The U.S. Army in Asia: Legacies of the Past, Present Challenges and Prospects for the Future

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Directed by Dr. David Finkelstein, Project Asia falls under the Corporation’s Center for Strategic Studies, directed by Rear Admiral Michael A. McDevitt, USN, (Ret.). The administrative director for Project Asia and the Center for Strategic Studies is Ms. Kathy Lewis, who can be reached at (703) 824-2519, and on e-mail at lewisk@cna.org.

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- To provide a broad and unique series of fora to discuss and debate contemporary and future national security issues,

- To examine and advance ways to focus the instruments of national power more effectively, and

- To contribute to the ongoing national security dialogue while broadening the experience of mid-level and senior Army leaders through exposure to diverse issues, institutions, and perspectives.

Eisenhower Conference on the U.S. Army in Asia

A Conference Report of the Eisenhower National Security Series

Report by Dr. Henry J. Kenny

June 2005
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Executive Summary

On March 31, 2005, the CNA Corporation hosted a conference co-sponsored by the U.S. Army’s Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series, on “The United States Army in Asia: Legacies of the Past, Current Challenges, and Prospects for the Future.” Focusing on key issues of importance to the U.S. Army in Asia, the conference brought together a diverse group of scholars, regional experts, and current and former military and government personnel with experience in Asia. This report summarizes the main themes of the conference, and is being disseminated to a wide audience in military, government, and academic circles. Although focusing on the U.S. Army in Asia, many of the concepts presented pertain to the Army as a whole. It is hoped that these ideas will be useful to the Army as it continues to face a multitude of challenges in support of U.S. interests throughout the world. Major themes recurring during the conference are listed below.

Panel 1: Legacies of the Past

- Lessons learned in the Philippine War and pacification effort have specific applicability to the Army today.
  - Transplanting democratic values to a society without a democratic tradition can involve the U.S. Army in a long and difficult mission.
  - Knowledge of the local conditions and various insurgent motivations is critical to a successful counterinsurgency effort.
  - Successful pacification demands simultaneous and appropriately balanced civil and military action.
  - Every soldier in a counterinsurgency environment has civic action responsibilities, and the military leader on the spot is the best pacification agent.
  - Training an indigenous police force and army is a long-term key to success.

- The Army needs to remember lessons learned the hard way in combat. Korea taught the value of jointness, and Vietnam how to conduct counterinsurgency operations, but the postwar Army forgot them, only to have to relearn them at a later date.

Panel 2: Current Challenges

- A war in Korea remains the single most likely high-intensity challenge facing the U.S. Army in Asia.

- Force reduction in Korea has several disadvantages. It may be perceived in the region as weakening U.S. force posture, reducing U.S. willingness and ability to come to the defense of South Korea, and verifying a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from Asia.
• Modularity may be able to offset many of the disadvantages of force reduction. It allows force augmentation from a whole panoply of Army units configured for rapid reaction.

• U.S. Army security cooperation in Asia can yield big dividends in the long term.

• Although U.S. Army presence in Japan is limited, it is an important component of an alliance that is key to U.S. strategy in Asia.

Panel 3: Prospects for the Future

• Contingency planning for the collapse of North Korea is essential.

• A collapse of Pakistan and resultant decontrol of its nuclear weapons could require U.S. Army intervention.

• Negotiated entry of international forces into Indonesia for the purpose of countering terrorist groups is a possibility that could involve U.S. Army units.

• It is difficult to conjure up plausible large-scale ground combat scenarios for the U.S. Army in Asia. Hypothetical cases such as a Sino-Russian conflict in Siberia, or Chinese occupation of the northern portion of a unified Korea are unlikely, and probably would not engage the U.S. Army in any case.

• Sustained interaction with Asian nations through security cooperation is essential to future U.S. Army missions in the region.

• In light of recent reductions in U.S. Army forward presence, frequent and sustained training missions are more important than ever.

Concluding Commentary

• Although there is agreement on the ends of U.S. policy in Asia, many Asian scenarios do not fit into a traditional threat matrix; thus, concentration on leadership, logistics, and mobility take on a new importance.

• Frequent exchanges between U.S. Army personnel and their Asian counterparts can help the United States maintain its role as an Asian and Pacific power.

• Japan can assist U.S. Army operations in Asia in three ways: (a) by allowing pre-positioned equipment in country; (b) by further developing the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to conduct operations other than war; and (c) by providing rear-area support for U.S. Forces.
Conference Overview

Introduction

While today many think of Asia as a predominantly maritime military theater, the U.S. Army has had a continuous presence in the region for over a century, and continues to play an important role in support of U.S. interests throughout the region. Looking back, the Army has conducted in Asia nearly every conceivable type of operation along the spectrum of conflict. These include a major theater war, a limited conventional war, nation building, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, occupation duty, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and even operations against radical Islamic irregulars. The Army’s presence in Asia is important today, and will remain important in the future. What are the legacies and lessons from the Army’s Asian past that might inform the Army’s Asian future? What are the challenges facing the Army today in Asia? What does the future strategic landscape of Asia portend for the Army’s over-the-horizon requirements?

On March 31, 2005, The CNA Corporation, in conjunction with the Eisenhower National Security Series, hosted a conference on “The United States Army in Asia: Legacies of the Past, Current Challenges, and Prospects for the Future.” The Conference was not intended to provide definitive answers to all these questions, but rather to present a diverse range of views on each of them. It brought together a wide variety of experts on Asia and the U.S. Army, including academics, analysts from non-government institutions, and current and former U.S. Army officers and government officials with responsibilities in Asia.

The conference agenda was designed to assist the senior U.S. Army leadership in thinking through future force postures and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific Region in a period of service transformation and a changing political-military environment in the Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). It consisted of three panels:

- Panel 1: “Legacies of the Past”—a review of the war-fighting legacies of the past across the spectrum of conflict in order to examine how the Army adjusted operationally and organizationally to constantly changing security environments. Are there lessons worth remembering as the Army deals with the challenges of today and the uncertainties of the future?

- Panel 2: ‘Current Challenges”—a discussion of the challenges the Army faces in being prepared to engage in two potential types of conflicts: the “Cold War legacies” (predominantly in Korea, but also between China and Taiwan); and support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT), not just in the form of transferring forces out of theater, but also in conducting in-theater activities in support of the GWOT. What is the range of activities in each of the two (legacy preparedness and GWOT requirements)? What is the impact on the Army?
Panel 3: “Prospects for the Future”—an exploration of a range of Asian security scenarios a decade over the horizon. How might Asia’s security landscape transform? What are the implications for the U.S. Army in the realm of capabilities, force structure, and presence?

A concluding session summarized the principal themes identified throughout the one-day conference, focusing on the implications for the Army role in Asia today and tomorrow.

As part of the conference, papers were commissioned from prominent scholars, former military officers, government and non-government researchers, and Asia specialists. These are included in this report.

Introductory Remarks

After welcoming remarks by Dr. David Finkelstein, the Director of Project Asia at The CNA Corporation, the Honorable Reginald Brown, recently the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserves, introduced the conference with a lucid commentary on the Army's current restructuring to modular expeditionary forces during a time of demanding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Noting that the U.S. Army in Asia has grappled with a wide spectrum of conflicts, ranging from total war to counterinsurgency, he pointed to the fact that the Pacific during peacetime has not been an area of heavy force allocation. He viewed this as appropriate, both because the Army has generally operated on the periphery of Asia rather than the mainland, and because the Army is currently reconfiguring into mobile expeditionary forces that can deploy rapidly to any part of the world, including Asia. Mr. Brown’s remarks can be found on page 19 of this report.

Panel 1: Legacies of the Past

Professor Brian Linn of the Department of History at Texas A&M University opened the first panel, Legacies of the Past, by focusing on U.S. Army efforts at pacification and strategic planning during the years prior to World War II in the Philippines. The conference’s focus on the Philippines was apropos, both because of the insights it offers for Army counterinsurgency doctrine, and because some assert the lessons of the Philippine experience have considerable applicability to ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. Dr. Conrad Crane, Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, commented on Dr. Linn’s presentation, and followed with a succinct discourse indicating that the Army needs to learn the right lessons from past wars in Asia, including those in Korea and Vietnam, and pointing to the relevance of those lessons to current Army operations. Several important themes became evident from their presentations and the audience’s comments.

Theme #1: Lessons learned in the Philippine War and pacification effort have specific applicability to the Army today.

Considerable discussion revolved about the applicability of the lessons of the Philippine insurgency and occupation to the U.S. Army today. One point on which all could agree was the need to include counterinsurgency doctrine in the professional military education curricula at
army schools. Many participants bemoaned the fact the counterinsurgency doctrine and training was excluded from Army professional military education after the Vietnam War. They pointed to the fact that the U.S. Army performs well the tasks of defeating enemy in combat, but is not nearly as adept in performing pacification tasks in difficult situations such as Vietnam and Iraq. Likewise, many participants opined that the lessons of the Philippine War and occupation provide unique insights into methods of dealing with the insurgency in Iraq. The above lessons, as well as those cited by Dr. Kenny on pages 84 and 85 of this report, were part and parcel of this discussion.

Theme #2: Transplanting democratic values to a society without a democratic tradition can involve the U.S. Army in a long and difficult mission.

The Philippine War lasted from 1898 to 1902, when President Theodore Roosevelt declared the war officially ended. However, occupation duty accompanied by a significant pacification campaign continued until 1912. During this period U.S. Army officers performed multiple governmental functions. The Army garrisoned over 600 towns and villages, where officers often served as civil administrators—mayors, school superintendents, directors of local police forces, etc. One general was a governor. These officers also began the process of training indigenous leadership in the process of good governance, but this was a lengthy endeavor that, together with other factors, led to independence only in 1946.

Theme #3: Knowledge of the local conditions and various insurgent motivations is critical to a successful counterinsurgency effort.

The U.S. Army in the Philippines faced a diverse set of opposition forces. During the war phase (1899–1902), much of it was organized and nationalistic in character. During the occupation phase (1902–1912), it was generally decentralized, and composed of Filipino tribal-religious groups, brigands of various sorts, charismatic local leaders, and opportunists with varying motivations. To know and understand the motivations of these sundry groups, U.S. Army officers needed lengthy tours of duty, knowledge of indigenous customs and culture, language skills, and involvement in local political dynamics. Such knowledge and experience enabled the U.S. Army to set up civic action programs that addressed grievances exploited by the insurgents. Knowledge of enemy motivations also enabled most commanders to determine the proper balance between coercion and conciliation in planning and executing campaigns against the various insurgents, and, with some exceptions, to limit very forceful actions to those against hard-core groups.

Theme #4: Successful pacification demands simultaneous and appropriately balanced civil and military action.

One participant expressed the view that you cannot make progress in pacification unless you first establish a political system that commands popular loyalty. In this view, political stability is the *sine qua non* for progress in other areas, such as training, economic development, and local counterinsurgent operations. A contrary view was that you cannot have political stability until you first conduct effective operations against the insurgents, largely because they will not permit
Soldiers in the Philippines had both a construction mission and a destruction mission. They needed to win Filipino loyalty, or at least neutrality, but they also occasionally needed to escalate violence to unacceptable levels for citizens and terrorists. The risk of alienating the population by strong military action needed to be carefully weighed against the necessity of attacking insurgents. The record in the Philippines shows that in-and-out punitive operations rarely achieved lasting results and often set back pacification efforts. Although not always done in practice, the ideal was to tilt the balance between military and civic action in favor of the latter.

**Theme #5: Every soldier in a counterinsurgency environment has civic action responsibilities, and the military leader on the spot is the best pacification agent.**

All agreed that winning “hearts and minds” was important. In the Philippine case, U.S. Army personnel assisted the local population in eradicating disease, developing roads, building schools, providing sanitation, taking part in other developmental projects, and administering justice. They also spent money, which benefited many local people. By working closely with the indigenous population they developed intelligence networks that became increasingly effective over time. Civic action projects also helped with recruiting indigenous forces. Sustained contact with the local population required extended tours of duty, but was worth the effort, as positive contact with indigenous people became a prime ingredient of the successful pacification campaign.

**Theme #6: Training an indigenous police force and army is a long-term key to success.**

Filipino auxiliaries were essential to defeat the insurgency. By the end of the war, 15-20 percent of regular forces were Filipino. U.S. Army officers served in a constabulary capacity until Filipino police could be recruited and trained. Because the constabulary was often outgunned, Filipino scouts units were placed under its control. Only after a learning period of several years did they succeed in suppressing the last banditry movement. The Army also recruited and trained increasing numbers of Filipinos during the occupation, and for the first several years their focus was heavily on pacification. Over time U.S. Army personnel trained not only Filipino scouts, but also junior and field grade officers.

**Theme #7: Failure to resolve whether U.S. possessions in the Pacific (Hawaii and the Philippines) served as an outer defense of the United States or as a base to project power into Asia led to strategic miscalculation in 1941.**

In both in his presentation and his paper, Dr. Crane emphasized major shifts in the strategic environment and U.S. strategy at the turn of the century. The principal Army mission as late as 1898 was the coastal defense of the United States, primarily against a European power, and within that primarily against Great Britain. With the seizure of the Philippines, the question arose whether U.S. bases in Manila and Hawaii were there as outer bastions for defense of the continent, or to enable the United States to project power into Asia itself. Until 1905, plans for the defense of the Philippines were based upon the possibility of European attacks, resulting in the construction of coastal defenses in Manila Bay. With the Japanese victory over the Russian
fleet in 1905, the United States faced the possibility of an attack upon other parts of the Philippines, and upon Hawaii as well. However, plans by General Douglas MacArthur in the 1930s to defend the Philippines depended upon the arrival of a robust American fleet to relieve the garrison at Manila Bay in the event of an attack. Resource constraints rendered this strategy unviable, with the result that Manila Bay, potentially a forward operating base that could project power into Asia, left a tempting target for Japan, which viewed the U.S. position in the Philippines as a threat to its imperial ambitions. The result was strategic disaster in 1941.

**Theme #8: The Army needs to remember lessons learned the hard way in combat. Korea taught the value of jointness, and Vietnam how to conduct counterinsurgency operations, but the postwar Army forgot these things, only to have to relearn them at a later date.**

The limited wars in Korea and Vietnam are replete with implications for future types of war, but cursory reviews of those wars risk drawing the wrong lessons. The Army, as Dr. Crane pointed out, created a competent fighting force in 1951 under the leadership of General Matt Ridgway. However, the lessons of Korea were quickly forgotten as the Army became absorbed in the Pentomic Era. It also lost much of the competence it gained in Korea in joint operations, only to have to reestablish that competence in the 1980s. Likewise, the Army in Vietnam erred in training divisions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to fight a conventional war with road bound forces dependent upon heavy use of firepower. As with the lessons of jointness learned painfully in Korea, lessons learned in blood in Vietnam about countering insurgency were soon forgotten. One result was that the Army was initially unprepared to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. Participants commented that the Army is now reconstructing counterinsurgency doctrine and practice, and urged that it include a judicious understanding of the similarities and differences between the current counterinsurgent operations and those in Vietnam.

The panel concluded by noting that peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and post-conflict operations are likely to characterize U.S. Army operations in the GWOT for years to come, and that the Army, through its professional military education, training, promotions, and assignment policy, needs to balance its focus on winning wars with more emphasis on winning the peace. For additional detail on Panel 2, see Dr. Linn’s paper beginning on page 29 of this report.

**Panel 2: Current Challenges**

The second panel addressed current challenges facing the U.S. Army in Asia. LTG William Odom, USA (Ret.), a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, opened the panel by discussing the strategic context in which the U.S. Army operates in Asia. Noting that its missions often exceed its peacetime capabilities, he emphasized the importance of maintaining a credible force in Asia, especially in Korea, as well as developing closer ties to our traditional allies in the region. Mr. Andrew Feickert, a Congressional Research Service specialist in national defense, followed with a description of the current Army disposition to meet requirements in Asia, pointing out the possibilities for and problems with maintaining a ready response capability. He also emphasized the importance of security cooperation with Asian nations. Dr. Larry Wortzel, a national security expert on Asia, commented upon these two presentations, as well as the requirements of the
global war on terror and the type of organization, doctrine, and strategy needed for Army missions in Asia. The following are the principal themes of Panel 2 presentations and discussion.

**Theme #1: A war in Korea remains the single most likely high-intensity challenge facing the U.S. Army in Asia.**

Although a Cold War legacy, North Korea remains reclusive and hostile to the United States. Adding to the danger posed by its concentration of forces near the Demilitarized Zone is the very real possibility that North Korea has, or may soon acquire, nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. (Subsequent to the conference, North Korea declared that it was a nuclear weapons state.) Conference participants emphasized that, as long as the situation on the peninsula remains unresolved, the U.S. Army needs to serve as a deterrent to North Korean aggression, and, if deterrence fails, as a spearhead of a counterattacking force.

**Theme #2: Force reduction in Korea has several disadvantages.**

All participants agreed that the potential for war on the Korean peninsula constituted the greatest current challenge in Asia for the U.S. Army. Several participants felt that a strong U.S. forward presence in Korea was needed, and that any reduction in U.S. Army strength was inadvisable. Reasons listed included the following:

- U.S. Army forces in Korea deter North Korean aggression. They have contributed to keeping the peace on the peninsula for over 50 years, and are an important factor in Pyongyang’s strategic calculations. North Korean combat readiness and war making potential are still at a high level.

- U.S. forces in Korea help stabilize the region. They help mollify tensions between Japan and South Korea. They facilitate U.S. military presence in Japan by ensuring it is not “the nail that sticks out” as the only country hosting U.S. forces in Northeast Asia. Ground forces signal that the United States is in Asia for the long term, and thereby enhance the stability needed for continued Asian economic dynamism. They provide a counterweight to the increasingly strong gravitational pull of China on South Korea.

- Due mostly to South Korean host nation support, but also due to savings in transportation costs, U.S. forces in Korea are cost-effective.

- Critics of force reduction argued that U.S. units in the continental United States (CONUS) tapped for Korea in an emergency might not arrive in time to blunt North Korean attacks. Given the heavy equipment needed, deployment by sea is the only alternative.

**Theme #3: Modularity may be able to offset many of the disadvantages of force reduction.**

- Some argued that the deployment of one of two Brigade Combat Teams of the Second Division in Korea for duty in Iraq demonstrates the mobility of U.S. forces—signifying that these forces can be readily reinserted into Korea in a crisis.
• The current Army transformation into modular units is specifically designed to allow augmentation of forces in theater wherever and whenever needed. Conversion of many units into Stryker Brigades will provide them both the mobility and firepower needed for a Korean contingency.

• ROK forces, combined with U.S. air power, provide a powerful disincentive for North Korean aggression. This combination can handle the situation until U.S. Army reinforcements arrive for the counterattack phase.

• South Koreans do not want large numbers of U.S. troops on their soil in peacetime.

• Unit rotations allow soldiers to be away from their families for six-month deployments, rather than the year-long deployments of the past.

Theme #4: U.S. Army security cooperation in Asia can yield big dividends in the long term.

With one exception, Japan, the “dominant” service in Asian militaries is the army. Soldiers like to train and interact with soldiers. It is important that the Army play a major role in security cooperation in Asia. U.S. security cooperation with the Philippines has resulted in benefits for both countries—notably in training and anti-terrorist operations. Cooperation with India has developed over the past few years, but only at the small unit level. If politically palatable, higher-level combined exercises would help cement the U.S. military relationship with India. Training and exercises with Japan and Korea help stabilize Northeast Asia and enhance the capabilities of those two countries to support American forces in Iraq and elsewhere. Cooperation with Australia has similar benefits, and could lead to additional U.S. Army training opportunities.

Theme #5: Although U.S. Army presence in Japan is limited, it is an important component of an alliance that is key to U.S. strategy in Asia.

The proposed transfer of I Corps from Ft. Lewis, Washington, to Camp Zama was assessed by many as an important step in maintaining a credible Joint Force presence in Japan. The transfer may also help in developing a closer relationship with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF). Another step advocated by some conference participants was basing a Brigade Combat Team in Hokkaido. Advocates of this position pointed to its advantages in strengthening the relationship with the GSDF, the proximity of Hokkaido to Korea in the event of a crisis there, the possibility of Japanese host nation support, and the potential for its being seen as a replacement for U.S. Marines, some of whom may leave Okinawa. Detractors stated that the Government of Japan would not agree to additional U.S. troops, that local groups would exercise veto rights due to environmental regulations, and that Japan would not likely pay additional host nation support as it is already reducing that funding to some extent and feels it need not pay as much due to its commitments in Iraq and elsewhere.

Other points mentioned in Panel 2 included a potential U.S. Army non-combatant evacuation (NEO) of the 70,000 U.S. citizens in Taiwan in the event of impending crisis or actual hostilities across the Strait; and the Army’s possible consideration of forward basing units or equipment in
Panel 3: Prospects for the Future

The third panel, Prospects for the Future, addressed plausible future scenarios that the Army might face in Asia. Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, presented a range of scenarios that could generate requirements for U.S. Army deployments, involving not only Northeast Asia, but South and Southeast Asia as well. Dr. John Hanley, Deputy Director of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and Dr. Thomas Donnelly, a Resident Fellow in defense and security policy at the American Enterprise Institute, commented on the implications of Dr. O’Hanlon’s scenarios for the Army. Dr. Hanley emphasized the Army’s role in joint training and operations. Dr. Donnelly stressed the need for a sustained long-term presence that can help shape the security environment. Besides Korea and China, the discussion focused on potential GWOT missions in South and Southeast Asia. Major themes for Panel 3 are as follows.

Theme #1: Contingency planning for the collapse of North Korea is essential.

The panel discussed the possibility of a regime collapse in North Korea, noting that the economic situation in the North could lead to popular unrest, or alternatively, that economic reform might lead to a top-down collapse. In either case, a unified Korea is the likely result. Some feared that without U.S. forces a unified Korea would likely be nuclear armed, with the result that Japan, out of concern for Korea, might follow suit. U.S. forces, however, can act as a buffer between Korea and Japan, and serve to dampen the prospects for a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. Assuming that China can be expected to line up with Korea in any dispute that country has with Japan, U.S. forces in a united Korea can help by demonstrating to Korea that it need not fear an overly assertive Japan, and thereby help prevent Korea from automatically aligning itself with China in the latter’s ongoing competition with Japan for power and influence in Asia.

Theme #2: A collapse of Pakistan and resultant decontrol of its nuclear weapons could require U.S. Army intervention.

