Improving Police Agency Analytics:
A Key Strategy for the Future

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Introduction

Police leaders work in very dynamic environments. They face persistent problems, as well as emerging challenges that require solid evidence to help them identify “what works” programmatically, procedurally, and administratively. Ideally, police leaders compile this solid evidence base through research, planning, and analysis (referred to as “police agency analytics” in this paper).

The purpose of this paper is to provide law enforcement leaders and policy-makers with an understanding of what these analytic functions are and why they are critically important to policing today and in the future. Specifically, readers of this paper will learn that though these analytic functions have contributed to advances in policing over the past few decades, there are still obstacles to overcome to realize their full benefit. The paper concludes with a discussion of the future of police agency analytics, including what law enforcement leaders should be thinking about and doing as they continue to engage in evidence-based policing strategies that are cost-effective and that promote improved public safety.

Changing Nature of Policing

Over the past decade, the regulatory nature of policing has become more complex due to a variety of social and economic changes, such as declines in public revenue, rapidly growing technologies, and changing patterns of crime and delinquency. These changes have caused the organizational environment of law enforcement to evolve in important ways, now requiring police to perform at new levels and to deliver high-quality police services more effectively and efficiently.


First, the nationwide economic crisis that began in 2008 not only cut police budgets drastically but also diminished the opportunities for local governments, including local law enforcement, to receive federal and state funding assistance. Several recent studies reveal that a majority of law enforcement agencies across the United States have experienced decreases in their budgets since 2009, with an average annual decrease of 7 percent.\(^3\) To alleviate budget problems, many departments have reduced and consolidated their resources and staffing. A survey conducted by the National League of Cities in October 2010 reported that 79 percent of city officials surveyed made cuts to personnel in order to deal with the fiscal implications of the current economic condition (Office of Community Policing Services, 2011). In addition, these struggles with managing resource reductions are often compounded by the need to regularly compete with other public agencies for resources. Law enforcement agencies have resorted to short-term solutions, including mandatory furloughs, elimination of services, civilianization, reductions in training, and increased shift lengths.

In addition, new technologies and information-sharing initiatives are making policing more complex by pushing law enforcement agencies to make better use of their data and resources.\(^4,^5\) This creates new challenges to understand and manage large amounts of information. In addition, police can no longer simply respond to calls for service or modify resources on a daily basis to attend to crimes and social problems. Communities now expect the police to anticipate and pre-


vent crimes before they occur, even with fewer resources and officers.  

Finally, changes to the nature of crime—such as the proliferation of gang crimes, attention to immigration, rise in concern about terrorism, and growth of cybercrime—have compounded the complexity of police work.7,8 For example, the events of September 11, 2001 spurred public interest in coordinated law enforcement efforts and intelligence sharing, and new roles for local police in combating anti-terrorism.9 Criminals and criminal organizations have become more adaptive, networked, and mobile, requiring police to always be one step ahead.

This complex and dynamic environment requires that police chiefs, executive officers, commanders, supervisors, and line-level officers have access to reliable evidence to help them identify “what works”. Leaders need information about the pros and cons of responses and intervention options so that they can make well-informed decisions within their fiscally constrained budgets. In other words, they need the products of research, planning, and analysis, which are the police functions and units best suited for providing this information and for building scientifically based evidence for effective decision-making.

**Analytic Functions of Research, Planning, and Analysis**

Before delving into the history, value, and gaps of research, planning, and analysis, it is important to first understand what these police

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agency analytics are, specifically pertaining to law enforcement. The functions of research, planning, and analysis often can be confused as one and the same, due to likeness in their respective activities. However, it is important to understand that these analytic functions are not the same thing, though they are logically connected. Below, we distinguish each function and identify how it applies to the profession of policing, and we provide examples pertaining to gun violence.

**Research** aims to describe and explore new approaches, as well as produce new knowledge. It is typically produced by entities outside of a law enforcement agency (e.g., universities, private-sector research organizations or consultants, or professional associations), so it is important for law enforcement agencies to stay abreast with the latest research developments to determine applicability to their own operations. Even so, research from a different jurisdiction or from a national study may not necessarily apply to a particular local jurisdiction or context. Thus, in some instances, local research should be conducted by someone within—or closely connected to—the police department. As an example, for understanding gun violence, an agency could conduct research to evaluate the effectiveness of particular gun-enforcement strategies.

