previous drastic demobilizations after wars, was mostly for internal political reasons, given the debates between the parties across the Cold War, from which most representatives came, even if they hadn’t served in the military—or even more warlike if they hadn’t served.

Whatever the case, the whole world has known that the U.S. has retained a large, capable military. And that meant they could reduce their own defenses, or, to put it another way, to put their economic growth to other uses. All of this depended on the U.S. not necessarily using its forces in war—except for the restoration of the international order under UN resolutions and in concert with others as represented by the U.S. leading the international effort to throw Saddam out of Kuwait in 1991. The U.S. was long reluctant to get involved in Bosnia and Kosovo—but then the NATO Kosovo effort somehow scared the hell out of Russia and China; they haven’t gotten over it, thinking they would somehow be next.

For the U.S. after 9/11, retaliating against al Qaeda and the Taliban was an act of self-defense, and the U.S. got all kinds of support for that around the world. But Iraq was a step too far, and has left the U.S. unsupported and helpless. As the years pass then, the U.S. finds itself reaching back to the more traditional ways of relating to other countries—as shown in Figure 22. And this might very well contain al Qaeda, even if it doesn’t resolve the mess in Iraq.
The American Way of War

There was an American Way of War (AWW) developed during the Cold War—but the U.S. never really got a chance to exercise it. Vietnam didn’t count, since it was a counterinsurgency war and the U.S felt it lost. As a result, it put counterinsurgency out of its mind and concentrated on the high-end technological competition with the Soviet Union. It relied on Israel’s experience in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war to judge the utility of new weapons and the intensity of conventional warfare. The evolution of U.S. military engagement around the world, culminating in what we call “The American Way of War,” is shown in this chart, courtesy of Tom Barnett.

Figure 23. From Cold War to American Way of War

The Soviet Union, over-militarized, collapsed. The U.S. outlasted the defective Soviet economic system by maintaining a strong economy of its own and promoting it around the world outside the Soviet bloc. The third world conventional military threat, mostly supplied by the Soviets, has declined, especially without any more free Soviet military goods. People in the U.S. Defense Department imagined China as a
future “peer competitor” (a crabbed term from the past, especially from the past of European wars)—simply because they needed one. But this notion of a Chinese threat—to Taiwan—seemed to materialize to some degree only when China began to physically threaten Taiwan in 1996. We will talk about China later.

In the meantime, the U.S. found itself in a series of engagements—most reactively and reluctantly; only Panama in 1989 and Iraq in 2003 constituted initiatives. The two major bookends were Iraq in 1991 and 2003, where the enormous progress in connectivity, use of space assets, precision weapons, and the training of the All-Volunteer Force were demonstrated. But, as we will discuss a little bit more in the next pages, the U.S. essentially obsolesced this way of war, given its success and given the general pattern of peace that had settled on the world. As noted earlier, most of what is left are a declining number of internal conflicts that nevertheless don’t seem to threaten the global system, and the global terrorists, who do try to threaten the global system.

The cases we studied to describe “the American War of War” are listed here. Somalia was not a success and the U.S. and its allies withdrew.

Figure 24. Cases for the Study of The American Way of War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Storm</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1995*</td>
<td>Deliberate Force (air strikes) only</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desert Fox</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2003**</td>
<td>“Major Combat Phase” only</td>
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* Bosnia: Deliberate Force (air strikes) only
** Iraq 2003: “Major Combat Phase” only
For Bosnia, we looked only at the air operation—Deliberate Force—that drove Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, to the negotiating table at Dayton. Milosevic was also driven to the table by the success of the combined ground forces of the Croats and Bosniaks, who drove the Serbs out of Krajina (that’s the same word as “Ukraine,” i.e., “borderland”) and most of Bosnia, leaving them with a rump Republika Srpska. Strong allied peacekeeping forces then ruled Bosnia and kept order, without losses.

Desert Fox lasted only four days—it was bombing of suspected Iraqi WMD sites after Saddam kicked out the UN inspectors.

The “American Way of War” covered in Kosovo was the bombing campaign of 79 days in 1999. The effect of that bombing was to drive the Russians to pressure Milosevic to give up. After the war, he told an associate that he gave up because of NATO solidarity and Russian betrayal. “The U.S. bombed Chernomyrdin to the table.” No Serb has mentioned any fear of a ground threat. Milosevic’s point about NATO solidarity is worth special note, since there was much worry and criticism by the U.S. military, particularly General Short, about “political interference” in perfect effects-based bombing plans and the presumed inefficiency (and thus lack of timeliness) of NATO decision-making. It should be remembered that NATO does not take votes—it operates by consensus, a concept too difficult for most Americans. Otherwise, the alliance would have lost the crucial participation of Greece if it had votes.

The U.S. supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan with devastating air strikes against Taliban forces and the remaining Afghan Arabs, thus driving the Taliban out of power and Osama bin Laden, Omar Mullah, and Zawahiri into hiding in the mountains.

Finally, in our study of the American Way of War, we examined only the “major combat phase—mission accomplished” of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which last for about three weeks in March-April 2003. The rest—and the present and likely the future—is back to the counterinsurgency that the U.S. had put aside since Vietnam.

Figure 25 on the following page shows the evolution of the American Way of War in sequence.
The Cold War gave the U.S. big forces, which maintained high readiness (given the fears of Soviet surprise attacks), coupled with the continuous development of their technological capabilities (again given the fears of the Soviets coming up with new technological surprises after Sputnik). The U.S. also assumed its conventional forces would be fighting “over there,” and thus had formed alliances to support against the local Soviet threats and built the airlift and sealift to get the forces “over there,” as well as maintaining forces in Europe (300,000 military personnel) and Northeast Asia (100,000). (We in Washington worked almost exclusively on providing these expeditionary capabilities in U.S. forces—especially for the major U.S. contribution of tactical air.) As noted earlier, the U.S. had little opportunity to actually fight, “except for” the Korean and Vietnam Wars—difficult and costly experiences.

The U.S. was thus in 1990 equipped and capable of moving large forces to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, first to defend those other countries and then to expel Saddam from Kuwait. By that time,
the U.S. had professional forces (the average length of service for those deployed to Desert Shield and Desert Storm was 7 years). Its good relations maintained in the area and its Cold War alliances paid off in UN resolutions, access to facilities in the area, and allies joining the force or paying for the expenses. One great lesson learned was that, unlike the possible war with the Soviets, which was always envis-aged in U.S. exercises as global, all the U.S. and allied forces piled into one spot in Kuwait, which meant tight control and deconfliction of the joint and combined forces—the lack of jointness in the Grenada operation of 1983 had been mostly overcome.

In the other combat operations, leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, certain characteristics emerged. The U.S. has had a fascination with regime change as the key to solving the situation: Noriega in Panama, Saddam in Iraq, Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia, Aidid in Somalia, Cedras (and restoration of Aristide) in Haiti, and Omar/Osama in Afghanistan. This obsession left the U.S. ill-prepared to follow up to stabilize the country in several cases.

From the experiences in Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, it appeared that the U.S. was relying heavily on air strikes as its lead military capability—to which may be added the Tomahawk cruise missiles. Tight control and targeting, helped by increasing numbers of precision weapons and aircraft capable of dropping them, was also characteristic—giving rise to the recognition of “network-centric warfare.” But we also saw that air strikes were not enough to bring about the change in regimes. Either diplomacy (as in the case of Kosovo) or ground forces (as with the Iraqis in Desert Storm) was necessary to bring the conflict to an end—after which peacekeeping forces could safely come in to keep order.

However, it turns out that the experience of the residual “peacekeeping” forces in Iraq, turned into counterinsurgency forces, have now changed the whole nature of the American Way of War. In some ways, the U.S. was lulled by the multinational agreements reached with

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15. This author calls it “the Martian Strategy.” The Martians land and say, “Take me to your president.” People in the U.S. think presidents in a country run everything, including in our own.
Milosevic for Bosnia and Kosovo, which meant that they faced no armed resistance upon moving in. They thought Iraq would present no-casualties peacekeeping amongst a grateful public. They were wrong. And we have no idea when the insurgency or the American occupation in Iraq will end. Subsequent charts show how the transformation of the American Way of War from Desert Storm to the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom has since had to morph into transformation for counterinsurgency and then for the quite separate global war on terror.

A first sketch is shown in the bottom set in Figure 25 of what the U.S. is left with after its enormous success with the American Way of War. Bogged down in Iraq, it is hard to envisage what country the U.S. might invade next—the reluctance of the American public for such adventures is already manifest. Air attacks on Iranian nuclear sites are discussed in the public (whether inside the Administration is rumored—at least as routine JCS planning), in an almost Desert Fox style. But no one considers it a good idea. Otherwise, with the reduction in state-on-state warfare, a more mundane kind of warfare may be foreseen for the future.

The American Way of War has been the main reason that the U.S. built and maintained forces. It was designed with a war with the Soviet Union in mind—not that successive U.S. administrations thought such a war was likely (at least not since 1965, after the last Berlin incident). Rather it was the conventional component of the overall deterrent of the Soviets. After the end of the Cold War, this American Way of War was fully demonstrated, as discussed earlier, especially in the two Iraq operations.

Now the U.S. is mired in counterinsurgency in Iraq and doesn’t know when it will end. Otherwise, it looks very much like the U.S. has worked itself out of a job. State-on-state wars have practically ended around the world (though it is hard to see that at the moment, as Israel and Hezbollah engage in war). And the U.S. can hardly imagine where it might apply the American Way of War next. Iran is the strongest possibility, including an air-only, Kosovo, type of campaign. But most of the commentary on that possibility thinks it not a good idea. The Bush Administration says that the diplomatic route is the way now.
While the core of U.S. forces is designed for the American Way of War, it is not all that U.S. forces engage in or plan for.

Figure 26. AWW is at the Core of U.S. defense

As seen above, deterrence, engagement, responses short of war, presence, homeland defense, and peacekeeping (as with allies in Bosnia and Kosovo) are all activities that U.S. forces have undertaken, even during the Cold War. Iraq now confuses our ability to see into the future. In the chart above, I have changed “peacekeeping” to “nation-building” as a new possibility. That’s what the U.S. is trying to do in Iraq.

But the U.S. certainly wouldn’t want to give up the combat capabilities represented by the American Way of War. It is representative of American genius and its strong technological core. Within the American political system, the politicians and public like these “legacy forces.” Their capabilities have just about scared every other country out of the business—or reassured them so that they are content to be under that American umbrella as they pursue economics instead. And it is a great hedge against any other country challenging the
U.S.—China has a long way to go. China especially lacks the war-fighting experience gained by the U.S.

Even if “the American Way of War” remains at the core of U.S. military capabilities, which it will, as we have noted the current and near-term evolution of conflict in the world tends to concentrate on troubles within countries. There’s been much talk in the rather restricted circle of those interested in defense about nation-building in failed states, on the Iraq model. The notion that the U.S., including its military, should be out there nation-building is not popular among the U.S. public and thus not in Congress—if they were to think about it at all before situations present themselves.

But the experience in Iraq has raised the question of adding those kinds of capabilities in U.S. forces, particularly in ground forces, but also on an interagency basis. The burden tends to fall on the U.S. military, though, because Congress is reluctant to fund the personnel and programs in other agencies, notably State and AID. Moreover, in between the American Way of War and nation-building lies the development of U.S. counter-insurgency capabilities—right now that is happening in the hard way inside Iraq. How all this may be balanced out into the future in the programs of U.S. forces is hard to foresee.
The Global War on Terror (GWOT)

Let us now move on to the major pressing security issue for the United States—the global war on terror. As noted earlier, it is the real residual threat to the U.S.\textsuperscript{16}

It is a threat that is hardly on the scale of the threat that the Soviet Union posed to the U.S. during the Cold War. It may not even come close to 5 percent of that threat. The global Islamic extremists are not likely to bring down the American society or the American economy, or the world economy for that matter.

It is because they do not have the capability to do anything like that, nor are they likely to get it. They are not even likely to get nuclear weapons—though that is the one possibility, however remote, that is most scary.

In the meantime, everybody in the U.S. lives in dread of the next terrorist incident in this country—as Californians always wonder when the great earthquake may occur. The U.S. Government, along with all the other countries, must pursue the terrorists and prepare for homeland defense and consequence management. It is their responsibility. This section analyzes the terrorist threat and American reaction to it.

9/11 was a huge shock for America. But looking back, we could then see it as the culmination of a terrorist campaign against us. After all, there was the original World Trade Center attack in 1993, in which “only” six people were killed. There was the attack on the US Air Force housing at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, in which 19 U.S. military personnel were killed, the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998, in which mostly Tanzanians

\textsuperscript{16} Most of this material on GWOT is adapted and updated from H. H. Gaffney and Daniel Whiteneck, \textit{Applying Transformation to the Global War on Terror: A Study of a Study} (CNA: CAB D0010294.A2/Final, June 2004).
and Kenyans were killed, and then the U.S. Cole was bombed in Aden Harbor in 2000. (The chart that follows is again courtesy of Tom Barnett.)

