



**NATION-STATE BUILDING 101  
WORKSHOP  
DRAFT REPORT  
October 28, 2008**

**CNA**

**and**

**U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute**

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## Workshop Report

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## Introduction

### Summary:

On October 28, 2008 CNA, which operates the Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for Public Research, and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) hosted a Nation-State Building 101 Workshop. The Workshop was the second in a series of three workshops held by the sponsors to explore three key elements of stability operations. This event, held at CNA Headquarters in Alexandria Virginia, addressed a holistic interagency approach to stability operations as defined in the recently published FM 3.07, the U.S. Army Field Manual on Stability Operations. FM 3.07 includes guidance on interim government and the role of peacekeepers in reconstituting governments. This workshop focused on the role of stability operations in rebuilding legitimate and effective national, sub-national and local governments and fostering civil society and social reconciliation.

Prior to the Workshop, key issues were identified in each of these three subject areas. Subject matter experts from think tanks, academia, practitioners and host country officials were identified to address these issues in three panels. The issues formed the basis for a day-long frank and thoughtful discussion among the participants. Participants included key military practitioners, the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), the US Institute for Peace, and other government agencies such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), the United Nations, and civil affairs officers.

The keynote address for the Workshop was presented by Dr. Ashraf Ghani, formerly the Finance Minister of Afghanistan and Director, Institute for State Effectiveness, who opened the session by outlining the objective of state building and providing a framework for state functions. The other panelists on nation building discussed the role of outside interveners, sequencing of tasks, and a holistic host-government-centric approach to effective, legitimate government. The first panel came to some overarching conclusions on the critical terminology for state building, defining such terms as legitimacy, resiliency and effectiveness which participants determined were three essential characteristics of a state. A central debate in the session centered on the attempt to define end states for stability operations, since one fundamental objective of

the stability operation is security. Yet, the group reached a clear consensus that focusing solely on security was insufficient to ensure that a nation-state was on the trajectory for a viable country; legitimate governance was also a critical component.

The second panel focused on local government and the dilemmas and sequencing of national vs. local government rebuilding. The first two panelists focused on the unique characteristics and challenges of local government strengthening. Various models of states were examined and the nature of the central government vs. regional power-sharing reviewed. Panelists described the case studies of Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of identifying stakeholders and key actors to the local process (warlords, tribal leaders, and local elites). Panelists critiqued the efforts of the international community to prescribe a strong central government model for nations that have been historically and politically decentralized. Further, the panelists attempted to define the challenges facing legitimacy of local government, i.e. meeting citizen expectations in the midst of hostility and generally without functioning local or central institutions. A consensus emerged as to the need for a host-government centric approach where transition to local autonomy and authority is consistently a mutually agreed-upon end state between the outside interveners and the host government at all levels.

The final panel discussed the necessity of fostering a strong and vibrant civil society, the need for memorialization of victims and the role of local nongovernmental organizations and actors in supporting the legitimacy of the state. While inherently a host government function, the workshop concluded that the outside interveners had a primary role in fostering social reconciliation and brokering the interaction among different groups within the host nation. Central to the outside interveners' efforts to rebuild effective governance was the need for "cultural awareness", i.e. the outside interveners' understanding of the host country's culture, norms, societal relationships and structure. Ultimately, the participants agreed that for the nation-state rebuilding process to succeed, the process needed to be "citizen focused and driven".

This report is an interim document, as the title implies. The authors welcome comments on the report from Workshop participants or from other interested parties, which may be submitted to either CNA (Constance Custer, [custer@cna.org](mailto:custer@cna.org)) or PKSOI (Susan Merrill, [susan.merrill@us.army.mil](mailto:susan.merrill@us.army.mil)).

This workshop was preceded by a similar event on Security Sector Reform on October 16, and was followed by an Economic Development Workshop on November 12. A larger stakeholder conference is anticipated in spring 2009 to review the workshop

conclusions and recommendations and discuss a way ahead for the new administration in stabilization and reconstruction.

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## **Executive Summary and Recommendations**

This Workshop, the second of a series of three on stability operations, focused on nation-state building, governance, civil society, and social reconciliation. Initially, the panelists and discussants developed a consensus around core terminology and definitions involved in nation-state building. The keynote speaker, Ashraf Ghani, defined the goal of stability operations as a “legitimate and functioning State that provides for the security and prosperity of its citizens and contributes to regional and global stability”. Subsequent panelists added the concept of “resiliency” – the ability of a state to withstand shocks and prevent future large-scale violent conflict. Resilience is not viewed as a static state, rather it encompasses the flexibility and adaptability to meet challenges and crises without state failure. This relatively new term in the lexicon is currently the subject of both practitioner and academic research designed to identify factors that lead to state resilience.

State-building during stability operations is designed to address three critical deficits: 1) security -- where the state failed to protect people and property, 2) effectiveness - the failure to provide basic services and economic opportunity to all citizens, and 3) legitimacy -- the failure to provide responsive and accountable government, protection of basic rights and representation and inclusiveness for all citizens. Addressing these deficits is the core of rebuilding failed states because they form the basis of citizen expectation for their government. When governments are capable and efficient at meeting citizens’ needs and expectations, this is the core of legitimate governance.

How does a stability operation address these deficits? One of the key conclusions of the Workshop was the need for a thorough situational assessment involving all dimensions of the state’s political, military, economic, cultural and social characteristics to inform both strategic and operational planning. Based on this assessment, outside interveners should plan a phased and appropriate sequencing of tasks. It was deemed imperative to avoid an overambitious, multitiered agenda which sought to address all deficiencies simultaneously and equally. Choices will be necessary if for no other reason than limitations on resources. However, in a nonpermissive environment, those institutions that affect security will need priority attention. But the process of reconstituting governmental structures and institutions needs to be continued, if at all possible, during

nonpermissive environments. Ultimately, the strength of the governmental institutions, processes and rule of law will be the bulwark against further violence.

In making sequencing choices, participants cautioned against an approach that deals only with the central government. A combination of both a more phased and a “citizen-centric” approach was recommended which would start with that part of the governmental process that has the greatest impact on the rebuilding of government and/or citizens, and balances the central level with subnational and local efforts as well. The ultimate end state or goal of a stability operation will only be reached if there is a considered, sequenced approach that guides the stability operation agenda and the timetable for nation-state reconstruction.

In rebuilding nation-states, the Workshop reviewed state models- a decentralized unitary state, federation, confederation and consociationalism - and concluded that centralization vs. decentralization is a false dichotomy. Both central and local governmental structures will be important to provide the capacities and operations that actually affect the needs of the people. Participants noted that historically, in the development of “interim” or temporary government there was the tendency to establish a “mirror image” of Western or US institutions and models. Participants argued that such imaging might actually undercut the longer-term establishment of an effective and legitimate state in many cases. Panelists cited examples of both Afghanistan and Somalia as nations with historically fragmented regions without a national identity where a highly centralized government is problematic. Existing state organizations and structure and the relative political power and weight to give national, regional, and local governments must be reviewed.

Participants agreed that the following sectors merited consideration as three key priorities for restoring governance: 1) Restoration of the justice sector. The goal is to create a system where there is less impunity and more “rule of law”. This does not necessarily involve a US judicial model, though whatever system is established needs to respect fundamental human rights and provide due process. Indigenous systems, even potentially incorporating some elements of traditional approaches, should be first examined and an evaluation made as to their viability and relationship to other legal and judicial models; 2) Second, restoration or establishment of public services is another critical priority to meet citizen expectations for a functioning government. There may be a crossover between such services and the level of security. Interveners need to consider whether and how to apply resources to first-line services such as electrical, sewerage, water and transportation requirements as compared with longer-term public services that invest in human development (schools, primary care health facilities). Additionally, the fiscal mechanisms for revenue generation and government financing must be considered as intrinsic elements of public service provision. Without a method for financing and maintenance, there is the continuing problem of sustaining these

services. Public services function to meet the citizens' requirements of their government and ultimately, they enhance the confidence of the citizens in government structures building towards legitimacy; 3) Third, capacity and institution building is an indispensable element of all nation-state building missions. State failure generally causes a flight of the highly skilled and educated individuals, both in the public and private sectors. Inherently, rebuilding human capital – not only leadership, but managerial and technical skills- is a long-term phenomena which requires an integrated US governmental approach and generally extends well beyond the timeframe of the stability operation.

## **Recommendations - Strategic and Operational Guidelines**

### **Panel I- Interim Government and Transition to Sovereignty (Assessment)**

1. Avoid over ambition in defining a nation-state building agenda. Too broad and ambitious an agenda gives no guidance as to how actually to reconstruct a state which, given that there is a stability operation, has failed in its operational purposes. Any agenda should be based on a comprehensive political, military, economic, cultural and social assessment of the state. States do have multiple requirements so simultaneous lines of operation will be necessary. But, within that context, doing some things well is important, and the need for prioritization is necessary to avoid simply doing many things but poorly. Panelists believed that capacity-building and institution-building were paramount, but sequencing with time phased objectives was essential to ensure absorptive capacity for the host government and to avoid overwhelming fragile and weak nation-states.

2. It is important to differentiate the longer term goals of a stability operation from what is often a necessary early, humanitarian approach, which seeks to rapidly infuse a country with large-scale resources to meet large gaps in basic human needs as a result of a complex contingency, civil conflict, or even natural or man-made disasters. Humanitarian operations are generally driven by external donors to meet both host country resource and capacity shortages. The transition in a stability operation which ultimately must turn over operations to the host country is fundamentally different. Humanitarian operations are driven by outsiders while stability operations require: 1) phasing; 2) institution building, and most importantly; 3) local involvement and ownership.

3. Often, it is important to start the state-building and particularly the large public sector infrastructure rebuilding on a small scale. Large injections of capital and massive lists of projects often are not conducive to sustainable, high-quality and long-term maintenance of projects. The local institutions and host governments frequently cannot absorb very high level of both financial and capital assets that can be applied, especially

at the beginning of an intervention. Large, rapid infusions of capital with nascent weak financial systems frequently exacerbate the problem of “rent-seeking” behavior. A transparent public finance system needs to be established, individuals trained and a project management program developed to handle massive infrastructure reconstruction.

4. In order to be effective, the outside interveners should be aware of the “rules of the game” as to how governance is established in the host nation. “Rules of the game” refer to the existing informal and formal legal and power arrangements that assist in brokering power sharing, mediating disputes, and allocating resources. These rules are imbedded in the culture and social norms of a society. Any new legal code or laws will necessarily be established against the background of these rules. It is important to understand them in order to determine whether they can be built upon and where they need to be changed. This would include the determination of whether they meet international codes of conduct or standard human rights conventions that the outside interveners should insist upon. It is difficult to believe that an intervening force can impose a specific body of law without consideration of the existing legal structures, informal rules and practices, and cultural norms and patterns of behavior—but it is not the case that all practices of a society that has needed a stability operation have to be accepted. Depending on the context, it often will be the case that a full-blown governance structure will take time to be established and to become effective. In those circumstances, it is useful to think in terms of developing a rules-based structure which supports the progress towards stability.

5. Throughout the term of the stability operation, interveners should ask what are appropriate milestones and end points. Another way to ask this question is “what is good enough” realistically in the context and time frame. The ultimate end point for a stability operation may well be less than the ultimate goal for the nation-state. In a stability operation, a reasonable end goal may be that the host government and economy should be making significant progress towards “good governance”, i.e. establishing the processes, institutions that enable a secure, legitimate, and adequately effective governance structure. That there is a trend line toward increasingly improved governance was deemed very important. Precisely how far down that line is “good enough” depends on the context but key factors include that, for the most part, when conflict groups within the country have chosen to utilize governmental structures to resolve political disputes, the basic structures of government are agreed upon, government can provide reasonable services, and the economy is stabilized and investment is beginning to occur. Despite these general conclusions, there was clear concurrence that the notion of “good enough” will be different each time for every host country situation and related outside intervention. However, it is important to specifically

identify those goals in each particular context so activity by outside interveners and the host nation is directed toward achievable outcomes.

There is a second point about “good enough” which separates the outside interveners from the host nation. Ultimately, the host nation will desire to have long-term international assistance for reconstruction and commitment for an extended development agenda. Outside interveners may often be satisfied with far less, at least in terms of a stability operation, as opposed to a developmental effort. The goal for the outside interveners will generally be in terms of whether foreign policy objectives have been met. While developmental objectives usually have a longer time horizon, donor fatigue due to the extraordinary cost of troops and reconstruction has often led to a withdrawal of effort long before the nation-state building task is completed. Yet, this end point may be adequate to meet outside interveners’ stability operation objectives.

6. Corruption is usually an omnipresent threat to the legitimacy and success of state-building efforts. It can siphon off vast amounts of public resources needed to restore services, encourages the perception of kleptocratic government as inevitable, demoralizes a society and enhances the perception of the illegitimacy of a regime. Rampant corruption also has an impact on the donor community- both international financial institutions and bilateral donors are either hesitant or prohibited from providing financing for “rent-seeking” regimes. While participants were unanimous on the need to address corruption, there was little consensus on effective methodology. Thus, the participants determined that this was a topic for further study and research.

## **Panel I - Building Central and Local Governance**

1. Participants concluded that the issue of configuration of a nation-state in terms of centralization and decentralization was a false dichotomy. Essential central features of a state – constitution, the ability to hold free and fair elections to ensure a peaceful transfer of power, and establishment of certain key security institutions (e.g., military, border control) to provide stability are necessary. However, important building blocks of a state also include the subnational (regional and local) units. These local units most obviously include traditional municipal services. Other functions, such as taxing, control over resources, and police and security can function at the national and/or regional/local level, and political decisions have to be made as where to vest such powers, which may be overlapping. Often the central versus local dispute is a surrogate for issues of power sharing and/or distribution of assets and resources among diverse—and frequently opposed—groups within the host nation. Resolving such questions, which are ultimately political, requires understanding the underlying political and economic

structures of the host nation, which are much more important than abstract discussions as to the relationship between central and/or regional and local governments.

2. Given that there are relatively scarce resources to establish or alter governmental structures, the overriding principle for sequencing the development of government should be to address the part of the government that has the greatest impact on the overall effectiveness of government and/or the condition of the populace, economically or otherwise.

3. At all levels of government, but particularly at the local level, there is the need to address key structural requirements such as institutions capable of public services, local police, penal and judicial institutions that can enforce the rule of law and, revenue generation and management. The goals of a stability operation should not override the need for local citizens to drive the process in terms of timing of electoral or inclusionary processes.

4. One of the fundamental problems in a stability operation is the limitations on human capital in the host nation. Those limits create a tendency for the outside interveners to take on numerous tasks. Such outside actions may be necessary at the outset of a stability operation, but it should not be forgotten that the goal of the operation is to create a sovereign and independent host nation. Development of human capital at all levels is critical. In that regard, coaching and mentoring by the outside interveners is generally preferable, rather than “driving.” Driving refers to control by the outside interveners. Building human capital is difficult and often time-consuming. Training usually is not enough - institutions must be created which require more than a training/educational approach. Coaching involves both “advising and action” - the transfer of knowledge first, but ultimately the transfer of responsibility for action-implementing projects as the responsibility of the host-country nationals is the goal of a stability operation.

### **Panel III- Civil Society**

1. In order to achieve a sustainable peace, outside interveners must broker local power structures, foster legitimacy not just at the national but at the provincial and local level of government, as well. This negotiation must include civil society and private sector institutions. While most nation-states have gone through creation of institution and processes at all levels, the citizens of many of these countries have not. They have not had the opportunity to participate in processes where common values are identified and agreed upon, and institutions created where this fundamental societal consensus is reflected. In virtually every failing or failed state, there tends to be a little national identity but strong identity at the ethnic, religious or community level. The processes of institution building at all levels of society can transcend the divisive nature of localism,

communalism, ethnic or religious divisions and assist in building national identity. These institutions may include activities as diverse as education and health committees, agricultural cooperatives, parent-teacher associations, or water boards.