If radical Islamic or ethnic groups replace the moderate central core of the Pakistani government, its nuclear weapons could come under hostile control. Some participants opined that the stakes for the international community are just too high to permit that to happen without intervention. They posited that such intervention would best be under circumstances in which the threatened regime called for the assistance of the international community before it actually collapsed, after which time securing nuclear weapons may be impossible. A multilateral stabilization force of as many as 50,000 troops may be needed, including substantial numbers of U.S. Army soldiers. U.S. Army personal contacts in Pakistan, particularly those with the Pakistani Army, could be critical to the success of any such endeavor.

Theme #3: Negotiated entry of international forces into Indonesia for the purpose of countering terrorist groups is a possibility that could involve U.S. Army units.
Panelists discussed the possibility of a destabilized Indonesia in which government forces were unable to cope with terrorists who might seize control of parts of the country or who operate training camps and bases in remote areas. In such cases the Government of Indonesia might invite international forces to help deal with the problem. U.S. Army units, including but not limited to Special Forces, might well be called upon to assist in rooting out the terrorists. As with other potential contingencies, the degree or rapport and cooperation that the U.S. Army establishes with the nation’s military forces could influence both whether it is invited to intervene, and the success of such intervention.

Theme #4: It is difficult to conjure up plausible large-scale ground combat scenarios for the U.S. Army in Asia. Hypothetical cases such as a Sino-Russian conflict in Siberia, or Chinese occupation of the northern portion of a unified Korea are unlikely, and probably would not engage the U.S. Army in any case.

Some participants noted that there are over a million Chinese entrepreneurs and workers in Siberia, and that the number is growing at a rapid pace. Many are engaged in illegal business, giving Russia, the impression, they said, that there is a de facto occupation of Siberia in some places. Although there is little likelihood of general Sino-Russian war over this matter, local conflict could erupt. The Panel felt that this was of little consequence to the United States, however, and that U.S. Army intervention was out of the question.

In keeping with the idea that China wishes secure borders, the possibility of Chinese forces entering the northern portion of a newly unified Korea also was discussed. If, for example, China seized a 10-mile security zone across the Yalu River, or occupied several dozen miles inside northern Korea, perhaps to secure a political settlement that included removal of U.S. forces from Korea, what would be the result? First, panel members viewed such action as unlikely, since it would be seen globally as a naked act of Chinese aggression. Second, if it did occur, it would be difficult for Beijing not to withdraw if asked to do so by a recognized government of a unified Korea. Finally, of course, if the Chinese were foolish enough to try leverage such as an occupation, Korean opinion would be outraged, making it more rather than less likely U.S. forces would be asked to stay.

Theme #5: Sustained interaction with Asian nations through security cooperation is essential to future U.S. Army missions in the region.

Many conferees were in agreement that U.S. Army trainers can help build competent indigenous forces that may well obviate the need for direct American military involvement in future crises, particularly in the GWOT. It was pointed out that U.S. Army Special Forces and Foreign Area Officers play an important role here, and that the regional expertise and rapport they develop with regional commanders can determine the level of cooperation U.S. Army units may expect in a crisis. The army is the dominant service in most Asian countries, so army-to-army cooperation is important politically as well as militarily. Sustained interaction with Asian armies also demonstrates that the United States is there for the long haul. Army cooperation in addressing transnational problems such as drugs and piracy is also important (piracy is not just a navy problem, as pirates operate from base areas on land), especially as the type of cooperation developed can be useful against terrorists.
Theme #6: In light of recent reductions in U.S. Army forward presence, frequent and sustained training missions are more important than ever.

Frequent training missions demonstrate staying power, something force reductions bring into question. They help build rapport with local forces upon which the United States may have to depend in fighting the GWOT or other contingencies. They also create a network of locations where training takes place, so that in an emergency some of these locations might be used for needed access. The bottom line is that the U.S. Army should seek to create an extensive enough network of places where it is welcome to conduct training, so that it would have a good possibility of using at least one of those places as a temporary base of operations if a nearby contingency required it.

For a more detailed analysis of potential future scenarios that could involve the U.S. Army in Asia, see the paper by Dr. O’Hanlon beginning on page 67 of this report.

Concluding Commentary

Dr. James Carafano of The Heritage Foundation and Dr. Henry Kenny of CNA Corporation provided a wrap-up session that commented on many of the specific issues raised earlier. Dr. Carafano summarized the importance of sustaining a combat-ready force that can both contribute to regional stability, and if necessary, fight and win, as part of a joint force, any conflict in which it may be called upon to participate. He emphasized that the Army needs leaders who think strategically about Asia, including the means to fulfill missions that do not fit traditional threat scenarios. Dr. Kenny stressed the political value of U.S. Army forward presence, and the importance of maintaining close relations with Asia’s military forces. He also analyzed the implications of the Philippine War for U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and training. His paper amplifying these and other conference concepts can be found on page 75 of this report. Additional themes emphasized in the concluding commentary included the following.

Theme #1: Although there is agreement on the ends of U.S. policy in Asia, many Asian scenarios do not fit into a traditional threat matrix. Thus, concentration on leadership, logistics, and mobility take on new importance.

New types of challenges may arise, such as those involving collapsing regimes, the Sino-Japanese relationship, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Given the indeterminacy of such matters, the Army should develop a flexible force that can address a range of threats. Modularity provides more flexibility, but organization and technological lock-in is overemphasized. The Army has fought every war it has ever participated in with a task-oriented force. After the first battle they were characterized by improvisation. The tool-kit for such improvisation requires logistical support and mobility, both of which are especially important given the long distances across the Pacific. Flexibility also includes leaders who can think creatively and view Asia strategically. A diverse education for younger officers is a prerequisite for such leaders.
Theme #2: Frequent exchanges between U.S. Army personnel and their Asian counterparts can help the United States maintain its role as an Asian and Pacific power.

Army dependence upon Special Forces to interact with Asian militaries is limited both by the fact that Special Forces are stretched thin around the world, and by the necessity of training and working with a variety of conventional forces with which Special Forces may have less contact. Thus, mission training for regular forces, to include area orientation and cultural awareness, is important. Because the U.S. Army is being configured as an expeditionary force, interaction with regional forces is crucial both for access and to help develop indigenous forces capable of handling their own problems with or without U.S. assistance.

Theme #3: Japan can assist U.S. Army operations in Asia in three ways: (a) by allowing pre-positioned equipment in country; (b) by Self-Defense Forces (SDF) operations other than war; and (c) by rear-area support for U.S. Forces.

The idea of stationing a U.S. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in Hokkaido may be desirable due to time/distance factors, but may not be politically acceptable. An alternative might be to pre-position heavy equipment for U.S. Army units in Japan, so as to reduce the time needed in responding to a contingency in Asia, especially in Korea. Japanese SDF have increased their ability to conduct OOTW in Asia, as evidenced by participation in peacekeeping in Cambodia, tsunami disaster relief in Thailand and Indonesia, humanitarian assistance in East Timor, anti-piracy operations in South and Southeast Asia, and a deployment for a non-combatant evacuation (that ultimately did not need to be executed) in Indonesia. U.S. Army combined training with the Ground SDF could further develop its capabilities in these areas. Finally, Japanese rear-area support, to include use of Japanese bases, search and rescue operations, and transportation and logistic support, can greatly facilitate U.S. Army operations in Korea and elsewhere.
The U.S. Army in Asia: an Introduction

Overview

In some respects, it is very difficult to embrace the notion that U.S. land forces in general, and the Army in particular, must make special, extraordinary preparations and allocate specific resources for Asia.

Notwithstanding our participation in the Boxer Rebellion and its aftermath, U.S. ground force operations in Asia have historically been on the periphery of the Asian landmass or on the islands of the Pacific. Examples are the Philippine Stability Operations before World War I; island hopping to Japan in World War II; the Korean War; the Vietnam War; and the recent counterterrorist operations. It can be argued that the constraints imposed during the Korean and Vietnam wars were partly due to the concern that we would become massively involved in a land war on the mainland of Asia. The cost, in both dollars and personnel, was too much to contemplate.

As the Pacific Rim powers experience dynamic rates of economic growth, we will surely need to shift our attention to that area of the world. This shift in focus, however, does not require us to contemplate major land combat operations in the heart of the Asian mainland. To the extent that the United States must be involved, it is likely to remain on the periphery of the mainland. Accordingly, U.S. military responses in the Pacific region will continue to be primarily by sea and air forces, aimed at “defeating the aggressive efforts” of one or more regional powers, and preventing strikes against our homeland by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or by unconventional means.

A recent RAND study offered the following observation:

Asia, in contrast to Europe, is by its very geographic nature an air and naval theater because control and power stem from ensuring rapid and unconstrained flow of goods and military power between landmasses rather than from control of any particular landmass.

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1 Disclaimer: Unless otherwise specifically noted, the views and/or arguments expressed in this paper are solely those of the author, and are not intended to represent those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Army.


The landscape of forward-deployed land forces

The force structure implications for the U.S. Army are apparent. More and more emphasis is placed on expeditionary forces that can be deployed rapidly and sustained indefinitely. This new emphasis is captured in *The Army Strategic Planning Guidance* by the description “a campaign quality army with a joint and expeditionary mindset.” The Army provides the joint force with the campaign-quality combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities necessary to conduct sustained land warfare. This is the Army’s unique contribution to the joint team, and it will be maintained. The challenge is to provide these forces more rapidly in the context of an expeditionary mindset. These types of forces are embodied in the transformation to modularity, and are designed to provide a component of land combat capability to joint expeditions anywhere on the globe.

Associated with modular units is the concept of “unit manning” (or unit stabilization)—i.e., personnel are assigned to units and stay with those units for extended periods. When replacements are needed in an operational theater, the entire unit is replaced by another. This is the unit rotation we now see in Southwest Asia. The move to unit manning facilitates the relocation of all our forward-deployed units to home bases in CONUS, with much smaller footprints in the supported regions.

As we form modular units and implement “unit manning and rotation,” questions are being raised concerning the requirement to permanently station large formations of ground forces in places such as Europe and Korea. At a minimum, a smaller contingent of ground combat formations can be provided on a rotational basis, without dependents and the associated infrastructure. More ambitiously, these forward-deployed forces can be removed entirely. These adjustments in force structure, manning, and deployment will increase our ability to provide ground combat power where it is needed. They may not, however, enhance our capabilities as occupying forces or constabularies.

The details for redeploying U.S. ground forces from Europe were aired by Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith in December 2003. He was quoted as saying, “The U.S. plans to pull such forces out of the country (Germany) in 2005 and 2006.”

Ironically, redeployment from Europe has not yet begun. However, Korea is another story. We have already seen the prospective relocation of one of the two brigade combat teams of the Korea-based 2d Infantry Division to CONUS following its current tour of duty in Iraq.

General Schoomaker’s modular army promises to drastically alter the landscape of forward-deployed forces, providing enhanced capability and resilience. These forces will be capable of global response, heretofore not contemplated by the Army.

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Taking this logic a bit further, one might ask whether we really need to maintain geographically defined combatant commands. As we begin to move our ground forces back to CONUS, this question is given added emphasis. The future is one of a robust Army and Marine Corps, configured to support expeditionary warfare around the globe. The management of these forces, when committed, will be through standing Joint Task Force Headquarters, in the process of being created. In this configuration, the relevance and utility of standing geographic-based commands will surely come under increased scrutiny.

**The current state of U.S. land forces**

On March 10, 2005, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld “upheld the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan...as powerful demonstrations of U.S. military prowess that will make other countries think twice about making ‘mischief’ around the world.”

The current tempo of operations in southwest Asia has sparked a number of alarm calls. Examples are: “we are breaking the force”; “the current high tempo is not sustainable”; and “our capacity to undertake major operations elsewhere has been compromised.”

In responding to these cries, consider the following facts. It is undoubtedly the case that the wear-and-tear on equipment has raised the cost of maintenance and refurbishment. Secretary Rumsfeld asserted that “equipment such as tanks, helicopters, and Bradley Fighting Vehicles are wearing out at from two to six times the peacetime rate.” To remedy this state, DOD is requesting $12 billion for equipment repairs in 2005, and each unit returning from operations is given a period to reset both people and equipment.

It is also true, that the recruitment of ground force personnel is beginning to face increased pressures. However, it should be remembered that, in the absence of a 9/11 call to action, there were significant recruitment shortfalls in 1998 and 1999. Today’s challenges are being addressed. The Army and Marine Corps, with DOD and congressional support, have aggressively tackled the recruitment issue, using incentives in imaginative ways and successfully appealing to a deep reservoir of patriotism and morality in today’s youth. As improvements take place in the national economy, these challenges will become more pronounced.

The Army National Guard and Reserve have been challenged to meet the demands of current operations. They have successfully met those challenges, and in the process, they have had an opportunity to strengthen their formations by weeding out unfit soldiers, and by having been subjected to periods of intense training prior to undertaking operations. Secretary Rumsfeld, speaking in reference to the entire military, noted, “The fighting has created a force of ‘battle-hardened veterans.’”

Andrew Feickert, in his paper for this conference, expressed a similar observation explicitly related to Pacific Command formations that have participated in Southwest Asia operations:

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
“U.S. Pacific Command will have the benefit of having its major ground forces ‘blooded’ or combat tested in extended combat...” In the same context he states, “While this is not something that the Pentagon will likely advertise, the Army will reap the benefits of having combat veterans...” The Secretary’s recent declaration makes clear that the Pentagon has not been reluctant to advertise this benefit.

The benefits of combat are particularly poignant in the case of Guard and Reserve formations. These formations are being balanced and reset, as they return from these operations. The Guard and Reserve formations now comprise significantly higher proportions of veteran officers and noncommissioned officers, many of whom have reenlisted in response to increasingly attractive incentives. Our ability to create and sustain these highly capable Reserve formations is envied by many nations.

National Guard ground units in Alaska and Colorado have also taken on a historically unique role in providing a component of our strategic missile defense capability. This role parallels the longstanding involvement of the Air National Guard in strategic air defense of our homeland.

Talking in terms of brigade combat teams for the Army alone, the nation has considerable residual capacity. The Army had hoped to increase the number of active brigade combat teams from 33 to 43 with a follow-on increment of 5, for a total of 48 active brigades. For now, the interim goal is 43. When this process is complete, we will have some 43 active-component brigade combat teams and 33 in the Army National Guard. This force, along with the U.S. Marine Corps, will enable us to sustain operations in Southwest Asia at the current levels. This force will provide a significant residual ability to answer another major call for land combat capability, as well as to respond to several small-scale contingencies (those involving units of less than brigade size).

This enhanced force is consistent with our declared national strategy, based upon the specified level of capability that we have decided to provide. This force reflects the level of resource commitment that we, as a nation, are willing to make at this time. In the event of impending war, that level of commitment can be adjusted.

When Secretary Rumsfeld was asked about a potential military threat from China, he said that this year’s Quadrennial Defense Review would plan long-range weapons systems “with respect to China and other circumstances that can change dramatically.” The defense review, he said, must “recognize the changes that are taking place in Asia and the kinds of capabilities that the United States could be facing in 10, 15, 20 years.”

**Scenarios for Asia**

The RAND study cited earlier listed 13 potential security challenges for the United States in Asia:  

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9 See “The U.S. Army in Asia—Challenges and Opportunities,” in this conference report.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Tyson.  
12 Cliff and Shapiro, 93.
• Invasion of South Korea by North Korea
• Regime collapse in North Korea
• Widespread ethnic or separatist conflict in Indonesia
• Chinese attempt to coerce or invade Taiwan
• Nuclear war between India and Pakistan
• Counterterrorist or counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines
• Collapse of governance in Pakistan
• Conflict between claimants to Spratly Islands
• Failure of central governance in Burma
• Failure of central governance in China
• War between Burma and Thailand
• War between Malaysia and Singapore
• Land war with China.

Given this rather far reaching list, it is most appropriate for others to discuss in detail the relevant, or likely, scenarios for U.S. ground combat operations in Asia. At least four major considerations should be taken into account in assessing Asian ground combat scenarios: the implications for a “Win Decisively” National Strategic Objective; the “imperialistic character” of an expeditionary army; the corrosive effects of constabulary duty on combat formations; and the requirement to enable allied forces to collaborate with us.

First, implications for a Win Decisively National Strategic Objective

Current defense strategy requires the provision of forces to accomplish four missions concurrently:

1. Defend the homeland; 2. Deter aggression and coercion in four critical regions: NE Asia, East Asian Littoral, Middle East/Southwest Asia, and Europe; 3. Swiftly defeat the efforts of adversaries in two overlapping wars while preserving the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts—including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and 4. conduct a limited number of lesser contingency operations.

We are just now beginning to appreciate the possible long-term implications of a “Regime Change” as part of a “Win Decisively National Objective.” Long-term stability operations (occupation) easily become a corollary to regime change. It is not always enough to defeat the organized armed forces of an adversary. The popular will to resist must also be subjugated. Surgical strikes, and other forms of warfare that carefully limit collateral civilian damage leave behind significant segments of the enemy populace that do not recognize or accept that they have been beaten. So “Regime Change and Win Decisively” must account for the long-term stability requirements. The Army’s current planning guidance explicitly addresses the “asymmetric” possibilities associated with modern warfare.

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13 As articulated in *The Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2006-2023*, 16-17.
Second, the “imperialistic character” of an expeditionary army

The emphasis on the creating a “joint expeditionary force” mindset has a distinctly imperialistic character. Expeditionary forces are designed for expeditions, adventures, interventions, operations somewhat removed from the defense of the homeland, and the defense of vital national interests, e.g., those encompassed by treaties. Expeditionary warfare is often envisioned to be of limited duration and intensity. When expeditions become unlimited in duration and high in intensity, they will surely challenge our resolve. The nation will quickly demand confirmation or validation that high stakes, e.g., direct threats to our national security, are involved.

Others have questioned whether the United States is ready to, or should, wear an Imperial Crown. Past empires have been successful in extracting tribute, other forms of economic support, and military assistance from their far-flung provinces and protectorates. This support has been instrumental in preserving the security and integrity of these empires. The current American empire, whether intended or inadvertent, may be missing such support at the very times when it is most needed.

Patrick Buchanan argues that we should back away from imperial policies and return to our roots as a republic. He warns:

The day is coming when America’s global hegemony is going to be challenged, and our leaders will discover they lack the resources to make good on all the war guarantees they have handed out so frivolously; and the American people, awakened to what it is their statesmen have committed them to do, will declare themselves unwilling to pay the price of empire.14

From this thesis, Mr. Buchanan calls for the dissolution of all security treaties with Asian allies that require us to go to war if they are attacked.15

In contrast, to Buchanan, Walden Bello argues that the United States has already become imperialistic, and must now guard against impending collapse. In his view, “Three crises threaten to convulse the empire: a crisis of overproduction, a crisis of overextension, and a crisis of legitimacy.”16 As he details these crises, he sees benefit for both the United States and the rest of the world in the decline of our empire.17 In some respects, he and Mr. Buchanan are not far apart.

Bill Odom argues that American Liberal Capitalism has provided the ideological infrastructure that has sustained successful economic and political dominance by Northern Economic Powers.

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15 Ibid., 376.
17 Ibid., 217.
According to him, “This American organizing function is our imperial legacy.”\(^{18}\) In Odom’s paper for this conference, he argues for a stabilizing influence from the continuing presence of Army forces in Korea, even in the event of reunification.\(^{19}\)

Zbigniew Brzezinski uses the words “hegemonic” and “imperial” interchangeably in presenting the American empire “hegemonic democracy”:

Unlike previous hegemonic powers, America operates in a world of intensifying immediacy and intimacy. Past imperial powers such as Great Britain during the nineteenth century, China at various stages in its several thousand years of history, or Rome during half a millennium, just to name a few, were relatively impervious to external threats. The world they dominated was compartmentalized and non-interactive. Distance and time provided breathing space and enhanced homeland security. In contrast, America may be uniquely powerful in its global scope, but its homeland is also uniquely insecure.\(^{20}\)

Brzezinski goes on to point out how we can end up misusing our hegemonic advantages, and suffer the effects of chronic insecurity. His prescriptions are clearly the opposite of Mr. Buchanan’s. The fact that the debate on our proper imperial role is alive and possibly growing gives emphasis to the need for our military instrument to be ready across the entire spectrum of warfare. The Army appears to have struck the right balance by striving to preserve its ability to engage in and win sustained land combat, while concurrently maintaining the capacity to undertake those imperial expeditions it is given.

The Navy and Marine Corps have formed the traditional core instrument of America’s expeditions. In some ways, the Army is new to the game, albeit Army constabulary (occupation) troops were dispatched from the Philippines to China during the Boxer Rebellion, and from Japan to Korea during the Korean outbreak. A largely constabulary US. Army, along with its Philippine allies, unsuccessfully confronted General Homma when his forces invaded the Philippines in Japan’s opening moves of World War II. In the period following the Korean War, our Airborne forces readily adapted to expeditionary roles. It remains to be seen how well the big Army (with its modular mechanized and infantry brigade combat teams) adjusts to this new role.

**Third, the corrosive effects of constabulary duty**

Operations associated with brokering and maintaining peace accords, i.e., “peacekeeping operations,” have proven to be personnel intensive, costly, and inconsistent with traditional ground combat operations. In some ways these operations replicate some of the features of constabulary duty, and likely have the same effect on combat readiness.

\(^{19}\) See Odom’s “The Role of the U.S. Army in Asia,” in this conference report.  
Stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the value of military police, civil affairs, engineers, transportation, and special operators. The Army has been forced to adjust force structure in order to satisfy the increased demand for these types of forces. Artillery batteries have been converted into provisional military police companies. Army schools have been working overtime to meet the new demands. Heavy brigade combat teams have had to be largely motorized, retaining only a fraction of their heavy armor and artillery.

Put another way, a lot of resetting will have to take place before these brigade combat teams are ready to take on their traditional land combat missions. The costs associated with these resets must be taken into account.

**Finally, the need to sustain allied capabilities to operate with us**

It is unlikely that any operation in the Asia/Pacific region will take place without close involvement of allied nations. Collaborative relationships with trusted allies should be sustained and cultivated over the long term. Andrew Feickert’s paper emphasizes that engagement of regional partners is important to our future success in the region: “Many feel that it is critical for regional engagement to continue.”

Japan’s contribution of engineer troops to the Iraq stabilization mission is a significant milestone for Japan. However, in recent times, actual combined operations with Asian land forces are largely limited to Australia and the Republic of Korea. Japan has been a principal beneficiary of American hegemony. Brzezinski argues that it is time for Japan to take its proper place alongside our forces in ensuring regional, if not global, security. “Japan—in conjunction with Europe—has to be viewed as America’s eventual partner in the long-term struggle against the many forces of chaos within the Global Balkans.”

