The Role of the Reservist in Maritime Homeland Defense

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Introduction

This white paper\(^1\) analyzes and draws conclusions about Department of Defense (DOD) support for homeland security (HLS) and homeland defense (HLD) in general, and maritime homeland defense (MHLD) specifically. It was requested by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA) as part of that office’s comprehensive review of the reserve component (RC) as directed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).\(^2\)

OASD/RA’s original question was, “What is the appropriate mix of forces between the active component (AC) and the RC to accomplish the MHLD mission?” However, initial research quickly revealed that as yet there are no official definitions of HLS, HLD, or MHLD, no definitions of service MHLD roles and missions, and no official organizational structure in which to manage the HLS missions and forces. These issues are being considered in the ongoing discussions about the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (NORCOM). Until official decisions are made, there is no way to determine the appropriate AC/RC force mix.

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1. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s, based on informal comments and discussions with the various staffs interviewed, supplemented by numerous articles and speeches of senior government officials. The staffs interviewed include those from the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT) and Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Coast Guard Headquarters and Atlantic Area Command (LANTAREA), the National Guard Bureau (Office of Homeland Security), the Marine Corps (Office of Homeland Defense), the Air Staff (Office of Homeland Security), and the Office of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities in OASD/RA. Time limited our ability to hold discussions with the Army and any RC service outside the National Guard Bureau. The views in this paper do not necessarily represent the opinions of The CNA Corporation, the Department of the Navy, or DOD.

2. This paper was originally delivered to the sponsor in April 2002 as an unofficial CNA report. This CNA Information Memorandum (CIM) is the official publication of that report and includes more formal editing and a formal internal CNA review. It does not include any additional research or analysis since April 2002.
Those limitations notwithstanding, this paper presents a general overview of the HLS and HLD missions, and provides a framework and a methodology for determining the appropriate AC/RC mix in the MHLD mission area when key decisions are reached.

**Definitions**

Key to any discussion of HLS and HLD is a definition of those terms. As mentioned, approved organizational definitions proved elusive. Thus, I will use working definitions,\(^3\) which were used for the discussions with the various staffs I visited.\(^4\)

**Homeland security**: the preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggression directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support.

**Homeland defense**: the protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. HLD has three environments: land, aerospace, and maritime.

**Anti-terrorism/Force protection (AT/FP)**: the protection of U.S. military personnel, facilities, and equipment under all situations and at any location.

One problem in analyzing the differences between HLS, HLD, and AT/FP is that public use of these terms over time has blurred their distinction.

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3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Terms of Reference for Establishing U.S. Northern Command, ltr, unclassified, 7 March 2002.

4. It should be noted that not all staffs I visited agreed with the above definitions. Each organization has its own working definitions, based on its perspective of the mission.
HLS and HLD

HLS is the protection of the U.S. homeland, its territories, its people, and its infrastructure from threats and aggression. For purposes of this paper, those threats include all types of threats and aggression, internal or external, traditional or non-traditional. “Traditional aggression” refers to an attack by external sovereign authorities using easily identifiable military means, such as a ballistic missile attack on the United States. An example of a non-traditional act of aggression is a terrorist attack. It is non-traditional because its sponsor is unknown, at least at the time of the attack, and its attack means are usually not easily classified as military. The sponsor can be a sovereign nation, or a non-state actor who is based external to or internally within the United States. The Oklahoma City bombing was a non-traditional, internally based attack. The 9/11 attacks were non-traditional, externally based attacks.

While HLS is focused on all types of threats and aggression, research suggests that HLD is focused only on traditional—that is, military—threats from external sources. These threats are generally from sovereign states, and U.S. response to them implies military actions by U.S. military forces.

“Anti-terrorism” and “force protection” mean the protection of all U.S. military personnel, facilities, and equipment anywhere in the world. While it is not considered part of HLS or HLD per se, the AT/FP mission has the same objective as HLS or HLD—protection—but is more narrowly focused on the protection of military assets only. Some suggest that AT/FP is not a mission at all, but a natural extension of the responsibility of all military units, much like safety.

When viewed holistically, HLS is an umbrella concept that contains HLS functions (preparation, prevention, deterrence, preemption, defense, and response) conducted by civil and military organizations, and HLD functions (deterrence and preemption) conducted by U.S. military forces so that all U.S. homeland, territories, people, and infrastructure are protected from all threats and potential acts of aggression.
In some cases, there is not a clear division between the HLS civil and HLD military functions. For example, in the maritime environment, both Coast Guard and Navy ships can perform either prevention or deterrence functions simply by being present. If the Coast Guard action is done within territorial waters, it may be a civil, law enforcement, or military function. On the other hand, if the Navy performs the same function in, say, the Persian Gulf, it is a military function. Further complicating the division between maritime HLS and HLD are the operating instructions for both services. In the example above, the Coast Guard may use either law enforcement rules or military rules of engagement (ROE), depending upon the circumstances. The Navy will operate under rules of engagement.

