
Peter M. Swartz
with Karin Duggan

MISC D0026414.A1/Final
December 2011
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The Strategic Studies Division is led by Vice President and Director Dr. Eric V. Thompson, who is available at 703-824-2243 and on e-mail at thompsoe@cna.org. The executive assistant to the Vice President and Director is Ms. Rebecca Martin, at 703-824-2604.

The principal author of this study thanks especially Karin Duggan for graphic assistance; Loretta Ebner for administrative assistance; Gregory Kaminski, Laurie Ann Lakatosh, and Rhea Stone for library assistance; and Dana Smith and Anwar Fry for production assistance. A full listing of substantive contributors can be found in Peter M. Swartz and Karin Duggan, *U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction and Background: Volume I*, (D0026421.A1, December 2011). A full listing of all volumes in the CNA Navy Strategy series can be found on the inside back cover of this document.

Approved for distribution: December 2011

Dr. W. Eugene Cobble, Jr.
Director, Strategic Initiatives Group

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♦ Sep 1970  Project SIXTY
  ♦ An assessment; direction to move
♦ Mar-Apr 1974  “Missions of the Navy”
  ♦ Missions

- Surface warfare officer
  - Followed 3 naval aviator CNOs
- Served under President Nixon; SECDEFs Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger; SECNAVs Chaffee, Warner, Middendorf

- Drew on previous education & experience
  - Naval War College & National War College graduate
  - OSD/ISA (Arms Control), SECNAV EA, 1st OP-96 (Director, Systems Analysis)
  - Protégé of Paul Nitze (*NSC-68* Cold War strategy author)
- Drew on ideas of subordinates (esp. RADM – later ADM -- Stansfield Turner) & civilians (created CNO Executive Panel)

- Came into office from Commander, US Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV).
  - Imaginative COIN thinker & operator in-country
  - But saw Vietnam War as ill-advised drain on needed USN anti-Soviet resources, esp. for sea control
- Had a clear agenda when he came into office and immediately created a capstone document as blueprint
- Sought to implement it throughout his term
- Had NAVWARCOL President VADM Turner promulgate its overarching themes at end of his term


- Centralized Navy POM & budget decision-making
- Publicly fearful of Soviet Navy
- Sought to avoid USN anti-Soviet SSBN prosecution; focus on SLOC sea control
- Opposed to Nixon-Kissinger arms control efforts (SALT I)
- Conflicts with ADM Rickover
- Signature programs: FFGs, PHMs, sea control ships, equal opportunity, personnel reforms
- Later, continued to write on US naval policy and strategy

◆ Memoirs:
  ◆ *On Watch* (1976)
  ◆ *My Father, My Son* (1986)

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Project SIXTY (Sep 1970)
Project SIXTY (1970)

- **Overview**
  - Signed by CNO ADM Zumwalt (Sept 1970)
  - “Assessment” & “Direction to Move”
  - Medium-length (30 pp) SECRET brief & memo
  - CNO flag officer special assistants drafted
  - Principal targets: SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV
  - Comprehensive plan, program guidance for Zumwalt term
    - Precedent for subsequent annual CNO program guidance
  - To re-optimize USN to counter Soviet threat
  - 4 USN capability categories; hi-low mix
    - Sea control priority over power projection programs
  - Listed 22 specific actions taken or proposed
  - Presented 3 force structure alternatives
  - Concepts proved more influential than programs

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Project SIXTY (1970)

- **Signed by:**
  - CNO ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
  - 2 months after taking office
Project SIXTY (1970)

♦ What it was
  ♦ Billed as “an assessment”, “direction to move,” “concepts”
  ♦ Secret briefing for SECDEF Laird & DEPSECDEF (Sep 1970)
  ♦ Secret memorandum to all Flag Officers (and Marine general officers)
  ♦ Medium-length (30 pages plus slides)
  ♦ Kickoff for development of POM-73 & precedent for subsequent CNO ADM Zumwalt annual Navy program guidance

Project SIXTY (1970)

♦ Why it was written (I)
  ♦ Show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through SLOC defense
  ♦ Re-optimize USN vs. growing Soviet at-sea combat & SLOC-cutting capabilities in a NATO-Pact war
  ♦ Take advantage of SECDEF Laird de-centralization of DOD POM & budget processes to services
    ♦ Establish CNO guidance as authoritative interpretation of SECDEF guidance
  ♦ Centralize under the CNO what had been a de-centralized internal Navy program planning process, to implement his policies
  ♦ To guide USN, USMC flag/general officer actions, especially in developing POM-73 and subsequent CNO ADM Zumwalt POMs
  ♦ Principal targets: SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV
Project SIXTY (1970)

Why it was written (II)
- Gain OSD & OPNAV support for CNO ADM
  Zumwalt vision to reconfigure fleet capabilities
  - Focus more on sea control, less on power projection
  - Add “low-mix” ships to established “high-mix” programs
- Focus on “capability categories”, to reduce “union” parochialism
- Show that the Navy was conforming to:
  - New national “Nixon Doctrine” policy of reliance on allies, focus on USSR
  - Sharply reduced budget allocations
- Leave the 1960s and the Vietnam War behind
  - Despite current ongoing major Navy Vietnam War combat operations

Project SIXTY (1970)

Context (I)
- 2nd year of Nixon administration (1969-74)
- SECDEF Laird (1969-73)
  - Decentralization of DOD PPBS to services
- US-Soviet strategic nuclear weapons parity
- Détente, deterrence & disarmament policies vis-a-vis Soviets
- Nixon Doctrine: Allies do more
- “1 ½ War” national defense planning construct (reduced from “2 ½ wars”)
- Vietnam War still raging, but US withdrawing troops
- Improving US relations with China
- US economy in recession
  - GDP growth slowing; inflation rate rising
  - Modest U.S. government deficit spending
  - Price of oil low and steady
Project SIXTY (1970)

Context (II)
- AVF impending
  - USN downsizing; declining budgets
  - But, DoN TOA now >DoA or DoAF
- SECNAV Chaffee (1969-72) (Made VADM Zumwalt CNO)
- New CNO ADM Zumwalt (1970-74)
- Soviet naval buildup
  - 1st Soviet global naval exercise: Okean 70
  - Imminent deployment of Delta SSBNs w/ long range SLBMs, & Backfire-C bombers
- Six-Day War Egypt Styx anti-ship missile use shock (1967)
- N. Korean USN EC-121 SOJ shoot-down (Apr 1969)
- US withdrew from Libya Wheelus AFB (1970)

Project SIXTY (1970)

Context (III)
- USN in 1970: 769 battle force ships & declining sharply; 10 new ships authorized
- DON budgets declining
- CEP, OPNAV OP-00K, NADEC created (1970)
- Carriers changing to CV/CVN concept
  - From CVAs & CVSs
Cited references

- Nixon Doctrine (1969)
- JCS Plans
- DoD FY 72 Fiscal Guidance
- FY 72 POM Annex Navy budget

Context: Other important publications

- NATO MC 14/3 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1968)
  - Flexible response
- NATO MC 48/3 Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1969)
- SACLANT, Relative Maritime Strategies and Capabilities of NATO and the Soviet Bloc ("Brosio Study") (Mar 1969)
- DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958)
- Herman Kahn works
- Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (1968) (resisted)
- Paul Nitze thinking
- Naval Warfare NWP 10B (1970)
How it was written

- Drafted by RADM-SEL Stansfield Turner
  - New OPNAV special office (Op-00H)
  - Drew officers from OP-60, OP-93, OP-96, Secretariat
- Finished by RADM Worth Bagley
- “60-day effort”
- CNO & SECNAV Chaffee briefed SECDEF Laird & DEPSECDEF Packard, to influence POM 73 (Sep 1970)
- Then distributed to USN, USMC flag & general officers
- Tracking goal accomplishment (measuring effectiveness) by new Coordinator of Decisions (OP-09C) (RADM Emmett Tidd)

Outline

- CNO’s Project SIXTY presentation to SECDEF
- Assured second strike potential
- Sea control and projection
- Overseas presence
- Alternative combinations of sea control and projection forces
- Other types of change
- Summary
Project SIXTY (1970)

Key Ideas (I):

- Soviets & their navy are the priority threat
  - Taken very seriously
  - “CHICOM” threat mentioned in passing
- Soviet threat is global
- Alarming view of USN capabilities to defeat Soviets at sea
  - 55% w/ present forces
  - 30% w/ POM 72 forces
- Vital importance of NATO flanks & NE Pacific
- Joint & allied coordination & cooperation
  - Need allied navies to contribute more to sea control
- Reprioritized naval missions

Project SIXTY (1970)

Key ideas (II):

- 22 specific actions taken or proposed
  - Included topics for further study & analysis
- 3 force structure alternatives
- Theater tradeoffs necessary. Gave details.
- Retire obsolescing forces early (for $)
- Modernize (“hi-low mix”)
- New R&D initiatives
- Reduce support costs
- Pursue people programs
- Reduce forward deployments to ensure optimum rotation policies for personnel retention & motivation
- Testing new force packages: Add SSNs to surface task forces
Project SIXTY (1970)

What was new?