His Global Balkans is the crucial swath of Eurasia between Europe and the Far East that is the home of turbulent Islam. In his view, “For the next several decades, the most volatile and dangerous region of the world...will be the new Global Balkans.” He reminds us that most of the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims live within this region. One must wonder how long it will take for Japan to recognize and accept that it has a significant stake in preserving the security of the empire.

As the U.S. Army continues its pace of modernization, allowances will have to be made to facilitate collaboration with the forces of these allied nations. Collaborative exercises are particularly relevant to any operations that are likely to arise on the periphery of the mainland.

**Conclusions**

The United States Army, along with the United States Marine Corps, is quite capable of providing the ground combat elements that any of the Asian war scenarios put forth by the conference presenters are likely to require of us.

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21 See Feickert’s “The U.S. Army in Asia—Challenges and Opportunities” in this conference report.
22 Brzezinski, 67.
23 Ibid.
The need to provide permanent or semi-permanent allocations of ground combat forces to regional commands will likely be increasingly questioned. Although Bill Odom makes a case for maintaining permanent U.S. ground combat forces in Korea, the provision of those forces through a rotation system of stabilized units is one way of achieving the same result. Those who dispute the need for U.S. ground combat forces in Korea will point to the availability of CONUS-based ground combat units that are rapidly deployable. Korea is ideally situated to become the first significant test of rotational deployment of CONUS-based ground combat units.

Up until now, the role of the Army National Guard has been unprecedented in contributing to the success in Southwest Asia. It remains to be seen how much longer we will be able to call on it to fulfill what is essentially the mission of an expeditionary army.
To write about the legacy of the Pacific Army is to write about an army that never officially existed and is now all but forgotten. Unlike Britain or France, the United States did not establish a distinct colonial institution equivalent to the Indian Army. The “Pacific Army” thus has no official or legal meaning; rather, it applies to the American and Filipino troops assigned to the overseas departments of Hawaii and the Philippines between 1898 and 1941. The Pacific Army was thus not a separate force; it was but one factor in the overall priorities of the U.S. Army and the national defense. Hence, to determine the “lessons” of the Pacific Army for today’s armed forces, we must overcome two major conceptual problems. The first is to provide sufficient background to allow an appreciation of this unique organization without getting bogged down in detail. The second is to avoid the temptation to let current events significantly shape analysis. Both irrelevance and hyper-relevance create problems. Five years ago, the Pacific Army and its counterinsurgency experience was a curiosity of only historic interest to a defense establishment obsessed with “military transformation.” Today the danger is exactly the opposite: that analysts will interpret the Pacific Army’s experience only in the context of today’s military realities, draw direct connections between past and present that do not exist, and extract a set of simplistic how-to solutions.

With these cautions in mind, it is possible to discuss the two great legacies of the Pacific Army: first, the experience of counterinsurgency or pacification; second, the impact on American strategic thought and planning.

Origins of the Pacific Army

Before a Pacific Army could be created, a number of problems had to be solved. First and foremost was that its needs had to be balanced against those of the primary missions of the entire U.S. Army: the defense of the homeland, and, as a distinct second, the protection of the overseas possessions. This latter mission was complicated, for not all of the foreign commands were equal. There very quickly emerged competition for strategic preeminence, and for human, financial, and material resources, among the Philippines, Hawaii, and the Caribbean (particularly the Panama Canal Zone). But in addition to these two declared U.S. Army missions there was a third, if unwritten, priority: to complete the military transformation begun by Secretary of War Elihu Root in 1899. Root and other military reformers sought to change the Army from a border constabulary and coastal defense force into one that could conduct large-scale modern warfare against another Great Power.

A further complication in creating a Pacific Army was that the U.S. Army had neither a tradition of expeditionary service nor an imperial ideology. In 1898, it was unprepared both materially and mentally for the sudden demands of overseas expansion. The first forces dispatched overseas
were scratch forces intended to take advantage of a temporary strategic advantage in the war against Spain. Neither the occupation of Hawaii in 1898 nor the Philippine War of 1899-1902 provided clear lessons to guide future policy. No new Mahan or Jomini emerged from the officer corps to develop an imperial doctrine; indeed, the General Staff was still in the process of creating a planning and strategic agency. But at its simplest, the Army’s intellectual response was pragmatic: imperial rule was essentially a military problem in which the task was to identify threats and develop an appropriate response. These threats—an internal uprising and an external invasion, perhaps linked to the uprising—remained remarkably consistent for the next 40 years. The military responses were equally consistent. Internal turmoil was to be met with “pacification”: the inculcation of American principles of law and order among Pacific populations. External threats were to be met by protecting strategic areas with mobile forces and fortification.

Pacification

Of these two threats, a potential internal uprising initially loomed as more serious. The first plan for the defense of Hawaii in 1903 argued that 2,000 soldiers would be more than sufficient to maintain order and represent the national government. In contrast, securing the Philippine archipelago for colonial government required three years of hard fighting and the use of military forces that, at their peak, were almost three times the size of the entire prewar Army. Although President Theodore Roosevelt termed “insurrection” in the Philippines to be over on 4 July 1902, three years later the list of military engagements in the Islands took up 14 pages in the War Department’s annual report.24

The counterinsurgency campaigns and small wars waged by the U.S. Army in the Philippines between 1902 and 1913 are often viewed as a curious mixture of romanticism and mortification. Some authors portray these imperial wars as simply an exotic postscript to the “Indian Wars” of the late 19th century. Others interpret them as the brutal suppression of patriots, primitive tribesmen, and peasants. Neither of these extremes is accurate, and neither is useful as an analytical reference.25

In point of fact, the Army involvement in pacification after 1902 occurred at the behest of the civil government and was monitored by civilian authorities, often Filipinos, and employing Filipino troops. The army’s three major pacification campaigns—the misnamed “Moro Wars” of 1902-13; the Pulajan Campaign of 1904-1907; and the anti-banditry operations in southwestern Luzon from 1902 to 1907—were directed against individuals and groups who were attacking other Filipinos. Many former opponents of the 1899-1902 conflict assisted the Americans, as did local officials and townspeople, by guarding towns, providing intelligence, patrolling the

countryside, and otherwise serving as para-military forces. The Army employed thousands of Filipino boatmen, porters, and laborers—without whom, as one officer admitted on Mindanao, “military operations of any scope would have been impossible.”

Thus every pacification campaign was a temporary Fil-American alliance against those that threatened both parties’ interests.

Among some academic schools it is fashionable to portray the post-July 1902 conflict as a new phase of “Asia’s first war of national liberation.” According to this interpretation, the “Philippine Revolution” that began against the Spanish in 1896 became the war for national self-determination against American occupation that raged from 1899 to 1902. After that, the revolution was carried on for another decade by the “masses.” Such an interpretation owes at least as much to ideology as to research or serious analysis. Those who fought against the colonial authorities after 1902 had very little in common with their predecessors. They shared no ideology, nationalist or otherwise, and had no common goal. They were not fighting for political entity (such as an independent Philippines) and did not articulate a distinct Filipino national identity. Rather, they were a diffuse group with diffuse beliefs that incorporated elements of folk religion, brigandage, tribal and communal connections, and other traditional values. In contrast to the propertied, commercial, and educated elites who had dominated the pre-1902 resistance, the post-1902 resistance was essentially peasant based, peasant led, and concerned with peasant issues. Finally, whereas the resistance from 1899 to 1902 had been politically disunited but shared the common goal of expelling American forces, the post-1902 resistance was often directed as much against Filipino institutions and individuals as against American ones. In short, it is only by the greatest stretch that the post-1902 violence can be connected to the pre-1902 insurgency.

The forms of this resistance were equally diffuse, incorporating ladrones (brigands or armed gangs), populist rebels such as the Pulahans, and tribal-religious opponents such as the Moros. These distinctions were often blurred, and represent points on a continuum more than clearly identifiable categories. Brigands often allied with populist movements, providing a relatively well armed and experienced cadre around which the rebels could coalesce. Conversely, the crushing of a populist movement often saw its leaders turn to banditry. Religious-tribal resistance included men who combined in one person chieftain, religious authority, and pirate. Despite the imprecision, the examples do provide an overview of the nature of resistance after 1902 and allow for more specific analysis of both the rebels and the means used to defeat them.

**Ladrones**

In many respects, the transition from guerilla or insurrecto to brigand or ladrone was one of semantics. During the Philippine War, many American officers continued to refer to their opponents as bandits. Although the bandits’ and guerrillas’ organization, tactics, and conduct were similar, their political objectives were not. The guerrillas sought to establish themselves as

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the legitimate government, whereas the brigands were hostile to all government. The U.S. Army implicitly recognized this distinction during the Philippine War, most notably in December 1900 when it issued a general order defining various categories of resistance. With Roosevelt’s 1902 proclamation, armed violence ceased to be insurrection and became criminal action. In practice, such legalisms had little immediate effect in the provinces, where armed gangs continued to assert that they were continuing the war for independence.

Most ladrone bands consisted of a charismatic leader and a few dozen followers who extorted blackmail, kidnapped, robbed, and were otherwise engaged in illegal activities. Armed with a few rifles or shotguns, they avoided combat with anything like an equal force. Most had close ties to local communities—both parasitic and symbiotic. The brigands often had some popular support, both due to the money they spent and because their targets included the merchants and landlords who oppressed the peasantry. Conversely, they often served as enforcers for these same merchants and landlords to intimidate rivals and to keep the peasantry compliant. Because of these close links with their communities, breaking the ladrone gangs required patient police work—gathering evidence, arresting, and prosecuting. The primary task of the Army in anti-banditry operations was to be a sort of flying squad that protected the investigators, raided hideouts, surrounded and swept villages, on occasion forcibly relocated peasants into protected camps, and otherwise aided the police. The bandits were seldom able to resist even token military force, and when separated from their traditional areas of operation usually found themselves pursued not only by the troops, but by the entire countryside.

**Populist rebellions**

Far more serious were such violent folk protest movements as the Pulahanes of Samar and the Babylanes of Negros and the Santa Iglesia in Central Luzon. The motives behind these outbreaks were complex and varied. In many areas of the Philippines there were outstanding grievances over land tenancy, forced labor, illegal taxes, anti-labor violence, and other abuses. To these would be added a potent mixture of local folk magic, charismatic leadership, and communal rivalry. Not surprisingly, the Americans had a great deal of trouble identifying the causes of these violent populist movements. One general ascribed the Leyte Pulahan uprising of 1906-07 to “religious fanaticism of long standing in the mountains, accession of outlaws and other criminals, discontent, political animosities between the ‘ins and outs,’ alleged abuses by some local officials, [and] reputed inefficiency of the provincial government . . . .” A civil official blamed the same movement on “the fanatic Faustino Ablen, who has proclaimed himself to be Jesus Christ and his daughter the Virgin Mary” and who was supported by “the most ignorant” of

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31 Jesse M. Lee, "Personal Memorandum Submitted to the Honorable, the Secretary of War," 21 March 1907, #1250150, RG 94.
the population. Others traced the origin of the Leyte Pulahans to high taxes, government oppression, the weakness of the Constabulary, and a domino effect of early success. The confusion over motives was matched by similar disagreements over leadership, composition, and numbers, with estimates as low as 100 and as high as 1,500. If the root causes of the rebellion were unclear, what was seldom in doubt was that the rebels often fought with fanatical courage, often because they bore talismans that were believed to protect them from weapons.

Most of the populist uprisings followed a similar pattern. They occurred in remote areas that were undergoing profound social-economic stress, in which there were longstanding class, religious, or communal disputes, relatively high levels of banditry, and sizeable numbers of disaffected groups. Low-level violence, itinerant preaching, and banditry would grow sufficiently strong to contest government control in some villages or regions. A triggering event, such as the defeat of a Constabulary patrol or a raid on a government office, would ignite widespread, and often unrelated, uprisings. Bandits, folk religion (or folk magic), communal, and land tenancy disputes would all coalesce into a powerful if disunited movement. Usually the local civil government, which was almost always a significant contributor to local grievances, would wait until the local police and Constabulary were already overwhelmed before calling for help. Thus the Army, usually in the form of the Scouts, would arrive to confront a full-fledged violent revolt.

The Army’s role in suppressing populist outbreaks tended to follow a similar pattern. In some instances, such as the Santa Iglesia, the Constabulary and Scout reinforcements were able to launch cordon-and-sweep operations that broke up the rebels and sent their followers into hiding. Cases such as the Pulahans on Leyte were more serious, and occasionally required the brief dispatch of Regulars. These would garrison important towns and send columns into the countryside, seeking to either force the rebels into battle or to destroy their camps. Usually a few defeats were enough to break up the large bands, discredit the religious leaders, and impel so many defections and surrenders that the Army could turn over to the Constabulary the arrest of the last hold-outs.

Tribal and religious rebellions

From 1903 to 1913 the Army provided both the civil and the military personnel in “Moro Province,” the Muslim regions of the southern Philippines. Following the Spanish practice, there was a political-military administration in which officers served in civil positions. In cases of armed resistance, they could call on the military authorities—who could be themselves—for aid. Although the so-called “Moro Wars” have become part of American military lore, the Army’s task was more to govern than to fight. How much fighting would be necessary depended a great deal on the individual political-military officer. John J. Pershing and others were able to suppress armed resistance in the volatile Lake Lanao region of Mindanao with a combination of garrisons, shows of force, and a few skirmishes. Leonard Wood’s arrogance and provocation helped incite an uprising in Jolo, which he crushed with extreme brutality, killing hundreds and provoking national outrage. Such large outbreaks were rare. Most of the opposition came from outlaws.

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32 Edmond Block to Supervisor of Fiscals, 24 June 1903, File 6731, RG 350.
ritual suicides (*juramentados*), and disaffected tribal leaders unwilling to give up piracy, raiding, and feuds. The rapid pacification of Moroland was largely due to the Army’s efforts to build markets and roads, establish schools, and in other ways extend government into previously ungoverned areas. In addition, the Army achieved a very important negative goal: it prevented a united Muslim polity from emerging to contest U.S. rule.

**Lessons learned**

Between 1899 and 1910, U.S. military journals offered an extensive outpouring of literature on small wars. But what the U.S. Army did not try to develop was a complete conceptual approach to the problems of warfare with irregular and unconventional opponents. There were a number of problems that inhibited such a doctrine.

First, because their opponents were so diverse, there was little tactical or doctrinal coherence. Troop formations that proved effective against mass attacks by machete-wielding hordes on Samar would have been ineffective against Moros fighting in forts. Moreover, as officers constantly made clear in their writings, combat skills were not the most important ones to have. Effective pacification largely reflected an officer’s non-military abilities—his cultural sensitivity, diplomacy, and civic engineering ability—none of which could be taught (or was even considered worthy of being taught) by the military professional education system.

Second, officers were either consciously or unconsciously restricted by both political and professional reasons from a critical analysis of their small wars experience. Although pacification campaigns were largely won through a combination of civil and military measures, it could be professionally unwise to stray too far from strictly military topics. In many cases, military officers believed that the civil government’s own corruption and brutality had helped turn discontent into rebellion. The controversial and polarizing Major General Leonard Wood’s prominence in Philippine military matters further restricted discussion. Even those who hated Wood and viewed his policies in Moroland (correctly) as provocative, brutal, and inept, were unwilling to criticize him publicly.\(^{34}\)

Third, American colonial officers often faced great hostility from their continental colleagues, who advocated a far different standard of military efficiency. By the 1890s the enormous changes in technology, military mobilization, and industrial organization were breeding expectations that officers would become not simply heroic warriors but “managers of violence.” Warfare against other Western powers—what was usually called Modern Warfare—required a constantly evolving officer corps. Also, the virtues of an officer had changed: they were no longer physical endurance, small unit leadership, and flexible practicality, but rather education, administrative ability, skill at staff work, and technical competence. Officers had to spend most of their time simply trying to master the increasing complexities of their profession. Few made the effort to study small wars, because the superiority of Western military techniques appeared so completely established.

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\(^{34}\) For criticism of Wood, see 17 September 1904 diary entry, Robert L. Bullard Papers, Library of Congress; *Army and Navy Journal* (28 July 1906); Joseph H. Dorst to Esther Dorst, 11 March 1906, Box 3, Joseph H. Dorst Papers, Special Collections, USMA Library, West Point, NY. Pulahan movements still continue to fight government authority in the Philippines to this day.
The Pacific Army and strategic planning

We must try to comprehend what an enormous intellectual challenge the Pacific was to American military officers. Even since the founding of the Republic, the primary task of the U.S. Army had been to protect the continental United States. Virtually the entire body of American military thought—from the Totten Board, Dennis Hart Mahan, and Henry Halleck, though William T. Sherman and Emory Upton—focused on how to organize and deploy military resources for the defense of the North American heartland. Throughout the 19th century the primary threat was England and the Army’s focus was on the Atlantic coast. As late as 1898, when war with Spain was only a few months away, the War Department chose to allocate its emergency funding to constructing and manning the coastal defenses called for in the Endicott Board of 1886.

After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Philippines became the most vulnerable part of the American empire. The war scare of 1907 focused national attention on both the internal and external safety of the Pacific possessions. The Army’s General Staff estimated that the Japanese could land between 70,000 and 100,000 men at Lingayen Gulf within 15 days and reach Manila in less than two more months after that. In another study, the General Staff determined that Hawaii could face a sudden Japanese invasion of as many as 100,000 soldiers accompanied by an internal uprising by the population. Although estimates of enemy strength varied widely, Leonard Wood’s 1916 statement expressed the common sentiment: “We may predict with almost absolute certainty that any descent against the Philippine Islands will be made in such force as to overwhelm any forces that might be put in the field to oppose it.” Thus instead of worrying about Moros and Pulahanes, American officers had to plan for a sudden invasion.

This geostrategic revolution occurred at the very time the U.S. Army was going through the institutional reforms associated with Secretary of War Root. The creation of the Army War College and the General Staff meant that the Army for the first time had permanent organizations charged with the development and direction of national security. Thus it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the evolution of Pacific defense and that of U.S. military strategy were linked together.

Pacific defense forced the U.S. Army, and especially its new strategic planning agencies, to wrestle with questions to which there were no easy answers, and for which the commitment to one solution almost by necessity precluded a successful response to other dangers.

One of the central, and unanswered questions was whether Hawaii and the Philippines were intended to be outward bastions for continental defense or bases for power projection into Asia. If one accepted that the primary duty of the nation’s military forces was to protect the United

35 AG to CG, Philippines Division, 6 July 1907, AGO 1260092, RG 94. William W. Wotherspoon, memorandum on the naval base in the Philippine Islands and its protection from capture or destruction by the Army, 21 November 1907, Subic Bay File, Entry 299, RG 165.
States, then Hawaii was absolutely essential. In the days of coal-powered battleships, no enemy could attack the continental United States without possessing a protected fueling station in the Northern Pacific, and Pearl Harbor was the only such harbor suitable to shelter a fleet. Thus, as long as Hawaii held, the continental United States was safe. The same rules applied in the opposite direction: without a secure harbor in Hawaii, the Pacific Fleet was confined to the West Coast.

But the Philippines had no significant strategic value except as an outpost for American interests in the Far East. Indeed, the Philippines posed a positive threat. Not only did the garrison provide a standing temptation for attack by Japan but that in turn might force the premature commitment of the fleet to defend the Philippine garrison. At worst, this would mean the destruction of the fleet, the collapse of the nation’s military defenses in the Northeast Pacific, and a possible attack on the West Coast. But if one’s perspective was that the United States was indeed a Pacific and Asian power, then Hawaii was only a stepping stone and the Philippines was the more important strategic possession. Only a Philippine base would allow the fleet to operate in the Western Pacific and bring about Japan’s rapid defeat. The immediate loss of the Philippines would rule out the possibility of either projecting power into Asia or fighting a short war with Japan. Indeed, it would force the United States to fight a long and costly campaign across the Central Pacific—a campaign that the American public might refuse to support. On the negative side, the presence of a weak garrison in the Philippines allowed Japan an opportunity to deliver a devastating blow at the beginning of the war. Thus, the United States needed to build up its Philippine defenses, especially those of Manila Bay, to provide a safe anchorage for the fleet—and the fleet in turn had to be organized to launch an immediate thrust into the Western Pacific to relieve the Manila Bay garrison. Army officers who advocated this strategy, such as Douglas MacArthur, found supporters among Navy officers, who recognized that such a contingency was the only possible justification for the Navy’s advocacy of a large battleship fleet and a Mahanian offensive strategy.

Given its limited resources, it was debatable whether the pre-World War II U.S. Army could defend either Hawaii or the Philippines. To protect both was impossible; by not deciding which was the most important, it would risk the loss of both. Unfortunately the Army never resolved this essential conflict between those who argued for an aggressive forward posture in the Pacific and Far East based on holding the Philippines, and those who supported a continental strategy and urged focusing energies on the defense of Hawaii. Instead, Army strategy in the Pacific vacillated back and forth depending on who was Chief of Staff, who was in War Plans Division, and especially who commanded overseas. This lack of coherence and consistency explains how MacArthur was able to ignore the Pacific (Japan or Orange) War Plans in developing his own scheme to defend the Philippines in the late 1930s. It also explains why in 1941 planners in Washington, in the space of only a few months, went from writing off the islands to pouring men and resources into their defense.

**Analyzing the threat**

Until 1905, Army planners believed that the major danger to the Pacific territories would come from a sudden raid by a European naval squadron stationed in Asia. This would be a relatively small force, and its goal would be to duplicate Commodore George Dewey’s feat at Manila Bay
in 1898. That is, it would steam into the harbor and train its guns on Manila or Honolulu, forcing the surrender of the capital city and—by a precedent established by the United States itself—the surrender of the entire overseas possession. Defense lay in the construction of fortifications sufficient to hold Honolulu and Manila and a naval base, until the enemy squadron either ran out of coal or was driven off by the U.S. Navy’s Pacific squadron. As a result, in the early 1900s the United States began building some of the most complex and expensive fortifications ever constructed, at the mouth of Manila Bay and along Oahu’s southern coast.

In 1905, Japan emerged as the dominant regional power in the Western Pacific. Now, instead of facing a small European squadron, the American garrisons in the Pacific faced an enemy capable of mounting not merely a short-term naval raid, but a full-scale invasion. Moreover, the danger was no longer just from the sea. The Japanese could land tens of thousands of troops on Oahu or Luzon and attack the harbor defenses from the rear. Thus the Army was forced to expand its defenses farther out, to incorporate the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines and the entire island of Oahu in Hawaii. No sooner had the Army made this decision—and deployed sufficient forces to Hawaii to provide at least a chance of protecting it from invasion—than the new technology of the airplane and the aircraft carrier emerged to challenge America’s Pacific defenders.