The MHLS environment

It seems obvious to say that MHLS missions are performed in the maritime environment—however, the limits of that environment (200 nm, 500 nm, or all waters) are not obvious. They are currently being discussed within NORCOM, the Navy, and the Coast Guard. While we don’t know what exact limits will be established, it is clear that it is the location of the target (i.e., whether in the water or not), and not the location of the operating force, that determines whether the action is part of the maritime environment. Although the Army, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the National Guard can also perform MHLS missions, the two dominant services that perform these missions are the Navy and the Coast Guard. Thus, we’ll now look at their views of the maritime environment for HLS.

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5. For ease of discussion, we use the term “MHLS” to mean either MHLS or MHL D.

The Coast Guard’s view

The Coast Guard views its MHLS mission through its cultural prism of having defended America’s coasts for over 200 years. Because of that culture and the current mission suite (maritime law enforcement, maritime safety, national defense, maritime mobility, and maritime environmental protection), the Coast Guard looks outward from the U.S. coasts, prepared to perform law enforcement or defense operations as required. While the Coast Guard is capable of performing defense operations anywhere, there is a practical limit as to how much firepower it can bring to bear against a traditional military threat and how far forward its forces can conduct sustained operations. The Coast Guard is not currently structured to patrol the oceans of the world on a frequent basis, with any great numbers. Nor does it have high-end warships with which it can conduct significant military operations. It looks to the U.S. Navy to conduct those operations.

The Coast Guard sees MHLS as a layered strategy that begins with port security and moves outward toward the seas, with capabilities to detect, identify, intercept, and interdict (if necessary) vessels of interest before they get into U.S. ports. A key enabler of this strategy, from the Coast Guard’s perspective, is an all-source\(^7\) information and intelligence system, “maritime defense awareness” (MDA), that creates a common operating picture (COP), which allows all users to know what cargo and crew are being moved on what ship to what destination.

The Navy’s view

The Navy’s view of MHLS is similar to the Coast Guard’s. Like the Coast Guard, the Navy has protected America for over 200 years with actions both local and abroad. Since World War II, and especially in the 1990s, the U.S. Navy has structured itself as the lead, forward-deployed American military force, ready and able to defend U.S. interests when directed. Operation Enduring Freedom is only the latest example of this ability. Because of this history and its current force structure, the Navy sees itself as better suited than the Coast Guard to

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\(^7\) “All-source” in this case means from all organizations, government and commercial, throughout the world.
conduct forward-deployed MHLS functions of deterrence and pre-emption of military targets. The Navy would say, correctly, that all of its missions support the HLS mission. It would also say that most of its MHLS support is done by its forward-deployed forces, rather than by its forces in U.S. coastal waters. (One exception is naval coastal warfare, including mine countermeasures.)

**HLS zones**

In the Navy’s and Coast Guard’s views, the location of their operating forces is a key factor in deciding which one of them will perform particular MHLS functions. Focusing on location also helps identify the specific tasks required to meet overall HLS objectives, which service could best perform that task, and simplifies the analysis.

Using operating location, we can create three MHLS zones—a Homeland Zone, a Forward Deployed Zone, and a Transition Zone—to use in analyzing potential RC roles. These three zones are shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. MHLS operating zones
Another important factor in determining which service will perform which MHLS function(s) is the command and control (C2) structure. This structure has yet to be decided within NORCOM but several models are being discussed. One model is based on the current C2 structure used in the drug war where forces are controlled by their respective services but mission or tactical command transfers depending upon the local situation. Another model is based on the Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ), which is a Navy command that has both Navy and Coast Guard forces and is commanded by a Coast Guard officer.\(^8\)

This analysis assumes that the Operating Zone concept discussed previously would be used as the basis for the C2 structure: the Coast Guard would manage (i.e., have command and tactical control over) all maritime assets in the Homeland Zone; the Navy would manage all maritime assets in the Forward Zone; and C2 in the Transition Zone would be determined by the type of target (traditional or non-traditional), the function needed (interception or interdiction), and the assets available (Coast Guard or Navy).

The role of the RC in MHLS

Before the role of the RC in MHLS is discussed, two factors need to be considered. First, no new missions have been added by any military service as a result of the 9/11 attacks and the war on terrorism. The services' OPTEMPO has changed significantly and the importance of particular missions within a set of missions has changed (some call this the new normalcy), but no new missions have been added. Second, all missions performed by all services add, directly or indirectly, to the protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure, and to the support of national security objectives.