- Comprehensive USN statement of strategy & policy
  - Annual CNO program guidance
- 4 prioritized disaggregated capabilities
  - Assured second strike
  - Control of sea lines and areas
  - Projection of power ashore
  - Overseas presence in peacetime
- “Strategic deterrence must come first”
- Focus on sea control vs. Soviet threat
- Shift $ from VN-era USN power projection CV strike to defensive sea control
- Many new programs
  - Sea control ships to replace CVSs (aborted)
  - Perry-class FFGs
- Tracking goal accomplishment; measuring effectiveness

Not addressed

- Naval Warfare NWP 10B (1970)
- Non-Soviet threats
- World trade issues
- On-going war in Vietnam
- USN submarine ISR operations
- Counterinsurgency; terrorist threats
- Coastal & riverine operations & programs
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
- Maritime Security Operations
- US Coast Guard
- US government inter-agency partners
- US industrial base & shipbuilding
- Little on USMC
  - Just distribution list & USMC CV TACAIR bid
Project SIXTY (1970)

Subsequent analyses & critiques
❖ ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch* (1976)
❖ David A. Rosenberg, “Project 60: Twelve Years Later” (1982)
❖ Jeffrey Sands, *On His Watch* (CNA 1993)
  ❖ Included measuring effectiveness
❖ Norman Friedman, *Seapower and Space* (Ch X) (2000)

Criticisms (I)
❖ “A non-Mahanian aberration” (Norman Friedman)
❖ Too defensive and fearful
❖ Too much focus on sea control vs. Soviets
❖ Too little focus on power projection vs. Soviets
❖ Sea control & power projection were actually intertwined, not bifurcated
❖ Wrongly assumed Soviet priority to cut SLOCs
❖ To abandon naval offensive would lose the fleet & the war
Project SIXTY (1970)

♦ Criticisms (II):
  ♦ A step backwards from focus on forward USN influence on events ashore
  ♦ Wrong solutions to problems
  ♦ Unaffordable
  ♦ Led to tactical caution
  ♦ Not well connected to national policy of détente
  ♦ Not joint or allied enough
  ♦ Too parochial (surface-warfare advocacy)
  ♦ Too heavy on programmatics and too light on strategy
  ♦ Not a consensual document. One man’s vision

Project SIXTY (1970)

♦ Influence (I):
  ♦ Wide within Navy & DOD at the time
  ♦ Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on sea control
  ♦ Concepts more influential than specific programs
  ♦ Many programs repudiated by successors
  ♦ Subsequent Navy program planning used Project 60 “missions of the Navy” construct: Strategic deterrence, projection of power, control of sea lines
    ♦ Especially OP-96-led CNO Program Analysis Memoranda (CPAMs)
    ♦ OP-96 reorganized internally along “mission area” & support area” lines
    ♦ Overseas presence could not be used to justify forces, IAW DOD guidance
Project SIXTY (1970)

♦ Influence (II):
  ♦ Institutionalized as annual *CNO Policy and Planning Guidance (CPPG)* (from 1971 on)
    ♦ Drafted in OP-96 (Systems Analysis) (RADM Turner (1971-2) et al.)
  ♦ As a Navy “program planning” document, OP-00H-drafted *Project SIXTY* & successor OP-96-drafted CPPGs eclipsed influence of OP-06/OP-60-drafted planning & strategy documents as conceptual basis for internal OPNAV & USN thinking during 1970s
  ♦ Led to USN emphasis on “second P” of PPBS, vice “First P”

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Project SIXTY (1970)

♦ Why did it have this influence? (I)
  ♦ Personalities:
    ♦ Strong backing by forceful & thoughtful, but unorthodox & controversial, CNO ADM Zumwalt
    ♦ Continued advocacy by Stansfield Turner
      ♦ As RADM & OP-96 (1971-2); and later VADM & President, Naval War College (1972-4)
  ♦ Effective CNO management techniques (special assistants, NADEC, Z-Grams, successor CPPGs)
  ♦ Deliberate fostering of OP-96-led OPNAV “program planning” as intellectual center of OPNAV staff, vice OP-06-led “planning”
Project SIXTY (1970)

Why did it have this influence? (II)

- SECDEF Laird left Navy alone to implement its own plan
- Declining US defense budgets & post-Vietnam operational lull in 1970s led to USN focus on getting the budget right
- Limited internal Navy buy-in on many specifics
- Crystallized poles in USN thinking; sparked debates
- 1982 ENS Rosenberg OP-965 retrospective study showed utility of comprehensive USN policy statement
  - Successive descendents CPPGs had become more programmatic & less conceptual & strategic over time

Influence on subsequent capstone documents

- Set the example for all
- Conceptual roots of *Missions of the U.S. Navy*
- Triggered contrary views in *Strategic Concepts of the US Navy*
- Studied for lessons leading to *The Maritime Strategy*
- But spawned succession of CPPGs that refocused many in Navy away from strategy
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

✿ Overview
  ✿ Drafted & signed by NAVWARCOL President VADM Turner (Mar-Apr 1974)
    ✿ Drafting assistance by NAVWARCOL faculty
  ✿ Short (16 pp max) UNCLAS articles
  ✿ Described 4 Navy missions (from Project SIXTY)
  ✿ Showed relationship of missions to tactics
  ✿ Deliberate creation of a new vocabulary
  ✿ Principal target: US Navy officer corps
  ✿ USN officers should think deeply about their service
  ✿ Missions construct lends itself to analyzing naval issues
  ✿ Soviet Union the chief threat for USN to counter
  ✿ Lasting influence
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

- Signed by VADM Stansfield Turner
  - President, Naval War College (1972-4)
  - Surface warfare officer
  - Later, NATO CINCSOUTH, Carter Administration CIA Director (1977-81)
  - Continued to write extensively on naval policy & strategy

Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

- What it was
  - Billed as “Missions”
  - UNCLAS Naval War College Review article (Mar-Apr 1974)
    - Short (16 pages)
    - Reprinted in Naval War College Review (Winter 1998)
  - UNCLAS US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Dec 1974)
  - Derived from Project SIXTY
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

Why it was written

- To get USN officers to think deeply about their service
  - To transform Navy internal thinking about what it does
  - To help naval officers understand what is best for the whole organization, not just their own platforms or programs
  - To focus the Navy on cross-cutting outputs (missions), vice parochial inputs (platforms, unions)
- To inform future naval force structure decisions
  - To form a basis to establishing priorities for allocating resources
  - To assist in selecting the best among competing systems
- Institutionalize Project SIXTY framework
- Principal target: US Navy officer corps

Context (I)

- Last year of Nixon administration (1969-74)
  - Watergate scandal 1972-4
- All US forces withdrawn from South Vietnam (1973)
  - Northern combat actions against South Vietnam continued
- SECDEF Schlesinger (1973-75)
- All-Volunteer Force (from 1973)
- US economy in recession again; inflation rate rising
  - Arab oil embargo; Price of oil soaring
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

Context (II)
- SECDEF nuclear strategy changes (1974)
- Palestinian attack at Munich airport (1970). Beginning of major terrorist campaign
  - Munich Olympics (1972); Rome airport (1973)
- World food crisis (1972-74)
  - Shortages, price hikes led to famines, unrest
- Yom Kippur War (1973)
  - Battle of Latakia
    - 1st naval battle in history between surface-to-surface missile-equipped boats, & using electronic deception

Context (III)
- Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit meeting (May 1972)
  - High point of detente
- INCSEA agreement with Soviets (1972)
- ABM & SALT Treaties (1972)
- Soviet naval buildup
  - Delta-class SSBNs w/long-range SLBMs (from 1972)
- USN post-Vietnam War ops
- Indo-Pakistani War & Enterprise cruise (1971-2)
- Close Soviet-Indian military ties
- Improving US relations with PRC
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

Context (IV)

♦ Outgoing CNO Zumwalt (1970-74)
♦ OPNAV reorganization: Creation of “3 platform barons” as Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNOs) (1971)
  ♦ OP-02 (Submarines); OP-03 (Surface); OP-05 (Air)
  ♦ Formalized increased post-World War II officer specialization
♦ OPNAV OP-090 Net Assessment Office created
♦ OP-96-led “program planning” the dominant intellectual activity in OPNAV, vice OP-06-led “planning”
♦ Declining DON budgets
♦ USN in 1974: 512 battle force ships and declining sharply; 14 new ships authorized
♦ But, DON TOA now >DA or DAF

Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

Context (V)

♦ Sea Control Ship experiment on USS Guam with AV-8s & SH-3s (1972)
♦ Racial incidents on USN ships (1972)
♦ “Turner Revolution” at Naval War College (1972-4)
  ♦ Curriculum transformation, esp. Strategy & Policy Course (1972)
  ♦ New top-notch faculty, esp. Strategy Department
  ♦ Current Strategy Forum instituted (1973)
♦ Increasing USAF minelaying & surveillance support at sea
♦ Army at TRADOC developing defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

- Context: Cited references
  - Mahan

- Context: Other important publications
  - *Project SIXTY* (1970)
  - USN-USAF MOAs on B-52 minelaying at sea (1971, 1974)
  - “U.S. Strategy for the Pacific/Indian Ocean Area in the 1970s”
  - “Project 2000” long-range planning Study (1974)
  - ADM Gorshkov, “Navies in War and Peace” articles in US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (with commentaries) (Jan-Nov 1974)
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

How it was written

Drafted at newly-transformed Naval War College

Drafter: NAVWARCOL President, VADM Stansfield Turner (Jun 1972-Aug 1974)

- Had conceived and drafted CNO ADM Zumwalt’s Project SIXTY
- Director of OPNAV analysis office (OP-96) before going to NWC
- Leaving Naval War College for command of US Second Fleet

Editor & sounding board: CDR George Thibault (NAVWARCOL faculty)

Outline (Naval War College Review article)

- Usefulness of categorizing Navy missions
- Evolution of Naval capabilities and missions
- Definition of naval missions and discussion of their forces and tactics
  - Strategic deterrence mission
  - Sea control mission
  - Projection of power ashore missions
  - Naval presence mission
- Current and future issues involving naval missions areas
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

Key ideas (I):

4 “Missions”

- Strategic deterrence
- Projection of power
- Sea control
- Naval presence

Naval War College Review order

US Naval Institute Proceedings order

- “Warfighting missions”
  - Sea control
  - Projection of power

- “Deterrent missions”
  - Naval presence
  - Strategic deterrence

Key ideas (II):

- Each of 4 missions subdivided into “tactics”

- Detailed & nuanced definitions & discussions of each
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

Key ideas (III):

- “To force the Navy to think in terms of output rather than input”
  - (Key goal of McNamara-instituted PPBS since 1961-2)
- Missions as “outputs”.
  - Tied to national objectives
  - Interdependent
  - NOT prioritized
- Tradeoffs within/among missions
- USMC implements a few of the tactics

Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

Key ideas (IV):

- USN officers should think deeply about their service
- USN sea control focus may yield to naval presence focus (US Naval Institute Proceedings article)
- Discussed historical development of Navy concepts
- Placed 4 Missions in historical context
- Soviets the chief threat
  - Communist Chinese threat mentioned in passing
- Discussion of “blockade” as a discreet naval operation
Interdependent Naval Missions

What was new?

- Going public with *Project SIXTY* 4-capability construct
- Explicit discussion of “sea control” as superseding “control of the sea” terminology
- Rejection of “command of the seas” and “sea power” terminology
- Explication of “Presence” mission
- Tying mission areas to tactics
- Wide subsequent influence and citation
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

- Not addressed (I)
  - *Explicit* priorities among missions
  - Non-Soviet threats
  - World trade issues
  - Submarine ISR operations
  - Counterinsurgency & irregular warfare
  - Convoy operations
  - Coastal & riverine operations & programs
  - Maritime Security Operations
  - Terrorist threats
  - Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
  - “Fleet-in-being” or “force-in-being”

- Not addressed (II)
  - Sealift
  - US Coast Guard; U.S. Army
  - U.S. Merchant marine
  - US industrial base & shipbuilding
  - U.S. government interagency partners
  - Little joint or allied mention
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

♦ Subsequent analyses & critiques
  ♦ ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch* (1976)

Were they “missions?”

What is a “mission” (officially)?

1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task

Joint Pub 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Oct 2008)
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

- Were they “missions?”
- What is a “mission” (officially)?

“The terms ‘roles, missions, and functions’ often are used interchangeably, but the distinctions between them are important. ‘Roles’ are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services . . . were established in law. **Missions** are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. ‘Functions’ are specific responsibilities assigned by the NCA to enable the services to fulfill their legally established roles.”

Joint Pub 02 *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (July 2001)

Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

- Criticisms
  - These weren’t really “missions”?
  - These weren’t really the right missions.
  - “Sea control” really 2 missions: “Offensive” & “Defensive” (CDR/Dr John Allen Williams USNR)
  - Sea control & power projection intertwined, not bifurcated
  - Presence not really a “mission”
  - All 4 missions not co-equal
    - Implicit primacy of “sea control” right/wrong
  - New vocabulary shouldn’t supersede older terms
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

Subsequent evolution of ADM Turner’s thought

- 4 roles/missions of the Navy
  - Sea control
  - Projection of power by amphibious assault
  - Projection of power ashore by bombardment
  - Strategic nuclear retaliation

Today a new mission may be emerging
  Defending the homeland or other land areas against attack by missiles through space

Setting aside homeland defense... The other four missions are today of lessening importance to our country’s security

ADM Stansfield Turner USN (Ret)

“Is the U.S. Navy Being Marginalized?”
 Naval War College Review (Summer 2003)

Influence:

- Very wide and very long-lasting
- In particular, led to increased DOTMLPF focus on naval forward presence
- Cited throughout world defense literature
  - E.g.: Japanese admiral quoted in 2007 conference paper
- Forged a long-lasting consensus on the missions of the US Navy
- Spilled over into CNO ADM Holloway 1st (Mar 75) Posture Statement & US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Jun 1975)
Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

Why did it have this influence?

- Groundwork already laid by Project SIXTY, subsequent CPPGs, and OP-96-led OPNAV program planning
- Simple, elegant construct; Filled a conceptual void & need
- Widely adopted by Navy leadership
- Personality: VADM Turner reputation as USN’s intellectual leader, inside & outside USN
- Adopted by academia (civilian & military)
- Links to ADM Zumwalt-specific policies muted

Influence on subsequent capstone documents

- New vocabulary used in almost all
  - But “control of the seas” & “sea power” terms persisted too
- 4-mission framework triggered contrary views in Strategic Concepts of the US Navy & The Future of U.S. Sea Power
- Missions restated, re-ordered and/or modified somewhat in Forward . . . From the Sea, Anytime, Anywhere, Naval Power 21, Sea Power 21, & added to in NOC (2006)
- Missions repeated in 2007 Program Guide to the U.S. Navy (“crisis response” added)
ADM James L. Holloway III (CNO Jun 1974-Jul 1978)

- Dec 1975: *Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy (S)*
- 1976-78: CNO Reports (Posture Statements)
- Jan 1977: *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (NWP 1)*
- May 1978: *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy NWP 1 (Rev. A)*
- (Mar 1978): *(Sea Plan 2000) (S)*
  - A force planning study

ADM James L. Holloway III (CNO Jun 1974-Jul 1978)

- Naval aviator (nuclear power trained & experienced)
- Served under Presidents Ford & Carter; SECDEFs Schlesinger, Rumsfeld & Brown; SECNAVs Middendorf & Claytor
- Experienced in initiating concepts & processes
  - E.g.: NATOPS; USN program planning; CV concept (1968); Nuclear Powered Carrier Program; changed USN frigate nomenclature; CVBGs (1977); flexible, reconfigurable air wing; fostered CWC concept
- Combat veteran of three wars & numerous crises
ADM James L. Holloway III (CNO Jun 1974-Jul 1978)

- Initially let previous concepts stand (he had been VCNO under ADM Zumwalt)
- Progressively developed & promulgated a new coherent set of concepts to replace them
- At end of his term, promulgated a final comprehensive statement
- Fought successfully to prevent cruise missiles from being banned by US-USSR SALT II agreement
- Signature program: CVN, CVBG

ADM James L. Holloway III (CNO Jun 1974-Jul 1978)

- Later, continued to write on naval strategy & policy, & serve on high-level national & DOD commissions & study groups
  - President, Council of American-Flag Ship Operators (1978-88)
  - Chairman, Special Operations Review Group (investigating 1980 Desert One Iran Hostages Rescue debacle)
  - Executive Director, President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism (1985)
  - President, then Chairman of Naval Historical Foundation (1980-2008)
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

Overview

- Drafted and signed by CNO ADM Holloway
- “Strategic Concepts”
- Principal targets: USN officer corps & Capitol Hill
- CLAS memo, then UNCLAS article, NWP, posture statement brochures, revised medium-length (37 pp) NWP
- Concepts evolved through various editions
- Comprehensive analysis of naval requirement development
  - Rigorous flow from national policy to systems
- Focus on naval warfare tasks, across platforms
  - Highlighted range of aircraft carrier capabilities
- No specific USN adversaries mentioned by name
- Still modestly influential
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