**Planning** aims to identify gaps and needs in organizational strategies, anticipate and prepare for future needs, and prescribe the process for change. This function is a particularly significant part of a police executive’s job, because s/he is responsible for and strategically preparing for the future of the organization as a whole. As it relates to gun violence, planning could help to determine what resources are necessary to accommodate a chosen enforcement strategy (e.g., a task force) and to forecast its impact on police operations or future crime.

**Analysis** aims to provide a detailed examination of a concept or process, as well as evidence for why things occur. Specifically, analysis for police agencies consists of more than just crime analysis—it includes problem analysis, intelligence analysis, operations analysis, policy analysis, and administrative analysis. Law enforcement should perform analysis within the organization itself, or, in some cases, it can occur through a regional fusion center or in collaboration with other research organizations. Continuing with the gun violence example, analysis could involve compiling statistics and information regarding
the gun violence problem, as well as exploring correlations and causative factors, mostly likely in support of the research and planning activities.

**Historical Contribution of Analytics to Policing**

As we consider the importance of police agency analytics to the modern police department, we should take stock of the improvements and advancements made in the world of policing over the past several decades. Research, planning, and analysis are not novel concepts to law enforcement. Over the past 50 years, there have been modest efforts to integrate analytics into policing as it has evolved through distinct eras—the professional era, the community-policing era, and the intelligence-led policing era.

The **professional era** began in the 1960s. During this time, strategies focused heavily on random patrol, rapid response, and reactive investigation, leaving little room for analytics. However, in the late 1960s, a strong push for police planning and research did occur when the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) within the U.S. Department of Justice began funding programs to evaluate policing, and also encourage, for the first time, state-level planning in criminal justice by spurring the formation of criminal justice state planning agencies. These partnerships with numerous law enforcement agencies nationwide played a major role in stimulating, supporting, and disseminating research and technical assistance throughout the 1970s.  

Increased research on policing resulted in findings that challenged prevailing practices and beliefs, which supported the emergence of **community policing** in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Studies suggested that “information” could help improve policing.

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Thus, policing could be enhanced by obtaining information about crimes and criminals from interactions with citizens. Community policing shifted focus to understanding and addressing underlying causes of crime within communities through citizen engagement. Research also revealed that the foundational practices of policing—random patrol, rapid response, and reactive investigations—had limits. These findings paved way for Herman Goldstein’s problem-oriented policing approach, which pushed away from reactive policing. Instead, problem solving focused on proactive and systematic examinations of identified problems to develop and rigorously evaluate effective responses through “Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment” (the SARA model).

Then, in the early 1990s in New York City, Chief William Bratton introduced a data-driven management model called Compstat in an effort to reduce growing crime rates. This model focuses on performance measurement; information sharing; responsibility and accountability; and improving effectiveness. Analytics play a role in Compstat, in which facilitating accurate and timely analysis of crime data is necessary for identifying crime patterns and developing tailored responses. Compstat helped pave the way for intelligence-led policing, and the events of September 11, 2001 catalyzed the movement. Intelligence-led policing augmented problem-oriented and community policing by including research-based approaches; information and communications technology; and increased accountability. Analytics is important in this era, with its strong emphasis on using criminal intelligence, tactical analysis, and strategic planning for crime prevention. More recently, the emergence of predictive policing—the application of sophisticated analytical techniques to identify and forecast likely targets for police intervention—has directed the movement even more toward analytics.


This historical development of policing in America points to improvements in policing. Specific improvements we can point to include expanded outreach to community partners and stakeholders, employment of problem-solving models that focus on local problems (e.g., the SARA model), marshaling data for crime-tracking and performance-measurement, integration of crime analysis into crime fighting, better collection and utilization of intelligence data, and more. These developments and improvements came about, not as the result of specific funded programs, but as the result of the continual search for better ways of doing things, which includes the accumulation of evidence about police practices.

We can also point to specific improvements in the analytic capacities in police agencies, such as: the proliferation of crime mapping and crime analysis software programs (off-the-shelf and “home grown” programs), with the attendant growth in professional associations and user groups of various kinds; the emergence of link analysis, social network analysis, and gang intelligence software systems; the interest in some agencies in close relationships with researchers (“embedded” researchers); and a growing body of evidence around the successful implementation of focused crime-prevention and intervention strategies directed at geographic hot spots and small groups of prolific offenders.

