Research for World War II

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April 1, 1997
During this century the United States has used naval mines both effectively and ineffectively. Naval mines first evolved as a weapon during the Revolutionary War. The United States employed them during both World Wars, most notably the North Sea Barrage in WWI and Operations Starvation in WWII. In such 'go-for-bust' global wars against peer unified rivals, naval mines significantly shaped events. The Cold war brought a different type of warfare. This report provides information about naval mines and U.S. mining operations in the Revolutionary War, Civil War, WWI, WWII, the Korean War, Vietnam, Nicaragua and the Persian Gulf War.
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May 1, 1995

One issue the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Services (CORM) is examining is the appropriate mix of Army and Marine corps capabilities for forcible entry. This research memorandum briefly examines the United States' use of military forces for forcible entry, sustained land operations, and sustained land combat since the Second World War. In terms of forcible-entry capabilities, it not only examines cases of forcible entry involving combat, but also highlights some non-combat and contingency-response uses of forcible-entry capabilities.

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September 1, 1994

The Naval Doctrine Command asked the Center for Naval Analyses to examine the command and control doctrine and practice of U.S. naval forces. The purpose of this effort is to help the Command (1) refine naval doctrine and (2) participate more effectively in the development of joint doctrine. CNA's Naval Command and Control for Joint Operations project examines how current Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) and Amphibious Warfare concepts can better integrate with the command and control of joint and combined operations. One of the objectives of this study is to understand how the dynamics that drive command and control for joint and combined operations differ from those that drive the Navy's use of the CWC structure. To do this, we need to examine the following questions: (1) How did our current joint and combined command structures evolve? (2) Why did these structures take the forms that they have? and (3) What are the implications for naval forces? This research memorandum focuses on the origins and evolution of U.S. doctrine for joint, combined, and amphibious warfare. First, we discuss how doctrine developed from the initial U.S. experience at modern coalition warfare in World War I, and then through the development of techniques and doctrine for operations between the wars. Second, we examine how current doctrine arose out of World War II. Finally, we discuss some of the implications for today's naval forces.

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July 1, 1986
This report describes the construction of a new score scale for the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The ASVAB was administered to a nationally representative sample of young adults in the fall of 1980. The test scores for this sample were used to construct the new score scale, called the 1980 ASVAB score scale. On 1 October 1984, the 1980 score scale replaced the World War II scale, used by the Department of Defense (DoD) since 1950. The new score scale provides nationally representative test norms that enable DoD personnel and manpower managers to compare the aptitudes of military recruits with those of the potential supply of recruits in the civilian youth population.
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October 1, 1980
This research contribution consists of a series of eight memoranda originally published by the Statistical Research Group at Columbia University for the National Defense Research Committee in 1943 on methods of estimating the vulnerability of various parts of an aircraft based on damage to surviving planes. The methodology presented continues to be valuable in defense analysis and, therefore, has been reprinted by the Center for Naval Analyses in order to achieve wider dissemination.
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April 1, 1980
This paper examines the small but important role the Azores played in the conduct of WW II. Included is a study of the diplomacy surrounding the Anglo-American acquisition of military bases in the islands.
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April 1, 1975
Examines the experience of the US Navy in countering attacks by Japanese suicide aircraft (Kamikaze) in World War II, and provides an analytical history of the Kamikaze program and develops estimates of the effectiveness of the Kamikaze and of efforts to counter it. Statistics on results in the Philippine and Okinawan Campaigns are used to establish estimates of the effectiveness of defense at various states--attack at the source, defense by interceptors, defense by anti-aircraft guns, and the like. These estimates are used to provide a model of overall effectiveness.
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June 1, 1974
This report on Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) represents a compromise between two major aims, to produce a unified summary of the events and problems of the antisubmarine war on the one hand, and to illustrate the scientific evaluation of naval operations on the other. The approach is fundamentally historical on both accounts.
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June 1, 1974
In World War II, the phrase 'operations research' has come to describe the scientific, quantitative study of operations of war. This report is a first attempt to describe some of the methods which have proved most valuable in the study of warfare, and to indicate possible fruitful lines for further development, military and nonmilitary. The first chapter outlines the scope and methods of the subject. The second chapter discusses the relevant portions of the theory of probability, which is the field of mathematics most useful for this work. The rest of the chapters discuss techniques which have been particularly useful, with illustrations picked from work done in the recent war.
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April 1, 1954
Examination of the War Diary of the German Communication Submarines (ComSubs) has made it possible to estimate the character and extent of intelligence obtained by the decryption of Allied radio messages pertaining to convoy operations in the North Atlantic during World War II, and to determine the effect of such intelligence on the capability of the U-Boats to contact convoys and sink ships. It is estimated that the availability of timely usable decryption intelligence increased the contact rate twofold over that which they would have obtained without it; probably over 60 sinkings in excess of the expected number if they had been deprived of decryption intelligence. These calculations help in estimating a valid measure of effectiveness of current and future submarines in anti-convoy operations when decryption intelligence is not available.
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