3. Why should civil society be involved in the political processes and institution building? In a failed state, the “social contract” has been violated and the fundamental relationship and agreements between the citizens and state have broken down. Rebuilding the “social contract” between the private sector, civil society groups and government is essential and an inherent part of stability operations. The process of rebuilding the social contract is a way to redirect the competition for wealth and power from violent into peaceful channels. Ideally, all elements of civil society should be able to participate in open forums and elections. Since institutions based on fully representative government are typically the only forms of reconstituted state authority acceptable to most of the population, state legitimacy will be affected if groups are marginalized. Ultimately, civil society will need to take ownership of the broad-based process and institution building that must take place before a transition to host-government sovereignty is complete.

## **Panel I - Interim Government and the Transition to Sovereignty**

This panel was chaired by Dr. Phyllis Dininio, formerly Senior Governance Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State. The keynote speaker was Dr. Ashraf Ghani, who is the founder and currently Director, Institute for State Effectiveness and most recently served as the Minister of Finance, Afghanistan. The panelists included Dr. Derick Brinkerhoff, Senior Research Fellow, Research Triangle Institute and Dr. Karen Guttieri, a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and Director of Research for PKSOI.

*Issues to be Addressed: Given the lack of a legitimate sovereign government, what are the options for federal composition of the central/provincial/and local government for an interim government? What is the role/relationship of the peacekeeper to support existing government structures? How do you create recreate legitimacy and effectiveness with civil society and the private sector, for all levels of government? What is the appropriate sequencing/phasing – build from the local to the national level or a “top-down” approach? How do outside interveners enhance the resilience, accountability, and capability of a government?*

### **Panel Discussion**

The first panelist was Dr. Ashraf Ghani, former Finance Minister of Afghanistan and currently Director, Institute for Effective States, who defined the end state of peacekeeping as a “legitimate and functioning state“. Legitimacy, for this presenter, is the perception of effectiveness by the citizens. The issue was raised as to how peacekeeping forces assist in fostering this perception and supporting legitimacy. In reality, this goal is a highly ambitious target which requires extraordinary coordination of a number of actions and lines of operation. Each of the lines of operation - rebuilding public services, holding elections, and institution building, for example - must be coordinated simultaneously by the international and national actors. Moreover, it is a long-term and manpower-intensive phenomenon that requires continual support by the central, subnational and local governments of the host country as well as both regional and international actors. Nation-state building also requires specialized tasks, which are fundamentally different from those skills that military units are generally trained in.

The Workshop was urged to use the term “state-building” rather than nation-state building. In failed states, the nation and state are not synonymous terms. A “nation”, loosely defined, equates to the state and its culture, historical legacy, ethnicities, and peoples which peacekeeping forces can’t recreate, but which form a sense of national identity. A “state” generally refers to institutions, organizations and processes which form the framework for state functioning- these are the factors which peacekeeping forces can support and shape. In terms of state-building, institutions are fundamental building blocks for governance. Some institutions are enabling institutions upon which others are dependent and where sequencing of rebuilding is needed. After considerable discussion and debate, the participants concurred that nation-state building was the eventual aim of a peacekeeping operation. This would include the reduction of ethnic fissures in the society, building a sense of national identity and consensus around a “social contract” between the citizens and the government.

While the overwhelming desire is to move forward on all fronts, sequencing and breaking down to short, medium and, long term objectives is critical. Peacekeeping forces need to establish a feedback loop as the institutions develop to continuously assure that institutions are viable. The strategy must be to align the internal with the external in the following areas:

1. From conflict to political contestation and security;
2. Charisma and personalistic leadership to management;
3. Opaqueness to transparency in public finances;
4. Absence of service delivery to nurturing of human capital;
5. Oppositional identities to citizenship rights;
6. Destruction to creation of infrastructure;
7. Subsistence and war economy to a market economy;
8. Diversion and privatization to creation of public value;
9. Marginalization and illegitimacy to international legitimacy;
10. Rule of gun to rule of law.

For Dr. Ghani, the goal cannot be achieved without a process of state-building which addresses all aspects of a functioning state. State effectiveness includes the following ten primary functions: 1) regulation of the markets; 2) national treasurers manage public

finances; 3) national executive controls the public administration; 4) investment in human capital; 5) a national utility runs effective infrastructure services; 6) national enterprise actors invest in natural, industrial, and intellectual assets; 7) national legislatures define social contract; 8) national actors oversee international relations and public borrowing; 9) rule of law is upheld; and 10) national military controls a monopoly on the means of violence. This formulation of state functions is a product of the Institute for State Effectiveness as the core functions that a state in the 21<sup>st</sup> century must provide. Putting these governance structures in place has proven to be an ambitious undertaking for any post-conflict country, much less for fragile or failed states with damaged or destroyed institutions, ravaged economies and impoverished and traumatized citizens.

Moreover, to ensure resiliency (the ability of a state to withstand shocks and avoid future conflict) and legitimacy, these functions must occur at multiple levels of government, sometimes including the center, province, municipality, district and village. While there is no blueprint for how this sequencing occurs and the degree to which all aspects of a state must involve all functions, there needs to be a phased approach for these levels. In reality, sequencing is the art of the possible and outside interveners should move from first understanding rules of the game (both formal and informal) to rules of law. Ultimately, all sequencing should lead to a functioning, effective state. On a macro level, prioritization should include:

- Dealing with entrenched interests first (e.g. drug lord's incentives ) and understanding context;
- Assure the alignment of internal interests with external actors interests (or vice versa); the strategy must be to align the internal with the external with minimal rules of the game (informal and formal).
- You need a common budgeting framework, which matches priorities to resources; rules and regulations should be facilitators not impediments. Corruption and rent-seeking behavior should not also become a major impediment.

The second panelist, **Derick Brinkerhoff**, described the underlying transition that must occur in a fragile or failed state and reinforced Dr. Ghani's emphasis on a pared-down, less-ambitious agenda. Fragile or failed states face three critical deficits – lack of legitimacy, security, and effectiveness of service delivery. Beyond the security lens normally employed by outside interveners, they must see restoring good governance as a central organizing principle, and seek to mesh societal expectations with state capacity and political will. Finally, for Dr. Brinkerhoff, the end-state is an emerging

sovereign government which should be resilient and self-sustaining, without the need for large international aid or financial support.

In reviewing recent case studies, this panelist concluded that the US and the United Nations have the habit of adopting an idealized agenda for reconstruction that causes an overall sense of “indigestion” on the part of the host government. Peacekeepers have historically insisted on a broad spectrum of reforms- rapidly forcing rule of law, free and fair elections, civil and political rights, high transparency, accountability and effective management, all at the same time. The speaker noted that we learned from Iraq that rapid and poorly organized elections can have a negative effect in causing ethnic fractionalization. In other countries, such as Cambodia and Angola, fulfilling a rigid timetable for elections actually resulted in the continuation of conflict as conditions for a free and fair contestation were not in place and the results were not accepted by the population. Overly complex, idealized agendas for reconstruction cause absorptive and capacity problems for the fragile host governments which have lost capacity and have either fragile or non-existent institutions. The ultimate end- state is not always a “Denmark” (a euphemism for a small, highly developed democracy) - every state can't become a Denmark.

Dr. Brinkerhoff stated that rebuilding states should focus on reconciling ethnic, religious and other fissures in society; addressing poor distribution of services and resources; and focus on making progress towards strategic agendas. Priorities should be set according to host-country political, historical and cultural context with explicit attention to recognizing the linkages between security objectives, effectiveness, and legitimacy. But he warned against the international tendency for “rowing” rather than “steering”. He defined “rowing” as providing services and making strategic decisions directly by the outside interveners while steering relates to guiding and mentoring during reconstruction.

Finally, he also addressed the issue of sequencing with the premise that the lines of operation are staggered; we don't start everything at once. We need to recognize linkages, lay foundations for resilience, build capacity, and recognize the problems of time, difficulties and resources. Initiation of the various lines of operation should be “condition based”- built upon the successful achievement of the earlier building blocks. It is not simply a matter of reconstruction of services and training; a holistic approach to state-building is needed.

Quoting Machiavelli that “nothing is harder to manage, more risky in the undertaking, or more doubtful of success than to set up as the introducer of a new order”, the third panelist, **Dr. Karen Guttieri**, discussed the extraordinary difficulty in establishing an interim or transitional government. She defined an interim government as any “organization that rules a polity during the period between the fall of the ancient regime

and the initiation of the next - the transition period". Setting up an interim or transitional government is the hardest task for the international community as the old order has residual legitimacy. Under the current system, sovereignty doesn't generally transfer to an international government in accordance with international law, so its status and "legitimacy" does not pass to an interim regime. Sovereignty is an internal matter for the citizens but also external in terms of representation before the international community. To more completely establish the requirements for a sovereign government, she defines legitimacy as multi-dimensional. Legitimacy is both a horizontal concept – "citizens living in governance units" - and a vertical concept -- "the connections between state and citizens".

Yet, according to Dr. Guttieri, the shape and form of interim government is highly dependent on the nature and scope of the conflicts initiating all this change. These conflicts arise from requests for independence, irredentism, and competition for control of the state. How do they end? Interim governments can be besieged by requests for independence, victory without capitulation, or domestic power sharing. Throughout the process of restoring a sovereign government, the focus is generally on the elites rather than the needs of citizens, where it should be. Regional neighbors can also intervene to force capabilities and actions on the part of the interim government.

Ultimately, the issue is transition from an interim to a constitutional, sovereign-elected government. The ending of an interim regime does not necessarily have an impact on the subsequent state building as power is persistent and not easily transferred. In cases such as Iraq, where the long-standing power structures have been disintegrated or destroyed, the interim regime can play a critical role in starting to shape a more balanced and inclusive power structure. Alternatively, Dr. Guttieri identified the pitfalls of an institutionalized interim government which can create a legitimacy gap with the populace. The cases of Bosnia and Serbia are illustrative. In these cases, the Dayton Accords created a long-term UN administrative structure which was difficult to transition to the individual nations. The early and successful transfer of authority is important. For this panelist, the mantra was that we should leave the locals to do it. Unfortunately, the political realities and dynamics of the international community create a stake in the successful outcome of the peacekeeping mission. Endings do matter to us and we care about who ultimately rules. Do we care whether the outcome is inclusive or not? Obviously we do care as the governance structure must be participatory, and for the United States, our stated policy goals require progress towards a democratic state. In reality, without the mechanism to include all political actors, there is little hope for a stable peace. To ensure that there is an end to the insurgency, the solution must address the underlying political inequalities in order to really achieve a stable peace.

Finally, the discussants believed that there was a need to get the partnership right, establishing a genuine dialogue with the host country leaders, power brokers and

citizens. Outside interveners need to involve the regional neighbors in the process - no state is an island. But, in the end, the sovereign state should put all instruments of national power to use, not just the use of military force.

### **Panel Discussion**

The panel discussants quickly revealed the dichotomy between the need to prioritize and sequence and the desire to initiate reconstruction activities quickly to enhance legitimacy. The question became where you start - a judicial system is key to establishment of rule of law, yet security is the sine qua non of a progressive state. Participants questioned how much security was needed before reconstruction and institution building should be initiated.

Equally as critical is the issue of to what extent to engage with the citizen population, not just with the civilian government elements. How should the peacekeepers relate and work with local elites and religious leaders? The discussants pointed to the Iraq experience where the US initially tried to develop large-scale infrastructure public service projects tied to the government. Ultimately, they canvassed the local leaders and private citizens rather than wait for Baghdad and built smaller-scale, more localized capital projects, working to develop the local budgets to support the projects.

Finally, the participants were asked to refine the discussion into key recommendations for the next Administration. First, there was universal agreement that the intervening force should get an open and close “partnership” with the host government and establish a genuine dialogue with the populace. Second, no state is an island, and there is a strong imperative to involve the surrounding regions in the state-building process, and all instruments of US national power should be involved in rebuilding the government, beyond the use of military power and security.

# Building Resilience in Fragile States: The Role of Governance

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Peacekeepers involved in stability operations in fragile, post-conflict states recognize that the transition from stabilization to reconstruction to lay the foundation for sustainable development requires attention to how the state fulfills key governance functions. Rebuilding state capacity to perform calls for institution-building in the three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judiciary. But the state cannot manage a nation's affairs alone. It needs the support, engagement, and contribution of citizens, so rebuilding capacity includes how government and citizens connect and interact. The term governance, which is broader than just government, is used to characterize these state-society interactions. It refers to the processes and rules through which state and non-state actors in a society wield power and authority, and how they influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public affairs and socio-economic development.

This short paper offers some thoughts on the role of governance in stability operations for presentation at a workshop jointly sponsored by CNA and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute of the US Army War College. This topic has a huge literature, and the selective remarks offered here only scratch the surface of the breadth and complexity involved, drawing largely on the author's previous work.

The Essential Tasks Matrix of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization treats restoring governance as one category of stability operations tasks among several. However, the perspective of this paper is that governance constitutes an integrative set of tasks that crosscuts all elements of stability operations. Thus the underlying transition problem in post-conflict situations is reestablishing positive linkages between the state and its citizens.

The Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation's Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) has explored state-society linkages in detail to explain why some states are fragile and others are stable. The concept that is at the core of these linkages is a "social contract" between the state and its citizens. This contract is a product of three interacting components (OECD/DAC 2008, 17):

- Expectations that citizens have of the state
- State capacity to provide services within a secure environment, and to obtain sufficient resources from its population and territory to provide these services
- Political will to direct resources and capacity to meet citizens' expectations.

When these three components are in balance—that is, when citizens' expectations match up with state capacity and political will—then the state exhibits resilience. Resilience leads to stability, but not in the static sense of a balance that never changes. Rather, resilience enables the state to adjust to new and different expectations, shifts in capacity, changes in external conditions, and changes in political will.

## State fragility and governance

In any society, the governance system fulfills a set of core functions: assuring security, achieving effectiveness, and generating legitimacy. States vary in terms of how well or how poorly their governance systems combine state and citizen interaction to fulfill these functions. In fragile states, the interaction patterns are largely negative. The state, captured by elites, preys upon its citizens and maintains power through a combination of patronage and repression. Citizens distrust and fear the state, and hold low expectations that government has the ability, or the desire, to meet their needs. Fragile states face deficits in fulfilling all three of the core functions (Brinkerhoff 2007b):

- ⌚ Security: failure to protect people and property. Clearly, a high priority activity in fragile and post-conflict societies is coping with the lack of safety and security. Without security, the other governance functions cannot be fulfilled. Re-establishing security requires dealing with the police, military, and paramilitary units, and private militias through a mix of rebuilding, professionalizing, reforming, and dissolving. This governance function links closely to reconstituting legitimacy.
- ⌚ Effectiveness: failure to provide basic services and economic opportunity. The inability of fragile and post-conflict states to provide fundamental public goods and services has impacts on both the immediate prospects for tending to citizens' basic needs and restarting economic activity, and long-term prospects for assuring welfare, reducing poverty, and facilitating socio-economic growth.
- ⌚ Legitimacy: failure to provide responsive and accountable government, protection of basic rights, representation and inclusiveness for all citizens. Reconstituting legitimacy in post-conflict states involves expanding participation and inclusiveness, reducing inequities, creating accountability, combating corruption, and introducing contestability (elections). Delivering services, which links to the effectiveness function, is also important for establishing legitimacy. It demonstrates government willingness and capacity to respond to citizens' needs and demands.