**Obstacles to Full Utilization**

If it is true, as we suggest above, that policing as a professional institution has made advancements and improvements during its natural evolution, and if it is true that there have been advancements in police agency analytic capacity, then why is there concern about the lack of analytic capacity in modern police agencies? We suggest that there have been modest gains in police agency analytic capacity over the years, and we can point to some excellent examples of police agencies with high-functioning analytic capacities.\(^{14}\) It is also true that there are persistent challenges to further expansive improvements in police agency analytics, while there are also some promising developments that may provide pathways to greater advances.

To address such issues, one must ask the following: What are the obstacles and impediments to large-scale, persistent improvements in police agency analytics? Why haven’t these practices found their way into routine agency management and operations?

This lack of diffusion can be attributed to a variety of challenges:

- Police may view analytics as important, but they are often relegated to a lesser priority in the real world of policing, because of other priorities and contingencies, especially during times when police agencies are in reactive mode or operating under constrained budgets.

- Police view analytic work as a technical activity that lacks perceived direct or long-term payoffs; therefore, it is often perceived to be best left to academics in universities and high-tech companies.

- The policing community is uncertain, skeptical, and resistant to consequences that may accompany changes suggested by analytics.

- Most agencies have cut back on analytics due to budgetary constraints, so there are fewer dedicated specialists encouraging the adoption of these activities.

- Medium- to large-sized agencies may be in better positions financially to support analytics, while smaller agencies (the largest category of police agencies by size) feel they cannot support analytics substantially.

- There has not been a strong push from any of several sectors (e.g., police unions, professional associations, federal agencies) to aggressively promote the expansion of analytics in police agencies across-the-board.

- In some of the larger agencies, analytics are decentralized, existing in different units; hence, there is not a coordinated effort within the agencies to promote expansion of analytic capabilities.

These are all plausible and often overlapping obstacles to the broader expansion of analytics in police agencies. Some are more easily
addressed than others. A handful of studies have been conducted to better understand these obstacles and reveal interesting findings:

- While planning and research directors are well educated and skilled (more than 75 percent have a Master’s degree or higher), they do not feel as if they contribute as much as they would like to agency operations (LEOPRD, 2008).15,16

- While 70 percent of planning units produce work directly for the chief or sheriff and command staff, 27 percent of the planning and research director respondents felt their unit was underutilized by the agency as a whole, and only about one-third felt their organization placed a “high” value on planning and research. In addition, a notable concern expressed by the planning and research directors was the sustainability of the planning and research units within their organization; 21 percent felt this was an ongoing concern. A majority (over 40 percent) of planning and research directors felt dissatisfied with the level of funding, training, and staffing within their units.17,18

- There is no significant relationship between population size and (1) an analytic unit’s focus on research and planning; (2) an agency’s the level of involvement in analytic activities; or (3) an analytic director’s satisfaction with budget, training, and staffing. In addition, the level of education of the analytic unit


16. The 2007 Police Executive Research Forum LEOPRD Survey surveyed planning directors from 75 of the 100 largest state and local law enforcement agencies in the United State.

17. Ibid, 15.

18. The 2008 Police Executive Research Forum LEOPRD Survey surveyed 118 chiefs or sheriffs from the 200 largest police agencies in the United States.
director is not related to a greater frequency of involvement in analytic activities.\textsuperscript{19}

- There is considerable variation in the capacity levels for activities related to analytics across police agencies. For example, while most agencies perform allocation and deployment analysis (86 percent), only 58 percent have a written policy for personnel allocation. Nearly all agencies reported performing strategic planning (96 percent) and allow agency personnel to provide input on policy development (99 percent); however, around half involve outside stakeholders and the community in these efforts. Only 51 percent of agencies maintain an ongoing relationship with external researchers.\textsuperscript{20,21}

- Respondents whose unit was organizationally situated within higher levels of the agency (e.g., Commissioner or Executive Staff Office) reported higher levels of organizational support. However, only one-third (36 percent) felt that the organization considers employees’ goals and values. Thirty-seven percent felt that the organization helps them perform better, and 32 percent thought the agency cared about their work satisfaction. On the other hand, less than positive perceptions were provided regarding how well-rewarded employees feel, and whether the agency would take advantage of them.\textsuperscript{22}

This research points to the fact that police agencies in the United States are at once very interested yet concerned about the prospects for improving their capacity for police agency analytics. The concerns


\textsuperscript{20} Thorkildsen, Z. (2013). Law Enforcement Organization of Planning and Research Development (LEOPRD) Capacity Assessment: Pilot Phase II – Analysis Results. CNA, Alexandria, VA.