Signed by:
- CNO ADM James L. Holloway, III
- Successive drafts after 1 ½ years in office

What it was
- Billed as “Strategic concept(s)”
- Secret signed document circulated to Fleet Commanders for comment (Dec 1975)
- CNO Reports (Posture Statements) (Jul 76, Apr 77, Mar 78)
  - Pocket-sized for portability
- US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Jul 1976)
- UNCLAS Naval Warfare Publications (NWP)
  - NWP 1 (Jan 1977)
  - NWP 1(A) (May 1978): 37 pages
  - Not formally cancelled until 1993
- Later boiled down in Holloway 1985 Oceanus article
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

Why it was written (I)

- So USN officers would understand basic USN concepts, doctrine & processes, in order to be able to contribute effectively to internal Navy decisions, make effective external cases for the Navy, and understand the implications of making changes
- To lay out the capabilities of the US Navy in support of the nation, including aircraft carriers
- Reaction to Project SIXTY & Turner “Missions”
- “Consolidation” of internal USN thinking, esp. “missions”
- To emphasize warfare tasks over platforms
  - And in so doing highlight the versatility of the aircraft carrier

Why it was written (II)

- To reflect evolution of CNO ADM Holloway’s thinking
- To influence Administration policies:
  - To create a coherent Navy policy statement in anticipation of a possible Jan 1977 change in administrations (1975-6)
  - To try to influence new administration policies (1977)
  - To try to change administration policies (1978)
  - To enlist Congressional support in influencing/changing Administration policies (1977-8)
- To achieve consensus on US Navy roles, missions, tasks, functions (and, ultimately, force levels & mix)
- Principal targets: USN officer corps, Capitol Hill, DOD
 Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

Context (I)

♦ CNO ADM Holloway (1974-78)
♦ 2nd year of Ford (R) administration (1974-77) thru 2nd year of Carter (D) administration
♦ US voters repudiated Ford administration (Nov 1976)
♦ SECDEFs Laird, Rumsfeld (1975-77); SECNAV Middendorf
♦ SECDEF Brown (1977-81); SECNAV Claytor
♦ US economy pulling out of recession (from Mar 1975)
  ♦ But inflation rate rising & unemployment rate high
  ♦ Increasing U.S. government deficit spending
  ♦ Price of oil high but declining somewhat
♦ PRC occupied Paracel Islands; PLAN defeated VNN in South China Sea naval battle (1974)
♦ N. Vietnam victory, occupation of S. Vietnam (1975)
♦ Communist regimes in Laos, Cambodia (1975)

Context (II)

♦ National policy shift from Pacific military commitments
♦ Outgoing Ford Administration policies comfortable for Navy, if underfunded
♦ Soviets deployed SS-20 nuclear missiles Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Central Europe (1975)
♦ US countered with Pershing II & GLCM INF deployment plans
♦ New Carter administration defense focus on NATO central region & USN Atlantic SLOC protection
  ♦ Robert Komer as DOD Special Assistant for NATO
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

**Context (III)**
- Arms Control Agreements & talks
  - Seabed, INCSEA, SALT I, ABM
  - US-Soviet talks to demilitarize Indian Ocean (1977-8)
- Soviet fleet build-up
  - New Delta-class SSBNs w/ long-range SLBMs (1972)
    - Soviet SSBNs no longer needed to deploy far forward & transit GIUK & other barriers to reach CONUS targets
  - Backfire-B bomber with ASMs (1972)
    - To keep US carrier aviation beyond striking range of Soviet targets
  - 2nd Soviet global naval exercise: Okean 75
- 1st USN, Soviet Navy reciprocal port visits (1975)

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

**Context (IV)**
- Increased Soviet interventions in 3rd world
- Close Soviet-Indian military ties
- 1st nuclear weapon test by Soviet-friendly India (1974)
- Improving US relations with PRC
- Yom Kippur War (1973)
  - Battle of Latakia
    - 1st naval battle in history between surface-to-surface missile-equipped boats, & using electronic deception
Context (V)

- Portuguese empire freed (1974-5)
- Periodic Korean crises
  - Tree-cutting incident & Operation Paul Bunyan (1976)
- Panama Canal transfer treaty signed (1977)
- Executive branch, Congress reluctant to intervene overseas in 3rd world (“Vietnam syndrome”)
  - Congress blocked US aid to anti-Communist forces in civil war in newly-independent Angola (1975-6)

Context (VI)

- Declining USN force levels; fluctuating DON budgets
- USN in 1978: 468 battle force ships & starting to increase somewhat; 18 new ships authorized
- Emerging USN force level goal: 600 ships
- New systems entering fleet
- CWC concept entering fleet
- Internal USN “Repeal Zumwalt” debates
- Bitter internal US government aircraft carrier, VSTOL budget debates
  - Culmination: Congress debated adding CVN 71 to carrier-less FY 79 defense budget (Feb-Aug 1978)
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

Context (VII)
- Specialized USN ASW carriers disappeared
  - CVA/CVAN/CVS → CV/CVN
  - CVWs transformed from 2 specialized air wing types to one general multi-mission model
- New fleet battle organization (1977)
  - CVTF/CVTG → CVBF/CVBG
- Continued primacy of OP-96-led program planning as intellectual basis for OPNAV activity, vice OP-06-led planning
- OPNAV Op-96-OP-60 rivalry

Context (VIII)
- USN surface ship reclassifications (1975)
  - CNO ADM Holloway initiatives
  - Brought USN “frigate” nomenclature in line with international practice
  - Eliminated perceived USN-Soviet Navy “cruiser gap”
  - Eliminated USN surface combatant “escort” terminology
    - CG/CLG → CG
    - DL/DLG → CG or DDG
    - DD/DDG → DD/DDG
    - DE/DEG → FF/FFG
    - PF → FFG
- CNO ADM Holloway decision to halt CGN procurement
Context (IX)

- New SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south, to free up escort forces for northern forward ops
- New CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific
- CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans to stand & fight in central, eastern Med
- But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner plans to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis

Context (X)

- USN Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) created (1975)
- NAVWARCOL Center for Advanced Research created (1975)
- John F. Lehman as CNO consultant (from 1977)
- Army at TRADOC developed defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe (1976)
- Increasing USAF minelaying, surveillance support at sea
- Military Reform Movement (from 1976)
  - SEN Taft, then SEN Hart. Bill Lind
  - Adopted & advocated “lo” end of Zumwalt “hi-lo mix”
- Committee on the Present Danger (from 1976)
  - Paul Nitze, John Lehman, etc.
Cited references

- Title 10 of U.S. Code
- DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (31 Dec 1958)
- DOD Total Force Policy
- *Unified Command Plan*
- JCS & USN Readiness Reporting Systems

- Discussed historical development of USN strategy & law of the sea

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)

- Robert Komer RAND studies on NATO (1973-6)
  - Collaborator: CAPT Ernie Schwab USN (Ret)
- NSDM 242 *Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons* (Jan 1974) (flexible nuclear options)
- NIE 11-15-74 *Soviet Naval Policy and Programs* (Dec 1974)
  - Bound & published as *Red Star Rising at Sea* (1974)
- NSDM 242 *Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons* (Jan 1974) (flexible nuclear options)
- USN-USAF MOA on cooperation at sea (1975)
Context: Other contemporary publications (II)

- CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)
- Record & Binkin (Brookings), *Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?* (1976)
- US Army FM 100-5 *Operations* (“active defense”) (1976)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)

- CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward “Sea Strike” briefings (1977-9)
- NSDM 344 *Navy Shipbuilding Program* (Jan 1977)
  - Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers
  - Based on NSC study on “U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements” (Sep 1976)
    - John Lehman helped draft
- USN *Sea Based Air Platform Study* (Feb 1978)
- *Sea Plan 2000* naval force planning study (1978)
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

How it was written (I)

- Personality: CNO ADM Holloway the driver
  - Saw importance of “writing it all down”, himself
  - Advocate of direct senior involvement; not “completed staff work”
  - Advocate of standardized processes throughout his career
  - Denigrated fancy pictures and art work

- Assisted by
  - Executive Assistant CAPT John Poindexter as sounding board
  - CNO Fellow
  - OP-60N (LCDR Joseph Strasser, Fletcher Ph.D.); 1-on-1 meetings
  - CAPT Dirk Pringle (OP-64) for “readiness” section

How it was written (II)