Rebuilding governance, then, concerns restoring—or in many fragile, post-conflict states creating from scratch—a governance system that can fulfill these three core functions in ways that meet citizens' expectations. How a stability operations mission undertakes assistance with these functions is important. For example, if citizens perceive that it was external parties such as donors, humanitarian agencies, or military forces that achieved the restoration and that host country government actors were not involved, then the state has missed an opportunity to gain legitimacy and the stability objectives may be at risk.


## Good governance

International donor intervention to reform governance combines a relatively standard agenda that multilateral and bilateral agencies have been supporting throughout the developing world for several decades (Brinkerhoff 2008b). This agenda combines the following:

- Improving administrative efficiency through management reforms
- Streamlining the role of government, reducing its involvement in direct service delivery and getting it to focus on policy, financing, and regulation (that is, getting government to do less “rowing” and more “steering”)
- Increasing government responsiveness to citizens (transparency, accountability, democratic elections).

However, putting these good governance reforms in place has proven to be an ambitious undertaking for any developing country, much less for fragile, post-conflict states with damaged or destroyed institutions, ravaged economies, and impoverished and traumatized citizens. Faced with a long menu of governance reforms, many developing countries have had difficulty ingesting the full, high-calorie “meal.” The menu characterizes the ultimate end conditions of a resilient state that peacekeepers are aiming for (see, for example, US Department of the Army 2008), but how to get there is the fundamental governance issue for stability operations. Figure 1 illustrates the elements of the good governance agenda arrayed according to their associations with the three governance functions of security, effectiveness, and legitimacy.

**Figure 1. The Good Governance Landscape**



Grindle (2007) has argued that what is needed is a reframing of the good governance agenda to focus on “good enough governance.” She contends that governance reforms in developing countries should aim not for a comprehensive idealized vision of good governance, but for a selected set of changes that are good enough to create critical improvements in political and administrative systems and in state-society relations. They should be pursued in ways that fit country contexts.

Among the questions to be answered in pursuit of good enough governance is the relative merits of decentralization versus centralized systems. Centralized governance regimes in fragile and weak states generally do poorly at equitable and inclusive resource allocation and redistribution, negatively impacting service delivery, economic opportunity, welfare, and ultimately legitimacy as well. Distributive mechanisms tend to operate based on patronage and clientelism, promoting economic inefficiency and heightening social and ethnic tensions. These can be exploited by those in power, both at the national level, as in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or at the local level, as in Afghanistan. Yet, state capacity at sub-national levels is often critically weak as well, and constitutes a shaky platform for governance improvement.

Striking the right balance between attention to both local- and central-level governance is not simple. As noted, capacity and incentives for decentralization among national-level actors may be weak, at best, particularly in fragile states. These gaps can lead donors to pursue bypass strategies that rely upon external resources and capacity, which are unsustainable in the longer term. Thus, how to develop indigenous capacity will be critical to both an exit strategy for peacekeepers, as well as to the government and citizens of the host country.

## Capacity development


How can peacekeepers enhance the resilience, accountability, and capability of government and civil society? This is in essence a capacity development question. Capacity is often thought of in terms of resources (who has what) and of skills and knowledge (who knows what), so capacity development becomes a question of providing resources (financial, equipment, supplies, and staff) and building knowledge and skills (training, technical assistance). But capacity is also embodied in organization (who can manage what), politics and power (who can get what), and incentives (who wants to do what). So an expanded view of capacity development looks at these elements as well (Brinkerhoff 2007a). Here are some examples of capacity development interventions in the categories of organizations, politics and power, and incentives:

- Organization: management systems development, civil service reform, decentralization
- Politics and power: community empowerment, civil society strengthening, political party development

- Incentives: pro-poor social safety nets, strengthened accountability structures and procedures, rule of law reforms.

Not all capacity development interventions are equally easy to accomplish, and they often involve trade-offs. Three intersecting dimensions are the main sources of these trade-offs: 1) the time required to achieve an increase in capacity, 2) the degree of difficulty and complexity associated with developing capacity, and 3) the magnitude of the change involved in the capacity development intervention. Combining these three dimensions with the elements of capacity noted above provides a model for intervention that illustrates targeting options, their implications for each of the dimensions, and their interactions. The following figure, from Brinkerhoff (2007a, 13) illustrates this model.

**Figure 2. Capacity Development Model**



These targets are distinguished in the figure to highlight their relationship to time requirements, difficulty/complexity, and magnitude of change. The figure should not be interpreted as suggesting that they are uniformly discrete, or sequentially additive. Capacity

development most often addresses multiple targets, though the starting point and emphasis is usually one of the five designated targets:

- Moving along the horizontal axis graphically shows how the time requirements for capacity development increase as interventions move from a relative emphasis on resource transfers to addressing features in the enabling environment encapsulated in politics and power shifts, and finally to new incentives.
- Ascending the vertical axis explains how capacity development becomes more difficult and complex as interventions expand in scope and call for actions among multiple parties that penetrate increasingly deeply into the bureaucratic, political, socio-cultural, and economic fabric of society.
- Moving up the diagonal from left to right indicates how combining all of the targets involves a progressively greater magnitude of change, which requires both more time to accomplish and is increasingly difficult the farther up and to the right the intervention reaches.

### What can peacekeepers do?

A variety of templates and tools have been developed for post-conflict intervention. The S/CRS Essential Task Matrix is a useful starting point for the discussion, despite the criticism leveled at it by some as too much of a blueprint. Clearly context matters significantly. That includes a given country's historical legacy, indigenous institutions, culture and values. For many post-conflict situations, context is also set by the peace agreement, which often establishes key features of governance restoration: e.g., power-sharing among interest groups, timetables for elections, and division of resources (e.g., El Salvador). So setting priorities according to characteristics of the context is important: looking at, for example, peace accords, conflict drivers, levels of existing capacity, key capacity gaps, and degree of political will.

Pace and sequencing issues for governance reforms are the subject of continued debate, although consensus exists that demilitarization and restoration of the state's capacity to fulfill the security function is a primary step on the path to peace (e.g., Jeong 2005). Without safety and security, stability operations cannot make progress toward reconstruction. One area of debate has to do with timing for elections. Some analysts argue for early elections in post-conflict settings, partly on the basis that citizens expect them. Others, for example Paris (2004), have argued for democratic governance institution building first, with postponed elections.

It is critical to recognize the linkages among security, effectiveness, and legitimacy. Peacekeepers should balance the urge to pursue a “do it yourself” strategy for restoring services and recognize that new, post-conflict governments need to build their legitimacy in citizens’ eyes through providing services and demonstrating leadership. The utilization of stability operations resources should contribute as much as possible to establishing good governance practices and building government capacity. For example, US Army peacekeepers should avoid simply allocating CERP funds in response to what seems to be a worthwhile community request without establishing a transparent process, and connecting that process to a government entity, e.g., a ministry office, a municipal government, or a provincial parliament.

Here are some lessons learned from an analysis of local governance reconstruction in Iraq that offer additional food for thought on what peacekeepers can do to restore governance as part of stability operations (Brinkerhoff 2008a):

- Build on local capacity and engage local actors in governance reconstruction
- Foster accountability and transparency to reduce corruption and build citizen support
- Build new, positive relationships between citizens and public officials around key service delivery issues
- Pay attention to building legitimacy when introducing new governance structures
- Recognize that governance transformation is a long-term process that will extend beyond a given stability operation.

## Conclusion

Intervening in the dynamics of fragile, post-conflict nations requires a solid understanding of both the general lessons of experience in nation and state building, and of the situation-specific context of the particular country where peacekeepers are engaged in a stability operation. The appropriate path to restored (or newly created) governance and the achievement of societal resilience must take into account factors that are largely outside the control of peacekeeping missions: a) the legacy of societal conflict and cleavages, b) the country’s indigenous institutions, and c) the existing capacity and willingness of state and non-state actors to cooperate and contribute to rebuilding their nation-state. Successfully navigating the governance landscape that these initial conditions shape will guide peacekeepers to pockets of capacity and political will. These become the starting points for planning and action to restore governance that can:

- Assure basic safety and security
- Provide priority services effectively and transition from a war to a peace economy

- Create social and institutional arrangements that lead to inclusion, transparency, and representation of citizen interests.

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## ***Interim Governments in Theory and Practice***

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International statesmen and scholars have for some years now focused on a domestic political question: who rules when the fighting stops? The mechanics of authority transitions – ostensibly an internal sovereign concern – have become an international preoccupation. Practitioners from outside war torn societies broker constitutional arrangements, provide military and police to sustain order and enforce laws, and fashion aid programs in order to move transitions forward. These practitioners by and large operate according to a state-centric paradigm, even while violating its rules.

State-builders patch sub-state ruptures in order to sustain the larger structure – a system of relations among states based upon sovereign equality and non-intervention. In the transition from one form of rule to another, interim or temporary governance structures – sometimes several iterations of them - are formed.<sup>1</sup>

This chapter defines interim government, its functions and forms, and identifies some dilemmas for contemporary state-builders.

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<sup>1</sup> An interim state may last for decades or quickly give way to another temporary structure. The Global Information System identifies over a dozen interim regimes since 1999 in the transition tables available online at <http://www.gisresearch.com/>. In the period 1990-2003, over twenty-two ethnically divided societies have been the site of settlements ranging from those that established political rights for minorities to power sharing arrangements to partition and establishment of new sovereign states. See Roeder, P. G. and D. S. Rothchild (2005). Sustainable peace : power and democracy after civil wars. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.

### *Defining Interim Government*

Interim government may be broadly defined as an organization that rules during the period between the fall of a prior regime and the initiation of the next – the transition period. If it is temporary, how does one know when it is over? For those interested in democratization the marker might be the assumption of power of a freely elected government.<sup>2</sup> State-building sets a different marker: when a new or reconstituted, permanent domestic government is able to wield *effective internal sovereignty* – including resumption of law and order functions of governance.<sup>3</sup> Sovereignty is internal with respect to its citizens; it is external with respect to representation before the international community. It is persistent and non-transferable, according to international law, even in the presence of military occupation. The exercise of effective internal sovereignty by a permanent domestic government requires that the transition settle a social process: the collective determination of the right to rule, also called the determination of legitimacy.

Other actors in the system may be interested in the outcome of regime change because it identifies a point of contact for international relations, as well as the authorities obliged to control affairs within those borders. For members of a polity in transition, the determination of a new political order is much weightier than the identification of authorities to obey; it involves a leap of faith in processes in place to articulate and represent interests. Although legitimacy is commonly conceived in vertical terms of authority relations; legitimacy is also horizontal - a shared sense of right governance among the communities that make up the polity.<sup>4</sup> In the shadow of its former state, the new order must recognize the legacy of the old - its residual legitimacy, laws still on the books, and habits of obedience still practiced by its people. Any effort to construct a new order must do more than secure external recognition; it must provide a normative foundation for new habits. Despite the legacy effects of the old order and the uncertainty of a change, new normative structure is possible.

As the political theorist Charles Taylor explains, we employ a *social imaginary* to enable, and perhaps codify, the moral or normative order:

...the modern theory of moral order gradually infiltrates and transforms our social imaginary. In this process, what is originally just an idealization grows into

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<sup>2</sup> Shain, Y. and J. Linz, Eds. (1995). Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions. New York, Cambridge University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Guttieri, K. and J. Piombo (2007). Interim governments : Institutional bridges to peace and democracy? Washington, D.C., United States Institute Of Peace Press.

<sup>4</sup> Kal Holsti refers to these as vertical and horizontal legitimacy, respectively. Holsti, K. J. (1996). The state, war, and the state of war. Cambridge ; New York, N.Y., USA, Cambridge University Press.

a complex imaginary through being taken up and associated with social practices, in part traditional ones, which are often transformed by the contact.

### *Transitional Forms*


The shape and form of interim government is highly dependent on the nature and scope of the conflicts initiating all this change. In earlier waves of transition studies these conflicts were about authoritarian transitions from civilian to military rule (El Salvador, Indonesia, and Guatemala) or economic-ideological transitions from communist rule. Some of the conflicts have been very bloody, stemming from independence movements (as in East Timor and Kosovo); irredentism (Bosnia); or competition for control of the state by internal factions (Afghanistan, Iraq). The requirements for transitional governance vary, as Michael Doyle observes, with the environments in which they operate, and the number of factions within them, the coherence of those factions, and their hostility to one another.<sup>5</sup>

Interim governments may be fashioned together from remnants of an old regime (as in Indonesia), created new by a revolutionary victor (Afghanistan), forged as a pact by competing factions (Burundi, DRC), or superimposed by outside authorities (Iraq); each of these forms carries its own promises and perils with respect to the viability and longevity of peace and the determination of legitimacy or consent of the governed. The first wave of scholars identified four basic forms of interim governments, some of which include little role for outside actors. As the role of outside actors increased, scholars began to differentiate the international genre of interim governance. These relations are depicted in a typology prepared in a comparative study led by myself and Jessica Piombo, and published in the 2008 volume, *Interim Governments* as follows:

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<sup>5</sup> Doyle, M. (2001). War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations' Post-Cold War Record. Turbulent Peace. F. O. H. Chester A. Crocker, and Pamela Aall. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace: 529-560.

## *A Typology of Interim Government<sup>6</sup>*



Revolutionary regimes enjoy popularity, but have little connectivity to established structures and a tendency to turn violent as agendas compete and scores are settled. Caretaker regimes tend to be legalistic rather than democratic and, because they depend upon the good will of the former regime, favor amnesty over transitional justice. Power-sharing regimes depend upon pacts, sometimes among thugs, and the power basis of these may shift. International structures may confer external legitimacy but suffer internal deficits, as they are hard-pressed to manage internal rivals claiming a right to rule. The international community is slow to intervene and cumbersome to organize when it does, creating, as initially in Bosnia, an awkward administrative structure divided along civilian and military lines of operations. In Kosovo the authority structure was more stable, but created a long-term dependency.

### *Dilemmas of Interim Government*

The empirical world has yielded a significant number and variety of interim regimes for study. Reviewing a dozen recent cases of transitional governance yielded a number of insights about the prospects and perils of interim governance in the effort to establish

<sup>6</sup> Guttieri, K. and J. Piombo, Eds. (2008). *Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?* Washington, DC, U.S. Institute of Peace Press.

peace and democracy.<sup>7</sup> Of these, the most striking theme is the persistence of power. As the earliest group of transition scholars noted, those governments with the best records are the ones that were designed and driven more by internal than external powers.

Groups that were powerful at the end of the conflict phase tend to be the ones that remain powerful; with the possible exception of transitions by foreign invasion.<sup>8</sup> Structural factors like economic or socio-cultural divisions that lead to disaffection between citizens and elites are unlikely to be cured by the act of voting.<sup>9</sup> Transition processes tend to entrench in power those individuals and factions who have the ability to derail a peace process by taking up arms, and so possess “veto power.”

Power-sharing approaches have been favored by the international community in part because they are local solutions, less costly, and likely to ensure peace in the short run, since they bring the relevant parties to the table. Power-sharing is also a risky approach and, as a compromise, unlikely to represent progress.<sup>10</sup> This is a pernicious possibility in a highly indigenous structure: the prospect that those more interested in personal power than long-term stability will manipulate negotiations and power-sharing agreements to strengthen their ability to wage war. When peace agreements and a transitional government are initiated before peace is secured, combatants are able to stay outside the transitional process at will.

If change is needed, an international administrative authority might create a shock to the system.<sup>11</sup> However, even in cases in which deep changes were sought by international

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid. In July 2005, the Naval Postgraduate School convened a workshop to examine the innovations in interim governance that had occurred since the end of the Cold War. Particularly, the project aimed to trace the evolution of transitional governance in the past decade and to analyze the increased international involvement in transitional regimes, with particular attention to the longer term consequences of heavy external involvement on domestic legitimacy, stability, and governance. Participants at the workshop were asked to prepare case studies and theoretical works that examined a number of critical cases in international governance, and which probed various themes. Cases studied included El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq.