\textsuperscript{21} The 2013 LEOPRD two-phased pilot conducted by CNA surveyed 65 local, county, state, and campus police agencies in the United States.

\textsuperscript{22} Preliminary analysis by Dr. Brenda Bond regarding perceived organizational support by research and planning unit members (a survey of members or the International Association of Law Enforcement Planners conducted in 2012, n=193, a 39-percent response rate).
vary by agency type—smaller agencies are concerned about having the basic resources to do the work, and some are moving toward resource sharing (regional) models, while larger agencies are concerned about effective utilization of the resources they have, and about appropriate models for organizing and deploying their analytic resources. The recentness of this research, the resonance of common themes across the surveys, and the strong interest evidenced by agencies participating in the research suggest that the timing is good for a strong push to advance analytics in police agencies, with efforts ranging from basic capacity building to high-level policy approaches.

Overcoming Obstacles and Putting Analytics into Practice

Numerous policing initiatives in the past several years point to promising approaches for addressing some of these challenges and for expanding police agencies’ analytic capacity. Approaches include reorganizing departments, embedding criminologists within police organizations, leveraging outside collaborations with researchers, and integrating evidence-based policing into department policies and practices.

Department Reorganization

Reorganizing departments so that police agency analytics is prevalent as its own function/unit lays a solid foundation for increasing analytic capacities. For example, in 1998, the Lowell Police Department (LPD) established a Research and Development Unit to foster innovation and leverage resources for public safety efforts. In doing so, LPD transformed itself into a dynamic, modern, flexible, productive, and analytical organization. The Research and Development Unit helped the department to secure well over $20 million in external grant funds over 13 years, while spending less than $2 million to staff and support the unit over the same period. Their ability to secure grants for new programs, support research and turn it into best practices, and support new program development, played an integral role in facilitating organizational change under the direction of the Police Superintendent. Thus, the organization was better equipped to fight crime (it sustained reductions in reported Part I Uniform Crime Report crimes for over 10 years) and to reduce citizen complaints to Internal Affairs by: making remarkable advances in police-community relations; successfully engaging with outside agencies to collaborate
on crime-prevention and crime-reduction efforts, enhancing crime analysis, and improving relationships with city government.23

**Embedded Criminologist and Research Partnerships**

Reorganizing a department can be a heavy lift, and since police departments are generally not structured to effectively engage or implement research, alternative strategies are to embed a criminologist or engage research partners. According to Dr. Anthony Braga, an embedded criminologist is a researcher who is effectively part of the executive staff and who reports directly to the Chief of Police.24,25 The criminologist helps the department understand, in practical ways, research and analytics about what works within the department. In 2010, the Redlands, California Police Department hired a Ph.D.-level criminologist for about the same costs as a patrol officer. The criminologist has proven valuable in translating existing research findings, helping craft new evidence-based strategies, and evaluating existing ones. Police departments wanting to replicate this effort but lacking the financial resources to hire a criminologist can instead look to academic institutions to form partnerships. Increased access to data makes police-researcher partnerships appealing to university-based researchers. In turn, police departments benefit from the research and analysis that researchers can perform to improve services (creating targeted interventions, identifying priorities, understanding citizen fears), collect data for writing grant applications, and analyze data for hiring or staffing decisions.

**Evidence-based Policing Initiatives**

Currently, several BJA initiatives are under way to enhance analytic capabilities of police agencies, with several goals in mind: improve

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the use of science in policing and test initiatives with methodological rigor (Smart Policing Initiative); enhance analytic capabilities to anticipate crime problems (the Bureau of Justice Assistance Law Enforcement Futures Group); improve crime analysis capabilities (Bureau of Justice Assistance Crime Analysis on Demand); and improve the ability of research directors to influence agency development (LEOPRD). In this section, we specifically describe the efforts of the SPI and LEOPRD projects.