Figure 27. “And then 9/11 Occurs...”

We were worried about terrorist attacks all through the 1990s, but had only vague conceptions of the masterminding of Osama bin Laden and his second-in-command, Ayman Zawahiri, until they were fully realized as the organizers upon 9/11. They hit the U.S. homeland and changed the entire complexion of U.S. security thinking.

Maps of the GWOT

The next three charts are impressionistic. They reduce the actual complexity of both the area in which the terrorists are operating and of the larger world of U.S. security.

This first chart shows the Islamic world—which is what we think of as “The Gap” world—though the “gap” is probably better expressed by the dividing waters of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the various straits of Southeast Asia. The
more important “gap” is between the advancing civilization of the north versus the stalled and practically medieval Islamic world, “corrupted” though it is by access to the cash, technology and media penetration of the north. The following chart was shown earlier, and is repeated here.

Figure 28. Emerging GWOT World for U.S. Security

Within the Islamic world, this map shows the major regional problems and the major terrorist incidents from 9/11 on. The terrorist incidents are an interesting scattering. They are both infrequent and unpredictable.

The extent of penetration of terrorists into the Sahel remains to be seen. It is an unpopulated area for very good reasons.

Note that the global terrorists extend into the U.S., Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and China (the restless Uighurs).
Also shown are the current outlying U.S. security problems: North Korea and its nuclear program, Taiwan, and the northern Andes area with its guerrillas and drug trade.

Next is an impressionistic map of global terrorism.

Figure 29. Their Net vs. Our Net: (I) Their Net

We assume terrorist cells are present in every Islamic country.

We assume sleeper cells are in the more advanced countries and may be present in those countries in Africa South of the Sahara that are only partially Muslim.

(Islam has been spreading all across the savannah of Africa since at least 1400, as documented by Ibn Khaldun in the Middle Ages. It has not quite penetrated the rain forest areas of Africa, except as workers immigrate into those areas (see the current clash in Cote d’Ivoire). Islam has reached as far as Senegal and Sierra Leone (this author is familiar with the Muslim situation in Sierra Leone, having done his dissertation research there; note that the chaos of the last several years in Sierra Leone is neither religious nor ethnic).
We have shown a scattering of “mastermind cells,” without any real information to back up such a distribution.

We show the cells connected by dotted lines, reflecting the virtual network that the global terror, originating with al Qaeda, has become. As is said, “al Qaeda” is “the base.” It has franchises scattered across “The Gap,” and in Europe, and probably retains a central inspirational role. But it looks like all those other disaffected groups may have their own local origins, as in Morocco.

But a few “traveling salesmen” can have a real catalytic effect. (From a Russian, we have the report of a Tajik colonel attending the Marshall Center in Garmisch, who had been trained in Tajikistan by Khattab, the Wahhabi who may have been originally from Jordan. The training included bathing hands in the entrails of a sheep in order to get real bloody experience. Khattab later showed up in Chechnya and was killed there).

Characterizing and identifying the jihadist movement, the extremist Islamic terrorists, has been difficult for the rest of the world. In a way, it has been the product of globalization—as globalization spread after the end of the Cold War (though not clearly connected to the end of the Cold War).

There had been terror that went beyond local terror before—notably the PLO roaming around the Mediterranean and as far north as the Munich Olympics in 1972. The Iranians reached out after their revolution in 1979—but to Paris to assassinate Iranian refugees opposing the regime and, oddly enough, to make two attacks on Jewish centers in Argentina.

But this new global terror definitely arose with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and the efforts of the United States to get Arab (particularly Egyptian and Saudi) support for the “freedom fighters” opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan. Thus were created the Arab-Afghans. On another track, Osama bin Laden was kicked out of Saudi Arabia and Ayman Zawahiri out of Egypt. They found their way to Afghanistan when the Taliban finally took over in 1996. They paid off the Taliban regime and set up their training camps.
Thus was created what might be called the nomadic terrorists. They took advantage of globalization—as shown in the left-hand column of the following chart—to move easily and secretly around the world. Yet their objectives are just the opposite of globalization: as shown in the right-hand column. They cannot stand what they see as globalization’s assault on Islam.

Figure 30. The Paradox of al Qaeda/Jihadism in Globalization

And yet they represent only a tiny fraction of all of those of Islamic faith—estimated as being as many as 1.4 billion people. And they have not been successful in the Arab countries themselves. They have generated local offshoots, like the Jemaah-i-Islami in Indonesia and the surrounding area. This dispersion, especially to Europe, in turn seems to have broken them into small cells, which also restricts their ability to mount larger efforts or build bigger weapons. Yet they can strike anywhere, anytime, it seems.

Finally, we show how little penetration the United States forces have into the Islamic world, in Figure 31 below.
In terms of organized military units, U.S. forces in or near the Islamic world include:

- The Operation Iraqi Freedom forces in Iraq and Kuwait—a huge presence. (Some 25,000 other coalition forces are there too.) Bases elsewhere in the Gulf would also be counted.

- The 17,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan (Plus the NATO force in Kabul and Kunduz), plus the surrounding supporting units in Pakistan (e.g., at air bases near Jacocobad and Pasni), and in Central Asia (actually, one at Manas in Kyrgyzstan).

- The 1,600 personnel of the Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA), in Djibouti. The only publicly reported action taken by them is training in Ethiopia and civic action in northern Kenya along the coast.

- There are also 865 U.S. troops in the MFO in the Sinai, but this has nothing to do with the GWOT.
Finally, there are naval patrols in the Mediterranean, Gulf, and Indian Ocean.

There are training missions in other countries, notably Saudi Arabia, the U.S. continues to have big exercises with local countries (e.g., Bright Star), and the U.S. has access to facilities in Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Kuwait. It maintains command centers in Qatar and Bahrain.

Fighting the GWOT

This chart shows the confrontation and aims of al Qaeda on the right and the United States on the left.

Figure 32. The Global War on Terror

On the top level, the global terrorists, here called “al Qaeda,” want to attack the U.S. and kill Americans. But some say what they really want to do is drive the U.S. and the rest of the West out of the Islamic world, seize control of “The Two Holy Places” (Mecca and Medina) from the Saudi monarchy, establish a unified Islamic world for the first time in
history (the new caliphate), and then drive Israelis into the sea, thus to seize the third holy place (al Aqsa mosque in al Quds).

Since 9/11, they haven’t struck the U.S. again, but have struck intermediate targets, e.g., from Madrid to Bali, at the seams of The Gap. In the Madrid case, they think they may have found a way to strip away U.S. allies. In the meantime, and ever since Khobar Towers and the USS Cole bombing, they are likely to attack U.S. embassies and forces.

On the bottom level of the chart, the U.S. in turn wants to attack the global terrorists, wherever they are—to arrest them in the course of their plotting, to interrupt their finances, and to track down individuals and kill them. If al Qaeda were to set up in another state, having been closed down in Afghanistan (or if they were to seize Afghanistan again), the U.S. would preemptively attack that state.

Figure 33. How to apply U.S. forces to the GWOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOW TO APPLY U.S. FORCES TO THE GWOT</th>
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<td>(Assuming no new harboring state</td>
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<td>in which U.S. may intervene to effect regime change)</td>
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GWOT: From the short vertical scenario to the long horizontal scenario

Carrying on from the previous chart, the simple way to attack the global terrorists would be to conduct surveillance and gain intelligence, and then conduct raids to kill them.
Unfortunately, already this has not proven so simple. Aside from activities in Afghanistan and putative cooperation with the Pakistanis in the tribal areas, only one raid has been publicly reported by CIA, that of using an armed Predator to destroy an SUV in Yemen.

So we go to the second level of action: the need for interagency action and cooperation on a global basis to identify and arrest the terrorists and to dry up their financing. Thus, the FBI and CIA have been operating in Pakistan. We also ask what new capabilities should be added to the forces—especially in Special Forces—to carry out such missions.

But then the third circle becomes important: on one level, the GWOT takes widely coordinated international action, not least in non-proliferation, to contain terrorism and trade intelligence.

Raids without the cooperation of host governments are likely to be the case of “every dog gets one bite”—and that would be the last one. The U.S. found this out in 1986 in the case of the Achille Lauro: we forced the Egyptian airliner to land at Sigonella; it was surrounded by the Italian base police; Delta Force personnel flew in and surrounded them; and the Italian gendarmerie formed a third circle. We were in the middle of the classic circular Italian firing squad!

Finally, there is the question of nation-building and the huge personnel and financial resources needed for anything like that.

Carrying this series of charts to its conclusion, we can envisage two extreme outcomes for U.S. forces and the Defense Department.

- The first is a major shift to homeland defense because of a catastrophic attack, possibly including, a dirty bomb or a use of a chemical weapon as by Aum Shinriyko in Tokyo (even if it kills only 12 as it did in Tokyo). There is a great fear of the American public panicking. The U.S. may need to post guards at every airport, train station, and port, as it used the National Guard at airports after 9/11. It may need to inspect every container. It may need continuous border and maritime patrols. The demands for manpower could be huge.
The other major shift would be if the U.S. were to really occupy more Islamic countries, beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, and possibly to include Pakistan, in order to eliminate the breeding grounds of terrorism. What it would take to really change, e.g., the economy or the education system in a whole country, is not known. (A start has been made with the Binnendijk-Johnson NDU study of nation-building done for the Office of Force Transformation, but even the best assumptions about Iraq were to restore a basic order, whereas the U.S. found none existed.) Again, at the minimum, huge manpower resources would be needed—but from all agencies and walks of life in the U.S.

Figure 34. Two Extreme Outcomes in Which DOD May Play Big Roles

Where Special Forces or conventional forces would be left in this dichotomy is subject to further study.

The domains in which the GWOT (and counter-insurgency as well) take place are different from the set that applied to battle, which covered technology, people, networking, and resources/movement/logistics. These are shown in the following chart:

Three of the four ovals above point to the need for the individuals on the counter-terrorist side to be better trained, knowledgeable, and interactive around the world with other peoples and cultures. We suspect that the success in countering the terrorists may lie more in the ability to mobilize moderate Muslims to the mutual cause, since they are being attacked even more than the Americans are and may be subject to Taliban-like regimes if the terrorists were able to seize power. At the same time, we are aware that the term “moderate Muslims” is our term, whereas the situation country-by-Muslim-country is far more complex.

We have found it useful to array the strategies for pursuing the GWOT under the three tiers set up originally by Kenneth Waltz and elaborated by Tom Barnett:
At the global system level, the U.S. Government has to interact closely with other governments around the world.

At the state level, we get down to how the U.S. Government and DOD are organized, what forces and other capabilities are to be bought, and their interacting with other states—all against the background fact that the terrorists are essentially stateless, but can only move around from state to state. But we are reminded that states no longer control everybody on their territories, unlike the way the Soviet Union did.

The individual level poses a great range of challenges, from the question of understanding the terrorists and the milieus in which they lie low preparing for their next strike, to the need for educating, training, and retaining our own individuals—for much of the GWOT depends on individual vs. individual.

**But the big problem is overall change (reform?) in the Middle East**

Whatever the specific campaigns and instances of chasing terrorists, breaking up their cells, disrupting their financing, capturing their
leaders may entail, just as in counter-insurgency, the terrorists may replicate faster the more successful the U.S. and its allies are. So the real key to “winning” the global war on terror lies in the future of the Islamic countries, especially those in the belt lying from Morocco to Pakistan (all Arab, except for Iran and Pakistan).  

There are four key sectors for this reform: economic, social, security, and political. All would evolve on different timelines, so the holistic coordination among them is extremely difficult. We could possibly add environment and technology to complete a sextet. (This chart was originally designed by Tom Barnett.)

Figure 37. The Big Bang Timelines in the Middle East

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**On economics**, there is the oil question, which is a race of transition for both the Core and the Gap.

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18. We tend to exclude Turkey from “The Gap,” even though its population is Muslim and the ruling party is Muslim. But, as a Turkish general (head of their special forces) pointed out to this author, the remnant of the Ottoman Empire represented by present-day Turkey was the most European-oriented part of the empire. Turkey remains a bridge between the two worlds, both culturally and geographically.
On the social side, you have the basic and most important struggle in terms of Osama’s ability to tap young men in the Middle East (there is important data I came across recently on the “middle aging” of the Middle East that pertains to this).

On security, it’s Bush’s go-it-alone versus the Asian countries—especially India and China—taking their own measures.

On political, what’s left is the race on the West Bank (either let Israel have its solution or the Palestinians theirs); the point being that a do-nothing approach by the Core reveals this race.

As for the U.S. role in bringing about change in the Middle East, perhaps the track may look like Figure 38 below.

Figure 38. Challenges to the U.S. in reforming the Middle East

All the change would be meant to “dry up the seedbeds” of Islamic terrorism, if that is possible—but the expression is more a metaphor than a guide to a practical course.