- Unhappy with “4 Missions of the Navy,” (which had informed his 1st Posture Statement & 1st US Naval Institute Proceedings article)
- Continuously reworked his ideas, in various media
- Added “readiness” section IRT perceived SECDEF Brown confusion on readiness terminology at Armed Forces Policy Council meeting
- Published in final form as NWP 1 (Rev A) in May 1978
- Saw it as a baseline. Ok to deviate from as required
  - “If you’re going to break the rules, you’ve got to have rules to break”
Outline (NWP 1 (Rev A))

- Part I: Generation of naval force requirements
  1. Introduction
  2. National strategy
  3. U.S. Navy support of the national military strategy
  4. Required capabilities and characteristics of naval forces
  5. Navy program development

- Part II: Planning, employment and readiness doctrine for naval operating forces

Key ideas (I)

- Strategic concepts drive force requirements
- Formal orderly top-down general processes
- Used accepted DOD definitions of terms
  - “Mission,” “roles,” “functions,” etc.
- Importance to US of open & free seaborne trade
- Importance of factors unique to shipbuilding
Key ideas (II)

- Utility & importance of net assessment & analysis
- Importance of ship & a/c readiness & employment cycles
- Forward deployment & surge posture balance
- Coordinated joint & allied ops
- USN sea control a prerequisite for sustained Army, Air Force overseas campaigns (enabling)
- Capabilities-based. Discussed only generic threats
  - Soviets not mentioned

Key ideas (III)

- Revised (& complexified) Turner concepts, vocabulary
  - 2 basic USN functions
    - Sea control (prerequisite)
    - Power projection
  - 3 USN roles
    - Strategic nuclear deterrence
    - SLOC security
    - Overseas deployed forces
      - Presence = a “clear side benefit” of forward deployment
      - Must reflect “combat capability”
      - Presence nota mission; buys “reduced response time”
Key Ideas (IV)

- Fundamental warfare tasks
  - AAW
  - ASW
  - ASUW
  - Strike
  - Amphibious
  - Mine

- Supporting warfare tasks
  - Special warfare
  - Ocean surveillance
  - Intelligence
  - C3
  - EW
  - Logistics

Types of naval operations

- Strike force operations
- Amphibious operations
- Anti-air warfare
- Anti-submarine warfare
- Mining & mine countermeasures
- Riverine operations
- Support operations
- Surveillance & blockading
- Search and rescue
- Domestic emergency operations

Warfare tasks

- Anti-air warfare
- Anti-submarine warfare
- Anti-surface warfare
- Strike warfare
- Amphibious warfare
- Mine warfare
- Special warfare
- Ocean surveillance
- Intelligence
- C3
- Electronic warfare
- Logistics
Key ideas (V)

- Warfare tasks across platforms
  - Update of earlier NWP 10 listings
  - Implicit primacy of strike warfare & carrier platform
  - New CVBG force packages to incorporate CVS missions
- USMC = ½ of 1 of 6 “fundamental” warfare tasks

Key ideas (VI): Evolution of CNO ADM Holloway thinking

- 1975 Posture Statement & NIP article
  - Followed Zumwalt-Turner “4 Missions” construct
- Dec 1975 SECRET Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy
  - “Sea Control is the fundamental U.S. Navy function”
  - Naval presence a “unique capability”
  - Two principal functions: Sea Control & Power Projection
- 1977 & 1978 Posture Statements
- May 1978 NWP 1 (Rev A)
  - Naval presence a “clear side benefit”
What was new? (I)

- Heavy CNO involvement in initial drafting
- CNO signature
  - Contrast with *Naval Warfare* (NWP 10) of 1950s & 60s
- Comprehensive taxonomies & processes
  - Even submarine reconnaissance role embedded in chart
What was new? (II)

- Capabilities-based threats
  - No mention of Soviets
  - Contrast with ADMs Zumwalt & Turner’s approach
- Mention of benefits to US of “a system of free & open trade”
  - Reference to a “system” will not reappear for 20+ years
- NWP-Posture Statement similarity

Not addressed

- Soviets (or any other adversary) by name
- Terrorist threats
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
- Maritime Security Operations
- US Coast Guard
- Arms control
- U.S. government interagency partners
- Blockade
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

- Barely addressed
  - “Sealift” mentioned as part of “logistics” task
  - Unconventional warfare, coastal & riverine *interdiction*
    subsumed under Naval Special Warfare

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

- Were they “strategic concepts?”
- What is a “strategic concept” (officially)?

The course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the military, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures which stem from it

Joint Pub 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Oct 2008)
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

- Subsequent analyses & critiques

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

- Criticisms
  - Too long & complex
  - Too dry & lifeless
  - Too generic, general & abstract
  - Too hard to update & keep current
  - Too “doctrinal”
  - All form & no substance
  - Did not convey a “story” or “narrative”
  - Not aligned with contemporary national defense policies
  - Not the right vehicle to achieve internal USN consensus
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

Influence:

- In NWP format, modest within USN
  - Used in war colleges
  - Still cited in 2005
    - P.H. Liotta & Richmond M. Lloyd Naval War College Review article on strategy & force planning
- In Posture Statement format, influential on Capitol Hill during budget battles
- ADM Holloway influence on John Lehman

Why did it have the influence it did?

- Deep, personal involvement by CNO ADM Holloway
- But ADM Holloway little known to defense academics
- Comprehensive
- Wide distribution as internal USN NWP & external Posture Statements
- But USN “wary of doctrine;” limited buy-in by officers
- Posture Statement format had short shelf life
- Overshadowed by in Washington by Sea Plan 2000 debate
- Superseded by The Maritime Strategy
- Never updated
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - Warfare tasks adopted in *The Maritime Strategy*

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Overview

- Signed by SECNAV Claytor (Mar 1978)
  - Article signed by Under SECNAV Woolsey
- Principal target: SECDEF, OSD, Joint Staff, OPNAV
- SECRET 2-volume force planning study
  - Separate UNCLAS medium-length (23 pp) abridgement of study executive summary
  - USN Woolsey *International Security* article
- Drafted by a working group; NAVWARCOL professor lead
- Maintain stability - Contain crises - Deter war spectrum
- Focus on countering Soviet threat
- Naval forces can be decisive in crises & in war with Soviets
- 7 USN missions
- New technology as USN enabler
- 3 USN force level options
- Great short-term influence. Overshadowed later by Hayward views & *The Maritime Strategy*

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Document signed by:

- SECNAV W. Graham Claytor (1977-9)
  - 2nd year in office
  - Went on to become Carter Administration Deputy Secretary of Defense, Acting Secretary of Transportation (1979-81)

Article signed by:

- Under SECNAV R. James Woolsey (1977-9)
  - 2nd year in office
  - Went on to become Bush Administration CFE Ambassador (1989-91); Clinton Administration CIA Director (1993-5)
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

What it was
- Billed as a “force planning study”
- “Major source document of DoN planning and policy”
- Massive SECRET study
  - Book length (889 pages in two volumes)
- UNCLAS abridgement of Executive Summary
  - Medium length (23 pages)
- SECDEF Brown tasked SECNAV Claytor (Aug 1977)
- SECNAV Claytor signed (Mar 1978)
- Under SECNAV Woolsey summarized in *International Security* (Summer 1978)
  - “Planning a Navy: The Risks of Conventional Wisdom”

Why it was written
- To show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive US naval operations
- To try to reverse policies & concepts underlying PRM 10, PD 18, general Carter Administration/SECDEF Brown defense policy & strategy, & US Army/USEUCOM recommendations on US defense policy & strategy, especially focus on central Europe & ground combat
- To bolster Congressional Navy supporters in ongoing bitter inter-branch government debates on funding more carriers, esp. CVN-71
- To act as an advocacy vehicle for SECNAV Claytor & USN Woolsey
- Principal target: NSC staff, SECDEF & OSD, Joint Staff, OPNAV, Capitol Hill
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (I)
- Early in 2nd year of Carter administration
- SECDEF Brown (1977-81)
  - Robert Komer as Special Assistant for NATO Affairs
- SECNAV Claytor; USN Woolsey
- Outgoing CNO ADM Holloway
- Low US economic growth; high unemployment and very high inflation
  - U.S. government deficit spending plateauing
  - Price of oil high but declining somewhat
- Executive branch, Congress reluctant to intervene overseas in 3rd world (“Vietnam syndrome”)
  - Congress blocked US aid to anti-Communist forces in civil war in newly-independent Angola (1975-6)