In conclusion, the Pacific Army left the United States, and especially the U.S. Army, with a twin legacy. The first was that of a successful counterinsurgency campaign that combined benevolence and repression, military and civil projects, central direction and local initiative, garrisoning, and the recruitment of local auxiliaries. It has been virtually ignored by the Army. The second was an ambiguous legacy of strategic planning which sought to reconcile continental defense with power projection, to meet an ever-changing threat, and to resolve the inherent conflict between national and regional priorities. This legacy, of course, is still very much with us.
The Role of the U.S. Army in Asia

Military missions have meaning only as instruments for achieving political objectives. We cannot, therefore, assess the role and requirements for U.S. Army forces in East Asia without first understanding the political dynamics of the region and the political objectives of U.S. strategy. Thus we must review the factors of change and continuity with an eye to appreciating their impact on U.S. interests. Because national interests are, in practice, whatever leaders define them to be, we must investigate what the U.S. government has seen them to be in the past and what it sees them to be today.

Once we have done that, working out the military requirements to support those interests is rather straightforward. Actually deploying the most effective mix of forces, however, is not so straightforward, especially for U.S. Army forces, because this region has been dominated by U.S. maritime forces for a long time. As will become clear, missions for army forces have long been beyond the capabilities of the U.S. Army units deployed to accomplish them. That is also true for the missions of the Air Force units deployed there to support ground forces.

U.S. interests in the region

The U.S. government has long proclaimed regional stability and expanding international trade to be its primary interests in East Asia. That was true long before World War II, and it has remained true ever since. Change has occurred primarily in the strategy employed to secure those interests—that is, until recently.

Today, considerable confusion surrounds U.S. strategy in East Asia. A couple of decades ago, it was clear. It grew out of the containment strategy after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. President Truman committed the United States to containing the expansion of Communist-controlled regimes not only in Europe but also in Asia, especially Northeast Asia. That accelerated change in the relations with both Japan and South Korea. A peace treaty and a military security treaty were signed with Japan in 1952, much earlier than had been anticipated and three years before a similar set of treaties was signed with Germany. A parallel military alliance emerged with the Government of South Korea, removing the ambiguities about U.S. commitments that had probably contributed to North Korea's decision to invade in 1950.

American relations with China also experienced dramatic change. During and immediately after the war with Japan, China was America's ally. When the Chinese Communists took power in 1949, and Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan with his Chinese Nationalist government, the United States lost its footing on the mainland but maintained its support of Chiang's government in Taiwan.
Both developments—the Korean War and the Communist takeover in China—convinced the Truman administration that containing the expansion of the Soviet bloc was a top priority, not only in Europe but also in East Asia.

Putting this change into historical perspective can help keep the U.S. regional strategy of today linked effectively to its regional interests in East Asia—that is, the maintenance of regional stability and continuing economic prosperity. Unfortunately, a "de-linking" has been occurring since the end of the Cold War.

As Japan expanded into China in the early 1930s, the United States tilted in favor of China. At the same time, its relations with Japan worsened. This pro-China and anti-Japan tilt lasted more than two decades. Then, in only about a year—1949-1950—a radical reversal began. By the end of the Korean War, the United States was formally allied with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, to oppose Chinese and Soviet expansion.

Since that time, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and the U.S.-Korean security alliance have been the foundation of strategic stability in East Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia. They have made possible not only the longest period of peace in Northeast Asia in modern times, but also the greatest prosperity that region has ever known.

Both South Korea and Taiwan fell into the U.S. security orbit more by chance than by calculation. Chang Kai-shek used his strong China lobby in the United States to gain recognition of his "One China" policy, and made Taiwan its temporary center. In the 1930s, Mao Tse-Tung told Edgar Snow in an interview that he did not consider Taiwan an integral part of China.³⁷ It was poorly administered and had a native population that was not well disposed toward the Chinese mainland. Japanese colonial rule, beginning in 1910, had changed Taiwan. It had imposed order, improved roads, built schools, and introduced modern governmental institutions, including European code law.³⁸ As a result, the native Taiwanese were inclined to be pro-Japanese—unlike the Koreans, in whose country the Japanese colonial rulers also introduced Western legal institutions but confronted a deeply rooted and proud nationalism not present in Taiwan.

Korea's place in U.S. strategy was left ambiguous after 1945, but once North Korea invaded, South Korea became part of the U.S. "containment" wall in the U.S. regional security orbit. In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration extended the wall to Southeast Asia by creating SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) to fence in not just the Soviet Union, but the entire new Sino-Soviet bloc.

We note only two things about Southeast Asia. First, the United States was drawn into this region largely because Roosevelt and Truman did not want European colonialism to be restored there after World War II. Thus, they tended to favor nationalist leaders who wanted to expel colonial regimes, as long as they were not Communists. Moscow, of course, had long been

supporting local Communist parties working within "national liberation fronts" to push out French, British, Dutch, and other European colonial governments. The U.S. decolonization policy risked letting Communist parties end up with the power in post-colonial regimes. Believing that Moscow and Beijing were closely allied and in firm control of these parties, U.S. leaders easily slipped into commitments against local insurgency movements where Communists of any stripe played a role.

The most spectacular case is Vietnam, and the outcome of the war there is the second point to keep in mind. Local Communist leaders proved less responsive to Moscow than had been assumed, and the Sino-Soviet bloc was already coming apart by the mid 1950s. Only in the early 1970s did the U.S. government come to recognize its flawed assumptions about Moscow's influence over Beijing and the prospects for creating modern stable and liberal regimes in the post-colonial states of Southeast Asia. When the regime in Saigon collapsed in 1974, Washington discovered that it could greatly reduce its military presence in Southeast Asia without major adverse consequences.

In Northeast Asia, things worked out differently. The U.S.-Japanese alliance became the cornerstone of stability for the region. It also reassured most governments in the Pacific Island states and East Asia, who feared a revived threat from Japan; thus, they soon opened their doors to Japanese businessmen. Their dependence on the American military umbrella, held up by the U.S.-Japanese alliance, has lasted right up until today, and reaches beyond the countries that were occupied by the Japanese military to include Thailand and Australia. By the mid 1970s, therefore, U.S. strategy for Southeast Asia had changed dramatically. In Northeast Asia, however, it remained the same. Military alliances with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were the pillars of the Northeast Asia strategy, and its effects extended to Southeast Asia as well.

The new strategic equilibrium

President Nixon's trip to China in 1972 marked the beginning of a major shift in U.S. perception of how to defend its interests in East Asia. If the Sino-Soviet bloc was now mainly a formal affair, could China be drawn into a cooperative relationship with the United States? The fact that Nixon had achieved a diplomatic opening to China suggested that it could. President Carter moved to full normalization of relations in December 1978. This was not easy, however, because of the Taiwan issue. The China lobby in Washington was still strong and was opposed to normalization with the mainland. Based on the Shanghai communiqué, however, Washington and Beijing created a formula making the issue sufficiently ambiguous to allow the full normalization and to transfer the Chinese permanent seat in the UN Security Council from Taipei to Beijing.

This shift produced a new strategic equilibrium in Northeast Asia, which considerably reduced the risks of war while improving the prospects for prosperity. Five factors underpinned it:

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39 An Australian politician who lost his bid for becoming prime minister in the early 1990s told the author at a dinner in Washington that if his country could be sure of the permanency of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance, it would enter the East Asian economy far more deeply. Uncertainty about it, however, meant that Australia had to retain less profitable economic links with both Europe and the United States.
1. Most important was the Soviet military buildup. By the 1970s, Soviet ground forces on the border had grown from about 15 divisions to over 60. The Soviet Pacific Fleet also grew rapidly. It became the second largest Soviet fleet, ranking below only the Northern Fleet, which is in the Barents Sea.

2. China was militarily weak. Mao's use of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to support his "cultural revolution" had enhanced the military's political status, but did had done nothing to increase its combat capabilities and, in fact, had done much to erode them. Thus, by the 1970s its fighting potential for opposing a Soviet invasion was dangerously limited. Its miserable performance in its invasion of Vietnam in 1979 left no doubt on this point.  

3. Japan emerged in the 1980s as an economic superpower, but its military remained small (albeit increasingly modern—especially its naval and air forces). Its security dependence on the United States therefore increased in step with the Soviet military buildup.

4. The stalemate on the Korean peninsula between Pyongyang and Seoul remained unabated as the Soviet Union and the United States backed the opposing sides. Thus, political change leading to reunification was impossible—a situation reassuring to Japan, and perhaps also to China.

5. U.S. military power, deployed in both Japan and South Korea, provided the only real counterbalance to the Soviet military build-up, sublimated Chinese-Japanese competition, and reinforced the stalemate in Korea. When the United States and China normalized their diplomatic relations, China too began to share the regional security provided by the U.S. military presence.

Although President Carter brought this new equilibrium to fruition, initially he did not fully appreciate the stabilizing role of U.S. land power in Northeast Asia. If he had, he would not have tried to reduce U.S. Army forces in South Korea shortly soon after his inauguration in 1977. When every member of his National Security Council and his national security advisor strongly opposed a reduction, he reluctantly yielded to their objections.

The collapse of the regional equilibrium

Removing any of these five conditions was bound to break the equilibrium. As the Cold War ended, the first and most important one disappeared—and with it, the equilibrium. Unfortunately, U.S. strategy has not been effectively adapted to deal with the changes. Halting and sometimes contradictory modifications have been made in U.S. policies toward all the countries in Northeast Asia. They have undermined the old strategy without replacing it with a new one. In fact, the proclivity of the State Department to view the region in terms of bilateral

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40 Before the invasion, a high-level China political leader told the Carter administration that the PLA would resort to a "people's war"—that is, an insurgency—if Soviet forces entered China in support of Vietnam. Thus the Chinese leadership was well aware of the PLA's weakness, but perhaps less so after its incursion into Vietnam. Source: the author's personal conversation with a high-level official who observed the delivery of the Chinese advance message.
links to all five countries prevents it from seeing the internal dynamics of the region as a whole. The regional dynamics are also obscured by the Defense Department's tendency to view China as the major security challenge to the United States in 2001 and then neglecting it after 9/11.

To recognize those dynamics, one must understand how the end of Cold War released forces of change. Such an understanding allows one to appreciate the three key realities on which an effective U.S. strategy must be designed:

1. Change in Korea is the most urgent challenge for a new U.S. strategy.
2. Japanese-Chinese strategic competition is the largest and longest-term challenge.
3. Certain U.S. policies pursued for the past decade are undermining regional stability, not securing it.

Change in Korea—the most urgent challenge

Gorbachev's *perestroika* policy destroyed the strategic equilibrium in Northeast Asia. To meet China's demands for improved relations, he reduced Soviet forces opposite the Chinese border, pressed Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, and removed Soviet forces from Afghanistan. These steps alone might not have upset the balance so quickly, but Gorbachev’s recognition of South Korea in the fall of 1990 left North Korea isolated, in a state of shock, and soon to be cut off from free oil supplies from the Soviet Union. In other words, it threatened to break the stalemate of the Korean peninsula.

For the next year or so, Japan's diplomatic flirting with Pyongyang reflected deep worry about a reunified Korea. South Korea initially expressed excitement about early reunification, but when its business leaders and politicians saw the huge financial costs of German reunification, their enthusiasm cooled and they began talking about a long-term, soft-landing transformation in North Korea. During the ensuing 15 years, competing politicians in South Korea have fought openly over how to deal with North Korea. Pyongyang has used this debate in Seoul along with Washington's obsession with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to pry open the traditionally strong Seoul-Washington cooperation on dealing with North Korea. Not surprisingly, strains have resulted.

U.S. policy toward Korea has become increasingly contradictory and self-defeating. Threats to North Korea over its nuclear weapons program have had priority in a rhetorical sense, but Defense Department planning has given priority to significant reductions of ground forces in South Korea. Not surprisingly, doubts about U.S. military commitments have increased, along with anticipation of instability throughout the region. Pyongyang's counter-gambits have exploited the contradiction by making threats that anger the United States and make South Koreans upset with U.S. policy rhetoric.

The other powers in the region cannot avoid being drawn into this struggle. They all want stability; yet they have conflicting interests in terms of how stability is maintained.

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41 China formulated these three conditions shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and stubbornly insisted that Moscow meet them.
Russia tried to retain some influence in Pyongyang and to increase its influence in Seoul, but its power has so diminished that today Moscow is hardly a factor in the regional balance, much less in that of the Korean peninsula. It can cause trouble by flirting with Pyongyang, but it can offer little constructive leadership or influence.

China's reactions are ambivalent. It does not want to see North Korea have nuclear weapons, not least because that would almost certainly prompt Japan to acquire its own nuclear weapons. If it withdraws all support for North Korea, it risks catalyzing an upheaval in Korea. But it also sees the U.S. policy as having the unintended consequence of pushing North Korea to produce nuclear weapons earlier rather than later.

Moreover, China wants to keep the Korean peninsula stable and quiet, at least until it has gained control of Taiwan. Whether or not U.S. leaders recognize it, the Korean and Taiwanese issues are closely linked. Beijing does not want to deal with them simultaneously, and its first priority is Taiwan, not Korea.

In South Korea, the business community fears the economic consequences of an early reunification with North Korea. Other obstacles to an easy transition are no less real, although not as well understood. For example, after a half-century of separation and radically different socialization processes, North and South Koreans will not easily mix to form a unified country. The difficulties faced by East Germans during reunification would seem pale beside those that North Koreans would undergo. Hunger and malnourishment are reducing the IQ level of the North’s population—which would be another serious problem for a unified Korea, as well as a hurdle for any political and economic reform program that a North Korean leadership might try to implement. Denial of these realities, common among political leaders in both the North and the South, does not augur well for sober policy making in Seoul, not to mention in Pyongyang.

Nor do other factors. Many South Koreans quietly favor North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons because as North-South relations improve and peaceful reunification becomes possible, Seoul could end up inheriting nuclear weapons from the North—thus, presenting Japan, China, and the United States with a fait accompli. We in the United States tend to be unaware of the depth of the anti-Japanese legacy in Korea. Even during the Cold War, most South Koreans’ responses to public opinion polls said that the major military problem facing the country was Japan—not North Korea, the Soviet Union, or China. Americans may not be aware of it, but in the minds of many Koreans, U.S. forces there defend them from Japan. At the same time, the younger generation, with little or no memory of the Korean War, is showing stronger signs of wanting to see U.S. forces withdraw from South Korea. That, of course, would leave South Korea to face Japan, the country it has traditionally feared most, alone.

Put succinctly, if Korea reunites and either allows or requests U.S. troops to leave, it will almost certainly acquire nuclear weapons and drift into the Chinese security orbit. Its hostility toward Japan, combined with the lack of a U.S. military presence, will leave it with China as its only security anchor.
One obstacle to cooperative military ties between Seoul and Beijing is that the South Korean public has recently become conscious of the old Korean kingdom of Kokuryo, which embraced a large part of what is northeast China today. The Chinese blundered by publicly denouncing Korean claims to this ancient polity. This could be a positive development. It should remind Korea that it has always been dominated by one of three powers in the region: China, Russia, or Japan. South Korea's security alliance with the United States has yielded its longest period of national sovereignty and economic prosperity in its history. To break that alliance would mean to risk, once again, becoming a vassal of one of the three regional powers. With Russia out of the game for now, only China or Japan could assume that role. And neither could risk showing self-restraint if the United States withdrew from the region. Sadly, however, the younger generation of South Korean politicians may not see it that way. Several indulge in the illusion that Korea is a budding superpower, able to stand toe-to-toe with Japan or China.

**Japanese-Chinese strategic competition—the largest challenge**

The outcome of the change in Korea will affect how soon Japanese-Chinese strategic competition re-emerges, and it will either weaken or strengthen Japan's capacity to deal with China. The big issue in the region is not, as is sometimes asserted, U.S.-Chinese competition—but rather how Japan and China get on. The challenge for the United States is how it plays into that competition. It could ameliorate it or exacerbate it, and losing Korea to the Chinese security orbit would weaken Washington's hand. Again, the nuclear proliferation issue can prove catalytic for the worst outcomes.

The American focus on Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program hardly reassures Japan. Tokyo would not like to see nuclear weapons in North Korea, but it fears that U.S. actions will upset things in Korea. Japan's worst nightmare has to be a reunited Korea with nuclear weapons and no U.S. troops deployed on the peninsula. No development is more likely to prompt Japan to acquire nuclear weapons and to increase its ground force capabilities. (Its air and naval capabilities are already significant, but they also might be increased.)

How would China react to a nuclear-armed Japan with large and highly modern conventional forces? Would it be willing to depend on the United States to restrain Japan? Or would it take a more confrontational approach to Japan? The latter is more likely, especially if China ends up displacing the United States as South Korea's security warden.

The Taiwan issue could also become more explosive. If the native Taiwanese have reasonably positive memories of Japan’s rule and some cultural legacies from that period, Taiwan’s leaders who favor independence might turn to Japan for support if U.S. support weakened or were withdrawn. Now, Washington holds the reins on Taiwan. But it would have to share them if a re-armed Japan re-entered the region's great power competition. Such a Japan might decide to guide Taiwan in directions that Washington opposes.

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Were these developments to occur, they would be followed by major political and economic change, including the demise of East Asian economic prosperity.

**U.S. policy as a destabilizing factor**

As noted earlier, the United States has never looked at Northeast Asia as a strategic region the way it has viewed Europe. It compartmentalizes policy-making into U.S.-Chinese, U.S.-Japanese, U.S.-Korean, and U.S.-Russian relations. In part, this results from the refusal of U.S. postwar allies—Japan, South Korea, less so Taiwan—to join a multilateral security alliance like NATO.

This point deserves strong emphasis because of its ramifications for U.S. military requirements. In both Europe and Northeast Asia, U.S. forces have been defending U.S. allies against one another, not just the Soviet Union, North Korea, or China. In other words, U.S. forces have played a critical role in providing supranational political-military governance in both regions. Without them playing this role, economic reconstruction after the war would have been difficult in Europe and essentially blocked in East Asia. Japanese businessmen would not have been welcome anywhere. Opening the international market's doors to Japan, which U.S. military forces in Japan did, paved the way for Japan's, South Korea's, Taiwan's, and now China's economic development.

For all of its discontent with the U.S. military in the region, China has quietly favored the presence of U.S. forces in Japan and Korea since normalization of diplomatic ties in 1978. In the past decade, Chinese foreign policy has changed: China no longer sponsors Third World countries in campaigns to destroy the U.S.-led international economic and security order. Now it seeks entry into that order, and hopes to turn its institutions into instruments that will promote its own interests. The open question is, of course, whether Beijing will see shared international interests if it attains a strong or dominant role in the WTO, IMF, UN, World Bank, and other such organizations. Still, this aspect of Chinese policy may offer a way to moderate and eventually eliminate the region's major challenge—Japanese-Chinese strategic competition.

From the earlier analysis of the collapse of strategic equilibrium in Northeast Asia, it should be clear that Washington's reluctance to think about the region as a strategic whole is having perverse effects on Korea, Japan, and China—and on Taiwan as well.

Taiwan, of course, is often seen as the most urgent and dangerous problem in East Asia. China encourages this view, but in fact, it is not accurate. Taiwan is related to an old debate within China about what constitutes a fully liberated China. Never in Chinese history has there been agreement on what precise territory constitutes China. Tibet and Xinjiang were included only

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in the 1700s, and Taiwan's "liberation" was never a central issue until Chiang Kai-shek formulated his "one-China" policy that Beijing now has appropriated. Taiwan's status can also become connected to regional autonomy movements in China's wealthier coastal provinces. Thus, this issue cannot be resolved soon. Actually, it is better left unresolved until China has coped with its own internal transition to a constitutional system that eliminates the Chinese Communist Party's monopoly rule. A rough path lies ahead for China's domestic politics, one that can well undercut that country’s rapid economic growth. In other words, China is not inexorably on the road to becoming a superpower, and its internal stability cannot be taken for granted. Yet, Chinese leaders have proven remarkably pragmatic and astute in avoiding disorder thus far.

In any case, change in Korea could destabilize the region; change in Taiwan could only destabilize China.

**Review: the flaws in U.S. strategy**

The foregoing regional analysis has already identified most of the problems with U.S. strategy in East Asia, but a review can help us think more clearly about why it needs revisions. Without them, it may produce the very military challenges it was meant to prevent. Moreover, the mix of U.S. forces now deployed in East Asia is not well designed to meet either these challenges or the lesser ones that a more effective strategy would require.

Long focused on maintaining regional stability, Washington has almost entirely ignored all of these major determinants of change that threaten that stability.

President Clinton viewed the region with a narrow focus on two issues. First, although he initially made human rights in China his primary concern, events soon forced him to shift to another, equally narrow, focus, on U.S. business interests there. Second, North Korea's nuclear weapons program was his primary concern on the peninsula. The dangers of a major change in Korea were ignored. As noted above, U.S. relations with Seoul fell into trouble as North Korea drew the United States into negotiations over the nuclear weapons issue. Leaders in South Korea—both in the government and in the opposition—feared a U.S.-North Korean deal that would produce outcomes they did not want. The Republicans in Congress not only shared this narrow and destabilizing focus on nuclear weapons, but contributed to it.

When President George W. Bush entered office in 2001, U.S. tactics for dealing with the nuclear proliferation issue changed, but the U.S. obsession with that issue, to the exclusion of all others, did not. Moreover, it the obsession became more counterproductive with the use of the President's phrase, the "axis of evil," to include North Korea along with Iran and Iraq. The incentives for North Korea to produce nuclear weapons sooner were reinforced; many other countries, especially in Europe, began to turn dramatically against U.S. international leadership; and South Korea's leaders and the public were unnerved.

The major U.S. interest—stability—was being endangered by this exclusive concern with non-proliferation. That is, the very thing that the non-proliferation policy is supposed to seek was, and still is, endangered by the policy itself. Perhaps North Korea would acquire nuclear weapons
anyway, but the threats and pressures that the United States presents to Pyongyang virtually ensure that North Korea will proliferate, if it has not done so already.

The ramifications for Japan’s security policy are major, but they may prove just as significant for China, and even more so for South Korea. A three-way or perhaps four-way nuclear weapons competition in Northeast Asia could easily result. The present U.S. non-proliferation policy cannot prevent it, and has even made it more likely.