In the first place, as we keep saying throughout this paper, it is hard to see beyond Iraq (and Afghanistan), for we have no idea how Iraq
is going to turn out. That is, no turning point has been reached as yet. The killing continues on an immense scale, whether one calls it insurgency or civil war. And Afghanistan may be crumbling again, too. We were told right after 9/11 that Afghani men have only two choices: fight or grow poppies. At the moment (July 2006), they are doing both—perhaps more poppy growing than fighting as the revitalized Taliban.

Whenever Iraq is over, and whatever “over” looks like, the U.S. will then be turning back to Middle East peace and Iran. Actually, the diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program has been intense—but there is no break in Iran’s position yet. And Middle East peace prospects are going in the opposite direction, as they certainly have upon Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian elections, and now as what almost looks like a coordinated Hamas and Hezbollah attack on Israel has taken place. And Iran supports both those organizations.

Beyond those two issues, if there is a “beyond,” the U.S. might get back to promoting reform in the Middle East—the word democracy can only be used advisedly, since it hasn’t worked to date. Two approaches are shown: bottom-up and top-down. The classic pattern of the development of democracy (per Inglehart and Welzel19) is better economy, the development of identity and civil society on that basis, followed by democracy. Top-down imposition of democracy, as represented by simply imposing elections, doesn’t work. Key in the Arab countries especially, but also in Iran and Pakistan, is the creation of jobs. Right now, it is hard to envisage how that can be done. The half of countries that have oil create rentier populations, always on the dole. Those that do not have oil must attract foreign direct investment (FDI), but the conditions are not good for it, except perhaps in Egypt. The service economies of Lebanon and Dubai might be models—but Lebanon’s economy (July 2006) has just been destroyed again. The road ahead is long and hard. In the meantime, there is a massive migration of people from the area north to Europe.

Conclusion on GWOT

At the same time, al Qaeda and its offshoots are not likely to bring down the global economy. Whatever their aspirations, they are too dispersed. They have mobilized local forces against them—Saudi Arabia, the prime target country, has done particularly well in suppressing its terrorists, and is making some progress in reforming the country.

Figure 39. A Final Observation About Terrorism

A final observation about terrorism

al Qaeda won't bring down the global economy

Why?
- Didn't on 9/11 – high cost but quick recovery
- Continuing high cost for air travel security – but absorbed
- Attacking oil facilities is not easy: they're hard and repairable
- Global trade is immense and mostly out of their way

Particular incidents caused by al Qaeda may temporarily disrupt an economy—like the tourist trade in Bali. But after the train bombings in Madrid, London, and Mumbai, what did people do the next day? They went back to work because they have to work. The U.S. had to put enormous resources into at least airport and airline security, and there was a substantial loss in the economy for a while after 9/11, but overall the economy has flourished since (that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer and the deficits deeper really has not much to do with 9/11).

It is somewhat surprising that al Qaeda has not disrupted oil production facilities—at all. They had one two-vehicle attack on the huge...
Abqaiq oil refinery in Saudi Arabia, but the gates were sturdy and they didn’t get very far. They hit one tanker—the MV Limburg—as it was waiting for a pilot off the Yemeni port of Mukkala, but the tanker suffered minimal damage while the Yemeni economy suffered greatly.

The global economy has hardly been affected by al Qaeda’s war on the West and on the Muslim countries and the West’s war on terror in return. It continues to grow. Trade continues without disruption, except for some minimal pirate activity in selected places. Oil prices are soaring (July 2006), because of the continuing trouble in Iraq (not particularly due to al Qaeda, though they have contributed to the insurgency), the uncertainties over Iran’s nuclear program, the inability of the corrupt Nigerian government to take care of their people in the Niger Delta instead of stealing the oil proceeds for themselves, Hurricane Katrina, the uncertainties over the new war between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah, and the continuing growth in demand in India and China.

Conclusion on the U.S. role in conflict around the world

To put the security situation, at least for the United States, into perspective, we can see that there’s been a favorable evolution:

![Running Down the Threat](image-url)

*Is this all just a “nesting doll” we need to keep disassembling?*
Reaching back to before 1960, back to the realization of the Soviet threat as it emerged right after World War II, we saw that the West (as distinct from the Soviet “East”) prospered and outlasted the Soviet Union, which concentrated on its military (as somehow the ultimate supply-side pseudo-stimulation of their economy) and, within the command economy system, failed completely in that economic system—and with it the collapse of their military. Just about everybody in the U.S. didn’t know that was going to happen until it happened. But it happened.

The U.S. was left with the rogue states to cope with upon the end of the Cold War. In Washington, the focus was on four of them—Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. All four possessed weapons of mass destruction (notably chemical weapons), were in some kind of process to get nuclear weapons, and had missiles to carry such weapons, assuming they could be mated. All threatened their neighbors in some way (not to be exaggerated). Three of four had tyrannical governments, while revolutionary Iran’s internal political arrangements were more complex. Cuba and Syria might have been added to the rogues list, but they were weak and didn’t really pose threats. And yet the conventional forces of all the rogues were running down hill in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and the cessation of free Soviet military supplies. Now Libya is trying to rejoin the global economy, the U.S. has occupied Iraq, and North Korea’s economy gets more destitute as each year passes—they are barely kept alive by Chinese supplies of food and fuel. Iran has for 18 years been trying to create a nuclear fuel cycle. Basically, they are no threat to their neighbors or to the U.S.—though see the current Iranian support to Hamas and Hezbollah.

As we have tried to lay out, what remains as a global threat—though wraith-like—are the global Islamic extremists. How may they be run to ground by the international community remains to be seen.

But, in the meantime, we don’t know when the war in Iraq will be over, or what “over” may look like.

But, just to remind, it is very hard for the U.S. and for U.S. forces to grapple with the future, including the global war on terror in a con-
sistent and thorough way, until the burden of Iraq is removed from U.S. shoulders.

By mid-July 2006, no turning point had been reached. The insurgency persists, 3,000 Iraqis are being killed a month, and the U.S. can hardly reduce its troops on the ground, especially as most of its coalition partners creep quietly away into the night. The Iraqi economy is in bad shape because of the security problems; particularly bad is the supply of electricity. The U.S. says it can reduce its forces in Iraq as the local Iraqi forces—military and police—ramp up, but then some (e.g., General McCaffrey) say this could take as long as ten years.

The political situation among the Iraqis is up in the air. A government has been formed, but its constituent sects continue to fight each other. The possibility of Iraq disintegrating into sectarian communities remains real. The Iranians are increasing their influence in the south, and the Turks threaten to invade in the north to curb the Kurds. It is particularly difficult for Iraqis—if such people exist—to develop and rotate leadership after years of suppression by Saddam and his minions.

When the U.S. is able to substantially reduce its forces, it will take years to “reset” the forces, both through the replacement and refurbishment of equipment and the recovery of its military personnel to more normal lives. All of this will come at great cost.
Picking up the pieces in DOD after Iraq

Just to set the stage for what may be happening in U.S. defense in mid-2006, this chart shows its rough evolution from the end of the Cold War up through the occupation of Iraq.

Figure 41. A brief history of U.S. defense, 1989-present

In the Bush 41 Administration, they saw the Berlin Wall fall in late 1989, and with it the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact (and any other remnants of the Soviet empire). Within two years, by December 1991, the Soviet Union itself had collapsed. A great global threat had been removed—especially as the Soviet military itself was moved back to Russia from East Europe (as well as leaving some of its best forces in Ukraine and Belarus). The forces then ran out of fuel and fell into disrepair as the old Soviet economy evaporated.
General Colin Powell was then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He designed the Base Force, with cuts to the size of the forces by 25 percent (Marines) to 40 percent (Army and Navy). But he insisted that these cuts, that is, in military personnel, follow a gentle glidepath down (finally reached around 1997). This was to protect the commitments DOD had made to All-Volunteer Force people. The effect of these cuts was also to take a peace dividend, i.e., cut the defense budget. Coincidentally, the federal budget went into surplus. U.S. military personnel in Europe were cut by two-thirds, from 300,000 to 100,000, whereas personnel in Northeast Asia stayed roughly the same (the North Korean threat had not gone away). Altogether, the forces remaining were merely a smaller version of Cold War forces.

U.S. forces (25,000) were used to seize Noriega in Panama in late 1989 and then (500,000) to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Desert Shield), and to oust the Iraqis from that country (Desert Storm). In late 1992, Bush 41 finally sent U.S. forces to Somalia to protect food supply lines and the NGOs administering them.

The Clinton Administration wanted to put a floor on force structure and tried to size it to two major regional conflicts for that purpose. These two were supposed to be abstract, but were quickly identified with North Korea and Iraq, since those were the cases gamed. The selected force structure was 10 active Army divisions and 20 Air Force wings (12 active and 8 reserve).

The Navy proposed to keep 346 ships, including 11 active carriers and one for training (11+1). In the event, under budget restrictions, the Navy shrank to around 300 ships, but made the training carrier (the JFK) a deployable one (12). The smaller forces continued modernization at lower levels, especially in command and control and in precision-guided munitions, to make up for some of the deficiencies otherwise revealed in the highly successful Desert Storm operation. Talk of “transformation” grew across the 1990s, though it was not quite clear what that was.

The Clinton Administration inherited the Somali situation, which was actually a UN operation, but then pulled out after the ill-conceived attempt to go beyond protection of food supplies and other
relief in order to displace leader Aidid. The Administration also faced the continued boat people flow from Haiti, and finally decided to oust the military government there and restore Aristide to the presidency. They contained Iraq all across the 1990s, maintaining no-fly zones over north and south Iraq and making occasional strikes on suspected WMD facilities. Their biggest operations were those to stop civil war and remove Serbian domination from Bosnia and Kosovo. They also expanded NATO membership. In the meantime, global presence was maintained, including regular naval deployments.

For the Bush 43 Administration, initially there were few changes in force structures, but a new emphasis on missile defense. They set in motion a transformation process, though no one was quite sure what it meant (Admiral Cebrowski said, “Don’t try to define it; just do it.”) But for Secretary Rumsfeld, the totality of his view of transformation seemed to be, “lighter, faster.” This led to disaster in Iraq after the first flush of quickly capturing Baghdad and driving Saddam Hussein out of office.

After 9/11 occurred, a new vulnerability of the U.S. homeland was recognized, the U.S. retaliated to remove the Taliban government and al Qaeda from Afghanistan, and the Administration quickly planned to remove Saddam Hussein and install a new regime in Iraq. They accompanied this with a National Security Strategy that featured preemption of threats to the U.S. (actually a prevention strategy). They essentially declared that the U.S. would act unilaterally (those who wanted could join “the coalition of the willing”) and they didn’t see much need for diplomacy or arms control.

They then invaded Iraq, in March 2003, and have been stuck there ever since.

Transformation

The charts on this and the following two pages lay out the characteristics of three evolutions of the operations of U.S. forces:

1. The American Way of War, as it had been transformed in the period from Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
2. The operations of the forces in stabilization and reconstruction—but which have turned largely into counter-insurgency.

3. Operations in the global war on terror.

Figure 42. Transformation in War-Fighting

The basic war-fighting skills of U.S. forces have been demonstrated since the end of the Cold War, especially from Desert Storm through Operation Iraqi Freedom, and in other fighting experiences from Panama on through Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. See the extensive study by Gaffney, Cobble, Gorenburg, and McDevitt on the American Way of War cited earlier. The characteristics of these forces are shown in the four ovals above. At the center is “The Plan:” the U.S. executed much better when it had taken the time to plan. There was a pretty good plan to oust Saddam Hussein, though right on the margin in size of forces and with extremely vulnerable accompanying logistics, which were essentially unprotected.

These characteristics demonstrate U.S. forces’ capabilities for “battle” especially—against other organized forces, or to strip defenses from around a regime so as to rob it of control (the U.S. has actually been
unsuccessful at “decapitation,” not having actually killed a single dictator with its air strikes).

We have noted, though, that U.S. success with this “American Way of War” seems to have left it with no other classic battles to fight. No other country could cope with this kind of force—though a battle with China over Taiwan would pose unique problems.

The U.S. has been less successful in pacifying a country after occupying it. This may be because the energies and imagination devoted to modernization, transformation, training, and education were not devoted to it. The only experiences before Iraq—albeit undertaken with some reluctance amidst constant Congressional complaints about the drain on “readiness”—were in Bosnia and Kosovo (forgetting about Somalia). Yet those experiences for those who had them were considered invaluable (if insufficient) for Iraq.

Figure 43. Transformation for Phase IV—Stabilization, Nation-Building

Using the same framework, however, reveals the difficulties of “transforming transformation” for these purposes. As we know, there was no plan for what to do upon occupying Iraq, and no anticipation of
the insurgency, which grew and grew. The looting, the dismissal of six levels of Ba'athist officials, and the disbanding of the Iraqi army left a huge vacuum that the insurgency filled. The burden was on the U.S. to govern the country, and especially on the U.S. military since there had been no plan and it was difficult to find civilian U.S. officials to go there. Contractors were hired, but had to put around a third of their contract funds into security of their projects. The lack of Arabic language among the Americans was a huge drawback. In short, the shift in transformation was from machines to people, and from moving across territory chasing a (disorganized) enemy to urban warfare reached by roads mined with IEDs, all the time while Iraqis are killing Iraqis.