The question then becomes, What is the specific RC role in each service as that service increases its OPTEMPO in support of new normalcy MHLS requirements? One way to approach this question is to use the operating

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\(^8\) It is interesting to note that the MARDEZ was not activated after the 9/11 attacks.
zone model discussed earlier and to establish what each service will do (the specific tasks, task objectives, and critical success factors) within each HLS operating zone. Figure 2 displays some functions (e.g., preparation, prevention, deterrence, preemption, response) within the Homeland Zone. Figure 2 also includes three Coast Guard-suggested maritime security conditions (MARSEC). These security conditions are assumed to drive OPTEMPO: as MARSEC increases, so do security operations, such as port security and maritime surveillance flights.

Once the specific missions in each MARSEC level are established, they can be analyzed according to specific tasks accomplished by each service (the Army, National Guard, Marine Corps, and Air Force are assumed to also have tasks in each zone). For example, let’s assume that a particular vessel is moving towards a U.S. port. The vessel’s ports of call, cargo, or crew raise suspicions within the combined East Coast MHLS Fusion Center, and the vessel is monitored closely by Fusion Center officials as it comes within 500 nautical miles of the U.S. coast. Due to new intelligence information, the MARSEC level is
increased for the vessel’s intended U.S. arrival port (requiring increased port security operations) and a maritime surveillance flight is requested. This flight could be a Navy P-3 or S-3 (although their availability is limited due to other worldwide missions). It could also be a Coast Guard HC-130, or perhaps an Air Force or National Guard specially equipped operational support aircraft. The question arises, Are these missions (increased port security and the surveillance flight) in which the RC could help? The logical answer would seem to be “yes,” but other factors, such as operating costs, equipment and crew availability, and crew training, need to be considered and analyzed.

This same general methodology could be followed for the Forward Zone and the Transition Zone. MARSEC would be changed to whatever best fit the state of operations.

Once overall service mission requirements and tasks are established, the appropriate AC/RC mix can be established based on missions and levels of support needed, and criteria such as reservists’ time, location of support, training needs, frequency of support, cost-effectiveness, and, ultimately, mission effectiveness. Trade-offs between these criteria, and between each service’s suitability to perform a given function, will no doubt have to be considered.

The role of the reservist

Key to determining those trade-offs will be an understanding of why reserve component forces are needed. In the post 9/11 environment, will they be used solely for wartime mobilization purposes? Or will they be used as “temps,” there to relieve the operations tempo of the active component service members? Or will they be considered for both OPTEMPO support missions and wartime missions? Will their mission be exclusively HLS or HLD (as suggested by some), with no wartime mission? Or will they train and potentially have to respond to both HLS and general war requirements?

Reservists and National Guardsmen and women provide many admirable and desirable traits. Among them are highly sought after skills, experience, maturity, and an understanding of their respective service’s organizational structure. But reserve component members are
reservists and guardsmen and women by choice, and therefore, they
are not available all the time unless mobilized—and if mobilized,
they are no longer cost-effective. Thus, it is safe to say that reserve
compartment forces are not always available in an unpredictable envi-
ronment. Availability, in conditions that require 24/7 operations,
which are subject to unpredictable increases in OPTEMPO, will be a
key factor in determining what roles are suitable for reserve support.

As suggested in figure 3, it will take detailed analysis to balance the
tensions between reservists’ and guardsmens’ availability, cost-effec-
tiveness, unpredictable operational requirements at home and
abroad, and increased OPTEMPO as a result of 9/11.

Figure 3. Four-way tensions

Conclusions

HLS, HLD, and MHLS are currently not defined. It is clear, however,
that all services are performing missions that either directly or indi-
rectly protect U.S. sovereignty, its domestic population, and its infra-
structure. Defining the various terms, such as homeland security and
homeland defense, will help clarify the specific service roles and mis-
sions. The Zone approach will help analyze specific tasks and levels of
service support required for those roles and missions.
No new missions were added to service requirements as a result of 9/11; however, service mission priorities have been reordered and OPTEMPO has increased—and will remain at the new normalcy for the foreseeable future. Thus, all resources are strained to the point where operations at the current rate cannot be sustained within today's budget limitations.

Using reserve component forces is seen as a natural way to relieve the strain on active component resources. Some services—most notably the Air Force and the Coast Guard—have been more successful than others in the past in relieving this OPTEMPO-induced strain. But, it does not necessarily follow that use of reserve component forces will effectively relieve the OPTEMPO-induced strain caused by the 9/11 attacks and the re-prioritization of missions.

Once service roles, missions, and specific tasks are determined, a detailed analysis of those tasks based on appropriate criteria—such as location of support, training needs, frequency of support, mission capability requirements, and ultimately, increased mission effectiveness—should be done to determine the appropriate AC/RC mix. Trade-offs between the criteria should be considered. Key to understanding those trade-offs will be determining why the reserve component forces are needed in general and for specific missions, and whether their role in that mission will be cost-effective.