<sup>8</sup> Manning, C. (2007). *Interim Governments and the Construction of Political Elites. Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?* K. Guttieri and J. Piombo. Washington, DC, U.S. Institute of Peace Press: 53-73.

<sup>9</sup> Carothers, T. (2002). "The end of the transition paradigm." *Journal of Democracy* **13**(1): 5.

<sup>10</sup> Roeder, P. G. and D. S. Rothchild (2005). *Sustainable peace : power and democracy after civil wars.* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.

<sup>11</sup> Ottaway, M. and B. Lacina (2003). "International interventions and imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s." *SAIS Review* **23**(2): 71.

actors, these changes fell short. The United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) in Cambodia provided a large commitment of troops and time. However, UNTAC's efforts to preserve functioning state institutions gave an advantage to the incumbent, Hun Sen, a despotic dictator. In Afghanistan, an international coalition working together with local insurgents overthrew the Taliban regime that had held the nation in a reactionary ideological grip and openly supported terrorist groups. Whether due to an inadequate resolution on the ground, crafty negotiations by warlords in the *loya jirga* constitutional process, or both – economic and other progress is scarce and instability threatens.

Fully internationalized governments have difficulty extending powers, achieving capacity and transparency, and are ill-suited to address disconnects between the elite and population. Regional neighbors also frequently influence the interim government. The consequence is often more disconnected in already divided societies. A study in Afghanistan by Tufts University found that the outsiders and insiders differed considerably in their comprehension of security in this environment. While formally the transitional political process was inclusive, it did not reach out to the everyday lives of the people. "The extent of disenfranchisement," Antonio Donini observes, "is proportional to the distance, - geographical, cultural, or political, - from the capital."<sup>12</sup> It is ideal to conduct an early transfer of executive authority, with step by step reductions in scope for a peacekeeping mission. Economic control may be slower to regain than political control.

International scholarship and practice in general is disposed to focus on negotiations with elite power-sharing and division of spoils. The options are much more varied in practice than whether an international, caretaker or power-sharing government might bridge a gap in rule. In plural societies, a wide range of options are available to channel conflict so that groups can co-exist without being assimilated by one another. A proportional representation system of election, for example, by including representative numbers of interest groups, can ensure that these voices are heard.<sup>13</sup> When these approaches are taken, care and attention to party structure and development is also vital. Similarly, divided and federal government structures are other ways to create checks on power and build manageable governance units. The dilemma for transitional governments is to navigate existing powers that may be across the minefield of short term interests, to a structure that will create the best footing for effective governance, and the horizontal and vertical legitimacy of a permanent domestic government.

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<sup>12</sup> Donini, A. (2007). Knocking on Heaven's Door: Meeting Social Expectations in Post-Conflict Transitions. Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy? K. Guttieri and J. Piombo. Washington, DC, U.S. Institute of Peace Press: 35-52.

<sup>13</sup> Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy. New Haven and London, Yale University Press.

### *Conclusion*

It is ultimately in the enlightened self interest of the international community to pay attention to who rules when the fighting stops, and how that question is settled. Without the mechanism to include all political actors there is little hope for a stable peace, so the governance structure must be participatory and reflect progress towards a democratic state. Insurgents aim to change the status quo; when those factions have a stake in the political order the prospects that they will put down their arms will improve.

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## Panel Two: Local Governance

This panel on the role of rebuilding local governance was chaired by Dr. Sarah Meharg, from the Pearson Peacekeeping Institute on secondment to PKSOI. Presenters included Dr. Karin von Hippel, Co-Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and formerly senior fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. The panel also included Dr. Ronald Johnson, former Vice President, International Development Group, Research Triangle Institute. Additionally, COL Richard Megahan, PKSOI presented his experience in Diyala Province, Iraq.

*Issues to be Addressed: What are the keys to effective subnational/local governance? How do civil society and local interest groups (warlords, tribal leaders, and local elites) elect and support legitimacy/effectiveness/accountability? What are the key actors, institutions and ethnic/societal interest groups roles and challenges to the process of rebuilding local governance?*

**Dr. Karin von Hippel** discussed a range of models of government - decentralized unitary state, federation, confederation, consociationalism. From the options presented, she addressed the question of the type of model that should be applied to rebuilding governments based on country context. What models might be most appropriate for Afghanistan or Somalia? She also outlined the pros and cons of the different approaches and issues for donors to consider.

Somalia is a case study of the difficulties. Can the international community support efforts to build local governance capacity, in the absence of an effective central government? Somalia has been without an effective central authority since 1991, and many unsuccessful attempts have been made to rebuild the state. Is it useful revisiting some of those attempts?

**Dr. Ron Johnson**, the second panelist, emphasized that there should not be a single approach to centralization/decentralization. First, there must be an effective central government structure to manage security. But, the key is to ultimately be able to relate to the local and informal leadership which will reduce hostility and tensions and reconstitution of the state. There is a direct correlation between the level of hostility to a regime and conflict over time.

How does a local government deal with conflict? The reality is that it can't deal with conflict separately from a central government. Local governments need to provide public services and engage in reconstruction and stabilization. The challenges to local

government include insurgency, limited conflict, and transitioning from military to civilian leadership.

For Dr. Johnson, civil society, local interests and, tribal leaders are critical elements to provide local governments in legitimacy/accountability/effectiveness. Local governments can be a focal point for access to political power (local elites, military, etc.). The process for reconstructing local governments must involve a broad variety of actors – civil affairs, development agencies, local leaders and community based groups (including tribal/traditional, interim local leaders, NGOs).

**COL Rick Megahan** described his experience in Diyala Province in Iraq rebuilding the provincial government. He emphasized the need for direct and face-to-face coaching for local leaders and the need for a holistic approach to a new government.

As a prime example of the type of effort to address reconstruction, he used the example of the CORDS program in Vietnam. During the period of the CORDS program, State, USAID and the military were coaching at every level, before the longer term attempts at more developmental activities were brought in. His paradigm included: 1) the initial assessment 2) using existing institutions 3) mentoring and coaching and 4) urging leaders to produce for their citizens to enhance legitimacy and resilience. In all of the reconstruction efforts, the overarching framework must be that the host country is the responsible agent.

For this panelist, there were several central principles necessary to create the traction for long-term developmental change. These are: 1) the synchronization of all agency's efforts; 2) all agencies are working through host country institutions and government structures; 3) support for delivering services; 4) building services and building trust; enabling the locals rather than the US imposing solutions.

The ultimate objective of the peacekeeper's presence is the transition to host-country authorities and governance. Commentators noted that the real issue in dealing with transition is what end-state the outside interveners were seeking? More importantly, were these end-states concomitant with local objectives - was there synchronization with the host country in terms of transition framework and timing?

**Panel Discussion:** Participants raised the central question as to what the end-state should be of peacekeeping operations. What is "good enough" governance that leaves the host nation on a trajectory to peace and economic growth? How do you have a common objective that incorporates all levels of the political structure central, subnational and local government? Without a common objective, it is difficult to have a successful reconstruction program and the transition to host-country authority and government is more difficult.

US policy objectives change as well, making it difficult to coordinate USG efforts internally as well as with the host government. Ambassador Negroponte in Iraq believed that the USG should focus its efforts on strengthening the central Maliki government, disagreeing with USAID and others on the need to work at the provincial/local levels. The next US ambassador didn't believe that a strong central government was the solution and the US policy and resources were altered to reflect this focus. Dr. von Hippel cited the Afghanistan case where the current international effort has been directed through the Karzai government, but with the chaos and deteriorating security situation, it appears that approach has been ineffective. Now the IMF and World Bank are considering whether their funding should be allocated through the central government, but they realize that this will require that they develop a common strategic and programmatic agenda with the local governments as to how it would work. For these International Financial Institutions (IFIs), it would imply the need for a power-sharing arrangement between the center and the local government, and the central government would have to concur with the program. In reality, for the four central models of government, this type of power-sharing may not work. Sequencing is hard - it depends on what cycle in the conflict cycle you are in. If there is substantial conflict to begin with, the local government needs a minimum level of security before reconstruction begins.

*Centralized and Decentralized Governance Options after Protracted Conflict*

By Karin von Hippel, Senior Fellow and Co-Director, PCR Project, CSIS

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*One major challenge for the international community when involved in rebuilding states after conflict is whether and how to support “top-down” or “bottom up” approaches to governance. This paper is organized in three parts: first, it outlines the risks and opportunities of the different approaches and briefly discusses the Afghanistan experience, second, it provides a lengthier analysis of past attempts at political reconstruction in Somalia, and third, it concludes with a summary of critical issues to consider.*

*1. Competing Approaches*

After lengthy civil wars, signatories to the peace typically opt for some sort of power-sharing arrangements, within a range of centralized to decentralized models of government. In the best circumstances, traditional political culture and organization are taken into account in designing new models, and civil society leaders from across the country are fully engaged in the consensual reconstruction of their state. The preferred options are constitutional arrangements that have arisen from local initiatives, or that confer considerable powers on local institutions and peoples.

In the worst case, those directly responsible for the conflict carve up the pie within a winner-take-all, unitary form of government. Local customs and decentralized practices are ignored or overlooked in favor of more centralized models, which are easier to control, even if these may have contributed to the implosion of the state in the first place. Faction leaders aggressively compete for top posts, especially the jobs of president, prime minister, minister of defense and minister of finance.

### *1.1. Why top-down?*

If the centralized model is chosen, this can be due to reasons of expediency and worries that the ceasefire may not hold. It may also be the preferred option because of the deep societal fissures caused by years of civil war, and the paramount concern that, if not checked, centrifugal forces could contribute to complete state disintegration, with Somalia being the ultimate exemplar. If the new government has been democratically elected, donors would also want to help the nascent (and usually weak) central authority establish its legitimacy throughout the country so as to tackle the critical challenges involved in rebuilding trust and capacity. Most donors are required to work directly through national government offices because of their own conditionality factors.

For example, the World Bank has generally been restricted by its articles of agreement to working only with recognized governments, with a few exceptions to this rule. In the absence of a peace settlement, or during a protracted conflict when sovereignty is contested, the Bank has sidestepped this rule on occasion, notably in West Bank and Gaza, and in Kosovo and East Timor before independence. When there is no central authority, as in Somalia, the Bank can provide some aid at local levels, usually through trust fund mechanisms, at the request of the international community (typically the UN). In this latter case, the funding would not likely be significant, as arrears would need to be cleared before larger lending programs were underway. Other multilateral organizations, including the United Nations and the European Union, as well as bilateral donors, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, have developed more flexible funding mechanisms to work in conflict zones.

### *1.2. What are the risks?*

The threat of an over-centralized approach is that it could destabilize and undermine functioning local authorities, which may have been the only trusted structures that provided security or delivered services throughout the conflict. Aid delivered only through the center also tends to empower the elites, while marginalizing rural communities, minorities and opposition parties. This is especially problematic in deeply divided societies, where capturing the capital city means capturing the spoils, and is seen as a zero-sum-game.

### *1.3. And bottom-up?*

As noted, decentralized political models may be the best option for rebuilding trust in deeply divided societies, as in post-war Bosnia. During negotiations over peace settlements, ordinary citizens and civil society leaders are keen to avoid another overly powerful central government. They argue that the only way to ensure

that another dictator does not usurp power at the centre is to decentralize as many aspects of government as possible.

There are four main models of decentralized government. The first is a confederation, which is an association of independent sovereign units that agree to join together for certain purposes and to create common institutions to manage their common affairs, such as the European Union or the American states at the time of the Articles of Confederation in 1781.

The second is a federation, an association of states that agree to form a union under a federal government, while retaining full control over their own internal affairs. There are several different ways in which sovereignty can be divided between the centre and the regions or provinces, but the most usual is for the federating units to agree to a triple list of powers, i.e., those to be exercised exclusively by the centre; those to be exercised exclusively by the regions or provinces; and a concurrent list of powers that can be exercised by both the centre and the regions. Examples include Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, India, Switzerland, and the United States.

The third model is a decentralized unitary state with guarantees of regional autonomy. Here, sovereign power and authority are vested in the central government, but the center devolves many of the functions of government to regional and/or local authorities due to particular demands by minorities or regions. Examples of this include Spain, Papua New Guinea or Uganda.

Finally, the fourth model is a community-based option called consociation. This involves non-territorial power-sharing amongst all important communities within a state (e.g., component ethnic groups, clans, etc.). Unlike the other forms of decentralised government, consociational principles do not require the state to be divided territorially into separate local units. Consociational governments normally have four key features: executive power sharing; the principle of proportional representation in all public institutions and allocations; community self-government; and veto powers for minorities. Consociational practices can be applied within the other models, and are usually tried in multi-ethnic states. They were invented by Dutch politicians in 1917 and operated there until the 1960s; used in Lebanon between 1943 and 1975; in Malaysia between 1955 and 1969, Fiji on and off between 1970 and 1987, in Northern Ireland briefly in 1974, and in South Africa, after apartheid.<sup>14</sup> It may be that still other arrangements of power-sharing between the center and the periphery will need to be developed to deal with the complexities involved in many current and future cases, but generally these are the models on offer.

#### 1.4. *The risks?*

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<sup>14</sup> For more information about the models and the application in different parts of the world, see J. Barker, E.A. Brett, P. Dawson, I.M. Lewis, P. McAuslan, J. Mayall, B. O'Leary, and K von Hippel, *A Study of Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options*, London School of Economics, EC Somalia Unit and the UN Development Office for Somalia, August 1995 (published in English and Somali).

Even if there is a peace settlement, donors often choose to work at the local levels in order to circumvent a number of critical concerns, such as corruption and kleptocracy, or to achieve key goals, such as moving beyond the elites and into neglected rural areas, strengthening civil society, and ensuring that minorities and other excluded groups also benefit from democratization efforts. Yet if not undertaken carefully, normally with some knowledge and cooperation of the central or regional or even locally elected authorities, such support can risk undermining the national government, as it empowers others at the expense of elected authorities.

#### 1.5. *A consistent approach?*

Once the national government has agreed on a constitutional design and the international donor and diplomatic community has endorsed that model, some assert that donors should then commit to the approach and try to make it work, even if it was not the most appropriate design in the first place. Others argue that donors should be as flexible as possible in transition periods, which are usually volatile and unpredictable, as long as they are transparent and communicate any changes in policy or approach with the national government, the public and international partners. Ideally, aid should be distributed at both the central and local levels in order to build capacity and confidence in newly elected authorities.

#### 1.6. *Centralization in Afghanistan?*

The Afghan government that emerged after the Bonn Agreement was a centralized, unitary state, not one of the four decentralized models mentioned earlier. This was viewed as important after decades of civil war, when Afghanistan became extremely fragmented,<sup>15</sup> and Afghans and international partners were concerned about complete state disintegration. Even the word “federation” had negative connotations. The major international donors thus agreed to work with the center to help it establish its legitimacy throughout the state. More recently, many donors have altered their approach due to concerns about corruption, mismanagement of resources, increasing insecurity, and poor governance.

The first issue that comes to mind is whether a unitary state was and is the appropriate design, especially if one wanted to work *with* rather than *against* the Afghan tendency of fragmentation. A case could be made for a more combined approach than the current situation, striking a balance between local autonomy, tribal systems and central government. The unitary model has, however, been enshrined in the constitution, and thus it would require creative leadership to forge a more appropriate design within the parameters of the constitution, and President Karzai is no longer viewed as such a reformer.