The need for technology is still exists, e.g., for local surveillance, for IED defeat, for UAVs/UCAVs, etc. At the other end, trying to restore 60-year old Iraqi electric equipment, bought from all over Europe, poses another kind of technological challenge.

Similar challenges exist in Afghanistan, although in some ways it is a far more primitive country than Iraq and the challenges there more basic.

It is not clear how many such occupations and nation-building ventures, either at once or serially, the U.S. in the future would either be willing to undertake or could afford.
This is an attempt to apply the same pattern to the GWOT.

- Both the “battle” and the “nation-building” described in the previous two charts lend themselves to careful planning prior to be undertaken.

- For the nine combat situations we had examined in our earlier study of the American Way of War, careful planning for the battle existed for seven of the cases (the two that were badly planned were Somalia and Kosovo; the U.S. left Somalia, but eventually won in Kosovo).

- But for nation-building, particularly in Iraq, the planning was deficient, and thus the several elements were patched together hastily, with the inevitable difficulties of coordination and synthesis, and no clear successes to date. As someone has said, “They made it up as they went along.”

Perhaps the strategy for GWOT should be to use other means—like working with established governments and helping them to evolve
(though that is risky—see what happened to the Shah of Iran) and to avoid having to take apart another country like Iraq or Afghanistan. That is, the strategy should aim at taking apart the terrorists’ networks rather than nation-building.

The transformation tasks, then, for the GWOT appear formidable. The plan would be more of a capabilities plan. The forces would be ready for contingencies on short notice—if the intelligence were really good—or more deliberate response after an incident (as Tom Barnett has noted in other contexts, it is the inevitably of the response that is more important than the speed of response).

The capabilities in the four dimensions would seem to be quite specialized, e.g., in language abilities needed, in the kind of networking (with other agencies), and in specialized technologies. The movement capabilities may already exist.

This chart shows the transitions in transformation combined from the previous three charts.

Figure 45. Transformation: From AWW to COIN to GWOT

1. **In technological capabilities,** we see the transition from high technology indirect destruction, to close fighting against IEDs, with snipers, using UAVs, etc., while trying to restore ancient
electrical systems, to a globally-dispersed effort, using SIGINT, financial records, local police, and maybe an occasional Special Forces raid.

2. **In networking and jointness**, we see the transition from use of space (“war from space”?) and close cooperation among U.S. forces (beyond simple deconfliction), to coordinating with local officials and troops (as the U.S. may try to organize them), and then to international coordination among many countries and agencies. Note the language changes across the spectrum: from U.S.-only in code/SPIRNET, to the local language (Arabic in Iraq), to many languages, though predominantly English.

3. **In people—their training and readiness**—we see the transition from the U.S.’s own professional force, trained for classic battles, to the additional tasks of cultural sensitivity and learning the local language, plus one-on-one fights, and then to beyond the military to engaging with far more diverse individuals.

4. **As for movement, logistics, funding**, we see the transition from U.S.-only expeditionary movement and its logistics train, to the use of local relief and infrastructure-building funds while protecting the interior logistics train, and then to, again, a much more dispersed effort that in itself may not take a great amount of funding—and a real problem as to where to send U.S. forces that they might find some terrorists?

5. **Finally, as to who does the planning**, we see the transition from regional commanders, interacting with Washington, doing classic contingency/war planning, U.S.-only, to much more complex interagency planning (i.e., for “Phase IV”), and then to not so much planning as daily operations based on the scrounging of clues for the locations and plotting of terrorists—and behind that, the kind of consequence management planning that would be part of homeland defense.

How is all of this to be combined, both within DOD and across the U.S. Government? We can at least show an evolution in DOD attention, per the following chart.
Note that the three cases of transformation examined in the previous three charts correspond to the “running down the threats” chart shown earlier. The U.S. has already progressed from running down the classic threat, i.e., the Soviet threat, through running down the rogue threat, and may be left with the global terrorist threat once Iraq is over, if it is ever over.

In any case, the GWOT would represent a fairly big cultural change for DOD, as it transitions to a new age and the new challenges of the GWOT.

Some might take exception to the characterization of the “golden age of the 1990s” as the “engagement” DOD. But it was a relatively benign era (the combat described in our studies of the nine combat situations took up grossly only 6 percent of the total time from 1989 through the end of “the major combat phase” of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and only a small portion of the forces was used in most of the cases). Otherwise, U.S. forces were maintaining the peace around
the world, improving their own internal coordination and readiness, and modernizing incrementally.

The third phase now lies beyond Iraq. Iraq must be settled first. Afghanistan then probably becomes part of the GWOT, as it started out to be.

The planning for dilemmas for the Defense Department

The dynamics of the decisions the Defense Department faces are portrayed in the chart that follows—assuming the picking up of the pieces once U.S. forces have left Iraq. The chart also reflects some of the main themes that were being pursued by the Bush 43 Administration “aside from Iraq.”

Figure 47. The future of U.S. Defense After Iraq

These three circles represent the typically major activities in which DOD is involved:

- In the first place, the **size and structure of forces** are the Services’ “legacies,” their continuity, their career pipelines, and
the basis of what they think are their strength. It takes about two-thirds of their budgets (personnel costs and O&M, i.e., their readiness). In a way, it’s “the ghost of Christmas past.”

- **Posture and operations** takes the forces out into the world—current operations, as it were, and the incremental costs to do that. In a way, it’s “the ghost of Christmas present.”

- **Transformation** encompasses modernization or change to something new and different (“recapitalization” is embedded in size-and-structure). It’s “the ghost of Christmas future.”

- DOD has talked about reposturing, but at the present it is bogged down in current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It can hardly think much about the reposturing beyond those operations. In any case, the changes proposed have been on the margin (further reductions in Europe, a brigade out of South Korea, loading forces onto Guam, but most forces being returned to the Continental U.S.).

- **On size and structure** after Iraq and Afghanistan, for the GWOT the Special Forces are to be increased from about 57,000 to 85,000—though out of other services’ hides. But that the Army should be increased by 30,000 (or more) and the Marines by 5,000 has been resisted by the current Administration. The Navy and Air Force structures are going to shrink simply because replacement ships and aircraft are much more expensive, even if more capable. Indeed, the case can be made for the Navy and Air Force that overall capabilities will increase over time (especially as reflected in aircraft strike sortie effectiveness). The balance between active and reserve personnel, especially in ground forces, needs to be adjusted—again depending on whether the U.S. at the top expects to be engaging in further invasions, occupations, stabilization and reconstruction, and nation-building, beyond Iraq.

- **As for transformation**, we have tried to show in the previous charts that this is in transition—the transformation of transformation as it were—because of the progression from The American Way of War into Counterinsurgency and then into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Beyond that may lie deterrence and dissuasion of China, which will be discussed later. In
the notes above, it should be noted that the American Way of War forces had become quite capable between Desert Storm and OIF, though still with holes in the net and problems with gathering and disseminating intelligence. The other transformations remain to be worked out—and how they may be balanced with the basic legacy, or American Way of War, forces.

Going through the intersections in this Venn diagram:

1. **On the posture-force size/structure nexus**, it will be hard to resolve until the occupation of Iraq is over. U.S. ground forces will stay larger than envisaged for a longer term until that time. If the costs of the occupation are rolled into the regular presidential budget submission, as the Congressional appropriations committees are now indicating, that could squeeze Air Force and Navy. After Iraq, the previous reposturing plans may be carried out—but that also depends on how the world may have changed in the interim, as well as the disposition of the next Administration as to use of military force.

2. **On the transformation/size nexus**, the question is whether a resumption of high-tech acquisitions is to be undertaken, in which case the forces will continue to shrink in size, especially given likely budget straits under the high U.S. deficits and the growing costs of Social Security and Medicare. On the other hand, a greater shift to counterinsurgency and Special Forces, then more cultural and language training would displace transformation as technology—though the costs are not comparable.

3. **On the posture/transformation nexus**, we have simply noted, “the more occupation and policing of the world” undertaken by U.S. administrations, i.e., the more they attend to the immediate troubles in the world, the more thoughts about some longer-term future will be put on the back burner.

4. Finally, at the center of this Venn diagram is “strategy and budget.” There is a myth in DOD that one should set the strategy, decided what the “requirements” for the forces are to carry out the strategy, and then calculate the budget needed. It is a myth because it never happens that way. Besides, Americans are no
good at strategy because they are infinitely flexible and adaptable. But that is beside the point. The main point is that both strategic direction and the budget are set outside DOD.

- Strategic direction comes from the Administration in office based on their view of the world, the U.S. role in the world, and their view of the role of the U.S. military. If they prefer a foreign policy not driven by thoughts of military intervention, they look to the future of the forces—which may be the default impulse in the domestic political context. If they want to lead with the military in world affairs (lead with their noses), then it is a matter of current operations “with what you have.”

- Budget direction also comes from the Administration in office, but from a different set of people: OMB and the Treasury Department. They set the budget according to Administration economic policy—notably, the deficit the federal government thinks it can tolerate. The current Administration can tolerate huge deficits since their highest priority is tax cuts for the wealthy, which they believe leads to increased economic growth.

- But then there are the legacy forces and legacy involvements around the world—right now, Iraq dominates.

The result of all this are iterative processes and compromises toward what is “good enough” Basically, the services are left to balance out their manning, operations and maintenance, and future investments in their forces within the budgets they are given—whatever strategic words are issued by the Administration.

**QDR-06**

In the meantime, the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the beginning of the QDR-05 process (which turned into QDR-06 because it took longer than expected) set forth the quadrant chart shown below in Figure 48, with what they described as the future challenges to U.S. security.
Figure 48. Challenges to U.S. Security

The intent of this chart was to push resources and strategic thinking from the traditional sector of the quadrant to the other three quadrants.

- **The irregular sector** has come to be well-recognized, as covering the current insurgency in Iraq (and growing again in Afghanistan) and what some think are the prospects for continuing U.S. engagement in insurgencies around the world (despite the fact that it was otherwise reluctant to engage in such insurgencies in the 1990s—the Somalia syndrome). It also covers the GWOT.

- **The catastrophic sector** covers WMD—but confines it to “terrorists and rogue states” rather than, say, Russia and China, both of which are sustaining older strategic nuclear forces. The rogues would be Iran and North Korea, neither of which could reach the U.S. for a long time to come. Global Islamic terrorists acquiring WMD, especially nuclear weapons, would have dire consequences, but it would be extraordinarily difficult for
them, especially as they are dispersed and have no industrial capability of their own. The favorite sources are Russia, or the Pakistanis giving them one—neither strong possibilities.

- **The disruptive sector** is about another country developing “breakthrough technologies.” It is really directed at China turning out to be brilliant technologists like the Soviets were once presumed to be. It is the latest expression of the Sputnik phenomenon. China developing terminally-guided ballistic missiles for attacks on U.S. carriers and other ships that would be approaching Taiwan to aid in its defense upon a Chinese attack is a clearly emerging capability. Whether they have a full sensor-to-shooter capability to exploit it is another question: it isn’t easy.

The greatest difficulty with the four challenges quadrant chart lies in the changes in programming that might follow upon its adoption, as shown in Figure 49 below.

**Figure 49. Strategic Implications of QDR-06**

![Diagram of strategic implications](image-url)
This chart is an attempt to indicate some directions and proportions—but the limits of one-dimensional, restricted area PowerPoint presentation prevented this author from properly portraying those proportions. Clearly, the program expenses now for the war in Iraq (and Afghanistan) take the overwhelming amount of resources and attention.

The main point is that, with the continuing occupation and counter-insurgency in Iraq, plus continuing operations in Afghanistan, and counting the supplementals for these purposes together with the regular defense budget, the “irregular” quadrant should overwhelm the picture. It would become even more so if the present U.S. administration were to undertake other invasions and occupations, as in Iran, or another country harboring a new al Qaeda base (the next U.S. administration is highly unlikely to do so). There might be more emphasis on the GWOT, but, with current trends, it would not be a big resource drain. However, if there were another horrendous terrorist attack on the U.S. itself, there would be a major shift of defense resources (and DHS budget increases) to homeland defense. Whether homeland defense is a stretch of “irregular” might be disputed by some.

As for the “catastrophic” quadrant, in the immediate real world, the new threats would be from Iran and North Korea—though both countries would have great troubles reaching the U.S. with nuclear weapons. The fear of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons has been mentioned. Against these, especially against Iran and North Korea, the U.S. retains formidable nuclear retaliation capabilities. But uncertainties remain as to whether U.S. can deploy missile defenses that can work. There is also the question of WMD attacks against other countries or against deployed U.S. forces—the shorter range missile defense systems the U.S. is developing may be more effective than the longer-range. Beyond that is the great fear of terrorists setting off biological pandemics—for which there is no evidence as yet, but an enormous amount of analysis and research in the U.S. of prevention (through vaccines) and consequence management.