Non-proliferation is not the only destabilizing U.S. policy toward the region. Over the past decade, the reduction of U.S. ground forces in South Korea has resurfaced as a possible U.S. policy over the past decade. The Clinton administration flirted with the idea. The Bush administration actually appears bent on moving the forces out. Some already have been transferred to Iraq, and the broader Rumsfeld redeployment plan apparently would reduce Army forces in Korea to an operationally insignificant number. Thus Washington's voice on U.S. ground forces in Korea not only ignores any discussion of their presence in the event of reunification, but even encourages the states in the region to expect them to depart earlier.

It hardly needs saying that such policies, or hints of such policies, about the future of U.S. ground forces in Korea increase the likelihood of regional instability in general, and the eventual drift of Korea into the Chinese security orbit in particular. The consequences for the balance of power between Japan and China would be hugely adverse to U.S. interests.

Revising U.S. strategy

As Clausewitz said, "Everything in strategy is simple, but that does not mean that it is easy." Knowing the aim of a strategy, of course, is a precondition for making it "simple." There are no objective reasons for revising our view of U.S. interests in East Asia in general or Northeast Asia in particular. Political and military stability has to be the primary interest. Without it, lesser interests become impossible to sustain.

The question for strategy, therefore, is, What’s the best way to maintain stability? The answer is indeed simple: Deal effectively with change on the Korean peninsula. This means keeping South Korea within the U.S. security orbit—both now and after reunification if it occurs. Sequence is critical. If the possibility of Korean reunification is treated as a second-priority issue, of less importance than strategic competition between Japan and China, or the resolution of the Taiwan issue, the U.S. position in the region could easily become unhinged. That would leave Washington with little power in a face-off between Japan and China. Moreover, that challenge is not urgent, not likely to emerge soon. It might even be prevented if things turn out favorably in Korea.

How might that be managed? The first step is to realize that the odds of an eventual breakdown of the North Korean regime are high. We have witnessed the collapse of the Soviet-type Communist regimes throughout the world, but not in North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. We have yet to witness a successful "transformation," that is, a "soft landing," of a Communist regime.

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China can also be included, but it never had the deep penetration of Soviet economic institutions that existed in most of the others. Moreover, the jury is still out on China. And North Korea's brittle structure is far more fragile than the Soviet Union's. Any reform efforts, or endeavors at a transformation to a "soft landing," therefore, are far more likely to catalyze a collapse.

Accordingly, contingency planning for a collapse in North Korea should have very high priority in Washington. South Korean leaders are so frightened of a North Korean collapse that they will not plan for it. The United States can, and should, plan for it at once, with Japan as its primary partner, and perhaps eventually engaging China and Russia as well.

The aim of the planning should be to end up, after reunification, with (1) U.S. forces still on the ground in Korea, and (2) no nuclear weapons in Korea. What would induce Seoul to accept this outcome? Two things:

1. The first is the establishment of a large U.S.-Japanese investment facility able to provide several hundreds of billions of dollars to Korea for reconstruction of the North after reunification. This should alleviate the fears of both the government and the business community in South Korea. The potential costs of a rapid reunification have scared them into believing that North Korea could be transformed through a "soft landing." It could not be. That is a delusion that South Koreans use to avoid the uncomfortable truth.

2. The second is Japan’s promise not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for Seoul's promise not to acquire them (and to give up North Korea's nuclear weapons if they fall into South Korea's hands).

Obviously, Japan would have to fully support this contingency deal. But the deal would have two huge advantages that should secure Tokyo's support. First, by keeping U.S. troops on the ground in Korea and preventing a nuclear-armed Korea, it would solve a major security problem for Japan. Second, the capital needed for reconstruction in North Korea would not be provided purely out of charity. It also could enable Japanese business to share in the longer-term prosperity of a reconstructed economy in Korea's north.

This deal is the only promising long-term solution to limiting nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. Contingency planning for it cries out for attention, and, even if the assumption that North Korea cannot transform proves wrong, it is far better to be prepared for its collapse than to fail to plan and be caught by surprise.

The next strategic objective has to be anticipating and moderating inchoate Japanese-Chinese competition. The preconditions of that are military stability on the Korean peninsula and avoidance of a crisis over Taiwan. Achieving them, however, is not enough. Openings to China should be offered, so that Beijing to can show that it, too, has a strong interest in regional stability.

46 This does not mean that the collapse of the Communist regime in Pyongyang necessarily will involve civil war and violence. All of the Warsaw Pact regimes—all of which were Communist—collapsed without violence. Only in Yugoslavia was there extensive violence. A political vacuum, however, would have to be filled there soon to prevent disorder.
How China will respond is anybody's guess, but we have seen some interesting trends in Chinese policy that are encouraging. As explained earlier, China has reversed its approach to U.S.-led international organizations such as the UN, the WTO, and the IMF. During the Cold War, it championed Third World countries in a common effort to oppose and destroy those organizations. Now it seeks to join them and participate in them for its own economic and security well-being. If it continues successfully on this path, it could do either of two things. First, it could try to dominate the region and counterbalance U.S. influence globally in the world. That would either destroy most of these organizations or render them ineffective in East Asia. Chinese economic development would hardly benefit from that outcome, but leaders don't always pursue their best interests. Second, China could find these organizations still useful and play a constructive role in them. That would have to include avoiding confrontations with Japan.

The aim for U.S. strategy, therefore, should be to avoid being lured into ambivalence about its security relations with Japan and Korea. Specifically, it should avoid another dramatic "changing partners" experience, like the one that took place after World War II, and it should leave China with positive incentives for entering a stable security relationship with the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

**The military requirements for the revised strategy**

**Preventing outbreak of hostilities**

Deployments to prevent the outbreak of hostilities are the first priority, and these are most probable in two places: in Korea, and across the Taiwan Strait.

**Korea**

Any reduction in U.S. forces in Korea would be very unwise; actually, there is a compelling argument for adding several artillery battalions. A fairly large ground force deployment is essential, not only for the possible outbreak of war on the peninsula but also to sustain close bilateral interactions with the Korean armed forces. Naval and air forces may contribute to those interactions, but they cannot substitute for U.S. Army interactions, which are critical to a combined U.S.-South Korean effective military defense. U.S. Army interactions are also essential for regional stability, as they reassure Japan, and perhaps China as well, of their safety from a Korean military aimed at Japan, or even China. Moreover, they are a guarantee against Seoul's proclivity for acquiring nuclear weapons, either by its own efforts or by inheriting them from North Korea. In other words, having a division or more of Army forces in Korea serves both to deter North Korea and to protect Japan and South Korea from one another.

The present single division in Korea would by no means be adequate in the event of a war. It might have been somewhat adequate in the 1980s, the last decade of the Cold War, but at best it never provided a margin for error. Reinforcements, therefore, must be available—and attention to reinforcements is also long overdue.

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If reunification takes place, the Army forces deployed in Korea must remain there. In that case, their mission will not be to defend against an attack from China or Russia; rather, it will be to reassure Korea and Japan of their safety from each other. Reinforcements may be reduced in that event, but we cannot know for sure in advance. We can know that any withdrawals from Korea would be extremely risky for years to come.

**The Taiwan Strait**

Army forces are unlikely to have an early role in the defense of Taiwan. Nor is a later reinforcement role all that probable, but contingency plans for it should be made. The U.S. Navy certainly has a role to play in dealing with a crisis between Taiwan and mainland China, but the technique of using high-altitude strategic bombers for tactical support of ground operations, pioneered in Afghanistan, has extraordinary potential for blocking a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, as well as for countering a Chinese bombardment of Taiwan with rockets or bombers. If U.S. strategic bombers are permitted to fly from Okinawa, they can sustain precision bombing over the strait and the Chinese coast at rates far above those of carrier battle groups—even of several carrier battle groups massed near Taiwan. Both the accuracy and tonnage of ordnance delivered by strategic bombers with GPS-guided and laser-guided bombs can greatly exceed what several carrier battle groups could deliver. Together, they could present an awesome obstacle to a Chinese attack, be it an invasion or some kind of punishing bombardment blow.

China’s awareness of this capability can have a strong stabilizing effect during and between crises. The U.S. Army would have little or no part in the mix of forces needed in the initial conflict; however, it should be available for a reinforcement role, in the event that heavy losses are suffered by Taiwanese ground forces. During a crisis over Taiwan, keeping the balance of military forces heavily in the favor of the United States and South Korea would become more important than ever. Thus, the Army's role, although a subsidiary one in Taiwan, is still an essential reinforcement capability.

**Overall observations**

We make two overall observations. First, the overall force requirements for the Korea and Taiwan Strait deployments are smaller than believed by many analysts, especially those who see China as the major rising threat to U.S. hegemony in the region and even the world. Conflicts may break out in several other places, but few, if any, could involve U.S. military forces early in the fighting.

Second, there is an assumption that Japan would allow U.S. bombers to operate from its soil in a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. A related point is the stability of U.S.-South Korean relations during such a crisis. In other words, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and the U.S.-South Korean alliance are both just as critical today as they were during the Cold War, although for different reasons.

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48 This now appears more probable in light of Japan's recently announced concern over Taiwan versus Japan. See footnote 42.
**U.S. governance in the region**

Deployments and operations required for maintaining regional supra-national political-military governance remain much the same today as during the Cold War. U.S. forces in Japan and Korea must reassure both countries of their safety from each other, and countries throughout East Asia and the Pacific Island states of their safety from Japan.

**Korea**

This governance role can be met in Korea by the same forces needed for the contingency of a war between the two Koreas. Even if South Korean forces became clearly able to meet such an attack alone, U.S. Army forces would remain as essential as before, precisely because of this governance mission.

**Japan**

For several decades, the governance mission in Japan has hinged mainly on U.S. Navy and Air Force deployments. Ever since U.S. Army forces left Hokkaido in the 1950s, there has been little or no operational interaction between the U.S. Army and the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). The commanders of the JGSDF have frequently voiced a strong desire for more interaction, but the Defense Department has dismissed their requests. The Japanese government has also been reluctant to push the case made by the JGSDF commanders.

The easiest way to deal with this deficiency in U.S.-Japanese military cooperation is to deploy a brigade or more in Hokkaido, where most Japanese ground forces train. A division headquarters would also be very useful there because the GSDF needs higher-level counterpart staff interactions, to improve interoperability. This need cannot be filled by staffs at the battalion, or even brigade, level.

Given the strategic mobility that C-17 aircraft can provide for heavy forces, including M-1 tanks, a brigade in Hokkaido could be moved fairly swiftly to any place in the Pacific, or its main combat elements could be flown from the Middle East. Putting a brigade in Japan, therefore, makes far more sense than stationing one in Alaska as is now scheduled for later this year. A brigade could do double duty in Japan—it could be prepared for several conflict contingencies beginning in Korea and extending throughout the region, and it could fill a dangerously neglected gap in U.S.-Japanese military operational cooperation. Given the tendency of Japanese ground force officers to embrace radical nationalist political views, it would be prudent for the U.S. Army, with its moderating effect, to establish closer ties with them. When officers of a small and limited army are allowed to participate with the most advanced army forces in the world, not only are they flattered and challenged, but they also tend to take a more cosmopolitan political outlook. Nothing is more important for Japanese officers, who are socialized in one of the most inward-looking countries in the world.
Other countries in East Asia

Stationing of Army forces in Southeast Asia, or in any of the Pacific Island states, is not essential, but cooperative military relations—e.g., combined exercises, exchange visits, and army-to-army conferences—remain important. They convey a sense of the U.S. military presence so essential to regional stability even now, after the Cold War. They are also essential to the overall U.S. political-military governance mission in East Asia.

Even small annual exercises with most of the countries of Pacific islands and a few in Southeast Asia are inexorably manpower intensive, especially for "combat service support" units. The 25th ID in Hawaii is hardly sufficient to meet such a schedule.

China

Although the U.S. military must plan for the possible military conflicts involving China, such conflicts are not inevitable. The fundamental change in Beijing's attitude toward U.S.-created international organizations, joining them instead of working to disrupt and destroy them, may also involve a willingness to participate in military exercises with U.S. forces and those of its allies in East Asia. I proposed this idea at the Chinese National Defense University in January 2004, suggesting four-way annual exercises involving U.S., Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese military units. One officer, a rather young general, said he found the idea positive and promising.

Obviously, a trilateral military security arrangement including U.S., Japanese, and South Korean armed forces would contribute to regional stability and facilitate U.S. command, control, and logistics. Three-way exercises could pave the way to long-term goals. Involving China as well would be yet another stabilizing step.

In both three-way and four-way exercises, army forces from all countries need to be included if they are to have more than symbolic significance. Naval and air exercises do not need to involve as much personal interaction between all levels of command as ground force exercises do. Years of ground force exercises in NATO were the vehicle for achieving real progress in interoperability. They moved ahead even when political consensus was lacking, and helped restore it. They could do the same in East Asia.

Special Operations Forces

The deployment of Special Forces teams to the Philippines has already increased the number of SOF dealing with terrorist groups in East Asia. Some Air Force and Navy units are also involved, but Army units play the key roles in counterterrorism operations.

The size of the forces needed for this mission is unlikely to be stable. At times, very few will be needed; at others, double or triple the number may be essential.

The support infrastructure, however, needs to be beefed up and maintained at a level capable of handling surges in deployments.
The combined training and exercises mentioned above can help maintain the support infrastructure for special operations.

Conclusion

It should now be clear why a much larger role for Army forces in East Asia is more essential than is generally recognized. Over the years since the Vietnam War, and especially since the end of the Cold War, pressures for reductions have dulled our understanding of both U.S. interests in East Asia and the military forces needed to secure them. Given the large maritime nature of much of the region, it is easy to drift back toward almost total dependence on naval and air forces. To design an effective regional strategy today, it is necessary to review of what U.S. interests have been and still are in East Asia, especially in Northeast Asia; and to review the different strategies the United States has used over the years—from the Korean War, through the Vietnam War, to the end of Cold War—to pursue normalization of relations with China. Those reviews expose a few elementary but too little recognized realities:

- We must realize the critical nature of change on the Korean peninsula, its possible consequences, and the urgency needed for contingency planning for a rapid reunification of Korea.

- North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is a symptom of, not the ill that threatens, Northeast Asian stability. Removing those weapons would not improve regional stability at all. In fact, the U.S. non-proliferation policy as applied to North Korea, combined with neglect of the larger regional dynamics, actually contributes to instability and increases the incentives for South Korea and Japan to seek nuclear weapons.

- The largest regional challenge over the longer run is Chinese-Japanese competition. U.S. strategy will have to deal with how the United States plays in competition, not how to cope with China as a rising superpower. Too much attention to the latter will end up complicating the former. Moreover, it could undermine the U.S.-Japanese security alliance, a bulwark for regional stability.

Once we recognize these realities, we can design more promising strategies for dealing with them. And the military requirements follow quite logically. As they do, one begins to see a much larger need for Army forces than has been recognized since the Vietnam War. Why? Mainly because one takes into account a military mission that has never been formally acknowledged for force requirements: the supra-national political-military governance role that U.S. military forces have always played there, especially in Northeast Asia.

Once that mission is fully recognized, it is not hard to see ways to head off a major U.S.-Chinese confrontation. If the U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-Korean alliances can be sustained intact with U.S. Army forces on the ground in both countries after Korea reunifies, the prospects of engaging China in cooperative security operations will improve.
But before the United States can design and implement a strategy that promises such desirable outcomes, the Department of State and Department of Defense will have to change the way they view East Asia. Within the Department of Defense, the traditional dominance of the Department of the Navy in the Pacific could prove an obstacle to implementing such a strategy. No less difficult may be changing the Department of the Army’s reluctance to accept the rather subjective concept of supra-national political-military governance as its mission.
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The U.S. Army in Asia—Challenges and Opportunities

U.S. Army forces in the Asia-Pacific region face three distinct challenges that either draw their origins from 9/11 and the global war on terror, or are complicated by the demands of the GWOT. These three are: fighting the war itself, making the Army’s modular conversion, and remaining engaged in the region while at war elsewhere. This paper will elaborate on those challenges and raise issues for consideration. Although the global war on terror has challenged the Army, and will continue to do so, it also presents some profound opportunities which, if properly exploited, could not only benefit the Army but also affect regional and global security. This paper’s focus, which is deliberately narrow, is on Active Army combat forces, including Army Special Forces, stationed in or aligned with the Asia-Pacific region.

The war on terror is not being actively fought in the Asia-Pacific region, but regional forces have been active participants and will likely continue to be so. Units, mostly brigade sized, from the 2nd Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, and the 172nd Infantry Brigade, have served and are serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, and, according to Army planning documents, will continue to do so. While units from the 25th and 172nd were accorded little fanfare upon their departure for their year-long tours of duty, the deployment of the 2nd Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team from Korea to Iraq in August 2004 received a great deal of attention. One concern was that two of the 2nd’s three ground combat brigades were now committed to Iraq and unavailable for operations in Korea should a military crisis arise. Another issue raised was that by committing the "untouchable" 2nd Division, along with opposing forces from the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, and an infantry company from the Old Guard, to the war on terror, that the Army had reached rock bottom in terms of its active-duty force pool. Also, although not widely publicized, the Army has about 200 soldiers deployed to the Philippines—most likely from the Fort Lewis and Okinawa-based 1st Special Forces Group—training Filipino forces in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations as a part of the global war on terror.

The obvious issue is that these deployed forces are unavailable to respond to situations in the Asia-Pacific region. I won’t belabor this point, because our national political and military leadership likely assessed the risk in the region as low—not unlike when 7th Corps was sent from Germany to participate in Desert Storm—but the point remains that if the prognosticators are wrong, someone will have to backfill these units. Given the current deployment profile, that might be a tall order to fill. While fighting our nation’s wars is the Army’s primary mission, one

can only speculate what roles units from the 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions might have played in tsunami relief had they been available.

But this issue also has a benefit, which, in the opinion of many, outweighs the risk. By participating in "out-of-theater operations," U.S. Pacific Command will have its major ground forces "blooded" or combat tested in extended combat—something that has not happened since the Vietnam War. While this is not something that the Pentagon will likely advertise, the Army will reap the benefits of having combat veterans, particularly among the junior NCO and officer corps. This benefit will extend beyond the units into the institutional army as these soldiers become drill instructors, small group leaders in professional development schools, and ROTC or West Point instructors. Many hope this infusion of combat-experienced leaders will provide a combat focus in terms of training and equipping the Army so that precious time and resources are optimized. But there is also a challenge associated with this windfall: that of retaining and growing these junior combat leaders—particularly those with families—with repeated extended deployments.

Although the war on terror’s main focus is in Afghanistan and Iraq, let’s not forget about the Philippines. The Philippines is threatened by three Islamic-based terrorist groups, with one in particular—the Abu Sayyaf Group—reportedly having ties to Al Qaeda. The Army reportedly has about 200 soldiers in the Philippines, largely from the 1st Special Forces Group, involved in a variety of training and advisory roles. Although the Filipino constitution prohibits foreign armed forces from participating in combat operations, the 1st Special Forces Group is credited with "significantly improving the operational capability of more than 10 infantry battalions" in the Philippine Armed Forces, which will contribute to regional security. Although not combat experience per se, the experience gained by the 1st Special Forces is just as valuable. Many experts suggest that these special forces’ training and advisory missions—such as this operation and similar ones in Colombia, Georgia (Gruzia), and Africa—are not only valuable tools in the war on terror but also the most likely form of operation in the future. These operations have relatively low visibility, and, because they are not resource-intensive, they can be sustained over a long period of time. The drawback is that an increase in the number of these missions will put additional strains on special forces, despite efforts to use conventional Army units and the Marines in a similar role.

The global war on terror also involves the armies of our regional allies, which also has implications for our Army as well. Japan and South Korea have ground forces in Iraq working with the coalition, and Australia has provided forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Philippines, Thailand, and New Zealand have also provided forces in Iraq, but have now withdrawn their troops. While the numbers of troops from any country range from a couple of thousand to fewer than a hundred, their involvement is militarily significant for two reasons. The first is simply economy of force—for every Allied soldier deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, one fewer U.S. soldier has to be deployed to the region. While this is probably overstated in terms of

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a one-to-one exchange ratio, it still amounts to a savings in U.S. troops, for which the Army is likely thankful. The second reason is that our regional allies will also gain combat or peacekeeping experience that will benefit their armies as much as it will benefit ours. During peacetime, we may exercise with our allies for a week or two once a year but their participation in Afghanistan and Iraq permits us to work with them for months on end. That not only will permit us to forge better working relationships with them and better understand how they conduct operations, but also will give us the opportunity to gauge their effectiveness in a hostile and demanding environment. Another possible benefit is that our regional allies will gain valuable experience in conducting expeditionary operations. Deploying and sustaining their forces for extended periods of time in a non-permissive environment will undoubtedly challenge these countries, and could lead to changes which could improve their ability to participate in similar operations in the future.

In what the Army describes as the "most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years," it intends to redesign its current force of 10 active-duty divisions into a 43- or 48-brigade-level "unit of action," or UA, force by FY 2007. U.S. Army Pacific forces will begin their conversion this year. The Fort Lewis based I Corps will be redesigned into what is currently called a UEx—which is essentially a division-level headquarters.\(^\text{52}\) Reportedly, the Army hopes to station up to one thousand I Corps officers and soldiers to Camp Zama in Japan, although, theoretically, the I Corps based UEx could be deployed anywhere in the world to command up to six UAs plus supporting forces.\(^\text{53}\) While not specifically aligned with the Pacific, the Fort Polk based 2\(^{nd}\) Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) will add an additional 3,900 soldiers, move to Fort Lewis, and convert to the Army’s fourth Stryker Brigade Combat Team.\(^\text{54}\) The 2\(^{nd}\) Ranger Battalion and 1\(^{st}\) Special Forces Group are expected to remain home-stationed at Fort Lewis.