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (II)
- Administration defense focus on NATO central region & USN SLOC protection
  - Focus on ASW, ASUW, AAW, readiness, not strike, amphibious ops
- NSC PRM 10 & PD 18 policies slighted Navy roles
- OMB Randy Jayne indicted Navy for incoherence
- Bitter internal US government CVN, VSTOL budget debates, culminating in carrier-less FY 79 DOD & presidential budget proposal (Feb 1978)
- Congressional dissatisfaction with Carter Administration naval policies, especially omission of new CVN in FY 79 defense budget proposal
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (III)
- USN in 1978: 468 battle force ships, & starting to increase somewhat; 18 new ships authorized
- DON budgets fluctuating modestly
- Evolving 600-ship Navy force goal
  - 1974: Zumwalt HASC recommendation: 600 ships
  - 1974: Holloway HASC recommendation: 600 ships
  - 1974: DEPSECDEF HASC statement: 575-600 ships
  - 1977: NSDM 344: About 600 ships in mid-1990s
  - 1977: Outgoing SECDEF Rumsfeld: “closer to 600 than to the present 485 ships” by mid-1990s
- New systems entering USN fleet
- CWC becoming institutionalized in fleet

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (IV)
- Soviet fleet buildup
  - Especially submarines & Backfire-B bombers w/ ASMs
  - Increasing Soviet “out-of-area” deployments
- OPNAV morale rattled
- Resurgence of OP-06 influence within OPNAV; increasing dissatisfaction with OP-96-led analytical program planning as intellectual center of naval thought
- Unofficial “Commanders Cabal” DC-area officer discussion group (late 1970s)
  - Convener: CDR Norm Mosher
  - Members included Sea Plan 2000 contributors, OP-06 and OP-96 staff officers
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Context: (V)
  - Increasing USAF minelaying, surveillance support at sea
  - US Army implementing defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe
    - Internal Army resistance to defensive concepts building, esp. at TRADOC
  - Soviets deploying SS-20 missiles in Europe (1977)
  - US rapprochement with PRC
    - Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai dead (1976)
    - Deng Xiaoping takes power (1978)
  - Periodic Korean crises
    - Tree-cutting incident & Operation Paul Bunyan (1976)
  - Communist regime in Vietnam aligned with USSR
  - Panama Canal transfer treaty signed (1977)

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Context: (VI)
  - Increased Soviet interventions in 3rd world
  - Operations & plans
    - Jordanian crisis (1970)
    - Cienfuegos crisis (1970)
    - Indo-Pakistan War (1971)
    - Mideast War/ resupply of Israel (1973)
    - Mayaguez incident & amphibious raid (1975)
  - Increased war gaming activity at NAVWARCOL
    - Center for Advanced Research created (1975)
    - ONI “Newport Detachment” created (1977)
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (VII)
- Non-DOD policy experts
  - Military Reform Movement (SEN Hart & Bill Lind)
  - RADM (Ret) Gene Laroque & Center for Defense Information (CDI) (1972)
  - “Team B” assessment of Soviet threat (1976)
  - Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (1976)
  - John Lehman as independent US Navy CNO consultant

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context (VIII)
- New SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south, to free up escort forces for northern forward ops
- New CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific
- CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans to stand & fight in central, eastern Med
- But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner had planned to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis (1975-7)
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

❖ Cited references
  ❖ NSSM 3 (1970)
  ❖ Other (DOD papers, congressional reports, studies & theses)

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)

❖ NATO MC 14/3 *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1968)
  ❖ NATO MC 48/3 *Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1969)
  ❖ Flexible response
❖ Robert Komer RAND studies on NATO (1973-6)
  ❖ Collaborator: CAPT Ernie Schwab USN (Ret)
❖ NATO *Long-Term Defense Program* (LTDP) (1977-78)
❖ DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (31 Dec 1958)
  ❖ Consolidated Guidance
  ❖ JSCP & OPLANS
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
  - NSDM 344 *Navy Shipbuilding Program* (Jan 1977)
    - Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers
    - Based on NSC study on “U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements” (Sep 1976)
      - John Lehman helped draft
    - GAO UNCLAS report on NSC study (Mar 1978)
  - USN-USAF MOA on cooperation at sea (1975)
  - US Army FM 100-5 *Operations* (“active defense”) (1976)

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
    - Bound & published as *Red Star Rising at Sea* (1974)
  - CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)
  - Record & Binkin (Brookings), *Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?* (1976)
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
  - NIE 11-15-74 *Soviet Naval Policy and Programs* (Dec 1974)
  - USN *SEAMIX I* study (1973)
  - USN *SEAMIX II* study (1975)
  - CNA *Sea War 85* study (1975-8)
    - Atlantic campaign in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war
    - (Scenario for Tom Clancy (LT Larry Bond) *Red Storm Rising*)
  - CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward “Sea Strike” briefings ongoing (1977-9)
  - CNO ADM Holloway NWP 1 “Strategic Concepts” drafting efforts ongoing
  - USN *Sea Based Air Platform Study* (Feb 1978)
    - Ongoing simultaneously
    - Re: CVNs, CVVs, VSSs, etc.

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- How it was written (I)
  - SECNAV Claytor, USN Woolsey requested SECDEF authorize DON study of range of USN roles (Jul 1977)
  - SECDEF so tasked SECNAV (Aug 1977)
  - To examine probable range of naval tasks
  - A series of policy and feasibility analyses
  - USN-USMC study group drafted
    - Director: F.J. (Bing) West, Jr. (NWC civilian professor; former USMC)
    - 12 military team members (10 USN; 2 USMC)
    - Staff incl/ LCDR Ken McGruther (NWC) & LCDR Jim Stark (OPNAV OP-965), OP-06 representatives, others
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- How it was written (II)
  - SECNAV Graham Claytor, USN James Woolsey, VCNO ADM Robert Long active oversight
  - No significant CNO (ADM Holloway) role
  - Liaison with ADM Hayward & staff (CINCPACFLT)
  - Influence of consultant Hon. John Lehman
  - Analytic support: Presearch, Inc.
    - Len Gollubin, President
  - Tensions between “policy analysts” & “quantitative analysts”
  - SECNAV delivered study to SECDEF (Mar 1978)
  - USN Woolsey summarized in *International Security* (Summer 1978)

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Outline (UNCLAS Executive Summary)
  - Introduction
  - The international environment
  - Basic study findings and trends
  - U.S. security objectives: General
  - Security objective: Maintenance of stability
  - Security objective: Containment of crises
  - Security objective: Deterrence of global war
  - Security objectives and naval missions: A summary
  - Force/funding options
  - Assessment of *Sea Plan 2000* force alternatives
  - Fiscal assumptions
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Key ideas (I):

- 3 national security objectives & 7 USN Missions
  - I. Maintain stability
    - 1. Forward deployments
  - II. Contain crises
    - 2. Calibrated use of force against the shore
    - 3. Superiority at sea in a crisis setting
  - III. Deter global war
    - 4. SLOC defense
    - 5. Reinforcement of allies
    - 6. Pressure upon the Soviets
    - 7. Hedge against uncertainties of the distant future

- No priorities given
- Disregarded Zumwalt/Turner & Holloway typologies
Key ideas (III)
- Deter major war: USN contributions
  - War with Soviets will be global
  - USN forces should take the offensive worldwide
  - Operate forward & increase risks to Soviets
  - Survivable USN SSBN force
  - USN SLOC protection
  - Support allies
  - Capability to open second front, especially in Pacific
  - Hedge against uncertainty of where & how war would start
- A primary use of naval forces:
  - Contain conflicts & so prevent outbreak of major conflict

Key ideas (IV):
- Passing mention of “blockade” as a naval activity
- 3 USN force level alternatives
  - Option 1
    - 439 ships (1% budget growth)
  - Option 2
    - 535 ships (3% budget growth)
  - Option 3
    - 585 ships (4% budget growth)
### COMPARISON OF SEA PLAN 2000 FORCE OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Option 1</th>
<th>Option 2</th>
<th>Option 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain Stability</td>
<td>Maintain current deployment at objective rotation; reduced U.S. visibility</td>
<td>Maintain current deployment; resolve versus Soviet growth, enhanced perception</td>
<td>Maintain current deployment at objective rotation; enhanced perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Crises</td>
<td>Crisis/deployment tradeoff; high D-day 'shooter' loss</td>
<td>Sustain forward deployments during a crisis; create SLOCs</td>
<td>Sustain forward deployments during crises; significant residuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deter Global War</td>
<td>Some SLOCs; no forward ops; at best, defensive</td>
<td>Protects SLOCs; enables 2-4 forward ops; second front option</td>
<td>All-around superiority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Assessment</td>
<td>High risk; minimal capability; not flexible</td>
<td>Minimum acceptable risk; maintains selective superiority vs. Soviets</td>
<td>Lower risk; provides hedge and options</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Illustrative Alternative Force Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Option 1</th>
<th>Option 2</th>
<th>Option 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total active ships</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack submarines</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface combatants</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious ships</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