Moving to the “disruptive” quadrant, U.S. legacy forces, especially those of the Navy, plus perhaps the U.S. Air Force, tend to be focused on the possibilities of a growing technological threat from China. In
a sense, the function of what we have called “the American Way of War” flows here because we can’t think of other plausible scenarios in which to apply it. More important is the “dissuasion” function, as expressed by the late Admiral Cebrowski: by maintaining a technological edge through continued research and development, other countries may be either discouraged from developing comparable capabilities or, as Admiral William Owens put it, the U.S. sharing those capabilities with them obviates the necessity of them developing it for themselves (though both the Europeans and Russians have developed the equivalent of GPS).

Finally, the U.S. forces characterized as “traditional” may shrink, though the services cling to them (the Army’s development of the Future Combat Systems, FCS, is an example). But most such forces throughout the rest of the world, especially among the advanced countries, are shrinking even more—perhaps discouraged by any thought of keeping up with the U.S. and being content under a U.S. umbrella—though that is dependent on the U.S. umbrella being wielded wisely—and yet a good deal of confidence in that has been lost around the world. Other traditional forces, as in Egypt, Syria, and Iran, are simply not being replaced and remaining equipment is getting old and is in any case unused. But any U.S. operations, except perhaps those of Special Forces, are to be drawn from these traditional forces, however they may be adapted for counter-insurgency (but not for nation-building). They could well be swung to homeland defense if the need arises.

The Quadrant chart was not the complete center of QDR-06 thinking, however. The following chart shows the other directions the words of the QDR pointed to, yielding what I call a complicated, 64-cell, planning framework.
Is the security situation in the world requiring attention to these tasks that complicated? We have pointed out earlier that state-on-state war has practically disappeared from the globe, that we are down to two rogues—neither one likely to pose any formidable threats, especially to the U.S. itself, and the most substantial residual is the global threat of Islamic extremists—who are surviving by being dispersed in small cells. Of course, the current rocket and kidnap wars on Israel by Hamas from the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah from southern Lebanon have created an almost new kind of war—and yet the U.S. itself, under the current U.S. administration, is highly reluctant to intervene there with forces, even as part of peacekeeping forces (if the world would be so lucky as to get agreement to set them up).

Rather, the U.S. has to pursue a good deal of these tasks by diplomacy, i.e., working with other nations and with countries that could turn hostile to defuse the conditions for any future war. Such is the case with China, where China’s stakes in its own internal growth (and control of unrest) are tightly bound with its worldwide commerce. “Counter” proliferation is a forces-in-reserve notion, whereas non-proliferation or assuring that the minimal proliferation that has
taken place is contained and measures of reassurance, as between India and Pakistan, are taken. That is what is being pursued now with regard to India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran.

This chart and the next one summarize the QDR-06.

Figure 51. Outcome of QDR-06: Strategically

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME OF QDR-06</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRATEGICALLY:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Beyond Iraq,” in essence – but is there a “beyond Iraq”? Iran?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “The long war” -- it’s on terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Influence choices of countries at strategic crossroads” (China – throw in Russia and India to dilute focus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nice words on nation-building, cultures, languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can’t do it alone – need allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• But the preemption option preserved as “last resort”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “1-4-2-1” becomes “1-global-2-1 big insurgency-1”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first place, QDR-06 is almost silent on what to do about Iraq—that was beyond its charter. Yet it is unlikely that Iraq will be stabilized and U.S. forces come home before it is time for the next QDR.

The QDR talks about “the long war”—establishing some kind of rough equivalence of the GWOT with the Cold War against the Soviet Union—a protracted conflict, as Robert Strausz-Hupé put it in the 1950s. But then “the long war” is confused with repeated incidences of counter-insurgency warfare. And the al Qaeda campaign is labeled “an insurgency,” which is doubly confusing. Single words to describe everything don’t help the planning or the commander in the region.

“Influencing countries at strategic crossroads” is mostly about China—but Russia and India are thrown in to dilute the political implica-
tions of focusing on China. Yet the peril in such dilution (aside from the desperate desire of the services to maintain 2MCOs in order to keep force structure) is that of the self-fulfilling prophecy. As a keen observer of the Russian military, this author notes (1) it is a shrunken, un-recapitalized force that hardly operates and (2) at least through Putin, it has no priority in Russian government policy. They are much too busy trying to create an economy.20

There are nice words on nation-building, building cultural sensitivity in U.S. forces, and U.S. military personnel learning languages, but the words don’t appear until page 78 of the document, and the resources applied to it are minimal—one-thirtieth of those devoted to missile defense R&D.

But at least the strong message of the QDR is that the U.S. can no longer manage the world militarily all by itself, but needs help from other countries. This is a step forward. However, the reissue of the National Security Strategy still keeps the preemption option.

Finally, some had hoped that the “2MCOs” that the services like to plan on in order to maintain their force structures would go away in light of the changed world—where the GWOT and possibly more counter-insurgency operations would be pursued by the Administration, while the legacy force, transformed, would serve as a hedge on the remote possibility of the appearance of a military “peer” like the Soviet Union (which collapsed trying to be a peer). But in the QDR, the “requirements” got broader instead: 1 (homeland defense) remained; “presence in 4 areas” became “global presence,” the 2 MCOs were retained, but one might be reframed as a big insurgency, and the last 1 (essentially regime change) was retained. This seems a muddle.

As for the forces indicated by the QDR, as shown on the following chart, they look very much like the legacy forces, and their next improvements look very much like extending “the American Way of

“War.” That is not a bad thing at all. It is the American genius and truly discourages other countries from trying to compete with us. Whether it implies a strategy that takes U.S military thinking straight back to MCOs is not made clear.

Figure 52. Outcome of QDR-06: The Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME OF QDR-06 (continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE FORCES:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Preserves Army at 480K, continues brigade restructuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ But lets them continue with Future Combat System (FCS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Marines dropped back to 175K, but 2600 to SOCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ But MV-22 begins production at $101 million a copy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lets Navy talk about 313 ships as a goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Lets them proceed with DDX, CVN-21, two SSNs in 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Air Force gets 183 F-22s, new bomber advanced from 2037 to 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ But otherwise shrinks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Special forces increased by 14K – 10K out of Army &amp; Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dumb proposal for conventional warhead on Trident D-5 missile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The very expensive systems for each of the services are continued—many dating in development all the way back to the Cold War, like the F-22.

The Navy is going to have great difficulty getting to 313 ships, as will be discussed in the next section, especially as the DOD budget gets leveled off and has to absorb the continuing operations in Iraq (and Afghanistan). The Navy’s hope for numbers lies in the LCS (Littoral Combat Ship), which would also be consistent with daily involvement out in the world.

There is a strong emphasis on increasing Special Forces, though.
Two alternative paths for U.S. forces

Whatever the challenges emerging from the QDR, we can nonetheless lay out two paths that U.S. forces might follow, as shown in the chart that follows.

In the first place, the choice of paths cannot take place until there is a turning point in Iraq; that is, until the way is clear for U.S. forces to come home. At this point in time (July 2006), the assumption is that the U.S. will not “cut and run,” whatever the pressures of the U.S. Congressional election in November 2006.

Thereafter, what path the Administration may set U.S. forces on (it’s a political choice) depends on the situation in the rest of the world.

Per Track I, at the bottom, in the best possible of worlds, the greater part of U.S. forces could return to the U.S. and resume their watchful waiting and preparation for the future—perhaps leaving it to Special Forces to do the military part of the GWOT (recalling that most
efforts in the GWOT will be interagency and international). In any case, U.S. ground forces especially will need time to recover and reset, to restore and replace equipment and souls—short, to go back to the readiness and recapitalization that marked most of the 1990s. There might be a renewed emphasis on the Navy and Air Force, i.e., the high-tech part of U.S. forces—and then in preparation for “the MCO” (Major Combat Operation, with China the objective. At the same time, the ground forces (Marines and Army) will nonetheless be absorbing the lessons and future approaches to counter-insurgency in their training and education.

**Per Track II, U.S. forces would continue to be engaged in the world as they are now**—just about completely wrapped into “the present” rather than the future. The future would be now—nudging the world day-by-day to maintain stability or something. There is a lot of talk in the defense community in Washington (both in DOD and the clusters of organizations that think about it) about building up U.S. government capabilities (interagency) for “Phase IV”/stabilization and reconstruction/nation-building. In the meantime, though, the great continuing experiment in this regard in Iraq probably discourages the current administration or any next administration from undertaking such an adventure in another country, leaving aside which country that might be. Otherwise, though, the pattern has been set for U.S. forces to remain active in the world, in continuous operations. The services are enthused about undertaking lesser interventions, especially for humanitarian purposes, including disaster relief.

Track II could also mean a continued priority to ground forces, since most of these activities take place on land, where the people are, rather than at sea or in the air—although, as usual, U.S. forces get to those places by sea or air.

Track II is where the GWOT would be pursued in detail, especially by Special Forces—directly, or by assisting local forces. They are now active in Afghanistan (and in communication with Pakistani forces across the border) and in the Trans-Sahel. The CJTF Horn of Africa is also busy digging wells in Kenya and training other local troops—but it is unclear whether the Administration would want them to go into Somalia. (The Ethiopians may have taken that role, as of July 2006.)
All the calculations as to how to deploy and equip U.S. forces would be changed if they were refocused on U.S. homeland defense upon another horrendous terrorists attack here.

Note, in the chart, the huge gaps in three pairs looked at vertically.

- You can’t occupy another country instead of returning to the U.S.

- You can’t stay active in the world if you want to restore readiness and recapitalization (remembering that, for Congress, perfect readiness is never have to deploy the forces—see both Congressional and Republican Party agitation about how having minimal U.S. forces in Bosnia and Kosovo was “ruining readiness; they are silent now in that respect with regard to Iraq).

- Pursuing GWOT might actually take few resources, which could be devoted to planning for the China MCO, but the two sets are still mentally disconnected.

As usual in DOD planning, however, there will be the temptation to have a little bit of everything (shown as “mixed priorities”), even as the DOD budget goes stagnant or shrinks.

**Summing up the directions in U.S. defense under globalization**

To sum up the loose connections between the paths U.S. forces might take in the future—both in operations and in building for the future—we return to the four track evolution of globalization discussed earlier in this paper, as the next chart shows.
The best of the four possible world evolutions (the stress must be kept on “evolutions” as opposed to end-points), had looked to be on track before 9/11 and Iraq. If that had continued to be the case, U.S. forces would be on Track I, planning for the future, with no great daily engagement in the world except to maintain connections with allies and to stay familiar with the physical environments around the world.

The current world, mid-2006, is the second path of globalization: globalization with glitches as it were—patches of conflict around the world, not strategically connected. Some fear that the current two-front war that Israel is fighting, against Hamas and Hezbollah, with strong Syrian and Iranian involvements, is the start of “World War III” (Gingrich). Whatever that may be, it does once more point to the Middle East as the greatest source of instability, not least because it is the breeding grounds for the global extremist Islamic terrorists. U.S. forces would be on Track II in this case—continuous daily involvement in the world, either involved in conflicts or standing by to intervene.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path of Security</th>
<th>Path of U.S. Forces?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security needs diminish: no state-on-state wars; internal conflict down; terror dispersed, controlled</td>
<td>U.S. forces return to Readiness, improvements: wait for future emergences; capabilities-based planning; some world engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current world: continued ME troubles, frictions complicate security coop, persistent internal conflicts</td>
<td>Continued operations in world: Iraq and Afghanistan; shift in forces to nation-build; but no new invasions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frictions over competition for resources, possible arms races, new East Asian security arrangements</td>
<td>U.S. forces stay strong, back Home: leave settlements to diplomacy; periodic engagement &amp; presence in world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New security blocs track with exclusive economic zones</td>
<td>U.S. forces build alliances; U.S. policies of containment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Center for Strategic Studies
The third course of globalization has the world in some kind of competition between the U.S. and China, as two superpowers, at least in the economic and resource competition sense. This is not bad, for economics tend to be non-zero-sum, but oil and gas may get scarcer as peaks in reserves are reached, and energy will be short unless alternatives and renewables are fully developed and deployed. For U.S. forces, it would be a variation on Track I, with the addition of engagement and presence out around the world, as a deterrent. It is hard to imagine them engaging in some military battles with China over resources—it would ruin the markets, and China is more vulnerable economically than the U.S.

The fourth globalization track implies the breakdown of globalization into regional economic blocs with the failure of the Doha Round and thus WTO. It is hard to imagine self-sufficient regional economic blocs, however. But an imagined result might be the resurrection of regional alliances, as in the Cold War, in which U.S. forces would be engaged.

We can sum up the evolution of U.S. forces and U.S. involvement in the globalized world in the chart that follows:

Figure 55. The Evolution of U.S. Forces’ Operations
Starting after World War, and, for the U.S. military, with the Korean
War in 1950 (which also led to the construction of the military arm of
NATO), there was the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union
—from Europe to the Far East. With decolonization, the competition
shifted in a half-hearted and ragged way into the Third World. The
Soviet Union got Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. The U.S.
fought in Vietnam, but also got Egypt over to its side.