The 25\(^{th}\) Infantry Division is scheduled to stand up the division’s fourth unit of action—with an airborne capability for forced-entry operations—at Fort Richardson, Alaska, in FY 2005.\(^\text{55}\) Also, at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, the 172\(^{nd}\) Separate Infantry Brigade will continue its transformation to the third Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the 172\(^{nd}\) is currently scheduled to deploy to Iraq in early August 2005.\(^\text{56}\)

FY 2006 not only will bring major additional modularity changes to the U.S. Army’s Pacific-aligned forces but also will have major reorganization implications for the 2\(^{nd}\) Infantry Division. The 25\(^{th}\) Infantry Division headquarters is scheduled to convert to a UEx in FY 2006. The division’s current 3\(^{rd}\) Brigade will become the 25th’s first UA Brigade Combat Team.\(^\text{57}\) The 25th’s third UA Brigade Combat Team will be stood up at Fort Benning, and the 4th UA Brigade Combat Team will be stood up at Fort Riley. In FY 2006, based on experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more than likely budgetary considerations, the Army will decide whether to

\(^{52}\) U.S. Army Senior Leadership Briefing, "Where We Are/Where We Are Going: (Current/Future Force Direction)," General Dick Cody, U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff, October 21, 2004.
\(^{55}\) Ibid.
\(^{56}\) "OIF and OEF Ground Force Rotation Plan," Army Congressional Liaison Office, as of January 13, 2005.
\(^{57}\) Cox, "Army Announces Locations."
build five additional units of action—two of which would be 2nd Infantry Division brigades. Apart from this decision, the Army plans to convert the 2nd Infantry Division headquarters to a UEx structure and field the fifth Stryker Brigade Combat Team to the 25th Infantry Division in FY 07.

In terms of infantry brigades aligned with Pacific-based forces, modularization could possibly add five brigades by 2007.

These changes are significant in a number of ways, the most fundamental of which is to the units themselves. Army units in the Asia-Pacific region transitioning to modular design will have the benefit of learning from those that have gone before them—the 3rd Infantry, the 10th Mountain Division, and the 101st Airborne Division—which converted to the modular design in FY 04 and FY 05. Lessons learned from these units should provide valuable insight to Pacific forces as they undergo this process. The transition to UAs and UExs will not be without challenges, however. Discussions in 2004 with Army officials involved with modularization suggest that there will be a number of equipment shortages, particularly in the UAs that are not being formed from existing infantry and armor brigades.\(^{58}\) These potential shortages include:

- Wheeled vehicles of all classes, ranging from HMMWVs to larger-capacity trucks
- Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
- Command, control, and communication equipment
- M-2 and M-3 Bradleys for armored UAs.

Exacerbating these potential shortages is the impact of combat losses and damaged and worn-out equipment, primarily attributed to operations in Iraq. While combat losses are likely classified, a number of reports suggest that the Army’s vehicles are being driven thousands of miles more than they were designed to be driven and that Army depots are being confronted with “four to five times more equipment wear than anticipated.”\(^{59}\) Necessary force protection measures—such as adding armor to HMMWVs, which were not designed to carry the extra 1,000 pounds or so—will also likely aggravate this situation.\(^{60}\) These reports also maintain that the demands of maintaining and repairing equipment needed in Iraq and Afghanistan are degrading the Army depots’ ability to provide equipment for modularization.\(^{61}\) This being the case, it seems reasonable to assume that Army units in the Pacific region will be challenged with a variety of equipment shortages as they transform to the modular design.

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There also is evidence to suggest that the Army may confront selected personnel shortages in its modular units. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, General Richard Cody, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, stated that Army planners had estimated that they would require an additional 9,000 specialists to man the Army’s new Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition units and its new UAV units—both critical units found in armored and infantry UAs as well as SBCTs. There also may be shortages in the officer corps: An internal Army memorandum in 2004 reported, "The Army is short approximately 30% of its infantry officers in the grades of branch-qualified captains and above because of rapid transformation and expansion." Another recent report stated that the 4th Infantry Division will pull 29 officers out of Command and General Staff College to fill out the division before it deploys to Iraq. And recent reports concerning female soldiers in UA Forward Support Companies (FSCs), although focused on the women-in-combat issue, have said that there are "insufficient male soldiers in the inventory to fill forward support companies" and that “the pool of available male recruits may be too small to sustain the force.” While these three items may not be truly indicative of personnel shortages that might confront units converting to a UA structure, they do at least suggest that there may be some difficulties in manning UAs as intended, and that these personnel challenges will likely impact Army units in the Pacific as they convert to modular structures.

Aside from the units themselves, modularity has the potential to change the strategic complexion of the Asia-Pacific region. According to current plans, four of out of five active-duty Stryker Brigade Combat Teams will have ties to Pacific-based units. Although in theory, Stryker brigades and units of action are not tied to any UE and are not theater specific, the fact that at least three of these brigades will be based in the Pacific region would make them well-positioned and logical choices to respond to regional events. Also, as previously noted, the 25th Infantry Division will stand up an airborne unit of action at Fort Richardson, Alaska, and, along with the Fort Lewis based 2nd Ranger Battalion, the region will host a fairly significant forced-entry capability. These changes, along with planned additional units of action in the 25th Infantry Division and possibly the 2nd Infantry Division in 2007, represent an increase not only in terms of number of forces but also in terms of force capabilities. Some believe that these increases in numbers and capabilities offset the ongoing reduction of U.S. ground forces in Korea.

If fighting and winning the nation’s wars is the Army’s primary mission, preventing them is probably a close second. Most experts maintain that engagement—primarily through training exercises, military education and exchange programs, and conferences—is a highly effective tool in helping to keep the peace. With most of the world’s attention squarely focused on the Middle East at the moment, some people have begun to take renewed interest in the Asia-Pacific region.

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63 From the Infantry Senior Leader Update given by LTC Lee Fetterman, U.S. Army Infantry Branch Assignments Office, June 2004.
perhaps due in part to the recent tragic tsunami. Some speculate that the United States, Australia, Japan, and India—characterized as the four big Pacific democracies—will emerge as this century’s premiere alliance.\textsuperscript{66} One of the major reasons for this anticipated shift is Asia’s growing economic power, which will translate into greater political and military power.\textsuperscript{67} While China is touted as the region’s rising economic power, India and other Asian states reportedly maintain economic growth rates “that could outstrip those in major Western countries for decades to come.”\textsuperscript{68} Given current and future anticipated economic conditions in Europe, as well as strained ties between the United States and a number of European countries, it seems reasonable to assume that the United States could give increasingly more attention and resources to the Pacific.

The strategic realignment of U.S. forces has been characterized as “opening a second front in Asia,”\textsuperscript{69} largely due to the increased number of units that the Army plans to station in and around the Pacific region, as well as the possible establishment of some small operating bases in Central Asia. While specifics are not publicly available, these forward operating bases would likely be manned by Army units on either a rotational or short tour basis. While these operating bases were or are being established to support the war on terror, some analysts suspect that another intention—particularly in view of the renewed and intensified U.S. military cooperation with India—is the indirect containment of China.\textsuperscript{70} While the United States may be laying the groundwork to mitigate China’s military influence in the region, we are also beginning efforts to re-engage with China on a military-to-military level. U.S. and Chinese officials held talks in late January–early February of this year, hoping to restart military visits and other activities that were suspended in 2001 when a Chinese fighter collided with a U.S. Navy surveillance plane.\textsuperscript{71}

A number of reports suggest that the United States is actively pursuing a long-term defense alliance with India, primarily as a means to contain Chinese expansion, particularly in the Indian Ocean region.\textsuperscript{72} The United States and India supposedly share a similar view that China poses a strategic threat, and U.S. officials view engagement with India as a “future investment” should the region become hostile, noting that India’s military would be capable of assisting the U.S. military in the event of a Chinese threat.\textsuperscript{73}

The U.S. Army participates in a number of exercises and security cooperation events with India each year. On December 9, 2004, the U.S. and Indian armies signed a two-year exercise plan for military exercises in FY 2005 and FY 2006, consisting of a various combined exercises, exchanges between subject matter experts, and seminars.\textsuperscript{26} The United States and India agreed to continue their annual platoon-level exercises, held in both India and the United States, as well as a series of security cooperation activities on aviation, military medicine, and logistics. In order to further develop military relations and interoperability between the two countries, platoon-level

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
exercises should be expanded at some point to higher echelons such as brigade, division, or corps, but such an expansion may not be politically feasible.

The United States is also actively pursuing a diplomatic and military relationship with Pakistan—a country that has fought three wars with India since 1971, with the two nuclear-armed nations almost going to war in 2002 over Kashmir. Although India and Pakistan have made some peaceful overtures in the past couple of years, there is still a great deal of tension between the two heavily armed countries. Some speculate that the United States does not wish to antagonize Pakistan with large-scale U.S./Indian military exercises, and that exercises between the two countries are kept at the small-unit level for that reason. Another possible reason is that large-scale exercises might also antagonize the Chinese—keeping in mind that India fought a border war with China in 1962. A challenge for both the U.S. military and the Army will be to develop relations with the Indian Army, most likely through a series of small-unit exercises, that will enable the two militaries to successfully function together at all echelons in a variety of operational settings without exacerbating regional political tensions.

The U.S. Army’s longstanding relationship with Japan may also face new challenges and opportunities—driven somewhat by the global war on terror, but primarily by perceived national security threats from China and North Korea. Experts maintain that the U.S.-Japanese alliance is in a new stage of its evolution. Japan’s commitment of 800 troops for humanitarian purposes in 2004 marked a watershed event: it was Japan’s largest deployment of its forces into a combat zone since the end of World War II. Japan and the United States have an extensive history of training exercises, and a joint drill on the island of Hokkaido, which involved about 4,300 Japanese troops and about 1,500 U.S. troops, including elements from the 1st U.S. Corps, ended in early February. It is not clear what direction Japan’s new security policy will take, but Japan will likely proceed cautiously, to avoid accusations of renewed militarism in the region. Engagement and training with the U.S. Army will likely continue to focus on defensive and peacekeeping operations as well as missile defense exercises and training. Some also suggest that U.S. Special Operations Forces may work with Japan in the area of counterterrorism as Japan continues to enhance that capability of its military.

Australia has been described by as some as "second only to Great Britain" in its support for the United States and the global war on terrorism. Australia has committed ground forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and recently announced that it will send an additional 450 troops to Iraq, to assist Japanese troops—who are constitutionally barred from taking part in combat except in self-defense—with security in southern Iraq. Australia has also offered to expand military exercises in Australia with the United States, and some have suggested the possibility of establishing a training center in Australia or even a small U.S. forward operating base for U.S. Army forces. On June 1, 2003, Australian Defense Minister Robert Hill reportedly announced

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78 Hugh J. White, Mr. Howard, p. 2.
that Australia would increase joint exercises with U.S. forces, allowing them to conduct independent training exercises in Australia. It is not readily apparent whether joint exercises with Australia have been increased or whether the United States has an interest in establishing a base or a training center in Australia, but many experts maintain that it is in the best interest of the United States to aggressively pursue expanded military ties with Australia.

In the not-too-distant future, the Army may also find itself involved in renewed military training with Indonesia. Training was suspended in 1992 after Indonesian forces began to employ brutal tactics to quell an independence movement in East Timor. Secretary of State Rice recently announced the resumption of the International Military Education Training (IMET) Program for Indonesia, reportedly stating that Indonesia had "satisfied legislative conditions," thus permitting the resumption of training. Although this program involves training only a few selected Indonesian officers in the United States, it is seen by many as an important first step in expanding military engagement with the Indonesian military. Such efforts will likely receive a great deal of attention from the administration, which has reportedly pushed hard to broaden counterterrorism cooperation with Indonesia—the world’s most populous Muslim nation, and home to a number of militant Islamic groups.

Engagement in the Pacific region will likely expand not only in terms of scope but also in terms of level of effort. The United States Army Pacific conducts a wide variety of activities under its Theater Security Cooperation program (TSCP), including almost 35 joint, combined command post and field training exercises with Asia-Pacific armies annually. The recent tsunami tragedy underscored the value of engagement in the region. Some have credited the U.S. military’s rapid response to December’s disaster to the ties that have been cultivated over the past decade with the region’s various military forces. One example cited was the noticeable ease in which the U.S. and Thai militaries coordinated tsunami relief efforts, which was attributed to familiarity gained through IMET as well as long-established joint exercises such as Cobra Gold. Engagement has also directly affected the global war on terror. Former Commanding General of the U.S. Army Pacific, Lieutenant General James Campbell noted that it was “no coincidence that many of our Asia-Pacific partners are making significant contributions to the efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq,” in terms of both troops and other forms of support.

Engagement in the Asia-Pacific region will present the Army with both challenges and opportunities. The primary challenge will be maintaining, if not increasing, joint military activities and exercises not only with our traditional partners but also with other nations in the

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79 Ibid, p.8
82 Matt Pottinger and Barry Wain, “U.S. Military Ties to Region Allowed Faster Response,” Asian Wall Street Journal, January 10, 2005
region while fighting a war and restructuring forces into the modular configuration. Trying to accomplish all of this could further strain the units; however, although the natural tendency might be to reduce or limit military activities and training with our allies, many feel that it is critical for regional engagement to continue, if not expand. Supporters argue that engagement is one of the most effective means not only of shaping the regional security environment but also of establishing vital and lasting military-to-military relationships with both allies and countries such as China that might oppose us in the future. Military engagement with non-allied countries offers the opportunity for all involved to gain insights and develop relationships which that could help diffuse tensions during critical periods. A history of such engagement could potentially persuade countries to abstain from military actions in favor of less destructive means of settling differences.

Seeing what the Army is trying to accomplish in the midst of a demanding, multi-front, protracted war, one could think that the institution has "bitten off more than it can chew." Some might suggest that a more prudent course would be to focus solely on fighting and ending this war as quickly as possible, saving the major changes and new initiatives for later. While this position has merit, many others suggest that it considers only the war on terror while ignoring other potential security challenges, which, if addressed now, might be reduced in the future. The Asia-Pacific region is arguably an area with vast future security implications that should be addressed now and not deferred because of the demands of the war on terror. To the Army’s credit, many believe that it is doing a commendable job in fighting the war on terror, reconfiguring and repositioning itself, and remaining engaged worldwide. During this challenging period in which greater demands are being placed on it daily, the Army should not overlook or shortchange potential opportunities—particularly in terms of engagement, which could pay significant dividends in the future.
Scenarios Involving U.S. Ground Forces in Asia in the Coming Decade

Looking five to ten years in the future, one can envision several types of military scenarios in Asia that could involve large numbers of U.S. ground forces. A war with China over Taiwan would probably not make heavy use of American armies; some scenarios, such as a Chinese invasion of Siberia, would probably not be of sufficient strategic importance to the United States to justify intervention; others, such as a direct Chinese overland attack on Korea, seem sufficiently unlikely as not to warrant major emphasis. But even if all such cases are considered implausible, at least three important examples remain: the time-tested case of war pitting South Korea against the North, nuclear-related crises in South Asia (of at least two main types), and a stabilization mission in a country such as Indonesia. Each is considered in turn below.

War and occupation in Korea?

Many at the Pentagon have long believed that a surprise North Korean attack on South Korea could achieve important successes, quite possibly including the capture of Seoul, before U.S. reinforcements could arrive in sufficient numbers to work with surviving ROK troops to stop and then reverse the onslaught. But given continued improvements in South Korean and U.S. capabilities, together with gradual atrophy of the DPRK military, allied prospects for successfully defending ROK territory appear rather good today—and are likely to remain good in the future.

Still, the United States cannot neglect Korea in its war planning and force structure analysis. An escalating crisis over nuclear weapons could lead to war. That could happen if the United States and its allies grow acutely worried that North Korea might sell nuclear materials abroad, or if they decide that Pyongyang must be prevented from developing a large nuclear arsenal. It could also happen if North Korea miscalculates the new leverage that its nuclear capabilities afford it and pushes brinkmanship too far.\footnote{Reportedly, Pentagon models estimate about 50,000 U.S. and 500,000 South Korean military casualties during the first three months of war. See Don Oberdorfer, "A Minute to Midnight," \textit{Newsweek}, October 20, 1997, p. 18.}

This leads to two pertinent questions:

- A war on the peninsula could lead to many hundreds of thousands of military and civilian casualties. But might it be won more quickly and decisively, using innovative war plans and new technologies?
- U.S. forces needed for the defense and ultimate liberation of the ROK have been estimated by Pentagon planners at roughly six ground combat divisions, including Marine and Army units, ten wings of Air Force aircraft, and four to five Navy aircraft carrier
battle groups—altogether totaling at least half a million Americans under arms. Are these estimates still valid?86

First, a word of background. Although U.S. defense reviews in the 1990s lumped Korea with Southwest Asia conceptually, the peninsula is much more like a cross between the former intra-German border and Bosnia than like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or southern Iraq. That image applies to both the nature of the terrain and the nature of the fighting forces deployed in the vicinity. Indeed, the Korean peninsula remains the most densely militarized region on Earth. North Korean forces of about 1 million (with a defense budget that may exceed 25 percent of GDP and even approach 40 percent) face off against combined allied forces of about 600,000.87 Tens of thousands of pieces of heavy equipment are deployed as well—some two-thirds of the total are within several tens of kilometers of the DMZ. The Korean peninsula as a whole is roughly 250 kilometers wide at its waist and about 1,000 kilometers long. It is characterized by very hilly topography; the flat land that does exist largely comprises marshes and rice fields.

Korea's central region is also one of the most heavily militarized zones in human history. Significantly more than 1 million troops and 20,000 armored vehicles or artillery pieces, as well as more than 1 million landmines, abundant chemical weapons, and fortified defensive positions, are found between Pyongyang and Seoul. (The 4-km-wide DMZ is roughly 40 kilometers from Seoul and about 125 kilometers from Pyongyang.) Forces in Korea are more densely concentrated than Warsaw Pact and NATO units were in Central Europe during the Cold War. For North Korea, in fact, roughly 65 percent of its total units and up to 80 percent of its estimated aggregate firepower are within 100 kilometers of the DMZ, significantly greater percentages than in the 1980s.88

In the (relatively) flat western part of the peninsula near Seoul, there are only two main natural axes of potential attack. Known as the Chorwon and Munsan corridors, they each are about 15 kilometers wide in some places, and branch out and interconnect in others. Another three to four attack corridors could be imagined in the central and eastern parts of the country, given the

88 On the comparison with Europe, see, for example, Fran Lussier, U.S. Ground Forces and the Conventional Balance in Europe (Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, June 1988), pp. 7-28, 91-99. About one-fourth of the total NATO and Warsaw Pact forces were either deployed in the Germany-Poland-Czechoslovakia area or immediately deployable to that zone using prepositioned stocks. That made for a total of roughly 2.5 million troops and 60,000 armored vehicles in a zone with a front three times the length of the Korean DMZ—similar numbers, per kilometer of front, to what prevails near the DMZ. But forces in the Germanys, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were based as far away as 200 to 300 kilometers from the intra-German border, whereas most of those in the Koreas are within roughly 100 kilometers of the front. See also James C. Wendt, "U.S. Conventional Arms Control for Korea: A Proposed Approach," RAND Note (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993), p. 14; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 313; and the Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength, Update 1995 (Washington, DC: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, March 1996), p. 13.
existing road networks and terrain, although the Sea of Japan (known in Korea as the East Sea) coastal route would be the most accessible to vehicles.  

North Korea would probably begin any war with a massive artillery barrage of South Korean and U.S. positions below the DMZ; likely, it would target Seoul itself. Chemical weapons might well be used. Infantry and mechanized forces would then try to take advantage of the carnage and chaos to penetrate U.S.-ROK defenses and reach Seoul quickly. They would be aided by about 100,000 Special Forces, some predeployed into South Korea if possible, which would move by tunnels, small planes, mini-submarines, and more conventional means. North Korea would probably try to catch the allies by surprise, profit from cloud cover that would reduce (somewhat) the effectiveness of U.S. airpower, and seize Seoul before U.S. reinforcements (or South Korean reserve soldiers) could arrive en masse. It then might try to take the rest of the peninsula. Or, perhaps more likely, given its limited capabilities for long-range mechanized movement, it might try to use Seoul as a “hostage” in order to negotiate favorable surrender terms.

With this background in mind, do the United States and South Korea have a realistic capability to wage a decisive offensive war against North Korea? And what forces would be needed if war should occur?

A preemptive use of force by the ROK and the United States seems very unlikely. Even though there may be ways to win a war in Korea more quickly than commonly expected, the carnage would likely be great during whatever period of time the war endured.

There are several reasons for this. First, so many North Korean weapons are near Seoul (many in protected locations) that even a well-timed surprise attack could not prevent thousands of explosive rounds launched by artillery tube or missile from landing in Seoul.

Second, many North Korean military and political headquarters are deep underground, making it hard to attack them even with a “shock and awe” type of air campaign. Compared to Iraq, U.S. Special Forces would also have a harder time infiltrating into North Korea and locating such sites for aerial attack, given the degree to which the country is cut off from outsiders.

Third, terrain in Korea is difficult and complex. There is no easy axis of approach to Pyongyang similar to the open desert used by coalition forces to race to Baghdad in March and April 2003.

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91 As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, North Korea has about 500 artillery tubes within range of Seoul. Each could fire one or more rounds a minute at the South Korean capital over an extended period of time. Unless their locations were virtually all known in advance, permitting preemptive attack against these sites, U.S. and ROK forces would be able to destroy them only after observing the trajectories of shells launched by these artillery tubes and then firing weapons at them. Even in a best case for coalition forces, a typical North Korean weapon would be able to fire several shots before being destroyed.
Among its other implications, this means that the enemy’s harassment of supply lines, like that which coalition forces faced at a few specific sites in Operation Iraqi Freedom, could be a much more pervasive problem in any invasion of North Korea.

Fourth, North Korea’s military, with total active-duty strength over (or at least near) one million, is much larger than Iraq’s. Moreover, three-fourths of Iraq’s troops were believed unlikely to fight hard before the war began; few make a similar assumption about North Korea’s military.\(^{92}\)

Fifth, North Korean troops are believed to be even more thoroughly indoctrinated by their leadership, and hence more dedicated to their nation’s defense, than were Saddam’s forces. Reportedly many North Koreans made it their first priority to salvage pictures of the Dear Leader—whether out of loyalty or fear—when a train explosion in the spring of 2004 caused huge damage and many casualties in a northwestern DPRK city. Indeed, most North Korean soldiers would probably be more dependable, and fiercer in battle, than were most of Saddam’s elite units, such as his Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, presidential guards, and Fedayeen Saddam (“Men of Sacrifice”). Similar conclusions follow for North Korea’s top military and political leadership, which would probably fight on even if somehow Kim Jong Il were targeted and killed in a “decapitation attack” of the type attempted against Saddam Hussein at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom.\(^{93}\) It is for these reasons that war simulations, even if inexact, predict hundreds of thousands of deaths in any future Korean war regardless of how it might start. The simulations are probably exaggerations of likely casualties—but by a factor of 2 or 3, not 10 or 20.