What was new? (I)
- Major Navy future force level needs study (since at least 1945)
- Strong SECNAV, Under SECNAV, VCNO involvement
- Drafting by committee
- Peace-crisis-war spectrum used as framework
- 7-mission construct
- USN lead in anti-air warfare touted
  - Aegis system introduction

What was new? (II)
- Naval forces can be decisive in crises & in war with Soviets
- Horizontal escalation
- Strong USMC amphibious assault role
- Call for perception management
- Naval forces can prevent major global war through containing lesser conflicts
- Identification of four “uncertainties” to hedge against
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Not addressed (in UNCLAS “Executive Summary”)
  - Priorities among missions
  - World trade issues
  - Jointness
  - U.S. Army
  - Submarine ISR operations
  - Mine warfare
  - Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Response
  - Maritime Security Operations
  - US Coast Guard
  - US Merchant Marine
  - US inter-agency partners

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Subsequent analyses & critiques
  - “Notebook,” US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jun 1978)
  - GAO, How Good Are Recent Navy Studies Regarding Future Forces? (Feb 1980)
  - Francis J. West et al., Review of USN Long-Range Planning (CNA, 1985)
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

♦ Criticisms:
  ♦ Unrealizable
  ♦ Unrealistic funding assumptions
  ♦ Overly optimistic re: Soviet threats
  ♦ Questionable assumptions
  ♦ Too carrier-centric
  ♦ Overly focused on conventional anti-Soviet warfighting & offensive sea control; not enough on defensive sea control or 3rd world contingencies (CAPT John Allen Williams USNR) (1981)
  ♦ Not aligned with contemporary national defense policies
  ♦ GAO critique “How Good are Recent Navy Studies Regarding Future Forces”
  ♦ “Executive Summary” not always congruent with analysis

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

♦ Influence:
  ♦ Highly controversial for a few years
  ♦ Center of intense open & classified discussions on USN roles & forces
  ♦ Used to support arguments inside & outside Congress for increased Navy funding, especially for CVN 71
  ♦ Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on power projection
  ♦ Experience helped develop new cadre of USN strategists (e.g.: LCDR Stark, LCDR McGruther)
  ♦ Influenced 1980s efforts by OP-603 & SSGs
  ♦ Launched Global War Games to test hypotheses
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Why did it have the influence it did?
  - Strong SECNAV, Under SECNAV, VCNO, other USN leadership involvement & ownership
  - Most coherent & detailed compilation to date of Navy strategy views in current world & US policy context
  - Study format & study team composition limited buy-in by the fleet
  - Soon superseded by CNO ADM Hayward views & The Maritime Strategy (which incorporated many elements)

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - Strong & direct conceptual influence on “The Future of U.S. Sea Power” and The Maritime Strategy
    - Horizontal escalation
    - Centrality of naval strike & amphibious assault
    - Vital importance of NATO flanks & NE Pacific
    - Enumeration & analysis of uncertainties
  - “Peace-crisis-war” framework used in The Maritime Strategy, Forward . . . From the Sea, Navy Operating Concept, & Sea Power 21
  - Also, Sea Plan 2000 influenced USCINCPAC ADM Long Pacific Campaign Plan, which formed core construct for 2nd version of The Maritime Strategy (1984)
    - ADM Long had been VCNO overseeing Sea Plan 2000
ADM Thomas B. Hayward (CNO Jul 1978-Jun 1982)

- Jan 1979  CNO Strategic Concepts (Top Secret)
- Jan 1979  CNO Posture Statement (UNCLAS)
- May 1979  The Future of U.S. Sea Power (UNCLAS)
  - Fundamental principles

ADM Thomas B. Hayward (CNO Jul 1978-Jun 1982)

- Naval aviator
- Naval War College & National War College graduate; George Washington University International Affairs master’s degree
- Extensive previous experience in Navy program planning
ADM Thomas B. Hayward (CNO Jul 1978-Jun 1982)

- Began term as CNO having developed new theater strategies for the Pacific & influenced *Sea Plan 2000*
  - Previous tours as post-Vietnam Commander, Seventh fleet, then Commander, Pacific Fleet
- Within 6 months as CNO had expanded on his Pacific theater thinking to embrace the globe
- Maintained same course for duration of his term

ADM Thomas B. Hayward (CNO Jul 1978-Jun 1982)

- Created flag officer dialogue during 1st year in office
- Encouraged NAVWARCOL Global War Game
- Created CNO’s Strategic Studies Group (SSG)
- Expanded mandate of OP-095 directorate to encompass all naval warfare; moved responsibility for warfare area program planning from OP-96 to OP-095 (1980)
- Created OPNAV Long-Range Study Group (OP-00X) (1980-82)
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

- **Overview**
  - Signed by CNO ADM Hayward (May 1979)
  - Primary targets: OSD, Congress, USN officer corps
  - CLAS briefings & letter; then UNCLAS Posture Statement & very short (6 pp) article
  - Principal drafter: CNO Executive Assistant
  - “Fundamental principles of naval strategy”
  - Call for USN maritime superiority, indeed, supremacy
  - Global forward, offensive USN ops vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact
  - More allied naval contributions encouraged
  - 12 CVBGs the centerpiece
  - Need to keep USN technological edge
  - Heavy influence on *The Maritime Strategy*

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

- **Signed by:**
  - CNO ADM Thomas B. Hayward
  - Successive versions within 1st year in office
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

What it was

♦ Billed as “Fundamental principles of naval strategy”

♦ Classified versions
  ♦ TS “CNO Strategic Concepts” (Jan 1979)
  ♦ V vetted at Flag Officer conferences
  ♦ Briefings

♦ Then much shorter UNCLAS versions
  ♦ FY 1980 CNO Report (“Posture Statement” (Feb 1979)
  ♦ Testimony before House Seapower Subcommittee (Feb 1979)
    ♦ Very short (7 pages)
  ♦ US Naval Institute Proceedings “Naval Review” issue article “The Future of Sea Power” (May 1979) culled from testimony
    ♦ Very short (6 pages)
  ♦ Briefings

Why it was written (I)

♦ To show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive US naval operations
  ♦ Dampen Zumwalt/Turner/Carter emphasis on SLOC protection

♦ Influence & change perceptions about utility of USN
  ♦ By U.S. political leadership
  ♦ By Soviets

♦ Explain why US needed “maritime superiority” – even “supremacy” – especially in war with the Soviets

♦ Elevate debates on USN budget to strategic level, especially to provide rationale for high-quality platforms & systems over less capable ones, and to deploy 12 carrier battle groups
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

Why it was written (II)

♦ To catalyze US Navy strategic thinking:
  ♦ To influence and/or resist Carter Administration policies (1978-80)
  ♦ To influence Congressional policies toward the Navy (1978-80)
  ♦ To prepare for possible Administration change (1980)
♦ Expand CNO ADM Hayward’s earlier C7F & CPF fleet operational concepts to global policy & strategic level
♦ Primary targets: OSD, Capitol Hill, USN officer corps
♦ To achieve internal USN consensus, based on evolution of ADM Hayward’s thinking

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

♦ Context (I)
  ♦ 3rd year of Carter administration (1977-81)
  ♦ SECDEF Brown (1977-81)
    ♦ Robert Komer now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
  ♦ Continued Carter administration focus on NATO central region & USN SLOC protection
  ♦ New CNO ADM Hayward (1978-82)
  ♦ Low US economic growth; high unemployment and very high inflation
    ♦ Price of oil high but declining somewhat
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

Context (II)

- Continuing Soviet interventions in 3rd world
  - Esp. Afghanistan Communist coup (1978)
- Continuing US rapprochement with PRC
  - Deng Xiaoping takes power in PRC (1978)
  - Soviet-aligned Communist regime in Vietnam invaded, occupied PRC-aligned communist Cambodia (1978)
- Emerging concerns over oil security & Gulf region
- Israeli-Egyptian Camp David Accords (Sep 1978)
- Panama Canal transfer treaty signed (1977)
- SALT II Agreement limitations (1979)

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

Context (III)

- Continuing Soviet Navy build-up
  - Especially submarines, Backfire-B bombers with ASMs
  - Continued increase in Soviet “out of area” deployments
- USN force levels rising modestly; DON budgets flat
- USN in 1979: 471 ships; 16 new ships authorized
- New systems deploying in USN Fleet
- CWC concept becoming institutionalized in fleet
- CMC full member of JCS (1978)
- Increasing USAF minelaying, ISR support at sea
- US Army developing new, more offensive operational doctrine
Context (IV)

- Intensified bitter internal US government debates on carrier funding (1978-79)
  - Congress added unrequested CVN 71 to FY 79 defense budget (Aug 1978)
  - President Carter vetoed entire budget bill due to CVN funding
  - Congress could not override CVN veto (Oct 1978)
  - CVN $ to other USN, Army, Air Force programs
- Feb 1979 DOD budget request for FY 80 included CVV
- US economic slowdown (1979)