With the end of the Cold War, we have gone through “the American
Way of War,” with its series of military engagements from Panama to
Operation Iraqi Freedom. These demonstrated American military
strength and expertise, and corresponded with the decline of state-
on-state war and internal conflicts.

U.S. defense today in the global system is dominated by 9/11, Iraq,
and Afghanistan (terrorists are being pursued in Pakistan, Southeast
Asia, and Europe by others, it seems). DOD has a new QDR in place,
as shown in the middle-bottom.

The possibilities for the future are shown on the right—as discussed
earlier: greater focus on GWOT, the problems with Iran, unknown
cases of other interventions and counter-insurgencies, and China. As
usual, surprises may occur, as with the war Israel is engaged in right
now (July 2006). Whether they establish a dominant path depend-
cency into the future would have to be seen when they occur.

But, as noted earlier, U.S. homeland defense—the reference is to the
far right on the chart—could become the highest priority.

Another way of looking at the evolution of U.S. forces—their equip-
ment, postures, deployments, and engagements—can be shown in
the next chart. The chart may be a bit of a caricature, but it shows the
cycles the U.S. seems to have gone through.

In between Iraq and China lies a low-tech, all agencies, many coun-
tries around the globe, war on global terrorism. But it is hard to see
that war as a force-sizer for U.S. forces, or a technological driver. That
is because the terrorists are dispersed in cells—in Europe, the Middle
East, the Trans-Sahel (but not in most of Africa), and Southeast Asia
(but not in China or, apparently in the U.S., nor in Latin America—
no matter how some people strive to make the Tri-border area among Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina at hotbed of terrorism).

Figure 56. Evolution(?) of American Strategic Thinking

**COLD WAR**
- Nukes: Hi-Tech, for quality over quantity

**VIET-NAM**
- Bogged down in a lo-tech ground war, with attrition

**AWW**
- Hi-Tech, Powell doctrine: in and out quickly, low attrition

**IRAQ**
- Bogged down in a lo-tech ground war, with attrition

**CHINA!**
- Hi-Tech, for quality over quantity; fast war

**WHERE HAS THE GWOT DISAPPEARED TO?**
(except for Special Forces, not a force sizer or configurer)

*Center for Strategic Studies*
How does the U.S. Navy fit into this picture out into the future?

We can illustrate the changing global distribution of the U.S. Navy in its contribution to solving particular disruptions in the 1990s. The distribution of U.S. naval forces’ responses shown here is based on the study we did.21

Figure 57. U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations in the 1990s

It is crucial to point out that the non-functioning areas are where the vast majority of U.S. military responses took place in the post-Cold

War era. Those areas being “left behind” by globalization are the same areas into which the U.S. has typically sent military forces on a recurring basis. Conversely, U.S. military interventions in those parts of the world that are globalizing are rare.

In the 1990s, there were only four clusters of responses that dominated: Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia-Kosovo, and containment and strikes against Iraq from the Persian Gulf. In short, these were across the seam of the world and, especially in Bosnia-Kosovo and the Gulf, at the seam between the functioning and non-functioning areas. (Note that most of the responses outside the seam were NEOs, that is, not of strategic or global significance.)

For the future, Haiti as a problem has gone away, but could be back. Bosnia and Kosovo are making progress in stabilization, aided by allied ground forces. It is hard to envisage U.S. naval forces returning there. Somalia had gone away as a problem too, but as of this writing, there was some fear that al Qaeda might seek a new base there as the Islamic Courts Union takes over the country. That leaves the Persian Gulf and South Asia as the areas in which the mostly likely threats to global stability may continue. At the same time, North Korea has not gone away and is still poised to attack South Korea. The Navy participated in a significant show of force off Korea in 1994. China’s threat to Taiwan is constant, and the Navy participated in a show of force in that area in 1996.

Whatever the utility of the U.S. Navy in participating in Administration-directed responses to situation up to now, their leadership faces real problems now in addressing the Navy’s future.
With the ongoing counter-insurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a new Middle East war involving Israel, where the U.S. is on the sideline, there would seem to be no particular focus to the GWOT on the part of the Administration—except for all the ongoing inter-agency work to track down terrorists. Democratizing the Middle East is, for the moment, a big failure and is not being pressed, except in Iraq. It would otherwise not engage much of U.S. forces.

All this leaves the U.S. Navy on the sidelines—except that they are providing sorties in support of OIF, plus around 10,000 naval personnel (IAs—individual augmentees) serving in the rear areas in Iraq (in addition to the medics with the Marines, EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) people, SeaBees, and lawyers already there (Seals as well—but they belong to SOCOM)).

Unfortunately, five years after 9/11, and ten years after al Qaeda was recognized as a centrally-directed (now –inspired) terrorist organization, the terrorists do not appear to have put to sea, though there is a constant concern that they might. The Navy continues, with allies, to patrol in the Persian Gulf and in the Mediterranean (Active Endeavor), in the western Indian Ocean (CTF 150), and is now oper-
ating a little more in West Africa, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. They encounter smuggling in the Gulf, boat people in the Med, and some piracy off Somalia, but no one has picked up any terrorists during these patrols. These patrols may well have a deterrent effect, but the nature of deterrence is that it’s hard to know how it’s working.

At the other end of the spectrum—building for the future—the Navy plans to grow from 281 combat ships at present to 313 in the future. This will take, by their current estimates, and in current dollars (not inflated) an average of $13.4 billion a year plus extremely strict cost controls and reductions, especially for the DD-1000 and SSN-774 classes. They are getting $11.2 billion for FY07, but would need $15.1 billion in FY08—a nearly $4 billion jump. Yet in the same years, the U.S. Army is now saying it needs equivalent amounts for resetting itself after Iraq. What difference to global stability 313 ships vs. 281 ships makes is not clear—other than the Regional Commanders wanting the number of ships they had before.

The DD-1000 (Zumwalt Class) hangs in the balance, especially—given wide-ranging estimates of its costs. On the other hand, it is essentially part of “the American Way of War” forces. As noted earlier, the AWW forces are a good capability for the U.S. to hold onto, but they are also a truly joint force. The real trade-off for DD-1000 is with tactical aviation of the Navy and Air Force.

The Navy, as do the other services, faces continually rising costs of personnel, especially in the medical area (as does the whole of U.S. society—medical care is now up to 16 percent of GDP and still rising, and the U.S. military is not exempt from these rises) and of O&M, including rising fuel costs. These rising costs also put a squeeze on ship construction.

The Navy has a noble initiative underway to create a world-wide “1,000-ship navy.” The part of it furnished (To us? Or is it a truly cooperative venture?) by advanced allies is already functioning—except that those navies, except perhaps for the Japanese navy, are also

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shrinking. The greater difficulty lies in mobilizing all the little navies in the Third World. The Navy is also up against the fact that navies around the world are hardly influential—especially to get resources for themselves, and certainly not at political levels in their countries. By the same token, U.S. military assistance funds are hardly enough to buy any boats and ships for the poorer countries. But the interactions are good in themselves.

The Navy in the QDR-06 Quadrant of Challenges

The Navy’s (and the Marines’) involvement in the Quadrant Chart follows, on the next page.

Looking at U.S. Navy functions (and the U.S. Marine Corps) in the context of the irregular quadrant, the Marines now (in Iraq) have a lot to do. The Navy provides useful, though perhaps marginal, support to the Iraq effort. Beyond that, the Navy, as noted, is patrolling endlessly in several areas, but has encountered only the few pirates off Somalia.

Figure 59. How do U.S. naval forces fit in the QDR-06 Quadrant Chart?

![Diagram showing the Quadrant Chart for U.S. naval forces in relation to Ryan Henry’s challenges.](image)

*Where does “sea basing” fit in any of this?*
If homeland defense against the terrorists is considered part of the irregular quadrant, the Navy would be likely to be given an immense role in patrolling off the coasts of the United States following another horrendous terrorist incident in the U.S.

The Navy’s initiatives for LCS and a riverine force are particularly pertinent to the irregular quadrant.

On the catastrophic quadrant, the Navy still provides the 14 Trident SSBNs and the developing Aegis/SM-3/SM-4 capabilities for missile defense, if needed. If disaster relief, with widespread death and suffering are involved, the Navy has demonstrated that its hospital ships and large-deck ships—carriers and the amphibious ships that have both helicopter and well-deck capabilities—can be very useful. But it is a little hard to see the Navy buying ships on that rationale.

For the disruptive quadrant, the strike Navy—naval aviation and SSNs—play a major deterrent role against a threatened Chinese attack on Taiwan. (I am told there’s no Marine role in that case—no one has indicated that it would be any Administration’s policy to place U.S. ground forces on Taiwan.)

Finally, it is the erstwhile traditional, or legacy, forces from which all the Navy’s activities in the other three quadrants are drawn. Apart from LCS and a riverine force, it is not apparent that other initiatives peculiar to each of those other three quadrants are warranted. In particular, after Iraq, it is hard to envisage the Administration wanting to invade another country again. Thus, it isn’t clear where an expanded sea-base of forces would be needed. It may be, however, an ideal case of “capability-based planning,” i.e., a good capability to have on hand, without regard to any particular scenarios or threats. Yet that means it may well be squeezed in competition with the other elements of the Navy as time goes by. What I am saying is that it is hard to fit it into the evolving world as we conjecture it—but it would be hard to tailor U.S. forces exactly to any alternative path of globalization in any case. The forces remain in reserve in a largely peaceful world (see the introduction to this paper)—assuming Iraq is stabilized, and whenever that may be.
Using a parallel chart to the earlier one that showed the dilemmas and trade-offs for the entirety of U.S. forces, we can look at the trade-offs that the U.S. Navy possibly faces—again depending on when U.S. forces get to leave Iraq, and what Iraq and the region looks like upon that departure. It is very likely that the U.S. will want to retain military presence in the Persian Gulf, but it is now a certainty that there will be no land bases in Iraq. That does means a prominent role for the U.S. Navy as the continuing U.S. military presence in the Gulf for the indefinite future. It has had that role since 1949.

Figure 60. U.S. Navy Can’t Do Everything At Once

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy prides itself on its balance among readiness, people, capabilities—so size shrinks.</td>
<td>Navy has gotten itself in a bind because it’s changing all its types all at once. It is choosing capability over size.</td>
<td>To afford all the new capabilities, including ships, fewer ships, less presence, but so what?</td>
<td>Navy always strives for balance; budget straits mean numbers shrink; problem for Navy is whether stays joint, or goes “internal,” creates own world, stays at sea – strong temptation after Iraq (if there’s an “after”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at the Navy’s operations out in the world, the Navy is at the moment torn between “surge,” as instituted by retired CNO Vern Clark, where he had discovered in the course of OIF that “the president was a customer” (he must have been the only person in Washington to be so surprised), vs. the pressure by the regional commanders to have as much day-to-day naval presence as possible. The Navy declares that it does not want to be maintenance-schedule driven, but
operational-needs driven, but the reality is that there is little flexibility in that scheduling. Surge practically meant cutting regular deployments to, e.g., four months vice the customary six, at least for carriers. The Navy may be gaining some flexibility with “Sea Swap,” exchanging crews on deployed ships rather than bringing the ships all the way back to the U.S. We hear that this program may be curtailed, though.

Nonetheless, with whatever ships it has, the Navy will continue to deploy regularly, and to the areas that it usually does—with the addition of a new interest in the Gulf of Guinea. There the regular, even continuous, deployment, ideally of an LPD (probably not with a full complement of Marines) may suffice. Otherwise, the Navy will continue to exercise and otherwise professionally relate to other navies, especially those of the advanced nations.

As for transformation, the Navy continues to make enhancements to its connectivity, especially in its broadband connections. It is also improving its capabilities for missile defense, using existing platforms, of which it will have around 84 for some time into the future. It is in producing whole new classes of ships that it faces the greatest challenges of transformation. Production of DDG-51 is to be replaced by LCS and DD-1000. The SSN-774 line is already producing one a year—but it cannot go to two a year until 2012 and maybe not even then, depending on the budget situation—and, of course, the putative Chinese threat. The Nimitz carrier type is to be replaced by CVN-21 at much greater cost (and the Navy will reduce to 10-11 carriers at various times). There is much talk and study and analysis of sea-basing, but it looks like a modest force of 8 ships may be the result, and without radically new long-range aerial deliveries nor new ship-to-shore capabilities beyond helos and LCACs.

As for size and structure of the naval forces, it is these radical new developments of ships that may well cause the Navy to end up smaller than its present 281, whatever its aspirations for 313. This is further complicated by the likely desire to keep all kinds of platforms in their present balance.

Looking at the operations/size nexus, if the size goes down, even higher priority-setting would have to take place as to what areas to deploy to. They will need help from higher political authorities on
this rather than trying to work the solutions themselves. Perhaps Vern Clark’s surge concept may find itself back in favor. Alternatively, if some things like DD-1000 were given up in favor of more LCS, then the Navy may be able to be in more places overseas, whether they need to or not.

As for the size/transformation nexus, the Navy definitely seems to be choosing capabilities over size. This may make sense for the future for the Navy in the role of a high-technology reserve force rather than fruitlessly chasing terrorists who do not go to sea. Yet they have not faced up to this as yet.