The last two arguments in particular have another set of implications. They mean that, in all likelihood, winning decisively in Korea would require hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in addition to the large ROK armed forces. It is worth reexamining the details of the war plan more rigorously than is possible here; however, a first-blush assessment suggests that existing force requirements may not be far off. Fortunately, in Korea any invasion would be followed by an occupation that the South Koreans could probably handle largely on their own (unlike the situation in Iraq). But that invasion phase itself could be difficult—and it would be very important to keep it as short as possible, given the astronomically large numbers of casualties that would accumulate with each added day of fighting. The Pentagon’s official estimate that at least half a million military personnel could be needed for such a war could be too conservative. But if the overall Iraq experience is any guide, its conservatism is probably best estimated as being in the range of 10 to 20 percent in excess manpower—and not 50 percent or more, as proponents of defense revolution and transformation tend to argue for conflict scenarios such as this.

**Preventing nuclear catastrophe in South Asia**

Of all the military scenarios that would undoubtedly involve the vital interests of the United States short of a direct threat to its territory, a collapsed Pakistan ranks very high on the list. The combination of Islamic extremists and nuclear weapons in that country is extremely worrisome;

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\(^{93}\) Such ideas have reportedly been investigated in regard to Korea (and Pyongyang surely has figured that out); see Thom Shanker, “Lessons from Iraq Include How to Scare North Korean Leader,” *New York Times*, May 12, 2003.
if parts of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal should ever to fall into the wrong hands, al Qaeda could conceivably gain access to a nuclear device with terrifying possible results. Another quite worrisome South Asia scenario could involve another Indo-Pakistani crisis leading to war between the two nuclear-armed states over Kashmir.  

The Pakistani collapse scenario appears unlikely, given that country’s relatively pro-Western and secular officer corps. But the intelligence services, which created the Taliban and have condoned (if not abetted) Islamic extremists in Kashmir, are less dependable. The attempts to assassinate President Mubarak, as well as other evidence, have made it clear that the country as a whole is so heavily infiltrated by fundamentalist that this terrifying scenario of civil chaos cannot be entirely dismissed.

Were it to occur, it is unclear what the United States and like-minded states would or should do. It is very unlikely that “surgical strikes” could be conducted to destroy the nuclear weapons before extremists could make a grab for them. It is doubtful that the United States would know their location, and at least as doubtful that any Pakistani government would countenance such a move, even under duress.

If a surgical strike, a series of surgical strikes, or commando-style raids were not possible, the only option might be to try to restore order before the weapons could be taken by extremists and transferred to terrorists. For example, the United States and other outside powers might respond to a request by the Pakistani government to help restore order. But given the embarrassment associated with asking for such outside help, the request might not be made until it was almost too late—complicating the task of helping Pakistan restore order before nuclear arsenals could be threatened. Hence such an operation would be an extremely demanding challenge, but there might be few options other than to attempt it. The international community, if it could act fast enough, might help defeat an insurrection. Or it might help protect Pakistan’s borders, making it hard to sneak nuclear weapons out of the country, while providing only technical support to the Pakistani armed forces as they tried to put down the insurrection. All that is sure is that, given the enormous stakes, the United States would literally have to do anything it could to prevent nuclear weapons from getting into the wrong hands.

Should stabilization efforts be required, the scale of the undertaking could be breathtaking. Pakistan is a very large country. Its population is just under 150 million, or six times that of Iraq. Its land area is roughly twice that of Iraq; its perimeter is about 50 percent longer in total. Stabilizing a country of this size could easily require several times as many troops as the Iraq mission—with a figure of up to a million being plausible.

Of course, any international force would have help. Presumably some fraction of Pakistan’s security forces would remain intact, able, and willing to help defend their country. Pakistan’s military comprises 550,000 army troops, 70,000 uniformed personnel in the air force and navy.

96 See International Crisis Group, Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism (Brussels, 2004).
another 510,000 reservists, and almost 300,000 gendarmes and interior ministry troops. But if some substantial fraction of the military, say a quarter to a third, broke off from the main body and was assisted by extremist militias, it is quite possible that the international community would need to deploy 100,000 to 200,000 troops to ensure the quick restoration of order. Given the need for rapid response, the U.S. share of this total would probably be a majority fraction, or quite possibly 50,000 to 100,000 ground forces.

What about the scenario of a war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir? It is highly doubtful that the United States would ever wish to actively take sides in such a conflict, allying with one country to defeat the other. Its interests in the matter of who controls Kashmir are not great enough to justify such intervention; no formal alliance commitments oblige it to step in. Moreover, the military difficulty of the operation would be extreme, in light of the huge armed forces arrayed on the subcontinent and the inland location and complex topography of Kashmir. In addition to the numbers cited above for Pakistan, India’s armed forces number 1.3 million active-duty troops, and feature such assets as 4,000 tanks, 19 submarines, and about 750 combat aircraft (the defense budgets of Pakistan and India are $2.5 billion and $13 billion, respectively).

However, there are other ways in which foreign forces might become involved. If India and Pakistan went up to the verge of nuclear weapons use, or perhaps even crossed it, they might consider what was previously unthinkable to New Delhi in particular—pleading to the international community for help. For example, akin to the Palestine trusteeship idea outlined above, they might agree to allow the international community to run Kashmir for a period of years. After local government was built up, and security services reformed, elections might then be held to determine the region’s future political affiliation, leading to an eventual end to the trusteeship. While this scenario is admittedly a highly demanding one, and also unlikely in light of India’s adamant objections to international involvement in the Kashmir issue, it is hard to dismiss such an approach out of hand if it seemed the only alternative to nuclear war on the subcontinent. Not only could such a war have horrendous human consequences—killing many tens of millions—and shatter the tradition of nuclear non-use that is so essential to global stability today. It could also lead to the collapse of Pakistan, and thus the same types of worries about that country’s nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands that are discussed above.

What might a stabilization mission in Kashmir entail? The region is about twice the size of Bosnia in population, half the size of Iraq in population and land area. That suggests a need for initial stabilization forces in the general range of 100,000, with the U.S. contribution being perhaps 30,000 to 50,000. The mission would make sense only if India and Pakistan truly blessed it, so there would be little point in deploying a force large enough to hold its own against a concerted attack by one of those countries. Even so, the mission would call for robust monitoring of border regions, as well as capable counterinsurgent/counterterrorist strike forces.

98 Ibid., pp. 136-137, 337.
Stabilizing a large country such as Indonesia

Consider the possibility of severe unrest in one of the world’s large countries such as Indonesia. At present, such a problem is generally seen as being of secondary strategic importance to the United States. This means that Washington may support and help fund a peacekeeping mission under some circumstances but will rarely commit troops—and certainly will not deploy a muscular forcible intervention capability.

However, under some circumstances this situation could change. For example, if al Qaeda developed a major stronghold in a given large country, the United States might—depending on circumstances—consider overthrowing the country’s government or helping the government reclaim control over the part of its territory occupied by the terrorists. Or it might intervene to help one side in a civil war against another. For example, if the schism between the police and armed forces in Indonesia worsened, and one of the two institutions wound up working with an al Qaeda offshoot, the United States might accept an invitation from the responsible half of the government to help defeat the other and the terrorist organization in question. Or if a terrorist organization was tolerated in Indonesia, the United States might strike at it directly. That could be the case if the terrorist group took control of land near a major shipping lane in the Indonesian Strait, or even if it simply decided to use part of Indonesia for sanctuary.

Clearly, the requirement for foreign forces would be a function of how much of the country in question became unstable, how intact indigenous forces remained, and how large any militia or insurgent force proved to be. For illustrative purposes, if a large fraction of Indonesia were to become ungovernable, the problem could be two to three times the scale of the Iraq mission.

General guidelines for force planning for such scenarios would suggest a foreign troop strength of up to 100,000 to 200,000 personnel, in rough numbers—similar to the strength needed in the scenario of a collapsing or fracturing Pakistan. For these missions, which are somewhat less urgent missions than those considered in South Asia, U.S. contributions might only be 20-30 percent of the total rather than the 50 percent assumed above. But even so, up to two or three American divisions could be required.

Conclusion

In envisioning several possible scenarios for future planning, it is important to be open minded and imaginative. The United States typically does not accurately predict its next enemy very well, as evidenced by Operation Desert Storm and even more vividly by the recent war in Afghanistan. So it is important not to lapse into rote answers to the question of which war or major stabilization mission the U.S. armed forces may wage next.

This is not to advocate pure “capabilities-based planning,” however. Scenario planning is still needed. The United States needs to develop a rough idea of whom it might fight, where, and over

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what stakes. Capabilities-based planning is fine once the range of plausible scenarios has been at least somewhat narrowed and specified.

Some missions are implausible. A Russian threat to Europe is now in this category, given the demise of Communist ideology and Russia’s need for economic interaction with the West. So is the need for American forces to respond to a possible Chinese threat against Siberia, with all of its open spaces and natural richness. Admittedly, if Russia were to join NATO someday, the United States might theoretically assume an Article V commitment to help guarantee its security against any and all possible threats. On the other hand, NATO is a Europe-oriented organization, not a Siberia-oriented one. Moreover, defending against a hypothetical Chinese overland threat to the Asian landmass is strategically insensible and unnecessary for the United States. Even a Chinese overland threat to Korea seems extremely unlikely and is probably not a sound scenario for force-planning purposes.

A war involving an invasion of Iran, a country of more than 70 million with a complex geography, is a borderline case. It would be extremely challenging militarily, as American analysts apparently concluded after briefly examining the scenario in the mid-1990s, and it would be highly undesirable politically, given how much it could set back pro-Western reformers. The scenario might be seriously contemplated only in a worst case—say, one in which Iran both developed nuclear weapons and encouraged Hezbollah to dramatically escalate terrorist attacks against Israeli and Western interests.

But if some missions are simply not plausible, or barely so, a wide range of them are more thinkable than they might first appear. Given the nature of global terror, as well as the new dangers and continued spread of weapons of mass destruction, the United States may find itself in substantial and sustained military operations in places it hardly would have dreamed of going only a short time ago. Several of the above scenarios would require significant numbers of ground forces, though probably not more than are in the American military today.

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Facing the Challenge: The U.S. Army in Asia

Not long ago it was common to cite the fact that there had been three wars in Asia within a generation—World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Today there are no major conflicts in the Pacific Command Area of Operations (AOR), and have been none since the 1970s. On the other hand, there have been two such conflicts in the Central Command AOR, with a third definitely possible within this generation. What does this mean for the U.S. Army in Asia? Does it mean that Asia has become a backwater for the U.S. Army? Is the U.S. Army able to perform its role in meeting U.S. national commitments in the region? How does its current transformation affect its ability to do so? Does Army organization, strategy, and planning adequately address the changing strategic landscape in Asia? What legacies of past Army wars in Asia are important to current and future operations?

The comments that follow are not intended to provide a comprehensive answer to all these questions, but rather to shed some light on them in terms of ideas stimulated by the Eisenhower Conference on the United States Army in Asia. It addresses these questions from three viewpoints. The first looks at the major changes affecting the U.S. Army role in Asia, particularly (a) heightened U.S. global commitments, (b) major transformation of the Army itself, and (c) significant strategic change in Asia. The second addresses U.S. policy and the relationship between its ends and the means by which it will meet those ends; and the third focuses on lessons of the successful Philippine counterinsurgency campaign.

Heightened global commitments: GWOT, Iraq, Afghanistan

It is easy to postulate that the U.S. Army in Asia is overstretched. The million-man North Korean Army is equipped with 20,000 armored vehicles and artillery pieces, some 80 percent of which are within 100 kilometers of the DMZ. Thus, the 2d Division in Korea faces a dangerous adversary at a time when one of its two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) is conducting combat operations in Iraq with little likelihood of returning to Korea. Moreover, one of the two BCTs of the 25th Division in Hawaii, which has a mission to reinforce the 2d Division in case of war in Korea, is also in Iraq, and another likely reinforcing force, the 172d BCT in Alaska, is scheduled for duty in Iraq in the coming months. Other Army units likely to be tapped for reinforcement of Korea or other locations in Asia during a crisis or war are also committed to Iraq or Afghanistan. Whether one agrees with critics who claim that the number and strength of U.S. Army units considered in a position to reinforce the 2d Division in Korea are insufficient, fighting and winning a war in Korea clearly remains the greatest challenge for the U.S. Army in Asia.

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author, and are not intended to represent those of the CNA Corporation.
Another challenge for the U.S. Army in Asia is meeting the requirements of the global war on terror in the Asia-Pacific region itself. It is well known that the U.S. Army has deployed several hundred highly trained soldiers to the Philippines, where they conduct training and operations much like those their predecessors in the U.S. Army did there 100 years ago. This could turn out to be a long-term commitment. Long-term GWOT requirements are likely in other areas of the PACOM AOR as well. For example, indications are that the United States will soon reestablish military-to-military relations with Indonesia, a country where Jemaah Islamiya (JI) poses security problems. Although not considered a part of Al Qaeda (AQ), JI has links with that organization and could evolve into a regional threat to U.S. interests.

Compounding the challenge to the U.S. Army’s ability to meet Asia-Pacific requirements, and those in other areas of the world as well, is the fear that it may not be able to sustain its present OPTEMPO without significant problems of retention and wear-and-tear on equipment. While the Army is not “hollow,” these considerations nevertheless point to a degradation of readiness that could last a long time—particularly if, as has been the case so often, the Army budget is cut as soon as major combat operations cease.

A contrary view is that the U.S. Army can handle Korea or any other requirement that can reasonably be postulated in the Asia-Pacific region. War in Korea, after all, is the only scenario in which a division-sized force or larger could reasonably be expected to fight. Moreover, the U.S. Army is continuing to develop and maintain the ability to swiftly reinforce Korea with units, mostly from the United States. These forces would not be in country quickly enough to blunt an initial attack, but would enable combined U.S. and ROK forces to limit deep penetrations by North Korea and to conduct a robust counterattack. For example, if a third of all Army BCTs were in a condition of readiness to deploy rapidly, this would constitute a powerful punch. The challenge for the Army is to ensure that such a state of readiness exists, including sufficient airlift, rail, and sealift, as the alternative could well be the need to conduct a major counteroffensive at a tremendous disadvantage.

It is difficult to conceive other scenarios in Asia that might involve forces of division-size or higher. It is highly unlikely such forces would be needed Southeast Asia, and certainly will not be needed in China. It is possible to speculate about conflict between Russia and China, or temporary Chinese intervention in a collapsing North Korea, but these are unlikely to justify a U.S. military response.

Korea thus continues to be the major challenge for the U.S. Army in Asia. Even in Korea, however, the military balance has shifted in favor of the South. The ROK Army is now over 500,000 strong, and is modernized well beyond the level of the North Korean Army. U.S. air and naval forces can bring terrific pressure on any invading force, so that U.S. ground forces might be challenged more by the need to root out North Korean Special Forces and underground installations, possibly with weapons of mass destruction, than by requirements to stop a massive assault. Moreover, U.S. Army ability to reinforce Korea may be on the rise. Army plans call for the addition of at least two BCTs to both the 25th Division and the 2d Division, which, together with other force increases, will add considerable strength to Pacific-oriented forces. In addition, the whole concept of aligning forces geographically is changing, so that any CONUS-based unit may be called upon to augment U.S. forces in a Korean scenario. The bottom line is that while
the Army appears to be in a position to successfully reinforce Korea, its ability to do so expeditiously depends on current changes in force structure and posture. This line of discourse leads directly to the second major transition that affects the Army’s ability to perform its missions in the Asia-Pacific region—the transformation of the force.

**Transformation of the force**

The current restructuring of U.S. Army units of action (UAs) and units of employment (UEs) includes the concept that either forward-deployed or forward-deploying UEs can serve as the commander or the land force component of a Joint Mission Force. The UAs would generally locate in the Continental United States (CONUS), configured as expeditionary forces capable of deploying to any area of the world. The concept envisions that these UAs could then plug in as modules to any scenario in Asia.

A characteristic of modularity is that it favors the rotation of UAs into a theater of operations, thereby enhancing unit cohesion and possibly reducing the length of a soldier’s unaccompanied tour of duty. This is particularly important for Korea, which is traditionally a 12- or 13-month tour without family, with individual replacements having sustained the force. However, should the rotation fall below a long-term 1:2 ratio of unaccompanied-to-accompanied assignments, this advantage could be eradicated, and even at 1:2 is likely to pose personnel problems. There is also some concern that rotating UAs might undermine the esprit traditionally associated with unit identification, but this appears more than offset by the advantages of both unit cohesion in the short term and individual retention in the long term. Led by the many combat-experienced officers and non-commissioned officers in today’s Army, the type of units envisioned could pose a formidable combat-ready force in the coming years.

The modularity concept raises some military concerns, however. The first is the question of whether there will be sufficient ready UAs to deploy in crisis or war, in this case to Korea or elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region. The plan to increase the number of Regular Army BCTs from 33 to 43, plus 33 in the National Guard, seems to provide a definitive answer to that question, particularly in peacetime, but the plan remains subject to the vagaries of recruitment and retention, particularly without a draft during time of war. For example, with some 18 BCTs currently committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and most of the rest either returning from or preparing to return to those combat zones, the Army in a Korean scenario would have to make some tough decisions in order to implement the strategic goal of being able to defeat two adversaries while winning decisively against one of them.

The second issue is the speed with which CONUS-based UAs can move “to the sound of the guns” in an Asian scenario. Serious doubts exist as to whether airlift, both now and in the foreseeable future, can carry armored vehicles and other equipment in sufficient numbers to meet a threat on the Korean peninsula. Also, access to airfields might be impaired. Under the modularity/unit rotation concept, sealift thus becomes even more crucial for the successful introduction and sustainment of Army units, particularly in a Korean contingency. Sustainment of the force in Iraq has been overwhelmingly by sea, and, given the tyranny of distance in the Asia-Pacific AOR, the challenge of deploying and logistically supporting UAs in the PACOM AOR merits close examination.
Third, there is the issue of whether all expeditionary forces need to be configured to fit every potential contingency, since each contingency is unique. One can never be sure of where and how future threats might develop, so the Army’s answer of configuring the force into modules that would fit any contingency makes some sense. However, an equal if not more compelling case can be made that some units should focus more heavily than others on stability operations—particularly on those daunting tasks the Army has had to relearn in Iraq of simultaneously conducting humanitarian operations, facilitating the establishment of a legitimate government, and training indigenous forces. There appears to be a tendency in the Army to relegate these tasks to Special Forces personnel, who, although well qualified, do not exist in sufficient number to perform the multitude of tasks associated with stability operations. As was the case 100 years ago during the insurgency in the Philippines, every soldier performing counter-insurgent/occupation duty must also be a civic action soldier.

Finally, there is a question as to the purpose and role of expeditionary forces in terms of the national interest and the direction of American foreign policy. The idea of U.S. forces configured to deploy anywhere in the world on relatively short notice evokes the specter of imperial forces, whose role in Asia might well be taken as proof of American hegemony. Just as U.S. forces stationed in Europe are not there to defend Europe any longer, and may be pulled back to CONUS, so questions about the purpose of U.S. ground forces in Asia, particularly Japan and Korea, naturally arise. Are they there to protect their host country, or for other regional or global missions with which that country may not agree? This question leads to the third change that impacts the future roles, missions, and organization of the U.S. Army—strategic change in Asia.

**Strategic change in Asia: understanding the web vs. bilateral relationships only**

The end of the Cold War removed much of the certitude that characterized the military balance in Asia, replacing it with an intricate web of political, military, and economic relationships that tend to defy both bureaucracies concerned with bilateral relations and military planners concerned with operational requirements. To get it right, it is necessary to envision the new Asia as a web in which any action the U.S. Army takes in one area will necessarily affect the interests of the United States and possible Army missions elsewhere in the region. Nowhere is this more important than in our relationship with China.

**China**

The end of the Cold War removed the single greatest driving force in the U.S.-China rapprochement—concern about Soviet aggression. The economic bond, however, grew at a rapid pace so that today China depends heavily on foreign investment, markets, and resources for its modernization and internal stability. China therefore shares with the United States a strong interest in global and regional stability. This fact is significant to the U.S. Army in Asia to the extent that the Army contributes to that stability by its forward presence in Korea and Japan, and by its contribution to the GWOT.
Beijing does not like the idea of American troops in nearby Korea, but recognizes that the U.S. Army presence there helps deter North Korea from a reckless attack on the South. If Korea were to become unified, Beijing would likely seek to have that presence terminated. During a process of unification, such as might occur if North Korea imploded, Beijing could dispatch “peacekeeping” troops into the northern portion of the country with the real purpose of acting as a bargaining chip for complete foreign military withdrawal from the peninsula. However, Chinese forces, like U.S. forces, would have to leave the country if told to do so by the government of a united Korea. It is thus crucial for the U.S. Army to develop close and continuous ties with its South Korean counterparts and government authorities, which may have to make the decision on whether to retain a U.S. military presence in a unified Korea. In addition, the Army needs to configure its presence in a way that does not stimulate a strong “Yankee go home” sentiment among the South Korean population. A continuous U.S. Army presence is very important politically, not only to deter the North but also to act as a counterweight in the security realm to the ROK’s increasing ties to China.

Taiwan, the other potential zone of major combat in East Asia, also involves China. As demonstrated in 1995 and 1996, the U.S. Navy would have major responsibilities in a Taiwan crisis. However, the U.S. Air Force might play an even greater role, as it is capable of delivering a huge amount of ordnance from regional airfields. Although the U.S. Army would play less of a role than its sister services, it could nevertheless contribute in at least two areas. The first is a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). There are 70,000 U.S. citizens in Taiwan, and the Army might be called upon to help protect and/or evacuate them. The second is the protection of airfields from which USAF fighters may launch. For example, facilitating the transition to PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles in Japan could be part of that effort. This raises the issue of Japan’s place in the web of relationships in Northeast Asia.

Japan

Japan has been the cornerstone of U.S. strategy in the Western Pacific, and will continue to be so into the foreseeable future. Like the Philippines during the first half of the 20th century, it is a forward location from which U.S. forces can project power not only in the immediate vicinity but also throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

There is a strong political rationale for a U.S. Army presence in Japan. First, U.S. Army elements stationed in Japan do not routinely deploy to other areas in the Asia-Pacific region, as do USN, USMC, and to a lesser extent, USAF assets. Thus, their presence is seen as more permanent and is identified more specifically with the defense of Japan. They also provide a link to Ground Self-Defense Forces, whose contacts with the United States are minimal, and can thereby help influence an important component of Japan’s military in time of crisis.