The second issue relates to the aforementioned concerns about corruption at the center, about warlords in charge of several key ministries and provinces, and money not going to where it is intended. Because of this, more donors have been shifting funds and expertise to the provincial and district levels, with little consultation with government officials at central, provincial and often even district levels, despite agreements

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<sup>15</sup> See Barnett Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, Yale University Press, 2002.

already in place.<sup>16</sup> This has been facilitated for donors through the 26 internationally-run provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) operating throughout the country, some of which are becoming very involved in local governance, establishing parallel *shuras* in certain districts, for example.

If donors do believe this is the right approach – that is, working more directly at the local level - they need to be transparent about their intentions and activities with local, regional and national authorities, as well as ensure that ordinary Afghans are also aware of the change. A more transparent approach would also help in public relations campaigns to counter the sophisticated strategic communications operation run by the Taliban, which regularly disseminates stories about western imperial designs and other supposedly negative ambitions of the international community.

If instead donors and the Afghan government together agree that the “local first” approach is counter-productive, they should spend more time trying to fight corruption at the center and ensure that funds go to where they are needed. A number of monitoring mechanisms were set up in the early days after the Bonn Agreement to ensure transparency, using local and national press as well as other watchdog groups, these would have to be resuscitated and revitalized in full partnership between the Afghan government and major donors.

The inconsistent and often non-transparent donor behavior has interfered with progress in democratizing Afghanistan. A similar lack of overall strategy and coherence has also interfered with attempts at reconciliation in Somalia.

## 2. *Decentralization for Somalia?*

When there is no central government to work with, or when the signatories to the peace agreement cannot assert their authority, the situation is even more complicated. Somalia has been without an effective central government since January 1991, although there have been dozens of signed and ultimately failed peace agreements. Before and during the UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations (1992-1995), attempts at reconciliation had been made by various groups of Somali intellectuals, by Somali warlords or “politicians”, by neighboring states, by several western countries, and by regional and multilateral institutions. Between 1991 and early 1995, 17 national-level and 20 local-level “reconciliation initiatives” were attempted in Somalia and in neighboring states.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See Clare Lockhart, “The Aid Relationship in Afghanistan: Struggling for Government Leadership,” Managing Aid Dependency Project, Oxford University: Global Economic Governance Programme, GEG Working Paper 2007/27, June 2007.

<sup>17</sup> Ken Menkhaus, “International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 43.

Despite the plethora of agreements on peace, national unity and the formation of a central government, they arguably failed because they focused almost exclusively on a rapid revival of a centralized state – without the prior elaboration of constitutional arrangements that could have accommodated the decentralized (some even say “uncentralized”) realities of Somali society and built confidence amongst the various actors to the peace process. The national-level agreements also foundered because they included more warlords than traditional leaders from civil society, and these warlords could not fully control nor deliver their claimed constituencies.

Local-level agreements achieved more results through the organization of a cascading series of small meetings, as in Somaliland, which declared its independence from the rump Somali state in May 1991. Local meetings gradually transformed into the Boroma “national” conference, held between February and May 1993, which capped this process. Elders agreed on a National Peace Charter for the “Somaliland Republic,” which also assisted in resolving clan conflicts. Significantly, this process received very little external financial assistance.

### *2.1. Building Blocks*

From the mid to late 1990s, following the UN interventions, the international community subsequently supported what was called the “building block” or “peace dividend approach.” Areas that made progress on political reconciliation and security would receive support, whereas the so-called “poor performers” would receive only humanitarian assistance (when security permitted), and even then such assistance was minimal owing to funding constraints. The building block approach was based on the belief that an effective national government could only be realized if it were built on relatively strong, peaceful, decentralized regional foundations.

By the late 1990s, the building block/peace dividend approach had been endorsed by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African regional organization, which was chaired at the time by Ethiopia. Somaliland was already receiving the bulk of international assistance, and in 1998 the northeast soon established a regional charter for Puntland. Together these two regions comprise approximately half of all the territory of the former Somali Republic. Other regions in southern Somalia were at times declared to be building blocks, including Hiraanland, Jubaland, Gedo region and the Benadir Administration.

The hope was that these regional authorities would eventually join up and form a decentralized federal or even confederal state, and that this “bottom up” method of coming together would ensure that power remained diffuse. Although in theory this approach made the most sense, and complied with what many Somalis from all political and social affiliations had been advocating for years, in practice it was undermined by the relative indifference of some of the major powers, particularly the United States and UN headquarters, and the direct interference of the neighboring states.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> See Karin von Hippel, “Blurring of Mandates in Somalia”, in Larry Minear and Hazel Smith, eds., *Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft*, United Nations University Press, 2006.

The lack of interest by the major powers and their reluctance to support this approach in a meaningful way allowed regional actors to interfere with relative ease, to the detriment of the political and security situation inside the country. Had the U.S. government and UN headquarters put their full diplomatic weight behind this effort and applied greater pressure on Somali authorities and neighboring governments, as well as assisted in democratization efforts, potentially this policy might have succeeded in re-establishing an effective government.

Instead, a regional Cold War interfered with reconciliation attempts. The competition was first between Kenya and Ethiopia for control of the peace process, then between Ethiopia and Egypt owing to their longstanding dispute over the Nile. Each country supported different, opposing warlords in northern and southern Somalia.

Ethiopia and Egypt also had mutually exclusive ambitions for the type of government they wanted established in Somalia. Remembering its past border disputes and war with Somalia, Ethiopia preferred a decentralized state, which would hopefully be less of a threat to its larger neighbor. Ethiopia thus utilized its lead position at the time in IGAD to promote the building block approach, which also found resonance amongst western states and the United Nations. Egypt, on the other hand, itself a highly centralized state, advocated a model similar to its own, and probably also because it preferred Ethiopia's neighbor to be strong. The Egyptian view was that if Somalia were encouraged to break into "entities", there would be more of a likelihood that each entity would attempt to declare independence, as had already occurred in Somaliland. If instead a central government were formed first, then it could be up to the central government to decide on the regions that would comprise the state. Egypt argued that it was committed to preserving Somalia's integrity.

Complicating the equation was the Eritrean–Ethiopian war, which fully erupted in early 1999 and was responsible for an upsurge in arms flows into Somalia. Yemen and Libya also entered the picture and were accused of supplying arms to different actors as well. All these states additionally continued the earlier damaging policy of negotiating possible settlements only with the warlords (giving them large sums of money to attend so-called "peace talks" and sign agreements that could not be implemented). Thus, whereas at one level the international community, through the Somali Aid Coordination Body, was advocating a building block approach and a focus on civil society, the neighboring states were pushing a contrary policy that essentially kept Somalia in a political stalemate and continued to empower the warlords.

Things only deteriorated further with yet another regional peace initiative, this time sponsored by the Djibouti government. In August 2000, at the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti, a Transitional National Government (TNG) was officially announced. The TNG moved to the capital, Mogadishu, in October 2000. It received some support from the United Nations and financial support from several Gulf and North African states, including Saudi Arabia, which allegedly donated US \$6 million. Arta resembled more the Egyptian preference and it, too, soon faltered.

Significantly, the TNG signalled the end of the building block approach. As Matt Bryden explained,

The Arta conference effectively denied the existence of these [regional] authorities, and aimed instead at the formation of a government by a large group of hand-picked individuals, invited by the Djiboutian government. Since the leaders of the “building blocks” declined to attend, the conference attracted their political rivals instead, and awarded them legitimacy and recognition under the rubric of a new “Transitional National Government.” The consequences were dramatic: the administrations of Puntland and Bay/Bakool soon collapsed as pro- and anti-TNG groups struggled for power. Gedo region, which had been peaceful for several years, also erupted into inter-factional violence, and an alliance of pro-TNG militia from central Somalia assaulted and occupied the southern port of Kismayo.<sup>19</sup>

After further talks in Kenya in 2004, yet another Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established, which continues today, though in name only. The TFG has never managed to control more than half of Mogadishu and parts of Baidoa, while competing groups have vied for power. The most successful was the Islamic Courts Union, which was perceived as a radical fundamentalist movement that threatened Ethiopia and allegedly was linked to al-Qa’ida. In mid-2006, the ICU succeeded in consolidating its power over much of southern Somalia. Six months later, in December 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia with tacit U.S. government support in order to remove the ICU from power, and this temporarily bolstered the TFG, though it still could not control the country. The ICU meanwhile splintered into a number of competing and violent militias, which have contributed to a serious deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation throughout Somalia.

U.S. government concerns over the growth of Islamic radicalism and the threat of terrorism in Somalia, and consequent U.S. military, diplomatic and other activities in the country, have caused serious blowback in Somalia, helping to catalyze a much more powerful and violent jihadist movement and pushing Somalia further into humanitarian disaster.<sup>20</sup> In late January 2009, Ethiopia finally withdrew troops from Somalia, and Abdullahi Yusuf resigned as president of the TFG in December 2008. At the time of writing, Islamist militias had already taken over Baidoa, and further peace talks are underway in Djibouti. The future of the African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) is likewise uncertain.

Experience in Somalia over the past two decades has taught any would-be mediator that there is no simple solution to Somalia’s interconnected problems of warlordism, state collapse, radicalization, and humanitarian

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<sup>19</sup> Matt Bryden, “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam and Statelessness in Somalia”, *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall 2003, p. 44.

<sup>20</sup> See Ken Menkhaus and Karin von Hippel, “Somalia: Republic of Blowback,” *International Herald Tribune*, 4 September 2008.

disaster. And it may be too late to resuscitate the building block approach due to extreme fragmentation and violence, but in many ways, it might have been and still may be the only viable option for sustainable state building in Somalia. The lesson from the building block experience was that if there is general agreement on a road map, one that has the broad support of the population (and not just the militia heads), the international community should make every effort to ensure it is implemented and not obstructed by spoilers, which in this case included a combination of regional countries and a number of Somali warlords.

### 3. *Concluding remarks*

Rebuilding states and government capacity after protracted conflict is, by definition, extremely challenging. Wars almost always result in the destruction of most existing infrastructure and cause the majority of educated citizens to flee the country. Even in the best circumstances, when a constitutional design has been agreed upon, implementation will be fraught with difficulties. It will require sustained attention to detail and frequent interventions by external partners to ensure that competing parties implement their commitments and that government capacity is built at all levels. Sustained attention means years - if not generations - rather than months, so as to avoid repeated return interventions, as the UN has had to do at least five times in Haiti over the last two decades.

In terms of the strategic design of a new government as part of the peace process, this should be led by national actors, with the support and technical assistance of the international community when requested and required. The challenge for those who are seeking new decentralized political structures for their country is how to develop an over-arching framework capable of providing basic common services, and at the same time, is securely rooted in local democratic processes. Tribes, clans, ethnic groups, and even religious groups could be the natural building blocks. The key difficulty in designing and constructing the appropriate decentralized political model will lie in the local actors' willingness to agree upon the appropriate federating and consociating units.

While the process should be driven by local actors, the international community has a significant role to play. Without external pressures, it is not easy for many divided societies to transform their polities into decentralized models. Donors and diplomats should thus try as much as possible to encourage constitutional designs that complement local culture and traditions, rather than work against them.

Whichever of the options are chosen – from the most centralized to the most decentralized - the initial decision need not be permanent and irreversible. Constitutional arrangements can be built in, whatever number of states are created, which would allow *either* for the re-unification, by agreement, of the constituent states, *or* for the secession, by agreement, of any of the new political entities created by the re-establishment of a united state. Often decentralized, power-sharing consociational arrangements are only needed in the immediate aftermath of conflict, while trust is being rebuilt, and then they can be transformed into other models as and when appropriate.

Decentralized approaches can help thwart another overly strong central authority, while consociational practices recognize the importance of the clans, tribes, ethnic and/or religious groups. These power-sharing practices also help ensure that those who have been discriminated against in the past will be treated fairly in the future.

## **Achieving Effective Local Governance: A Perspective from the Field**

By COL Richard Megahan

*“Since an insurgency is a bottom-to-top movement, an administrative vacuum at the bottom, an incompetent bureaucracy plays into the hands of the insurgent.”*

*David Galula<sup>i</sup>*

*“We had done our best to provide advice and support to our counterparts, but I realized that perhaps sometimes we had been too quick to do things for them.”*

*John C. Loving<sup>ii</sup>*

### **Summary**

What possibly could a former Iraqi Infantry Division senior combat advisor have to say about effective local governance?

Essentially, that achieving effective local governance means insuring there is no security and public administration vacuum; that effective governance is “home-grown,” and occurs from the bottom up, not top down; that effective governance is all about leadership; that capability and capacity-building are critical efforts, but capability is immediately essential; that only the host nation can effectively govern itself; that “security of the people in their homes and communities had to be the first order of business,”<sup>iii</sup> but just as important are the interrelationships of security with all other sectors of stability operations that are critical to a holistic, synthesized, integrated approach to nation-building.

### **Discussion**

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the extraordinary experiences and insights into effective local governance that I gained during my tour as senior combat advisor with the 5<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Army Division in Diyala Province, Iraq, 2007-2008. I had the unique opportunity to observe first-hand how host nation institutions and leaders attempt to establish resilient, functioning governance in the midst of intensive counterinsurgency and stability operations.

In my position as the advisor to Staff Major General (SMG) Salem, the 5<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Division Commander, I was involved in countless provincial government meetings and conferences, watching closely the actions of the provincial governor, his deputies, the unabashedly contentious provincial council members, and the key clerics, influential sheiks, businessmen, and district and village leaders who sought a place in the execution of provincial government.

I observed the participation of opposing Islamic Party of Iraq politicians, the historic position of the Kurds, the emergence and extraordinary success of Sunni paramilitary group leaders and units, and the thinly-veiled, Shia extremist-fueled sectarianism and corruption of the provincial police. I witnessed the creation of the Diyala Operations Command, designed to coordinate rebuilding of the provincial government, police, and military activities. These tasks were never fully accomplished in the year that I watched it struggle for legitimacy and authority and do more to enflame resistance to a comprehensive approach to issues than to integrate provincial capabilities.

I was disappointed and perplexed by the often convoluted, unsynchronized, and unfocused actions of the assigned Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and its relationship with the governor and his deputies. Due to a variety of circumstances too numerous to detail in this paper, the PRT never really seemed to have a handle on the integration of “self-defense, self-government, and self-development,”<sup>iv</sup> and incompetent local governance was the result.

I was both participant and spectator to the valiant and frequently frustrated attempts by the US Brigade Combat Team and Multi-national Division North commanders to strike a balance between the complex, long-term stability operations activities and the high-payoff return and immediate gratification of US-unilateral counter-insurgency combat tasks. But success in prosecuting insurgent targets did not equate to accomplishing stability and effective governance in the province, and I often felt that we failed to follow-up on the opportunities presented by the highly successful high-value target raids.

I watched with great fascination how SMG Salem, the division commander, directed the 5<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Division into a stability operations focus, personally leading his units to improve the welfare of the citizens of the province as he conducted concurrent combat operations against insurgents. For a considerable period of time during the contentious anti-Al Qaeda campaign in Diyala, Salem was the most visible and effective representative of the Government of Iraq, and of Diyala Province.

I had a ringside seat as my counterpart participated in medical facility and health service regeneration, “jump-starting” provincial food delivery, resolving tribal quarrels, agribusiness conflicts, education system start-up and quality, irrigation disputes, fuel oil distribution irregularities, and reenergizing provincial industrial production. Infrastructure security concerns, law enforcement issues, elections, provincial finances, payroll of the government staff, provincial-national government control and responsibility disagreements, and provincial capital sewage, water, electricity, telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure reemergence - these were the areas in which my counterpart was intimately involved.