At this point in this logic train, the operations/transformation nexus takes care of itself: unless the U.S. were to step down its capabilities, e.g., with a much higher emphasis on LCS, it will be a future force, not so much a presence force. But that’s all right: there are practically no threats anywhere in the maritime domain.

Finally, as synthesis, the Navy as a reserve force would be part of the great Joint force, ready to be part of any large joint operation in the future, as opposed to thinking it was nudging the daily process of globalization.

The Navy in the Globalization Context

We can now connect alternative paths for the U.S. Navy to the sequence of globalization paths—security implications of those paths—the paths of U.S. forces in the sequence—and finally paths for U.S. naval, forces. All of this still lies “beyond Iraq”—whenever that occurs and whatever it looks like.
If the smooth progress of globalization continues, with more and more countries joining the global economy, with its interconnections and also its bringing more and more people out of poverty, and if state-on-state conflicts continue to disappear and the number of internal conflicts continues to shrink, and if global terrorism is contained (which also implies reform in the Muslim world from Morocco to Pakistan), then conflict and defense establishments around the world will continue to shrink. U.S. forces in turn can lay back for the future—restoring readiness and preserving advantages in technology, while continuing minimally to relate to allies and to preserve their experience of global environments, i.e., stay engaged in the world in at least a minimal way.

For the U.S. Navy in the smooth progress of globalization model, I refer to what I call the Cebrowski model: standing back from the world, engaging in lots of experimentation, having a number of prototypes ready for whichever direction the Navy finds it must expand, while still “keeping its feet wet” in the global maritime environment.
For the model of globalization with glitches, which seems to be the current case, this fits current Navy initiatives to stay active around the world, relating both to advanced navies and looking for ways to get poorer countries to patrol their own coastlines—the 1000-ship navy, so-called. It means trying to maximize the number of ships deployed, subject to maintenance schedules. To put it another way, the emphasis on “surge” recedes. Surface combatants are most numerous and flexible for these roles, including interactions with the widest range of other navies—some of the amphibious ships, with their boats-in-well-decks and helicopters (but not necessarily full complements of Marines) are also useful in this model. This model is also consistent with U.S. ground forces getting more involved in nation-building—though where next is difficult to know and the ground forces would want to come home and rest for a while after Iraq and Afghanistan.

For the third possible course of globalization, involving a shift in the economic balance toward Asia, particularly India and China, and leaving aside the minor disruptions caused by the few conflicts that might occur, the U.S. might prefer to hold its forces back and continue to improve the big joint surge force for whatever might come up—something like the Desert Storm force and operation.

For the U.S. Navy, this would be going back to the surge force—not overextended by trying to maximize the number of ships on routine deployments—with its emphasis on strike (aviation and Tomahawks).

Finally, if globalization were to break down into regional blocs, and if those blocs were also to organize new security alliances or other arrangements among their members, with concomitant build-ups of conventional forces, leading possibly to new arms races (depending on whether the economics of such globalization permitted), the U.S. might not be so much concerned with current operations and deployments, but with force-building of its own—and might prefer to step back from the world and build a strong homeland defense, including national missile defense.

For the U.S. Navy, this might entail maximizing its firepower, while also attending to patrolling off U.S. coastlines.

This seems to be a rather remote scenario for the future.
In all cases above, the underlying assumption here is that the U.S. is under tight budget restrictions—these were “equal budget” scenarios, at least conceptually. Every other country—the model of the Soviet Union, where they threw 40 percent of their GDP into military production, using funny-money accounting and moving materials around rather than currency—has proved unworkable.

The outcome for the U.S. Navy

The outcome for this whole train of thought—from globalization, through conflicts in the world, to U.S. policy for engaging in the world, to how DOD fits into this whole picture, and finally how the U.S. Navy would play—is that it is only loosely connected. Especially given the fact that practically every other military in the world has the same dilemma at the present time (July 2006) and is shrinking, and that the major security worry for a long time to come is the dispersed, elusive, low-technology global Islamic extremist terrorists, the U.S. will have great flexibility as to how it evolves and operates its forces.

The exception might be with regard to China, whose forces are in some way galloping into 1970s technology, however much they write about and experiment with space-age technology (it is the ability of forces to integrate all that through practice that is a real challenge). Their current wealth is deceptive, based as it is on a surplus of dollars sucked out of their economy and put in a savings account to keep inflation and costs down, and they face huge social safety net problems as the years pass.

Given the uncertainty as to the direction of U.S. security policy after Iraq and Afghanistan and in the years to come—it is not at all certain that the U.S. will want to effect regime change and nation-build another country, at least for many years until the memory of Iraq fades—the U.S. Navy will have a good deal of flexibility to set its own mix of capabilities and its own patterns of day-to-day operations for some time to come. But it will be under restrictive top-lines, given the huge federal budget deficits that are going to take years to pare down, if at all. At the same time, especially with smaller numbers of platforms that can be bought, costs will rise. But as we say, every other country—including China—is going to be experiencing the same
The sequence of considerations is shown in Figure 62, below.

Figure 62. Outcome for the U.S. Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CNA</th>
<th>OUTCOME FOR THE U.S. NAVY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The U.S. will keep a navy. <em>(All other navies in world are shrinking, except maybe China’s 1970s navy.)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Navy will keep its share of the DOD budget since there’s no big strategic reason to change those shares (UNLESS U.S. decides to invade and occupy more countries after Iraq).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>But because of the huge federal budget deficit, defense budget will go stagnant, and so Navy will be squeezed by rising costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>But within the budget, Navy gets to choose its mix, if it manages itself well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>What the Administration in office decides to do with the Navy depends on circumstances that arise, and any decision for large-scale use of U.S. forces would entail using a big joint force. The Navy and Marines are unlikely to carry out an important strategic mission all by themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>In the meantime, the Navy patrols and relates to other navies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Hard to make Navy relevant to GWOT; terrorists not at sea.</td>
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Conclusions about Transforming U.S. Forces and the World—and Whether They are Connected

Just to review the privileged place of the U.S. military establishment, including U.S. naval forces, in the American system, this chart provides a picture.

Figure 63. The Place of the U.S Military in the Globalizing World

Placing “a strong U.S. military” in the center, we see that it functions within the U.S. economy, which in turn functions more and more within the global economy. At the same time, it retains its status as the most respected institution in the United States—so long as Guantan-
amo Bay and Abu Ghraib fade from American memory (and the blame is falling on the current political administration for those cases).

As for the U.S. economy, if the U.S. is not at war, the topline of the defense budget is set outside defense (by OMB), as part of what Administrations calculate as tolerable budget deficits.

We have asserted in this paper that the world is largely at peace—despite the threat of the global Islamic extremist terrorists and despite what is happening at the moment in southern Lebanon. The U.S. military plays a role in sustaining this peace—partly by tidying up on the fringes (including its part in the interagency and international roles in chasing terrorists), and partly by being a looming, capable force in reserve. That large force is sustained mostly by U.S. internal politics, not especially by conditions out in the world.

But maintaining the large, capable force, kept in reserve, while tidying up on the edges (especially those edges coincident with the Islamic world), saves a lot of other countries from trying to build up military establishments—and just about all are slowly withering away—which in turn permits them to engage in a secure world economy. The non-zero-sum success of that economic globalization (in contrast to the zero-sum aspect of war) means more and more countries and people have a stake in maintaining the continuing peace.

It could all break down, of course—as Colin Grey has said, “the most predictable thing is the unpredictability of a great financial crisis.” And while the current picture may look pretty good, as pointed out earlier there are some fundamental problems lurking in the future for the globe—energy crunches, aging and large-scale migration of populations, pandemics, and global pollution and warming. None of these necessarily results in some kind of wars.

**The Progression of U.S. and U.S. Forces’ Involvements in the World**

To summarize the progression of the three major modes of human activity with which we have been concerned in this paper—(1) the nature of the world system, (2) the role of the U.S. (that it, its foreign
involvement and policies), and, within that, (3) the progression for U.S. forces—are shown here.

Figure 64. From Globalization to U.S. Forces

A MAJOR POINT IS THAT THESE THREE COLUMNS ARE ONLY LOOSELY CONNECTED. EACH HAS ITS OWN INNER DYNAMIC AND EVOLUTION—AND THEY ARE NOT NECESSARILY IN SYNCHRONIZATION, OR ONLY COINCIDENTLY SO.

AND THAT IS A GOOD THING—FOR IF THEY WERE IN COMPLETE SYNCHRONIZATION, NEITHER U.S. POLICY NOR U.S. FORCES WOULD BE ADAPTABLE TO THE SURPRISES, OR SURPRISE CHANGES IN DIRECTION, THAT MIGHT OCCUR.

This chart covers a short span of history—essentially beginning with the Bush 43 Administration, but before 9/11. Then we see how 9/11 really engaged the U.S. out in the world—but then with “too much” engagement in Iraq, which has distracted the U.S. while the rest of the world went about its business.
We wondered whether 9/11 and the recognition that al Qaeda could strike again, any time, any place, initially seemed to imply the arrival of a completely new world system. Indeed, the U.S. now treats it as “the long war,” equivalent (in some way) to the Cold War—it replaces the Cold War.

But with the Northern Alliance with U.S. assistance ousting the Taliban government in Afghanistan, driving Osama bin Laden into a cave, and dispersing the other foreign terrorists back around the world into small cells, the world settled back into the path of globalization.

The U.S. itself—or at least the Bush 43 Administration—has not been able to return to normal, though. There is Iraq and still Afghanistan. There is still the chasing of the terrorists. There is a big new concern with homeland defense in the U.S.

We can now add the evolution of U.S. naval forces to global and U.S. forces evolutions that we had described before.

Figure 65. From 9/11 and Globalization Over to the U.S. Navy
Before 9/11, the U.S. Navy had settled into its “joint, littoral, enabling” roles that had emerged early in the 1990s with …From the Sea. As Afghanistan demonstrated, it had improved enormously since Desert Storm in its strike and joint network capabilities. It had deployed regularly, responded when called upon by the President and Secretary of Defense as show in the earlier chart, and yet had not broken PERSTEMPO. Its ship numbers declined. Before 9/11, a strategic change was emerging with some higher priority for East Asia, as China loomed in the evolving globalization.

Upon 9/11, it immediately contributed to homeland defense, but also had a carrier on station in the Indian Ocean. As mentioned above, the capabilities it had developed in the 1990s gave it a larger role in joint strikes into Afghanistan than in Desert Storm or Kosovo. The Marines offshore were staged through Pakistan to Camp Rhino in Afghanistan.

After Afghanistan, it would play a huge role in any attack on Iraq. In the global scheme of things, and off the experience of the 1990s as well, its priority strategic location remains the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area. But it needed to take advantage upon the defense budget surge after 9/11 to take care of its people first and restore its O&M second. Its shipbuilding numbers remained low as a result.

In the longer run, assuming operations were not still immediately demanding, it would turn back to transformation, but the subtext to that is whether it must trade off force structure to effect that transformation.

Another way of summarizing how U.S. forces have evolved is shown in this very complicated chart. Basically, U.S. forces have evolved from the American Way of War, which essentially stretched from Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom, to facing “the long war” against global terror.
There is a confusion at the moment about insurgency, against which great U.S. military resources must be developed and applied in counter-insurgency. But it is not at all clear where a U.S. administration or U.S. forces will get to apply that next. But here we are looking beyond Iraq.

We can then carry on the chart to the next stage—from global terror to the global war on terror, as shown on the next page.
For U.S. forces, they want to track down individual terrorists, work with the Pakistanis to track down Osama and his first lieutenant, Zawahiri, while other agencies try to track down traveling terrorists, dry up their finances, and break their global connections. U.S. forces would also be ready to invade any new state that offers sanctuary and training grounds to al Qaeda.

Beyond that core, U.S. forces are to keep a hedge on China, that is, against an unexpected turn by China or its invasion of Taiwan. China invading Taiwan would essentially be “betting the farm” for them; as Dr. David Finkelstein says, “they get only once chance.” Otherwise, the U.S. would maintain a “dissuasive” military, i.e., one that is so technologically advanced that no other country would challenge it or engage in some kind of arms race with it (remembering too that it is American politics that sustain these kinds of U.S. forces—not some external threat (now that the Soviet Union is gone)—though many in the U.S. are imaginative in coming up with new threats. The U.S.
Administration and U.S. forces have also rediscovered engaging with other countries, especially old tried and true allies, i.e., the Europeans.

The work on poor and failing states (mostly in Africa South of the Sahara) is to be left mostly to other agencies and business—unless terrorists were to show up in these places.

At the same time, within the U.S., there are a number of troubles to which the Federal Government has to attend. Especially significant are the rising costs of health care. The Federal Government has a huge deficit that will constrain spending, which in turn will constrain the defense budget. That budget is not likely to be cut, or not cut very much, but a stagnant budget is very difficult for the services to manage, given rising costs of personnel, operations, and investments. Energy conservation, alternative fuels, and renewable fuels also must be found.