Second, the U.S. Army presence in Japan, along with that of the other services, may contribute to China’s perception that Japan is unlikely to develop offensive or nuclear forces. Given the intensity of what may be the most contentious issue in Asia this century—Sino-Japanese rivalry—this perception is important to the long-term stability of Northeast Asia. Moreover, by contributing to the defense of Japan, the Army can help deter aggressive moves on the part of China or North Korea. In this regard, it is important for the United States to continue to work with Japan to clarify mutual obligations and expectations in both Korean and Taiwan scenarios.
Given the importance of personal relations in Asia, rapport between senior Army generals and Japanese leaders could help smooth Japanese decision making in such cases.

Third, as part of the U.S. military presence in Japan, the Army helps ameliorate some of South Korea’s concerns regarding the direction of Japanese foreign and defense policy, including its intentions regarding the disputed island of Tokdo (Takeshima). South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s recent salvo regarding Japanese textbooks and claims to Tokdo is indicative of Korea’s deep underlying resentment of Japan, and reflects an element of Korean support for China’s effort to gain the moral high ground by focusing on historic issues in its bid for regional influence. While U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) may temper such heated exchanges only at the margin, their presence in Japan at least provides justification for cooler heads to think twice about turning well-cultivated nationalism into military action.

In summary, a U.S. Army presence in Japan is crucial to the network of security relationships that characterize Northeast Asia. The nature of that presence is open to debate: some call for a BCT in Hokkaido, while plans move forward for the relocation of I Corps to Camp Zama, outside Tokyo. The Hokkaido idea has military merit, but does not currently pass the political feasibility test in Japan. The Government of Japan, however, is allowing I Corps to relocate over the objection of some in the local community. (The fact that the move involves headquarters staff—and not GIs, whom the Japanese associate with some unfortunate past incidents in Okinawa—has helped gain this acceptance.) Finally, it is important to note that U.S. Forces in Japan receive upward of $4 billion annually in Japanese host nation support; thus, it is economical for the U.S. Army to maintain a forward presence in Japan.

Korea

Korea is the third focal point in Northeast Asia. The U.S. Army’s presence there is advantageous to the United States for several reasons: First, it will be a factor in Chinese calculations in any scenario. Second, the Army’s presence in South Korea is important to the vital U.S. presence in Japan, because it keeps Japan from being “the nail that sticks out” as the only country in Asia hosting significant U.S. forces. Third, South Korean host nation support is meaningful in sustaining U.S forward-deployed forces. Finally and most importantly, the U.S. Army in Korea has a proven deterrent value against North Korean aggression—a value that is would be degraded if it ceased being a real fighting force and became only a trip wire.

It is thus crucial that the rotating BCT be fully manned and equipped, highly trained, and supported with joint force assets. Such a force makes a statement about U.S. intent to defend South Korea. An infrequent but necessary corollary is the need to demonstrate to Northeast Asian audiences (South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan) the ability of the U.S. Army to reinforce that BCT, so that these audiences more clearly understand U.S. resolve, especially in the face of a nuclear-armed North Korea. In this regard, it would be useful to have a period of overlap when rotating BCTs, and to preposition equipment for insertion of another BCT.

Finally, plans to maintain high-level U.S. Army units of employment (UEs) in Korea have political advantages. Because UEs are able to interact with their Korean counterparts and government officials, they provide the key element of stability and continuity needed to gain and maintain South Koreans’ confidence in their country’s defense relationship with the United
States. They may also interact with their counterparts in Japan to help facilitate trilateral cooperation between the forces of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. To assure continuity, as well as long-term retention of expertise, UE commanders and staff should serve accompanied tours of several years’ duration.

Southeast, South, and Central Asia

The President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), was the last Indonesian officer to graduate from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A reform-minded leader untainted with the atrocities associated with East Timor, SBY illustrates the value of defense exchanges with Indonesia, including full International Military Education and Training (IMET). A nation of 240 million people, Indonesia has been the scene recently of terrorist bombings in Bali and Djakarta. The vast majority of people are Muslims: more than 60 million people belong to one of two moderate mass Muslim organizations. Still, the activities of Jemaah Islamiya during the past ten years pose potential problems for the future. For example, JI or other extremist terrorist organizations could set up training sites among Indonesia’s 17,000 islands, threaten freedom of navigation in the crucial Strait of Malacca, pose a terrorist threat to Singapore, and terrorize U.S. citizens and destroy property in Southeast Asia.

The U.S. Army could well be called upon to respond to any such terrorist activity in or around Indonesia. The idea of responding unilaterally with large forces is unrealistic. Djakarta has repeatedly denied U.S. military access to Indonesia that it believes conflicts with its sovereignty—most recently regarding U.S. maritime patrols in the Strait of Malacca. To respond to the aforementioned type of threats, therefore, the U.S. Army needs to establish personnel, intelligence, and training relationships with the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) that will both enable the TNI to respond appropriately to the threat, and allow small U.S. Army elements to accompany or communicate with the TNI in operations against high-value international terrorist targets. Like most other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia is willing to work with the U.S. Army, but only in a quiet manner that will not be seen as infringing upon its sovereignty.

Other ideas for the U.S. Army to consider in Southeast Asia include rotating small units (company size or less) into training programs at the jungle warfare school in Malaysia; establishing an Army regional command to direct GWOT activities, possibly in the Philippines; and planning for rapid deployment of humanitarian affairs and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations anywhere in the region—especially the countries chronically hit by typhoons—the Philippines and Vietnam—and the areas hit by the recent tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

India is a special case. Its army is fully prepared to deal with Pakistan in a conventional conflict, and the threat of a nuclear exchange inhibits both sides from pushing the envelope too far. Although relations with China have improved in recent years, New Delhi remains concerned about Chinese occupation of some of its border territory, and is concerned about the extent of Chinese military modernization. India is also proudly independent, and was disappointed by the U.S. choice of Pakistan rather than India for support operations during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Under these circumstances, U.S. Army interaction with India has been limited to small-scale training and exercises. This is not necessarily bad, as the United States continues to need the
cooperation of Pakistan in rooting out al Qaeda operatives, and the Indian Army is quite capable of handling its own security missions. Larger-scale exercises may be desirable, but depend upon the political climate in both India and Pakistan. Like in Southeast Asia, high-level exchanges with senior army officers are important politically, as the army is the dominant service in those countries. U.S. Army units should not expect to play any role in Kashmir, unless they do so as part of a multinational force under a United Nations mandate.

The U.S. Army could be called upon, however, to assist in either a stabilization mission or commando-style intervention in Pakistan, with the ultimate purpose of preventing that country’s nuclear weapons from falling into terrorist hands. Such intervention would best be done discreetly in the early stages of any coup attempt or extremist “revolution,” before radical groups gain control of any weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, the U.S. Army presence in Central Asia is likely to remain important for two reasons: First, it provides at least a foothold in a region where the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is becoming an important security venue. (For example, the SCO has sponsored several military exercises involving the first out-of-country deployments of China’s People’s Liberation Army.) Second, it helps counter terrorist activity in the region.

**U.S. policy and Army strategy**

**The ends**

The goals, or “ends,” of U.S. policy in Asia are to promote peace and stability, free trade, and democracy where possible, and to prevent the domination of the region by any power. They have been written and rewritten, sometime in blood, for over a century.

The American occupation of the Philippines left U.S. strategists with the fundamental question of whether the United States is an Asian and Pacific power, with interests throughout the region, or just a Pacific power, whose presence in Asia provided a *cordon sanitaire* for defense of the homeland. This question was never fully resolved, with the result that U.S. forces in the Philippines were inadequate to the task of defending against the might of the Rising Sun in 1941 (although tactically Filipino scouts and the U.S. Army garrison outnumbered General Homma’s invading troops). Likewise, the war in Korea can in no small sense be attributed to U.S. ambivalence regarding its position in Asia: pre-war statements, by both Secretary of State Dean Acheson and General Douglas MacArthur, that Korea lies outside the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia, were set aside as the United States rushed to the defense of South Korea. Finally, in Vietnam, the U.S. Army, remembering the Chinese intervention in Korea, never crossed the 50-yard line, with predictable results.

The legacy of Vietnam has a profound influence upon the roles and missions of the U.S. Army in Asia today. The first principle reflects the advice General MacArthur gave to President John Kennedy in 1961, that the United States should not get involved in a land war on the mainland of Asia. The second principle reflects the Guam Doctrine promulgated by President Richard Nixon in 1969, which stated that the United States could assist allied or friendly nations in Asia to defend themselves, but that they would have to bear the principal responsibility for their own
defense. These principles still guide U.S. foreign and defense policy in Asia, and make it clear that, as in the past, direct U.S. Army involvement in the region is likely to be limited to the periphery of Asia, and that assisting Asian nations with their own security will be an important mission.

The means

With regard to a U.S. Army role on the periphery rather than the mainland of Asia, the means employed by the United States to achieve its objectives have included efforts to maintain an equilibrium of power in Asia—first in an active response to perceived expansion of the Sino-Soviet empire (Korea and Vietnam); then in quasi-alliance with a relatively weak China to contain the Soviet empire; and presently in deterring aggression in Korea and the Taiwan Strait. U.S. forces today support diplomatic efforts to negotiate with North Korea, and to ease China toward peaceful means through economic and political integration into the global economic and legal system. In supporting this strategy the U.S. Army may be acting on the periphery of Asia, but it is a very important periphery because it is essential to the stability required for continued peace and prosperity of the region, and, in this age of globalization, of the United States as well.

With regard to helping Asian nations defend themselves, the U.S. Army has a special role in security cooperation with friends and allies. Army security cooperation is important, not only because most Asian armies dominate their countries’ militaries, but also because the fact that the U.S. Army is not over the horizon lends a degree of permanence to U.S. military presence in countries concerned about a perceived American withdrawal from the region. Nowhere is this more obvious than in Korea, where years of patient work by the Military Assistance Advisory Group and others helped develop an ROK Army capable of bearing the brunt of fighting in any North Korean attack. In a mode that is similar but of lesser scope, U.S. Army cooperation with the Philippines Armed Forces has helped put the Abu Sayef on the defensive, and training of Japanese Special Operations Forces helps develop their capabilities to handle terrorists or North Korean intruders.

U.S. Army security cooperation can also benefit the United States. At a time when favorable foreign views of the United States have been in decline, security cooperation is particularly helpful if it is seen as helping local communities, as was clearly shown by the marked improvement in Indonesia’s view of the United States in the wake of tsunami relief operations. The fact that these operations were largely done by other services highlights a deficiency in U.S. Army capabilities during a time when, unlike its sister services, it is fully engaged in war. Over the long term, however, the U.S. Army’s ability to rapidly conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in places such as Indonesia (with all its earthquakes), and Vietnam (with its devastating monsoons) can create needed goodwill toward the United States.

Security cooperation offers potential benefits for the U.S. Army as well. Working with Malaysia might enhance the prospects of its cooperation in Muslim areas of the world when needed. Malaysia’s counterterrorist forces are well trained, and its army is disciplined, as was demonstrated when a Malaysian relief battalion fought its way to the Bokara Market in 1993. Moreover, Malaysia maintains an excellent jungle warfare school that might be available for U.S. Army units of company size or smaller. Cooperation with India might also reap benefits, not only because of India’s joining peacekeeping operations under UN auspices, but also because
it can provide high-altitude training for Army units. Further cooperation with the Philippines could result in U.S. Army centers for logistics or command and control. By cooperating with their governments, the U.S. Army can help these and other Asian nations improve their national security posture, while building lasting personal relationships that could prove valuable in terms of intelligence, access, or logistics in any future crisis. Finally, security cooperation enables the U.S. Army not only to better understand the operating environment, but also to shape that environment by leveraging indigenous forces to serve mutual security objectives. Recognizing the importance of this in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as many other potential stability operations that may occur in the GWOT, the Army could do worse than review the history of its long and successful counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines 100 years ago.

Lessons of the Philippine insurgency

During the period 1899 to 1912, the U.S. Army fought and won a major campaign in the occupation and pacification of the Philippines. If Korea can be called the forgotten war, then the Philippine campaign might be called a war that never happened, swept into the dustbins of non-important history. However, as can be seen in the presentation by Dr. Brian Linn, it was a war more closely related to current Army pacification efforts than even Vietnam. The following is a brief review of 10 lessons learned and unlearned in the Philippines that appear applicable today:

1. **Successful counterinsurgency requires understanding the insurgents.** Insurgents in the Philippines, like those in Iraq, were a diverse lot. Unlike guerillas or the People’s Army troops in Vietnam, they had no central organization or driving ideology. They included gangs, brigands, warlords, opportunists, individuals with local grievances, religious sects, peasant/agrarian movements upset about changes in land use, and a few nationalists—all with different motivations.

2. **Good police work is essential to success.** Especially after 1902, insurgent activity in the Philippines could be characterized as disorganized crime and communal violence. U.S. Army officers led the constabulary, but they were often outgunned, and had to appropriate Filipino scouts. The Army needs more military police, and needs to learn more about police methods.

3. **A successful counterinsurgency campaign must deal effectively with local issues.** All politics is local. A military leader on the spot is the best agent for pacification. Severing insurgents from their local base areas removes them from the “friendly sea.” Every soldier needs to engage in civil affairs. Civic action both helps deprive insurgents of local support, and enables the CI force to gain intelligence by knowing local conditions and establishing contacts.

4. **A balance of coercion and conciliation is required.** Punitive operations often set back pacification, and in-and-out operations rarely yield lasting results.

5. **Small units win counterinsurgency wars.** They cover wider areas, have more opportunities to gain local rapport, and are more likely to develop unit cohesion.
Insurgents will try to attack in large enough numbers to compel small units to consolidate in fixed positions, thereby reducing their contact with the local population.

6. **Ideally political stability should precede pacification operations**, but often must be developed simultaneously with combat operations. Done right, one reinforces the other.

7. **The organizing, training, and equipping of indigenous forces is a prerequisite to success.** This requires U.S. Army leaders who both understand pacification and have served in combat long enough to apply that knowledge. Since CI is manpower intensive and of long duration, only indigenous forces can truly win an insurgent war. As President Kennedy said of Vietnam five days before his death, “In the final analysis, it is their war, the Vietnamese alone against the Communists.” This has real implications for professional/career tracking in the armed forces. As long as advisory duty is looked on (and is) detrimental to a career in the “real Army” there will be problems. The pattern was different in the Philippines, where advisory service was a path to promotion (Pershing, J. F. Bell, etc.)

8. **Extending tours for select leadership is essential to victory.** Long-term relationships build personal loyalties—which, for most individuals, determine political or social alignment during an insurgency.

9. **Both professional military education and mission training are essential to successful CI operations.** The U.S. Army forgot CI after the Philippines insurgency, and again after Vietnam. Before soldiers are deployed to the combat zone, the Army owes them mission training by CI experts who have combat experience in pacification.

10. **The political nature of counterinsurgency campaigns demands a clear message of Army purpose.** A well-considered public relations campaign needs to articulate that message to indigenous, U.S., and international audiences.

**Conclusion**

U.S. global interests dictate a definitive answer to the question of whether the United States is an Asian and Pacific power, or just a Pacific power. The U.S. Army posture in the region will have to support that answer, in terms of both forward presence and readiness to deploy units of action in a timely manner into the AOR, particularly to Korea. The Army must be able to do this at a time of heightened global commitments, its own major transformation, and significant strategic change in the region. History shows that in the past the Army has successfully met the challenge of supporting U.S. interests in Asia, but has all too often forgotten the lessons of past wars, particularly regarding pacification. The Army’s role today, as it has been in the past, is largely confined to the periphery of Asia, but it is a periphery vital to peace and stability of a dynamic and increasingly important part of the world. For this reason, as well as the impact of Army actions on the complex interrelationships between Asian states, further reductions of the force in Asia would be risky. The expeditionary forces characterizing the new Army require stable units of employment in Asia, joint training, and sufficient airlift and sealift for rapid unit rotation or
reinforcement. Security cooperation with Asian friends underpins confidence in U.S. staying power in Asia, and could prove essential for future access, intelligence, and logistical support.
Appendix: Speaker biographies

REGINALD J. BROWN recently retired as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, where he oversaw the mobilization of over 300,000 Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers for the current war. Previously, he served in the U.S. Agency for International Development as Assistant Administrator, Near East. He was also the Executive Director of a Presidential Commission on Military Compensation, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an instructor of economics and government at West Point. As an infantry officer, he served two tours of duty in Asia. Mr. Brown is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and has a Masters in Public Administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

BRIAN McALLISTER LINN is a professor in the Department of History at Texas A&M University. He is currently a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, where he is writing a book on the American way of war. He is the author of three books, including Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940, and The Philippine War, 1899-1902, both of which received the Society for Military History’s Distinguished Book Award. He has also written book chapters and articles, and has won the Moncado Prize twice. He has been an Olin Fellow at Yale University, the Harold K. Johnson Professor at the Army War College, and a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellow. He graduated from the University of Hawaii and has a Ph.D. from the Ohio State University.

CONRAD C. CRANE is the Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute. Previously, he served with the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, where he held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research. He joined SSI after his retirement from a 26-year military career, which concluded with 9 years as professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy. He has written or edited books and monographs on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, and has written and lectured widely on airpower and landpower issues. Before leaving SSI he coauthored a prewar study on reconstructing Iraq that influenced Army planners and has attracted much attention from the media. He has a B.S. from USMA, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM E. ODOM, U.S. Army (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute's Washington, DC, office. He is also an adjunct professor at Berkeley College, Yale University, and a visiting professor at Georgetown University. He has served as Director of the National Security Agency; Assistant Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs; and National Security Council staff member for strategic planning, Soviet affairs, nuclear weapons policy, telecommunications policy, and Persian Gulf security issues. He is a frequent radio and television commentator, and has written numerous books and articles. His most recent book is America’s Inadvertent Empire, co-authored with Robert Dujarric. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and has a Ph.D. from Columbia University.

ANDREW FEICKERT is a Congressional Research Service specialist in national defense, with a focus on missile proliferation, U.S. Army transformation, military operations in the global war
on terror, and Special Operations Forces. Previously, he was a senior weapons of mass destruction research analyst for the Center for Army Analysis. His 20-year Army career included command of a Special Forces "A" Detachment and service in Bosnia during the conflict as the NATO liaison officer to the United Nations Protection Force in Sarajevo. As a CRS national defense specialist, he has testified to Congress on the growing cruise missile and unmanned aerial vehicle threat, and written a number of studies on country-specific missile capabilities, man-portable air defense missile terrorist threats, U.S. Army modularization, the FCS program, and special operations forces. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and has M.S. degrees from Florida and Virginia Tech.

LARRY M. WORTZEL retired from the Army in 1999, as a colonel with 32 years of service. Since then, he has been a policy expert on Asia and national security at The Heritage Foundation. His military career began with seven years as an infantryman: three in the Marine Corps, and—after Army OCS, airborne school, and Ranger school—another four as an Army infantry officer. He then went into the intelligence field. He has been a signals intelligence collector, has gathered human intelligence, and has spent four years in counterintelligence. He has served as a strategist for the Army, as a military attaché in China, and as Director of the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College. He has written two books on China, and has edited and contributed to five books on the Chinese military. He has a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Hawaii.

MICHAEL O‘HANLON is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, specializing in U.S. national security issues. His particular areas of research include defense technology, strategy, and budgeting; Iraq policy; Northeast Asian security; and homeland security. He has taught at Princeton, Columbia, and Georgetown universities in recent years. Before joining Brookings in 1994, he served for five years in the Congressional Budget Office. After receiving his bachelor's degree in physics in 1982, he spent two years in Congo (then Zaire) in the Peace Corps. He has a Ph.D. from Princeton in public policy.

THOMAS DONNELLY is a Resident Fellow in defense and security policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He is the author of Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment (AEI Press, 2004), AEI's monthly National Security Outlook, and a forthcoming study, The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine (AEI Press, 2005). In February 2005, he was appointed by Senator Bill Frist to a two-year term on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Before coming to AEI, he served was the Director of Strategic Communications and Initiatives at Lockheed Martin, and Deputy Executive Director of the Project for the New American Century. Previously, he was the Policy Group Director, as well as a professional staff member, for the Committee on National Security (now the Committee on Armed Services) in the U.S. House of Representatives. He has also been the executive director of The National Interest, editor of the Army Times, and deputy editor of Defense News. He has a master’s degree from Johns Hopkins Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

JOHN HANLEY is Deputy Director of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He recently served as Assistant Director for Risk Management at the Office of Force Transformation. From 1999 to 2002, he was a Special Assistant to USCINCPAC. From 1985 to 1998, he was Deputy Director of the Chief of Naval Operations
Strategic Studies Group in Newport, Rhode Island. He served a total of 28 years of active and reserve duty as Navy submarine officer. He has A.B. and M.S. degrees from Dartmouth in engineering science, and a Ph.D. from Yale in operations research and management science.

JAMES CARAFANO is a scholar at The Heritage Foundation, specializing in defense transformation, military operations and strategy, and homeland security. A historian and teacher, he was an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy, and Director of Military Studies at the Army's Center of Military History. He also taught military and diplomatic history at Georgetown University and Mount Saint Mary College, served as a fleet professor at the U.S. Naval War College, and was a visiting professor at the National Defense University. A frequent commentator for major news organizations, he is the coauthor of Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom, and the author of Waltzing Into the Cold War, After D-Day, and the forthcoming book Homeland Security. During his 25-year Army career, Dr. Carafano served in Europe, Korea, and the United States. He was the executive editor of Joint Force Quarterly, and the head speechwriter for the Army Chief of Staff. A graduate of West Point, he has a master's degree and a doctorate from Georgetown University, and a master's degree in strategy from the U.S. Army War College.

HENRY J. KENNY is a senior analyst and studies director at the Center for Naval Analyses, where he has directed projects for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and the Pacific Command for the past ten years. A company commander and Special Forces commander in Vietnam, Dr. Kenny was wounded during the Tet Offensive of 1968. He subsequently taught international relations at West Point; graduate courses on causes of war and theories of conflict resolution at American University and George Washington University; and international politics at the Institute for International Relations in Hanoi. He has served with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the American Embassy Tokyo (Special Assistant to Mike Mansfield), and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His publications include Unfinished business in Afghanistan; Smaller, faster, smarter: retooling the military to combat terrorist threats; and The American Role in Vietnam and East Asia. His latest book, Shadow of the Dragon, analyzes the relationship between China and Vietnam, and its implications for U.S. policy in Asia. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he has a M.B.A. from Marymount University and a Ph.D. in international relations from American University.