### **Good Governance**

In my assessment of the situation in the provincial capital of Baqubah, and across the province at large, there always seemed to be an underlying tension between government-sponsored, short-term reconstruction actions and practical, enduring affects. Even in the fairly straightforward business of repairing the electrical power grid of the province or of providing clean drinking water to the people of western Baqubah, there always seemed to be a sense that the Governor and his principals did not have their heart in their business.

Efforts to improve the lot of the people were always publicly announced affairs, but the leadership rarely moved beyond the secure confines of the government center to observe the application of the pronounced plans. Often it seemed as though the Governor had finally been convinced to “do something” to appear as though governing. A steady stream of US senior leaders had audience with Governor Ra’ad, but appeared to stop short of nudging the governor to the point where he actually took steps to lead the integration of the military, police, and humanitarian enterprises.<sup>v</sup>

There was an enormous public administration vacuum. The resources of the province were not coordinated, governmental leadership was marginalized or absent, and US attention failed to appreciate what steps by the prevailing host-nation institutions were collectively necessary for good local governance during this protracted fight to liberate Baqubah and the province from Al Qaeda.<sup>vi</sup>

What is good local governance? One US Agency for International Development (USAID) publication suggests:

“Local governance comprises a set of institutions, mechanisms, and processes, through which citizens and their groups can articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences and exercise their rights and obligations at a local level. The building blocks of good local governance are many: citizen participation, partnerships among key actors

at the local level, capacity of the local actors across all sectors, multiple flows of information, institutions of accountability and a pro-poor orientation.”<sup>vii</sup>

Any discussion of effective local governance is never far removed from the behavior of the citizens. Rational, positive outcome of the efforts of the myriad actors and groups and interest-mongers to achieve a stable platform of political organization relies very much on the “strong reciprocity” and “pro-social behavior” of the citizens. Good governance is founded on good citizenship.

Unless the people are willing to sanction “punishment” for criminal activities and bad behavior, and “reward good behavior” without fear of inequality and unfairness, the compounding work of developing governance will crash precipitously. The citizens have to see the intrinsic value in transcending narrow, sectarian self-interests and behave in a way that ultimately serves “the common good.”<sup>viii</sup> Citizens are hardly interested in taking such steps unless local leaders are in place to make the first moves, especially in the midst of a robust insurgency.

### **The Critical Nature of a Province-focused Approach**

Establishing firm, responsible, and lasting national governance is an essential objective of successful counter-insurgency operations or stability operations, but much evidence has been provided that capable local governance must exist before central government high-level policy. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) actions in Vietnam underscore this approach, clearly determining that the lack of capacity at the local government level damages any intended national efforts.<sup>ix</sup>

This is not to suggest that the central government is out of the picture; instead, it must be recognized that the battle against insurgents first takes place in the villages and districts in provinces, not at the national echelon. Presuming that residual government capability exists in the provinces (region or subnational unit) this is the nexus of resources for host-nation army, police, and government programs in the provinces. This is the location of US military formations, advisors, PRTs, and perhaps NGOs and IOs. This is the location where the affects are tangible and indicators of success (or failure) are most overt and identifiable.

Thus, the fused interagency approach to stabilizing the province insures a comprehensive, cooperative US management organization is in effect at every echelon from the bottom to the

top. The theme is host nation government leaders (civilian, police, military), facilitated by a coordinated advisory effort by USG interagency experts.

### **Context of Cooperation: a Reminder for Agents of Developmental Change**

A multi-disciplinary approach to rebuilding provincial governance relies on cooperative measures by the “donor” advisors as much as on the “recipient” Host Nation officials. However, we often forget the multifaceted collaborative and cooperative behavior developmental change, instead defaulting to superior-subordinate style relationships. It is very important that we are continuously reminded that the effects of multicultural exchange move along a two-way street.

“Assuming sufficient institutional support, intercultural encounters in the context of development cooperation will be productive if there is a two-way flow of know-how: technical know-how from the donor to the receiver, and cultural know-how about the context in which the technical know-how should be applied, from the receiver to the donor. A technical expert meets the cultural expert, and their mutual expertise is the basis for their mutual respect.”<sup>x</sup>

If we intend on increasing capability of local governmental institutions, including the police and the army, then we have to suspend our judgments and assumptions and work collaboratively with our “allies,” our “partners”. From my experience in Diyala Province, we often tripped over our best intentions to achieve stability because of our hubris and perceived superiority. We must be more adept at developing a shared identity with the host nation in order to arrive at shared values of governance.<sup>xi</sup>

### **Overcoming the Legitimacy, Capability, and Capacity Deficits: “Transmogrifying” Local Governments**

Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer’s direction of counterinsurgency operations in Malaya in the decisive years from 1952-1954 is often cited as a formative example of the role of a senior leader in leading developmental change in governance during stability operations. Author Kumar Ramakrishna’s 2001 article in the *Journal of Southeast Asia Studies* highlights Templer’s psychological approach to building confidence by the citizens in the local governments:

“He declared that one rationale for his numerous personal visits was to demonstrate that ‘government extended right down the line into the lives of the simple people,’ and that ‘government - which on those occasions were represented by me - always kept its word when it made a promise.’”<sup>xii</sup>

Templer focused on changing both the appearance and the form of local government by “injecting new life into a moribund colonial administration” while personally demonstrating “the requisite moral/psychological ballast to withstand and ultimately overcome” the Malayan Communist Party. In his actions, he built upon the blueprint of his predecessor to integrate civil, police, and army resources at all levels.<sup>xiii</sup> Templer worked to improve governance through increased Federation of Malaya lower-tier governmental leader capability in activities such as “parish-pump” political entities known as Local Councils.<sup>xiv</sup>

### **Guiding Leadership and Capability-Building: the Framework of Stability Operations**

Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer’s methodology in Malaya, and my own personal experience in Iraq suggest a four-point template for considering capacity-building of local governments in stability operations: Assess, Advise, Action, and Assumption.

- **Assess-** determine the level of pre-existing institutions, rather than resorting to a “clean slate” method
- **Advise-** capability is improved through coaching, through person-to-person leader advising, donor to recipient
- **Action-** coaching and advising can only get so far; local leaders must then produce; advisors urge integrated institutional action
- **Assumption-** local governmental leaders are developed and oriented on the objective of full responsibility for governance

This approach is predicated on the philosophy of “host nation-first,” defined as viewing the stability operations problem through the eyes of the “recipient,” rather than through the donor.

### **Gaining Traction for Developmental Change**

Personal experience and research also suggests that gaining momentum for developmental change of local government institution leaders is difficult under the best of circumstances in stability operations. However, we have to be more conscious of the power of building upon the strengths of the local institutions.

In their seminal work *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*, Geert and Gert Hofstede adamantly express the scholarly view that:

Nobody can develop a country but its own population. Development is in the minds, not the goods. Foreign money and foreign expertise are only effective to the extent they can be integrated into local knowledge...a number of case studies shows how quickly results could be obtained by building on indigenous institutions that had a strong hold on people's commitment, dedication, sense of identity, while at the same time implementing essential modernizations like strengthening the rule of law. The dominant philosophy of development cooperation has too rarely recognized this need for local integration.<sup>xv</sup>

Integration advice and assistance at the local government level can facilitate developmental change. I suggest the following key points:

- “External aid” approach: PRT, Brigade Combat Team, military and police advisors must be synchronized and integrated in a scheme that supports collaboratively the host nation governance activities.
- Service delivery: service for and to the people-focus developmental change activities on human factors first to facilitate legitimacy-building.
- Building trust: requires establishing in-depth personal relationships between advisor and counterparts, and consistent collaborative and walking the talk (consistently fulfilling commitments to host country) behavior by “donors.”
- Enable: local leaders must feel the full weight of the freedom and necessity of strong, productive decision-making and acting.
- Empower: local leaders must experience the requirement to take action, to produce, to assume responsibility.
- Leadership in action: because “capability is not destiny.” Enabled and empowered (and advised) leaders begin to construct their own capacity through practice.
- Participation: inclusion of formal and informal local actors, in accordance with the cultural “Rules of the Game.”
- Transformation by their own hands: reengineering, restructuring, or enacting business process improvement in public administration based on cultural background.
- Evaluation/measurement: through host nation and jointly developed metrics.
- Shaping cultural change-carefully: through coaching, communication, coordination, and commitment. This is a full-time job.
- Transition as endstate: capabilities and capacity -building first, followed by capacity-enhancement, for assumption of full responsibility for governance.

### **Building Strength before Expansion of Scope**

Building capability - strengthening the ability of the Host Nation institutions to manage their own affairs - requires person-to-person coaching and mentoring, oriented on enabling the local leaders to act, to produce results from plans of their own design, to deliver services for their citizens. Strengthening local capability facilitates movement to capacity-enhancement, as the scope and sophistication of governance is enlarged.

Much of our problem in stability operations is confusion over our role as donors and facilitators. We enter into the situation with a flawed assumption that our task is to move the host nation forward at our pace, according to our procedures and style of management and government, and with our direct intervention. Enduring achievements do not come from our hands, instead, as Francis Fukuyama points out:

“If we really want to increase the institutional capacity of a less-developed country, we need to change the metaphor that describes what we hope to do. We are not arriving in a country with girders, bricks, cranes, and construction blueprints, ready to hire natives to help build the factory we have designed. Instead, we should be arriving with resources to motivate the natives to design their own factory and to help them figure out how to build it and operate it themselves. Every bit of technical assistance that replaces a comparable capacity on the part of local society should be regarded as a two-edged sword and treated with great caution. Above all, outsiders need to avoid the temptation to speed up the process by running the factory themselves.”<sup>xvi</sup>

In my experience in Diyala Province, I observed many examples of US military leaders and US Government civilians engaged in running the factory, or designing and building the factory for the local government. Of course, much of this behavior was a function of a short-range view: unit rotations lasted one year, and there was much to be done to demonstrate success; each problem set seemed unique, regardless of previous unit experiences.

Often, the approach taken served to usurp local leader authority, and derailed the prospects of enduring achievements. Our tasks were to change the Iraqi culture to fit new governance circumstances—the culture that didn’t change to account for the integration of all interagency partners, was ours.

### **A Philosophic and Practical Approach to Achieving Effective Local Governance**

Consequently, the issues of achieving effective local governance devolve to donors acknowledging a much more nuanced, less-imperialist mindset, and recognizing that long-term stability will only be accomplished if we get in and get our hands dirty, coaching in the field.

- **Host Nation *First***
- **Empowerment**

- **Enabling**
- **Transition Through Coaching**

View the situation first through the eyes of host nation institutions, actors, and then look through US eyes, since “nationality defines the organizational rationality.”<sup>xvii</sup> “Unpacking” centralization, de-centralization, and provincial autonomy<sup>xviii</sup> is an essential pre-requisite for establishing what form of governance is going to be the most practical model for the host nation - but this deconstruction of forms must fit the culture.

All politics, insurgencies, and stability operations are local. We must embrace the concept that causes us to focus effort where we can have the most immediate impact on the “simple people” first. Feasibility, not desirability, is the psychology necessary to be realistic about achieving effective governance in stability operations. Policy and feasibility don’t line up at first; it takes a concerted, holistic approach by donors to recognize the imperative nature of affecting developmental change at the bottom, so that the pillars are in place for the policy tier of national government.

What is good governance? How do we achieve effective local governance? Consider this exchange of over 2,500 years ago:

The second time Duke Ching called Confucius to an audience, he again asked him, “What is the secret of good government?” Confucius replied, “Good government consists in being sparing with resources.”<sup>xix</sup>

In my experience in Diyala Province in Iraq, the Confucian response is an appropriately pragmatic reminder about where we go wrong when we attempt to develop host nation institutions. Spare the outlandish cash resources; they never ultimately achieve the aim. Establishing effective local governance takes time, patience, and person-to-person coaching of the indigenous leaders.

<sup>1</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, New York: Praeger (1964), 30.

<sup>1</sup> John C. Loving, *Combat Advisor: How America Won the War and Lost the Peace in Vietnam, with a Warning About Iraq*, Lincoln, NE: iUniverse (2006), 159.

<sup>1</sup> Richard W. Stewart, *CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and pacification*, National War College, 1 May 2006, 121.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, 86. The Diyala PRT had a number of problems to overcome as it attempted to execute its responsibilities. First and foremost was the issue of inadequately trained and insufficiently experienced team members. This assessment comes from countless visits to the Provincial Government Center in Baqubah during the height of the fighting to remove Al Qaeda from the provincial capital. The PRT over-reliance on BCT security forces to transport the team from FOB Warhorse to downtown Baqubah (6 mile trip) hampered any plans of getting out to the far-flung districts and villages of the large province until the tactical situation was stable. I observed a lack of a concerted, full-time effort in “advising” provincial leadership, clearly related to the personnel problems. Routine review of PRT reports to Baghdad (obtained only after strenuous efforts to place one of my advisors at PRT functions) continuously highlighted a pointed failure to grasp the nuances of the governance situation in the province.

<sup>1</sup> The length of this essay does not allow me to paint a full landscape of the crushing complexity of the situation to achieve effective governance in Diyala Province in May, 2007 to April, 2008. The fact that MND-N last week turned over responsibility for Diyala Province security to the Sons of Iraq is a telling indicator of the lack of political backbone in the current provincial administration, the risk-aversion and lack of desire to govern without sectarian white-wash, and the apparent inability of an on-site PRT and other US agencies to solidify effective governance.

<sup>1</sup> In all fairness, US senior leaders were acutely interested in the development and performance of the neophyte Diyala Operations Command, established in the midst of extremely intense combat in the provincial capital. A small cell of advisors was assigned to the DOC-the right move-but things began to fall apart when the issues of synchronizing and integrating police and governmental efforts with military actions were retarded by great uncertainty, in-fighting, and sheer, unadulterated jealousy of the successes of SMG Salem and his division. The Assistant Division Commander of the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division/Multinational Division North was a constant visitor to the DOC, but the actual “day-to-day” personal advising of the two-star Iraqi DOC Commander was performed by a LTC from the staff at Tikrit. Although the PRT was on-site at the Provincial Government Center, there was no direct connection or relationship with the DOC. The DOC was the Governor’s provincial counterinsurgency headquarters-where the integration of army, police, and government programs was intended to occur-but it seemed that the civilian staff, and the PRT, was not up to the task of participating with the armed forces, in spite of US senior leader attention.

<sup>1</sup> Evan Bloom, Amy Sunseri, Aaron Leonard, *Measuring and Strengthening Local Governance Capacity: the Local Governance Barometer*, USAID, 20 March 2007, 4. The authors cite as the original source the UK Department for International Development (DFID), “Meeting the Challenge of Poverty in Urban Areas,” 2001.

<sup>1</sup> James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds*, New York: Anchor Books (2005), 116.

<sup>1</sup> Stewart, *CORDS and the Vietnam Experience*, 66.

<sup>1</sup> Geert Hofstede and Gert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*, New York: McGraw-Hill (2005), 358. Consider the following points on complex systems and the role of interactions in stability operations:

- Stability Operations: subsystems comprising a major system
- Security first-this facilitates all other stability operations “sectors,” orienting on transition
- Systems Theory Approach: complex system dynamics interact-no stove-pipes
- Changes in one subsystem affects other units of the system
- Interactions are transformative: they will cause a change.

## End Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, 364.

<sup>1</sup> Kumar Ramakrishna, Transmogrifying Malaya: The Impact of Sir Gerald Templer (1952-54), *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 32 (1), February 2001, 90. Transcript prepared by the British National Army Museum, 8011-132-2, "Proposed Dialogue Script for a Filmed Discussion with Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer on the Anti-terrorist Campaign in Malaya, 30 March 1977.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, 84. The Ramakrishna article is a counter-attack on "revisionists" who describe Templer's administration as all bluff and bluster instead of calculated programs to energize capability and capacity of government institutions. Templer embraced the incisive efficiency of "The Briggs Plan," as it was called, which is worthy of additional study as a template for a transdisciplinary approach to governance at all levels. Ramakrishna cites British Documents at the End of the Empire (BDEEP), Series B, vol. 3, Malaya, Part II: The Communist Insurrection, 1948-1953, edited by A.J. Stockwell (London:HMSO 1995), Doc. 233.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, 86.

