Research for USN

This volume of the Desert Storm Reconstruction Report summarizes the reconstruction of the operation of U.S. Navy forces during Operation Desert Storm. Because those forces were so heavily involved in the broader aspects of the war, as well as the preliminary operations during Desert Shield, some aspects of that broader involvement are also treated here. In particular, the Navy's contributions to building the Coalition through its work with the maritime interception force are discussed at length, as are the planning and conduct of Marine Corps amphibious operations. By means of a historical and analytical review, this paper seeks to identify the broader themes that should influence the critical decisions the Navy must take in the coming years of rethinking and retrenching U.S. defense policy and procurements. The paper does not, however, make any attempt to summarize Marine Corps operations ashore. See also 27 910178 thru 27 910190.

This information manual provides a sampling of U.S. Naval humanitarian operations over the past four decades. It was prepared as an adjunct to CNA's work on the history of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps crisis-response activity. This manual should not be viewed as a comprehensive documentation but instead as a highlighting of a few examples of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps humanitarian activity.

This paper investigates the dynamic nature of the Navy's Research and Development (R&D) budget by examining the Navy's budget in the aggregate and by functional activity (i.e., manpower, operation and maintenance, procurement, and research and development). Qualitative conclusions about trends in each functional area are made using constant-dollar plots for the period 1955-88. The percentage of the aggregate Department of the Navy (DON) budget that is allotted to R&D has been remarkably consistent at 10 percent over the last 30 years. A forecast for the R&D budget percentage is made for the next 5 years using statistical techniques. Thus, independent forecasts of the aggregate DON budget can be used to generate alternative R&D budget forecasts.

The Soviet Union might choose to operate a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines in U.S. coastal waters during a war with the United States. The effects of such operations on U.S. public opinion could require the U.S. Navy to redeploy Navy assets away from forward operations to augment coastal defenses. During past conflicts, American military forces have, in fact, been diverted from other missions precisely to counter perceived threats to the Continental United States (CONUS). In some instances, the diversion was driven less by a public outcry for reassuring defensive measures. This paper examines the U.S. experience with threats to CONUS or coastal waters during four wars (the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II). It attempts to place real, present concerns about the public's possible future reaction to Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine operations off the U.S. coasts within a broader historical context.