Context (V)

- **NIFTY NUGGET** worldwide DOD mobilization & deployment command post exercise (1978)
  - Exposed weaknesses in joint inter-modal integration, including sealift
  - Led to Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) establishment (1979)
- Major public debates on US defense policy & strategy
  - Military Reform Movement (SEN Hart & Bill Lind)
  - Retired RADM Gene Laroque & Center for Defense Information (CDI) (1972)
  - Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (from 1976) (Paul Nitze, John Lehman, etc.)
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

Context (VI)

♦ Evolving 600-ship Navy force goal
♦ OPNAV morale wavering
♦ VADM Bill Crowe (OP-06) & RADM Bob Hilton (OP-60) created new OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) (1978)
  ♦ CDR Hank Mauz, CDR John Bitoff, CDR Bill West, LCDR Phil Dur, LCDR Joe Strasser, LCDR Peter Swartz, etc.
♦ Global War Games began at Newport (1979)
  ♦ Examined US-USSR war issues
♦ TACTRAGRU created
♦ Unofficial “Commanders Cabal” DC-area officer discussion group continued
  ♦ (late 1970s)
  ♦ Convener: CDR Norm Mosher (OP-965)

The Future of US Sea Power (1979)

♦ Context (VII)
  ♦ New SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south, to free up escort forces for northern forward ops
  ♦ New CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific
  ♦ CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans to stand & fight in central, eastern Med
  ♦ But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner had planned to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis (1975-7)
## The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

**Context: Important contemporary publications (I)** (none cited in document)

- NATO MC 14/3 *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1968)
  - NATO MC 48/3 *Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1969)
  - Flexible response
- **NATO Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP)** (1978)
- DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (31 Dec 1958)
- CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward “Sea Strike” briefings (1977-9)
  - CAPT William Cockell & CAPT James Patton
- NSDM 344 “Navy Shipbuilding Program” (Jan 1977)
  - Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers

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## The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

**Context: Important contemporary publications (II)** (none cited in document)

- *Consolidated Guidance*
- USN-USAF MOAs on cooperation at sea (1975, 1979)
- *Sea Plan 2000* naval force planning study (1978)
- USN *Sea Based Air Platform Study* (Feb 1978)
- CNA outer air battle studies
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

Context: Important contemporary publications (III) (none cited in document)
- NIE 11-15-74 Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (Dec 1974)
- Jamie McConnell et al. (CNA), “Strategy & Missions of the Soviet Navy” (1978), etc.
  - Bound as Red Star Rising at Sea (1974)
- CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)
- Col John Boyd USAF briefings on defense reform, maneuver warfare, OODA Loop (1970s)

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

How it was written (I)
- Drafted by CNO EA (CAPT Cockell)
  - Sovietologist w/ law degree
  - Prior tour as ADM Zumwalt’s CEP Director (OP-00K)
- Influenced by Hayward CEP Director CAPT Jim Patton (OP-00K)
  - Fletcher School Ph.D.
  - Prior tour on SECSTATE Kissinger Policy Planning Staff
- Heavy personal CNO ADM Hayward involvement
  - Influenced by recent fleet experience as C7F, CINCPACFLT
  - Influenced by previous OPNAV experience as Director, Navy Program Planning (OP-090)
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

How it was written (II)

- Roots: Hayward thinking in fleet as C7F, CPF (1976-9); previous experience as USN program planner (OP-090)
  - “Sea Strike:” Hayward-Cockell-Patton-Dr. Al Brandenstein PACFLT “prompt offensive action” concept vs. Soviet Far East
  - To pin Soviet forces in place in global war (& avoid PACFLT “swing” to LANT/EUR), influence PR /Japan decisions (1977-79)
  - Leveraged existing & new USN technologies. Included USMC
  - Listed “incompatibilities” that impeded implementation
  - “Sea Strike” existed only in briefing format. An alternative concept. Did not reflect actual war plans of the period
  - Tested in at sea exercises & war games
  - “Influenced Sea Plan 2000: CINCPAC (former VCNO) ADM Long PACOM campaign plan; subsequent PACOM, PACFLT war plans

How it was written (III)

- Circulation to flag officers by TS memo as “CNO Strategic Concepts” (TS) (Spring 1979)
- Numerous flag officer conferences (1979)
  - Opinions & insights debated
  - Annapolis, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, San Diego
- Publicized externally through briefings, Congressional testimony, US Naval Institute Proceedings article
Key ideas (I):
- Focus on global conventional war with Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact
  - NATO had global concerns
  - War in Europe the least likely scenario
  - USN NORLANT convoy escort only one of many important USN roles
  - Why & how a war starts will influence USN response capabilities
  - Uncertainties re: Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea
  - Strategic nuclear forces & other contingencies not considered

Key ideas (II):
- Global Conventional War vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact (continued)
  - NATO-Pact War will be global
  - USN must be offensively capable to destroy Soviet forces
  - US is and will be outnumbered
  - USN margin of superiority = carriers & at-sea sustainability
  - USN must not mirror-image Soviets
  - USN must retain technological superiority
  - USN must draw on sister services & allies
CNO Strategic Concepts (TS) (1979)

Key ideas (III):
- Global Conventional War vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact (continued)
  - US must capitalize on Soviet geographical disadvantages & defensive mentality
  - USN must fight with what it has on hand
  - USN must use tactics that ensure favorable attrition ratios
  - NATO northern flank has direct impact on NATO center
  - The “Swing Strategy” is an anachronism
  - US must prioritize key areas & choose order for sequential control, given limited USN force levels

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

Key ideas (IV):
- Call for USN “maritime superiority” (even “supremacy”)
- “Sea Control” & “Power Projection” seen as “confusing” concepts
- Soviet Union the priority threat
- War with Soviets will be global
  - Not confined to Central Europe
  - Swing strategy an anachronism
- US & Allied naval forces will do more in global war with Soviets than protect sea-lanes
  - Offensive strike operations
  - Exploit Soviet disadvantages
Key ideas (V):
- 12 CVBG minimum: The centerpiece & priority
- Need to distribute USN offensive capability among greater number of platforms
- But quality of platforms has priority over quantity Need for highly capable USN platforms
  - Vs. Low-end USN ships
- Offensive USN ops/ systems have priority over defensive
- Need to keep USN technological edge
- Sequential operations necessary, given USN force levels
- Need for perception management

Key ideas (VI):
- Discussion of:
  - 8 principles
  - 5 conclusions
  - Regions of the world
- No priorities provided
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

What was new?

- Fleet origins
- Call for allied & sister service support to achieve maritime superiority
- Emphasis on the Persian Gulf & access to oil
- Call for favorable attrition ratios
- Role of naval forces post-conflict

Not addressed

- Priorities among regions
- Non-Soviet threats
- US Marine Corps
- Amphibious assault
- Submarine ISR operations
- Sealift
- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Merchant Marine
- U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
- US inter-agency partners
- US Air Force & US Army
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

Subsequent analyses & critiques

  - In same issue as ADM Hayward article
  - Focus on SLOC protection as well as NATO flanks
  - Pessimistic on Soviets, USN CVN vulnerability
  - Advocated “hi-lo mix” of USN platforms
- Gregory Vistica, Fall from Glory (1995)

Criticisms

- Too ambitious. Unexecutable
- Not aligned with contemporary Carter Administration national defense policies
- Over-emphasis on power projection & carrier strike warfare; neglect of SLOC security
- Only European theater should matter, not Pacific
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

- Influence: Significant, and grew over time
  - Began to forge a consensus within the Navy on USN rationale
  - Engaged Navy Flag Officers & OPNAV staff
  - Set stage for Strategic Studies Group (SSG) & influenced Global War Games
  - Influenced Capitol Hill debates
  - Congress replaced DOD-requested CVV with unrequested CVN 71 in FY 80 defense budget (Oct 1979)
    - Weakened President Carter did not veto; signed into law (Dec 1979)

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

- Why this influence?
  - Powerful, clear, simple messages
  - Direct CNO involvement & ownership
  - Repetition
  - Reinforced by fleet exercises & Global War Games
  - Not aligned well with Carter administration defense policy when written
  - But aligned with rising popular, Congressional defense views
  - Increasingly aligned with new Carter Administration focus on power projection & Third World ops in wake of fall of Shah of Iran & Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (late 1979)
The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

♦ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  ♦ Strong & direct conceptual influence on *The Maritime Strategy*
  ♦ Especially calls for:
    ♦ Global offensive forward ops vs. Soviets,
    ♦ Sister service & allied naval support to USN
    ♦ Perception management

1970s: Text & content of each document

CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context