<sup>1</sup> Hofstede and Hofstede, *Culture and Organizations*, 356. I have yet to find a single volume in the body of literature that is better at describing the cultural relativism so imperative in stability operations. This book addressed the earlier empirical data shortfalls in cross-cultural studies, but is even more impressive in its description of how values drive behaviors. The insights provided by this father and son duo are as revolutionary as they are applicable.

<sup>1</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century*, Profile Books (2004), 9.

<sup>1</sup> Hofstede and Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, 275.

<sup>1</sup> Edward L. Gibson, Subnational Authoritarianism and Territorial Politics: Charting the Theoretical Landscape, paper prepared for a panel on "Subnational Authoritarianism in Comparative Perspective," American Political Science Association Annual Congress, Boston, MA., 30 August 2008, 10. Gibson cites Tulia Falleti, "A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99 (3), August 2005, 327-346.

<sup>1</sup> Hofstede and Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, 237. The authors cite B. Kelen, *Confucius in Life and Legend*, Singapore: Graham Brash (Pte.) Ltd, (1983), 44. See also G. Helgeson and U. Kim, *Good Government: Nordic and East Asian Perspectives*, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, in collaboration with Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut-Danish Institute of International Affairs (2002),

<sup>1</sup> State-Building Policy Meeting: The Political, Institutional, and Economic Challenges of State-Building, November 5-7, 2004, p. 1.

### **Panel 3: Civil Society and Social Reconciliation**

This panel focused on role of peacekeeping forces in promoting civil society and social reconciliation. Moderated by Patricia Fn’Piere, Director, USAID’s Office of Democracy and Governance Civil Society Division, the two panelists represented a wide diversity of experience in post conflict countries. Victoria Baxter, of the UN Foundation and the United States Institute of Peace, has been a prolific writer on the issue of transitional justice and memorialization. Richard McCall, Senior Vice President for Programs, Creative Associates has been the Policy Advisor to the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Mogadishu. As Senior Advisor to the Africa Bureau of the US State Department, he was also responsible for overseeing implementation of the Peace Accords between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.

*Issues to be Addressed: How does a peacekeeping force foster social capital and reconciliation essential to sustained stability and governmental legitimacy? What are the guiding principles for peacekeeping forces in dealing with host country local governments? What are the roles/responsibilities of the civilian, military USG agencies in working with local NGOs and civil society groups? What roles do IOs and NGOs play in this process?*

**Richard McCall** spoke on the international community’s predilection to rebuild states without first having a thorough understanding and knowledge of their desired goals. This will generally produce a hollow state where the power structures have not been fully brokered, legitimacy is not well established and at the national, provincial and local levels of government, civil society and intermediate and private sector institutions remain shallow as well.

In recent peacekeeping operations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been an apparent lack of strategic planning before the intervening troops go in, particularly the failure to understand the local culture and context. Peacekeepers have short-term goals which are based on the eventual withdrawal of troops. Rebuilding governance, and particularly reconstituting trust between civil society and government is a long-term and often generational problem. For internal political dynamics in the peacekeeping nations, interveners generally withdraw too early. Rebuilding governance structures is generally treated as a formulaic exercise in which the outside interveners forego the need for

broad-based institution building. Institution building is not only needed for governmental structures, but private sector and civil society development as well. Associations, private non-governmental organizations, firms, private voluntary organizations, financial institutions, and other intermediate institutions need to be established. Especially the financial institutions should be built before economic liberalization occurs and they have to be built gradually.

The panelist used his recent experience in Colombia to cite the delivery of services and building of local institutions by the government in areas where the FARC had been active. In these cases, the projects are short-term because the government must deliver in order to strengthen their own influence and legitimacy.

Ultimately, the issue for the U.S. is the type of governments that result from the creation of new institutions. In most cases, the US must accept a non-Western, frequently not-democratic regime. In many cases, it may be a mistake to attempt to create Western-style democracies. The most critical outcome of nation-state building is one that reflects the inclusionary political, economic and social institutions, the foundation upon which legitimate governance can be realized. Somalia is an excellent case study of where continued attempts to deal with and associate with the warlords resulted in a fractured and fragile government. The US and peacekeeping forces didn't use government institutions. Then the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was funded by the Mogadishu businessmen and took on the role of a para-government institution in purging the city of criminals and violence. Over time, the ICU was taken over by extremists, there were no strong governmental institutions and rule of law was weak. While there is often a need to take unlikely partners – such as General David Petraeus working with local tribal chiefs in Anbar – ultimately strong governmental institutions need to be built.

### **Victoria Baxter**

A first principle for outside interveners in fostering social reconciliation is the time-worn “do no harm”. For this panelist, outside interveners should not initiate projects. Rather the host nation or interim government should set the objective and goals of rebuilding. This panelist believes that external peacekeepers should be advisors and mentors in joint planning, but should follow the lead of the current host-nation government.

In all cases, for this presenter, the objective of reconstituting a society involves rebuilding the social capital and trust needed to bring about reconciliation among the warring factions. Reconciliation is multilevel and a long-term constantly evolving process. Ultimately, a high degree of reconciliation is needed, or it will affect the potential for future conflict.

According to this panelist, reconciliation is a difficult construct for all outside interveners - at a minimum it is defined by the ability of ethnic, religious and other different groups

within a society to relate peacefully. Reconciliation is especially difficult in cases where mass atrocities or ethnic warfare has occurred. Many countries in Africa are in a period of transitional reconciliation and are still fragile states. In South Africa, they are now researching the impact of truth commissions achieving its goals. Memorialization of victims foster the healing process and is necessary for longer-term reconciliation.

As for the role of peacekeeping forces, they are generally the first line of preserving the sites of ethnic violence or genocides and mediating between ethnic groups after a mass atrocity. NGOs are also getting involved and specifically the establishment of local non-governmental organizations responsible for working across the warring factions. Both are building local capabilities, reestablishing social trust, and setting up transparency and accountability. These new roles require training for the external interveners in cultural awareness and in mediating disputes as they arise. These efforts require coaching and training, and peacekeepers need to be trained in skills and methods such as mediation and arbitration. Peacekeepers are currently handling problems as they arise, instead of seeking to prevent genocides or mass atrocities. In particular, they are preserving sites, fostering the institution of truth commissions, conducting continuing monitoring, and building memorials. All of these efforts can have a divisive or restorative effect. For example, external forces in Pristina were faced with the dilemma of whether to restore a church which had been used by the Nazis during World War II. The overwhelming reaction by the community that it would simply serve as an ongoing reminder of a painful history halted the reconstruction.

**Peacekeeping Operations and Social Reconciliation:  
The Challenges of Effective Peace Building**

By Richard McCall

The international community was thoroughly unprepared to respond effectively to the new post-Cold War challenges, which included the emergence of complex emergencies, many of which revealed ethnic, religious, cultural or nationalistic fault lines. These fault lines have been manipulated in many cases by state and/or non-state actors. This has led to the unraveling of many states, a large number of whom were former super power clients. What remained were hollow entities – states with very few attributes of nationhood, such as the institutional underpinnings of legitimate governance, the foundation upon which viable nation states are based.

Within this context, we need to re-evaluate many of our assumptions and develop different analytical tools and frameworks that are essential components of a new national security strategy. The logic of democratization and free market economies has driven the notion that many societies are in transition – that there is somewhat of a linear progression from centrally controlled political and economic systems to democratic and market driven systems. Yet, in these so-called transitions it is apparent that a difficult and patient societal transformation is the more appropriate description of the processes required for peace, stability and political pluralism/tolerance to be established and sustained over the long term.

In too many areas of the world, countries have not undergone the processes fundamental to the creation of a modern nation-state. All too often the international community has made the mistake in assuming that a reconstitution of the state apparatus alone, along with democratization and market liberalization, will form the basis for long-term stability. What we have failed to understand is that once an authoritarian state collapses or is overthrown, there is no institutional underpinning or

coherence in these societies. In the absence of functioning institutions that reflect a working consensus within these societies, particularly those diverse in their ethnic and/or sectarian makeup, the potential for re-emergence of violent conflict is a certainty.

The international community has a preoccupation with top down approaches to nation-building with a major focus on reconstituting central government institutions. While most modern nation states have gone through the creation of institutions at all levels of society, the citizens of many countries have not. They have not had the opportunity to participate in processes whereby common values are identified and agreed upon and institutions created that reflect this fundamental societal consensus. In virtually every conflict or post-conflict country one can find there to be a strong identity at the community level, ethnic or sectarian, but no sense of national identity. The processes of institution building at all levels of society can transcend the divisive nature of localism, or communalism, such as ethnic and/or sectarian.

This institution building can take many forms, such as local and regional government entities, community development organizations, local education and health committees, agricultural and marketing cooperatives, or water boards, just to name a few examples. Institutions reflect the accepted rules of the game, clearly defining individual rights and responsibilities within the broader community of interests.

Violent conflict generally breaks out in a society when the fundamental ideas and agreements that constitute order break down. It is these ideas and agreements, when given the force of law, and enforced by the state, that regulate behavior. Conflict is first and foremost a political failure whereby states cannot, or will not, build productive political communities or enable them to operate.

The processes that lead to the creation of a viable sustainable nation-state cannot be short circuited. This is a long-term process that should demonstrate sensitivity to, and understanding of, some basic fundamentals including, but not limited to:

- The creation and maintenance of institutions that reflect broad societal ownership is the major challenge in peace building. When trust breaks down, the legitimacy of governing processes must be built, which can only be done through institution building that is seen to be fair and inclusive. Building society-

wide consensus around a new set of governing rules is critical to broad ownership of resulting institutions.

- Healthy states are multi-constitutional, having multiple points of political access to address and solve problems.
- Effective long-term problem solving needs to occur at multiple levels and focus on building political solutions from solid social and economic foundations.
- A strong and active citizenry to design local institutions and co-produce public goods and services.
- A commitment to dialogue, participation, competition and compromise from the local to national level.

Within this context, the role of external actors should be one of partnership by encouraging an enabling environment so that rich systems of governance can be developed. The choices are not between small and large systems, but between systems of governance that are locally rooted which, into turn, are tied into regional and national systems. This is the principle of self rule through shared rule.

Establishment of basic and effective security is critical to the peace-building process. However, what is often overlooked is a commensurate focus on the need for dispersing power throughout society to insure against the abuse of political and economic power from the center. Establishment of the rule of law is also important. However, to ensure that law and justice are equitably and fairly applied, institutional accountability is critical. Institution building at all levels of society which clearly spells out rules, rights and responsibilities around which there is a broad societal consensus is a critical component of establishing a rule of law regime.

Why has the international community been so ineffective in peace building efforts? The answers are many. In November 2004, the International Peace Academy and the Center on International Cooperation held a symposium on the “Political, Institutional and Economic Challenges of State-Building.” There are poignant observations that are particularly relevant to the topic of this paper.

“Past attempts (at state-building) have been seriously undermined by a lack of strategic planning prior to intervention, particularly the failure to understand the local context in which state-building efforts will be undertaken. In most cases, an over-emphasis on short-term goals – largely dictated by external domestic politics – has resulted in no real foundations being laid for the attempted transition....Little attempt has been made to

reach out to the local community and manage their expectations for international interventions, let alone good faith efforts to properly consult and involve in important decisions about the future of their state. The international community withdraws too early, leaving behind weak institutions that are not sustainable over the long term.”<sup>xx</sup>

It was noted further that “...international actors have demonstrated a tendency to treat state-building as a purely technical exercise of transferring skills and running elections.”<sup>xxi</sup>

A joint War Torn Societies/International Peace Academy paper on post-conflict peace building – published in October 2004 – raised similar concerns which I will now highlight.

“One of the most persistent obstacles to more effective peace building outcomes is the chronic inability of international actors to adapt their assistance to the political dynamics of the war-torn societies they seek to support.”<sup>xxii</sup>

Mistaken assumptions on the part of the international community have also contributed to ineffective peace building. Quoting from that document:

“...economic and political liberalization are particularly ill suited and counterproductive in post conflict peace building since they promote economic and political competition at a difficult and fragile stage.”<sup>xxiii</sup>

Drawing on studies of economic and political liberalization in post conflict societies the paper cited Roland Paris’ book, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Paris argues for “a gradual and controlled peace building strategy” emphasizing “institutionalization before liberalization.” In other words, it is critical to establish domestic institutions “that are capable of managing the transition from war, while avoiding the destabilizing effects of democratization and marketization.”<sup>xxiv</sup>

The paper noted that there was strong agreement among conflict practitioners that ultimately local processes and institutions should play an important role in shaping the design, implementation, and outcomes of policy choices.

Finally, the paper laid out key persistent problems in implementation of peace building policies and programs which include the following:

- “Donors channel their support in the form of time-bound projects without a strategic framework and long-term commitment to peace building.
- Despite lip service paid to local ownership, there is a disconnect between external priorities and national processes and priorities.
- External actors consistently neglect institution and capacity building, which are recognized as central to peace building.
- In the absence of a strategic peace building framework, external interventions are uncoordinated, fragmented and incoherent.”<sup>xxv</sup>

The bottom line of these two papers which critiqued the international community’s failings in peace building is a poignant reminder that we should engage with the simple understanding that:

“Peace, security and stability cannot be imposed from the outside, but need to be nurtured internally through patient, flexible, responsive strategies that are in tune with local realities.”<sup>xxvi</sup>

Within this context, how do peace keeping forces foster social capital and reconciliation essential to sustained stability and government legitimacy? The key is to understand and recognize that social capital exists within any society. A couple of examples are worth citing.

In Iraq, Creative Associates Inc. began implementing an education project shortly after the invasion in 2003. One of the components of the program involved rehabilitation of schools. For every Iraqi family, quality education for their children was of the highest priority. Most schools in Iraq had deteriorated during the rule of the Saddam Hussein regime as virtually no resources were made available for facilities maintenance.

The Creative team held a number of local neighborhood assemblies comprised of parents, teachers and school administrators to explain a process whose goal was community ownership of the rehabilitation process. Self selected neighborhood education committees were established and each committee designated a construction engineer to oversee the work. The committees were then instructed on how to submit a proposal which included the estimated costs for rehabilitation. A bidding process was explained and training was provided the committee in how to evaluate bids coming in for the work.

Once the proposal was submitted and the winning bid awarded, grants were given to the local committees in the form of progress payments provided in tranches during the course of the rehabilitation. In virtually every instance, involving some 600 schools, the committees would withhold payments if the workmanship was not of the highest quality.

For the first time in their lives, the local communities involved in school rehabilitation, exercised ownership over the entire process. In other words, significant social capital was identified and organized around an issue of priority importance to the local community.

However, once the rehabilitation was completed, a level of frustration began to set in among these communities. No mechanism had been created to continue the engagement and ownership of the local school system. A recommendation was made to the USG that to address this issue some form of school boards and Parent Teacher Associations should be created to sustain the neighborhood involvement in controlling their schools. That recommendation was not accepted and a significant opportunity was missed to strengthen further, and to utilize more effectively, the social capital that existed within Iraqi society.

While Creative's approach to school rehabilitation in Iraq is cited, it is only one example of what could have been applied in other sectors as well. While billions of U.S. dollars were made available to Iraq reconstruction efforts through large contracts, there was no strategic framework within which to allocate these resources in a manner that fostered local ownership and with it sustainable institution building.