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) launched the Smart Policing Initiative (SPI), which now involves 35 police agencies—of various sizes and in different regions of the country—engaged in the development and testing of evidence-based practices involving both enhancements in crime and intelligence analysis capabilities and formal partnerships with external research experts. Evidence and lessons learned from the SPI sites point to significant and positive organizational impacts, including expansion of analytic capacity, and elevation of the personnel involved in that work to higher statuses within their departments. A recent survey of SPI sites regarding their research partnerships revealed an overall positive impact of the partnerships between police agencies and university researchers; key findings included the following: 26

- Research partners are directly involved in several analytic areas—problem identification and analysis, development of targeted responses, and evaluation of outcomes.

- Nearly half (43 percent, sample size=28) of the police agencies and research partners indicated that the researcher had a substantial impact on research and crime analysis functions, with 43 percent noting minimal impact, and 14 percent noting no impact. Overall, results indicated that researchers had a lesser impact on tactical operations; however, police respondents suggested that researchers had a greater impact on tactical operations compared to the impact the researchers gave themselves credit for.

• Personnel, technology, and training are areas within the research and analysis units that need the most enhancements.

Recognizing the need for improving the research and planning capacities of law enforcement agencies, in 2007, BJA funded a program called LEOPRD, with a mission to “provide law enforcement leaders and planning and research directors with venues in which they may share and discuss their unique planning and research issues, methodologies and promising practices.”\(^\text{27}\) Over the past two years, CNA has worked with an expert panel of police officials and researchers to craft a process through which agencies can first assess their current analytic capacities, and then receive follow-on training and technical assistance to improve identified gaps and areas of weakness. Significant outcomes of this initiative include the development of a capacity-assessment protocol for reviewing a police agency’s analytic capacities,\(^\text{28}\) development of organizational case studies and models that demonstrate how analytics are beneficial to police agencies,\(^\text{29}\) and development of a resource guide that compiles and categorizes existing resources to improve analytics capacities.\(^\text{30}\)

The law enforcement agencies that participated in the pilot testing of the LEOPRD analytic capacity assessment protocol provided a uniformly positive response.\(^\text{31}\) Several indicated that the assessment tool identified gaps in their analytic capacity that they had not fully appreciated, and indicated that they would begin plans to enhance certain aspects of their analytic capacity.

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\(^\text{27}\) Ibid, 15.
\(^\text{29}\) Ibid, 14.
A Time for Change

In addition to the historical trends and research findings summarized above, at the current time, there is a new call for improving and expanding policy agency analytics. This stems in part from the movement toward evidence-based policing, from recent experiences with SPI, and from the recommendations of leading scholars in police science.

Advocates for increasing police agency analytics must contend with the fact that currently there is no empirical evidence that the existence of such capacity reduces crime, solves crimes, reassures the public, or directly achieves any of the other “bottom lines” of policing. Police operations (e.g., patrol, investigations, traffic, community services, special units, and problem solving) achieve those objectives, and there is a growing body of research evidence supporting this. However, no police organization can confidently determine how many police officers it needs, what they should do, or where and when they should do it, without utilizing analytics. No police organization can identify—with confidence—hot spots, problem offenders, policy failures and successes, future impacts of new policies, ineffective training programs, or highly impactful initiatives without utilizing analytics.

A recent article encouraging the formation of research-police partnerships reinforces that analytics in law enforcement is critical to understanding the nature of crime and disorder problems, and establishing a knowledge base on effective police crime-prevention and control practices (Braga, Robinson, & Davis, 2013). An example that lends support to this argument concerns the Philadelphia Police Department. In 2010, the police department partnered with Temple University to test the impacts of three different police strategies (e.g., foot patrols, problem-oriented policing, and offender-focused polic-

ing) in violent crime hot spots, using a randomized controlled experiment. The research identified that the offender-focused strategy outperformed the other strategies, resulting in a 23-percent decrease in violent crime in the target areas.\textsuperscript{34} The department has since used this knowledge to facilitate broader organizational, operational, and cultural changes department-wide.

The Lowell experience described earlier leads us to several very important considerations regarding the expansion of police agency analytics, considerations that must be carefully factored into any new change initiatives. First and foremost, changing police agency analytics (the level of capacity, or the utilization of existing capacity) requires significant changes in police culture (e.g., how police think about analytics, how they value it, what they are willing to give up to get more of it, the roles that analysts play in agency decision-making). This is a very challenging endeavor under any circumstances, and even more so if, as Philadelphia Police Department Deputy Commissioner Nola Joyce and LEOPRD panel member suggests, “Asking a traditional research and planning unit to champion change whether in their work or the department in general, is the challenge. My experience suggests that the research and planning unit sees their job, much as legal counsel, as one of “protecting” the department; ensuring that current efforts are aligned with past efforts. They tend not to be the risk takers but the risk mitigators. As a consequence, they become the keeper of the culture.”