Finally, another horrendous terror incident in the U.S. would likely cause a massive shift of U.S. defense resources to homeland defense.

The Strategic Stretch of U.S. Forces at Present

Figure 68. The U.S. Strategic Stretch in July 2006
This chart is the map of the U.S. strategic stretch in July 2006. The stretch is from, at one extreme, the U.S. ground forces, assisted by Air Force and Naval aviation, bogged down in Iraq (and to a lesser degree in Afghanistan) to the future/contingent/reserve role of deterring China—with the specific case of Taiwan hanging over both countries.

In between, most of the rest of the world goes about its business—worldwide growth is about 5 percent a year—even African growth is at about that pace. We can describe two big roles for U.S. forces in this context:

1. “Policing The Gap,” as Tom Barnett describes it—that is, managing the areas and the conflicts that may be the sources of global terrorism—that “Gap” in a sense stretches across the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and into the Indian Ocean.

2. Dissuading the emergence of a “peer competitor”—keeping an insurance policy of strong forces with high technology, such that other countries stick to their courses of economic growth rather than waste government resources on military goods.

On one hand, U.S. forces may carry out day-to-day operations training others to track down terrorists or to maintain order in their countries, and on the other, to perhaps carry out the occasional raid themselves to catch them. This should not take a lot of resources—and is thought to be the role of enhanced Special Forces. Let us be clear: the terrorists are not going to be able to destroy the global economy, Western civilization, establish a caliphate, or otherwise take over the world. This would take far more resources and concentration of their fighters than they have in any way demonstrated to date. If they take over a state, it gets blasted.

In another sense, if the world is getting along pretty well, U.S. forces can lay back for the future. We can call this “capabilities-based planning”—that is, not predicated on particular threats. Unfortunately the system in DOD is utterly dependent on testing the forces in scenarios and threats and enemies that have to be invented—and all this takes on a distorted reality of its own. That’s what I mean by “fantastical thinking.”
The Navy equivalent to the previous chart is shown here.

Figure 69. The Strategic Stretch Applied to the U.S. Navy

While U.S. ground forces (and the supporting logistics and personnel pipelines from the U.S.) are tied down in Iraq (and to a much lesser extent Afghanistan), and while the Navy is contributing sorties from the carrier in the Gulf and other personnel and units on the ground in Iraq, the Navy otherwise continues to patrol for WMD transport (the proliferation security initiative, or PSI), terrorists, pirates, and boat people in the Mediterranean (Active Endeavor), the western Indian Ocean (CTF 150), and the Persian Gulf (MIO, or multinational interception operation). It is expanding its deployments to engage more in the Gulf of Guinea as well.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Navy would have a huge role in helping to defend Taiwan if it were attacked. Its carriers, attack submarines, and missile defense capabilities would be particularly relevant. This is where its high technology would be sustained.

Otherwise, it would always be ready to surge as part of a joint and combined strike force. As noted in the discussion of the American Way of War, such operations go better when carefully planned and an overwhelming force is assembled—taking whatever time is required.
The Navy’s SSBNs also maintain roughly half of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent.

At the left-hand extreme, capabilities-based planning for the Navy is one of advancing the state-of-the-art as better technologies and better net connections are developed. It also means, in a generally peaceful world, that they can experiment with new capabilities, including HSVs (high-speed vessels) and sea-basing.

Even if such capabilities-based planning and experimentation with prototypes resulted in further shrinkage of the Navy, it would still be the best navy in the world.

**Concluding Observations**

The question for this paper was “transforming U.S. forces and the world: are the two connected?” The answer is, “only very loosely.” Much of the world is at peace—even in most of the African countries now. The global economy continues to grow, even despite the high oil prices—though shortages of energy resources and associated global warming and the consequences thereof could lead to major perturbations in the future, say 20-30-40 years from now. The implications for U.S. forces, other than the need to develop alternative fuels, are not clear, especially as to the possibilities of armed conflict.

For U.S. forces and their transformation, along with the transforming world (however loosely connected these two may be), it is hard to see beyond Iraq at the moment (and it is hard to tell what is going to happen between Israel and Hamas/Hezbollah at this very moment). We do not know when the U.S. occupation of Iraq will be “over,” nor what the state of the country and its strategic neighborhood might be then. The sequence—Iraq and then what follows—is shown in this concluding chart, below.
Nonetheless, the problem of “The Gap,” that is, of the Islamic world, at least the part of it stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, as a breeding ground for terrorists, will remain, however favorable the outcome in Iraq. The notion that Iraq would set in motion a sweep of democracy across the Middle East seems dead. Rather, a long process of economic change and the growth of civil society in these countries would dissuade those who would otherwise become terrorists and are preconditions to the emergence of such democracy. It is not democracy per se that would dissuade them. Since this process is quite uncertain, some U.S. military presence in the region—most likely offshore, i.e., the Navy—is likely for years to come. Such presence would also be necessary as part of deterrence of a nuclear Iran.

It is likely that the U.S. Administration will be loath to engage in another invasion and occupation of the scale of Iraq for some years to come—unless it were a matter of the most dire necessity. U.S. ground forces, especially, will need time to recover—to reset their personnel and equipment. The exception, as shown above, would be
if al Qaeda were to take over another country, like they did the Taliban’s Afghanistan, and set up headquarters and training facilities for terrorists. Somalia might be the most likely candidate, but their new Islamic regime is under close watch and pressure from Ethiopia.

Whatever these possibilities, after Iraq the focus is likely to be shifted more intensely to the Global War on Terror (GWOT)—at least for current operations. The conditions for this are noted in the above chart. Currently, the terrorists are hard to find, even in Iraq. U.S. forces play roles within overall interagency and international efforts. Except for Special Forces, the GWOT is unlikely to be a force-builder for the services, including the U.S. Navy, though the Navy’s patrols discussed earlier are likely to continue, even if their encounters with any terrorists are exceedingly rare.

Next, the DOD budget is likely to become more constrained. We have already noted that the Appropriations Committees are urging that the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan be included in the regular presidential budget submission rather than covered by supplementals. In addition, the Federal budget deficit is likely to remain high and may grow even more if tax cuts are made permanent. This will put pressure for cuts on the discretionary portion of the budget.

Under these conditions—and assuming the general reduction of conflict around the world (however dire the Middle East situation may look at the moment (July 2006)), plus a reluctance by U.S. Administrations to invade and occupy any other countries for a while, the U.S. Navy is likely to keep its share of the budget—but that share is unlikely to permit it to reach 313 ships.

Otherwise, following the experience of Iraq (and Afghanistan):

- The ground forces especially (Army and Marines) are likely to reorient their doctrines, training, education, at least some portions of their equipment to counterinsurgency warfare, including cultural and language training. This will seem more plausible “capabilities-based planning” than for the type of forces that have characterized “the American Way of War” to date. The Navy is planning to do some of this too, with their initiatives for global fleet stations and riverine warfare. Their initiative for “the 1000-ship navy” also relates to low-level continued interactions around the world with other navies.
The American Way of War forces, the more classic state-on-state war-fighting forces, are likely to be sustained as well, as a hedge against an aggressive China—at least toward Taiwan. The continued technological improvement of U.S. forces should serve to dissuade China from thinking they can steal a technological march on the United States.

But, as noted above, it would be a big mistake to think China may emerge as the new Soviet Union—a mighty military force, with an economy geared to build that force. It is not now, whatever the impression may be of it as a rich country with lots of accumulated dollars to pass out around the world. It is far poorer than the United States and will never come close to the per capita GDP of the U.S. Moreover, its population will grow old before it grows rich. China is engaged in the global economy, dependent on its export of products (the Soviet Union never was) and more and more dependent as the years pass on the import of energy.

China’s economic vitality already depends on the growth of private enterprise and the reduction of its inefficient, obsolescent, and corrupt state-owned industries, where their military equipment has to this point been built. That in turn means the state has to expand its support to the social safety net, including health, education, and pensions, rather than leaving it to industries in the old Communist collective style. Their leadership is greatly concerned with existing and expanding unrest in a population that is experiencing more and more inequality. All these factors need to be taken into consideration as outsiders contemplate whether China would take a military and aggressive route. It is the job of the Administration, however, rather than the U.S. military itself, to keep a balanced perspective about China.

Projections out to the future are by definition uncertain, and so expanding ranges have been shown throughout this paper. At the same time, the globalization process as it emerged after World War II and which was fully recognized after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its bloc has created a dependent path for world affairs. That is, to break the creation of wealth that has come with global trade and its other connections would hurl the world back into the Depression of the 1930s and create other kinds of chaos.
It is not entirely inconceivable. The author Norman Angell thought that the first period of globalization, from around 1870 to 1914, had created such mutual dependencies that countries were unlikely to go to war and disrupt it. Tom Barnett has parsed more closely what Norman Angell said, and it was that countries, that is their leaderships, would be crazy to go to war. They were. This is not precluded today, as we have seen, but the diversity of global trade (with production of the parts of products spread over many countries, for instance) and the institutions that regulate it are far stronger than in that first period—to the great present discomfit of the Islamists, who nonetheless do not have the resources to disrupt it, even of oil production.

So the strong dependent path today is that of growing globalization, including the number of countries joining that process, reduction of state-on-state war, the decline in the number of internal conflicts, and the overall shrinkage of defense establishments. Thus the threat of terror incidents by the global extremist Islamic terrorists looms as the most immediate residual threat—though they are scattered, the incidents quite infrequent, and their ability to disrupt the global economy minimal.

Under these conditions, the U.S. is still likely to maintain a substantial military capability, mostly for domestic political reasons. This capability is better than that of any other military establishment in the world. It is likely to continue to get more so given American skill and experience. The U.S. military is also unique in its ability to move around the globe.

Both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War period up to 2003, these U.S. military capabilities were a source of stability and reassurance for most other countries in the world. There has been a temporary deterioration of that contribution to globalization since 2003, due to unilateralist policies and what has turned out to be a great misadventure in Iraq, but it is likely that a resumption of normality lies ahead in the not too distant future. The U.S. Navy will continue to contribute to this stability and reassurance in the years to come.
Whatever the evolution of the global system, and whatever capabilities and current operations U.S. forces may be pursuing, the bridge between the two—especially as far as U.S. forces are concerned—is the U.S. Administration in office. They are the ones and one would hope that the President would be in the lead in providing direction, constructive engagement with the other countries of the world, fiscal responsibility, and close consultation with the U.S military who decide how the forces are to be used. How the forces are manned and equipped tends to be a process that stretches across Administrations, except when an Administration takes an exceptional initiative, like increasing strategic nuclear forces in the past or pushing for national missile defense.

Over the decades of the unfolding of globalization as we now know it, it is American business that has taken the lead (along with German and Japanese business especially). But to provide the diplomacy and peaceful conditions under which that expansion of economic growth and wealth can take place, the Administration in office must take the lead. They have a good deal of discretion in how they use the forces—except for the immediate defense of the U.S. homeland, where it is imperative. But we can hardly see beyond Iraq at the moment—and that is the Bush 43 Administration’s big problem.
Annex A: Globalization Paths Combined

### SOME GLOBALIZATION PATHS AND THEIR SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

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<th>Globalization continues smoothly upward (even including Africa as agr. subsidies phased out)</th>
<th>Security needs diminish: no state-on-state wars; internal conflict down; terror dispersed, controlled</th>
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<td>Globalization continues, but with glitches (Doha stalled, regional pacts, rising energy &amp; commodity costs, etc.)</td>
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<td>Real breakdown of globalization into exclusive trading blocs</td>
<td>New security blocs track with exclusive economic zones</td>
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<td>Current world: continued ME troubles, frictions complicate security coop, persistent internal conflicts</td>
<td>Continued operations in world: Iraq and Afghanistan; shift in forces to nation-build; but no new invasions</td>
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<td>Frictions over competition for resources, possible arms races, new East Asian security arrangements</td>
<td>U.S. forces stay strong, back Home: leave settlements to diplomacy; periodic engagement &amp; presence in world</td>
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<td>New security blocs track with exclusive economic zones</td>
<td>U.S. forces build alliances; U.S. policies of containment</td>
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Center for Strategic Studies
# CONNECTING NAVY TO GLOBALIZATION

## Path of U.S. Forces?
- U.S. forces return to Readiness, improvements:
  - wait for future emergences; capabilities-based planning; some world engagement
- Continued low-level operations in world:
  - Iraq and Afghanistan; shift in forces to nation-build; but no new invasions
- U.S. forces stay strong, back home: leave settlements to diplomacy; periodic engagement & presence in world
- U.S. forces build alliances; U.S. policies of containment

## Path of U.S. Naval Forces?
- The Future Force – the Cebrowski Model: Lots of experimentation, prototypes, industrial variety; fleet shrinks, but keep all elements
- The Presence Force: relate to allies and little navies for stability; tidy up on fringes; emphasis on surface ships; carriers and subs in reserve
- The Surge Force: Joint; retain and extend extensive strike capabilities; fewer deployments; more possibly into HLD
- Either back to Cold War arms races, or much homeland defense
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