Peace building is a long-term process – a reality historically ignored by U.S. policymakers. Iraq was no exception. In other words, our strategy was predicated on the notion that we needed to get in fast, spend large sums of resources in the shortest period of time and exit as quickly as we could.

Almost every criterion for effective peace building, laid out earlier in this paper, was ignored in Iraq. We dug a deep hole for both ourselves and the Iraqis as a result. Five years later it is impossible to identify institutions that reflect a working consensus in that society that are inclusive and clearly spell out the rules of the game for all Iraqis.

Another example of how organizing social capital can serve as a conflict mitigation tool involved Northwest Rwanda during the 1997-1998 time period. From the middle of 1997, indiscriminate cross border attacks and killing by Interahamwe and ex-FAR (Armed Forces of Rwanda which were Hutu) based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo became increasingly frequent. The population began fleeing their homes to areas protected by the Government of Rwanda. By the end of 1998 the internally displaced population in the northwest had grown to 650,000.

Among other initiatives, the Women in Transition (WIT) program, which had been implemented successfully in other regions of the country, was undertaken in the northwest. The WIT program provided micro-loans to women's economic associations, with a percentage of profits invested in a revolving fund as capital for future lending. In northwest Rwanda, 18 women's associations were formed comprised of Hutu women who had fled Rwanda to Zaire and returned to their home communes; Tutsi women, many of whom were genocide survivors and the sole support for their children; and Hutu women who had not fled Rwanda in the mass migration to Zaire and Tanzania.

Initially, the level of trust within the mixed ethnic composition of the associations was almost nonexistent. But as the associations demonstrated their profitability, individual members understood that for them to succeed, the association itself had to succeed. The most significant manifestation of this realization was reconciliation among the members of the association.

Just as critical was the fact that the associations were an effective conflict mitigation tool. For the first time in their lives, these women earned sufficient income to meet the basic needs of their families. They now had a future of possibilities never realized before. For the Hutu women, many of who had male relatives involved in the Interahamwe and ex-FAR raids, their future was jeopardized by the violence. As a result, not only was sanctuary among the local population denied, but the women made it very clear that those involved in the violence either return to Rwanda and integrate peacefully in the society or stay away. Subsequent evaluations of the program revealed that this had a significant impact on reducing and/or ending the cross border raids. The WIT program was implemented under the auspices of the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives.

There are numerous other examples that could be cited as well.

Most conflict/post conflict practitioners have similar anecdotes that reflect what works and doesn't in these real world environments. However, if we want to effectively respond to the real world as it is, we have to address the structural problems within our own foreign policy/national security institutions.

Since the end to the Cold War, succeeding U.S. Administrations have struggled with the challenges posed by what can be described as the new world disorder. We have struggled with the need to reconcile the mandates of traditional national security institutions for managing government political, economic and security relations which are often driven by short-term political considerations, with the necessity to deal with, and ameliorate, the fault lines within many societies. The goal of the latter is long-term stability through capable and legitimate governance. Yet, despite recognition of the threats facing the United States, the bureaucratic responses have been ad hoc at best by institutions whose current structures are inadequate to deal with these challenges.

While we have defined the threats facing us, and the global community writ large, the U.S. government still tends to look at global problems as a discrete and differentiated set of security, economic and political issues. Although it is improving, we still tend to develop segmented policy and programmatic responses based on narrow, short-term parochial interests.

Currently, the one U.S. government organization which has the flexibility and can draw upon the expertise of practitioners with significant conflict programmatic experience, particularly at the grass roots level, is USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). Unfortunately it is a small organization with an annual appropriated budget of between \$45-\$50 million (although it has received inter-governmental transfers for large programs such as Iraq).

OTI's implementing partners have the capability for quick on the ground mobilization focused on engaging and strengthening civil society organizations, the creation of community development organizations, and small infrastructure reconstruction, to name but a few areas. The immediate goal of this engagement is to jump start community level processes to address priority needs of local populations.

There is usually a two-to-three year time frame for OTI programs with the ultimate goal of handing off to the longer-term development missions. Unfortunately, this time line for OTI country programs is too short. It does not allow sufficient time for these processes to mature into sustainable institutions. Part of the problem is that Congress has made it very clear that OTI engagement is of a short-term nature. This problem is compounded further by the fact that there is not a longer-term USG strategy for institution building in which an OTI like engagement is critical to a sustainable outcomes. In other words, we want quick results without understanding that this is an evolutionary process that needs to be viewed in five- to 10-year time frames.

The bottom line is that we are not employing this OTI capability effectively and appropriately. To do so would require a whole of government approach to integrated strategic planning where transitional institution building and local ownership is a fundamental element of the USG or international community engagement. In other words, there needs to be a stronger and more robust OTI that is recognized as a critical component of peace building that reflects the creation of inclusionary political, economic, and social institutions, the foundation upon which legitimate governance can then be realized.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>1</sup> Necla Tshigiri, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges," Oct. 7, 2004, p. i.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p. 15.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p. 15.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p. 16.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p. 17.

## Appendix A

**Nation-State Building Workshop 10/28/08****Attendees**

Amburn, Donald COL USACAPOC  
 Beinhart, Eric Mr. DOJ  
 Binnendijk, Hans Dr. NDU  
 Brineman, Elana Ms. PKSOI  
 Butcher, William COL Atlantic Council  
 Clark, Michael, COL (for LTG Caldwell) JCISFA  
 Courtney, Alexandra USAID  
 Dempsey, Tom COL PKSOI  
 Ewell, Web Dr. OSD PA&E  
 Futch, David Mr. CALL  
 Gordon, Vance Mr. OSD PA&E  
 Hill, Richard Mr. RTI  
  
 Jones, Michael Mr. Army Command and Gen. Staff College  
 Lieto, Anthony COL PKSOI  
 Meinheit, Harold Mr. JFCOM, J-9  
 Nichols, Hank Mr. PKSOI  
 Prindle, Debbie Ms. JFCOM  
 Sandoz, John Mr. Hicks & Associates  
 Sands-Pingot, Guy BG CACOM  
 Sass, Steven CDR EUCOM  
  
 Vasquez, Rob LTC Army Judge Advocate General's Legal  
  
 West, Rod BG Australian Embassy

**Moderators/Panelists**

Baxter, Victoria, Ms. *UN Foundation*  
 Brinkerhoff, Derick Dr., *RTI*  
 Dininio Phyllis Dr. *MSI*  
 Fn' Piere, Pat, Ms. *USAID*  
 Ghani, Ashraf Dr. *Ins.for State Effectiveness*  
 Guttieri, Karen Dr. *NPS*  
 Johnson, Ronald Dr. *RTI International*  
 Kramer, Franklin Mr. *CNA*  
 McCall, Richard Mr. *Creative Ass. Inc.*  
 Megahan, Richard COL *PKSOI*  
 Meharg, Sarah Dr. *PKSOI*  
 Merrill, Susan Ms. *PKSOI*  
 Murray, Robert Mr. *CNA*  
 von Hippel, Karin Dr. *CSIS*

**CNA:**

Ellison, Brian, Mr  
 Gaffney, Henry Dr.  
 Malkasian, Carter Dr.

## Nation-State Building 101 Workshop

October 28, 2008

### Draft Workshop Agenda

1. 8:30-9:00 Workshop Introduction (Hon. Frank Kramer, CNA, Robert Murray, Director CNA and COL Richard Megahan, PKSOI)

2. 9:00-10:30: **Panel I- Interim Government and Transition to Sovereignty** (Moderator- Phyllis Dininio) Panelists- Dr. Ashraf Ghani, Director, Institute for Effective States, Derick Brinkerhoff, Democracy Fellow, Research Triangle Institute, Dr. Karen Guttieri, Professor, Naval Postgraduate School)

Issues to be Addressed: *Given the lack of a legitimate sovereign government, what are the options for federal composition of the central/provincial/and local government for an interim government? What is the role/relationship of the peacekeeper to support existing government structures? How do you create recreate legitimacy and effectiveness with civil society and the private sector, for all levels of government? What is the appropriate sequencing/phasing – build from the local to the national level or a “top-down” approach? How do peacekeepers enhance the resilience, accountability, and capability of a government?*

3. 10:45- 12:30: **Panel II- Local Governance** ( Moderator- Sarah Meharg, PKSOI) Panelists- Karen Von Hippel, Director Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, CSIS , Ron Johnson, former Vice President, International Development RTI, COL Richard Megahan, PKSOI)

Issues to be Addressed: *What are the keys to effective sub national/local governance? How do civil society and local interest groups (warlords, tribal leaders, and local elites) elect and support legitimacy/effectiveness/accountability? What are the key actors, institutions and ethnic/societal interest groups roles and challenges to the process of rebuilding local governance?*

4. 12:30-1:30 Lunch

5. 1:30- 3:30 **Peacekeeping Operations and Social Reconciliation** (Moderator: Pat FnPierre) Panelists: Victoria Baxter, UN Foundation, Richard McCall, Creative Associates)

Issues to be Addressed: *How does a peacekeeping force foster social capital and reconciliation essential to sustained stability and governmental legitimacy? What are the guiding principles for peacekeeping forces in dealing with host country local governments? What are the roles/responsibilities of the civilian, military USG agencies in working with local NGOs and civil society groups? What roles do IOs and NGOs play in this process?*

6. 4:00- 5:30 Facilitated Discussion: Frank Kramer: The Way Ahead



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<sup>i</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, New York: Praeger (1964), 30.

<sup>ii</sup> John C. Loving, *Combat Advisor: How America Won the War and Lost the Peace in Vietnam, with a Warning About Iraq*, Lincoln, NE: iUniverse (2006), 159.

<sup>iii</sup> Richard W. Stewart, *CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and pacification*, National War College, 1 May 2006, 121.

<sup>iv</sup> *Ibid*, 86. The Diyala PRT had a number of problems to overcome as it attempted to execute its responsibilities. First and foremost was the issue of inadequately trained and insufficiently experienced team members. This assessment comes from countless visits to the Provincial Government Center in Baqubah during the height of the fighting to remove Al Qaeda from the provincial capital. The PRT over-reliance on BCT security forces to transport the team from FOB Warhorse to downtown Baqubah (6 mile trip) hampered any plans of getting out to the far-flung districts and villages of the large province until the tactical situation was stable. I observed a lack of a concerted, full-time effort in “advising” provincial leadership, clearly related to the personnel problems. Routine review of PRT reports to Baghdad (obtained only after strenuous efforts to place one of my advisors at PRT functions) continuously highlighted a pointed failure to grasp the nuances of the governance situation in the province.

<sup>v</sup> The length of this essay does not allow me to paint a full landscape of the crushing complexity of the situation to achieve effective governance in Diyala Province in May, 2007 to April, 2008. The fact that MND-N last week turned over responsibility for Diyala Province security to the Sons of Iraq is a telling indicator of the lack of political backbone in the current provincial administration, the risk-aversion and lack of desire to govern without sectarian white-wash, and the apparent inability of an on-site PRT and other US agencies to solidify effective governance.

<sup>vi</sup> In all fairness, US senior leaders were acutely interested in the development and performance of the neophyte Diyala Operations Command, established in the midst of extremely intense combat in the provincial capital. A small cell of advisors was assigned to the DOC-the right move-but things began to fall apart when the issues of synchronizing and integrating police and governmental efforts with military actions were retarded by great uncertainty, in-fighting, and sheer, unadulterated jealousy of the successes of SMG Salem and his division. The Assistant Division Commander of the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division/Multinational Division North was a constant visitor to the DOC, but the actual “day-to-day” personal advising of the two-star Iraqi DOC Commander was performed by a LTC from the staff at Tikrit. Although the PRT was on-site at the Provincial Government Center, there was no direct connection or relationship with the DOC. The DOC was the Governor’s provincial counterinsurgency headquarters-where the integration of army, police, and government programs was intended to occur-but it seemed that the civilian staff, and the PRT, was not up to the task of participating with the armed forces, in spite of US senior leader attention.

<sup>vii</sup> Evan Bloom, Amy Sunseri, Aaron Leonard, *Measuring and Strengthening Local Governance Capacity: the Local Governance Barometer*, USAID, 20 March 2007, 4. The authors cite as the original source the UK Department for International Development (DFID), “Meeting the Challenge of Poverty in Urban Areas,” 2001.

<sup>viii</sup> James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds*, New York: Anchor Books (2005), 116.

<sup>ix</sup> Stewart, *CORDS and the Vietnam Experience*, 66.

<sup>x</sup> Geert Hofstede and Gert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*, New York: McGraw-Hill (2005), 358. Consider the following points on complex systems and the role of interactions in stability operations:

- Stability Operations: subsystems comprising a major system
- Security first-this facilitates all other stability operations “sectors,” orienting on transition
- Systems Theory Approach: complex system dynamics interact-no stove-pipes
- Changes in one subsystem affects other units of the system
- Characteristics of one subsystem will affect other elements of the system
- Interactions are transformative: they will cause a change

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<sup>xi</sup> *Ibid.*, 364.

<sup>xii</sup> Kumar Ramakrishna, *Transmogrifying Malaya: The Impact of Sir Gerald Templer (1952-54)*, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 32 (1), February 2001, 90. Transcript prepared by the British National Army Museum, 8011-132-2, "Proposed Dialogue Script for a Filmed Discussion with Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer on the Anti-terrorist Campaign in Malaya, 30 March 1977.

<sup>xiii</sup> *Ibid.*, 84. The Ramakrishna article is a counter-attack on "revisionists" who describe Templer's administration as all bluff and bluster instead of calculated programs to energize capability and capacity of government institutions. Templer embraced the incisive efficiency of "The Briggs Plan," as it was called, which is worthy of additional study as a template for a transdisciplinary approach to governance at all levels. Ramakrishna cites *British Documents at the End of the Empire (BDEEP)*, Series B, vol. 3, Malaya, Part II: The Communist Insurrection, 1948-1953, edited by A.J. Stockwell (London:HMSO 1995), Doc. 233.

<sup>xiv</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>xv</sup> Hofstede and Hofstede, *Culture and Organizations*, 356. I have yet to find a single volume in the body of literature that is better at describing the cultural relativism so imperative in stability operations. This book addressed the earlier empirical data shortfalls in cross-cultural studies, but is even more impressive in its description of how values drive behaviors. The insights provided by this father and son duo are as revolutionary as they are applicable.

<sup>xvi</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century*, Profile Books (2004), 9.

<sup>xvii</sup> Hofstede and Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, 275.

<sup>xviii</sup> Edward L. Gibson, *Subnational Authoritarianism and Territorial Politics: Charting the Theoretical Landscape*, paper prepared for a panel on "Subnational Authoritarianism in Comparative Perspective," American Political Science Association Annual Congress, Boston, MA., 30 August 2008, 10. Gibson cites Tulia Falleti, "A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99 (3), August 2005, 327-346.

<sup>xix</sup> Hofstede and Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, 237. The authors cite B. Kelen, *Confucius in Life and Legend*, Singapore: Graham Brash (Pte.) Ltd, (1983), 44. See also G. Helgeson and U. Kim, *Good Government: Nordic and East Asian Perspectives*, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, in collaboration with Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut-Danish Institute of International Affairs (2002),

<sup>xx</sup> State-Building Policy Meeting: The Political, Institutional, and Economic Challenges of State-Building, November 5-7, 2004, p. 1.

<sup>xxi</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>xxii</sup> Necla Tshigiri, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges," Oct. 7, 2004, p. i.

<sup>xxiii</sup> *Ibid.* p. 15.

<sup>xxiv</sup> *Ibid.* p. 15.

<sup>xxv</sup> *Ibid.* p. 16.

<sup>xxvi</sup> *Ibid.* p. 17.