Making significant advancement in police agency analytics will require new perspectives on delivering police services, and on how the police agency integrates with its task and political environments, and new initiatives to ensure that progress along these lines suggested here continues and quickens. Marshaling the capacity for better analytics will require that police agencies (primarily police executives) become more knowledgeable about the advantages of enhanced analytics, and better integrated with their local, state, and federal agency counterparts (within the public safety sector, and in other realms like...\textsuperscript{34} Ratcliffe, J. H., Taniguchi, T., Groff, E.R., & Wood, J. (2011). The Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment: A randomized controlled trial of police patrol effectiveness in violent crime hotspots. \textit{Criminology}, 49(3), 795-813.
education, public health, and social services). Enhanced analytics will involve, more than before, the co-production of public safety through this more integrated approach. Police agencies need access to data from other sectors (and vice versa), and the results of improved analysis will have impacts far beyond the police agency alone. Police agencies must be open to the possibility that a more integrated approach will result in new conceptualizations of the types of services police agencies provide, and how they are valued in the public arena.

Improving analytics in police agencies is the smarter way to improve police outcomes, police performance, and police legitimacy. The current and future economic climate dictates that most police agencies will not be able to continue in “business as usual” mode, and even if changes occur only at the fringes of police organizations, they will have important ripple effects inside and outside the organization. The increasing scrutiny on police operations by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Special Litigation Section (evidenced by the record number [26 agencies in all] of compliance-monitoring, litigation, and investigation cases worked in 2011–2012)\(^{35}\) also dictates that police agencies will have to turn their analytic focus inward to bring their practices into constitutional compliance and stave off lengthy and expensive consent decrees.

Recommended Next Steps

The Department of Justice, and BJA in particular, should implement several distinct and related courses of action to continue the momentum that has been achieved through the LEOPRD project, the Smart Policing Initiative, and other recent efforts aimed at improving police agency analytic capacity nationwide:

1. Continue and expand the policy analytic capacity assessment work initiated through the LEOPRD project.
   
   a. While approximately 70 agencies of various types and sizes participated in the piloting of the analytic capacity assessment protocol, many more agencies would

benefit from completing the assessment protocol (to obtain a baseline review of their current capacities) and from add-on technical assistance from BJA to improve weaker capacities.

b. More development work on the protocol would provide for an in-depth pilot test and could expanded the set of analytic functional areas the protocol assesses (beyond the current six), and thus improve the utility of the instrument.

c. Applying the assessment protocol to a larger sample of police agencies would increase knowledge on the current state of police agency analytic capacities. Ideally, DOJ would fund a nationally representative sample through a stratified random sample methodology. At a minimum, several hundred additional agencies should pilot the instrument to improve our understanding of the current analytic capacities.

2. Develop and test recommended models for police agency analytic capacity development, including an evaluation of the impact of enhanced analytic capacity on the police agency ‘bottom line’ (e.g., clearance rates, investigations, intelligence development, public safety). This can be accomplished through the establishment of model demonstration sites and a carefully crafted matched design evaluation approach.

3. Develop and deliver executive-level training regarding the importance of police agency capacity development and its impact on the agency’s bottom line.

4. Increase current efforts to apply cost-benefit and other economic analysis approaches to police effectiveness by working directly with a several different types of agencies on pilot or demonstration cost-benefit analyses, which would add to the current LEOPRD library of agency models and resources.

5. Increase current efforts to promote police-researcher partnerships and collaborations by developing and testing different collaboration models, then sharing information about effective models through LEOPRD and other venues.
With SPI, LEOPRD, and other research initiatives and experiences with police agency analytics in mind, and with continued strong federal interest in supporting police agencies in further developing a broader, stronger knowledge base around policing effectiveness, the conditions are right for a strenuous effort to advance police agency analytics nationwide. This is a sure path to improvements in public safety, public confidence in the police, and police officer safety. Moreover, to the degree that police agencies must better integrate with their task-oriented and political environments, so must the agencies and leaders in those environments participate fully and faithfully in the co-production of public safety through enhanced analytics—and all have shared roles and responsibilities in this new movement.